@ni-c/mcp-hub 0.9.2 → 0.11.0

package/dist/auth/cimd.js

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+import { isPrivateAddress, resolvePublicAddress } from './address.js';
+import { guardedRequest } from './pinned-fetch.js';
+import { isSafeRedirectUri } from './redirect-uri.js';
+import { clampDisplayName, logSafe } from './text.js';
+// Lives in address.ts now — re-exported because it is part of this module's
+// established surface and the test suite reaches for it here.
+export { isPrivateAddress };
+/**
+ * OAuth Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD,
+ * draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00), the registration mechanism
+ * the MCP specification prefers over RFC 7591 dynamic registration.
+ *
+ * The client hosts its own metadata at a stable HTTPS URL and uses that URL as
+ * its client_id; the authorization server fetches and validates the document
+ * instead of handing out credentials. Nothing is persisted here — the document
+ * is the source of truth and is re-fetched when the cache entry expires, so a
+ * client that changes its redirect URIs does not need to re-register.
+ *
+ * Everything in this file runs against a URL an unauthenticated caller chose,
+ * so the fetch is treated as hostile: no redirects, no private addresses, the
+ * checked address pinned into the connection, a hard size cap and a short
+ * timeout.
+ */
+/** Draft §6.6 recommends 5 kB; anything larger is not a client metadata document. */
+const MAX_DOCUMENT_BYTES = 5 * 1024;
+/** A key set is legitimately larger than a metadata document, but not by much:
+ *  a handful of RSA keys is a couple of kilobytes. */
+const MAX_JWKS_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+const MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES = 200;
+const MIN_TTL_MS = 60_000;
+const MAX_TTL_MS = 24 * 3600_000;
+const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 3600_000;
+/** How long a rejected client_id is remembered, so a bad URL cannot be used to
+ *  make the hub hammer a third party once per authorization request. */
+const NEGATIVE_TTL_MS = 30_000;
+/**
+ * The per-URL negative cache alone does not bound how often one host can be
+ * fetched: the query string is part of the client_id, so `?n=1`, `?n=2` and so
+ * on are all distinct identifiers pointing at the same server. Failures are
+ * therefore also counted per origin.
+ */
+const MAX_ORIGIN_FAILURES = 10;
+const ORIGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS = 30_000;
+const MAX_TRACKED_ORIGINS = 200;
+const ASSERTION_SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['none', 'private_key_jwt']);
+let fetchOverride;
+/**
+ * Tests serve their metadata documents from a stub here. Client IDs are https
+ * URLs by specification and stay that way — the stub is what lets the suite
+ * exercise the real fetch path without a certificate authority. Passing
+ * undefined restores the global fetch.
+ */
+export function setCimdFetch(fn) {
+    fetchOverride = fn;
+}
+/**
+ * Draft §4.1: the identifier must be an https URL with a path component, no
+ * fragment, no credentials and no dot-segments. A `client_id` that fails this
+ * is not a metadata document URL at all and is looked up as a locally
+ * registered client instead — which is what keeps DCR working beside CIMD.
+ */
+export function isClientIdMetadataUrl(clientId) {
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(clientId);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (url.protocol !== 'https:')
+        return false;
+    if (url.hash || url.username || url.password)
+        return false;
+    if (url.pathname === '' || url.pathname === '/')
+        return false;
+    // Dot segments are checked against the string the client sent, not the
+    // parsed URL: the URL parser resolves `/a/../b` away, and a percent-encoded
+    // `%2e%2e` survives parsing entirely while still traversing on the server
+    // that ultimately serves the document.
