@ngockhoale/ukit 3.4.75 → 3.4.77
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +58 -677
- package/package.json +11 -4
- package/src/cli/commands/markerStore.js +15 -0
- package/src/cli/index.js +7 -0
- package/src/core/markerStoreMigration.js +122 -0
- package/template_project/.claude/hooks/skill-router.sh +252 -33
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/index/publication-intent.mjs +154 -26
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/index/route-task.mjs +44 -1
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/runtime/cron-operation-adapter.mjs +13 -1
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/runtime/execution-ledger.mjs +410 -62
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/runtime/operation-evidence.mjs +32 -4
- package/template_project/.claude/ukit/runtime/stop-coordinator.mjs +6 -1
- package/template_project/.omp/hooks/pre/ukit-bridge.js +441 -20
- package/scripts/bug/triage.mjs +0 -76
- package/scripts/docs/render-instructions.mjs +0 -66
- package/scripts/index/build-index.mjs +0 -102
- package/scripts/index/query-index.mjs +0 -128
- package/scripts/index/refresh-index.mjs +0 -195
- package/scripts/install/sync-installed-mirror.mjs +0 -263
- package/scripts/skill/audit-skill.mjs +0 -68
- package/scripts/test/run-handoff-isolated.mjs +0 -178
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@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ export function foldOperationEvidence(bank = {}, receipt, ledger) {
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}
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const prior = bank[key] || {};
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const seen = Array.isArray(bank.seenToolUseIds) ? bank.seenToolUseIds : [];
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-
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-
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// Dedup per (toolUseId, domain): one chained command may prove several goals, never the same goal twice.
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const seenKey = `${receipt.toolUseId}|${op.domain}`;
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if (receipt.toolUseId && (seen.includes(seenKey) || seen.includes(receipt.toolUseId) || Object.values(bank).some((entry) =>
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[entry?.mutation, entry?.state].some((proof) => proof?.toolUseId === receipt.toolUseId && proof.operation?.domain === op.domain)))) return bank;
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if (receipt.toolUseId && (!bounded(receipt.toolUseId) || seen.length >= 256)) return { ...bank, overflow: true };
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// Carry remote parity across successful state checks only until the next mutation; gate checks live HEAD.
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const lastMutation = Object.values(bank).reduce((max, entry) => {
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@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ export function foldOperationEvidence(bank = {}, receipt, ledger) {
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...(remoteSync ? { remoteSync } : {}),
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...(github ? { github } : {}),
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} };
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-
return { ...bank, seenToolUseIds: receipt.toolUseId ? [...seen,
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return { ...bank, seenToolUseIds: receipt.toolUseId ? [...seen, seenKey] : seen,
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[key]: { ...prior, [op.role]: proof } };
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}
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@@ -155,10 +157,36 @@ export function operationEvidenceStatus(goal, ledger = {}) {
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return { complete: true, operationProof: 'executed-and-verified' };
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}
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// Every independent native obligation of the contract. `operationGoals` lists them all (a prompt that orders
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// commit/push AND a script deploy owns both); `operationGoal` stays the primary for older readers. A stale list
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// whose head is not exactly the primary goal (stale after a re-route that only replaced operationGoal) is
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// ignored rather than trusted.
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export function contractOperationGoals(contract) {
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const primary = contract?.operationGoal;
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if (!primary) return [];
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const list = Array.isArray(contract.operationGoals) ? contract.operationGoals.filter((goal) => goal && typeof goal === 'object') : [];
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return list.length > 1 && JSON.stringify(list[0]) === JSON.stringify(primary) ? list.slice(0, 4) : [primary];
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}
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// A task-owned native mutation attempt (successful or not) for this goal. Completion evidence only: it never
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// gates whether an operation may run, it only separates "attempted, now prove it" from "not yet attempted".
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export function operationAttempted(goal, ledger = {}) {
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if (!goal || !ledger.taskInstanceId || !ledger.sessionKey || !goal.scope) return false;
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return Object.entries(ledger.operationBank || {}).some(([key, entry]) => key !== 'overflow' && key !== 'seenToolUseIds'
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&& entry?.mutation?.taskInstanceId === ledger.taskInstanceId && entry.mutation.sessionKey === ledger.sessionKey
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&& entry.mutation.operation?.domain === goal.domain && entry.mutation.operation.scope === goal.scope);
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}
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+
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export function operationCompletionPolicy(contract, _adapterGoal, ledger) {
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if (contract?.publication && !contract.operationGoal) return null; // Publication uses the registry-bound release-publication proof.
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const kind = String(contract?.taskKind || '').toUpperCase();
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if (!['OPERATIONAL', 'MIXED', 'CONFIGURATION'].includes(kind)
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|| (kind === 'CONFIGURATION' && contract.configurationScope !== 'external')) return null;
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-
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const goals = contractOperationGoals(contract);
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if (goals.length <= 1) return operationEvidenceStatus(contract.operationGoal, ledger) || { complete: false, operationProof: null };
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// Multi-operation task: each independent goal needs its own proof; one never stands in for another.
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const statuses = goals.map((goal) => ({ goal, status: operationEvidenceStatus(goal, ledger) || { complete: false, operationProof: null } }));
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const unmet = statuses.filter((entry) => entry.status.complete !== true).map((entry) => entry.goal);
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return { complete: unmet.length === 0, operationProof: unmet.length === 0 ? statuses.map((entry) => entry.status.operationProof).join('+') : null,
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unmetGoals: unmet };
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}
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@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ export function normalizeEvaluatorStdout(stdout) {
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...(parsed.outcome === 'blocked' && parsed.complete === false ? { outcome: 'blocked', complete: false } : {}),
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};
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}
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// A message-less non-completion release (the finite handback was already delivered) is never a pass.
