@nifrajs/core 1.9.1 → 1.11.0

package/src/capabilities.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+/**
+ * Route effect/capability assurance. Declarations are reflected at build/CI time; runtime beacons
+ * are a fail-closed defence at owned effect seams. Static provenance remains the security anchor.
+ */
+
+import type { DataClassification } from "./classification.ts"
+import {
+  CAPABILITY_GUARD,
+  type CapabilityGuard,
+  type CapabilityUseEvent,
+  validCapabilityId,
+} from "./internal/capability-runtime.ts"
+import { NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS } from "./internal/route-assurance.ts"
+import { type EffectCost, type EffectPhase, effectLedgerOf } from "./ledger.ts"
+import { reflectRoutes } from "./reflection.ts"
+
+export type { CapabilityUseEvent }
+
+export type CapabilityZone = "domain" | "operational"
+export type CapabilityAccess = "read" | "write"
+export type CapabilityIdempotency = "none" | "request" | "durable"
+
+export interface CapabilityDefinition {
+  readonly id: string
+  /** Domain state is subject to HTTP method semantics; operational writes (logs/metrics) are not. */
+  readonly zone: CapabilityZone
+  readonly access: CapabilityAccess
+  /** Evidence required when this capability may execute. Default `none`. */
+  readonly idempotency?: CapabilityIdempotency
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityImportRule {
+  /** Exact module specifier, or a trailing `/*` prefix rule. */
+  readonly specifier: string
+  readonly capabilities: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface ForbiddenCapabilityImport {
+  /** Exact module specifier, or a trailing `/*` prefix rule. */
+  readonly specifier: string
+  readonly reason: string
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityRouteSelector {
+  readonly methods?: readonly string[]
+  readonly paths?: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityRouteModule {
+  readonly match: CapabilityRouteSelector
+  /** Project-relative modules that implement the selected routes. */
+  readonly modules: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityProvenancePolicy {
+  readonly imports: readonly CapabilityImportRule[]
+  readonly forbiddenImports: readonly ForbiddenCapabilityImport[]
+  /** Explicit associations for contract/generated routes that source scanning cannot locate. */
+  readonly routeModules?: readonly CapabilityRouteModule[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityPolicy {
+  readonly definitions: readonly CapabilityDefinition[]
+  /** Required: capability assurance without a static provenance firewall is incomplete. */
+  readonly provenance: CapabilityProvenancePolicy
+  /** Default `capabilities.lock.json`. */
+  readonly lockfile?: string
+}
+
+export type CapabilityEvidenceKind = "static" | "runtime"
+
+/** Token-only effect evidence. `source` is an adapter/module id, never request or business data. */
+export interface CapabilityEvidence {
+  readonly id: string
+  readonly kind: CapabilityEvidenceKind
+  readonly source: string
+}
+
+export interface RouteCapabilityEvidence {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  /** True only when the route's reachable module graph was actually scanned. */
+  readonly covered: boolean
+  readonly evidence: readonly CapabilityEvidence[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityEvidenceSet {
+  readonly routes: readonly RouteCapabilityEvidence[]
+}
+
+export type CapabilityFindingCode =
+  | "unknown-capability"
+  | "provenance-uncovered"
+  | "undeclared-capability-evidence"
+  | "safe-method-domain-write"
+  | "missing-request-idempotency"
+  | "missing-durable-idempotency"
+  | "forbidden-effect-import"
+
+export interface CapabilityFinding {
+  readonly code: CapabilityFindingCode
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly capability?: string
+  readonly message: string
+}
+
+export interface AssuredCapabilityRoute {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly declared: readonly string[]
+  readonly evidence: readonly CapabilityEvidence[]
+  /** Declared capabilities without static/runtime evidence. Informational, never treated as proof. */
+  readonly unproven: readonly string[]
+  readonly covered: boolean
+  /** Highest data-sensitivity the response carries, when the route declares it. */
+  readonly classification?: DataClassification
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityAssuranceReport {
+  readonly ok: boolean
+  readonly routes: readonly AssuredCapabilityRoute[]
+  readonly findings: readonly CapabilityFinding[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilitySnapshotRoute {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly declared: readonly string[]
+  readonly evidenced: readonly string[]
+  readonly unproven: readonly string[]
+  /** Recorded so a route that starts returning `pii`/`secret` flips the lockfile and forces a review. */
+  readonly classification?: DataClassification
+}
