@nerviq/cli 1.20.1 → 1.22.0

package/src/anti-patterns.js

@@ -1,485 +1,485 @@
-/**
- * Anti-Pattern Catalog — things NOT to do when configuring AI coding agents.
- * Provides a static catalog and a runtime detector that checks a project context.
- */
-
-const {
-  getRepoInstructionBundle,
-  hasDocumentedVerificationGuidance,
-  hasDocumentedTestCommand,
-} = require('./instruction-surfaces');
-const { collectClaudeDenyRules } = require('./permission-rules');
-const { containsEmbeddedSecret } = require('./secret-patterns');
-const { containsPromptInjectionPattern } = require('./prompt-injection');
-
-const ANTI_PATTERNS = [
-  {
-    id: 'AP001',
-    name: 'bypassPermissions as default',
-    severity: 'critical',
-    description: 'Setting defaultMode to bypassPermissions removes all safety guardrails.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Use "default" or "safe-write" mode. Add specific allow rules for trusted operations.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      return settings && settings.permissions && settings.permissions.defaultMode === 'bypassPermissions';
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP002',
-    name: 'No deny rules configured',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Without deny rules, the agent can execute any operation it decides to, including destructive ones.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Add deny rules in settings.json for dangerous operations like rm -rf, git reset --hard, and reading .env files.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return true;
-      return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length === 0;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP003',
-    name: 'Secrets in CLAUDE.md',
-    severity: 'critical',
-    description: 'API keys, tokens, or passwords hardcoded in CLAUDE.md are visible to every session and may leak in outputs.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Move secrets to .env files and reference them via environment variables. Add .env to .gitignore.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      const patterns = [
-        /(?:api[_-]?key|api[_-]?secret|token|password|secret[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}/i,
-        /sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/,
-        /ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/,
-        /AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}/,
-      ];
-      return patterns.some(p => p.test(content));
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP004',
-    name: 'Empty CLAUDE.md',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'An empty or near-empty instruction file provides no guidance, making the agent guess at project conventions.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Add project description, architecture overview, verification commands, and coding conventions to CLAUDE.md.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      return content.trim().length > 0 && content.trim().length < 50;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP005',
-    name: 'Too many MCP servers (>10)',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'More than 10 MCP servers increases startup latency, context overhead, and potential for tool conflicts.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Limit MCP servers to essential ones. Remove rarely-used servers and consolidate overlapping functionality.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      if (!settings || !settings.mcpServers) return false;
-      return Object.keys(settings.mcpServers).length > 10;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP006',
-    name: 'Overly broad allow rules',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Allow rules like "Bash(*)" or "Write(**)" grant blanket permission, defeating the purpose of permission controls.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Scope allow rules to specific commands and paths. Use "Bash(npm test)" instead of "Bash(*)".',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
-      const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
-      const broadPatterns = ['Bash(*)', 'Write(**)', 'Edit(**)', 'Read(**)', 'Bash(**)', 'Write(*)', 'Edit(*)', 'Read(*)'];
-      return allow.some(rule => broadPatterns.includes(rule));
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP007',
-    name: 'No verification commands',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Without test, lint, or build commands across the repo instruction surfaces, agents cannot self-verify changes consistently.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add a canonical verification section or command doc in your repo instruction surfaces (for example CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, README, or platform rules).',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
-      if (!content) return false;
-      return !hasDocumentedVerificationGuidance(content);
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP008',
-    name: 'Ignoring .gitignore for sensitive files',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Not gitignoring .env, credentials, and key files means they can be committed and pushed to remote repos.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add .env, .env.*, credentials.json, *.pem, and *.key to .gitignore.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const gitignore = ctx.fileContent('.gitignore') || '';
-      return !gitignore.includes('.env');
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP009',