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if (parsed && parsed.outcome === 'blocked' && parsed.complete === false) return { kind: 'none', outcome: 'blocked', complete: false };
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return { kind: 'complete' };
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}
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@@ -2258,7 +2260,10 @@ export async function ownerStopState({ projectRoot, payload = {} } = {}) {
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try {
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const route = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path.join(projectRoot, '.ukit/storage/cache/route-state', `${safe}.json`), 'utf8'));
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if (String(route?.sessionId || '').trim() !== String(sessionId).trim()) return { active: false };
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-
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// An incomplete publication fails closed for COMPLETION (no task identity is trusted), but the owner STOP it
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// carries is honoured: the pending marker is written with the standing STOP so an interrupted publication
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// cannot lift it. Only a marker that itself carries the STOP keeps it active.
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if (route.routePublicationIncomplete === true && route?.ownerControl?.kind !== 'stop') return { active: false };
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return route?.ownerControl?.kind === 'stop' ? { active: true, control: route.ownerControl } : { active: false };
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} catch {
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return { active: false };
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
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evidencePromptKey,
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incrementContinuation,
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markNotified,
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markHandback,
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readExecutionLedger,
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readRouteState,
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ownerStopActive,
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@@ -1119,6 +1120,17 @@ export async function runBeforeAgentStart(pi, event, { projectRoot, context: ext
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// advisory refresh — routing continues on the previously recorded model
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}
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const metadata = runtimeMetadata(event, extensionContext);
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// Turn evidence for the UNKNOWN-ownership stop lanes: this is the bridge's only
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// signal that a NEW logical turn started. A session_stop arriving later can be
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// called "the same stop" only if NO before_agent_start fired since its block.
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try {
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const turnKey = unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, metadata.sessionId);
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// Process-wide monotonic sequence: an evicted-then-reinserted key always receives a
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// value above any count recorded before eviction, so eviction can never masquerade
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// as "no new turn" (see unknownOwnershipRepeat).
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unknownOwnershipTurnSeq += 1;
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boundedSet(unknownOwnershipTurnCounts, turnKey, unknownOwnershipTurnSeq);
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} catch { /* evidence unavailable → anti-wedge semantics apply */ }
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const payload = buildHookPayload('UserPromptSubmit', {
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prompt: event.prompt,
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promptOrigin: takeOwnContinuation(metadata.sessionId, event.prompt) ? 'system' : promptOriginFromBranch(event.prompt, extensionContext),
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@@ -1444,18 +1456,370 @@ async function readStopGateMaxCrashStreaks(projectRoot) {
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// the shared state file (.ukit/storage/cache/stop-coordinator/state.json) stay
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// byte-identical across both engines.
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const STOP_GATE_LOCK_BUDGET_MS = 600;
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// Finite-exit memory for the UNKNOWN-ownership stop lanes: block ONCE per exact
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// (session, task identity, cursor bytes, reason), then release an identical repeat
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// without completion. Properties (user acceptance):
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// DURABLE — the recorded verdict persists per key, so a host restart (a REAL new
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// process) still honors it: an identical repeat releases; a restart must not
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// resurrect the block.
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// LOGICAL-STOP BY TURN EVIDENCE, not wall-clock — omp has no stop-event id (no
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// turn linkage between before_agent_start and session_stop), but the bridge
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// OBSERVES before_agent_start: a stop that arrives after a new turn started is
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// a genuinely later stop (the continuation turn ran and stopped again with
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// unchanged evidence → finite exit); a stop with NO intervening turn is the
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// same logical stop (duplicate callback → RETAIN the block, never consume the
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// exit). Turn evidence is process-local: a different process has none and
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// fails anti-wedge (release once, sticky). A release is sticky per signature.
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// TASK-SCOPED — the key binds the route state's taskInstanceId, falling back to
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// the cursor's own RunId, then 'no-run'; the signature hashes the FULL cursor
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// bytes (streamed sha256), so even two legacy cursors without any identity
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// never share a bound — different bytes are different tasks.
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// CONSERVATIVE FINGERPRINT — the cursor is streamed in full; a cursor too large
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// to fingerprint (pathological) is NEVER released in these lanes (block).
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// OPAQUE — shard file names are sha256(session+task); shard contents are
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// sha256(reason, cursor hash) plus timestamps: no session/task id, no reason
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// text and no cursor bytes ever reach disk.
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// NO CROSS-SESSION LOSS — one shard file per hashed key: a read-modify-write —
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// even one that proceeds after its lock budget lapses — touches ONLY its own
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// key's shard, so another session's record can never be lost. The per-key lock
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// (exclusive create, stale takeover, bounded wait) serializes same-key
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// writers; atomic rename keeps every write torn-file-free.
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// BOUNDED — shards are capped (new keys beyond the cap stay in-proc only) and
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// the in-proc Map is capped as well: the fallback floor is bounded per
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// process — never a wedge, never unbounded.
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_REPORTED_MAX = 256;
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_CURSOR_HASH_MAX = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_CURSOR_CHUNK = 64 * 1024;
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const unknownOwnershipReported = new Map();
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-
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-
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const unknownOwnershipStoreQueue = new Map();
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const unknownOwnershipTurnCounts = new Map();
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// Turn count observed when the coordinator-up path last emitted a block for a session;
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// a turn after it means the cached dedupe replay must not swallow the next stop.
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const coordinatedBlockTurnMark = new Map();
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// Both in-process turn maps are bounded; eviction is never a wedge (see unknownOwnershipRepeat).
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_STATE_MAX = 256;
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let unknownOwnershipTurnSeq = 0;
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function boundedSet(map, key, value) {
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map.delete(key);
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map.set(key, value);
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while (map.size > UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_STATE_MAX) map.delete(map.keys().next().value);
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}
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let unknownOwnershipTempCounter = 0;
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// Turn evidence is scoped to the project root AND session: a turn in one repo never
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// advances another repo's finite exit.
