@nekzus/liop 2.4.6 → 2.5.0-beta.2

package/dist/types-CzRSOlOo.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import * as jose from 'jose';
+
+/**
+ * Technology-agnostic cryptographic audit interceptor.
+ *
+ * Fires asynchronously (fire-and-forget) AFTER each AuditEntry
+ * has been sealed (hash computed, chain linked, and optionally
+ * persisted to JSONL). The interceptor receives a frozen deep-clone
+ * of the completed AuditEntry — mutations cannot tamper with the
+ * hash chain.
+ *
+ * Use cases: forward audit entries to TypeSafe Jev for threat
+ * pattern detection, stream to SOC 2 SIEM aggregators, trigger
+ * PagerDuty alerts on BLOCKED_EGRESS/POLICY_VIOLATION statuses,
+ * or feed into compliance dashboards.
+ */
+type AuditInterceptor = (entry: Readonly<AuditEntry>) => void | Promise<void>;
+
+type AuditStatus = "SUCCESS" | "BLOCKED_EGRESS" | "ERROR" | "POLICY_VIOLATION" | "TAINT_ANALYSIS_VIOLATION";
+interface AuditEntry {
+    id: string;
+    timestamp: string;
+    traceId: string;
+    agentDid: string;
+    peerId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    datasetHash: string;
+    fuelConsumed: number;
+    outputHash: string;
+    zkReceiptSig: string;
+    status: AuditStatus;
+    prevEntryHash: string;
+    entryHash: string;
+}
+interface AuditRecordParams {
+    timestamp?: string;
+    traceId?: string;
+    agentDid: string;
+    peerId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    datasetHash?: string;
+    fuelConsumed: number;
+    outputHash?: string;
+    zkReceiptSig?: string;
+    status: AuditStatus;
+}
+declare const GENESIS_HASH: string;
+declare function computeEntryHash(entryWithoutHash: Omit<AuditEntry, "entryHash">): string;
+declare class AuditLogger {
+    private entries;
+    private lastEntryHash;
+    private filePath?;
+    private interceptor?;
+    constructor(filePath?: string);
+    /**
+     * Registers a technology-agnostic audit interceptor.
+     * The interceptor fires AFTER the entry is sealed (hash computed)
+     * and appended to the chain. It receives a frozen deep-clone
+     * that cannot tamper with the hash chain.
+     * Pass `undefined` to disable interception (zero overhead).
+     */
+    setInterceptor(interceptor: AuditInterceptor | undefined): void;
+    recordExecution(params: AuditRecordParams): AuditEntry;
+    getEntries(): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    getEntryCount(): number;
+    verifyIntegrity(): {
+        valid: boolean;
+        totalEntries: number;
+        brokenIndex?: number;
+        reason?: string;
+    };
+    exportJsonl(): string;
+    private loadFromFile;
+}
+declare const globalAuditLogger: AuditLogger;
+
+/**
+ * LIOP JWT Validator — Token Verification Engine
+ *
+ * Validates JWT Access Tokens using the `jose` library.
+ * Supports two modes:
+ *   - Local JWKS (Nexus role): Keys in memory, zero network latency.
+ *   - Remote JWKS (Node role): Fetched from Nexus /oidc/jwks with 10min cache.
+ *
+ * Standards: NIST SP 800-207 (continuous verification), OWASP API-A01
+ * Source: panva/jose DeepWiki — createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Authorization context extracted from a validated JWT.
+ * Compatible with MCP TypeScript SDK AuthInfo interface.
+ */
+interface AuthInfo {
+    /** Raw JWT string. */
+    token: string;
+    /** Subject claim (client_id for M2M flows). */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Space-delimited scopes parsed into an array. */
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Token expiration timestamp (Unix seconds). */
+    expiresAt?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * JWT Validator with dual-mode JWKS resolution.
+ *
+ * - Nexus role: `new JwtValidator(issuer, audience, localJwks)` (createLocalJWKSet)
+ * - Node role: `new JwtValidator(issuer, audience, new URL(jwksUri))` (createRemoteJWKSet)
+ */
+declare class JwtValidator {
+    private readonly jwksResolver;
+    private readonly issuer;
+    private readonly audience;
+    constructor(issuer: string, audience: string, jwksSource: URL | jose.JSONWebKeySet);
+    /**
+     * Validates a JWT access token and extracts authorization context.
+     *
+     * Checks performed (jose.jwtVerify):
+     * - Cryptographic signature verification (EdDSA or ES256)
+     * - Issuer claim matches configured issuer
+     * - Audience claim matches configured audience
+     * - Token is not expired (with clock tolerance for mesh skew)
+     * - Required claims (sub, scope) are present
+     *
+     * @throws JOSEError if validation fails (expired, wrong issuer, bad signature, etc.)
+     */
+    validate(token: string): Promise<AuthInfo>;
+    /**
+     * Builds a complete set of issuer URL aliases for the LIOP demo topology.
+     *
+     * The LIOP mesh runs on Docker Desktop with the following network layout:
+     *   Container hostnames: "nexus", "liop-nexus" (internal port 3000)
+     *   Host-published ports: 13000 (HTTP/MCP), 13001 (libp2p TCP)
+     *   Loopback addresses: 127.0.0.1, localhost
+     *
+     * The Nexus OAuth server may set its issuer to any of these depending on
+     * how it was configured, and nodes may resolve it via LIOP_NEXUS_URL
+     * which varies by context. This method generates all equivalent aliases
+     * so that jose.jwtVerify accepts the token regardless of which alias
+     * was used as `iss` in the JWT.
+     *
+     * Security note: This does NOT weaken validation — the cryptographic
+     * signature is still verified against the same JWKS keys. Only the
+     * string comparison of the `iss` claim is relaxed across known aliases.
+     */
+    private buildIssuerAliases;
+    /**
+     * Returns the configured issuer URL for PRM (RFC 9728) metadata.
+     */
+    getIssuer(): string;
+    /**
+     * Returns the configured audience for PRM metadata.
+     */
+    getAudience(): string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @mcp-legacy ENTIRE FILE — MCP 2025-era backward compatibility layer.
+ * Remove this file when MCP v1 (2025-11-25) reaches EOL.