+
+export interface CapabilitySnapshot {
+  readonly nifraCapabilities: 1
+  readonly routes: readonly CapabilitySnapshotRoute[]
+}
+
+const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD"])
+
+export { validCapabilityId }
+
+function normalizedIds(values: readonly string[], label: string): readonly string[] {
+  if (!Array.isArray(values)) throw new TypeError(`${label} must be an array`)
+  const out: string[] = []
+  const seen = new Set<string>()
+  for (const value of values) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || !validCapabilityId(value)) {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid ${label} id ${JSON.stringify(value)}`)
+    }
+    if (!seen.has(value)) {
+      seen.add(value)
+      out.push(value)
+    }
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(out)
+}
+
+function validSpecifier(value: string): boolean {
+  return value.trim() === value && value !== "" && !hasControlCharacter(value)
+}
+
+function hasControlCharacter(value: string): boolean {
+  for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index++) {
+    const code = value.charCodeAt(index)
+    if (code <= 31 || code === 127) return true
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+/** Validate and freeze a capability/provenance policy. */
+export function defineCapabilityPolicy(policy: CapabilityPolicy): CapabilityPolicy {
+  if (policy.provenance === undefined || policy.provenance === null) {
+    throw new Error("capability assurance: provenance policy is required")
+  }
+  const ids = new Set<string>()
+  const definitions = policy.definitions.map((definition): CapabilityDefinition => {
+    if (!validCapabilityId(definition.id)) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `capability assurance: invalid capability id ${JSON.stringify(definition.id)}`,
+      )
+    }
+    if (ids.has(definition.id)) {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: duplicate capability ${JSON.stringify(definition.id)}`)
+    }
+    ids.add(definition.id)
+    if (definition.zone !== "domain" && definition.zone !== "operational") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid zone for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    if (definition.access !== "read" && definition.access !== "write") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid access for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    const idempotency = definition.idempotency ?? "none"
+    if (idempotency !== "none" && idempotency !== "request" && idempotency !== "durable") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid idempotency for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    if (definition.access === "read" && idempotency !== "none") {
+      throw new Error(
+        `capability assurance: read capability ${definition.id} cannot require idempotency`,
+      )
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({ ...definition, idempotency })
+  })
+  const imports = policy.provenance.imports.map((rule): CapabilityImportRule => {
+    if (!validSpecifier(rule.specifier))
+      throw new Error("capability assurance: invalid import specifier")
+    const capabilities = normalizedIds(rule.capabilities, "import capability")
+    for (const id of capabilities) {
+      if (!ids.has(id)) throw new Error(`capability assurance: import references unknown ${id}`)
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({ specifier: rule.specifier, capabilities })
+  })
+  const forbiddenImports = policy.provenance.forbiddenImports.map(
+    (rule): ForbiddenCapabilityImport => {
+      if (!validSpecifier(rule.specifier) || rule.reason.trim() === "") {
+        throw new Error("capability assurance: forbidden import needs a specifier and reason")
+      }
+      return Object.freeze({ specifier: rule.specifier, reason: rule.reason.trim() })
+    },
+  )
+  const routeModules = policy.provenance.routeModules?.map((rule): CapabilityRouteModule => {
+    if (!Array.isArray(rule.modules) || rule.modules.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error("capability assurance: routeModules entry needs at least one module")
+    }
+    const modules = rule.modules.map((module) => {
+      if (!validSpecifier(module)) throw new Error("capability assurance: invalid route module")
+      return module.replace(/^\.\//, "")
+    })
+    return Object.freeze({
+      match: Object.freeze({
+        ...(rule.match.methods !== undefined
+          ? { methods: Object.freeze(rule.match.methods.map((method) => method.toUpperCase())) }
+          : {}),
+        ...(rule.match.paths !== undefined ? { paths: Object.freeze([...rule.match.paths]) } : {}),
+      }),
+      modules: Object.freeze(modules),
+    })
+  })
+  return Object.freeze({
+    definitions: Object.freeze(definitions),
+    provenance: Object.freeze({
+      imports: Object.freeze(imports),
+      forbiddenImports: Object.freeze(forbiddenImports),
+      ...(routeModules !== undefined ? { routeModules: Object.freeze(routeModules) } : {}),