-    name: 'No hooks configured',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Without hooks, there is no automated enforcement — all safety depends on instructions alone (80% compliance vs 100%).',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Add at least a protect-secrets PreToolUse hook and a post-edit lint hook in settings.json.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      if (!settings || !settings.hooks) return true;
-      const hookEntries = Object.values(settings.hooks).flat();
-      return hookEntries.length === 0;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP010',
-    name: 'Duplicated instructions across platforms',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Copy-pasting the same instructions into CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, and AGENTS.md creates drift when one is updated.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Create a shared source of truth (e.g., docs/ai-instructions.md) and reference it from each platform config.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const claudeMd = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      const cursorrules = ctx.fileContent('.cursorrules') || '';
-      const agentsMd = ctx.fileContent('AGENTS.md') || '';
-      if (!claudeMd || claudeMd.length < 100) return false;
-      const files = [cursorrules, agentsMd].filter(f => f.length > 100);
-      if (files.length === 0) return false;
-      // Simple heuristic: check if any significant chunk (100+ chars) appears in both
-      const chunk = claudeMd.slice(0, 200).trim();
-      return files.some(f => f.includes(chunk));
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP011',
-    name: 'Conflicting trust postures across platforms',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'One platform in bypassPermissions while another is read-only creates inconsistent security boundaries.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex'],
-    fix: 'Align permission profiles across platforms. Use Harmony audit to detect and resolve trust drift.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const claudeSettings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      const codexConfig = ctx.fileContent('.codex/config.toml') || '';
-      if (!claudeSettings || !codexConfig) return false;
-      const claudeMode = claudeSettings.permissions && claudeSettings.permissions.defaultMode;
-      const isBypass = claudeMode === 'bypassPermissions';
-      const codexHasAutoApprove = /approval_policy\s*=\s*["']auto-edit["']/i.test(codexConfig);
-      // Conflict: one is very permissive while the other is restrictive, or vice versa
-      return (isBypass && !codexHasAutoApprove) || (!isBypass && codexHasAutoApprove);
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP012',
-    name: 'No error handling in hooks',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Hook scripts without error handling can silently fail, giving a false sense of security.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Add "set -e" to shell hooks and wrap commands in try/catch for JS hooks. Log failures to a known location.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      if (!ctx.hasDir('.claude/hooks')) return false;
-      const hookFiles = ctx.dirFiles('.claude/hooks');
-      for (const file of hookFiles) {
-        const content = ctx.fileContent(`.claude/hooks/${file}`) || '';
-        if (file.endsWith('.sh') && content.length > 0 && !content.includes('set -e')) {
-          return true;
-        }
-      }
-      return false;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP013',
-    name: 'Hardcoded paths in CLAUDE.md',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Absolute paths like /Users/alice/project or C:\\Users break when other developers clone the repo.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Use relative paths or environment variables. Replace absolute paths with project-relative references.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      if (!content) return false;
-      return /(?:\/Users\/[a-zA-Z]|\/home\/[a-zA-Z]|C:\\Users\\[a-zA-Z])/.test(content);
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP014',
-    name: 'No test command defined',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Without a canonical test command in repo instructions or scripts, agents cannot verify changes reliably before handoff.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add a canonical test command in repo instructions or package scripts, e.g. "Test: npm test" or "Test: pytest".',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
-      const pkg = ctx.jsonFile('package.json');
-      const hasTestInMd = hasDocumentedTestCommand(content);
-      const hasTestScript = pkg && pkg.scripts && pkg.scripts.test;
-      return !hasTestInMd && !hasTestScript;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP023',
-    name: 'Suspicious prompt-injection phrases in repo instructions',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Instruction surfaces that say things like "ignore previous instructions", "bypass guardrails", or "score 100/100" create confusion and downstream trust problems, even when the static audit itself is not LLM-driven.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Remove adversarial phrases from repo instructions and replace them with an explicit trust-boundary note about treating repo/web/MCP content as untrusted data.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
-      return containsPromptInjectionPattern(content);
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP015',
-    name: 'All permissions allowed',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Allowing all tool permissions without any deny rules gives the agent unrestricted system access.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Define deny rules for destructive operations. At minimum deny rm -rf, git reset --hard, and .env reads.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