+ *
+ * SUNSET INSTRUCTION: Delete this file, then grep for "@mcp-legacy" in the
+ * codebase to find and remove all remaining legacy seams.
+ */
+/**
+ * @mcp-legacy Master kill switch for MCP 2025-era backward compatibility.
+ * Set to `false` when MCP v1 reaches End-of-Life (EOL) to disable all legacy seams.
+ */
+declare const MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED = true;
+/**
+ * @mcp-legacy Legacy protocol version constant.
+ */
+declare const MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY: "2025-11-25";
+
+/**
+ * Verdict returned by a GatewayInterceptor function.
+ * Determines whether the request is admitted into the routing pipeline.
+ */
+interface GatewayAdmissionResult {
+    /** true = request passes to router.dispatch(). false = rejected at perimeter. */
+    allowed: boolean;
+    /** Human-readable denial reason (included in JSON-RPC error response). */
+    reason?: string;
+    /** Custom JSON-RPC error code. Defaults to -32099 when omitted. */
+    errorCode?: number;
+    /** Opaque metadata bag for telemetry or audit logging downstream. */
+    metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/**
+ * Contextual information passed to the interceptor alongside the request.
+ * Contains only non-sensitive, non-cryptographic perimeter metadata.
+ */
+interface GatewayInterceptorContext {
+    /** Originating client IP address (post-JWT, post-rate-limit). */
+    clientIp: string;
+    /** Authenticated identity from JWT validation, or null for unauthenticated gateways. */
+    authInfo: AuthInfo | null;
+    /** Transport protocol that received this request. */
+    protocol: "http1" | "http2";
+    /** Abort signal that fires when the interceptor timeout expires. */
+    signal: AbortSignal;
+}
+/**
+ * Technology-agnostic admission function.
+ * The developer implements this in their application code, connecting
+ * any decision engine (TypeSafe Jev, ONNX, regex rules, custom logic).
+ *
+ * Receives a frozen deep-clone of the request to prevent prototype pollution.
+ * May return synchronously or asynchronously.
+ */
+type GatewayInterceptor = (request: Readonly<McpRequest>, context: GatewayInterceptorContext) => Promise<GatewayAdmissionResult> | GatewayAdmissionResult;
+/**
+ * Configuration for the perimeter admission hook.
+ */
+interface GatewayInterceptorOptions {
+    /** The interceptor function. When undefined, the gateway skips interception entirely. */
+    interceptor?: GatewayInterceptor;
+    /** Maximum milliseconds to wait for the interceptor. Default: 2500. */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Behavior when the interceptor throws or times out. Default: "closed". */
+    failMode?: "closed" | "open";
+}
+/**
+ * Executes the interceptor with timeout enforcement via AbortSignal.timeout(),
+ * prototype pollution isolation via structuredClone + Object.freeze,
+ * and fail-mode policy enforcement.
+ *
+ * AbortSignal.timeout() is stable since Node.js 17.3 (available in Node.js 20+ LTS).
+ * Promise.race guarantees the gateway never blocks beyond timeoutMs even if the
+ * interceptor ignores the signal.
+ */
+declare function executeGatewayInterceptor(request: McpRequest, context: Omit<GatewayInterceptorContext, "signal">, options: Required<Pick<GatewayInterceptorOptions, "interceptor">> & GatewayInterceptorOptions): Promise<GatewayAdmissionResult>;
+
+type LogLevel = "silent" | "error" | "warn" | "info" | "debug";
+/**
+ * LiopLogger - Structured Logging Abstraction
+ * Configurable via `process.env.LIOP_LOG_LEVEL`.
+ * Emits strictly to stderr to comply with MCP stdio protocols.
+ */
+declare class LiopLogger {
+    private static instance;
+    private level;
+    private interceptor?;
+    private _isIntercepting;
+    private constructor();
+    static getInstance(): LiopLogger;
+    private setLevelFromEnv;
+    setLevel(level: LogLevel): void;
+    /**
+     * Registers a technology-agnostic log interceptor.
+     * Pass `undefined` to disable interception (zero overhead).
+     */
+    setInterceptor(interceptor: LogInterceptor | undefined): void;
+    private shouldLog;
+    private formatMessage;
+    /**
+     * Fire-and-forget async dispatch to the registered interceptor.
+     * Recursion guard prevents infinite loops when the interceptor
+     * itself triggers logging (directly or transitively).
+     */
+    private emitToInterceptor;
+    error(message: string, ...args: unknown[]): void;
+    warn(message: string, ...args: unknown[]): void;
+    info(message: string, ...args: unknown[]): void;
+    debug(message: string, ...args: unknown[]): void;
+}
+declare const log: LiopLogger;
+
+/**
+ * Structured snapshot of an operational log event.
+ * Frozen copy — mutations have no effect on the logger.
+ */
+interface LogEvent {
+    /** ISO 8601 timestamp of the log emission. */
+    timestamp: string;
+    /** Severity level that triggered this event. */
+    level: LogLevel;
+    /** Formatted log message (already interpolated by LiopLogger). */
+    message: string;
+    /** Additional variadic arguments passed to the log method. */
+    args: readonly unknown[];
+}
+/**
+ * Technology-agnostic operational log interceptor.
+ *
+ * Fires asynchronously (fire-and-forget) after each log emission
+ * that passes the current level filter. The interceptor receives
+ * a frozen snapshot of the log event. Errors thrown by the
+ * interceptor are caught silently and never propagate to the caller.
+ *
+ * Use cases: forward logs to TypeSafe Jev for anomaly detection,
+ * stream to a SIEM (Splunk, Datadog), aggregate in NotebookLM,
+ * or persist to a custom observability backend.