+    const rawPath = clientId.slice(url.origin.length).split(/[?#]/)[0];
+    return !rawPath.split('/').some(segment => /^(?:\.|%2e){1,2}$/i.test(segment));
+}
+export class CimdResolver {
+    options;
+    cache = new Map();
+    /** Collapses concurrent lookups of the same client_id into one fetch. */
+    inFlight = new Map();
+    /** Recent failures per origin, so distinct client_ids on one host cannot be
+     *  used to keep fetching it. */
+    originFailures = new Map();
+    allowedOrigins;
+    constructor(options = {}) {
+        this.options = options;
+        this.allowedOrigins = new Set(options.allowedOrigins ?? []);
+    }
+    /** Undefined for every rejection; the reason is logged, never returned to
+     *  the client, so an attacker cannot map out the admission policy. */
+    async resolve(clientId) {
+        const cached = this.cache.get(clientId);
+        if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
+            // Refresh recency so the eviction below drops genuinely cold entries.
+            this.cache.delete(clientId);
+            this.cache.set(clientId, cached);
+            return cached.client;
+        }
+        const pending = this.inFlight.get(clientId);
+        if (pending)
+            return pending;
+        const promise = this.load(clientId).finally(() => this.inFlight.delete(clientId));
+        this.inFlight.set(clientId, promise);
+        return promise;
+    }
+    async load(clientId) {
+        try {
+            const url = new URL(clientId);
+            if (this.allowedOrigins.size > 0 && !this.allowedOrigins.has(url.origin)) {
+                return this.reject(clientId, `origin ${url.origin} is not in CIMD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`);
+            }
+            if (this.originIsExhausted(url.origin)) {
+                // Counting this one too would keep extending the window for as long as
+                // the flood lasts, so the block could never lift.
+                return this.reject(clientId, `origin ${url.origin} failed too often recently`, false);
+            }
+            const pinned = await this.assertPublicHost(url.hostname);
+            const { document, ttl } = await this.fetchDocument(url, pinned);
+            const client = validateDocument(document, clientId);
+            this.remember(clientId, client, ttl);
+            console.log(`mcp-hub: fetched client metadata document ${logSafe(clientId)} (${logSafe(client.client_name ?? 'unnamed')})`);
+            return client;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            return this.reject(clientId, error.message);
+        }
+    }
+    reject(clientId, reason, countAgainstOrigin = true) {
+        console.warn(`mcp-hub: refused client metadata document ${logSafe(clientId)}: ${logSafe(reason)}`);
+        this.remember(clientId, undefined, NEGATIVE_TTL_MS);
+        if (countAgainstOrigin)
+            this.recordOriginFailure(clientId);
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    /** True once one origin has failed often enough that further lookups are
+     *  refused without a request until the window passes. */
+    originIsExhausted(origin) {
+        const entry = this.originFailures.get(origin);
+        if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= Date.now())
+            return false;
+        return entry.count >= MAX_ORIGIN_FAILURES;
+    }
+    recordOriginFailure(clientId) {
+        let origin;
+        try {
+            origin = new URL(clientId).origin;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return; // not a URL, so there is no origin to hold responsible
+        }
+        const now = Date.now();
+        const entry = this.originFailures.get(origin);
+        if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
+            this.originFailures.set(origin, { count: 1, resetAt: now + ORIGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS });
+        }
+        else {
+            entry.count++;
+        }
+        if (this.originFailures.size > MAX_TRACKED_ORIGINS) {
+            for (const [key, value] of this.originFailures) {
+                if (value.resetAt <= now)
+                    this.originFailures.delete(key);
+            }
+            while (this.originFailures.size > MAX_TRACKED_ORIGINS) {
+                const oldest = this.originFailures.keys().next();
+                if (oldest.done)
+                    break;
+                this.originFailures.delete(oldest.value);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    remember(clientId, client, ttl) {
+        this.cache.delete(clientId);
+        this.cache.set(clientId, { client, expiresAt: Date.now() + ttl });
+        // Insertion order is recency order because a hit re-inserts; the oldest
+        // key is therefore the least recently used one.
+        while (this.cache.size > MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES) {
+            const oldest = this.cache.keys().next();
+            if (oldest.done)
+                break;
+            this.cache.delete(oldest.value);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Draft §6.5: refuse every private or loopback address, so a client_id cannot
+     * be aimed at the hub's own network or a cloud metadata endpoint. Returns the
+     * address the connection is then pinned to.
