@nockdev/awf 6.2.0

package/.agent/skills/core/security/META.yaml

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+name: security
+version: "6.2.0"
+display: Security Patterns
+category: core
+tier: 1
+priority: 0
+
+desc: "Comprehensive security patterns: OWASP Top 10/API/Mobile, CWE Top 25, binary exploitation, Web3/DeFi, RE protection, 13 language-specific patterns."
+
+triggers:
+  file_patterns: []
+  keywords:
+    - security
+    - vulnerability
+    - owasp
+    - cwe
+    - injection
+    - xss
+    - csrf
+    - auth
+    - encrypt
+    - sanitize
+    - api
+    - mobile
+    - cloud
+    - llm
+    - ai
+    - supply-chain
+    - network
+    - tls
+    - reverse-engineering
+    - solidity
+    - smart-contract
+    - web3
+    - binary
+    - exploitation
+    - buffer-overflow
+    - memory-safety
+  intents:
+    - security audit
+    - vulnerability scan
+    - owasp check
+    - security review
+
+caps:
+  - Security code review
+  - Vulnerability detection
+  - OWASP compliance
+  - Input validation
+  - API security
+  - Mobile security
+  - Cloud security
+  - AI/ML security
+  - Supply chain security
+  - Binary exploitation analysis
+  - Memory safety audit
+  - Web3/DeFi security
+  - Reverse engineering protection
+  - Language-specific patterns
+
+hsa:
+  enabled: true
+  adapter: security_adapter.py
+  functions:
+    - search_security_patterns
+    - get_owasp_patterns
+    - get_cwe_patterns
+    - get_language_patterns
+
+data_files:
+  # Core
+  - data/owasp-top10.yaml
+  - data/cwe-top25.yaml
+  - data/auth-patterns.yaml
+  # Domain-specific
+  - data/network-security.yaml
+  - data/reverse-engineering.yaml
+  - data/mobile-security.yaml
+  - data/api-security.yaml
+  - data/cloud-security.yaml
+  - data/supply-chain.yaml
+  - data/ai-ml-security.yaml
+  - data/binary-exploitation.yaml
+  # Language-specific (13 files)
+  - data/language-specific/c-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/cpp-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/go-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/csharp-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/php-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/solidity-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/python-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/rust-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/java-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/typescript-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/ruby-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/kotlin-security.yaml
+  - data/language-specific/swift-security.yaml

package/.agent/skills/core/security/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: security
+detect: ["always"]
+priority: 0
+version: "6.1.2"
+---
+
+# Security Patterns (Enhanced 2026)
+
+> Comprehensive security skill with 290+ patterns across 14 data files. Covers OWASP Top 10, API Security, Mobile, Cloud, AI/ML, and Supply Chain.
+
+## 📦 Data Files Overview
+
+### Core Security
+
+| File                | Content                               | Records |
+| ------------------- | ------------------------------------- | ------- |
+| `owasp-top10.csv`   | OWASP Top 10:2025 (NEW: Supply Chain) | 10      |
+| `cwe-top25.csv`     | CWE Top 25:2024 (XSS now #1)          | 25      |
+| `auth-patterns.csv` | AuthN/AuthZ patterns                  | 15      |
+
+### Domain-Specific Security
+
+| File                      | Content                               | Records |
+| ------------------------- | ------------------------------------- | ------- |
+| `network-security.csv`    | TLS, DNS, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket    | 25      |
+| `api-security.csv`        | OWASP API Top 10:2023, JWT, OAuth     | 20      |
+| `mobile-security.csv`     | OWASP Mobile Top 10:2024, iOS/Android | 35      |
+| `cloud-security.csv`      | AWS/Azure/GCP, K8s, IaC               | 25      |
+| `supply-chain.csv`        | SLSA, SBOM, Dependency security       | 20      |
+| `ai-ml-security.csv`      | LLM, Prompt Injection, Adversarial    | 20      |
+| `reverse-engineering.csv` | Frida, Xposed, Play Integrity         | 30      |
+
+### Language-Specific
+