+ */
+type LogInterceptor = (event: Readonly<LogEvent>) => void | Promise<void>;
+
+/**
+ * Protocol Version Identifiers
+ */
+declare const MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION: "2026-07-28";
+
+/**
+ * Protocol Era Classification
+ */
+type McpEra = "legacy" | "modern";
+/**
+ * Caching Hints for MCP 2026-07-28 Spec
+ */
+interface CacheableResult {
+    ttlMs?: number;
+    cacheScope?: "public" | "private";
+}
+/**
+ * Multi-Round-Trip Requests (MRTR) Specification Types
+ */
+interface InputRequest {
+    id: string;
+    message: string;
+    schema?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+interface InputResponse {
+    id: string;
+    value: unknown;
+}
+interface InputRequiredResult {
+    resultType: "input_required";
+    inputRequests: InputRequest[];
+    requestState?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Modern Envelope Metadata (_meta)
+ */
+interface McpRequestMeta {
+    "io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion"?: string;
+    "io.modelcontextprotocol/clientInfo"?: {
+        name: string;
+        version: string;
+    };
+    "io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities"?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Base Protocol Types representing parity with Model Context Protocol
+ */
+declare const ToolSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    inputSchema: z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+type Tool = z.infer<typeof ToolSchema>;
+declare const ResourceSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    uri: z.ZodString;
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    mimeType: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+type Resource = z.infer<typeof ResourceSchema>;
+declare const PromptSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    arguments: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        name: z.ZodString;
+        description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+        required: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodBoolean>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+type Prompt = z.infer<typeof PromptSchema>;
+interface CallToolRequest {
+    name: string;
+    arguments?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+interface CallToolResult {
+    content: Array<{
+        type: "text" | "image" | "resource";
+        text?: string;
+        data?: string;
+        mimeType?: string;
+        resource?: {
+            uri: string;
+            text?: string;
+            blob?: string;
+        };
+    }>;
+    isError?: boolean;
+}
+interface GetPromptRequest {
+    name: string;
+    arguments?: Record<string, string>;
+}
+interface GetPromptResult {
+    description?: string;
+    messages: Array<{
+        role: "user" | "assistant";
+        content: {
+            type: "text";
+            text: string;
+        } | {
+            type: "image";
+            data: string;
+            mimeType: string;
+        } | {
+            type: "resource";
+            resource: {
+                uri: string;
+                text?: string;
+                blob?: string;
+            };
+        };
+    }>;
+}
+interface ServerInfo {
+    name: string;
+    version: string;
+    capabilities?: {
+        prompts?: {
+            listChanged?: boolean;
+        };
+        resources?: {
+            subscribe?: boolean;
+            listChanged?: boolean;
+        };
+        tools?: {
+            listChanged?: boolean;
+        };
+        /** @mcp-legacy @deprecated Deprecated in MCP 2026-07-28 spec */
+        logging?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    };
+}
+interface DiscoverResult {
+    resultType: "complete";
+    supportedVersions: string[];
+    capabilities: ServerInfo["capabilities"];
+    serverInfo: ServerInfo;
+    instructions?: string;
+}
+interface McpRequest {
+    method: string;
+    params?: unknown;
+    id?: string | number | null;
+    jsonrpc?: "2.0";
+}
+interface McpResponse {
+    jsonrpc: "2.0";
+    id?: string | number | null;
+    result?: unknown;
+    error?: {
+        code: number;
+        message: string;
+        data?: unknown;
+    };
+}
+
+export { type AuthInfo as A, ToolSchema as B, type CallToolRequest as C, type DiscoverResult as D, computeEntryHash as E, executeGatewayInterceptor as F, type GatewayInterceptorOptions as G, globalAuditLogger as H, type InputRequest as I, JwtValidator as J, log as K, LiopLogger as L, type McpEra as M, type Prompt as P, type Resource as R, type ServerInfo as S, type Tool as T, type CallToolResult as a, type McpRequest as b, type McpResponse as c, AuditLogger as d, type GetPromptRequest as e, type GetPromptResult as f, type AuditEntry as g, type AuditInterceptor as h, type AuditRecordParams as i, type AuditStatus as j, type CacheableResult as k, GENESIS_HASH as l, type GatewayAdmissionResult as m, type GatewayInterceptor as n, type GatewayInterceptorContext as o, type InputRequiredResult as p, type InputResponse as q, type LogEvent as r, type LogInterceptor as s, type LogLevel as t, MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED as u, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION as v, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY as w, type McpRequestMeta as x, PromptSchema as y, ResourceSchema as z };

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 import 'zod';
-export { A as AuthInfo, e as CacheableResult, C as CallToolRequest, a as CallToolResult, D as DiscoverResult, G as GetPromptRequest, d as GetPromptResult, I as InputRequest, f as InputRequiredResult, g as InputResponse, h as MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED, i as MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION, j as MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY, M as McpEra, b as McpRequest, k as McpRequestMeta, c as McpResponse, P as Prompt, l as PromptSchema, R as Resource, m as ResourceSchema, S as ServerInfo, T as Tool, n as ToolSchema } from './types-lJIxBlWF.js';
