@nifrajs/core 1.9.0 → 1.10.0

package/src/budget.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/**
+ * Portable request-deadline mechanics owned by core.
+ *
+ * A wire deadline is an absolute wall-clock instant so every hop shares one end time. Once admitted,
+ * remaining time is measured against a monotonic clock so NTP or manual wall-clock changes cannot
+ * add time back to an in-flight request. Policy stays out of this primitive.
+ */
+
+/** Canonical wire header carrying an absolute Unix epoch deadline in milliseconds. */
+export const NIFRA_DEADLINE_HEADER = "x-nifra-deadline"
+
+/** The only clocks deadline mechanics need. Inject both for deterministic tests. */
+export interface BudgetClock {
+  /** Monotonic milliseconds; must never move backwards during the process lifetime. */
+  monotonic(): number
+  /** Unix epoch milliseconds; used only to translate an absolute wire deadline on admission. */
+  wall(): number
+}
+
+/** A time budget shared by one request and every downstream hop it initiates. */
+export interface RequestBudget {
+  /** Absolute Unix epoch deadline for wire propagation. */
+  readonly deadline: number
+  /** The request cancellation signal. Nifra drives this when its effective deadline elapses. */
+  readonly signal: AbortSignal
+  /** Non-negative milliseconds remaining, measured with the monotonic clock. */
+  remaining(): number
+  /** A view that finishes `reserveMs` before this budget, preserving time for response cleanup. */
+  child(reserveMs: number): RequestBudget
+}
+
+export type DeadlineHeaderResult =
+  | { readonly ok: true; readonly deadline: number }
+  | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: "missing" | "malformed" }
+
+const MISSING_DEADLINE: DeadlineHeaderResult = Object.freeze({ ok: false, reason: "missing" })
+const MALFORMED_DEADLINE: DeadlineHeaderResult = Object.freeze({ ok: false, reason: "malformed" })
+const UNBOUNDED_ADMISSION: DeadlineAdmission = Object.freeze({
+  ok: true,
+  inherited: false,
+  timeoutMs: 0,
+})
+
+/** DOM-lib-independent subset accepted by the Web `Headers` constructor. */
+export type DeadlineHeadersInit =
+  | Headers
+  | Readonly<Record<string, string>>
+  | [string, string][]
+  | undefined
+
+export interface CreateRequestBudgetOptions {
+  /** Absolute Unix epoch deadline. */
+  readonly deadline: number
+  readonly signal: AbortSignal
+  readonly clock?: BudgetClock
+}
+
+export interface DeadlineAdmissionOptions {
+  /** Local request timeout. `0` keeps requests without a wire deadline unbounded. */
+  readonly localTimeoutMs?: number
+  /** Hard cap for a request carrying the wire header. Default 30 seconds. */
+  readonly maxInboundDeadlineMs?: number
+  /** Injected wall clock for deterministic admission tests. */
+  readonly wallNow?: () => number
+}
+
+export type DeadlineAdmission =
+  | {
+      readonly ok: true
+      readonly inherited: boolean
+      readonly timeoutMs: number
+      /** Absent only for the unbounded no-header/no-local-timeout case. */
+      readonly deadline?: number
+    }
+  | {
+      readonly ok: false
+      readonly status: 400 | 408
+      readonly reason: "malformed_deadline" | "deadline_exceeded"
+    }
+
+/** Sentinel used only for an unbounded local budget. It is never written to the wire. */
+export const UNBOUNDED_DEADLINE = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER
+
+export class DeadlineExceededError extends Error {
+  readonly code = "NIFRA_DEADLINE_EXCEEDED" as const
+  readonly status = 504 as const
+
+  constructor(
+    public readonly remainingMs: number,
+    public readonly requiredMs: number,
+  ) {
