@node9/policy-engine 2.17.0 → 2.19.0

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -1438,6 +1438,33 @@ interface SsrfFloorOptions {
      *  those constantly (72 of 308 destinations on measured real history). */
     ssrfStrict?: boolean;
 }
+/**
+ * Does this exemption list release this address?
+ *
+ * ONE function, because the shell floor and the declared-URL floor must answer
+ * identically. They had two spellings of it — `normalizeIpLiteral(e) ?? e.trim()
+ * .toLowerCase()` here and `classifySsrf(a)?.normalized ?? a` in
+ * destinations.ts — and for an entry classifySsrf does not match they already
+ * disagreed. Nothing depended on the difference, which is exactly when it is
+ * cheap to remove.
+ *
+ * An entry is an exact address or a CIDR range. The range form exists so an
+ * operator can exempt the mesh-VPN range they actually use (100.64.0.0/10)
+ * instead of listing peers one at a time, which is what the settings panel's
+ * "remove this default" control needs.
+ *
+ * ⚠ This answers "is it in the list", NOT "may it be released". The caller
+ * keeps its `m.overridable` guard, and that guard is per ADDRESS, decided by
+ * classifySsrf before this is consulted. So a range can never release a
+ * protected address inside it: 100.100.100.200 (Alibaba IMDS) sits inside
+ * 100.64.0.0/10 and is named in METADATA_ADDRESSES above the range check, so
+ * it classifies as metadata / overridable:false and stays blocked with the
+ * whole range exempted. Pinned by E2 in exempt-range.spec.ts.
+ *
+ * Never throws: this runs on the hook path for every tool call, and a bad
+ * entry in a hand-edited config must not break every command on the machine.
+ */
+declare function ssrfExemptMatches(entries: readonly string[] | undefined, normalized: string | undefined): boolean;
 /**
  * The floor. Returns the first protected destination, or null.
  *
@@ -1501,4 +1528,4 @@ declare function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName: string, args: unknown, opts?: {
 /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
 declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
 
-export { AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAX_BLAST_PATH, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, checkDangerousSql, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifySsrf, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, dedupeCanonicalFindings, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractCanonicalFindings, extractNetworkTargets, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, hostMatches, isBashTool, isIgnoredTool, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeIpLiteral, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolvePinned, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanInjection, scanText, sensitivePathMatch, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
+export { AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAX_BLAST_PATH, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, checkDangerousSql, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifySsrf, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, dedupeCanonicalFindings, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractCanonicalFindings, extractNetworkTargets, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, hostMatches, isBashTool, isIgnoredTool, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeIpLiteral, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolvePinned, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanInjection, scanText, sensitivePathMatch, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1438,6 +1438,33 @@ interface SsrfFloorOptions {
      *  those constantly (72 of 308 destinations on measured real history). */
     ssrfStrict?: boolean;
 }
+/**
+ * Does this exemption list release this address?
+ *
+ * ONE function, because the shell floor and the declared-URL floor must answer
+ * identically. They had two spellings of it — `normalizeIpLiteral(e) ?? e.trim()
+ * .toLowerCase()` here and `classifySsrf(a)?.normalized ?? a` in
+ * destinations.ts — and for an entry classifySsrf does not match they already
+ * disagreed. Nothing depended on the difference, which is exactly when it is
+ * cheap to remove.
+ *
+ * An entry is an exact address or a CIDR range. The range form exists so an
+ * operator can exempt the mesh-VPN range they actually use (100.64.0.0/10)
+ * instead of listing peers one at a time, which is what the settings panel's
+ * "remove this default" control needs.
+ *
+ * ⚠ This answers "is it in the list", NOT "may it be released". The caller
+ * keeps its `m.overridable` guard, and that guard is per ADDRESS, decided by
+ * classifySsrf before this is consulted. So a range can never release a
+ * protected address inside it: 100.100.100.200 (Alibaba IMDS) sits inside
+ * 100.64.0.0/10 and is named in METADATA_ADDRESSES above the range check, so
+ * it classifies as metadata / overridable:false and stays blocked with the
+ * whole range exempted. Pinned by E2 in exempt-range.spec.ts.
