@ngocsangairvds/vsaf 3.2.13 → 3.2.15

package/tools/vds-scripts/audit_orchestrator/src/vds_audit_orchestrator/agents/security_agent.py

@@ -1,1829 +0,0 @@
-"""Security Analysis Agent (TSK-048).
-
-Enhanced with LLM-powered security analysis across multiple dimensions:
-- Authentication/authorization patterns
-- Input validation practices
-- Secrets management
-- Dependency vulnerabilities
-- Security headers and configurations
-
-Migrated to PydanticAI patterns (Phase 8).
-
-Phase 23 Refinement (FR-1, FR-5):
-- Scoped security pattern scanning via SecurityPatternScanner
-- All security findings are now scoped to the target repository only
-- Uses ripgrep with Python fallback for pattern-based scanning
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import asyncio
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-from vds_agent_core.skills.executor import SkillExecutor
-
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.base import AgentResult, BaseAgent
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.pydantic_base import (
-    AuditDeps,
-    SecurityFindings,
-    Vulnerability,
-    _build_toolsets,
-)
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.security_scanner import (
-    SECURITY_PATTERNS,
-    SecurityPatternScanner,
-)
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.toolsets.evidence_corpus import create_evidence_corpus_toolset
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.toolsets.filesystem import create_filesystem_toolset
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.agents.toolsets.vector_evidence import (
-    create_vector_evidence_toolset,
-    is_vector_evidence_ready,
-)
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.config import get_config
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.errors import AUDIT_ERROR_CODES, AuditError
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.evidence.corpus import EvidenceCorpus, deserialize_evidence_corpus
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.models.evidence import EvidenceBundle
-from vds_audit_orchestrator.models.task import AuditTask
-
-# =============================================================================
-# System Prompts
-# =============================================================================
-
-SECURITY_ANALYSIS_SYSTEM_PROMPT = """You are a security analyst specialized in application security.
-Analyze the provided evidence and identify security issues across these dimensions:
-
-1. **Authentication/Authorization**: Missing or weak auth checks, insecure session handling
-2. **Input Validation**: SQL injection, XSS, command injection risks
-3. **Secrets Management**: Hardcoded credentials, exposed API keys, insecure env var usage
-4. **Dependency Security**: Known vulnerable dependencies, outdated packages
-5. **Security Configuration**: Missing security headers, insecure defaults, CORS issues
-
-For each vulnerability found, provide:
-- id: A unique identifier (e.g., SEC-001, CWE-89)
-- severity: critical, high, medium, or low
-- category: dependency, code, or configuration
-- title: Brief title of the vulnerability
-- description: Clear explanation of the issue
-- affected_component: Where the issue was found
-- remediation: How to fix it
-
-Also provide:
-- posture_score: Overall security posture score from 0.0 to 10.0 (10 being most secure)
-- recommendations: List of prioritized security recommendations
-- security_controls: List of security controls detected (e.g., "JWT authentication", "input validation")
-
-Base your confidence score (0.0-1.0) on the completeness and clarity of evidence provided.
-A confidence below 0.4 indicates insufficient evidence for reliable analysis.
-
-Output format contract (strict):
-- Return ONLY structured JSON output, no markdown and no prose outside the schema.
-- Use exactly these top-level keys: vulnerabilities, posture_score, recommendations, confidence, sonarqube_issues, dependency_vulnerabilities, security_controls.
-- For each vulnerability always include: id, severity, category, title, description, affected_component, remediation.
-
-Tool usage guardrails (strict):
-- Never call grep_search/rg_search/ast_grep_search with empty or broad wildcard-only patterns (e.g. ".", ".*", "*", "^.*$").
-- Use targeted security patterns or concrete identifiers, then pivot to read_file/read_evidence_document for grounding.
-- Avoid generic file reads (README, package manifests) unless directly tied to a security finding.
-"""
-
-
-# =============================================================================
-# SecurityAgent Implementation
-# =============================================================================
-
-
-class SecurityAgent(BaseAgent):
-    """Agent for comprehensive security analysis.
-
-    Uses PydanticAI-powered analysis to evaluate security posture across:
-    - Code patterns from git evidence
-    - SonarQube vulnerability metrics
-    - Scoped pattern scanning via SecurityPatternScanner
-
-    Phase 23 Refinement (FR-1, FR-5):
-    - All security findings are now scoped to the target repository only
-    - Uses ripgrep with Python fallback for pattern-based scanning
-
-    This agent has been migrated to use the PydanticAI foundation from
-    pydantic_base.py while maintaining backward compatibility with the
-    existing analyze() method signature.
-    """
-
-    _DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOWLIST: tuple[str, ...] = (
-        "list_evidence_documents",
-        "search_evidence",
-        "read_evidence_document",
-        "search_evidence_vector",
-        "search_code_vector",
-        "grep_search",
-        "rg_search",
-        "ast_grep_search",
-        "read_file",
-    )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _apply_tool_allowlist(toolsets: list[Any], allowlist: list[str]) -> list[Any]:
-        """Filter FunctionToolset entries to allowed tool names only."""
-        allowed = {name for name in allowlist if isinstance(name, str) and name.strip()}
-        if not allowed:
-            return list(toolsets)
-        filtered: list[Any] = []
-        for toolset in toolsets:
-            tools_map = getattr(toolset, "tools", None)
-            if isinstance(tools_map, dict):
-                for name in list(tools_map):
-                    if name not in allowed:
-                        tools_map.pop(name, None)
-                if not tools_map:
-                    continue
-            filtered.append(toolset)
-        return filtered
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_positive_int_env(name: str) -> int | None:
-        """Read optional positive integer env override; ignore invalid values."""
-        raw = os.getenv(name)
-        if raw is None:
-            return None
-        value = raw.strip()
-        if not value:
-            return None
-        try:
-            parsed = int(value)
-        except ValueError:
-            return None
-        return parsed if parsed > 0 else None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_env_bool(name: str) -> bool | None:
-        """Parse boolean env flag using common truthy/falsy tokens."""
-        raw = os.getenv(name)
-        if raw is None:
-            return None
-        value = raw.strip().lower()
-        if value in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}:
-            return True
-        if value in {"0", "false", "no", "off"}:
-            return False
-        return None
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _parse_positive_int_env_any(cls, *names: str) -> int | None:
-        """Read first valid positive integer env across ordered key candidates."""
-        for name in names:
-            parsed = cls._parse_positive_int_env(name)
-            if parsed is not None:
-                return parsed
-        return None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_csv_env(name: str) -> list[str]:
-        """Read comma-separated env values as normalized non-empty strings."""
-        raw = os.getenv(name)
-        if raw is None:
-            return []
-        values: list[str] = []
-        for part in raw.split(","):
-            item = part.strip()
-            if item:
-                values.append(item)
-        return values
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _parse_csv_env_any(cls, *names: str) -> list[str]:
-        """Read first non-empty CSV env across ordered key candidates."""
-        for name in names:
-            values = cls._parse_csv_env(name)
-            if values:
-                return values
-        return []
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _is_security_skills_toolset_enabled(cls, llm_config: Any) -> bool:
-        """Resolve skills toolset enablement with env-first precedence."""
-        security_override = cls._parse_env_bool("VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_ENABLE_SKILLS_TOOLSET")
-        if security_override is not None:
-            return security_override
-        generic_override = cls._parse_env_bool("VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_ENABLE_SKILLS_TOOLSET")
-        if generic_override is not None:
-            return generic_override
-        return bool(getattr(llm_config, "skills_toolset_enabled", False))
-
-    async def analyze(
-        self,
-        evidence: EvidenceBundle | dict | AuditTask,
-        profile: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-        evidence_corpus: EvidenceCorpus | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> AgentResult:
-        """Perform comprehensive security analysis on the evidence bundle.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle containing git files, SonarQube metrics, etc.
-            profile: Optional project profile for context.
-
-        Returns:
-            AgentResult with security findings and risk assessment.