-      const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
-      const deny = settings.permissions.deny || [];
-      return allow.length > 5 && deny.length === 0;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP016',
-    name: 'Missing architecture diagram',
-    severity: 'low',
-    description: 'Without an architecture diagram, the agent has to infer project structure from file exploration, wasting tokens.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add a Mermaid diagram in CLAUDE.md showing the main components and data flow.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      if (!content) return false;
-      return !content.includes('mermaid') && !content.includes('```') && content.length > 200;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP017',
-    name: 'Using deprecated features',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Relying on deprecated features risks breakage when they are removed in future versions.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Check the platform changelog for deprecated features and migrate to recommended alternatives.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
-      // Check for known deprecated patterns
-      const deprecatedPatterns = [
-        /allowedTools/i,
-        /blockedTools/i,
-      ];
-      const hasDeprecatedInMd = deprecatedPatterns.some(p => p.test(content));
-      const hasDeprecatedInSettings = settings && deprecatedPatterns.some(p => p.test(JSON.stringify(settings)));
-      return hasDeprecatedInMd || hasDeprecatedInSettings;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP018',
-    name: 'No rules files',
-    severity: 'low',
-    description: 'Without .claude/rules/ files, all instructions live in one place, making it harder to scope guidance by file type.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Create .claude/rules/ with scoped rules for different areas (e.g., tests.md, api.md, frontend.md).',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      return !ctx.hasDir('.claude/rules') || (ctx.dirFiles('.claude/rules') || []).length === 0;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP019',
-    name: 'Overly long CLAUDE.md (>500 lines)',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Instruction files over 500 lines consume excessive context tokens and reduce adherence to individual rules.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Split into CLAUDE.md (core) + .claude/rules/ (scoped). Use @import for focused modules.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      if (!content) return false;
-      const lineCount = content.split('\n').length;
-      return lineCount > 500;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP020',
-    name: 'No security review command',
-    severity: 'medium',
-    description: 'Without a security review command, OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities go undetected during agent-assisted development.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add a /security-review command or include security scanning in your CI pipeline.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
-      const hasSecurityReview = /security[- ]?review/i.test(content);
-      const hasSecurityCommand = ctx.hasDir('.claude/commands') &&
-        (ctx.dirFiles('.claude/commands') || []).some(f => /security/i.test(f));
-      return !hasSecurityReview && !hasSecurityCommand;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP021',
-    name: 'Inline secrets in hook scripts',
-    severity: 'critical',
-    description: 'Hardcoded API keys or tokens in hook scripts are executed every session and easily leaked.',
-    platforms: ['claude'],
-    fix: 'Use environment variables in hooks. Reference secrets via $ENV_VAR instead of hardcoding values.',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      if (!ctx.hasDir('.claude/hooks')) return false;
-      const hookFiles = ctx.dirFiles('.claude/hooks');
-      const secretPatterns = [
-        /(?:api[_-]?key|token|password|secret)\s*=\s*['"][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}['"]/i,
-        /sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/,
-        /ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/,
-        /AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}/,
-      ];
-      for (const file of hookFiles) {
-        const content = ctx.fileContent(`.claude/hooks/${file}`) || '';
-        if (secretPatterns.some(p => p.test(content)) || containsEmbeddedSecret(content)) {
-          return true;
-        }
-      }
-      return false;
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'AP022',
-    name: 'Missing .env protection in .gitignore',
-    severity: 'high',
-    description: 'Without .env in .gitignore, environment files with secrets can be accidentally committed and pushed.',
-    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
-    fix: 'Add .env, .env.*, and .env.local to .gitignore. Verify with "git check-ignore .env".',
-    detect: (ctx) => {
-      const gitignore = ctx.fileContent('.gitignore') || '';
-      if (!gitignore) return true;
-      return !gitignore.includes('.env');
-    },
-  },
-];
-
-/**
- * Return the full anti-pattern catalog.
- * @returns {Array<Object>} All registered anti-patterns.
- */
-function getAntiPatterns() {
-  return ANTI_PATTERNS.map(({ detect, ...rest }) => rest);
-}
-
-/**
- * Detect anti-patterns present in a project context.
- * @param {Object} ctx - A ProjectContext instance (from src/context.js).