+ *
+ * Never throws: this runs on the hook path for every tool call, and a bad
+ * entry in a hand-edited config must not break every command on the machine.
+ */
+declare function ssrfExemptMatches(entries: readonly string[] | undefined, normalized: string | undefined): boolean;
 /**
  * The floor. Returns the first protected destination, or null.
  *
@@ -1501,4 +1528,4 @@ declare function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName: string, args: unknown, opts?: {
 /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
 declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
 
-export { AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAX_BLAST_PATH, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, checkDangerousSql, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifySsrf, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, dedupeCanonicalFindings, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractCanonicalFindings, extractNetworkTargets, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, hostMatches, isBashTool, isIgnoredTool, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeIpLiteral, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolvePinned, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanInjection, scanText, sensitivePathMatch, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
+export { AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAX_BLAST_PATH, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, checkDangerousSql, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifySsrf, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, dedupeCanonicalFindings, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractCanonicalFindings, extractNetworkTargets, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, hostMatches, isBashTool, isIgnoredTool, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeIpLiteral, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolvePinned, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanInjection, scanText, sensitivePathMatch, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
   scanText: () => scanText,
   sensitivePathMatch: () => sensitivePathMatch,
   ssrfDestinationFloor: () => ssrfDestinationFloor,
+  ssrfExemptMatches: () => ssrfExemptMatches,
   ssrfFloor: () => ssrfFloor,
   ssrfReason: () => ssrfReason,
   stripControlChars: () => stripControlChars,
@@ -3399,6 +3400,38 @@ function classifySsrf(host) {
     return null;
   }
 }
+function ssrfExemptMatches(entries, normalized) {
+  if (!entries?.length || !normalized) return false;
+  const target = bitsOf(normalized);
+  for (const raw of entries) {
+    const entry = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (!entry) continue;
+    const slash = entry.indexOf("/");
+    if (slash === -1) {
+      if ((normalizeIpLiteral(entry) ?? entry) === normalized) return true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!target) continue;
+    const base = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
+    const prefixText = entry.slice(slash + 1);
+    const prefix = /^\d+$/.test(prefixText) ? Number(prefixText) : NaN;
+    if (!base || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
+    // differ, so `0.0.0.0/0` does not release `::1`.
+    base.length !== target.length || prefix > base.length) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (base.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function bitsOf(normalized) {
+  const o = v4Octets(normalized);
+  if (o) {
+    return o.every((n) => Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0 && n <= 255) ? o.map((n) => n.toString(2).padStart(8, "0")).join("") : null;
+  }
+  const g = expandIpv6(normalized);
+  return g ? g.map((n) => n.toString(2).padStart(16, "0")).join("") : null;
+}
 var TIER_REASON = {
   metadata: "a cloud instance-metadata endpoint, the classic credential-theft target",
   "link-local": "a link-local address",
@@ -3408,14 +3441,11 @@ var TIER_REASON = {
   private: "a loopback or private address"
 };
 function ssrfFloor(tokens, opts = {}) {
-  const exempt = new Set(
-    (opts.ssrfAllow ?? []).map((e) => normalizeIpLiteral(e) ?? e.trim().toLowerCase())
-  );
   for (const { token, binary } of tokens) {
     const m = classifySsrf(token);
     if (!m) continue;
     if (isStrictGatedTier(m.tier) && !opts.ssrfStrict) continue;
-    if (m.overridable && m.normalized && exempt.has(m.normalized)) continue;
+    if (m.overridable && ssrfExemptMatches(opts.ssrfAllow, m.normalized)) continue;
     return { ...m, host: token, binary, reason: ssrfReason(m, token) };
   }
   return null;
@@ -3892,7 +3922,6 @@ function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName, args, opts = {}) {
   try {