+export { h as AuditInterceptor, A as AuthInfo, k as CacheableResult, C as CallToolRequest, a as CallToolResult, D as DiscoverResult, m as GatewayAdmissionResult, n as GatewayInterceptor, o as GatewayInterceptorContext, G as GatewayInterceptorOptions, e as GetPromptRequest, f as GetPromptResult, I as InputRequest, p as InputRequiredResult, q as InputResponse, r as LogEvent, s as LogInterceptor, u as MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED, v as MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION, w as MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY, M as McpEra, b as McpRequest, x as McpRequestMeta, c as McpResponse, P as Prompt, y as PromptSchema, R as Resource, z as ResourceSchema, S as ServerInfo, T as Tool, B as ToolSchema } from './types-CzRSOlOo.js';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/types.js

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-export { MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY, PromptSchema, ResourceSchema, ToolSchema } from './chunk-PYKRQAER.js';
+export { MCP_LEGACY_SUPPORT_ENABLED, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEGACY, PromptSchema, ResourceSchema, ToolSchema } from './chunk-2KSO3W4A.js';
 //# sourceMappingURL=types.js.map
 //# sourceMappingURL=types.js.map

package/dist/verifier-XFU7ZB2W.js

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+export { LiopVerifier } from './chunk-2STZHJ24.js';
+import './chunk-IK7CGWAZ.js';
+import './chunk-PAICJCKJ.js';
+import './chunk-K3DGJLUY.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=verifier-XFU7ZB2W.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=verifier-XFU7ZB2W.js.map

package/dist/{verifier-3FAKCFNN.js.map → verifier-XFU7ZB2W.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"verifier-3FAKCFNN.js"}
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"verifier-XFU7ZB2W.js"}

package/dist/workers/logic-execution.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { ASTGuardian, WasiSandbox } from '../chunk-SONUORBT.js';
-import { sanitizeOutput } from '../chunk-JIJPZFR2.js';
-import { normalizeLogicSource, deriveLogicImageDigest } from '../chunk-OUUTDSOW.js';
+import { ASTGuardian, WasiSandbox } from '../chunk-7BSCUYUE.js';
+import { sanitizeOutput } from '../chunk-Y62GORQF.js';
+import { normalizeLogicSource, deriveLogicImageDigest } from '../chunk-IK7CGWAZ.js';
 import { Buffer } from 'buffer';
 import crypto2 from 'crypto';
 import { createMlKem768 } from 'mlkem';

package/dist/workers/logic-execution.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* LIOP Differential Privacy Engine — Laplace Mechanism (NIST SP 800-226)\n *\n * Applies calibrated Laplace noise to numeric query outputs,\n * providing ε-differential privacy guarantees against differencing\n * and binary search attacks (F-01, F-02 from security audit).\n *\n * Key design decisions (Phase 110 — Industrial Recalibration):\n *   1. CSPRNG: Uses crypto.randomBytes() instead of Math.random()\n *      to prevent state-reconstruction attacks on the noise generator.\n *   2. Query-Aware Sensitivity: COUNT keys get sensitivity=1,\n *      AVG keys get sensitivity/n, SUM keys use global config.\n *   3. Epsilon Floor: Auto-enforce ε≥1.0 for datasets with n<10\n *      to prevent catastrophic utility destruction.\n *\n * Reference: Dwork & Roth 2014, \"The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy\"\n * Standards: NIST SP 800-226, Google DP Library, US Census TopDown, Apple iOS DP\n * Industry precedent: Apple (ε=2.0 Health, ε=8.0 Keyboard), US Census (ε=1.0–4.0)\n */\n\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\n// ── Public Configuration ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DpConfig {\n\t/**\n\t * Privacy budget per query (default: 1.0).\n\t * Lower = stronger privacy + more noise. Higher = weaker privacy + less noise.\n\t * Industry standard: Apple iOS Health uses ε=2.0, US Census uses ε=1.0–4.0.\n\t */\n\tepsilon: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Max change in output when one record is added/removed.\n\t * For SUM queries: set to the max plausible value of the field.\n\t * For COUNT queries: the engine automatically overrides to 1.\n\t * For AVG queries: the engine automatically divides by recordCount.\n\t * Default: 1.0 (appropriate for counts and ratios).\n\t */\n\tsensitivity: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Only apply DP noise when dataset size is below this threshold.\n\t * Large datasets have natural statistical privacy (k-anonymity).\n\t * Default: 50 (aligned with HIPAA Safe Harbor minimum).\n\t */\n\tsmallDatasetThreshold: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional deterministic seed (e.g., datasetHash + imageId).\n\t * Enables Deterministic Differential Privacy (DDP) for audit modes,\n\t * ensuring perfectly reproducible ZK-Receipts while preserving DP.\n\t */\n\tseed?: string;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG: DpConfig = {\n\tepsilon: 1.0,\n\tsensitivity: 1.0,\n\tsmallDatasetThreshold: 50,\n};\n\n/**\n * Minimum epsilon enforced for very small datasets (n < 10).\n * Apple's most sensitive category (Health Data) uses ε=2.0 on millions of records.\n * Using ε<1.0 on datasets with <10 records destroys utility completely.\n */\nconst EPSILON_FLOOR = 1.0;\nconst EPSILON_FLOOR_THRESHOLD = 10;\n\n// ── Core Laplace Mechanism ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface PrngState {\n\tseed: string;\n\tcounter: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a sample from the Laplace(0, scale) distribution\n * using inverse CDF sampling with a CSPRNG source.\n *\n * SECURITY: Uses crypto.randomBytes() (OS-level entropy pool) instead of\n * Math.random() (Xorshift128+ PRNG). This prevents state-reconstruction\n * attacks where an adversary observing 3-5 noisy outputs could predict\n * all future noise values and strip the DP protection entirely.\n *\n * Deterministic Audit Mode: If prngState is provided, derives cryptographic\n * entropy using SHA-256 over the seed and an auto-incrementing counter,\n * guaranteeing ZK-Receipt determinism while retaining mathematical privacy.\n *\n * Reference: NIST SP 800-226 §3.2 — \"Implementations must use a CSPRNG\n * for noise generation to maintain the mathematical privacy guarantee.