-        """
-        # Normalize evidence input and extract profile
-        evidence_data: Any = evidence
-        resolved_corpus = deserialize_evidence_corpus(evidence_corpus)
-        if isinstance(evidence, AuditTask):
-            payload = evidence.input_data
-            profile = profile or payload.get("profile", {})
-            evidence_data = payload.get("evidence_bundle") or payload.get("evidence")
-            if resolved_corpus is None:
-                resolved_corpus = deserialize_evidence_corpus(payload.get("evidence_corpus"))
-        elif isinstance(evidence, dict):
-            profile = profile or evidence.get("profile", {})
-            evidence_data = evidence.get("evidence_bundle") or evidence.get("evidence")
-            if resolved_corpus is None:
-                resolved_corpus = deserialize_evidence_corpus(evidence.get("evidence_corpus"))
-
-        if isinstance(evidence_data, dict):
-            try:
-                evidence_data = EvidenceBundle.model_validate(evidence_data)
-            except Exception as exc:
-                self.logger.debug("evidence_bundle_validation_failed", error=str(exc))
-
-        if not isinstance(evidence_data, EvidenceBundle):
-            return self._result(
-                agent_name="SecurityAgent",
-                success=False,
-                error=AuditError(
-                    code=AUDIT_ERROR_CODES["AGENT_EVIDENCE_MISSING"],
-                    message="Evidence bundle missing",
-                    template_params={"agent_name": "SecurityAgent"},
-                ),
-            )
-
-        evidence = evidence_data
-
-        # Store profile for use in LLM analysis
-        self._profile = profile
-
-        findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        metadata: dict[str, Any] = {
-            "llm_analysis_used": False,
-            "pydantic_ai_used": False,
-            "pattern_scanner_used": False,
-            "sonarqube_issues_parsed": 0,
-        }
-        SkillExecutor.reset_usage()
-
-        # 1. Extract repo_path from evidence bundle or profile (FR-1.1)
-        repo_path = self._get_repo_path(evidence, profile)
-
-        # 2. Use scoped pattern scanner for security patterns (FR-1, FR-5)
-        if repo_path:
-            pattern_findings = await self._scan_security_patterns(repo_path)
-            findings.extend(pattern_findings)
-            metadata["pattern_scanner_used"] = True
-            metadata["pattern_scanner_findings"] = len(pattern_findings)
-            metadata["repo_path"] = str(repo_path)
-        else:
-            self.logger.warning(
-                "security_pattern_scan_skipped",
-                reason="repo_path not available",
-            )
-            metadata["pattern_scanner_skipped"] = "repo_path not available"
-
-        # 3. Parse SonarQube evidence intelligently
-        sonar_findings = self._parse_sonarqube_evidence(evidence)
-        findings.extend(sonar_findings)
-        metadata["sonarqube_issues_parsed"] = len(evidence.sonarqube_evidence)
-
-        # 4. Analyze git evidence for security patterns
-        git_findings = self._analyze_git_evidence(evidence)
-        findings.extend(git_findings)
-
-        # 5. Use PydanticAI agent for comprehensive security assessment
-        if self.settings.enabled:
-            try:
-                llm_result = await self._run_pydantic_ai_analysis(
-                    evidence,
-                    findings,
-                    profile,
-                    evidence_corpus=resolved_corpus,
-                )
-                if llm_result:
-                    # Merge LLM findings with rule-based findings
-                    for vuln in llm_result.vulnerabilities:
-                        findings.append(self._vulnerability_to_finding(vuln))
-
-                    metadata["llm_analysis_used"] = True
-                    metadata["pydantic_ai_used"] = True
-                    metadata["posture_score"] = llm_result.posture_score
-                    metadata["confidence"] = llm_result.confidence
-                    metadata["security_controls"] = llm_result.security_controls
-                    metadata["recommendations"] = llm_result.recommendations
-                    metadata["overall_risk_level"] = self._score_to_risk_level(llm_result.posture_score)
-                    metadata["security_summary"] = self._generate_summary(llm_result)
-            except Exception as e:
-                if self._is_tool_policy_violation_error(str(e)):
-                    return self._result(
-                        agent_name="SecurityAgent",
-                        success=False,
-                        findings=findings,
-                        metadata=metadata,
-                        error=str(e),
-                    )
-                self.logger.warning("security_pydantic_ai_analysis_failed", error=str(e))
-                metadata["llm_error"] = str(e)
-        runtime_summary = getattr(self, "_security_agent_runtime_summary", None)
-        if isinstance(runtime_summary, dict):
-            configured_limit = runtime_summary.get("security_agent_tool_calls_limit")
-            if isinstance(configured_limit, int):
-                metadata["security_agent_tool_calls_limit"] = configured_limit
-            exhausted_count = int(runtime_summary.get("security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count", 0) or 0)
-            metadata["security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count"] = exhausted_count
-
-        tool_usage = SkillExecutor.consume_usage()
-        if tool_usage:
-            metadata["tool_usage"] = tool_usage
-
-        return self._result(
-            agent_name="SecurityAgent",
-            success=True,
-            findings=findings,
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _is_tool_policy_violation_error(error: str) -> bool:
-        lowered = error.lower()
-        return "tool policy violation" in lowered or "cadence guard unsatisfied" in lowered
-
-    def _resolve_tool_policy(self) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, Any]]:
-        try:
-            cfg = get_config().agentic
-        except Exception:
-            return (list(self._DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOWLIST), {})
-        configured_allowlist = cfg.tool_allowlists.get("security", [])
-        allowlist = [str(item).strip() for item in configured_allowlist if str(item).strip()]
-        if not allowlist:
-            allowlist = list(self._DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOWLIST)
-        non_progress_policy = cfg.non_progress_policy.model_dump()
-        return (allowlist, non_progress_policy)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _is_invalid_tool_usage_error(error: str) -> bool:
-        lowered = error.lower()
-        return (
-            "tool" in lowered
-            and (
-                "not found" in lowered
-                or "unknown tool" in lowered
-                or "invalid tool" in lowered
-                or "not allowed" in lowered
-                or "not in available tools" in lowered
-            )
-            and "invalid tool call arguments" not in lowered
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_tool_name_from_invalid_tool_error(error: str) -> str | None:
-        patterns = (
-            r"tool '([^']+)'",
-            r'tool "([^"]+)"',
-            r"unknown tool[:\s]+([a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+)",
-            r"invalid tool[:\s]+([a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+)",
-        )
-        for pattern in patterns:
-            match = re.search(pattern, error, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-            if match:
-                value = str(match.group(1)).strip()
-                if value:
-                    return value
-        return None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _is_low_signal_search_burst(
-        telemetry: dict[str, Any] | None,
-        *,
-        policy: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> bool:
-        if not isinstance(telemetry, dict):
-            return False
-        policy_values = dict(policy or {})
-
-        def _ival(name: str, default: int) -> int:
-            raw = policy_values.get(name, default)
-            try:
-                return int(raw)
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                return default
-
-        min_tool_calls = _ival("search_only_burst_min_tool_calls", 4)
-        min_search_calls = _ival("search_only_burst_min_search_calls", 4)
-        max_read_calls = _ival("search_only_burst_max_read_calls", 0)
-        high_repeat_min_tool_calls = _ival("high_repeat_min_tool_calls", 10)
-        max_unique_tools_in_window = _ival("max_unique_tools_in_window", 2)
-        usage = telemetry.get("usage")
-        usage_tool_calls = int(usage.get("tool_calls", 0) or 0) if isinstance(usage, dict) else 0
-        event_tool_calls = int(telemetry.get("event_tool_calls_completed", telemetry.get("event_tool_calls", 0)) or 0)
-        tool_calls = max(usage_tool_calls, event_tool_calls)
-        by_name = telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name")
-        if not isinstance(by_name, dict):
-            return False
-        search_calls = (
-            int(by_name.get("list_directory", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("grep_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("rg_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("ast_grep_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence_vector", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_code_vector", 0) or 0)
-        )
-        read_calls = (
-            int(by_name.get("read_file", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("read_evidence_document", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("get_definition", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("find_references", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("workspace_symbol", 0) or 0)
-        )
-        search_only_burst = (
-            tool_calls >= min_tool_calls and search_calls >= min_search_calls and read_calls <= max_read_calls
-        )
-        if search_only_burst:
-            return True
-
-        # Guard repetitive mixed search/read loops that never diversify beyond 1-2 tools.
-        # This catches long "grep -> read -> grep -> read" churn that still burns budgets.
-        unique_active_tools = sum(1 for value in by_name.values() if int(value or 0) > 0)
-        mixed_loop_churn = (
-            tool_calls >= high_repeat_min_tool_calls
-            and unique_active_tools <= max_unique_tools_in_window
-            and (search_calls + read_calls) >= max(1, tool_calls - 1)
-        )
-        if mixed_loop_churn:
-            return True
-
-        # Evidence-search churn: repeated search_evidence-like calls with weak
-        # read pivoting. This is common in low-quality loops and should trigger
-        # cadence guards earlier.