+| File                                      | Content              | Records |
+| ----------------------------------------- | -------------------- | ------- |
+| `language-specific/go-security.csv`       | Go-specific patterns | 20      |
+| `language-specific/csharp-security.csv`   | C#/.NET patterns     | 20      |
+| `language-specific/php-security.csv`      | PHP patterns         | 20      |
+| `language-specific/solidity-security.csv` | Smart contracts      | 20      |
+
+**Total: 290+ patterns across 14 files**
+
+---
+
+## �️ Security Tools
+
+| Tool           | Use Case            |
+| -------------- | ------------------- |
+| **Snyk**       | Dependency scanning |
+| **Trivy**      | Container scanning  |
+| **OWASP ZAP**  | DAST                |
+| **SonarQube**  | SAST                |
+| **Semgrep**    | Custom rules        |
+| **Dependabot** | Auto updates        |
+
+---
+
+## OWASP Top 10:2025 Quick Reference
+
+| ID  | Vulnerability             | Severity | Key Fix                     |
+| --- | ------------------------- | -------- | --------------------------- |
+| A01 | Broken Access Control     | CRITICAL | RBAC/ABAC on every endpoint |
+| A02 | Cryptographic Failures    | CRITICAL | bcrypt/argon2, TLS 1.3      |
+| A03 | Injection                 | CRITICAL | Parameterized queries       |
+| A04 | Insecure Design           | HIGH     | Threat modeling             |
+| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | HIGH     | Hardened defaults           |
+| A06 | Vulnerable Components     | HIGH     | SBOM, Dependency scanning   |
+| A07 | Auth Failures             | CRITICAL | MFA, session rotation       |
+| A08 | Integrity Failures        | HIGH     | SLSA, Signed releases       |
+| A09 | Logging Failures          | MEDIUM   | Security event logging      |
+| A10 | SSRF                      | HIGH     | URL allowlisting            |
+
+---
+
+## 🔥 NEW: AI/ML Security
+
+> See `data/ai-ml-security.csv` for 20 AI/ML threat patterns.
+
+| ID      | Vulnerability      | Severity | Fix                            |
+| ------- | ------------------ | -------- | ------------------------------ |
+| AIML-01 | Prompt Injection   | CRITICAL | Input sanitization, guardrails |
+| AIML-02 | Indirect Injection | CRITICAL | Content scanning               |
+| AIML-03 | Jailbreaking       | HIGH     | Content policy checks          |
+| AIML-04 | Training Poisoning | CRITICAL | Data validation, provenance    |
+| AIML-09 | LLM Data Leakage   | CRITICAL | PII filtering, redaction       |
+| AIML-10 | Insecure AI Output | HIGH     | Validation, sandboxing         |
+
+```python
+# ✅ LLM Security Example
+def secure_llm_call(user_input: str) -> str:
+    # 1. Sanitize input
+    cleaned = sanitize_prompt(user_input)
+
+    # 2. Detect prompt injection
+    if detect_injection(cleaned):
+        raise SecurityError("Potential injection detected")
+
+    # 3. Call with guardrails
+    response = llm.complete(
+        messages=[
+            {"role": "system", "content": STRICT_SYSTEM_PROMPT},
+            {"role": "user", "content": cleaned}
+        ],
+        max_tokens=1000
+    )
+
+    # 4. Filter output
+    return pii_filter(response)
+```
+
+---
+
+## 📱 Mobile Security (OWASP 2024)
+
+> See `data/mobile-security.csv` for 35 mobile patterns.
+
+| ID  | Vulnerability                    | Platform | Fix                        |
+| --- | -------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------- |
+| M1  | Improper Credential Usage        | Both     | Keychain/Keystore          |
+| M2  | Inadequate Supply Chain Security | Both     | Verify SDK, SBOM           |
+| M3  | Insecure Auth/AuthZ              | Both     | Biometric + server verify  |
+| M6  | Inadequate Privacy Controls      | Both     | Consent, data minimization |
+| M7  | Insufficient Binary Protection   | Both     | Obfuscation, anti-tamper   |
+
+```kotlin
+// ✅ Play Integrity API (replaced SafetyNet 2024)
+val integrityRequest = IntegrityManager.createRequest(nonce)
+integrityManager.requestIntegrityToken(integrityRequest)
+    .addOnSuccessListener { response ->
+        // Verify token on server
+        verifyTokenOnServer(response.token())
+    }
+```
+
+---
+
+## ☁️ Cloud Security
+
+> See `data/cloud-security.csv` for 25 cloud patterns.