+    }),
+    lockfile: policy.lockfile ?? "capabilities.lock.json",
+  })
+}
+
+function evidenceSourceValid(source: string): boolean {
+  return source.length > 0 && source.length <= 256 && !hasControlCharacter(source)
+}
+
+function routeKey(method: string, path: string): string {
+  return `${method.toUpperCase()}\n${path}`
+}
+
+/** Compare declared route capabilities against coverage-qualified static/runtime evidence. */
+export function evaluateCapabilityAssurance(
+  source: unknown,
+  policyInput: CapabilityPolicy,
+  evidenceSet: CapabilityEvidenceSet,
+): CapabilityAssuranceReport {
+  const policy = defineCapabilityPolicy(policyInput)
+  const definitions = new Map(policy.definitions.map((definition) => [definition.id, definition]))
+  const evidenceByRoute = new Map(
+    evidenceSet.routes.map((route) => [routeKey(route.method, route.path), route]),
+  )
+  const findings: CapabilityFinding[] = []
+  const routes: AssuredCapabilityRoute[] = []
+
+  for (const route of reflectRoutes(source)) {
+    const declared = route.capabilities ?? []
+    const supplied = evidenceByRoute.get(routeKey(route.method, route.path))
+    const covered = supplied?.covered === true
+    const evidence: CapabilityEvidence[] = []
+    const evidenceIds = new Set<string>()
+    for (const item of supplied?.evidence ?? []) {
+      if (
+        !validCapabilityId(item.id) ||
+        (item.kind !== "static" && item.kind !== "runtime") ||
+        !evidenceSourceValid(item.source)
+      ) {
+        continue
+      }
+      const key = `${item.id}\n${item.kind}\n${item.source}`
+      if (
+        evidence.some(
+          (candidate) => `${candidate.id}\n${candidate.kind}\n${candidate.source}` === key,
+        )
+      )
+        continue
+      evidence.push(Object.freeze({ id: item.id, kind: item.kind, source: item.source }))
+      evidenceIds.add(item.id)
+    }
+
+    for (const id of declared) {
+      if (!definitions.has(id)) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "unknown-capability",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} declares unknown capability ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+    if (!covered) {
+      findings.push({
+        code: "provenance-uncovered",
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        message: `${route.method} ${route.path} has no static provenance coverage`,
+      })
+    }
+    for (const id of evidenceIds) {
+      if (!declared.includes(id)) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "undeclared-capability-evidence",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} evidence exceeds its declaration: ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+
+    const effective = new Set([...declared, ...evidenceIds])
+    const assuranceIds = new Set((route.assurance ?? []).map((item) => item.id))
+    for (const id of effective) {
+      const definition = definitions.get(id)
+      if (definition === undefined) continue
+      if (
+        SAFE_METHODS.has(route.method) &&
+        definition.zone === "domain" &&
+        definition.access === "write"
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "safe-method-domain-write",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} cannot carry domain write capability ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+      if (
+        definition.idempotency === "request" &&
+        !assuranceIds.has(NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS.IDEMPOTENCY_KEY)
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "missing-request-idempotency",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} capability ${id} requires request idempotency evidence`,
+        })
+      }
+      if (
+        definition.idempotency === "durable" &&
+        !assuranceIds.has(NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS.DURABLE_COMMAND)
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "missing-durable-idempotency",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} capability ${id} requires durable command/provider-key evidence`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+    routes.push(
+      Object.freeze({
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        declared: Object.freeze([...declared]),
+        evidence: Object.freeze(evidence),
+        unproven: Object.freeze(declared.filter((id) => !evidenceIds.has(id))),
+        covered,
+        ...(route.classification !== undefined ? { classification: route.classification.max } : {}),
+      }),
+    )
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ok: findings.length === 0,
+    routes: Object.freeze(routes),
+    findings: Object.freeze(findings),
+  })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Optional effect-ledger fields for one `useCapability` beacon. Token-only by design: an adapter
+ * names *what* it touched and *how much resource* it used — never the value it read or wrote.
