@nihplod/sso-sdk 1.3.0 → 1.3.1

package/README.md

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Build the login URL string without redirecting. Returns `Promise<string>`.
 
 ### `sso.handleCallback(callbackUrl)`
 
-Handle the OAuth callback. Parses `code` and `state` from the URL, validates state, and exchanges the code for tokens.
+Handle the OAuth callback. Parses `code` and `state` from the URL, validates state, and exchanges the code for tokens. When an `id_token` is present, the SDK verifies its signature, issuer, audience, expiry and `at_hash`, and — when the login was initiated via `login()` / `getLoginUrl()` / `loginPopup()` — also validates the OIDC `nonce` claim against the value generated at login time (constant-time comparison, fail-closed, protecting against ID Token replay).
 
 | Parameter | Type | Description |
 |------|------|------|
@@ -365,7 +365,8 @@ const handler = createLogoutRouteHandler({
 });
 
 // Prefer POST to trigger logout (prevents logout CSRF via cross-site GET);
-// GET is kept for compatibility with plain <a> navigations.
+// a GET without a valid logout state does NOT log out — it returns a
+// confirmation page (HTML) whose form POSTs to the same endpoint.
 export const GET = handler;
 export const POST = handler;
 ```
@@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ Trigger the logout endpoint with a POST request (recommended):
 </button>
 ```
 
-A plain `<a href="/api/auth/logout">` still works via GET, but note it can be triggered cross-site (logout CSRF).
+A plain `<a href="/api/auth/logout">` navigation (GET) renders the built-in confirmation page instead of logging out directly, so cross-site image/prefetch requests can no longer trigger a logout (logout CSRF protection). Only a POST — or a GET carrying a valid RP-Initiated Logout `state` — performs the logout.
 
 ### Cookie Configuration
 
@@ -389,6 +390,7 @@ Default cookie names:
 | access_token | `__Host-nihplod_sso_at` | Requires Secure + Path=/ + no Domain |
 | refresh_token | `__Host-nihplod_sso_rt` | Requires Secure + Path=/ + no Domain |
 | state | `__Host-nihplod_sso_state` | Requires Secure + Path=/ + no Domain |
+| nonce | `__Host-nihplod_sso_nonce` | OIDC nonce for ID Token replay protection (validated fail-closed in the callback); Requires Secure + Path=/ + no Domain |
 | return_url | `__Host-nihplod_sso_return` | Requires Secure + Path=/ + no Domain |
 | verifier | `__Secure-nihplod_sso_verifier` | Requires Secure + no Domain; Path is the callback path, therefore uses `__Secure-` prefix |
 
@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ By default, the SDK stores tokens in **sessionStorage** (tab-scoped persistence)
 
 > ⚠️ XSS note: any token readable by JavaScript can be stolen by XSS. sessionStorage narrows the exposure compared with `localStorage` (tab-scoped, auto-cleared), but a `refresh_token` readable by JS is still exfiltratable while the tab is open. If you need stronger guarantees, use the Next.js BFF pattern below (tokens in `httpOnly` cookies) or keep the refresh token inside a Service Worker.
 
-Transient OAuth data (PKCE `code_verifier`, `state`, `returnUrl`, popup nonce) is stored separately in **sessionStorage**, because it must survive the full-page redirect to the SSO center and back; it is cleared automatically when the tab closes. In SSR environments without `sessionStorage`, it falls back to an in-memory map.
+Transient OAuth data (PKCE `code_verifier`, `state`, OIDC `nonce`, `returnUrl`, popup nonce) is stored separately in **sessionStorage**, because it must survive the full-page redirect to the SSO center and back; it is cleared automatically when the tab closes. In SSR environments without `sessionStorage`, it falls back to an in-memory map.
 
 If the sub-project is a **Next.js BFF / Confidential Client**, you can store tokens in `localStorage` for multi-tab sharing:
 