+
+```hcl
+# ✅ Terraform: S3 Bucket Security
+resource "aws_s3_bucket" "secure" {
+  bucket = "my-secure-bucket"
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block" "secure" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.secure.id
+
+  block_public_acls       = true
+  block_public_policy     = true
+  ignore_public_acls      = true
+  restrict_public_buckets = true
+}
+
+# ✅ Force IMDSv2 (prevent SSRF)
+resource "aws_instance" "secure" {
+  metadata_options {
+    http_tokens = "required"
+    http_put_response_hop_limit = 1
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🔗 Supply Chain Security
+
+> See `data/supply-chain.csv` for 20 patterns.
+
+| SLSA Level | Description   | Requirements      |
+| ---------- | ------------- | ----------------- |
+| 1          | Documentation | Build exists      |
+| 2          | Control       | Signed provenance |
+| 3          | Integrity     | Hardened builds   |
+| 4          | Trust         | Two-party review  |
+
+```bash
+# ✅ Generate SBOM (EU CRA 2024 mandatory)
+npx @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm --output sbom.json
+
+# ✅ Sign with Sigstore
+cosign sign-blob sbom.json --bundle sbom.bundle
+
+# ✅ npm publish with provenance
+npm publish --provenance
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🔐 Auth Patterns Quick Reference
+
+```typescript
+// ✅ JWT verification (jose)
+import { jwtVerify } from "jose";
+
+async function verifyToken(token: string) {
+  const { payload } = await jwtVerify(
+    token,
+    new TextEncoder().encode(process.env.JWT_SECRET),
+    { algorithms: ["HS256"] }, // Explicit algorithm
+  );
+  return payload;
+}
+
+// ✅ Password hashing (argon2)
+import argon2 from "argon2";
+const hash = await argon2.hash(password);
+const valid = await argon2.verify(hash, password);
+```
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Code Review Checklist
+
+```
+Security Review Checklist:
+□ No hardcoded secrets/API keys?
+□ All inputs validated (type, length, format)?
+□ Outputs properly encoded/escaped?
+□ Authorization checked on every endpoint?
+□ Errors don't leak sensitive information?
+□ Rate limiting on auth endpoints?
+□ CSRF protection for state-changing ops?
+□ Dependencies up to date (npm audit)?
+□ SBOM generated for release?
+□ LLM inputs/outputs sanitized?
+```
+
+---
+
+_DOMYH Awesome Code • Security Skill Enhanced • 290+ Patterns_

package/.agent/skills/core/security/data/ai-ml-security.yaml

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+metadata:
+  skill: security
+  domain: ai_ml_security
+  version: 6.2.0
+  updated: '2026-02-05'
+  migrated_from: ai-ml-security.csv
+  patterns_count: 20
+  columns:
+  - id
+  - name
+  - severity
+  - category
+  - subcategory
+  - description
+  - detection_pattern
+  - fix_pattern
+  - languages
+  - example_vuln
+  - example_fix
+patterns:
+- id: AIML-01
+  name: Prompt Injection
+  severity: CRITICAL
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Input
+  description: Malicious prompts manipulate LLM behavior via user input
+  detection_pattern: (prompt.*user|input.*llm|openai.*messages)(?!.*sanitize|filter)
+  fix_pattern: Sanitize user input use system prompts defensively
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  - typescript
+  example_vuln: 'messages = [{''role'': ''user'', ''content'': user_input}]'
+  example_fix: 'messages = [{''role'': ''system'', ''content'': STRICT_SYSTEM_PROMPT},\n{''role'': ''user'', ''content'': sanitize(user_input)}]'
+- id: AIML-02
+  name: Indirect Prompt Injection
+  severity: CRITICAL
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Input
+  description: LLM processes external content containing hidden instructions
+  detection_pattern: (fetch.*url|read.*document|web.*search).*llm(?!.*strip|clean)
+  fix_pattern: Scan and sanitize all external content before LLM processing
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: doc = fetch(url)\nresponse = llm.complete(doc)
+  example_fix: doc = fetch(url)\ncleaned = strip_instructions(doc)\nresponse = llm.complete(cleaned)
+- id: AIML-03
+  name: Jailbreaking Vulnerability
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Safety
+  description: System prompts can be bypassed with crafted inputs
+  detection_pattern: (system.*prompt|instruction)(?!.*guard|check)
+  fix_pattern: Use prompt injection detection and content filtering