+ */
+export interface UseCapabilityOptions {
+  /** Adapter/resource token recorded on the ledger entry (`repo:orders`). */
+  readonly target?: string
+  /** Dimensionless resource counters recorded on the ledger entry. */
+  readonly cost?: EffectCost
+  /** Keyed payload digest (see `computeEffectDigest`). */
+  readonly digest?: string
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityOutcomeOptions extends UseCapabilityOptions {
+  /** An outcome can only be recorded after the intent beacon succeeded. */
+  readonly phase: Exclude<EffectPhase, "intent">
+  /** Outcome error as a bounded token code. */
+  readonly error?: { readonly code: string }
+}
+
+function guardFor(context: object, capability: string): CapabilityGuard {
+  if (!validCapabilityId(capability)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: invalid runtime capability ${JSON.stringify(capability)}`,
+    )
+  }
+  const guard = (context as { readonly [CAPABILITY_GUARD]?: CapabilityGuard })[CAPABILITY_GUARD]
+  if (guard === undefined) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: ${capability} used on a route with no capability declaration`,
+    )
+  }
+  if (!guard.allowed.includes(capability)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: ${capability} is not declared for ${guard.method} ${guard.path}`,
+    )
+  }
+  return guard
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runtime effect beacon for owned adapters. It fails closed when the route omitted the capability or
+ * when no route guard is present. Static provenance is still required: code can bypass a beacon.
+ * When the server enabled the effect ledger, each beacon call also appends one token-only entry.
+ */
+export function useCapability(
+  context: object,
+  capability: string,
+  options?: UseCapabilityOptions,
+): void {
+  const guard = guardFor(context, capability)
+  const ledger = effectLedgerOf(context)
+  // Validate/append the intent before private admission hooks debit budgets. Overflow or malformed
+  // evidence therefore cannot consume quota and then fail the request.
+  ledger?.append({ capability, ...options, phase: "intent" })
+  guard.onUse?.({ capability, method: guard.method, path: guard.path })
+}
+
+/** Record the terminal outcome of an already-admitted capability without debiting admission twice. */
+export function recordCapabilityOutcome(
+  context: object,
+  capability: string,
+  options: CapabilityOutcomeOptions,
+): void {
+  guardFor(context, capability)
+  const ledger = effectLedgerOf(context)
+  if (ledger === undefined) return
+  ledger.append({ capability, ...options })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the route's token-only declaration for admission plugins. This intentionally exposes neither
+ * the request nor runtime evidence; it is the stable public seam for private entitlement policy.
+ */
+export function declaredCapabilities(context: object): readonly string[] {
+  const guard = (context as { readonly [CAPABILITY_GUARD]?: CapabilityGuard })[CAPABILITY_GUARD]
+  return guard?.allowed ?? Object.freeze([])
+}
+
+/** Deterministic, PII-free lockfile material. */
+export function snapshotCapabilities(report: CapabilityAssuranceReport): CapabilitySnapshot {
+  const routes = report.routes
+    .map(
+      (route): CapabilitySnapshotRoute => ({
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        declared: Object.freeze([...route.declared].sort()),
+        evidenced: Object.freeze([...new Set(route.evidence.map((item) => item.id))].sort()),
+        unproven: Object.freeze([...route.unproven].sort()),
+        ...(route.classification !== undefined ? { classification: route.classification } : {}),
+      }),
+    )
+    .sort((a, b) => a.path.localeCompare(b.path) || a.method.localeCompare(b.method))
+  return Object.freeze({ nifraCapabilities: 1, routes: Object.freeze(routes) })
+}

package/src/classification.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+/**
+ * Response data-classification tags. A route can declare the highest sensitivity its response body
+ * carries (`schema.classification`). This is a declarative, compile-time + introspection fact — never
+ * read on the request hot path and never enforced at runtime here. Downstream consumers use it: a
+ * partner-API surface refuses to expose a route whose response is `pii`/`secret`, privacy tooling
+ * learns which routes emit regulated data, and the capability lockfile records it so a route that
+ * *starts* returning PII flips the lockfile and forces a review.