-        evidence_search_churn = tool_calls >= 8 and search_calls >= 6 and search_calls >= (read_calls * 3)
-        return evidence_search_churn
-
-    async def _run_pydantic_ai_analysis(
-        self,
-        evidence: EvidenceBundle,
-        existing_findings: list[dict[str, Any]],
-        profile: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-        evidence_corpus: EvidenceCorpus | None = None,
-    ) -> SecurityFindings | None:
-        """Run PydanticAI-based security analysis.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle for analysis.
-            existing_findings: Findings from rule-based analysis.
-            profile: Optional project profile.
-
-        Returns:
-            SecurityFindings with LLM analysis results, or None on failure.
-        """
-        # Build dependencies for PydanticAI agent
-        deps = AuditDeps.from_evidence_bundle(
-            evidence=evidence,
-            profile=profile,
-            settings=self.settings if hasattr(self.settings, "model_dump") else None,
-            evidence_corpus=evidence_corpus,
-        )
-        repo_path = self._get_repo_path(evidence, profile)
-        self._analysis_repo_path = repo_path
-        toolsets = self._build_analysis_toolsets()
-        if deps.evidence_corpus is not None:
-            try:
-                toolsets.append(create_evidence_corpus_toolset())
-            except Exception as exc:
-                self.logger.warning("security_evidence_corpus_toolset_unavailable", error=str(exc))
-        try:
-            if is_vector_evidence_ready(deps=deps):
-                toolsets.append(create_vector_evidence_toolset())
-        except Exception as exc:
-            self.logger.warning("security_vector_evidence_toolset_unavailable", error=str(exc))
-        zero_tool_mode = not toolsets
-        available_skill_names = self._collect_available_skill_names(toolsets)
-        max_tool_calls = 0 if zero_tool_mode else None
-        tool_call_limit_exhausted_count = 0
-        self._security_agent_runtime_summary = {
-            "security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count": 0,
-        }
-
-        local_openai_protocol = self._should_disable_parallel_tool_calls()
-        # Prepare context prompt
-        user_prompt = self._build_analysis_prompt(
-            evidence,
-            existing_findings,
-            available_skill_names=available_skill_names,
-            tools_available=not zero_tool_mode,
-            local_openai_mode=local_openai_protocol,
-        )
-
-        allowlist, non_progress_policy = self._resolve_tool_policy()
-        toolsets = self._apply_tool_allowlist(toolsets, allowlist)
-        base_toolsets = list(toolsets)
-        zero_tool_mode = not toolsets
-        agentic_cfg = get_config().agentic
-        strict_no_fallback = bool(agentic_cfg.strict_no_fallback)
-        compact_default_max_turns = (
-            self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_COMPACT_DEFAULT_MAX_TURNS",
-                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_COMPACT_DEFAULT_MAX_TURNS",
-            )
-            or 8
-        )
-        compact_default_max_tool_calls = (
-            self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_COMPACT_DEFAULT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_COMPACT_DEFAULT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-            )
-            or 20
-        )
-        compact_max_turns_override = self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_COMPACT_MAX_TURNS",
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_COMPACT_MAX_TURNS",
-        )
-        compact_max_tool_calls_override = self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_COMPACT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_COMPACT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-        )
-        # Quality-first policy: strict mode should still bound search churn tightly.
-        max_turn_cap = 8 if strict_no_fallback else 24
-        strict_turn_cap_override = self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_STRICT_MAX_TURNS_CAP",
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_STRICT_MAX_TURNS_CAP",
-        )
-        if strict_no_fallback and strict_turn_cap_override is not None:
-            # Explicit override should control strict turn cap for profile-level tuning.
-            max_turn_cap = strict_turn_cap_override
-        # Keep strict mode bounded to limit search churn before recovery/synthesis.
-        # 20 keeps enough room for one focused discovery pass plus evidence reads.
-        max_tool_calls_cap = 20 if strict_no_fallback else 64
-        strict_cap_override = self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_STRICT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS_CAP",
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_STRICT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS_CAP",
-        )
-        if strict_no_fallback and strict_cap_override is not None:
-            # Explicit override should control strict tool-call cap for profile-level tuning.
-            max_tool_calls_cap = strict_cap_override
-        if strict_no_fallback and local_openai_protocol:
-            local_turn_cap = compact_max_turns_override or compact_default_max_turns
-            local_tool_cap = compact_max_tool_calls_override or compact_default_max_tool_calls
-            max_turn_cap = min(max_turn_cap, local_turn_cap)
-            max_tool_calls_cap = min(max_tool_calls_cap, local_tool_cap)
-        security_specific_tool_calls_limit = self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_TOOL_CALLS_LIMIT",
-            "VDS_AUDIT_SECURITY_AGENT_TOOL_CALLS_LIMIT",
-        )
-        configured_max_tool_calls = (
-            int(security_specific_tool_calls_limit)
-            if security_specific_tool_calls_limit is not None
-            else int(agentic_cfg.max_tool_calls)
-        )
-        min_tool_calls_floor = 1 if security_specific_tool_calls_limit is not None else 8
-        max_turns = None if zero_tool_mode else max(4, min(int(agentic_cfg.max_turns), max_turn_cap))
-        max_tool_calls = (
-            0 if zero_tool_mode else max(min_tool_calls_floor, min(configured_max_tool_calls, max_tool_calls_cap))
-        )
-        security_reported_tool_calls_limit = int(max_tool_calls)
-        self._security_agent_runtime_summary = {
-            "security_agent_tool_calls_limit": security_reported_tool_calls_limit,
-            "security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count": tool_call_limit_exhausted_count,
-        }
-        if not zero_tool_mode:
-            if strict_no_fallback and local_openai_protocol:
-                self.logger.info(
-                    "security_local_openai_budget_tightened",
-                    max_turn_cap=max_turn_cap,
-                    max_tool_calls_cap=max_tool_calls_cap,
-                    strict_turn_cap_override=strict_turn_cap_override,
-                    strict_cap_override=strict_cap_override,
-                    compact_default_max_turns=compact_default_max_turns,
-                    compact_default_max_tool_calls=compact_default_max_tool_calls,
-                    compact_max_turns_override=compact_max_turns_override,
-                    compact_max_tool_calls_override=compact_max_tool_calls_override,
-                )
-            self.logger.info(
-                "security_agent_budget_applied",
-                max_turns=max_turns,
-                max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                configured_max_turns=agentic_cfg.max_turns,
-                configured_max_tool_calls=configured_max_tool_calls,
-                security_specific_tool_calls_limit=security_specific_tool_calls_limit,
-                strict_no_fallback=strict_no_fallback,
-            )
-        guard_prompt = user_prompt
-        if local_openai_protocol and (not zero_tool_mode) and max_turns is not None:
-            guard_prompt = (
-                user_prompt
-                + "\n\nLOCAL OPENAI EXECUTION BUDGET:\n"
-                + f"- Hard cap: max_turns={max_turns}, max_tool_calls={max_tool_calls}.\n"
-                + "- Use exactly one tool call per turn.\n"
-                + "- Call list_evidence_documents once, then pivot to read_evidence_document/read_file.\n"
-                + "- Use search_evidence only when a direct read target is not available.\n"
-                + "- After at least one concrete read, stop tool calls and return final SecurityFindings JSON.\n"
-            )
-        used_allowlist_retry = False
-        used_cadence_retry = False
-        used_grounding_retry = False
-        used_budget_recovery_retry = False
-        used_budget_synthesis_retry = False
-        budget_recovery_mode = False
-        used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot = False
-        used_output_format_retry = False
-        used_rate_limit_retry = False
-
-        while True:
-            try:
-                output = await self._run_pydantic_agent(
-                    system_prompt=SECURITY_ANALYSIS_SYSTEM_PROMPT,
-                    user_prompt=guard_prompt,
-                    result_type=SecurityFindings,
-                    complexity="standard",
-                    deps=deps,
-                    prompt_type="security_analysis",
-                    toolsets=toolsets,
-                    max_turns=max_turns,
-                    max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                )
-            except Exception as exc:
-                message = str(exc)
-                rate_limited = ("rate limit" in message.lower()) or ("status_code: 429" in message.lower())
-                if rate_limited:
-                    if used_rate_limit_retry:
-                        raise RuntimeError("security provider rate-limit retry exhausted") from exc
-                    used_rate_limit_retry = True
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_rate_limit_retry",
-                        error=message,
-                        backoff_seconds=2,
-                    )
-                    await asyncio.sleep(2)
-                    continue
-                trailing_output_error = "trailing characters at line" in message.lower()
-                if trailing_output_error:
-                    if used_output_format_retry:
-                        raise RuntimeError("security output format recovery failed after retry") from exc
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_output_format_recovery_retry",
-                        error=message,
-                    )
-                    used_output_format_retry = True
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nOUTPUT FORMAT RECOVERY MODE:\n"
-                        + "- STOP calling tools.\n"
-                        + "- Use only evidence already collected from previous tool results.\n"
-                        + "- Return exactly one strict SecurityFindings JSON object (no markdown, no prose).\n"
-                    )
-                    toolsets = []
-                    zero_tool_mode = True
-                    # Keep a minimal allowance for residual provider-side final_result
-                    # tool emissions while still enforcing effective no-tool behavior.