- * @returns {Array<Object>} Detected anti-patterns with id, name, severity, description, and fix.
- */
-function detectAntiPatterns(ctx) {
-  const detected = [];
-  for (const pattern of ANTI_PATTERNS) {
-    try {
-      if (pattern.detect(ctx)) {
-        const { detect, ...rest } = pattern;
-        detected.push(rest);
-      }
-    } catch (_err) {
-      // Skip patterns that fail to detect (missing files, etc.)
-    }
-  }
-  return detected;
-}
-
-/**
- * Print detected anti-patterns to the console.
- * @param {Array<Object>} patterns - Detected anti-patterns.
- * @param {Object} [options] - Display options.
- * @param {boolean} [options.json] - Output as JSON.
- */
-function printAntiPatterns(patterns, options = {}) {
-  if (options.json) {
-    console.log(JSON.stringify(patterns, null, 2));
-    return;
-  }
-
-  const SEVERITY_COLORS = {
-    critical: '\x1b[31m',
-    high: '\x1b[33m',
-    medium: '\x1b[36m',
-    low: '\x1b[2m',
-  };
-  const RESET = '\x1b[0m';
-  const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
-  const DIM = '\x1b[2m';
-
-  console.log('');
-  console.log(`${BOLD}  nerviq anti-patterns${RESET}`);
-  console.log(`${DIM}  ${'═'.repeat(39)}${RESET}`);
-
-  if (patterns.length === 0) {
-    console.log(`  ${'\\x1b[32m'}No anti-patterns detected. Good job!${RESET}`);
-    console.log('');
-    return;
-  }
-
-  console.log(`  ${patterns.length} anti-pattern${patterns.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} detected`);
-  console.log('');
-
-  // Sort by severity: critical > high > medium > low
-  const severityOrder = { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 2, low: 3 };
-  const sorted = [...patterns].sort((a, b) => (severityOrder[a.severity] || 9) - (severityOrder[b.severity] || 9));
-
-  for (const p of sorted) {
-    const color = SEVERITY_COLORS[p.severity] || '';
-    console.log(`  ${color}[${p.severity}]${RESET} ${p.name} (${p.id})`);
-    console.log(`${DIM}    ${p.description}${RESET}`);
-    console.log(`${DIM}    Fix: ${p.fix}${RESET}`);
-    console.log('');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Print the full anti-pattern catalog.
- * @param {Object} [options] - Display options.
- * @param {boolean} [options.json] - Output as JSON.
- */
-function printAntiPatternCatalog(options = {}) {
-  const all = getAntiPatterns();
-  if (options.json) {
-    console.log(JSON.stringify(all, null, 2));
-    return;
-  }
-
-  const SEVERITY_COLORS = {
-    critical: '\x1b[31m',
-    high: '\x1b[33m',
-    medium: '\x1b[36m',
-    low: '\x1b[2m',
-  };
-  const RESET = '\x1b[0m';
-  const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
-  const DIM = '\x1b[2m';
-
-  console.log('');
-  console.log(`${BOLD}  nerviq anti-pattern catalog${RESET}`);
-  console.log(`${DIM}  ${'═'.repeat(39)}${RESET}`);
-  console.log(`  ${all.length} anti-patterns registered`);
-  console.log('');
-
-  const severityOrder = { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 2, low: 3 };
-  const sorted = [...all].sort((a, b) => (severityOrder[a.severity] || 9) - (severityOrder[b.severity] || 9));
-
-  for (const p of sorted) {
-    const color = SEVERITY_COLORS[p.severity] || '';
-    console.log(`  ${color}[${p.severity}]${RESET} ${p.name} (${p.id})`);
-    console.log(`${DIM}    ${p.description}${RESET}`);
-    console.log(`${DIM}    Platforms: ${p.platforms.join(', ')}${RESET}`);
-    console.log(`${DIM}    Fix: ${p.fix}${RESET}`);
-    console.log('');
-  }
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  ANTI_PATTERNS,
-  getAntiPatterns,
-  detectAntiPatterns,
-  printAntiPatterns,
-  printAntiPatternCatalog,
-};
+/**
+ * Anti-Pattern Catalog — things NOT to do when configuring AI coding agents.