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function unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, sessionId) {
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return `${projectRoot}\u0000${String(sessionId ?? 'no-session')}`;
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}
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// Process-local identity for the turn-evidence comparison: turn counts only mean
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// something inside the process that observed them.
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const unknownOwnershipProcessId = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
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function unknownOwnershipStoreKey(sessionId, taskIdentity) {
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return `${sessionId ?? 'no-session'}\u0000${taskIdentity || 'no-run'}`;
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}
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function withUnknownOwnershipStore(projectRoot, mutate) {
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// Serialize same-host read-modify-write cycles per project root; a failed
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// previous write must not poison the queue.
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const prev = unknownOwnershipStoreQueue.get(projectRoot) || Promise.resolve();
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const next = prev.catch(() => {}).then(mutate);
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unknownOwnershipStoreQueue.set(projectRoot, next);
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const purge = () => {
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if (unknownOwnershipStoreQueue.get(projectRoot) === next) unknownOwnershipStoreQueue.delete(projectRoot);
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};
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next.then(purge, purge);
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return next;
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}
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// CREATE-ONLY MARKER PRIMITIVES (no lock, no reclaim). Each marker is published with
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// link(2) from a fully written temp file: link fails with EEXIST when the name exists, so a
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// reader sees either no marker or a complete one, and no two creators can both win one name.
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// Nothing is overwritten and no lock is taken over, so an orphaned lock file cannot wedge a stop.
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_DIR = path.join('.ukit', 'storage', 'cache', 'omp-bridge-unknown-markers');
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_MAX = 512;
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_TMP_STALE_MS = 60 * 1000;
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const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_RE = /^([0-9a-f]{64})\.([0-9a-f]{64})\.(block|release)$/;
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const unknownOwnershipMarkerDir = (projectRoot) => path.join(projectRoot, UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_DIR);
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const unknownOwnershipMarkerFile = (projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, kind) => path.join(unknownOwnershipMarkerDir(projectRoot), `${keyHash}.${sigHash}.${kind}`);
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// Returns true when this call created the marker, false when the name already existed.
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// Any other error propagates (storage failure) and is never reported as EEXIST.
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async function createUnknownOwnershipMarker(file, body) {
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unknownOwnershipTempCounter += 1;
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const tmp = `${file}.tmp-${process.pid}-${unknownOwnershipTempCounter}-${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`;
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await fs.promises.writeFile(tmp, body, { flag: 'wx' });
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try {
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await fs.promises.link(tmp, file);
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return true;
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} catch (error) {
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if (error?.code === 'EEXIST') return false;
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throw error;
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} finally {
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await fs.promises.rm(tmp, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
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}
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}
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// ENOENT → null (absent). A published marker is whole, so an unparseable body is external
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// damage: it is reported as FOREIGN ({p:null}) and releases once, never as turn evidence.
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async function readUnknownOwnershipMarker(file) {
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let raw;
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try {
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raw = await fs.promises.readFile(file, 'utf8');
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} catch (error) {
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if (error?.code === 'ENOENT') return null;
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throw error;
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}
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try {
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const body = JSON.parse(raw);
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if (body && body.v === 2 && typeof body.p === 'string' && Number.isFinite(body.k)) return body;
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} catch { /* fall through: foreign */ }
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return { v: 2, p: null, k: null };
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}
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// A published release is sticky. Storage errors are distinct from a missing marker:
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// inaccessible storage must not trap a cached block indefinitely.
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1575
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async function releaseMarkerExists(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash) {
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try {
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+
await fs.promises.stat(unknownOwnershipMarkerFile(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, 'release'));
|
|
1578
|
+
return true;
|
|
1579
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
1580
|
+
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT') return false;
|
|
1581
|
+
throw error;
|
|
1582
|
+
}
|
|
1583
|
+
}
|
|
1584
|
+
// No final marker is ever removed: only temp files from crashed writers are swept once stale.
|
|
1585
|
+
// Capacity is therefore NOT recovered by pruning; at the cap the store stays saturated. A stat-then-unlink prune can delete a marker that
|
|
1586
|
+
// another process recreated under the same hashed name in between (a delayed unlink hits the
|
|
1587
|
+
// successor). The admission threshold is soft: concurrent blocks may exceed it, and releases
|
|
1588
|
+
// bypass it. At capacity a new block is refused and that stop is FAIL-OPEN released. Only temp files are swept, and
|
|
1589
|
+
// their names embed a per-writer random suffix, so no later writer can recreate them.
|
|
1590
|
+
async function reserveUnknownOwnershipSlot(dir) {
|
|
1591
|
+
let names;
|
|
1592
|
+
// A readdir failure propagates (storage error); it is never reported as saturation.
|
|
1593
|
+
names = await fs.promises.readdir(dir);
|
|
1594
|
+
const now = Date.now();
|
|
1595
|
+
let finals = 0;
|
|
1596
|
+
for (const name of names) {
|
|
1597
|
+
if (name.includes('.tmp-')) {
|
|
1598
|
+
const full = path.join(dir, name);
|
|
1599
|
+
try {
|
|
1600
|
+
if (now - (await fs.promises.stat(full)).mtimeMs > UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_TMP_STALE_MS) await fs.promises.rm(full, { force: true });
|
|
1601
|
+
} catch { /* raced */ }
|
|
1602
|
+
continue;
|
|
1603
|
+
}
|
|
1604
|
+
if (UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_RE.test(name)) finals += 1;
|
|
1605
|
+
}
|
|
1606
|
+
// Check-then-create: creators racing at the boundary can each pass this check, so the store may
|
|
1607
|
+
// exceed UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_MAX by up to the number of concurrent creators. No marker is deleted.