-                    max_tool_calls = 1
-                    max_turns = None
-                    continue
-                if self._is_invalid_tool_usage_error(message):
-                    attempted_tool = self._parse_tool_name_from_invalid_tool_error(message)
-                    if zero_tool_mode:
-                        self.logger.warning(
-                            "security_invalid_tool_usage_zero_tool_mode",
-                            error=message,
-                            attempted_tool=attempted_tool,
-                            max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                        )
-                        raise RuntimeError(
-                            "security tool policy violation: zero-tool mode forbids tool calls "
-                            f"(attempted={attempted_tool or 'unknown'}, max_tool_calls=0)"
-                        ) from exc
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_invalid_tool_usage_allowlist",
-                        error=message,
-                        attempted_tool=attempted_tool,
-                        allowed_tools=allowlist,
-                    )
-                    if used_allowlist_retry:
-                        raise RuntimeError(
-                            "security tool policy violation: invalid tool usage "
-                            f"(attempted={attempted_tool or 'unknown'}, allowlist={allowlist})"
-                        ) from exc
-                    used_allowlist_retry = True
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nTOOL ALLOWLIST GUARD:\n"
-                        + f"- Allowed tools for SecurityAgent: {', '.join(allowlist)}.\n"
-                        + f"- Invalid tool requested: {attempted_tool or 'unknown'}.\n"
-                        + "- Use only allowlisted tools and call one tool per turn.\n"
-                        + "- If search/list results are low-signal, pivot to read_file/read_evidence_document."
-                    )
-                    continue
-                lowered_message = message.lower()
-                limit_exhausted = (
-                    ("tool_calls_limit" in lowered_message)
-                    or ("request_limit" in lowered_message)
-                    or ("usagelimitexceeded" in lowered_message)
-                    or ("usage limit exceeded" in lowered_message)
-                )
-                if limit_exhausted:
-                    tool_call_limit_exhausted_count += 1
-                    self._security_agent_runtime_summary = {
-                        "security_agent_tool_calls_limit": security_reported_tool_calls_limit,
-                        "security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count": tool_call_limit_exhausted_count,
-                    }
-                exhausted_tool_calls = self._parse_tool_calls_exhausted_from_error(message) if limit_exhausted else None
-                exhausted_request_limit = (
-                    self._parse_request_limit_exhausted_from_error(message) if limit_exhausted else None
-                )
-                skip_recovery_for_request_limit = bool(
-                    limit_exhausted
-                    and strict_no_fallback
-                    and local_openai_protocol
-                    and exhausted_request_limit is not None
-                )
-                # For strict mode we still allow one bounded read-first recovery pass
-                # when tool-call limit is exceeded, then pivot to synthesis-only mode.
-                skip_recovery_for_tool_calls_limit = False
-                if skip_recovery_for_request_limit and (not used_budget_recovery_retry):
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_budget_recovery_skipped_request_limit_strict_local_openai",
-                        error=message,
-                        max_turns=max_turns,
-                        max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                        exhausted_request_limit=exhausted_request_limit,
-                    )
-                if skip_recovery_for_tool_calls_limit and (not used_budget_recovery_retry):
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_budget_recovery_skipped_tool_calls_limit_strict_mode",
-                        error=message,
-                        max_turns=max_turns,
-                        max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                        exhausted_tool_calls=exhausted_tool_calls,
-                    )
-                if (
-                    limit_exhausted
-                    and (not zero_tool_mode)
-                    and (not used_budget_recovery_retry)
-                    and (not skip_recovery_for_request_limit)
-                    and (not skip_recovery_for_tool_calls_limit)
-                ):
-                    used_budget_recovery_retry = True
-                    budget_recovery_mode = True
-                    recovery_max_turns = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_BUDGET_RECOVERY_MAX_TURNS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_BUDGET_RECOVERY_MAX_TURNS",
-                        )
-                        or 6
-                    )
-                    recovery_max_tool_calls = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_BUDGET_RECOVERY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_BUDGET_RECOVERY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                        )
-                        or 8
-                    )
-                    recovery_terminal_max_turns = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TERMINAL_MAX_TURNS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TERMINAL_MAX_TURNS",
-                        )
-                        or recovery_max_turns
-                    )
-                    recovery_terminal_max_tool_calls = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TERMINAL_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TERMINAL_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                        )
-                        or recovery_max_tool_calls
-                    )
-                    # Recovery is one bounded read-first terminal pass, not another full exploration loop.
-                    recovery_max_turns = min(recovery_max_turns, recovery_terminal_max_turns)
-                    recovery_max_tool_calls = min(recovery_max_tool_calls, recovery_terminal_max_tool_calls)
-                    # Keep local-openai recovery tighter to avoid search churn on weak local models.
-                    if local_openai_protocol:
-                        recovery_max_tool_calls = min(recovery_max_tool_calls, max(2, recovery_max_turns + 1))
-                    read_first_recovery_allowlist = [
-                        "list_evidence_documents",
-                        "read_evidence_document",
-                        "read_file",
-                    ]
-                    configured_recovery_allowlist = self._parse_csv_env_any(
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TOOL_ALLOWLIST",
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_BUDGET_RECOVERY_TOOL_ALLOWLIST",
-                    )
-                    if configured_recovery_allowlist:
-                        allowed_recovery_tools = set(read_first_recovery_allowlist)
-                        recovery_allowlist = [
-                            tool_name
-                            for tool_name in configured_recovery_allowlist
-                            if tool_name in allowed_recovery_tools
-                        ]
-                    else:
-                        recovery_allowlist = list(read_first_recovery_allowlist)
-                    telemetry_for_recovery = getattr(self, "_last_agent_run_telemetry", {})
-                    if isinstance(telemetry_for_recovery, dict):
-                        by_name = telemetry_for_recovery.get("event_tool_count_by_name")
-                        if isinstance(by_name, dict):
-                            search_evidence_calls = int(by_name.get("search_evidence", 0) or 0)
-                            read_calls = int(by_name.get("read_file", 0) or 0) + int(
-                                by_name.get("read_evidence_document", 0) or 0
-                            )
-                            if search_evidence_calls >= 6 and read_calls < 1:
-                                # Force a deterministic pivot away from repeated search-only loops.
-                                recovery_allowlist = list(read_first_recovery_allowlist)
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_budget_recovery_retry",
-                        error=message,
-                        max_turns=max_turns,
-                        max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                        exhausted_tool_calls=exhausted_tool_calls,
-                        exhausted_request_limit=exhausted_request_limit,
-                        recovery_max_turns=recovery_max_turns,
-                        recovery_max_tool_calls=recovery_max_tool_calls,
-                        recovery_allowlist=recovery_allowlist,
-                    )
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nBUDGET RECOVERY MODE (READ-FOCUSED TERMINAL PASS):\n"
-                        + "- Keep tool usage minimal and deterministic.\n"
-                        + "- Start with list_evidence_documents, then read_evidence_document/read_file on concrete matches.\n"
-                        + "- This is the final tool-enabled pass before synthesis-only mode.\n"
-                        + "- Do not use broad search loops in recovery mode.\n"
-                        + "- Do not use broad wildcard-only search patterns ('.', '.*', '*', '^.*$').\n"
-                        + "- Do not read generic files (README/package manifests) unless explicitly security-relevant.\n"
-                        + "- Avoid repeated broad searches.\n"
-                        + "- Return final SecurityFindings JSON once at least one concrete evidence read is completed.\n"
-                    )
-                    toolsets = self._apply_tool_allowlist(list(base_toolsets), recovery_allowlist)
-                    zero_tool_mode = not toolsets
-                    if zero_tool_mode:
-                        budget_recovery_mode = False
-                        max_tool_calls = 1
-                        max_turns = None
-                    else:
-                        max_turns = recovery_max_turns
-                        max_tool_calls = recovery_max_tool_calls
-                    continue
-                if limit_exhausted and not used_budget_synthesis_retry:
-                    budget_recovery_mode = False
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_budget_synthesis_retry",
-                        error=message,
-                        max_turns=max_turns,
-                        max_tool_calls=max_tool_calls,
-                    )
-                    used_budget_synthesis_retry = True
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nBUDGET EXHAUSTED - FINAL SYNTHESIS MODE:\n"
-                        + "- STOP calling tools.\n"
-                        + "- Use only evidence already collected from previous tool results.\n"
-                        + "- Return final SecurityFindings JSON now."