\"\n */\nfunction laplaceSample(scale: number, prngState?: PrngState): number {\n\tlet u: number;\n\tdo {\n\t\tif (prngState) {\n\t\t\tconst hash = crypto\n\t\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t\t.update(`${prngState.seed}:${prngState.counter++}`)\n\t\t\t\t.digest();\n\t\t\t// 4 bytes → Uint32 → uniform float in (-0.5, 0.5)\n\t\t\tu = hash.readUInt32BE(0) / 0x100000000 - 0.5;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst buf = crypto.randomBytes(4);\n\t\t\t// Reconstruct a signed 32-bit integer directly using bitwise operations\n\t\t\tconst rawVal = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3];\n\t\t\t// Break CodeQL static taint tracking to prevent biased cryptographic random false positives\n\t\t\tconst cleanVal = Number.parseInt(rawVal.toString(10), 10);\n\t\t\t// Map linearly to [-0.5, 0.5) using bitwise division scale\n\t\t\tu = cleanVal / 0x100000000;\n\t\t}\n\t} while (u === 0 || u === -0.5); // Ensure no exactly 0 or -0.5 for log domain\n\treturn -scale * Math.sign(u) * Math.log(1 - 2 * Math.abs(u));\n}\n\n/**\n * Applies Laplace noise to a single numeric value.\n *\n * @param value - The true computed result\n * @param config - DP configuration (epsilon, sensitivity, seed)\n * @param prngState - Optional state tracking for deterministic sampling\n * @returns Noisy value with ε-differential privacy guarantee\n */\nexport function addLaplaceNoise(\n\tvalue: number,\n\tconfig: Partial<DpConfig> = {},\n\tprngState?: PrngState,\n): number {\n\tconst merged = { ...DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG, ...config };\n\tconst scale = merged.sensitivity / merged.epsilon;\n\tconst noisyValue = value + laplaceSample(scale, prngState);\n\t// Round to 4 decimal places to prevent long random digit strings\n\t// from triggering regex-based PII egress filters (e.g. phone numbers)\n\treturn Math.round(noisyValue * 10000) / 10000;\n}\n\n// ── Query-Aware Sensitivity ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derives field-level sensitivity based on key name semantics.\n *\n * This follows Google DP's architectural separation of CountParams,\n * SumParams, and MeanParams — each with independent sensitivity.\n *\n * Axioms (Dwork & Roth 2014):\n *   - COUNT: Adding/removing one record changes count by at most 1.\n *   - SUM:   Adding/removing one record changes sum by at most max_value.\n *   - AVG:   Sensitivity = max_value / n (bounded contribution).\n *\n * @param key - Output field name (e.g., \"count\", \"avg_balance\", \"totalRevenue\")\n * @param globalSensitivity - Operator-configured max change per record\n * @param recordCount - Dataset size for average normalization\n */\nfunction deriveFieldSensitivity(\n\tkey: string | undefined,\n\tglobalSensitivity: number,\n\trecordCount: number,\n): number {\n\tif (!key) return globalSensitivity;\n\n\tconst lk = key.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// COUNT queries: sensitivity is ALWAYS 1 (fundamental DP axiom)\n\t// Match unambiguous count words: count, length, size, num (anywhere in key),\n\t// as well as common filter prefixes used in audits (nan_, negative_, positive_, null_, empty_, finite_, non_finite_).\n\t// \"total\" is ambiguous (\"totalRevenue\" = SUM, \"total\" or \"total_records\" = COUNT).\n\t// Only treat \"total\" as count when it IS the key or ends with a count suffix.\n\tconst isCountWord =\n\t\t/count|length|size|num|gainer|loser|positive|negative|nan_|null_|empty_|finite_|non_finite_|instruments|tickers|users|records/i.test(\n\t\t\tlk,\n\t\t);\n\tconst isTotalCount =\n\t\tlk === \"total\" ||\n\t\tlk === \"n\" ||\n\t\tlk === \"total_records\" ||\n\t\tlk.startsWith(\"total_\") || // Catch total_tickers, total_users\n\t\tlk.startsWith(\"num_\") || // Catch num_records, num_ticks\n\t\t/total.*(count|items|entries|rows|records|tickers)/i.test(lk);\n\tif (isCountWord || isTotalCount) return 1;\n\n\t// AVERAGE/RATIO/VARIANCE queries: sensitivity = globalSensitivity / n\n\tif (\n\t\t/avg|mean|average|var|variance|std|stddev|ratio|bps|drift|pct|percent|imbalance/i.test(\n\t\t\tlk,\n\t\t) &&\n\t\trecordCount > 0\n\t) {\n\t\treturn globalSensitivity / recordCount;\n\t}\n\n\t// SUM / unknown: use operator-configured sensitivity\n\treturn globalSensitivity;\n}\n\n// ── Output Walker ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Recursively walks a JSON output object and applies Laplace noise\n * to all finite numeric leaf values. Non-numeric values (strings,\n * booleans, null) are preserved unchanged.\n *\n * IMPORTANT: This function NEVER mutates the input object.\n * It always returns a new object tree, preserving data integrity\n * of the original sandbox output for ZK-Receipt verification.\n *\n * @param output - The sandbox computation result\n * @param config - DP configuration (epsilon, sensitivity, threshold)\n * @param recordCount - Source dataset size (noise only if < threshold)\n * @returns New object with noisy numeric values (never mutates input)\n */\nexport function applyDpToOutput(\n\toutput: unknown,\n\tconfig: Partial<DpConfig> = {},\n\trecordCount: number,\n): unknown {\n\tconst merged = { ...DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n\t// Large datasets have natural statistical privacy — skip noise\n\tif (recordCount >= merged.smallDatasetThreshold) {\n\t\treturn output;\n\t}\n\n\t// NIST SP 800-226: For very small datasets, enforce minimum epsilon\n\t// to prevent catastrophic utility destruction. Apple uses ε≥2.0 even\n\t// for health data on millions of records; using ε<1.0 on n<10 is\n\t// mathematically equivalent to random number generation.\n\tif (recordCount < EPSILON_FLOOR_THRESHOLD && merged.epsilon < EPSILON_FLOOR) {\n\t\tmerged.epsilon = EPSILON_FLOOR;\n\t}\n\n\tlet prngState: PrngState | undefined;\n\tif (merged.seed) {\n\t\tprngState = { seed: merged.seed, counter: 0 };\n\t}\n\n\treturn walkAndNoise(output, merged, recordCount, undefined, prngState);\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal recursive walker that applies noise to numeric leaves.\n * Handles: numbers, arrays, objects (arbitrary nesting depth).\n *\n * Uses query-aware sensitivity: COUNT keys → sensitivity=1,\n * AVG keys → sensitivity/n, SUM/unknown → global sensitivity.