|
|
1608
|
+
return finals < UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_MARKER_MAX;
|
|
1609
|
+
}
|
|
1610
|
+
const unknownOwnershipPendingRelease = new Map();
|
|
1611
|
+
const UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_PENDING_MAX = 256;
|
|
1612
|
+
async function persistUnknownOwnershipRelease(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, k) {
|
|
1613
|
+
const pendingKey = `${projectRoot}\u0000${keyHash}\u0000${sigHash}`;
|
|
1614
|
+
let persisted = false;
|
|
1615
|
+
try {
|
|
1616
|
+
await fs.promises.mkdir(unknownOwnershipMarkerDir(projectRoot), { recursive: true });
|
|
1617
|
+
await createUnknownOwnershipMarker(unknownOwnershipMarkerFile(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, 'release'), JSON.stringify({ v: 2, p: unknownOwnershipProcessId, k: k ?? 0 }));
|
|
1618
|
+
persisted = true;
|
|
1619
|
+
} catch { persisted = false; }
|
|
1620
|
+
unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.delete(pendingKey);
|
|
1621
|
+
if (!persisted) {
|
|
1622
|
+
unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.set(pendingKey, k ?? 0);
|
|
1623
|
+
while (unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.size > UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_PENDING_MAX) {
|
|
1624
|
+
unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.delete(unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.keys().next().value);
|
|
1625
|
+
}
|
|
1626
|
+
}
|
|
1627
|
+
return persisted;
|
|
1628
|
+
}
|
|
1629
|
+
// Marker-phase decision (create-only, no lock). A .release marker is sticky. A .block marker
|
|
1630
|
+
// written by THIS process decides by turn evidence (moved counter → release; missing or
|
|
1631
|
+
// unchanged → duplicate, block retained). A foreign or unreadable .block releases once.
|
|
1632
|
+
// No .block → create it exclusively; losing the create race re-reads the winner (bounded).
|
|
1633
|
+
async function decideUnknownOwnershipMarkers(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, turnKey) {
|
|
1634
|
+
await fs.promises.mkdir(unknownOwnershipMarkerDir(projectRoot), { recursive: true });
|
|
1635
|
+
const blockFile = unknownOwnershipMarkerFile(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, 'block');
|
|
1636
|
+
if (await releaseMarkerExists(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash)) {
|
|
1637
|
+
return { decided: 'repeat', k: unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKey) ?? 0, release: false };
|
|
1638
|
+
}
|
|
1639
|
+
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
|
|
1640
|
+
const marker = await readUnknownOwnershipMarker(blockFile);
|
|
1641
|
+
if (marker === null) {
|
|
1642
|
+
const current = unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKey) ?? 0;
|
|
1643
|
+
// At the soft admission limit (concurrent creators may overshoot it) no durable record is created and the stop is FAIL-OPEN released: a
|
|
1644
|
+
// saturated store must never wedge a stop behind an endless block, and releasing claims no
|
|
1645
|
+
// completion (cursor untouched). Nothing is pruned, so no existing marker is removed.
|
|
1646
|
+
if (!(await reserveUnknownOwnershipSlot(unknownOwnershipMarkerDir(projectRoot)))) {
|
|
1647
|
+
return { decided: 'degraded', reason: 'saturated', release: false, durable: false };
|
|
1648
|
+
}
|
|
1649
|
+
const created = await createUnknownOwnershipMarker(blockFile, JSON.stringify({ v: 2, p: unknownOwnershipProcessId, k: current }));
|
|
1650
|
+
if (created) return { decided: 'first', k: current, release: false };
|
|
1651
|
+
continue;
|
|
1652
|
+
}
|
|
1653
|
+
if (marker.p === unknownOwnershipProcessId) {
|
|
1654
|
+
const current = unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKey);
|
|
1655
|
+
if (current !== undefined && current !== marker.k) return { decided: 'repeat', k: marker.k, release: true };
|
|
1656
|
+
return { decided: 'duplicate', k: marker.k, release: false };
|
|
1657
|
+
}
|
|
1658
|
+
return { decided: 'repeat', k: marker.k ?? 0, release: true };
|
|
1659
|
+
}
|
|
1660
|
+
throw new Error('unknown-ownership marker race did not settle');
|
|
1661
|
+
}
|
|
1662
|
+
// Test-only: drive the verdict directly and bump turn evidence without the router.
|
|
1663
|
+
export function unknownOwnershipTestHooks() {
|
|
1664
|
+
return {
|
|
1665
|
+
repeat: unknownOwnershipRepeat,
|
|
1666
|
+
bumpTurn(projectRoot, sessionId) {
|
|
1667
|
+
unknownOwnershipTurnSeq += 1;
|
|
1668
|
+
boundedSet(unknownOwnershipTurnCounts, unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, sessionId), unknownOwnershipTurnSeq);
|
|
1669
|
+
},
|
|
1670
|
+
};
|
|
1671
|
+
}
|
|
1672
|
+
function rememberUnknownOwnership(memKey, entry) {
|
|
1673
|
+
unknownOwnershipReported.set(memKey, entry);
|
|
1674
|
+
if (unknownOwnershipReported.size > UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_REPORTED_MAX) {
|
|
1675
|
+
const oldest = unknownOwnershipReported.keys().next().value;
|
|
1676
|
+
if (oldest !== undefined && oldest !== memKey) unknownOwnershipReported.delete(oldest);
|
|
1677
|
+
}
|
|
1678
|
+
}
|
|
1679
|
+
// Full streaming fingerprint: the WHOLE cursor is hashed, so evidence changes are
|
|
1680
|
+
// never invisible because of a prefix cut. A pathologically large cursor is
|
|
1681
|
+
// unfingerprintable → the caller fails conservative (block; never release).