+     */
+    assertPublicHost(hostname) {
+        return resolvePublicAddress(hostname, this.options.allowPrivateAddresses);
+    }
+    /**
+     * The same guarded GET the metadata fetch uses, for the one other outbound
+     * request a client_id can trigger: the jwks_uri of a private_key_jwt client.
+     * Shaped for jose's customFetch hook, which reads only the status and the
+     * JSON body.
+     */
+    safeFetch = async (input, init) => {
+        const url = new URL(input instanceof Request ? input.url : String(input));
+        if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !this.options.allowPrivateAddresses)
+            throw new Error(`${url.origin} is not https`);
+        const pinned = await this.assertPublicHost(url.hostname);
+        return this.fetchCapped(url, pinned, MAX_JWKS_BYTES, headersFrom(init));
+    };
+    /**
+     * One GET, with every guard applied and the body capped before anyone gets
+     * to look at it. The cap is what makes this safe to hand to jose, which
+     * would otherwise buffer a key set of any size the client cares to send.
+     */
+    async fetchCapped(url, pinned, maxBytes, headers) {
+        const override = this.options.fetchImpl ?? fetchOverride;
+        if (!override && pinned) {
+            return guardedRequest(url, { pinnedAddress: pinned, headers, timeoutMs: FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, maxBytes });
+        }
+        const response = await (override ?? fetch)(url, {
+            method: 'GET',
+            headers,
+            redirect: 'error',
+            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
+        });
+        return capResponse(response, maxBytes);
+    }
+    async fetchDocument(url, pinned) {
+        const response = await this.fetchCapped(url, pinned, MAX_DOCUMENT_BYTES, { Accept: 'application/json' });
+        if (!response.ok)
+            throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}`);
+        const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type')?.split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase() ?? '';
+        if (contentType !== 'application/json' && !contentType.endsWith('+json')) {
+            throw new Error(`content type ${contentType || 'missing'} is not JSON`);
+        }
+        let document;
+        try {
+            document = JSON.parse(await response.text());
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new Error('body is not valid JSON');
+        }
+        return { document, ttl: cacheTtl(response.headers.get('cache-control')) };
+    }
+}
+/** Re-reads a response through the byte cap and hands back an equivalent one.
+ *  A failed status is passed straight through: nothing reads its body. */
+async function capResponse(response, limit) {
+    if (!response.ok)
+        return response;
+    const body = await readCapped(response, limit);
+    const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+    // Both would now describe the original transfer rather than this body.
+    headers.delete('content-encoding');
+    headers.delete('content-length');
+    return new Response(body, { status: response.status, headers });
+}
+function headersFrom(init) {
+    const result = {};
+    const headers = init?.headers;
+    if (!headers)
+        return result;
+    if (headers instanceof Headers)
+        for (const [key, value] of headers)
+            result[key] = value;
+    else if (Array.isArray(headers))
+        for (const [key, value] of headers)
+            result[key] = value;
+    else
+        Object.assign(result, headers);
+    return result;
+}
+/** Reads at most `limit` bytes and refuses anything longer, without buffering
+ *  a response an attacker made arbitrarily large. */
+async function readCapped(response, limit) {
+    const declared = Number(response.headers.get('content-length'));
+    if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > limit)
+        throw new Error(`document exceeds ${limit} bytes`);
+    const reader = response.body?.getReader();
+    if (!reader)
+        throw new Error('response has no body');
+    const chunks = [];
+    let size = 0;
+    try {
+        for (;;) {
+            const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+            if (done)
+                break;
+            size += value.byteLength;
+            if (size > limit)
+                throw new Error(`document exceeds ${limit} bytes`);
+            chunks.push(value);
+        }
+    }
+    finally {
+        await reader.cancel().catch(() => { });
+    }
+    return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
+}
+/** Draft §5: respect the client's cache headers, but never longer than a day
+ *  and never so short that every authorization request refetches. */
+function cacheTtl(cacheControl) {
+    if (cacheControl && /(^|,)\s*(no-store|no-cache)\s*(,|$)/i.test(cacheControl))
+        return MIN_TTL_MS;
+    const maxAge = cacheControl?.match(/(?:^|,)\s*max-age\s*=\s*(\d+)/i);
+    if (!maxAge)
+        return DEFAULT_TTL_MS;
+    return Math.min(MAX_TTL_MS, Math.max(MIN_TTL_MS, Number(maxAge[1]) * 1000));
+}
+/**
+ * Turns a fetched document into the client record the rest of the OAuth stack
+ * already understands. Throws with a reason for every rejection.