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: system = 'Be helpful'\nllm.chat(user_input)
+  example_fix: 'if detect_jailbreak(user_input): reject()\nif not content_policy_check(response): filter()'
+- id: AIML-04
+  name: Training Data Poisoning
+  severity: CRITICAL
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Training
+  description: Malicious data injected into training datasets
+  detection_pattern: (train|fit|fine_tune).*data(?!.*validate|verify)
+  fix_pattern: Validate training data verify sources implement data provenance
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: model.train(user_data)
+  example_fix: validated = validate_samples(user_data)\nmodel.train(validated)
+- id: AIML-05
+  name: Model Extraction Attack
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Model
+  description: API allows extraction of model weights or architecture
+  detection_pattern: (model|weights).*api(?!.*rate.*limit|auth)
+  fix_pattern: Implement rate limiting watermarking query detection
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: '@app.route(''/predict'')\ndef predict(input): return model(input).tolist()'
+  example_fix: '@app.route(''/predict'')\n@rate_limit(100/hour)\n@detect_extraction\ndef predict(input): return {''result'': label} # No raw logits'
+- id: AIML-06
+  name: Model Inversion Attack
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Privacy
+  description: Model predictions leak training data information
+  detection_pattern: (predict|confidence).*return(?!.*quantize|noise)
+  fix_pattern: Return only top-K predictions add noise to outputs
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: 'return {''probs'': model(x).numpy()}'
+  example_fix: 'return {''label'': top_prediction} # No raw probabilities'
+- id: AIML-07
+  name: Adversarial Input Attack
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Robustness
+  description: Model vulnerable to crafted inputs causing misclassification
+  detection_pattern: (model\\.predict|classify)(?!.*adversarial|robust)
+  fix_pattern: Implement adversarial training input preprocessing
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: prediction = model.predict(image)
+  example_fix: prediction = model.predict(preprocess_defense(image))
+- id: AIML-08
+  name: Insecure Model Loading
+  severity: CRITICAL
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Runtime
+  description: Model loaded from untrusted source without verification
+  detection_pattern: (pickle\\.load|torch\\.load|load_model)(?!.*verify|trusted)
+  fix_pattern: Verify model signatures use safetensors format
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: 'model = torch.load(''model.pkl'') # Arbitrary code exec'
+  example_fix: model = safetensors.torch.load_file('model.safetensors')
+- id: AIML-09
+  name: LLM Data Leakage
+  severity: CRITICAL
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Privacy
+  description: LLM returns sensitive data from training or context
+  detection_pattern: (context|rag).*(?!.*filter|redact).*response
+  fix_pattern: Filter sensitive data from context and responses
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: response = llm.chat(context=all_documents)
+  example_fix: filtered_context = redact_pii(documents)\nresponse = pii_filter(llm.chat(context=filtered_context))
+- id: AIML-10
+  name: Insecure AI Output Handling
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Integration
+  description: LLM output used without validation in code execution
+  detection_pattern: (llm|gpt|claude).*response.*eval|exec(?!.*sandbox)
+  fix_pattern: Validate and sandbox all AI-generated code
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: code = llm.generate_code()\nexec(code)
+  example_fix: code = llm.generate_code()\nif validate_syntax(code):\n  run_sandboxed(code)
+- id: AIML-11
+  name: Excessive Agency
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Safety
+  description: LLM has too many capabilities without human oversight
+  detection_pattern: (tools|functions).*(?!.*approval|confirm).*execute
+  fix_pattern: Require human approval for sensitive operations
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: tools = [delete_file, send_email, api_call]\nllm.run(tools)
+  example_fix: tools = [read_only_tools]\nif action.is_sensitive:\n  await require_approval()
+- id: AIML-12
+  name: RAG Poisoning
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: RAG
