@nodatachat/mcp 1.3.22 → 1.3.23

package/README.md

@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ The one-sentence version: **encrypt locally, send, revoke later, prove what happ
 | Say | Tool | What happens |
 |-----|------|--------------|
 | "send this file to …" | `nodata_send` | Encrypts on this machine (post‑quantum hybrid) and returns a `/lock/open/<id>#<key>` link. The key rides in the `#fragment`, which never reaches a server; NoData stores ciphertext only. Expiry (≤ 7 days) and max opens. Filed under your org with a signed receipt + `proof_url`. Preview first. |
+| "set rules for this folder" | `nodata_rules` | The rules board for files and folders on this computer: allowed · ask · clean copy only · not allowed, several per path, with conditions (action read/search/run/write, hour, weekday, file type). Enforced by the read gate on every read, search, command and write. Allowing, or removing a restriction, needs the user's own approval. |
+| "send it view-only" | `nodata_send` with `view_only` | The recipient sees it in the browser with no download, the same dial as Seal Studio's view-only switch. |
+| "send it with a code" | `nodata_send` with `code` | The same link, but it opens only with a code you send on another channel (`code: true` generates `XXXX-XXXX`, or give your own, 8+ characters). The link carries a salt; the key is PBKDF2(code, salt) in the recipient's browser, so a forwarded link alone opens nothing and the code never reaches NoData. Burn from the sending machine. |
 | "send it to <NoData address>" | `nodata_send` with `to` | Over the NoData road instead of a link: sealed here to that computer's key (X25519 sealed box), ciphertext only on the server, only the file's type travels unless `share_filename`. The recipient's plate decides — delivered, waiting for their approval, or refused — and the decision is on both organisations' proof chains before anything moves. Up to 10 MB. Preview first. |
 | "let our partner read the files in this folder" | `nodata_expose` | Access, not copies: a partner's computer may **ask** for files inside a folder you choose (`to`: their NoData addresses, `days`), and this computer answers on the road with the **verified clean copy** of each file asked for (`view: clean`, default) — or the original only if you say `view: original`. The request is sealed (NoData does not learn which file), your plate decides who may ask, and each answer is on both sides' proof chains. `list` shows answered/refused counts; `remove` stops it at once. Asks first. |
 | "what's my address / what arrived / who may reach me" | `nodata_inbox` | `address` (a key made on this computer, `~/.nodata/fabric-key.json`, only its fingerprint leaves), `list` (delivered + waiting, sender as their plate discloses it, never content), `open` (unsealed here into a folder, content not returned), `approve` / `block` a waiting sender, `policy` (open · verified · closed, allow/block lists, require purpose, what senders learn about you). Changes ask first. |