     const paths = DESTINATION_ARGS.get(bareToolName(toolName));
     if (!paths) return null;
-    const exempt = new Set((opts.ssrfAllow ?? []).map((a) => classifySsrf(a)?.normalized ?? a));
     for (const path of paths) {
       for (const value of valuesAt(args, path)) {
         const host = hostOf(value);
@@ -3900,7 +3929,7 @@ function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName, args, opts = {}) {
         const m = classifySsrf(host);
         if (!m) continue;
         if (isStrictGatedTier(m.tier) && !opts.ssrfStrict) continue;
-        if (m.overridable && m.normalized && exempt.has(m.normalized)) continue;
+        if (m.overridable && ssrfExemptMatches(opts.ssrfAllow, m.normalized)) continue;
         return { ...m, argPath: path, host, reason: ssrfReason(m, host) };
       }
     }
@@ -6169,6 +6198,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
   scanText,
   sensitivePathMatch,
   ssrfDestinationFloor,
+  ssrfExemptMatches,
   ssrfFloor,
   ssrfReason,
   stripControlChars,

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -3258,6 +3258,38 @@ function classifySsrf(host) {
     return null;
   }
 }
+function ssrfExemptMatches(entries, normalized) {
+  if (!entries?.length || !normalized) return false;
+  const target = bitsOf(normalized);
+  for (const raw of entries) {
+    const entry = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (!entry) continue;
+    const slash = entry.indexOf("/");
+    if (slash === -1) {
+      if ((normalizeIpLiteral(entry) ?? entry) === normalized) return true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!target) continue;
+    const base = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
+    const prefixText = entry.slice(slash + 1);
+    const prefix = /^\d+$/.test(prefixText) ? Number(prefixText) : NaN;
+    if (!base || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
+    // differ, so `0.0.0.0/0` does not release `::1`.
+    base.length !== target.length || prefix > base.length) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (base.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function bitsOf(normalized) {
+  const o = v4Octets(normalized);
+  if (o) {
+    return o.every((n) => Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0 && n <= 255) ? o.map((n) => n.toString(2).padStart(8, "0")).join("") : null;
+  }
+  const g = expandIpv6(normalized);
+  return g ? g.map((n) => n.toString(2).padStart(16, "0")).join("") : null;
+}
 var TIER_REASON = {
   metadata: "a cloud instance-metadata endpoint, the classic credential-theft target",
   "link-local": "a link-local address",
@@ -3267,14 +3299,11 @@ var TIER_REASON = {
   private: "a loopback or private address"
 };
 function ssrfFloor(tokens, opts = {}) {
-  const exempt = new Set(
-    (opts.ssrfAllow ?? []).map((e) => normalizeIpLiteral(e) ?? e.trim().toLowerCase())
-  );
   for (const { token, binary } of tokens) {
     const m = classifySsrf(token);
     if (!m) continue;
     if (isStrictGatedTier(m.tier) && !opts.ssrfStrict) continue;
-    if (m.overridable && m.normalized && exempt.has(m.normalized)) continue;
+    if (m.overridable && ssrfExemptMatches(opts.ssrfAllow, m.normalized)) continue;
     return { ...m, host: token, binary, reason: ssrfReason(m, token) };
   }
   return null;
@@ -3751,7 +3780,6 @@ function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName, args, opts = {}) {
   try {
     const paths = DESTINATION_ARGS.get(bareToolName(toolName));
     if (!paths) return null;
-    const exempt = new Set((opts.ssrfAllow ?? []).map((a) => classifySsrf(a)?.normalized ?? a));
     for (const path of paths) {
       for (const value of valuesAt(args, path)) {
         const host = hostOf(value);
@@ -3759,7 +3787,7 @@ function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName, args, opts = {}) {
         const m = classifySsrf(host);
         if (!m) continue;
         if (isStrictGatedTier(m.tier) && !opts.ssrfStrict) continue;
-        if (m.overridable && m.normalized && exempt.has(m.normalized)) continue;
+        if (m.overridable && ssrfExemptMatches(opts.ssrfAllow, m.normalized)) continue;
         return { ...m, argPath: path, host, reason: ssrfReason(m, host) };
       }
     }
@@ -6027,6 +6055,7 @@ export {
   scanText,
   sensitivePathMatch,
   ssrfDestinationFloor,
+  ssrfExemptMatches,
   ssrfFloor,
   ssrfReason,
   stripControlChars,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@node9/policy-engine",
-  "version": "2.17.0",
+  "version": "2.19.0",
   "description": "Shared policy evaluation engine for node9 — DLP, smart rules, AST shell parsing, shields, loop detection. Pure functions, no I/O. Used by both node9-proxy and the node9 SaaS firewall.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "homepage": "https://node9.ai",