+ * Provides a static catalog and a runtime detector that checks a project context.
+ */
+
+const {
+  getRepoInstructionBundle,
+  hasDocumentedVerificationGuidance,
+  hasDocumentedTestCommand,
+} = require('./instruction-surfaces');
+const { collectClaudeDenyRules } = require('./permission-rules');
+const { containsEmbeddedSecret } = require('./secret-patterns');
+const { containsPromptInjectionPattern } = require('./prompt-injection');
+
+const ANTI_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    id: 'AP001',
+    name: 'bypassPermissions as default',
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'Setting defaultMode to bypassPermissions removes all safety guardrails.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Use "default" or "safe-write" mode. Add specific allow rules for trusted operations.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      return settings && settings.permissions && settings.permissions.defaultMode === 'bypassPermissions';
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP002',
+    name: 'No deny rules configured',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Without deny rules, the agent can execute any operation it decides to, including destructive ones.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Add deny rules in settings.json for dangerous operations like rm -rf, git reset --hard, and reading .env files.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return true;
+      return collectClaudeDenyRules(ctx).length === 0;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP003',
+    name: 'Secrets in CLAUDE.md',
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'API keys, tokens, or passwords hardcoded in CLAUDE.md are visible to every session and may leak in outputs.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Move secrets to .env files and reference them via environment variables. Add .env to .gitignore.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      const patterns = [
+        /(?:api[_-]?key|api[_-]?secret|token|password|secret[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}/i,
+        /sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/,
+        /ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/,
+        /AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}/,
+      ];
+      return patterns.some(p => p.test(content));
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP004',
+    name: 'Empty CLAUDE.md',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'An empty or near-empty instruction file provides no guidance, making the agent guess at project conventions.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Add project description, architecture overview, verification commands, and coding conventions to CLAUDE.md.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      return content.trim().length > 0 && content.trim().length < 50;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP005',
+    name: 'Too many MCP servers (>10)',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'More than 10 MCP servers increases startup latency, context overhead, and potential for tool conflicts.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Limit MCP servers to essential ones. Remove rarely-used servers and consolidate overlapping functionality.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      if (!settings || !settings.mcpServers) return false;
+      return Object.keys(settings.mcpServers).length > 10;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP006',
+    name: 'Overly broad allow rules',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Allow rules like "Bash(*)" or "Write(**)" grant blanket permission, defeating the purpose of permission controls.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Scope allow rules to specific commands and paths. Use "Bash(npm test)" instead of "Bash(*)".',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
+      const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
+      const broadPatterns = ['Bash(*)', 'Write(**)', 'Edit(**)', 'Read(**)', 'Bash(**)', 'Write(*)', 'Edit(*)', 'Read(*)'];
+      return allow.some(rule => broadPatterns.includes(rule));
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP007',
+    name: 'No verification commands',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Without test, lint, or build commands across the repo instruction surfaces, agents cannot self-verify changes consistently.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add a canonical verification section or command doc in your repo instruction surfaces (for example CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, README, or platform rules).',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
+      if (!content) return false;
+      return !hasDocumentedVerificationGuidance(content);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP008',
+    name: 'Ignoring .gitignore for sensitive files',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Not gitignoring .env, credentials, and key files means they can be committed and pushed to remote repos.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add .env, .env.*, credentials.json, *.pem, and *.key to .gitignore.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const gitignore = ctx.fileContent('.gitignore') || '';
+      return !gitignore.includes('.env');
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP009',
+    name: 'No hooks configured',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Without hooks, there is no automated enforcement — all safety depends on instructions alone (80% compliance vs 100%).',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Add at least a protect-secrets PreToolUse hook and a post-edit lint hook in settings.json.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      if (!settings || !settings.hooks) return true;