+ */
+
+/** Sensitivity of the data a response carries. Ordered `public` < `pii` < `secret`. */
+export type DataClassification = "public" | "pii" | "secret"
+
+/** Field paths use JSON Pointer segments; array items use a `*` segment. */
+export interface ResponseClassification {
+  readonly fields: Readonly<Record<string, DataClassification>>
+  readonly max: DataClassification
+}
+
+const CLASSIFICATION = Symbol.for("nifra.data-classification")
+const JSON_SCHEMA_CLASSIFICATION = "x-nifra-classification"
+
+type ClassificationCarrier = {
+  readonly [CLASSIFICATION]?: DataClassification
+  readonly jsonSchema?: unknown
+}
+
+export type ClassifiedSchema<S extends object> = S & {
+  readonly [CLASSIFICATION]: DataClassification
+}
+
+/** Total order over classifications; higher = more sensitive. */
+export const DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK: Readonly<Record<DataClassification, number>> = Object.freeze(
+  {
+    public: 0,
+    pii: 1,
+    secret: 2,
+  },
+)
+
+const CLASSIFICATIONS = Object.keys(DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK) as readonly DataClassification[]
+
+/** Whether `value` is a known classification token. */
+export function isDataClassification(value: unknown): value is DataClassification {
+  return typeof value === "string" && (CLASSIFICATIONS as readonly string[]).includes(value)
+}
+
+/** The most sensitive classification among the inputs; `"public"` when none are given. */
+export function maxClassification(values: Iterable<DataClassification>): DataClassification {
+  let max: DataClassification = "public"
+  for (const value of values) {
+    if (DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK[value] > DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK[max]) max = value
+  }
+  return max
+}
+
+/** True when `value` is at least as sensitive as `floor` (e.g. `classificationAtLeast(x, "pii")`). */
+export function classificationAtLeast(
+  value: DataClassification,
+  floor: DataClassification,
+): boolean {
+  return DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK[value] >= DATA_CLASSIFICATION_RANK[floor]
+}
+
+function cloneObject<T extends object>(value: T): T {
+  return Object.create(Object.getPrototypeOf(value), Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(value)) as T
+}
+
+function tagObject<T extends object>(value: T, classification: DataClassification): T {
+  const clone = cloneObject(value)
+  Object.defineProperty(clone, CLASSIFICATION, {
+    configurable: false,
+    enumerable: true,
+    value: classification,
+    writable: false,
+  })
+  Object.defineProperty(clone, JSON_SCHEMA_CLASSIFICATION, {
+    configurable: true,
+    enumerable: true,
+    value: classification,
+    writable: true,
+  })
+  return clone
+}
+
+/**
+ * Attach data-classification metadata without changing validation or inferred input/output types.
+ * For Nifra/TypeBox carriers the raw JSON Schema node is tagged too, so metadata survives composition
+ * through `t.object`, `t.array`, `t.optional`, and unions.