+    super(`request deadline exceeded: ${remainingMs}ms remaining, ${requiredMs}ms required`)
+    this.name = "DeadlineExceededError"
+  }
+}
+
+const systemClock: BudgetClock = {
+  monotonic: () => globalThis.performance?.now?.() ?? Date.now(),
+  wall: () => Date.now(),
+}
+
+const assertFiniteNonNegative = (name: string, value: number): void => {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(value) || value < 0) {
+    throw new RangeError(`@nifrajs/core/budget: ${name} must be a finite non-negative number`)
+  }
+}
+
+const assertDeadline = (deadline: number): void => {
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deadline) || deadline <= 0) {
+    throw new RangeError(
+      "@nifrajs/core/budget: deadline must be a positive safe-integer epoch-ms value",
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+class MonotonicRequestBudget implements RequestBudget {
+  constructor(
+    readonly deadline: number,
+    readonly signal: AbortSignal,
+    private readonly monotonicDeadline: number,
+    private readonly clock: BudgetClock,
+  ) {}
+
+  remaining(): number {
+    if (this.signal.aborted) return 0
+    return Math.max(0, this.monotonicDeadline - this.clock.monotonic())
+  }
+
+  child(reserveMs: number): RequestBudget {
+    assertFiniteNonNegative("reserveMs", reserveMs)
+    return new MonotonicRequestBudget(
+      Math.max(1, Math.floor(this.deadline - reserveMs)),
+      this.signal,
+      this.monotonicDeadline - reserveMs,
+      this.clock,
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+class UnboundedRequestBudget implements RequestBudget {
+  readonly deadline = UNBOUNDED_DEADLINE
+
+  constructor(readonly signal: AbortSignal) {}
+
+  remaining(): number {
+    return this.signal.aborted ? 0 : Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY
+  }
+
+  child(reserveMs: number): RequestBudget {
+    assertFiniteNonNegative("reserveMs", reserveMs)
+    return this
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a budget from an admitted absolute deadline. Wall time is sampled once; every subsequent
+ * `remaining()` call is monotonic. This function does not arm a timer—the owner of `signal` does.
+ */
+export function createRequestBudget(options: CreateRequestBudgetOptions): RequestBudget {
+  assertDeadline(options.deadline)
+  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock
+  const wallAtStart = clock.wall()
+  const monotonicAtStart = clock.monotonic()
+  const admittedRemaining = Math.max(0, options.deadline - wallAtStart)
+  return new MonotonicRequestBudget(
+    options.deadline,
+    options.signal,
+    monotonicAtStart + admittedRemaining,
+    clock,
+  )
+}
+
+/** Create a local no-deadline view. Outbound header propagation deliberately omits it. */
+export function createUnboundedRequestBudget(signal: AbortSignal): RequestBudget {
+  return new UnboundedRequestBudget(signal)
+}
+
+/** Parse the canonical deadline header without trusting or clamping it. */
+export function parseDeadlineHeader(headers: Headers): DeadlineHeaderResult {
+  const raw = headers.get(NIFRA_DEADLINE_HEADER)
+  if (raw === null) return MISSING_DEADLINE
+  // A comma means multiple values were folded together. Ambiguous deadlines fail closed.
+  if (!/^[1-9]\d*$/.test(raw)) return MALFORMED_DEADLINE
+  const deadline = Number(raw)
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deadline)) return MALFORMED_DEADLINE
+  return { ok: true, deadline }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate and clamp an inbound absolute deadline. This is pure admission mechanics: callers supply
+ * local policy, then own the timer that drives their existing cancellation signal.