+ *
+ * No client_secret is ever produced: the SDK's client authentication middleware
+ * demands a secret exactly when the stored record has one, so a record without
+ * it is what makes a public client work — and the draft forbids symmetric
+ * secrets for CIMD clients outright.
+ */
+export function validateDocument(document, clientId) {
+    if (!document || typeof document !== 'object' || Array.isArray(document))
+        throw new Error('document is not a JSON object');
+    const metadata = document;
+    // Simple string comparison, per the draft: a document that could claim any
+    // identity would let one origin impersonate another.
+    if (metadata.client_id !== clientId)
+        throw new Error('client_id does not match the document URL');
+    // The name goes on the consent page, so it is held to what a name can be:
+    // one line, and short enough not to displace what sits below it.
+    const clientName = clampDisplayName(metadata.client_name);
+    if (clientName === undefined)
+        throw new Error('client_name is missing');
+    if ('client_secret' in metadata || 'client_secret_expires_at' in metadata) {
+        throw new Error('document carries a client_secret');
+    }
+    const authMethod = metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method;
+    if (authMethod !== undefined) {
+        if (typeof authMethod !== 'string' || !ASSERTION_SAFE_METHODS.has(authMethod)) {
+            throw new Error(`token_endpoint_auth_method ${String(authMethod)} needs a shared secret`);
+        }
+        if (authMethod === 'private_key_jwt' && !metadata.jwks_uri && !metadata.jwks) {
+            throw new Error('private_key_jwt without jwks or jwks_uri');
+        }
+    }
+    const redirectUris = metadata.redirect_uris;
+    if (!Array.isArray(redirectUris) || redirectUris.length === 0)
+        throw new Error('redirect_uris is missing or empty');
+    for (const uri of redirectUris) {
+        if (typeof uri !== 'string')
+            throw new Error('redirect_uris contains a non-string entry');
+        // Same rule the MCP specification states for every client: https, or a
+        // loopback address for native clients. A metadata document does not get
+        // the private-use schemes dynamic registration allows.
+        if (!isSafeRedirectUri(uri, { allowPrivateUseSchemes: false })) {
+            throw new Error(`redirect_uri ${uri} is neither https nor loopback`);
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...metadata,
+        client_id: clientId,
+        client_name: clientName,
+        redirect_uris: redirectUris
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=cimd.js.map

package/dist/auth/cimd.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"cimd.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/cimd.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACtE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAEtD,4EAA4E;AAC5E,8DAA8D;AAC9D,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;AAE5B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AAEH,qFAAqF;AACrF,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AACpC;sDACsD;AACtD,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AACjC,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/B,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC1B,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AACjC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AAChC;wEACwE;AACxE,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC/B;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/B,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACxC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;AAEhC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAgBpE,IAAI,aAAuC,CAAC;AAE5C;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,EAA4B;IACvD,aAAa,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACrB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,QAAgB;IACpD,IAAI,GAAQ,CAAC;IACb,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1B,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC5C,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC3D,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC9D,uEAAuE;IACvE,4EAA4E;IAC5E,0EAA0E;IAC1E,uCAAuC;IACvC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACnE,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACjF,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY;IASM,OAAO;IARnB,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAsB,CAAC;IACvD,yEAAyE;IACxD,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAA2D,CAAC;IAC/F;oCACgC;IACf,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAA8C,CAAC;IACvE,cAAc,CAAc;IAE7C,YAA6B,OAAO,GAAgB,EAAE;uBAAzB,OAAO;QAClC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9D,CAAC;IAED;0EACsE;IACtE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAgB;QAC5B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QACxC,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5C,sEAAsE;YACtE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5B,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACjC,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5C,IAAI,OAAO;YAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;QAC5B,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAClF,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACrC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,CAAC;IAEO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAgB;QACjC,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YAC9