-                    )
-                    toolsets = []
-                    zero_tool_mode = True
-                    max_tool_calls = 1
-                    # Disable request_limit in synthesis mode. Keeping a small request_limit
-                    # here can preempt structured-output retries and fail the fallback itself.
-                    max_turns = None
-                    continue
-                raise
-
-            telemetry = getattr(self, "_last_agent_run_telemetry", {})
-            telemetry_has_tool_observability = isinstance(telemetry, dict) and any(
-                key in telemetry
-                for key in ("event_tool_calls_completed", "event_tool_calls", "event_tool_count_by_name")
-            )
-            if (not zero_tool_mode) and telemetry_has_tool_observability and self._has_zero_tool_activity(telemetry):
-                self.logger.warning(
-                    "security_grounding_guard_unsatisfied",
-                    observed_tool_names=(telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None),
-                    observed_tool_counts=(
-                        telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                    ),
-                )
-                if budget_recovery_mode and not used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot:
-                    used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot = True
-                    budget_recovery_mode = False
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_recovery_terminal_pass_zero_tool_pivot",
-                        observed_tool_names=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                        observed_tool_counts=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                    )
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nRECOVERY TERMINAL PASS EXIT - FINAL SYNTHESIS MODE:\n"
-                        + "- STOP calling tools.\n"
-                        + "- Synthesize from already collected evidence only.\n"
-                        + "- Return final SecurityFindings JSON now.\n"
-                    )
-                    toolsets = []
-                    zero_tool_mode = True
-                    max_tool_calls = 1
-                    max_turns = None
-                    continue
-                if used_grounding_retry:
-                    # Prefer deterministic scanner findings over ungrounded LLM hallucinations.
-                    return None
-                used_grounding_retry = True
-                guard_prompt = (
-                    user_prompt
-                    + "\n\nEVIDENCE GROUNDING GUARD:\n"
-                    + "- Before final answer, call at least one search/list tool and one evidence-read tool.\n"
-                    + "- Ground each vulnerability in concrete evidence from read_file/read_evidence_document output.\n"
-                    + "- If no concrete evidence is found, return zero vulnerabilities and confidence <= 0.4."
-                )
-                continue
-            if self._is_low_signal_search_burst(telemetry, policy=non_progress_policy):
-                cadence_accept_min_read_calls = (
-                    self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_CADENCE_ACCEPT_MIN_READ_CALLS",
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_CADENCE_ACCEPT_MIN_READ_CALLS",
-                    )
-                    or 2
-                )
-                cadence_accept_min_unique_tools = (
-                    self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_CADENCE_ACCEPT_MIN_UNIQUE_TOOLS",
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_CADENCE_ACCEPT_MIN_UNIQUE_TOOLS",
-                    )
-                    or 2
-                )
-                self.logger.warning(
-                    "security_low_signal_cadence_guard",
-                    observed_tool_names=(telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None),
-                    observed_tool_counts=(
-                        telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                    ),
-                    cadence_accept_min_read_calls=cadence_accept_min_read_calls,
-                    cadence_accept_min_unique_tools=cadence_accept_min_unique_tools,
-                )
-                has_min_grounding = self._has_min_evidence_grounding(
-                    telemetry if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None,
-                    min_read_calls=cadence_accept_min_read_calls,
-                    min_unique_tools=cadence_accept_min_unique_tools,
-                )
-                search_dominant = False
-                if isinstance(telemetry, dict):
-                    by_name = telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name")
-                    if isinstance(by_name, dict):
-                        search_calls = (
-                            int(by_name.get("list_directory", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("grep_search", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("rg_search", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("ast_grep_search", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence_vector", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("search_code_vector", 0) or 0)
-                        )
-                        read_calls = (
-                            int(by_name.get("read_file", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("read_evidence_document", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("get_definition", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("find_references", 0) or 0)
-                            + int(by_name.get("workspace_symbol", 0) or 0)
-                        )
-                        search_dominant = search_calls >= max(8, (read_calls * 4))
-                if budget_recovery_mode and (not has_min_grounding or search_dominant):
-                    used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot = True
-                    budget_recovery_mode = False
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_recovery_terminal_pass_early_synthesis_pivot",
-                        has_min_grounding=has_min_grounding,
-                        search_dominant=search_dominant,
-                        observed_tool_names=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                        observed_tool_counts=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                    )
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nRECOVERY TERMINAL PASS EXIT - FINAL SYNTHESIS MODE:\n"
-                        + "- STOP calling tools.\n"
-                        + "- Synthesize from already collected evidence only.\n"
-                        + "- Return final SecurityFindings JSON now.\n"
-                    )
-                    toolsets = []
-                    zero_tool_mode = True
-                    max_tool_calls = 1
-                    max_turns = None
-                    continue
-                if used_cadence_retry and not has_min_grounding:
-                    raise RuntimeError("security cadence guard unsatisfied: low-signal repetition without pivot")
-                used_cadence_retry = True
-                if has_min_grounding and not search_dominant:
-                    # Avoid unnecessary extra model round-trips when output is already grounded.
-                    self.logger.info(
-                        "security_cadence_guard_grounded_output_accepted",
-                        observed_tool_names=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                        observed_tool_counts=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                        cadence_accept_min_read_calls=cadence_accept_min_read_calls,
-                        cadence_accept_min_unique_tools=cadence_accept_min_unique_tools,
-                    )
-                    budget_recovery_mode = False
-                    break
-                guard_prompt = (
-                    user_prompt
-                    + "\n\nCADENCE PIVOT GUARD:\n"
-                    + "- Stop search/list-only bursts.\n"
-                    + "- Pivot from list/search tools to read_file/read_evidence_document on a concrete match.\n"
-                    + "- Do not finish without at least one high-signal evidence read."
-                )
-                if not zero_tool_mode:
-                    cadence_retry_max_turns = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_CADENCE_RETRY_MAX_TURNS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_CADENCE_RETRY_MAX_TURNS",
-                        )
-                        or 4
-                    )
-                    cadence_retry_max_tool_calls = (
-                        self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_CADENCE_RETRY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                            "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_CADENCE_RETRY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                        )
-                        or 6
-                    )
-                    cadence_retry_allowlist = self._parse_csv_env_any(
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_CADENCE_RETRY_TOOL_ALLOWLIST",
-                        "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_CADENCE_RETRY_TOOL_ALLOWLIST",
-                    )
-                    if cadence_retry_allowlist:
-                        toolsets = self._apply_tool_allowlist(toolsets, cadence_retry_allowlist)
-                    max_turns = (
-                        cadence_retry_max_turns if max_turns is None else min(max_turns, cadence_retry_max_turns)
-                    )
-                    max_tool_calls = min(max_tool_calls or 0, cadence_retry_max_tool_calls)
-                continue
-            vulnerability_count = len(getattr(output, "vulnerabilities", []) or [])
-            if vulnerability_count > 0:
-                strong_grounding = self._has_min_evidence_grounding(
-                    telemetry if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None,
-                    min_read_calls=2,
-                    min_unique_tools=3,
-                )
-                if not strong_grounding:
-                    if zero_tool_mode:
-                        self.logger.warning(
-                            "security_strict_grounding_guard_zero_tool_coerce",
-                            vulnerabilities_count=vulnerability_count,
-                            observed_tool_names=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                            observed_tool_counts=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                        )
-                        # In zero-tool synthesis mode we cannot gather additional evidence.