+      const hookEntries = Object.values(settings.hooks).flat();
+      return hookEntries.length === 0;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP010',
+    name: 'Duplicated instructions across platforms',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Copy-pasting the same instructions into CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, and AGENTS.md creates drift when one is updated.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Create a shared source of truth (e.g., docs/ai-instructions.md) and reference it from each platform config.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const claudeMd = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      const cursorrules = ctx.fileContent('.cursorrules') || '';
+      const agentsMd = ctx.fileContent('AGENTS.md') || '';
+      if (!claudeMd || claudeMd.length < 100) return false;
+      const files = [cursorrules, agentsMd].filter(f => f.length > 100);
+      if (files.length === 0) return false;
+      // Simple heuristic: check if any significant chunk (100+ chars) appears in both
+      const chunk = claudeMd.slice(0, 200).trim();
+      return files.some(f => f.includes(chunk));
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP011',
+    name: 'Conflicting trust postures across platforms',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'One platform in bypassPermissions while another is read-only creates inconsistent security boundaries.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex'],
+    fix: 'Align permission profiles across platforms. Use Harmony audit to detect and resolve trust drift.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const claudeSettings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      const codexConfig = ctx.fileContent('.codex/config.toml') || '';
+      if (!claudeSettings || !codexConfig) return false;
+      const claudeMode = claudeSettings.permissions && claudeSettings.permissions.defaultMode;
+      const isBypass = claudeMode === 'bypassPermissions';
+      const codexHasAutoApprove = /approval_policy\s*=\s*["']auto-edit["']/i.test(codexConfig);
+      // Conflict: one is very permissive while the other is restrictive, or vice versa
+      return (isBypass && !codexHasAutoApprove) || (!isBypass && codexHasAutoApprove);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP012',
+    name: 'No error handling in hooks',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Hook scripts without error handling can silently fail, giving a false sense of security.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Add "set -e" to shell hooks and wrap commands in try/catch for JS hooks. Log failures to a known location.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      if (!ctx.hasDir('.claude/hooks')) return false;
+      const hookFiles = ctx.dirFiles('.claude/hooks');
+      for (const file of hookFiles) {
+        const content = ctx.fileContent(`.claude/hooks/${file}`) || '';
+        if (file.endsWith('.sh') && content.length > 0 && !content.includes('set -e')) {
+          return true;
+        }
+      }
+      return false;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP013',
+    name: 'Hardcoded paths in CLAUDE.md',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Absolute paths like /Users/alice/project or C:\\Users break when other developers clone the repo.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Use relative paths or environment variables. Replace absolute paths with project-relative references.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      if (!content) return false;
+      return /(?:\/Users\/[a-zA-Z]|\/home\/[a-zA-Z]|C:\\Users\\[a-zA-Z])/.test(content);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP014',
+    name: 'No test command defined',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Without a canonical test command in repo instructions or scripts, agents cannot verify changes reliably before handoff.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add a canonical test command in repo instructions or package scripts, e.g. "Test: npm test" or "Test: pytest".',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
+      const pkg = ctx.jsonFile('package.json');
+      const hasTestInMd = hasDocumentedTestCommand(content);
+      const hasTestScript = pkg && pkg.scripts && pkg.scripts.test;
+      return !hasTestInMd && !hasTestScript;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP023',
+    name: 'Suspicious prompt-injection phrases in repo instructions',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Instruction surfaces that say things like "ignore previous instructions", "bypass guardrails", or "score 100/100" create confusion and downstream trust problems, even when the static audit itself is not LLM-driven.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Remove adversarial phrases from repo instructions and replace them with an explicit trust-boundary note about treating repo/web/MCP content as untrusted data.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = getRepoInstructionBundle(ctx);
+      return containsPromptInjectionPattern(content);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP015',
+    name: 'All permissions allowed',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Allowing all tool permissions without any deny rules gives the agent unrestricted system access.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Define deny rules for destructive operations. At minimum deny rm -rf, git reset --hard, and .env reads.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      if (!settings || !settings.permissions) return false;