B,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACzE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;YACtF,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACvC,uEAAuE;gBACvE,kDAAkD;gBAClD,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,4BAA4B,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YACxF,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACzD,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAChE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACpD,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YACrC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,6CAA6C,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5H,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACf,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAG,KAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IAEO,MAAM,CAAC,QAAgB,EAAE,MAAc,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAAG,IAAI;QACxE,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,6CAA6C,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACnG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;QACpD,IAAI,kBAAkB;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IACnB,CAAC;IAED;6DACyD;IACjD,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAc;QACtC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;YAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;QACxD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;IAEO,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAgB;QAC1C,IAAI,MAAc,CAAC;QACnB,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACpC,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YACP,OAAO,CAAC,uDAAuD;QACjE,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACnC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACzF,CAAC;aAAM,CAAC;YACN,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QAChB,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;YACnD,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC/C,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;oBAAE,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,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package/dist/auth/consent-page.js

@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
-import { escapeHtml, renderPage } from './page.js';
+import { escapeHtml, renderPage, renderIdentity } from './page.js';
 /**
  * Shown when a signed-in user is asked to authorize a client they have not
  * confirmed before. This is the only thing standing between a live session
  * cookie and a code, so it must never be submitted on the user's behalf:
  * the CSRF token ties the form to their session.
  */
-export function renderConsentPage(requestToken, csrfToken, redirectUri, clientName, resource) {
+export function renderConsentPage(requestToken, csrfToken, redirectUri, identity = {}) {
     return renderPage('mcp-hub authorization', `<form method="post" action="consent">
   <h1>Authorize access?</h1>
-  <p>${clientName ? `<strong>${escapeHtml(clientName)}</strong> is asking` : 'An application is asking'} for access.</p>
-  <p class="label">Requested access</p>
-  <code class="target">${escapeHtml(resource ?? 'Every server on this hub')}</code>
-  <p class="label">Codes will be sent to</p>
-  <code class="target">${escapeHtml(redirectUri)}</code>
+  <p>${identity.clientName ? `<strong>${escapeHtml(identity.clientName)}</strong> is asking` : 'An application is asking'} for access.</p>
+${renderIdentity(redirectUri, identity)}
   <p>Only continue if you started this yourself. The name above is chosen by the application; the address is not.</p>
   <input type="hidden" name="request" value="${escapeHtml(requestToken)}">
   <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="${escapeHtml(csrfToken)}">

package/dist/auth/consent-page.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"consent-page.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/consent-page.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAGnE;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,YAAoB,EAAE,SAAiB,EAAE,WAAmB,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAmB,EAAE;IAC3H,OAAO,UAAU,CACf,uBAAuB,EACvB;;OAEG,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,0BAA0B;EACvH,cAAc,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;;+CAEQ,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;4CAC3B,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;;;QAGzD,CACL,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}

package/dist/auth/headers.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * sits there with no visible error, so the pages have to name the one origin
  * their flow legitimately ends on.
  */
-export function contentSecurityPolicy(formActionOrigins = []) {
+function contentSecurityPolicy(formActionOrigins = []) {
     const formAction = ["'self'", ...formActionOrigins].join(' ');
     return `default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; form-action ${formAction}; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'`;
 }
@@ -30,4 +30,25 @@ export function allowFormActionTo(res, redirectUri) {
         return;
     res.set('Content-Security-Policy', contentSecurityPolicy([origin]));
 }
+/**
+ * The headers every page and token response of the auth surface carries.
+ *
+ * Shared rather than repeated: the mounted authorization server is a Koa app
+ * the Express router never enters, so these have to be put in front of it
+ * explicitly -- and two copies of the list would drift the moment one of them
+ * gained a header.