|
|
1682
|
+
async function unknownOwnershipCursorFingerprint(projectRoot) {
|
|
1683
|
+
const cursorPath = path.join(projectRoot, 'docs/AI_HANDOFF/RUN.md');
|
|
1684
|
+
const handle = await fs.promises.open(cursorPath, 'r');
|
|
1450
1685
|
try {
|
|
1451
|
-
const
|
|
1452
|
-
|
|
1453
|
-
|
|
1454
|
-
|
|
1455
|
-
|
|
1456
|
-
|
|
1457
|
-
|
|
1458
|
-
|
|
1686
|
+
const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256');
|
|
1687
|
+
const chunk = Buffer.alloc(UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_CURSOR_CHUNK);
|
|
1688
|
+
let total = 0;
|
|
1689
|
+
let headText = '';
|
|
1690
|
+
for (;;) {
|
|
1691
|
+
const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(chunk, 0, chunk.length, null);
|
|
1692
|
+
if (bytesRead === 0) break;
|
|
1693
|
+
const bytes = chunk.subarray(0, bytesRead);
|
|
1694
|
+
hash.update(bytes);
|
|
1695
|
+
if (headText === '') headText = bytes.toString('utf8');
|
|
1696
|
+
total += bytesRead;
|
|
1697
|
+
if (total > UNKNOWN_OWNERSHIP_CURSOR_HASH_MAX) {
|
|
1698
|
+
return { unfingerprintable: true, runId: /^RunId:\s*(\S+)/im.exec(headText)?.[1] || null };
|
|
1699
|
+
}
|
|
1700
|
+
}
|
|
1701
|
+
return { unfingerprintable: false, hash: hash.digest('hex'), runId: /^RunId:\s*(\S+)/im.exec(headText)?.[1] || null };
|
|
1702
|
+
} finally {
|
|
1703
|
+
try { await handle.close(); } catch { /* best effort */ }
|
|
1704
|
+
}
|
|
1705
|
+
}
|
|
1706
|
+
// Degraded releases (cursor too large to fingerprint; store saturated; store unavailable) are
|
|
1707
|
+
// explicit verdicts 'degraded:<reason>' that release with a named notice. They never claim
|
|
1708
|
+
// completion, never touch the cursor, and are never memorized, so they cannot pin a block.
|
|
1709
|
+
const UNKNOWN_DEGRADED_NOTICE = {
|
|
1710
|
+
fingerprint: 'the handoff cursor exceeds the fingerprint bound (8 MiB), so its evidence cannot be proven unchanged',
|
|
1711
|
+
saturated: 'the UNKNOWN repeat store is saturated (512 durable records); capacity does not recover automatically, so this stop is released without a durable record',
|
|
1712
|
+
storage: 'the UNKNOWN repeat store is unavailable (storage error); this stop is released without a durable record',
|
|
1713
|
+
unreadable: 'the handoff cursor exists but cannot be read, so its evidence cannot be checked; this stop is released without a completion claim',
|
|
1714
|
+
};
|
|
1715
|
+
const isUnknownRelease = (verdict) => verdict === 'repeat' || (typeof verdict === 'string' && verdict.startsWith('degraded:'));
|
|
1716
|
+
// A plain repeat proves the evidence is unchanged. A degraded release cannot prove that, so the
|
|
1717
|
+
// notice states the uncertainty instead of asserting that no new evidence exists.
|
|
1718
|
+
function unknownReleaseClause(verdict) {
|
|
1719
|
+
return typeof verdict === 'string' && verdict.startsWith('degraded:')
|
|
1720
|
+
? 'new evidence could not be verified (degraded release)'
|
|
1721
|
+
: 'no new evidence or authority exists';
|
|
1722
|
+
}
|
|
1723
|
+
function unknownDegradedNotice(verdict) {
|
|
1724
|
+
if (typeof verdict !== 'string' || !verdict.startsWith('degraded:')) return '';
|
|
1725
|
+
const notice = UNKNOWN_DEGRADED_NOTICE[verdict.slice('degraded:'.length)] ?? 'the UNKNOWN repeat store could not decide';
|
|
1726
|
+
return `[UKit] Degraded release (no completion claim): ${notice}.`;
|
|
1727
|
+
}
|
|
1728
|
+
// Returns 'first' (record a block), 'duplicate' (same logical stop — no new turn
|
|
1729
|
+
// since the block: retain the block, do NOT consume the finite exit) or 'repeat'
|
|
1730
|
+
// (a genuinely later stop with unchanged evidence — or already-released evidence,
|
|
1731
|
+
// or a record from another process: release again).
|
|
1732
|
+
async function unknownOwnershipRepeat(projectRoot, sessionId, reason, taskInstanceId = null, { now = Date.now() } = {}) {
|
|
1733
|
+
let fingerprint;
|
|
1734
|
+
try {
|
|
1735
|
+
fingerprint = await unknownOwnershipCursorFingerprint(projectRoot);
|
|
1736
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
1737
|
+
// A genuinely absent cursor keeps the shared 'no-cursor' bound. Any other read error (EISDIR,
|
|
1738
|
+
// EACCES, EIO, ...) means the evidence cannot be read: that is a DEGRADED release, never a
|
|
1739
|
+
// label that could be mistaken for an unchanged-evidence repeat.
|
|
1740
|
+
if (error?.code !== 'ENOENT') return 'degraded:unreadable';
|
|
1741
|
+
fingerprint = { unfingerprintable: false, hash: 'no-cursor', runId: null };
|
|
1742
|
+
}
|
|
1743
|
+
// A cursor too large to fingerprint cannot be proven unchanged. It is a DEGRADED release (no
|
|
1744
|
+
// completion claim, cursor untouched) — never an endless block that no repeat can clear.
|
|
1745
|
+
if (fingerprint.unfingerprintable) return 'degraded:fingerprint';
|
|
1746
|
+
// Task identity precedence: route-state taskInstanceId (what the ledger and the
|
|
1747
|
+
// gates bind) → the cursor's own RunId → 'no-run' (the byte hash still isolates).
|
|
1748
|
+
const taskIdentity = taskInstanceId || fingerprint.runId || 'no-run';
|
|
1749
|
+
const storeKey = unknownOwnershipStoreKey(sessionId, taskIdentity);
|
|
1750
|
+
// Opaque on disk: hashed shard name (no raw session/task id) and hashed
|
|
1751
|
+
// signature (no reason text, no cursor bytes).