-                        # Prefer conservative output over ungrounded vulnerability assertions.
-                        output.vulnerabilities = []
-                        output.confidence = min(float(getattr(output, "confidence", 0.4) or 0.4), 0.4)
-                        if not output.recommendations:
-                            output.recommendations = [
-                                "Collect concrete security evidence (read_file/read_evidence_document) before reporting vulnerabilities."
-                            ]
-                        break
-                    if budget_recovery_mode and not used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot:
-                        used_recovery_early_synthesis_pivot = True
-                        budget_recovery_mode = False
-                        self.logger.warning(
-                            "security_recovery_terminal_pass_strict_grounding_pivot",
-                            vulnerabilities_count=vulnerability_count,
-                            observed_tool_names=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                            observed_tool_counts=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                        )
-                        guard_prompt = (
-                            user_prompt
-                            + "\n\nRECOVERY TERMINAL PASS EXIT - STRICT GROUNDING SYNTHESIS MODE:\n"
-                            + "- STOP calling tools.\n"
-                            + "- Use already collected evidence only.\n"
-                            + "- Return SecurityFindings JSON with conservative confidence when grounding is insufficient.\n"
-                        )
-                        toolsets = []
-                        zero_tool_mode = True
-                        max_tool_calls = 1
-                        max_turns = None
-                        continue
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "security_strict_grounding_guard_unsatisfied",
-                        vulnerabilities_count=vulnerability_count,
-                        observed_tool_names=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                        observed_tool_counts=(
-                            telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                        ),
-                    )
-                    if used_grounding_retry:
-                        self.logger.warning(
-                            "security_strict_grounding_guard_coerced_zero_vulnerabilities",
-                            vulnerabilities_count=vulnerability_count,
-                            observed_tool_names=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_names") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                            observed_tool_counts=(
-                                telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name") if isinstance(telemetry, dict) else None
-                            ),
-                        )
-                        # Conservative fallback: avoid ungrounded vulnerability claims.
-                        output.vulnerabilities = []
-                        output.confidence = min(float(getattr(output, "confidence", 0.4) or 0.4), 0.4)
-                        if not output.recommendations:
-                            output.recommendations = [
-                                "Collect concrete security evidence (read_file/read_evidence_document) before reporting vulnerabilities."
-                            ]
-                        break
-                    used_grounding_retry = True
-                    guard_prompt = (
-                        user_prompt
-                        + "\n\nSTRICT SECURITY GROUNDING GUARD:\n"
-                        + "- Do not report vulnerabilities unless grounded in concrete read_file/read_evidence_document evidence.\n"
-                        + "- Perform at least two evidence reads before final output.\n"
-                        + "- If concrete evidence remains insufficient, return zero vulnerabilities and confidence <= 0.4.\n"
-                    )
-                    if not zero_tool_mode:
-                        strict_grounding_retry_max_turns = (
-                            self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_STRICT_GROUNDING_RETRY_MAX_TURNS",
-                                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_STRICT_GROUNDING_RETRY_MAX_TURNS",
-                            )
-                            or 6
-                        )
-                        strict_grounding_retry_max_tool_calls = (
-                            self._parse_positive_int_env_any(
-                                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_STRICT_GROUNDING_RETRY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                                "VDS_AUDIT_AGENTIC_SECURITY_STRICT_GROUNDING_RETRY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS",
-                            )
-                            or 10
-                        )
-                        toolsets = self._apply_tool_allowlist(
-                            list(base_toolsets),
-                            ["list_evidence_documents", "read_evidence_document", "read_file"],
-                        )
-                        max_turns = min(max_turns or strict_grounding_retry_max_turns, strict_grounding_retry_max_turns)
-                        max_tool_calls = min(
-                            max_tool_calls or strict_grounding_retry_max_tool_calls,
-                            strict_grounding_retry_max_tool_calls,
-                        )
-                    continue
-            budget_recovery_mode = False
-            break
-
-        # Log response summary (additional specific fields)
-        self.logger.info(
-            "security_agent_response",
-            confidence=round(getattr(output, "confidence", 0), 2),
-            posture_score=getattr(output, "posture_score", None),
-            vulnerabilities_count=len(getattr(output, "vulnerabilities", []) or []),
-            recommendations_count=len(getattr(output, "recommendations", []) or []),
-        )
-        self._security_agent_runtime_summary = {
-            "security_agent_tool_calls_limit": security_reported_tool_calls_limit,
-            "security_agent_tool_call_limit_exhausted_count": tool_call_limit_exhausted_count,
-        }
-
-        return output
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _has_min_evidence_grounding(
-        telemetry: dict[str, Any] | None,
-        *,
-        min_read_calls: int = 1,
-        min_unique_tools: int = 2,
-    ) -> bool:
-        """Return True when tool telemetry shows both search/list and evidence-read activity."""
-        if not isinstance(telemetry, dict):
-            return False
-        by_name = telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name")
-        if not isinstance(by_name, dict):
-            return False
-
-        search_calls = (
-            int(by_name.get("list_directory", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("grep_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("rg_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("ast_grep_search", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_evidence_vector", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("search_code_vector", 0) or 0)
-        )
-        read_calls = (
-            int(by_name.get("read_file", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("read_evidence_document", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("get_definition", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("find_references", 0) or 0)
-            + int(by_name.get("workspace_symbol", 0) or 0)
-        )
-        unique_active_tools = sum(1 for value in by_name.values() if int(value or 0) > 0)
-        return (
-            search_calls >= 1
-            and read_calls >= max(1, int(min_read_calls))
-            and unique_active_tools >= max(1, int(min_unique_tools))
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _has_zero_tool_activity(telemetry: dict[str, Any] | None) -> bool:
-        """Return True when no tool call activity is observed for the run."""
-        if not isinstance(telemetry, dict):
-            return True
-        by_name = telemetry.get("event_tool_count_by_name")
-        if isinstance(by_name, dict):
-            total = sum(int(value or 0) for value in by_name.values())
-            if total > 0:
-                return False
-        completed = int(telemetry.get("event_tool_calls_completed", telemetry.get("event_tool_calls", 0)) or 0)
-        return completed <= 0
-
-    def _build_analysis_toolsets(self) -> list[Any]:
-        """Build optional MCP/skills toolsets for evidence-grounded analysis."""
-        try:
-            toolsets = _build_toolsets(get_config().llm)
-            enable_skills = self._is_security_skills_toolset_enabled(get_config().llm)
-            filtered: list[Any] = []
-            dropped = 0
-            for toolset in toolsets:
-                has_skills_map = isinstance(getattr(toolset, "skills", None), dict)
-                has_skill_metadata = isinstance(getattr(toolset, "_vds_skill_metadata", None), list)
-                if (not enable_skills) and (has_skills_map or has_skill_metadata):
-                    dropped += 1
-                    continue
-                filtered.append(toolset)
-            if dropped:
-                self.logger.info("security_analysis_skills_toolset_disabled", dropped_toolsets=dropped)
-            repo_path = getattr(self, "_analysis_repo_path", None)
-            if isinstance(repo_path, Path) and repo_path.exists():
-                try:
-                    cfg = get_config().agentic
-                    fs_toolset = create_filesystem_toolset(
-                        repo_path,
-                        safe_extensions=tuple(cfg.safe_extensions),
-                        max_read_bytes=int(cfg.max_read_bytes),
-                        max_read_lines=int(cfg.max_read_lines),
-                        grep_timeout_sec=int(cfg.tool_timeout_sec),
-                    )
-                    filtered.append(fs_toolset)
-                except Exception as exc:
-                    self.logger.warning("security_filesystem_toolset_unavailable", error=str(exc))
-            return filtered
-        except Exception as exc:
-            self.logger.warning("security_analysis_toolsets_failed", error=str(exc))
-            return []
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _collect_available_skill_names(toolsets: list[Any]) -> list[str]:
-        """Extract available skill names from toolset metadata."""