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  *   整页跳转与刷新后登录态保留，关闭标签页自动清除；SSR / 隐私模式写入失败时
  *   降级为内存 Map。对需要多 Tab 共享 token 或 BFF/Confidential Client 场景，
  *   可通过 setTokenStorage() 注入 localStorage 实现（如 createSecureStorage({ persist: true })）。
- * - 临时数据（PKCE verifier / state / returnUrl / popup nonce）：必须跨整页重定向存活
+ * - 临时数据（PKCE verifier / state / OIDC nonce / returnUrl / popup nonce）：必须跨整页重定向存活
  *   （login() 会 302 跳转到 SSO 中心再回来），因此默认写入 sessionStorage；
  *   SSR 等无 sessionStorage 环境自动降级为内存 Map。
  *
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ declare function generateState(): string;
  * SSO SDK 错误类型
  */
 /** SSO 错误码 */
-type SsoErrorCode = "invalid_config" | "state_mismatch" | "pkce_required" | "token_request_failed" | "session_expired" | "no_refresh_token" | "userinfo_failed" | "not_authenticated" | "authorization_code_expired" | "authorization_code_used" | "client_disabled" | "user_denied_authorization" | "account_disabled" | "sso_server_error" | "rate_limited" | "network_error" | "popup_blocked" | "popup_closed" | "id_token_invalid" | "id_token_unsupported_alg" | "id_token_hs256_unsupported" | "id_token_missing_secret" | "id_token_invalid_signature" | "id_token_issuer_mismatch" | "id_token_audience_mismatch" | "id_token_expired" | "id_token_missing_sub" | "id_token_at_hash_mismatch";
+type SsoErrorCode = "invalid_config" | "state_mismatch" | "pkce_required" | "token_request_failed" | "session_expired" | "no_refresh_token" | "userinfo_failed" | "not_authenticated" | "authorization_code_expired" | "authorization_code_used" | "client_disabled" | "user_denied_authorization" | "account_disabled" | "sso_server_error" | "rate_limited" | "network_error" | "popup_blocked" | "popup_closed" | "id_token_invalid" | "id_token_unsupported_alg" | "id_token_hs256_unsupported" | "id_token_missing_secret" | "id_token_invalid_signature" | "id_token_issuer_mismatch" | "id_token_audience_mismatch" | "id_token_expired" | "id_token_missing_sub" | "id_token_at_hash_mismatch" | "id_token_nonce_mismatch";
 /**
  * 将 OAuth 2.0 服务端 error 字段映射到 SsoErrorCode
  *

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  *   整页跳转与刷新后登录态保留，关闭标签页自动清除；SSR / 隐私模式写入失败时
  *   降级为内存 Map。对需要多 Tab 共享 token 或 BFF/Confidential Client 场景，
  *   可通过 setTokenStorage() 注入 localStorage 实现（如 createSecureStorage({ persist: true })）。
- * - 临时数据（PKCE verifier / state / returnUrl / popup nonce）：必须跨整页重定向存活
+ * - 临时数据（PKCE verifier / state / OIDC nonce / returnUrl / popup nonce）：必须跨整页重定向存活
  *   （login() 会 302 跳转到 SSO 中心再回来），因此默认写入 sessionStorage；
  *   SSR 等无 sessionStorage 环境自动降级为内存 Map。
  *
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ declare function generateState(): string;
  * SSO SDK 错误类型
  */
 /** SSO 错误码 */
-type SsoErrorCode = "invalid_config" | "state_mismatch" | "pkce_required" | "token_request_failed" | "session_expired" | "no_refresh_token" | "userinfo_failed" | "not_authenticated" | "authorization_code_expired" | "authorization_code_used" | "client_disabled" | "user_denied_authorization" | "account_disabled" | "sso_server_error" | "rate_limited" | "network_error" | "popup_blocked" | "popup_closed" | "id_token_invalid" | "id_token_unsupported_alg" | "id_token_hs256_unsupported" | "id_token_missing_secret" | "id_token_invalid_signature" | "id_token_issuer_mismatch" | "id_token_audience_mismatch" | "id_token_expired" | "id_token_missing_sub" | "id_token_at_hash_mismatch";
+type SsoErrorCode = "invalid_config" | "state_mismatch" | "pkce_required" | "token_request_failed" | "session_expired" | "no_refresh_token" | "userinfo_failed" | "not_authenticated" | "authorization_code_expired" | "authorization_code_used" | "client_disabled" | "user_denied_authorization" | "account_disabled" | "sso_server_error" | "rate_limited" | "network_error" | "popup_blocked" | "popup_closed" | "id_token_invalid" | "id_token_unsupported_alg" | "id_token_hs256_unsupported" | "id_token_missing_secret" | "id_token_invalid_signature" | "id_token_issuer_mismatch" | "id_token_audience_mismatch" | "id_token_expired" | "id_token_missing_sub" | "id_token_at_hash_mismatch" | "id_token_nonce_mismatch";
 /**
  * 将 OAuth 2.0 服务端 error 字段映射到 SsoErrorCode
  *