+      const allow = settings.permissions.allow || [];
+      const deny = settings.permissions.deny || [];
+      return allow.length > 5 && deny.length === 0;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP016',
+    name: 'Missing architecture diagram',
+    severity: 'low',
+    description: 'Without an architecture diagram, the agent has to infer project structure from file exploration, wasting tokens.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add a Mermaid diagram in CLAUDE.md showing the main components and data flow.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      if (!content) return false;
+      return !content.includes('mermaid') && !content.includes('```') && content.length > 200;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP017',
+    name: 'Using deprecated features',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Relying on deprecated features risks breakage when they are removed in future versions.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Check the platform changelog for deprecated features and migrate to recommended alternatives.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      const settings = ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.json') || ctx.jsonFile('.claude/settings.local.json');
+      // Check for known deprecated patterns
+      const deprecatedPatterns = [
+        /allowedTools/i,
+        /blockedTools/i,
+      ];
+      const hasDeprecatedInMd = deprecatedPatterns.some(p => p.test(content));
+      const hasDeprecatedInSettings = settings && deprecatedPatterns.some(p => p.test(JSON.stringify(settings)));
+      return hasDeprecatedInMd || hasDeprecatedInSettings;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP018',
+    name: 'No rules files',
+    severity: 'low',
+    description: 'Without .claude/rules/ files, all instructions live in one place, making it harder to scope guidance by file type.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Create .claude/rules/ with scoped rules for different areas (e.g., tests.md, api.md, frontend.md).',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      return !ctx.hasDir('.claude/rules') || (ctx.dirFiles('.claude/rules') || []).length === 0;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP019',
+    name: 'Overly long CLAUDE.md (>500 lines)',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Instruction files over 500 lines consume excessive context tokens and reduce adherence to individual rules.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Split into CLAUDE.md (core) + .claude/rules/ (scoped). Use @import for focused modules.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      if (!content) return false;
+      const lineCount = content.split('\n').length;
+      return lineCount > 500;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP020',
+    name: 'No security review command',
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Without a security review command, OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities go undetected during agent-assisted development.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add a /security-review command or include security scanning in your CI pipeline.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const content = ctx.fileContent('CLAUDE.md') || ctx.fileContent('.claude/CLAUDE.md') || '';
+      const hasSecurityReview = /security[- ]?review/i.test(content);
+      const hasSecurityCommand = ctx.hasDir('.claude/commands') &&
+        (ctx.dirFiles('.claude/commands') || []).some(f => /security/i.test(f));
+      return !hasSecurityReview && !hasSecurityCommand;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP021',
+    name: 'Inline secrets in hook scripts',
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'Hardcoded API keys or tokens in hook scripts are executed every session and easily leaked.',
+    platforms: ['claude'],
+    fix: 'Use environment variables in hooks. Reference secrets via $ENV_VAR instead of hardcoding values.',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      if (!ctx.hasDir('.claude/hooks')) return false;
+      const hookFiles = ctx.dirFiles('.claude/hooks');
+      const secretPatterns = [
+        /(?:api[_-]?key|token|password|secret)\s*=\s*['"][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}['"]/i,
+        /sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/,
+        /ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/,
+        /AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}/,
+      ];
+      for (const file of hookFiles) {
+        const content = ctx.fileContent(`.claude/hooks/${file}`) || '';
+        if (secretPatterns.some(p => p.test(content)) || containsEmbeddedSecret(content)) {
+          return true;
+        }
+      }
+      return false;
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'AP022',
+    name: 'Missing .env protection in .gitignore',
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Without .env in .gitignore, environment files with secrets can be accidentally committed and pushed.',
+    platforms: ['claude', 'codex', 'cursor', 'windsurf', 'copilot', 'gemini', 'aider', 'opencode'],
+    fix: 'Add .env, .env.*, and .env.local to .gitignore. Verify with "git check-ignore .env".',
+    detect: (ctx) => {
+      const gitignore = ctx.fileContent('.gitignore') || '';
+      if (!gitignore) return true;
+      return !gitignore.includes('.env');
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+/**
+ * Return the full anti-pattern catalog.
+ * @returns {Array<Object>} All registered anti-patterns.
+ */
+function getAntiPatterns() {
+  return ANTI_PATTERNS.map(({ detect, ...rest }) => rest);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect anti-patterns present in a project context.