-        names: list[str] = []
-        for toolset in toolsets:
-            skills_map = getattr(toolset, "skills", None)
-            if isinstance(skills_map, dict) and skills_map:
-                for skill_name in skills_map:
-                    name = str(skill_name or "").strip()
-                    if name and name not in names:
-                        names.append(name)
-                continue
-            metadata = getattr(toolset, "_vds_skill_metadata", None)
-            if not isinstance(metadata, list):
-                continue
-            for entry in metadata:
-                name = str(getattr(entry, "name", "") or "").strip()
-                if name and name not in names:
-                    names.append(name)
-        return names
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _is_missing_skill_error(error: str) -> bool:
-        lowered = error.lower()
-        return "skill" in lowered and "not found" in lowered
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_tool_calls_exhausted_from_error(error: str) -> int | None:
-        match = re.search(r"tool_calls_limit of \d+ \(tool_calls=(\d+)\)", error, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-        if not match:
-            return None
-        try:
-            value = int(match.group(1))
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            return None
-        return value if value >= 0 else None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_request_limit_exhausted_from_error(error: str) -> int | None:
-        match = re.search(r"request_limit of (\d+)", error, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-        if not match:
-            return None
-        try:
-            value = int(match.group(1))
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            return None
-        return value if value >= 0 else None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_skill_name_from_error(error: str) -> str | None:
-        patterns = (
-            r"skill '([^']+)'",
-            r'skill "([^"]+)"',
-            r"skill_name['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([^'\"]+)['\"]",
-        )
-        for pattern in patterns:
-            match = re.search(pattern, error, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-            if match:
-                name = str(match.group(1)).strip()
-                if name:
-                    return name
-        return None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _drop_skill_from_toolsets(toolsets: list[Any], skill_name: str) -> tuple[list[Any], int]:
-        if not skill_name:
-            return list(toolsets), 0
-
-        removed_count = 0
-        updated_toolsets: list[Any] = []
-        for toolset in toolsets:
-            skills_map = getattr(toolset, "skills", None)
-            metadata = getattr(toolset, "_vds_skill_metadata", None)
-            if isinstance(skills_map, dict):
-                if skill_name in skills_map:
-                    skills_map.pop(skill_name, None)
-                    removed_count += 1
-                if isinstance(metadata, list):
-                    filtered_metadata = [
-                        item for item in metadata if str(getattr(item, "name", "") or "").strip() != skill_name
-                    ]
-                    toolset._vds_skill_metadata = filtered_metadata
-                if skills_map:
-                    updated_toolsets.append(toolset)
-                continue
-
-            if isinstance(metadata, list):
-                matched = False
-                filtered_metadata = []
-                for item in metadata:
-                    name = str(getattr(item, "name", "") or "").strip()
-                    if name == skill_name:
-                        matched = True
-                        continue
-                    filtered_metadata.append(item)
-                if matched:
-                    removed_count += 1
-                    toolset._vds_skill_metadata = filtered_metadata
-                    if filtered_metadata:
-                        updated_toolsets.append(toolset)
-                    continue
-            updated_toolsets.append(toolset)
-        return updated_toolsets, removed_count
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _drop_all_skill_toolsets(toolsets: list[Any]) -> tuple[list[Any], int]:
-        filtered_toolsets: list[Any] = []
-        removed = 0
-        for toolset in toolsets:
-            has_skills_map = isinstance(getattr(toolset, "skills", None), dict)
-            has_skill_metadata = isinstance(getattr(toolset, "_vds_skill_metadata", None), list)
-            if has_skills_map or has_skill_metadata:
-                removed += 1
-                continue
-            filtered_toolsets.append(toolset)
-        return filtered_toolsets, removed
-
-    def _build_analysis_prompt(
-        self,
-        evidence: EvidenceBundle,
-        existing_findings: list[dict[str, Any]],
-        *,
-        available_skill_names: list[str] | None = None,
-        tools_available: bool = True,
-        local_openai_mode: bool = False,
-    ) -> str:
-        """Build the user prompt for LLM analysis.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle for analysis.
-            existing_findings: Findings from rule-based analysis.
-
-        Returns:
-            Formatted prompt string.
-        """
-        context_parts = []
-
-        # Add SonarQube summary
-        if evidence.sonarqube_evidence:
-            context_parts.append("## SonarQube Evidence")
-            for metric in evidence.sonarqube_evidence[:5]:
-                context_parts.append(f"- {metric.title}: {metric.content[:500]}")
-
-        # Add sample of git files (security-relevant)
-        security_relevant_files = [
-            f
-            for f in evidence.git_evidence
-            if any(kw in f.source_id.lower() for kw in ["security", "auth", "config", "env", "secret"])
-        ]
-        if security_relevant_files:
-            context_parts.append("\n## Security-Relevant Files")
-            for f in security_relevant_files[:3]:
-                context_parts.append(f"### {f.source_id}\n```\n{f.content[:1000]}\n```")
-
-        # Add existing findings summary
-        if existing_findings:
-            context_parts.append("\n## Preliminary Findings from Static Analysis")
-            for finding in existing_findings[:10]:
-                severity = finding.get("severity", "INFO")
-                description = finding.get("description", "")
-                context_parts.append(f"- [{severity}] {description}")
-
-        skills_clause = ""
-        if available_skill_names:
-            skills_clause = (
-                "\nSkill usage constraints:\n"
-                f"- Available skills: {', '.join(available_skill_names)}\n"
-                "- Use only the available skill names exactly as listed.\n"
-                "- Do not invent or call missing skill names.\n"
-            )
-
-        if tools_available:
-            tool_requirements = """Tool-first requirements:
-- When tools are available, retrieve or verify evidence snippets before concluding.
-- Ground each vulnerability claim in retrieved code/doc evidence.
-- Do not rely on assumptions that cannot be traced to evidence.
-- Use an efficient flow: search -> read -> conclude (avoid repetitive search-only loops).
-- Prefer diversified tools over repeating the same search tool with near-identical intent."""
-            if local_openai_mode:
-                tool_requirements += """
-- Local OpenAI discipline: keep tool usage bounded and deterministic.
-- Use list_evidence_documents first, then targeted read_evidence_document/read_file.
-- Keep search_evidence calls minimal (prefer at most one broad search before reading concrete files)."""
-        else:
-            tool_requirements = """Zero-tool requirements (strict):
-- No tools are available for this run.
-- Do not call any tool or skill.
-- Return final JSON directly from the provided evidence context."""
-
-        return f"""Analyze the following evidence for security vulnerabilities and assess the overall security posture:
-
-Repository: {evidence.repository}
-
-{chr(10).join(context_parts)}
-
-{tool_requirements}
-{skills_clause}
-
-Provide a comprehensive security assessment including:
-1. All vulnerabilities found (with severity, category, and remediation)
-2. Overall security posture score (0-10)
-3. Detected security controls
-4. Prioritized recommendations
-
-Focus on identifying issues not already captured in the preliminary findings."""
-
-    def _get_repo_path(
-        self,
-        evidence: EvidenceBundle,
-        profile: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    ) -> Path | None:
-        """Extract repository path from evidence bundle or profile.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle that may contain repo path.
-            profile: Optional project profile with repo path.
-
-        Returns:
-            Path to the repository, or None if not available.
-        """
-        # Try to get repo_path from profile first
-        if profile:
-            repo_path = profile.get("repo_path") or profile.get("repository_path")
-            if repo_path:
-                path = Path(repo_path)
-                if path.exists():
-                    return path
-                self.logger.debug(
-                    "repo_path_from_profile_not_found",
-                    repo_path=repo_path,
-                )
-
-        # Try to get from evidence bundle metadata
-        if hasattr(evidence, "metadata") and evidence.metadata:
-            repo_path = evidence.metadata.get("repo_path") or evidence.metadata.get("repository_path")
-            if repo_path:
-                path = Path(repo_path)
-                if path.exists():
-                    return path
-
-        # Try to infer from evidence.repository (may be a URL or path)
-        if evidence.repository:
-            # Check if it's a local path
-            path = Path(evidence.repository)
-            if path.exists():
-                return path
-
-        self.logger.debug(
-            "repo_path_not_found",
-            repository=evidence.repository,
-            profile_keys=list(profile.keys()) if profile else [],
-        )
-        return None
-
-    async def _scan_security_patterns(self, repo_path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Scan repository for security patterns using scoped scanner.
-
-        Uses a scoped ripgrep-based scanner that ONLY searches
-        the target repository (FR-1.3).
-
-        Args:
-            repo_path: Path to the repository to scan.
-
-        Returns:
-            List of security findings from pattern scanning.