+ *
+ * RFC 6749 §5.1 requires `no-store` on token responses; the login form has no
+ * business being cached either. The CSP and the legacy frame header keep an
+ * attacker from clickjacking approval or password entry. This application has
+ * no legitimate framing use case.
+ */
+export const authSecurityHeaders = (_req, res, next) => {
+    res.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+    res.set('Content-Security-Policy', contentSecurityPolicy());
+    res.set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
+    res.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    res.set('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
+    next();
+};
 //# sourceMappingURL=headers.js.map

package/dist/auth/headers.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"headers.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/headers.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,SAAS,qBAAqB,CAAC,iBAAiB,GAAsB,EAAE;IACtE,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9D,OAAO,8DAA8D,UAAU,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAC7H,CAAC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAa,EAAE,WAAmB;IAClE,IAAI,MAAc,CAAC;IACnB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACvC,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,CAAC,4EAA4E;IACtF,CAAC;IACD,uEAAuE;IACvE,qEAAqE;IACrE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM;QAAE,OAAO;IAC9B,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACtE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;IACrE,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACnC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7C,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1C,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACT,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/auth/login-page.js

@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
-import { escapeHtml, renderPage } from './page.js';
+import { escapeHtml, renderPage, renderIdentity } from './page.js';
 /**
  * Entering the password here is what approves the client, so the page names
  * both the client and where its codes would be sent — the client name is
  * self-declared at registration and anyone can register, the URL cannot lie.
  */
-export function renderLoginPage(requestToken, redirectUri, clientName, errorMessage, resource) {
+export function renderLoginPage(requestToken, redirectUri, identity = {}, errorMessage) {
     return renderPage('mcp-hub login', `<form method="post" action="login">
   <h1>mcp-hub</h1>
-  <p>${clientName ? `Authorize <strong>${escapeHtml(clientName)}</strong>` : 'Authorization required'}</p>
-  <p class="label">Requested access</p>
-  <code class="target">${escapeHtml(resource ?? 'Every server on this hub')}</code>
-  <p class="label">Codes will be sent to</p>
-  <code class="target">${escapeHtml(redirectUri)}</code>
+  <p>${identity.clientName ? `Authorize <strong>${escapeHtml(identity.clientName)}</strong>` : 'Authorization required'}</p>
+${renderIdentity(redirectUri, identity)}
   <input type="password" name="password" placeholder="Password" autofocus required autocomplete="current-password">
   <input type="hidden" name="request" value="${escapeHtml(requestToken)}">
   ${errorMessage ? `<p class="error">${escapeHtml(errorMessage)}</p>` : ''}

package/dist/auth/login-page.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/auth/oidc/adapter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import { errors } from 'oidc-provider';
+import { isClientIdMetadataUrl } from '../cimd.js';
+import { withoutPhantomSecret } from './quirks.js';
+/**
+ * oidc-provider's ten models, all backed by the one `AuthStore` the hub already
+ * serialises every other write through.
+ *
+ * The store is not replaced by this and does not shrink: API tokens, upstream
+ * credentials and the cross-process lock the admin CLI shares are mcp-hub's own
+ * concepts and have nothing to do with the authorization server. What this adds
+ * is a flat artifact slot the library owns the shape of.
+ *
+ * Two behaviours are deliberately in the store rather than here:
+ *
+ *   - the `revokedBefore` cutoff, because `find()` returning falsy IS the
+ *     revocation as far as the library is concerned (base_model.js treats any
+ *     falsy return as "not found"), and
+ *   - `consumed`, because a consumed authorization code has to be
+ *     distinguishable from an unknown one or replay detection cannot work.
+ */
+export function createOidcAdapter(store, cimd) {
+    return (model) => (model === 'Client' ? clientAdapter(store, cimd) : artifactAdapter(store, model));
+}
+/**
+ * Clients are NOT stored in the generic artifact slot.