|
|
1752
|
+
const keyHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(storeKey).digest('hex');
|
|
1753
|
+
const sigHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(`${reason}\u0000${fingerprint.hash}`).digest('hex');
|
|
1754
|
+
const signature = sigHash;
|
|
1755
|
+
const memKey = `${projectRoot}\u0000${storeKey}`;
|
|
1756
|
+
const turnKey = unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, sessionId);
|
|
1757
|
+
// Every decision (memory AND marker) runs inside the per-root queue, so a concurrent
|
|
1758
|
+
// same-process duplicate waits for the first call's memory record.
|
|
1759
|
+
return withUnknownOwnershipStore(projectRoot, async () => {
|
|
1760
|
+
// A release this process already proved but could not persist: retry it first. Whether or
|
|
1761
|
+
// not it lands, the proven release is authoritative for this evidence.
|
|
1762
|
+
const pendingKey = `${projectRoot}\u0000${keyHash}\u0000${sigHash}`;
|
|
1763
|
+
if (unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.has(pendingKey)) {
|
|
1764
|
+
await persistUnknownOwnershipRelease(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, unknownOwnershipPendingRelease.get(pendingKey));
|
|
1765
|
+
return 'repeat';
|
|
1766
|
+
}
|
|
1767
|
+
const mem = unknownOwnershipReported.get(memKey);
|
|
1768
|
+
if (mem && mem.s === sigHash) {
|
|
1769
|
+
// Same process → the turn counter is authoritative evidence. A duplicate callback
|
|
1770
|
+
// never mutates the record: the initial block is retained, the exit NOT consumed.
|
|
1771
|
+
if (mem.r === 1) return 'repeat'; // sticky: this evidence was already released
|
|
1772
|
+
const turns = unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKey);
|
|
1773
|
+
// A MISSING counter is unknown evidence (bounded state evicted it), never proof of a
|
|
1774
|
+
// new turn: retain the block and do not consume the exit. A real turn re-inserts the
|
|
1775
|
+
// counter with a process-wide sequence value that differs from mem.k, so it releases.
|
|
1776
|
+
if (turns !== undefined && turns !== mem.k) {
|
|
1777
|
+
rememberUnknownOwnership(memKey, { s: signature, t: mem.t, r: 1, k: turns }); // sticky release
|
|
1778
|
+
await persistUnknownOwnershipRelease(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, turns); // survive memory eviction
|
|
1779
|
+
return 'repeat'; // a turn ran since the block: genuinely later stop
|
|
1780
|
+
}
|
|
1781
|
+
// P0 stale-cached-block fix: while this r:0 record was cached, ANOTHER bridge
|
|
1782
|
+
// instance may have durably released this exact evidence (a .release marker is
|
|
1783
|
+
// create-once-sticky, so its presence proves a prior release decision). The
|
|
1784
|
+
// durable release outranks this process's cached block — without this check the
|
|
1785
|
+
// cached block would override it forever, because no turn can advance this
|
|
1786
|
+
// process's counter while the host idles. Adopt the durable release as sticky.
|
|
1787
|
+
try {
|
|
1788
|
+
if (await releaseMarkerExists(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash)) {
|
|
1789
|
+
rememberUnknownOwnership(memKey, { s: signature, t: mem.t, r: 1, k: mem.k });
|
|
1790
|
+
return 'repeat';
|
|
1791
|
+
}
|
|
1792
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1793
|
+
return 'degraded:storage';
|
|
1794
|
+
}
|
|
1795
|
+
return 'duplicate'; // no new turn: same logical stop → retain the block
|
|
1796
|
+
}
|
|
1797
|
+
// No process-local record: consult the durable markers (possibly written by another
|
|
1798
|
+
// process). Turn evidence does not survive processes, so a foreign record releases once.
|
|
1799
|
+
// Storage failure or capacity saturation is FAIL-OPEN: release without durable state, so
|
|
1800
|
+
// a broken or full store can never hold a stop open. Release claims no completion.
|
|
1801
|
+
let k = unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKey) ?? 0;
|
|
1802
|
+
try {
|
|
1803
|
+
const outcome = await decideUnknownOwnershipMarkers(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, turnKey);
|
|
1804
|
+
// Degraded verdicts are never memorized: they release explicitly and pin nothing.
|
|
1805
|
+
if (outcome.decided === 'degraded') return `degraded:${outcome.reason}`;
|
|
1806
|
+
if (outcome.k !== undefined) k = outcome.k;
|
|
1807
|
+
if (outcome.release) await persistUnknownOwnershipRelease(projectRoot, keyHash, sigHash, k);
|
|
1808
|
+
const verdict = outcome.decided;
|
|
1809
|
+
rememberUnknownOwnership(memKey, { s: signature, t: now, r: verdict === 'repeat' ? 1 : 0, k });
|
|
1810
|
+
return verdict;
|
|
1811
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1812
|
+
return 'degraded:storage';
|
|
1813
|
+
}
|
|
1814
|
+
});
|
|
1815
|
+
}
|
|
1816
|
+
|
|
1817
|
+
// Test-only observability for the bounded in-process state (sizes, never contents).