+ * @param {Object} ctx - A ProjectContext instance (from src/context.js).
+ * @returns {Array<Object>} Detected anti-patterns with id, name, severity, description, and fix.
+ */
+function detectAntiPatterns(ctx) {
+  const detected = [];
+  for (const pattern of ANTI_PATTERNS) {
+    try {
+      if (pattern.detect(ctx)) {
+        const { detect, ...rest } = pattern;
+        detected.push(rest);
+      }
+    } catch (_err) {
+      // Skip patterns that fail to detect (missing files, etc.)
+    }
+  }
+  return detected;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Print detected anti-patterns to the console.
+ * @param {Array<Object>} patterns - Detected anti-patterns.
+ * @param {Object} [options] - Display options.
+ * @param {boolean} [options.json] - Output as JSON.
+ */
+function printAntiPatterns(patterns, options = {}) {
+  if (options.json) {
+    console.log(JSON.stringify(patterns, null, 2));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const SEVERITY_COLORS = {
+    critical: '\x1b[31m',
+    high: '\x1b[33m',
+    medium: '\x1b[36m',
+    low: '\x1b[2m',
+  };
+  const RESET = '\x1b[0m';
+  const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
+  const DIM = '\x1b[2m';
+
+  console.log('');
+  console.log(`${BOLD}  nerviq anti-patterns${RESET}`);
+  console.log(`${DIM}  ${'═'.repeat(39)}${RESET}`);
+
+  if (patterns.length === 0) {
+    console.log(`  ${'\\x1b[32m'}No anti-patterns detected. Good job!${RESET}`);
+    console.log('');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  console.log(`  ${patterns.length} anti-pattern${patterns.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} detected`);
+  console.log('');
+
+  // Sort by severity: critical > high > medium > low
+  const severityOrder = { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 2, low: 3 };
+  const sorted = [...patterns].sort((a, b) => (severityOrder[a.severity] || 9) - (severityOrder[b.severity] || 9));
+
+  for (const p of sorted) {
+    const color = SEVERITY_COLORS[p.severity] || '';
+    console.log(`  ${color}[${p.severity}]${RESET} ${p.name} (${p.id})`);
+    console.log(`${DIM}    ${p.description}${RESET}`);
+    console.log(`${DIM}    Fix: ${p.fix}${RESET}`);
+    console.log('');
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Print the full anti-pattern catalog.
+ * @param {Object} [options] - Display options.
+ * @param {boolean} [options.json] - Output as JSON.
+ */
+function printAntiPatternCatalog(options = {}) {
+  const all = getAntiPatterns();
+  if (options.json) {
+    console.log(JSON.stringify(all, null, 2));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const SEVERITY_COLORS = {
+    critical: '\x1b[31m',
+    high: '\x1b[33m',
+    medium: '\x1b[36m',
+    low: '\x1b[2m',
+  };
+  const RESET = '\x1b[0m';
+  const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
+  const DIM = '\x1b[2m';
+
+  console.log('');
+  console.log(`${BOLD}  nerviq anti-pattern catalog${RESET}`);
+  console.log(`${DIM}  ${'═'.repeat(39)}${RESET}`);
+  console.log(`  ${all.length} anti-patterns registered`);
+  console.log('');
+
+  const severityOrder = { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 2, low: 3 };
+  const sorted = [...all].sort((a, b) => (severityOrder[a.severity] || 9) - (severityOrder[b.severity] || 9));
+
+  for (const p of sorted) {
+    const color = SEVERITY_COLORS[p.severity] || '';
+    console.log(`  ${color}[${p.severity}]${RESET} ${p.name} (${p.id})`);
+    console.log(`${DIM}    ${p.description}${RESET}`);
+    console.log(`${DIM}    Platforms: ${p.platforms.join(', ')}${RESET}`);
+    console.log(`${DIM}    Fix: ${p.fix}${RESET}`);
+    console.log('');
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  ANTI_PATTERNS,
+  getAntiPatterns,
+  detectAntiPatterns,
+  printAntiPatterns,
+  printAntiPatternCatalog,
+};