+ *
+ * `mcp-hub-admin clients list|prune|revoke`, the ceiling on unapproved clients,
+ * the activity stamps behind ageing registrations out, and the approval records
+ * all read `state.clients`. Putting oidc-provider's clients anywhere else would
+ * leave the admin CLI looking at an empty hub while the authorization server
+ * happily served a full one — two stores, one truth, no error message.
+ *
+ * The shapes already agree: both are RFC 7591 metadata keyed by `client_id`.
+ */
+function clientAdapter(store, cimd) {
+    return {
+        async upsert(id, payload) {
+            // A public client's record must not carry a secret; see withoutPhantomSecret.
+            const record = { ...withoutPhantomSecret(payload), client_id: id };
+            // A NEW client goes through addClient, which is what enforces the ceiling
+            // on unapproved registrations and creates the lifecycle entry the
+            // activity stamps and `mcp-hub-admin clients prune` are built on. Writing
+            // it with saveClient would leave a client nothing ages out.
+            if (store.getClient(id)) {
+                store.updateClient(record);
+                return;
+            }
+            // False means the hub is full of clients that were all confirmed, and
+            // dropping one of those would take a connector somebody uses offline.
+            // Refusing the newcomer is the failure an operator can see and fix, so it
+            // has to surface rather than be swallowed into a successful-looking
+            // registration that stored nothing.
+            if (!store.addClient(record)) {
+                const full = new errors.OIDCProviderError(400, 'too_many_requests');
+                full.error_description = 'the hub is not accepting new client registrations right now';
+                throw full;
+            }
+        },
+        /**
+         * Client ID Metadata Documents are resolved HERE, deliberately.
+         *
+         * models/client.js consults the adapter BEFORE its own metadata-document
+         * fetcher, so returning the document from here means oidc-provider's
+         * fetcher is never reached — and the hub keeps a materially stricter
+         * policy than the library's: DNS pinning against rebinding, an origin
+         * allowlist, per-origin failure counting so distinct client_ids on one host
+         * cannot be used to hammer it, and negative caching. oidc-provider has none
+         * of those. `allowFetch` is wired to refuse, so the built-in path stays
+         * closed even if this returns nothing.
+         *
+         * Nothing is written: a CIMD client is not registered, which is the point
+         * of it — the client reinstalls and is still the same client.
+         */
+        async find(id) {
+            const registered = store.getClient(id);
+            if (registered)
+                return registered;
+            if (cimd && isClientIdMetadataUrl(id)) {
+                return (await cimd.resolve(id));
+            }
+            return undefined;
+        },
+        async findByUid() {
+            return undefined;
+        },
+        async findByUserCode() {
+            return undefined;
+        },
+        async consume() {
+            // Clients are not single-use.
+        },
+        async destroy(id) {
+            store.deleteClient(id);
+        },
+        async revokeByGrantId() {
+            // A grant belongs to a client; revoking it never deletes the client.
+        }
+    };
+}
+function artifactAdapter(store, model) {
+    return {
+        async upsert(id, payload, expiresIn) {
+            store.oidcUpsert(model, id, payload, expiresIn);
+        },
+        async find(id) {
+            return store.oidcFind(model, id);
+        },
+        async findByUid(uid) {
+            return store.oidcFindBy(model, 'uid', uid);
+        },
+        /**
+         * Device flow only, and the hub does not enable it. Returning undefined is
+         * the honest answer for a model that is never written; throwing would turn
+         * a disabled feature into a 500 if it were ever reached.
+         */
+        async findByUserCode() {
+            return undefined;
+        },
+        async consume(id) {
+            store.oidcConsume(model, id);
+        },
+        async destroy(id) {
+            store.oidcDestroy(model, id);
+        },
+        /**
+         * Crosses model boundaries by design: revoking a grant has to take the
+         * access tokens, refresh tokens and codes minted under it with it, and the
+         * library calls this on exactly one of the models.
+         */
+        async revokeByGrantId(grantId) {
+            store.oidcRevokeByGrantId(grantId);
+        }
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=adapter.js.map

package/dist/auth/oidc/adapter.js.map

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