|
|
1818
|
+
export function unknownOwnershipStateSizesForTest() {
|
|
1819
|
+
return { turns: unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.size, marks: coordinatedBlockTurnMark.size, reported: unknownOwnershipReported.size };
|
|
1820
|
+
}
|
|
1821
|
+
export function unknownOwnershipMarkForTest(projectRoot, sessionId) {
|
|
1822
|
+
return coordinatedBlockTurnMark.get(unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, sessionId)) ?? null;
|
|
1459
1823
|
}
|
|
1460
1824
|
|
|
1461
1825
|
const HANDOFF_PROVENANCE_PREFIX = '[ukit-stop-coordinator] handoff-cursor also requested a block: ';
|
|
@@ -1531,9 +1895,20 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1531
1895
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pi.logger?.warn?.(`[UKit] stop-coordinator module unavailable (dedupe + handoff lanes skipped): ${error?.message || error}`);
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1532
1896
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}
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1533
1897
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const state = suppliedState ?? await readRouteState(projectRoot, payload);
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1534
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-
if (
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1535
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-
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1536
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-
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1898
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+
if (ownerStopActive(state, payload)) {
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1899
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+
// The STOP marker is read from the route state (execution-ledger), not from the
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1900
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+
// coordinator — an unloadable coordinator module must not turn an explicit owner
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1901
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+
// STOP into an endless gate. `releaseForOwnerStop` (cursor → PAUSED) is a
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1902
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+
// best-effort side effect: without the coordinator the stop is still released,
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1903
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+
// the cursor stays untouched and nothing completed or resumed.
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1904
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+
if (coordinator) {
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1905
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+
const released = await coordinator.releaseForOwnerStop({ projectRoot, payload });
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1906
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+
pi.logger?.warn?.(`[UKit] ${released?.systemMessage ?? 'stop allowed: the owner requested STOP; nothing completed or resumed.'}`);
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1907
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+
} else {
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1908
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+
pi.logger?.warn?.('[UKit] stop allowed: the owner requested STOP (stop-coordinator module unavailable; the run cursor could not be marked PAUSED). Nothing completed or resumed; no continuation or further automatic turn is scheduled.');
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1909
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+
}
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1910
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+
// A released owner STOP is not replayable authority: clear the turn mark (same rule as finish).
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1911
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+
coordinatedBlockTurnMark.delete(unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, payload.session_id));
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1537
1912
|
return undefined;
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1538
1913
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}
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1539
1914
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const ledger = suppliedLedger ?? await readExecutionLedger(projectRoot, payload) ?? {};
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@@ -1542,9 +1917,16 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1542
1917
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const initialInput = coordinator
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1543
1918
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? await coordinator.stopCoordinationInput({ projectRoot, payload, authority: authority() }) : null;
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1544
1919
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const key = initialInput ? `omp:${initialInput.key}` : null;
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1920
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+
// Turn evidence overrides the coordinator's wall-clock dedupe: once a turn has run
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1921
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+
// since this session's last coordinated block, the cached block is a stale replay of
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1922
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+
// an EARLIER logical stop and must not swallow the new one (window forced to zero).
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1923
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+
const turnKeyForDedupe = unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, payload.session_id);
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1924
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+
const turnsSinceBlock = (unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(turnKeyForDedupe) || 0) - (coordinatedBlockTurnMark.get(turnKeyForDedupe) ?? 0);
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1925
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+
const effectiveDedupeMs = coordinatedBlockTurnMark.has(turnKeyForDedupe) && turnsSinceBlock > 0
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1926
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+
? 0 : (dedupeWindowMs ?? coordinator?.DEDUPE_WINDOW_MS);
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1545
1927
|
if (coordinator && await coordinator.alreadyCoordinatedThisStop({
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1546
1928
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projectRoot, sessionKey: key, now,
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1547
|
-
dedupeWindowMs:
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1929
|
+
dedupeWindowMs: effectiveDedupeMs,
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1548
1930
|
lockBudgetMs, replayOnlyBlocked: true, claimToken,
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1549
1931
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})) {
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1550
1932
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try {
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@@ -1558,6 +1940,16 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1558
1940
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if (output && (output.continue === true || output.decision === 'block')) {
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1559
1941
|
rememberOwnContinuation(payload.session_id, output.additionalContext ?? output.reason);
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|
1560
1942
|
}
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1943
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+
// Mark the turn count at every coordinated continuation (block AND continue:true —
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1944
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+
// the coordinator stores both as a replayable 'block' decision) so a later turn can be
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1945
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+
// told apart from a duplicate callback of this same stop (see effectiveDedupeMs above).
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1946
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+
// A release clears the mark: a released stop is not a replayable authority.
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1947
|
+
const markKey = unknownOwnershipTurnKey(projectRoot, payload.session_id);
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1948
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+
if (output && (output.continue === true || output.decision === 'block')) {
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1949
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+
boundedSet(coordinatedBlockTurnMark, markKey, unknownOwnershipTurnCounts.get(markKey) || 0);
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1950
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+
} else {
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1951
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+
coordinatedBlockTurnMark.delete(markKey);
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1952
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+
}
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1561
1953
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if (coordinator) {
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1562
1954
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const evaluatedInput = await coordinator.stopCoordinationInput({ projectRoot, payload, authority: authority() });
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1563
1955
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await coordinator.publishStopDecision({
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@@ -1612,15 +2004,19 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1612
2004
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} catch { /* unreadable intent evidence keeps ownership UNKNOWN */ }
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1613
2005
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}
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1614
2006
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if (cursorActive && ownership.status === 'UNKNOWN') {
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1615
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-
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|
2007
|
+
const unknownVerdict = await unknownOwnershipRepeat(projectRoot, payload.session_id, ownership.reason, state?.taskInstanceId, { now });
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2008
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+
if (isUnknownRelease(unknownVerdict)) {
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1616
2009
|
sendContext(pi, [
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1617
|
-
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|
2010
|
+
unknownDegradedNotice(unknownVerdict),
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2011
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+
`[UKit] Handoff ownership is still UNKNOWN (${ownership.reason}) and ${unknownReleaseClause(unknownVerdict)}. `
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1618
2012
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+ 'Stop released without completion: the handoff cursor, its tasks and ownership were NOT changed, '
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1619
2013
|
+ 'and unfinished work stays unfinished until an owner request or a proven owning session resumes it.',
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1620
2014
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], 'nextTurn', { display: true });
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1621
2015
|
await recordEpisode();
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1622
2016
|
return finish(undefined);
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1623
2017
|
}
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|
2018
|
+
// 'first' records the block; 'duplicate' is the same logical stop again —
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2019
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+
// it retains the initial block instead of consuming the finite exit.