-        """
-        findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-
-        try:
-            scanner = SecurityPatternScanner(repo_path)
-            start = time.monotonic()
-            results = scanner.scan(SECURITY_PATTERNS)
-            duration_ms = int((time.monotonic() - start) * 1000)
-
-            for result in results:
-                findings.append(
-                    {
-                        "type": f"security_{result.pattern_name}",
-                        "severity": result.severity,
-                        "description": result.description,
-                        "location": f"{result.file_path}:{result.line_number}",
-                        "details": {
-                            "file_path": result.file_path,
-                            "line_number": result.line_number,
-                            "line_content": result.line_content,
-                            "match_text": result.match_text,
-                        },
-                        "source": "pattern_scanner",
-                    }
-                )
-
-            self.logger.info(
-                "security_pattern_scan_complete",
-                repo_path=str(repo_path),
-                findings_count=len(findings),
-            )
-            SkillExecutor.record_tool_usage(
-                {
-                    "tool": "security_pattern_scanner",
-                    "agent": "SecurityAgent",
-                    "repo_path": str(repo_path),
-                    "pattern_count": len(SECURITY_PATTERNS),
-                    "findings_count": len(findings),
-                    "duration_ms": duration_ms,
-                    "success": True,
-                }
-            )
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            self.logger.warning("pattern_scan_failed", error=str(e))
-            SkillExecutor.record_tool_usage(
-                {
-                    "tool": "security_pattern_scanner",
-                    "agent": "SecurityAgent",
-                    "repo_path": str(repo_path),
-                    "pattern_count": len(SECURITY_PATTERNS),
-                    "findings_count": 0,
-                    "duration_ms": 0,
-                    "success": False,
-                    "error": str(e),
-                }
-            )
-
-        return findings
-
-    def _vulnerability_to_finding(self, vuln: Vulnerability) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Convert a Vulnerability model to a finding dict.
-
-        Args:
-            vuln: Vulnerability model instance.
-
-        Returns:
-            Finding dictionary in standard audit format.
-        """
-        return {
-            "type": f"security_{vuln.category}",
-            "severity": vuln.severity.upper(),
-            "description": vuln.description,
-            "location": vuln.affected_component,
-            "recommendation": vuln.remediation,
-            "id": vuln.id,
-            "title": vuln.title,
-            "cvss_score": vuln.cvss_score,
-            "source": "pydantic_ai_analysis",
-        }
-
-    def _score_to_risk_level(self, score: float) -> str:
-        """Convert posture score to risk level.
-
-        Args:
-            score: Security posture score (0-10).
-
-        Returns:
-            Risk level string.
-        """
-        if score >= 8.0:
-            return "LOW"
-        if score >= 6.0:
-            return "MEDIUM"
-        if score >= 4.0:
-            return "HIGH"
-        return "CRITICAL"
-
-    def _generate_summary(self, findings: SecurityFindings) -> str:
-        """Generate a security summary from findings.
-
-        Args:
-            findings: SecurityFindings model instance.
-
-        Returns:
-            Summary string.
-        """
-        critical = findings.critical_count
-        high = findings.high_count
-        total = len(findings.vulnerabilities)
-
-        if critical > 0:
-            return (
-                f"Critical security issues detected: {critical} critical, "
-                f"{high} high severity vulnerabilities out of {total} total. "
-                f"Posture score: {findings.posture_score:.1f}/10."
-            )
-        if high > 0:
-            return (
-                f"Security concerns identified: {high} high severity "
-                f"vulnerabilities out of {total} total. "
-                f"Posture score: {findings.posture_score:.1f}/10."
-            )
-        if total > 0:
-            return (
-                f"Minor security issues found: {total} vulnerabilities detected. "
-                f"Posture score: {findings.posture_score:.1f}/10."
-            )
-        return f"No significant security issues detected. Posture score: {findings.posture_score:.1f}/10."
-
-    def _parse_sonarqube_evidence(self, evidence: EvidenceBundle) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Parse SonarQube evidence for security vulnerabilities.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle with SonarQube metrics.
-
-        Returns:
-            List of security findings from SonarQube.
-        """
-        findings = []
-
-        for metric in evidence.sonarqube_evidence:
-            content = metric.content
-
-            # Try to parse as JSON for structured analysis
-            try:
-                data = json.loads(content) if content.startswith("{") or content.startswith("[") else None
-            except json.JSONDecodeError:
-                data = None
-
-            if data:
-                # Structured SonarQube data parsing
-                issues = data.get("issues", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else data
-                for issue in issues if isinstance(issues, list) else []:
-                    severity = issue.get("severity", "UNKNOWN")
-                    if severity in ("CRITICAL", "BLOCKER"):
-                        findings.append(
-                            {
-                                "type": "sonarqube_vulnerability",
-                                "severity": "CRITICAL",
-                                "description": issue.get("message", f"Critical issue in {metric.title}"),
-                                "location": issue.get("component", metric.source_id),
-                                "rule": issue.get("rule", "unknown"),
-                                "source": "sonarqube",
-                            }
-                        )
-                    elif severity in ("MAJOR", "HIGH"):
-                        findings.append(
-                            {
-                                "type": "sonarqube_vulnerability",
-                                "severity": "HIGH",
-                                "description": issue.get("message", f"High severity issue in {metric.title}"),
-                                "location": issue.get("component", metric.source_id),
-                                "rule": issue.get("rule", "unknown"),
-                                "source": "sonarqube",
-                            }
-                        )
-            else:
-                # Fallback: keyword-based detection for unstructured content
-                severity_keywords = {
-                    "CRITICAL": [
-                        "CRITICAL",
-                        "BLOCKER",
-                        "vulnerability",
-                        "security hotspot",
-                    ],
-                    "HIGH": ["MAJOR", "HIGH", "injection", "authentication"],
-                    "MEDIUM": ["MINOR", "code smell"],
-                }
-
-                for severity, keywords in severity_keywords.items():
-                    if any(kw.lower() in content.lower() for kw in keywords):
-                        findings.append(
-                            {
-                                "type": "sonarqube_issue",
-                                "severity": severity,
-                                "description": f"{severity} severity issue detected in {metric.title}",
-                                "location": metric.source_id,
-                                "source": "sonarqube",
-                            }
-                        )
-                        break  # Only report highest severity match
-
-        return findings
-
-    def _analyze_git_evidence(self, evidence: EvidenceBundle) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Analyze git evidence for security-related patterns.
-
-        Args:
-            evidence: Evidence bundle with git files.
-
-        Returns:
-            List of security findings from git evidence.
-        """
-        findings = []
-
-        security_file_patterns = {
-            "security.md": "security_documentation",
-            "security.txt": "security_documentation",
-            ".snyk": "dependency_scanning",
-            "trivy.yaml": "container_scanning",
-            "dependabot.yml": "dependency_updates",
-            "codeql": "sast_scanning",
-        }
-
-        found_security_configs = set()
-
-        for file_evidence in evidence.git_evidence:
-            file_lower = file_evidence.source_id.lower()
-            content_lower = file_evidence.content.lower()
-
-            # Check for security configuration files
-            for pattern, config_type in security_file_patterns.items():
-                if pattern in file_lower:
-                    found_security_configs.add(config_type)
-
-            # Check for hardcoded secrets patterns
-            secret_patterns = [
-                ("password", "hardcoded_password"),
-                ("api_key", "hardcoded_api_key"),
-                ("secret_key", "hardcoded_secret"),
-                ("private_key", "hardcoded_private_key"),
-                ("bearer ", "hardcoded_token"),
-            ]
-
-            for pattern, issue_type in secret_patterns:
-                if pattern in content_lower and "=" in file_evidence.content:
-                    # Exclude common false positives
-                    if not any(fp in content_lower for fp in ["example", "placeholder", "your_", "xxx", "***"]):
-                        findings.append(
-                            {
-                                "type": f"potential_{issue_type}",
-                                "severity": "HIGH",
-                                "description": f"Potential {issue_type.replace('_', ' ')} in {file_evidence.title}",
-                                "location": file_evidence.source_id,
-                                "source": "git_analysis",
-                            }
-                        )
-
-        # Report missing security configurations
-        expected_configs = {"security_documentation", "dependency_scanning"}
-        missing = expected_configs - found_security_configs
-        if missing:
-            findings.append(
-                {
-                    "type": "missing_security_config",
-                    "severity": "MEDIUM",
-                    "description": f"Missing security configurations: {', '.join(missing)}",
-                    "recommendation": "Add SECURITY.md and enable dependency scanning (Snyk/Dependabot)",
-                    "source": "git_analysis",
-                }
-            )
-
-        return findings