+ */
+export function admitDeadline(
+  headers: Headers,
+  options: DeadlineAdmissionOptions = {},
+): DeadlineAdmission {
+  const localTimeoutMs = options.localTimeoutMs ?? 0
+  const maxInboundDeadlineMs = options.maxInboundDeadlineMs ?? 30_000
+  assertFiniteNonNegative("localTimeoutMs", localTimeoutMs)
+  if (!Number.isFinite(maxInboundDeadlineMs) || maxInboundDeadlineMs <= 0) {
+    throw new RangeError(
+      "@nifrajs/core/budget: maxInboundDeadlineMs must be a finite positive number",
+    )
+  }
+
+  const parsed = parseDeadlineHeader(headers)
+  if (!parsed.ok) {
+    if (parsed.reason === "malformed") {
+      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: "malformed_deadline" }
+    }
+    if (localTimeoutMs <= 0) return UNBOUNDED_ADMISSION
+    const now = options.wallNow?.() ?? Date.now()
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      inherited: false,
+      timeoutMs: localTimeoutMs,
+      deadline: Math.floor(now + localTimeoutMs),
+    }
+  }
+
+  const now = options.wallNow?.() ?? Date.now()
+  const clientRemaining = parsed.deadline - now
+  if (clientRemaining <= 0) {
+    return { ok: false, status: 408, reason: "deadline_exceeded" }
+  }
+  const localCap =
+    localTimeoutMs > 0 ? Math.min(localTimeoutMs, maxInboundDeadlineMs) : maxInboundDeadlineMs
+  const timeoutMs = Math.max(1, Math.min(clientRemaining, localCap))
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    inherited: true,
+    timeoutMs,
+    deadline: Math.floor(Math.min(parsed.deadline, now + localCap)),
+  }
+}
+
+/** Add this budget's absolute deadline to an outbound request. */
+export function withDeadlineHeader(
+  input: DeadlineHeadersInit,
+  budget: RequestBudget,
+  reserveMs = 0,
+): Headers {
+  assertFiniteNonNegative("reserveMs", reserveMs)
+  const headers = new Headers(input)
+  if (!Number.isFinite(budget.remaining())) return headers
+  const deadline = Math.max(1, Math.floor(budget.deadline - reserveMs))
+  headers.set(NIFRA_DEADLINE_HEADER, String(deadline))
+  return headers
+}
+
+/** Fail before starting work that cannot fit inside the remaining time. */
+export function assertBudgetRemaining(budget: RequestBudget, requiredMs = 0): void {
+  assertFiniteNonNegative("requiredMs", requiredMs)
+  const remaining = budget.remaining()
+  if (remaining <= requiredMs) throw new DeadlineExceededError(remaining, requiredMs)
+}
+
+/** True only when a new attempt plus a caller-owned reserve can still fit. */
+export function canAttempt(
+  budget: RequestBudget,
+  estimatedAttemptMs: number,
+  reserveMs = 0,
+): boolean {
+  assertFiniteNonNegative("estimatedAttemptMs", estimatedAttemptMs)
+  assertFiniteNonNegative("reserveMs", reserveMs)
+  return budget.remaining() > estimatedAttemptMs + reserveMs
+}

package/src/capabilities.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+/**
+ * Route effect/capability assurance. Declarations are reflected at build/CI time; runtime beacons
+ * are a fail-closed defence at owned effect seams. Static provenance remains the security anchor.
+ */
+
+import type { DataClassification } from "./classification.ts"
+import {
+  CAPABILITY_GUARD,
+  type CapabilityGuard,
+  type CapabilityUseEvent,
+  validCapabilityId,
+} from "./internal/capability-runtime.ts"
+import { NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS } from "./internal/route-assurance.ts"
+import { reflectRoutes } from "./reflection.ts"
+
+export type { CapabilityUseEvent }
+
+export type CapabilityZone = "domain" | "operational"
+export type CapabilityAccess = "read" | "write"
+export type CapabilityIdempotency = "none" | "request" | "durable"
+
+export interface CapabilityDefinition {
+  readonly id: string
+  /** Domain state is subject to HTTP method semantics; operational writes (logs/metrics) are not. */
+  readonly zone: CapabilityZone
+  readonly access: CapabilityAccess
+  /** Evidence required when this capability may execute. Default `none`. */
+  readonly idempotency?: CapabilityIdempotency
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityImportRule {
+  /** Exact module specifier, or a trailing `/*` prefix rule. */
+  readonly specifier: string
+  readonly capabilities: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface ForbiddenCapabilityImport {
+  /** Exact module specifier, or a trailing `/*` prefix rule. */
+  readonly specifier: string
+  readonly reason: string
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityRouteSelector {
+  readonly methods?: readonly string[]
+  readonly paths?: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityRouteModule {
+  readonly match: CapabilityRouteSelector
+  /** Project-relative modules that implement the selected routes. */
+  readonly modules: readonly string[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityProvenancePolicy {
+  readonly imports: readonly CapabilityImportRule[]
+  readonly forbiddenImports: readonly ForbiddenCapabilityImport[]
+  /** Explicit associations for contract/generated routes that source scanning cannot locate. */
+  readonly routeModules?: readonly CapabilityRouteModule[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityPolicy {
+  readonly definitions: readonly CapabilityDefinition[]
+  /** Required: capability assurance without a static provenance firewall is incomplete. */
+  readonly provenance: CapabilityProvenancePolicy
+  /** Default `capabilities.lock.json`. */
+  readonly lockfile?: string
+}
+
+export type CapabilityEvidenceKind = "static" | "runtime"
+
+/** Token-only effect evidence. `source` is an adapter/module id, never request or business data. */
+export interface CapabilityEvidence {
+  readonly id: string
+  readonly kind: CapabilityEvidenceKind
+  readonly source: string
+}
+
+export interface RouteCapabilityEvidence {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  /** True only when the route's reachable module graph was actually scanned. */
+  readonly covered: boolean
+  readonly evidence: readonly CapabilityEvidence[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityEvidenceSet {
+  readonly routes: readonly RouteCapabilityEvidence[]
+}
+
+export type CapabilityFindingCode =
+  | "unknown-capability"
+  | "provenance-uncovered"
+  | "undeclared-capability-evidence"
+  | "safe-method-domain-write"
+  | "missing-request-idempotency"
+  | "missing-durable-idempotency"
+  | "forbidden-effect-import"
+
+export interface CapabilityFinding {
+  readonly code: CapabilityFindingCode
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly capability?: string
+  readonly message: string
+}
+
+export interface AssuredCapabilityRoute {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly declared: readonly string[]
+  readonly evidence: readonly CapabilityEvidence[]
+  /** Declared capabilities without static/runtime evidence. Informational, never treated as proof. */
+  readonly unproven: readonly string[]
+  readonly covered: boolean
+  /** Highest data-sensitivity the response carries, when the route declares it. */
+  readonly classification?: DataClassification
+}
+
+export interface CapabilityAssuranceReport {
+  readonly ok: boolean
+  readonly routes: readonly AssuredCapabilityRoute[]
+  readonly findings: readonly CapabilityFinding[]
+}
+
+export interface CapabilitySnapshotRoute {
+  readonly method: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly declared: readonly string[]
+  readonly evidenced: readonly string[]
+  readonly unproven: readonly string[]
+  /** Recorded so a route that starts returning `pii`/`secret` flips the lockfile and forces a review. */
+  readonly classification?: DataClassification
+}
+
+export interface CapabilitySnapshot {
+  readonly nifraCapabilities: 1
+  readonly routes: readonly CapabilitySnapshotRoute[]
+}
+
+const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD"])
+
+export { validCapabilityId }
+
+function normalizedIds(values: readonly string[], label: string): readonly string[] {
+  if (!Array.isArray(values)) throw new TypeError(`${label} must be an array`)
+  const out: string[] = []
+  const seen = new Set<string>()
+  for (const value of values) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || !validCapabilityId(value)) {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid ${label} id ${JSON.stringify(value)}`)
+    }
+    if (!seen.has(value)) {
+      seen.add(value)
+      out.push(value)
+    }
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(out)
+}
+
+function validSpecifier(value: string): boolean {
+  return value.trim() === value && value !== "" && !hasControlCharacter(value)
+}
+
+function hasControlCharacter(value: string): boolean {
+  for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index++) {
+    const code = value.charCodeAt(index)
+    if (code <= 31 || code === 127) return true
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+/** Validate and freeze a capability/provenance policy. */
+export function defineCapabilityPolicy(policy: CapabilityPolicy): CapabilityPolicy {
+  if (policy.provenance === undefined || policy.provenance === null) {
+    throw new Error("capability assurance: provenance policy is required")
+  }
+  const ids = new Set<string>()
+  const definitions = policy.definitions.map((definition): CapabilityDefinition => {
+    if (!validCapabilityId(definition.id)) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `capability assurance: invalid capability id ${JSON.stringify(definition.id)}`,
+      )
+    }
+    if (ids.has(definition.id)) {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: duplicate capability ${JSON.stringify(definition.id)}`)