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1624
2020
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return finish({ decision: 'block', reason: `UKit handoff ownership UNKNOWN (${ownership.reason}); completion is unproven. Reconcile provenance before stopping.` });
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1625
2021
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}
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1626
2022
|
handoff = await coordinator.evaluateHandoffCursor({
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@@ -1633,8 +2029,9 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1633
2029
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} catch (error) {
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1634
2030
|
pi.logger?.warn?.(`[UKit] handoff-cursor evaluator failed: ${error?.message || error}`);
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1635
2031
|
if (cursorActive) {
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1636
|
-
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|
1637
|
-
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|
2032
|
+
const failureVerdict = await unknownOwnershipRepeat(projectRoot, payload.session_id, `evaluation failed: ${error?.message || error}`, state?.taskInstanceId, { now });
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|
2033
|
+
if (isUnknownRelease(failureVerdict)) {
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|
2034
|
+
sendContext(pi, ['[UKit] Handoff provenance evaluation still fails; stop released without completion and without touching the handoff cursor (unproven, unfinished work preserved).', unknownDegradedNotice(failureVerdict)], 'nextTurn', { display: true });
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1638
2035
|
await recordEpisode();
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1639
2036
|
return finish(undefined);
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|
1640
2037
|
}
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@@ -1642,6 +2039,23 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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1642
2039
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}
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1643
2040
|
}
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1644
2041
|
} else if (cursorActive) {
|
|
2042
|
+
// Same finite lifecycle as the two UNKNOWN lanes above: an unloadable
|
|
2043
|
+
// coordinator is an infrastructure failure, not proof of an owner — block once,
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|
2044
|
+
// then release an identical repeat WITHOUT completion and without touching the
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|
2045
|
+
// cursor, so a broken module can never wedge a session behind an endless gate.
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|
2046
|
+
const downVerdict = await unknownOwnershipRepeat(projectRoot, payload.session_id, 'stop coordinator unavailable', state?.taskInstanceId, { now });
|
|
2047
|
+
if (isUnknownRelease(downVerdict)) {
|
|
2048
|
+
sendContext(pi, [
|
|
2049
|
+
unknownDegradedNotice(downVerdict),
|
|
2050
|
+
`[UKit] Handoff ownership is still UNKNOWN (stop coordinator unavailable) and ${unknownReleaseClause(downVerdict)}. `
|
|
2051
|
+
+ 'Stop released without completion: the handoff cursor, its tasks and ownership were NOT changed, '
|
|
2052
|
+
+ 'and unfinished work stays unfinished until an owner request or a proven owning session resumes it. '
|
|
2053
|
+
+ 'Run `ukit install` to repair the runtime.',
|
|
2054
|
+
], 'nextTurn', { display: true });
|
|
2055
|
+
await recordEpisode();
|
|
2056
|
+
return finish(undefined);
|
|
2057
|
+
}
|
|
2058
|
+
// 'first' records the block; 'duplicate' retains it (same logical stop).
|
|
1645
2059
|
return finish({ decision: 'block', reason: 'UKit handoff ownership UNKNOWN: stop coordinator unavailable; completion is unproven.' });
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1646
2060
|
}
|
|
1647
2061
|
const handoffBlock = handoff?.kind === 'block' ? handoff.reason : null;
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@@ -1687,6 +2101,11 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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|
|
1687
2101
|
await resetCompletionCrashStreak(projectRoot);
|
|
1688
2102
|
if (!evaluation.continue) {
|
|
1689
2103
|
if (evaluation.capped) pi.logger?.warn?.(`[UKit] ${evaluation.reason}`);
|
|
2104
|
+
// Finite handback: record the one handback per task state; a later Stop at the same state is silent.
|
|
2105
|
+
if (suppliedLedger === undefined && (evaluation.outcome === 'handback' || evaluation.capped === true)
|
|
2106
|
+
&& evaluation.gateRelease !== 'handback-delivered') {
|
|
2107
|
+
try { await markHandback(projectRoot, payload, evaluation, { deadlineMs: lockBudgetMs }); } catch { /* repeats one handback at most */ }
|
|
2108
|
+
}
|
|
1690
2109
|
const missingEvidence = Array.isArray(evaluation.missingEvidence) ? evaluation.missingEvidence : [];
|
|
1691
2110
|
// The visible-blocker exit (verification loop) carries no missingEvidence but must still
|
|
1692
2111
|
// reach the user — a silent release is indistinguishable from a stall.
|
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@@ -1718,8 +2137,10 @@ export async function runSessionStop(
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|
|
1718
2137
|
try {
|
|
1719
2138
|
// TASK-007 (OMP-2a): the 600ms lock budget — a contended ledger lock must
|
|
1720
2139
|
// never hold the omp host near its hook deadline.
|
|
1721
|
-
|
|
1722
|
-
|
|
2140
|
+
const marker = { stateFp: evaluation.stateFingerprint, taskKey: evaluation.handbackKey,
|
|
2141
|
+
opOnly: evaluation.missingEvidence?.length > 0 && evaluation.missingEvidence.every((item) => item === 'operation-verification') };
|
|
2142
|
+
if (evaluation.finalNotice) await markNotified(projectRoot, payload, ledger, { deadlineMs: lockBudgetMs, ...marker });
|
|
2143
|
+
else await incrementContinuation(projectRoot, payload, ledger, state?.requestKey || null, evidencePromptKey(state), { deadlineMs: lockBudgetMs, ...marker });
|
|
1723
2144
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
1724
2145
|
pi.logger?.warn?.(`[UKit] continuation bookkeeping failed open: ${error?.message || error}`);
|
|
1725
2146
|
}
|