+ */
+export function classified<S extends object>(
+  schema: S,
+  classification: DataClassification,
+): ClassifiedSchema<S> {
+  if (!isDataClassification(classification)) {
+    throw new TypeError(`classification: invalid tag ${JSON.stringify(classification)}`)
+  }
+  const clone = tagObject(schema, classification) as S & ClassificationCarrier
+  const raw = (schema as ClassificationCarrier).jsonSchema
+  if (raw !== null && typeof raw === "object") {
+    Object.defineProperty(clone, "jsonSchema", {
+      configurable: true,
+      enumerable: true,
+      value: tagObject(raw, classification),
+      writable: false,
+    })
+  }
+  return clone as ClassifiedSchema<S>
+}
+
+const recordOf = (value: unknown): Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined =>
+  value !== null && typeof value === "object"
+    ? (value as Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>)
+    : undefined
+
+const classificationOf = (value: unknown): DataClassification | undefined => {
+  const record = recordOf(value)
+  const symbolValue = (value as ClassificationCarrier | null)?.[CLASSIFICATION]
+  if (isDataClassification(symbolValue)) return symbolValue
+  const extension = record?.[JSON_SCHEMA_CLASSIFICATION]
+  return isDataClassification(extension) ? extension : undefined
+}
+
+const pointerSegment = (value: string): string => value.replaceAll("~", "~0").replaceAll("/", "~1")
+
+/** Read field-level metadata from an introspectable response schema. Never invokes its validator. */
+export function reflectClassification(schema: unknown): ResponseClassification | undefined {
+  const carrier = recordOf(schema)
+  const raw = carrier !== undefined && "jsonSchema" in carrier ? carrier.jsonSchema : schema
+  const fields: Record<string, DataClassification> = {}
+  const seen = new Set<object>()
+  const all: DataClassification[] = []
+
+  const record = (path: string, value: DataClassification): void => {
+    const key = path === "" ? "$" : path
+    const previous = fields[key]
+    fields[key] = previous === undefined ? value : maxClassification([previous, value])
+    all.push(value)
+  }
+
+  const visit = (value: unknown, path: string): void => {
+    const object = recordOf(value)
+    if (object === undefined) return
+    if (seen.has(object as object)) return
+    seen.add(object as object)
+    const own = classificationOf(value)
+    if (own !== undefined) record(path, own)
+
+    const properties = recordOf(object.properties)
+    if (properties !== undefined) {
+      for (const [name, child] of Object.entries(properties)) {
+        visit(child, `${path}/${pointerSegment(name)}`)
+      }
+    }
+    if (object.items !== undefined) visit(object.items, `${path}/*`)
+    if (Array.isArray(object.prefixItems)) {
+      for (const [index, child] of object.prefixItems.entries()) visit(child, `${path}/${index}`)
+    }
+    if (object.additionalProperties !== undefined && object.additionalProperties !== false) {
+      visit(object.additionalProperties, `${path}/*`)
+    }
+    for (const key of ["allOf", "anyOf", "oneOf"] as const) {
+      const variants = object[key]
+      if (Array.isArray(variants)) for (const child of variants) visit(child, path)
+    }
+  }
+
+  visit(raw, "")
+  // A validation-only carrier can still carry a root tag even when it has no JSON Schema metadata.
+  const carrierTag = classificationOf(schema)
+  if (carrierTag !== undefined && all.length === 0) record("", carrierTag)
+  if (all.length === 0) return undefined
+  return Object.freeze({ fields: Object.freeze(fields), max: maxClassification(all) })
+}
+
+/** Merge field metadata with an optional route-level sensitivity fallback. */
+export function routeClassification(
+  responseSchema: unknown,
+  fallback: DataClassification | undefined,
+): ResponseClassification | undefined {
+  const reflected = reflectClassification(responseSchema)
+  if (reflected === undefined && fallback === undefined) return undefined
+  return Object.freeze({
+    fields: reflected?.fields ?? Object.freeze({}),
+    max:
+      fallback === undefined
+        ? (reflected as ResponseClassification).max
+        : maxClassification([fallback, ...(reflected === undefined ? [] : [reflected.max])]),
+  })
+}

package/src/errors.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ export type RouteConfigErrorCode =
   | "INVALID_PARAM_NAME"
   | "WILDCARD_NOT_LAST"
   | "INVALID_METHOD"
+  | "INVALID_ASSURANCE"
+  | "INVALID_IDEMPOTENCY"
 
 /**
  * Thrown at route registration when a route is misconfigured. This is the