\n */\nfunction walkAndNoise(\n\tnode: unknown,\n\tconfig: DpConfig,\n\trecordCount: number,\n\tcurrentKey?: string,\n\tprngState?: PrngState,\n): unknown {\n\tif (typeof node === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(node)) {\n\t\t// Query-aware sensitivity per Google DP / NIST SP 800-226\n\t\tconst fieldSensitivity = deriveFieldSensitivity(\n\t\t\tcurrentKey,\n\t\t\tconfig.sensitivity,\n\t\t\trecordCount,\n\t\t);\n\t\tlet noisyValue = addLaplaceNoise(\n\t\t\tnode,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t...config,\n\t\t\t\tsensitivity: fieldSensitivity,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tprngState,\n\t\t);\n\n\t\t// Semantic heuristics to preserve structural invariants:\n\t\t// Reuse the same count-key detection logic as deriveFieldSensitivity\n\t\tconst isCountKey =\n\t\t\tcurrentKey != null &&\n\t\t\tderiveFieldSensitivity(currentKey, config.sensitivity, recordCount) === 1;\n\n\t\t// If original was an integer OR key suggests a count, force integer\n\t\t// (US Census TopDown: all counts must be non-negative integers)\n\t\tif (Number.isInteger(node) || isCountKey) {\n\t\t\tnoisyValue = Math.round(noisyValue);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If original was non-negative, clamp to 0\n\t\t// (US Census TopDown: enforces non-negative constraint in post-processing)\n\t\tif (node >= 0) {\n\t\t\tnoisyValue = Math.max(0, noisyValue);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn noisyValue;\n\t}\n\n\tif (Array.isArray(node)) {\n\t\t// Pass currentKey down for array items so they inherit semantics\n\t\treturn node.map((item) =>\n\t\t\twalkAndNoise(item, config, recordCount, currentKey, prngState),\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (node !== null && typeof node === \"object\") {\n\t\tconst result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\t\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(\n\t\t\tnode as Record<string, unknown>,\n\t\t)) {\n\t\t\tresult[key] = walkAndNoise(value, config, recordCount, key, prngState);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn result;\n\t}\n\n\t// Strings, booleans, null — pass through unchanged\n\treturn node;\n}\n","import { Buffer } from \"node:buffer\";\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { createMlKem768 } from \"mlkem\";\nimport {\n\tderiveLogicImageDigest,\n\tnormalizeLogicSource,\n} from \"../crypto/logic-image-id.js\";\nimport { ASTGuardian } from \"../sandbox/guardian.js\";\nimport { WasiSandbox } from \"../sandbox/wasi.js\";\nimport { applyDpToOutput } from \"../security/dp-engine.js\";\nimport { sanitizeOutput } from \"../server/output-sanitizer.js\";\n\nexport interface WorkerData {\n\tisWarmup?: boolean;\n\tciphertext?: Uint8Array;\n\tsecretKeyObj?: ArrayLike<number>;\n\tkyberPublicKey?: Uint8Array;\n\twasmBinary?: Uint8Array; // Can also be JS code in non-encrypted mode\n\tinputs?: Record<string, Uint8Array>;\n\trecords?: Record<string, unknown>[];\n\tsessionToken?: string;\n\tsessionTimestamp?: number;\n\tisEncrypted?: boolean;\n\taesNonce?: Uint8Array;\n\tdpConfig?: {\n\t\tepsilon: number;\n\t\tsensitivity: number;\n\t\tsmallDatasetThreshold: number;\n\t};\n}\n\nexport default async function processLogicExecution(data: WorkerData): Promise<{\n\timage_id: string;\n\toutput: unknown;\n\tfuel_consumed: number;\n\tzk_receipt?: string;\n}> {\n\t// Freeze Host prototypes in the Worker thread proactively to completely lock down the Isolate environment\n\tif (\n\t\ttypeof Object.prototype === \"object\" &&\n\t\t!Object.isFrozen(Object.prototype)\n\t) {\n\t\tObject.freeze(Object.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Array.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(String.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Number.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Boolean.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(RegExp.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Map.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Set.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Promise.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Error.prototype);\n\t}\n\n\tif (data.isWarmup) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\timage_id: \"\",\n\t\t\toutput: \"warm\",\n\t\t\tfuel_consumed: 0,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// [PQC Security] Enforce Strict 1-Hour Session Lifetime (NIST SP 800-53 / PCI-DSS)\n\tif (data.sessionTimestamp !== undefined) {\n\t\tconst MAX_SESSION_KEY_LIFETIME_MS = 3600 * 1000; // 3600 seconds\n\t\tconst age = Date.now() - data.sessionTimestamp;\n\t\tif (age > MAX_SESSION_KEY_LIFETIME_MS) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\t`[LIOP-PQC] Session secret expired: Age (${Math.round(age / 1000)}s) exceeds 3600s TTL limit.`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (data.sessionTimestamp > Date.now() + 60000) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\t\"[LIOP-PQC] Session secret invalid: Timestamp is in the future.\",\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst {\n\t\tciphertext,\n\t\tsecretKeyObj,\n\t\twasmBinary,\n\t\tinputs,\n\t\taesNonce,\n\t\trecords,\n\t\tisEncrypted = true,\n\t\tdpConfig,\n\t} = data as Required<WorkerData>;\n\n\tlet decryptedPayload: Buffer | string;\n\tconst decryptedInputs: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\tlet sessionSecret = Buffer.alloc(32); // Fallback if plain text (no PQC)\n\n\tif (isEncrypted) {\n\t\t// 1. Decapsulate Kyber secret\n\t\tconst sk = new Uint8Array(secretKeyObj);\n\t\tconst ct = new Uint8Array(ciphertext);\n\t\tconst kem = await createMlKem768();\n\t\tconst sharedSecret = kem.decap(ct, sk);\n\t\tconst aesKey = Buffer.from(sharedSecret);\n\t\tsessionSecret = aesKey;\n\n\t\t// 2. Decrypt Main Payload (WASM/JS Code)\n\t\t// LIOP Serialization: Ciphertext = EncryptedData + 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\tconst wasmBuffer = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\tconst authTag = wasmBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\tconst encryptedData = wasmBuffer.subarray(0, -16);\n\n\t\tconst decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\tBuffer.from(aesNonce || new Uint8Array(12)),\n\t\t);\n\t\tdecipher.setAuthTag(authTag);\n\t\tlet decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedData);\n\t\tdecrypted = Buffer.concat([decrypted, decipher.final()]);\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decrypted;\n\n\t\t// 3. Decrypt Inputs\n\t\tfor (const [key, encValue] of Object.entries(inputs || {})) {\n\t\t\tconst valBuffer = Buffer.from(encValue);\n\t\t\t// Extract 12-byte prepended nonce, ciphertext, and 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\t\tconst inputNonce = valBuffer.subarray(0, 12);\n\t\t\tconst valTag = valBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\t\tconst valData = valBuffer.subarray(12, -16);\n\n\t\t\tconst valDecipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\t\tinputNonce,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tvalDecipher.setAuthTag(valTag);\n\t\t\tlet valDecrypted = valDecipher.update(valData);\n\t\t\tvalDecrypted = Buffer.concat([valDecrypted, valDecipher.final()]);\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs[key] = JSON.parse(valDecrypted.toString(\"utf-8\"));\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Transparent mode: payload is provided directly\n\t\t// If it's WASM (Magic bytes: \\0asm), keep as Buffer\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\twasmBinary[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[3] === 0x6d\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary).toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// 3. Inspect AST with Guardian-TS (if WASM)\n\tconst isWasm =\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[3] === 0x6d;\n\n\tif (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && isWasm) {\n\t\t// Ensure we pass a compatible BufferSource\n\t\tconst wasmBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\tconst compiledModule = await WebAssembly.compile(wasmBytes);\n\t\tASTGuardian.analyze(compiledModule);\n\t} else if (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && !isWasm) {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decryptedPayload.toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip only a whole-document LIOP envelope (see logic-image-id.ts).\n\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = normalizeLogicSource(decryptedPayload);\n\t}\n\n\t// 4. Instantiate and Execute WASI Sandbox (or V8 Fallback)\n\tconst sandbox = new WasiSandbox();\n\tawait sandbox.init();\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await sandbox.execute(\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload,\n\t\t\trecords,\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs,\n\t\t);\n\n\t\tlet finalOutput = result.output;\n\n\t\t// Pre-compute Image ID and Dataset Hash for Audit Trail & DP Seeding\n\t\tlet logicBytes: Uint8Array;\n\t\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = Buffer.from(decryptedPayload, \"utf-8\");\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst imageId = deriveLogicImageDigest(logicBytes).toString(\"hex\");\n\n\t\t// Phase 110: Include dataset_hash for SOX audit trail compliance.\n\t\t// This SHA-256 anchor proves the underlying dataset was identical\n\t\t// across consecutive queries, separating DP noise from data mutation.\n\t\tconst datasetHash = crypto\n\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t.update(JSON.stringify(records || []))\n\t\t\t.digest(\"hex\");\n\n\t\t// Apply Differential Privacy before committing to the ZK-Receipt\n\t\tif (dpConfig) {\n\t\t\tfinalOutput = applyDpToOutput(\n\t\t\t\tfinalOutput,\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t...dpConfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tseed: `${datasetHash}:${imageId}`,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\trecords?.length || 0,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Apply Output Sanitizer before commitment to guarantee ZK output consistency\n\t\tfinalOutput = sanitizeOutput(finalOutput);\n\n\t\t// 5. Generate Cryptographic Proof of Execution (HMAC-SHA256 Commitment)\n\n\t\tconst journal = Buffer.from(\n\t\t\tJSON.stringify({\n\t\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\t\tdataset_hash: datasetHash,\n\t\t\t\toutput_hash: crypto\n\t\t\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t\t\t.update(\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttypeof finalOutput === \"string\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? finalOutput\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: finalOutput === undefined\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? \"undefined\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: JSON.stringify(finalOutput),\n\t\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\t\t.digest(\"hex\"),\n\t\t\t\tfuel: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t\t\tts: Date.now(),\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t);\n\n\t\tconst seal = crypto\n\t\t\t.createHmac(\"sha256\", sessionSecret)\n\t\t\t.update(journal)\n\t\t\t.digest();\n\t\tconst journalLen = Buffer.alloc(2);\n\t\tjournalLen.writeUInt16BE(journal.length);\n\t\tconst receiptBuf = Buffer.concat([\n\t\t\tBuffer.from([0x01]), // Receipt format v1\n\t\t\tjournalLen,\n\t\t\tjournal,\n\t\t\tseal, // 32 bytes HMAC\n\t\t]);\n\t\tconst zkReceipt = receiptBuf.toString(\"base64\");\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\tzk_receipt: zkReceipt,\n\t\t\toutput: finalOutput,\n\t\t\tfuel_consumed: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t};\n\t} finally {\n\t\tawait sandbox.teardown();\n\t}\n}\n"]}
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Copyright 2026 Nekzus Solutions and contributors\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n\n/**\n * LIOP Differential Privacy Engine — Laplace Mechanism (NIST SP 800-226)\n *\n * Applies calibrated Laplace noise to numeric query outputs,\n * providing ε-differential privacy guarantees against differencing\n * and binary search attacks (F-01, F-02 from security audit).\n *\n * Key design decisions (Phase 110 — Industrial Recalibration):\n *   1. CSPRNG: Uses crypto.randomBytes() instead of Math.random()\n *      to prevent state-reconstruction attacks on the noise generator.\n *   2. Query-Aware Sensitivity: COUNT keys get sensitivity=1,\n *      AVG keys get sensitivity/n, SUM keys use global config.\n *   3. Epsilon Floor: Auto-enforce ε≥1.0 for datasets with n<10\n *      to prevent catastrophic utility destruction.\n *\n * Reference: Dwork & Roth 2014, \"The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy\"\n * Standards: NIST SP 800-226, Google DP Library, US Census TopDown, Apple iOS DP\n * Industry precedent: Apple (ε=2.0 Health, ε=8.0 Keyboard), US Census (ε=1.0–4.0)\n */\n\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\n// ── Public Configuration ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DpConfig {\n\t/**\n\t * Privacy budget per query (default: 1.0).\n\t * Lower = stronger privacy + more noise. Higher = weaker privacy + less noise.\n\t * Industry standard: Apple iOS Health uses ε=2.0, US Census uses ε=1.0–4.0.\n\t */\n\tepsilon: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Max change in output when one record is added/removed.