package/dist/index.js

@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ var STORAGE_PREFIX = "nihplod_sso_";
 var TOKEN_KEY = "token";
 var VERIFIER_KEY_PREFIX = "pkce_verifier_";
 var STATE_KEY = "oauth_state";
+var NONCE_KEY = "oidc_nonce";
 var RETURN_URL_KEY = "return_url";
 var LOGOUT_STATE_KEY = "logout_state";
 function buildKey(base, clientId) {
@@ -247,6 +248,15 @@ function getOAuthState(clientId) {
 function removeOAuthState(clientId) {
   _transient.remove(buildKey(STATE_KEY, clientId));
 }
+function saveOAuthNonce(nonce, clientId) {
+  _transient.set(buildKey(NONCE_KEY, clientId), nonce);
+}
+function getOAuthNonce(clientId) {
+  return _transient.get(buildKey(NONCE_KEY, clientId));
+}
+function removeOAuthNonce(clientId) {
+  _transient.remove(buildKey(NONCE_KEY, clientId));
+}
 function saveLogoutState(state, clientId) {
   _transient.set(buildKey(LOGOUT_STATE_KEY, clientId), state);
 }
@@ -269,6 +279,7 @@ function clearAllSsoData(clientId) {
   if (clientId) {
     removeTokenData(clientId);
     removeOAuthState(clientId);
+    removeOAuthNonce(clientId);
     removeReturnUrl(clientId);
     removeLogoutState(clientId);
     removePkceVerifier(clientId);
@@ -277,6 +288,7 @@ function clearAllSsoData(clientId) {
   }
   removeTokenData();
   removeOAuthState();
+  removeOAuthNonce();
   removeReturnUrl();
   removeLogoutState();
   const prefix = STORAGE_PREFIX + VERIFIER_KEY_PREFIX;
@@ -367,18 +379,21 @@ function normalizeIssuer(url) {
 var cachedJwks = null;
 var cachedDiscovery = null;
 var JWKS_CACHE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
+var FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 1e4;
 async function fetchDiscoveryDoc(baseUrl) {
   const now = Date.now();
   if (cachedDiscovery && cachedDiscovery.baseUrl === baseUrl && now - cachedDiscovery.fetchedAt < JWKS_CACHE_TTL_MS) {
     return cachedDiscovery.doc;
   }
   try {
-    const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/oauth/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
-    const doc = res.ok ? await res.json() : null;
+    const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/oauth/.well-known/openid-configuration`, {
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) return null;
+    const doc = await res.json();
     cachedDiscovery = { baseUrl, doc, fetchedAt: now };
     return doc;
   } catch {
-    cachedDiscovery = { baseUrl, doc: null, fetchedAt: now };
     return null;
   }
 }
@@ -390,7 +405,10 @@ async function fetchJwks(baseUrl, options = {}) {
   const discovery = await fetchDiscoveryDoc(baseUrl);
   const jwksUri = discovery?.jwks_uri || `${baseUrl}/api/oauth/jwks`;
   try {
-    const res = await fetch(jwksUri, options.forceRefresh ? { cache: "no-cache" } : void 0);
+    const res = await fetch(jwksUri, {
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+      ...options.forceRefresh ? { cache: "no-cache" } : {}
+    });
     if (!res.ok) return null;
     const jwks = await res.json();
     cachedJwks = { baseUrl, jwks, fetchedAt: now };
@@ -437,7 +455,7 @@ async function computeAtHash(accessToken) {
   return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
 }
 async function validateIdToken(idToken, accessToken, expectedIssuer, expectedClientId, options = {}) {
-  const { rejectHs256WhenRs256Available = true } = options;
+  const { rejectHs256WhenRs256Available = true, expectedNonce } = options;
   const header = decodeJwtHeader(idToken);
   if (!header) {
     throw new SsoError("id_token_invalid", "ID Token \u683C\u5F0F\u9519\u8BEF");
@@ -527,6 +545,12 @@ async function validateIdToken(idToken, accessToken, expectedIssuer, expectedCli
       throw new SsoError("id_token_at_hash_mismatch", "ID Token at_hash \u4E0D\u5339\u914D");
     }
   }
+  if (expectedNonce !== void 0) {
+    const tokenNonce = typeof payload.nonce === "string" ? payload.nonce : "";
+    if (!tokenNonce || !timingSafeEqualString(expectedNonce, tokenNonce)) {
+      throw new SsoError("id_token_nonce_mismatch", "ID Token nonce \u4E0D\u5339\u914D");
+    }
+  }
   return { sub: payload.sub };
 }
 