+    }
+    ids.add(definition.id)
+    if (definition.zone !== "domain" && definition.zone !== "operational") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid zone for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    if (definition.access !== "read" && definition.access !== "write") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid access for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    const idempotency = definition.idempotency ?? "none"
+    if (idempotency !== "none" && idempotency !== "request" && idempotency !== "durable") {
+      throw new Error(`capability assurance: invalid idempotency for ${definition.id}`)
+    }
+    if (definition.access === "read" && idempotency !== "none") {
+      throw new Error(
+        `capability assurance: read capability ${definition.id} cannot require idempotency`,
+      )
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({ ...definition, idempotency })
+  })
+  const imports = policy.provenance.imports.map((rule): CapabilityImportRule => {
+    if (!validSpecifier(rule.specifier))
+      throw new Error("capability assurance: invalid import specifier")
+    const capabilities = normalizedIds(rule.capabilities, "import capability")
+    for (const id of capabilities) {
+      if (!ids.has(id)) throw new Error(`capability assurance: import references unknown ${id}`)
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({ specifier: rule.specifier, capabilities })
+  })
+  const forbiddenImports = policy.provenance.forbiddenImports.map(
+    (rule): ForbiddenCapabilityImport => {
+      if (!validSpecifier(rule.specifier) || rule.reason.trim() === "") {
+        throw new Error("capability assurance: forbidden import needs a specifier and reason")
+      }
+      return Object.freeze({ specifier: rule.specifier, reason: rule.reason.trim() })
+    },
+  )
+  const routeModules = policy.provenance.routeModules?.map((rule): CapabilityRouteModule => {
+    if (!Array.isArray(rule.modules) || rule.modules.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error("capability assurance: routeModules entry needs at least one module")
+    }
+    const modules = rule.modules.map((module) => {
+      if (!validSpecifier(module)) throw new Error("capability assurance: invalid route module")
+      return module.replace(/^\.\//, "")
+    })
+    return Object.freeze({
+      match: Object.freeze({
+        ...(rule.match.methods !== undefined
+          ? { methods: Object.freeze(rule.match.methods.map((method) => method.toUpperCase())) }
+          : {}),
+        ...(rule.match.paths !== undefined ? { paths: Object.freeze([...rule.match.paths]) } : {}),
+      }),
+      modules: Object.freeze(modules),
+    })
+  })
+  return Object.freeze({
+    definitions: Object.freeze(definitions),
+    provenance: Object.freeze({
+      imports: Object.freeze(imports),
+      forbiddenImports: Object.freeze(forbiddenImports),
+      ...(routeModules !== undefined ? { routeModules: Object.freeze(routeModules) } : {}),
+    }),
+    lockfile: policy.lockfile ?? "capabilities.lock.json",
+  })
+}
+
+function evidenceSourceValid(source: string): boolean {
+  return source.length > 0 && source.length <= 256 && !hasControlCharacter(source)
+}
+
+function routeKey(method: string, path: string): string {
+  return `${method.toUpperCase()}\n${path}`
+}
+
+/** Compare declared route capabilities against coverage-qualified static/runtime evidence. */
+export function evaluateCapabilityAssurance(
+  source: unknown,
+  policyInput: CapabilityPolicy,
+  evidenceSet: CapabilityEvidenceSet,
+): CapabilityAssuranceReport {
+  const policy = defineCapabilityPolicy(policyInput)
+  const definitions = new Map(policy.definitions.map((definition) => [definition.id, definition]))
+  const evidenceByRoute = new Map(
+    evidenceSet.routes.map((route) => [routeKey(route.method, route.path), route]),
+  )
+  const findings: CapabilityFinding[] = []
+  const routes: AssuredCapabilityRoute[] = []
+
+  for (const route of reflectRoutes(source)) {
+    const declared = route.capabilities ?? []
+    const supplied = evidenceByRoute.get(routeKey(route.method, route.path))
+    const covered = supplied?.covered === true
+    const evidence: CapabilityEvidence[] = []
+    const evidenceIds = new Set<string>()
+    for (const item of supplied?.evidence ?? []) {
+      if (
+        !validCapabilityId(item.id) ||
+        (item.kind !== "static" && item.kind !== "runtime") ||
+        !evidenceSourceValid(item.source)
+      ) {
+        continue
+      }
+      const key = `${item.id}\n${item.kind}\n${item.source}`
+      if (
+        evidence.some(
+          (candidate) => `${candidate.id}\n${candidate.kind}\n${candidate.source}` === key,
+        )
+      )