+  description: Retrieval-Augmented Generation with untrusted sources
+  detection_pattern: (vector\\.search|rag).*external(?!.*trust|verify)
+  fix_pattern: Validate and score RAG sources filter untrusted content
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: 'docs = vectordb.search(query) # Any source'
+  example_fix: docs = vectordb.search(query)\ntrusted = [d for d in docs if d.source in TRUSTED]
+- id: AIML-13
+  name: Embedding Leakage
+  severity: MEDIUM
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Privacy
+  description: Embeddings expose sensitive information from inputs
+  detection_pattern: (embed|encode).*return(?!.*noise|truncate)
+  fix_pattern: Add differential privacy noise to embeddings
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: 'return model.encode(text) # Full embedding'
+  example_fix: 'return add_noise(model.encode(text)[:128]) # Truncated & noised'
+- id: AIML-14
+  name: AI Supply Chain Risk
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Supply
+  description: Using untrusted models from public hubs without verification
+  detection_pattern: (huggingface|modelzoo|download)(?!.*verify|scan)
+  fix_pattern: Scan models for backdoors verify provenance signatures
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: model = AutoModel.from_pretrained('random/model')
+  example_fix: model = AutoModel.from_pretrained('verified-org/model')\nverify_signature(model)
+- id: AIML-15
+  name: Missing AI Guardrails
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Safety
+  description: LLM deployed without content safety guardrails
+  detection_pattern: (llm|chat|complete)(?!.*guard|moderate|filter)
+  fix_pattern: Implement input and output content moderation
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: response = llm.complete(prompt)
+  example_fix: 'if not is_safe(prompt): reject()\nresponse = llm.complete(prompt)\nif not is_safe(response): filter()'
+- id: AIML-16
+  name: Bias Exploitation
+  severity: MEDIUM
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Fairness
+  description: Model biases exploited for adversarial purposes
+  detection_pattern: (predict|classify)(?!.*fairness|bias.*check)
+  fix_pattern: Monitor for demographic bias implement fairness checks
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: result = model.predict(input)
+  example_fix: 'result = model.predict(input)\nif bias_detected(result): flag_for_review()'
+- id: AIML-17
+  name: Denial of Wallet
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: LLM
+  subcategory: Resource
+  description: Expensive AI operations triggered without limits
+  detection_pattern: (openai|anthropic)\\.(?!.*budget|limit)
+  fix_pattern: Implement token budgets and cost controls
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: 'response = openai.chat(messages) # No limits'
+  example_fix: 'if token_count(messages) > MAX_TOKENS: reject()\nwith budget_limit(max_cost=1.0):\n  response = openai.chat(messages)'
+- id: AIML-18
+  name: Shadow AI Usage
+  severity: MEDIUM
+  category: Compliance
+  subcategory: Governance
+  description: Unauthorized AI tools used in production without approval
+  detection_pattern: (openai|claude|gemini)(?!.*approved|registered)
+  fix_pattern: Register and approve all AI services audit usage
+  languages:
+  - python
+  - javascript
+  example_vuln: '# Using ChatGPT for code review without approval'
+  example_fix: '# Only use company-approved AI services\n# Log all AI usage for audit'
+- id: AIML-19
+  name: Feature Extraction Leak
+  severity: MEDIUM
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Privacy
+  description: Model features reveal sensitive attribute information
+  detection_pattern: (features|encode).*user(?!.*anonymize)
+  fix_pattern: Anonymize features remove identifying attributes
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: features = extract_features(user_data)
+  example_fix: features = anonymize(extract_features(mask_pii(user_data)))
+- id: AIML-20
+  name: Membership Inference
+  severity: HIGH
+  category: ML
+  subcategory: Privacy
+  description: Model reveals whether data was used in training
+  detection_pattern: (predict|probability).*return(?!.*defend)
+  fix_pattern: Apply differential privacy or output perturbation
+  languages: python
+  example_vuln: return model.predict_proba(x)
+  example_fix: return defend_membership_inference(model.predict(x))