@@ -633,8 +657,10 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
     const challenge = await generateCodeChallenge(verifier);
     const state = generateState();
+    const nonce = generateState();
     savePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId, verifier);
     saveOAuthState(state, this.config.clientId);
+    saveOAuthNonce(nonce, this.config.clientId);
     if (returnUrl) {
       this._saveReturnUrlIfTrusted(returnUrl);
     }
@@ -645,6 +671,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     params.set("redirect_uri", this.config.redirectUri);
     params.set("scope", this.config.scopes || "openid profile");
     params.set("state", state);
+    params.set("nonce", nonce);
     params.set("code_challenge", challenge);
     params.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
     window.location.href = `${authorizeEndpoint}?${params.toString()}`;
@@ -662,8 +689,10 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
     const challenge = await generateCodeChallenge(verifier);
     const state = generateState();
+    const nonce = generateState();
     savePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId, verifier);
     saveOAuthState(state, this.config.clientId);
+    saveOAuthNonce(nonce, this.config.clientId);
     if (returnUrl) this._saveReturnUrlIfTrusted(returnUrl);
     const authorizeEndpoint = await this._getAuthorizeEndpoint();
     const params = new URLSearchParams();
@@ -672,6 +701,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     params.set("redirect_uri", this.config.redirectUri);
     params.set("scope", this.config.scopes || "openid profile");
     params.set("state", state);
+    params.set("nonce", nonce);
     params.set("code_challenge", challenge);
     params.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
     return `${authorizeEndpoint}?${params.toString()}`;
@@ -713,9 +743,11 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
     const challenge = await generateCodeChallenge(verifier);
     const state = generateState();
+    const nonce = generateState();
     const popupNonce = generateState();
     savePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId, verifier);
     saveOAuthState(state, this.config.clientId);
+    saveOAuthNonce(nonce, this.config.clientId);
     savePkceVerifier(`${this.config.clientId}_popup_nonce`, popupNonce);
     if (options.returnUrl) {
       this._saveReturnUrlIfTrusted(options.returnUrl);
@@ -727,6 +759,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     params.set("redirect_uri", this.config.redirectUri);
     params.set("scope", this.config.scopes || "openid profile");
     params.set("state", state);
+    params.set("nonce", nonce);
     params.set("code_challenge", challenge);
     params.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
     params.set("popup_nonce", popupNonce);
@@ -751,6 +784,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     if (!popup) {
       removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
       removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+      removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
       removePkceVerifier(`${this.config.clientId}_popup_nonce`);
       throw new SsoError(
         "popup_blocked",
@@ -770,6 +804,13 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
           const savedNonce = getPkceVerifier(`${this.config.clientId}_popup_nonce`);
           if (!savedNonce || !timingSafeEqualString(event.data.nonce ?? "", savedNonce)) return;
           removePkceVerifier(`${this.config.clientId}_popup_nonce`);
+          try {
+            event.source?.postMessage(
+              { type: "nihplod_sso_popup_ack", nonce: savedNonce },
+              event.origin
+            );
+          } catch {
+          }
           completed = true;
           cleanup();
           if (popup && !popup.closed) {
@@ -801,6 +842,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     } catch (err) {
       removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
       removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+      removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
       removePkceVerifier(`${this.config.clientId}_popup_nonce`);
       throw err;
     }
@@ -820,6 +862,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     const error = params.get("error");
     if (error) {
       removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+      removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
       removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
       const desc = params.get("error_description") || error;
       throw new SsoError(mapOAuthErrorToSsoCode(error), `\u6388\u6743\u5931\u8D25: ${desc}`);
@@ -828,18 +871,21 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
     const returnedState = params.get("state");
     if (!code) {
       removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+      removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
       removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
       throw new SsoError("token_request_failed", "\u56DE\u8C03 URL \u4E2D\u7F3A\u5C11 authorization code");
     }
     const savedState = getOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
     if (!savedState || !timingSafeEqualString(savedState, returnedState ?? "")) {
       removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+      removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
       removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
       throw new SsoError(
         "state_mismatch",
         "State \u53C2\u6570\u4E0D\u5339\u914D\uFF0C\u53EF\u80FD\u5B58\u5728 CSRF \u653B\u51FB"
       );
     }
+    const expectedNonce = getOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId) ?? void 0;
     const verifier = getPkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
     if (!verifier) {
       throw new SsoError(
@@ -886,7 +932,8 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
           data.id_token,
           data.access_token,
           this.config.ssoBaseUrl,
-          this.config.clientId
+          this.config.clientId,
+          { expectedNonce }
         );
       } catch (err) {
         removeTokenData(this.config.clientId);
@@ -894,6 +941,7 @@ var _SsoClient = class _SsoClient {
       }
     }
     removeOAuthState(this.config.clientId);
+    removeOAuthNonce(this.config.clientId);
     removePkceVerifier(this.config.clientId);
     const now = Date.now();
     const tokenData = {