+        continue
+      evidence.push(Object.freeze({ id: item.id, kind: item.kind, source: item.source }))
+      evidenceIds.add(item.id)
+    }
+
+    for (const id of declared) {
+      if (!definitions.has(id)) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "unknown-capability",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} declares unknown capability ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+    if (!covered) {
+      findings.push({
+        code: "provenance-uncovered",
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        message: `${route.method} ${route.path} has no static provenance coverage`,
+      })
+    }
+    for (const id of evidenceIds) {
+      if (!declared.includes(id)) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "undeclared-capability-evidence",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} evidence exceeds its declaration: ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+
+    const effective = new Set([...declared, ...evidenceIds])
+    const assuranceIds = new Set((route.assurance ?? []).map((item) => item.id))
+    for (const id of effective) {
+      const definition = definitions.get(id)
+      if (definition === undefined) continue
+      if (
+        SAFE_METHODS.has(route.method) &&
+        definition.zone === "domain" &&
+        definition.access === "write"
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "safe-method-domain-write",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} cannot carry domain write capability ${id}`,
+        })
+      }
+      if (
+        definition.idempotency === "request" &&
+        !assuranceIds.has(NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS.IDEMPOTENCY_KEY)
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "missing-request-idempotency",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} capability ${id} requires request idempotency evidence`,
+        })
+      }
+      if (
+        definition.idempotency === "durable" &&
+        !assuranceIds.has(NIFRA_ASSURANCE_IDS.DURABLE_COMMAND)
+      ) {
+        findings.push({
+          code: "missing-durable-idempotency",
+          method: route.method,
+          path: route.path,
+          capability: id,
+          message: `${route.method} ${route.path} capability ${id} requires durable command/provider-key evidence`,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+    routes.push(
+      Object.freeze({
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        declared: Object.freeze([...declared]),
+        evidence: Object.freeze(evidence),
+        unproven: Object.freeze(declared.filter((id) => !evidenceIds.has(id))),
+        covered,
+        ...(route.classification !== undefined ? { classification: route.classification } : {}),
+      }),
+    )
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ok: findings.length === 0,
+    routes: Object.freeze(routes),
+    findings: Object.freeze(findings),
+  })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runtime effect beacon for owned adapters. It fails closed when the route omitted the capability or
+ * when no route guard is present. Static provenance is still required: code can bypass a beacon.
+ */
+export function useCapability(context: object, capability: string): void {
+  if (!validCapabilityId(capability)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: invalid runtime capability ${JSON.stringify(capability)}`,
+    )
+  }
+  const guard = (context as { readonly [CAPABILITY_GUARD]?: CapabilityGuard })[CAPABILITY_GUARD]
+  if (guard === undefined) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: ${capability} used on a route with no capability declaration`,
+    )
+  }
+  if (!guard.allowed.includes(capability)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `capability assurance: ${capability} is not declared for ${guard.method} ${guard.path}`,
+    )
+  }
+  guard.onUse?.({ capability, method: guard.method, path: guard.path })
+}
+
+/** Deterministic, PII-free lockfile material. */
+export function snapshotCapabilities(report: CapabilityAssuranceReport): CapabilitySnapshot {
+  const routes = report.routes
+    .map(
+      (route): CapabilitySnapshotRoute => ({
+        method: route.method,
+        path: route.path,
+        declared: Object.freeze([...route.declared].sort()),
+        evidenced: Object.freeze([...new Set(route.evidence.map((item) => item.id))].sort()),
+        unproven: Object.freeze([...route.unproven].sort()),
+        ...(route.classification !== undefined ? { classification: route.classification } : {}),
+      }),
+    )
+    .sort((a, b) => a.path.localeCompare(b.path) || a.method.localeCompare(b.method))
+  return Object.freeze({ nifraCapabilities: 1, routes: Object.freeze(routes) })
+}