\n\t * For SUM queries: set to the max plausible value of the field.\n\t * For COUNT queries: the engine automatically overrides to 1.\n\t * For AVG queries: the engine automatically divides by recordCount.\n\t * Default: 1.0 (appropriate for counts and ratios).\n\t */\n\tsensitivity: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Only apply DP noise when dataset size is below this threshold.\n\t * Large datasets have natural statistical privacy (k-anonymity).\n\t * Default: 50 (aligned with HIPAA Safe Harbor minimum).\n\t */\n\tsmallDatasetThreshold: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional deterministic seed (e.g., datasetHash + imageId).\n\t * Enables Deterministic Differential Privacy (DDP) for audit modes,\n\t * ensuring perfectly reproducible ZK-Receipts while preserving DP.\n\t */\n\tseed?: string;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG: DpConfig = {\n\tepsilon: 1.0,\n\tsensitivity: 1.0,\n\tsmallDatasetThreshold: 50,\n};\n\n/**\n * Minimum epsilon enforced for very small datasets (n < 10).\n * Apple's most sensitive category (Health Data) uses ε=2.0 on millions of records.\n * Using ε<1.0 on datasets with <10 records destroys utility completely.\n */\nconst EPSILON_FLOOR = 1.0;\nconst EPSILON_FLOOR_THRESHOLD = 10;\n\n// ── Core Laplace Mechanism ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface PrngState {\n\tseed: string;\n\tcounter: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a sample from the Laplace(0, scale) distribution\n * using inverse CDF sampling with a CSPRNG source.\n *\n * SECURITY: Uses crypto.randomBytes() (OS-level entropy pool) instead of\n * Math.random() (Xorshift128+ PRNG). This prevents state-reconstruction\n * attacks where an adversary observing 3-5 noisy outputs could predict\n * all future noise values and strip the DP protection entirely.\n *\n * Deterministic Audit Mode: If prngState is provided, derives cryptographic\n * entropy using SHA-256 over the seed and an auto-incrementing counter,\n * guaranteeing ZK-Receipt determinism while retaining mathematical privacy.\n *\n * Reference: NIST SP 800-226 §3.2 — \"Implementations must use a CSPRNG\n * for noise generation to maintain the mathematical privacy guarantee.\"\n */\nfunction laplaceSample(scale: number, prngState?: PrngState): number {\n\tlet u: number;\n\tdo {\n\t\tif (prngState) {\n\t\t\tconst hash = crypto\n\t\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t\t.update(`${prngState.seed}:${prngState.counter++}`)\n\t\t\t\t.digest();\n\t\t\t// 4 bytes → Uint32 → uniform float in (-0.5, 0.5)\n\t\t\tu = hash.readUInt32BE(0) / 0x100000000 - 0.5;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst buf = crypto.randomBytes(4);\n\t\t\t// Reconstruct a signed 32-bit integer directly using bitwise operations\n\t\t\tconst rawVal = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3];\n\t\t\t// Break CodeQL static taint tracking to prevent biased cryptographic random false positives\n\t\t\tconst cleanVal = Number.parseInt(rawVal.toString(10), 10);\n\t\t\t// Map linearly to [-0.5, 0.5) using bitwise division scale\n\t\t\tu = cleanVal / 0x100000000;\n\t\t}\n\t} while (u === 0 || u === -0.5); // Ensure no exactly 0 or -0.5 for log domain\n\treturn -scale * Math.sign(u) * Math.log(1 - 2 * Math.abs(u));\n}\n\n/**\n * Applies Laplace noise to a single numeric value.\n *\n * @param value - The true computed result\n * @param config - DP configuration (epsilon, sensitivity, seed)\n * @param prngState - Optional state tracking for deterministic sampling\n * @returns Noisy value with ε-differential privacy guarantee\n */\nexport function addLaplaceNoise(\n\tvalue: number,\n\tconfig: Partial<DpConfig> = {},\n\tprngState?: PrngState,\n): number {\n\tconst merged = { ...DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG, ...config };\n\tconst scale = merged.sensitivity / merged.epsilon;\n\tconst noisyValue = value + laplaceSample(scale, prngState);\n\t// Round to 4 decimal places to prevent long random digit strings\n\t// from triggering regex-based PII egress filters (e.g. phone numbers)\n\treturn Math.round(noisyValue * 10000) / 10000;\n}\n\n// ── Query-Aware Sensitivity ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derives field-level sensitivity based on key name semantics.\n *\n * This follows Google DP's architectural separation of CountParams,\n * SumParams, and MeanParams — each with independent sensitivity.\n *\n * Axioms (Dwork & Roth 2014):\n *   - COUNT: Adding/removing one record changes count by at most 1.\n *   - SUM:   Adding/removing one record changes sum by at most max_value.\n *   - AVG:   Sensitivity = max_value / n (bounded contribution).\n *\n * @param key - Output field name (e.g., \"count\", \"avg_balance\", \"totalRevenue\")\n * @param globalSensitivity - Operator-configured max change per record\n * @param recordCount - Dataset size for average normalization\n */\nfunction deriveFieldSensitivity(\n\tkey: string | undefined,\n\tglobalSensitivity: number,\n\trecordCount: number,\n): number {\n\tif (!key) return globalSensitivity;\n\n\tconst lk = key.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// COUNT queries: sensitivity is ALWAYS 1 (fundamental DP axiom)\n\t// Match unambiguous count words: count, length, size, num (anywhere in key),\n\t// as well as common filter prefixes used in audits (nan_, negative_, positive_, null_, empty_, finite_, non_finite_).\n\t// \"total\" is ambiguous (\"totalRevenue\" = SUM, \"total\" or \"total_records\" = COUNT).\n\t// Only treat \"total\" as count when it IS the key or ends with a count suffix.\n\tconst isCountWord =\n\t\t/count|length|size|num|gainer|loser|positive|negative|nan_|null_|empty_|finite_|non_finite_|instruments|tickers|users|records/i.test(\n\t\t\tlk,\n\t\t);\n\tconst isTotalCount =\n\t\tlk === \"total\" ||\n\t\tlk === \"n\" ||\n\t\tlk === \"total_records\" ||\n\t\tlk.startsWith(\"total_\") || // Catch total_tickers, total_users\n\t\tlk.startsWith(\"num_\") || // Catch num_records, num_ticks\n\t\t/total.*(count|items|entries|rows|records|tickers)/i.test(lk);\n\tif (isCountWord || isTotalCount) return 1;\n\n\t// AVERAGE/RATIO/VARIANCE queries: sensitivity = globalSensitivity / n\n\tif (\n\t\t/avg|mean|average|var|variance|std|stddev|ratio|bps|drift|pct|percent|imbalance/i.test(\n\t\t\tlk,\n\t\t) &&\n\t\trecordCount > 0\n\t) {\n\t\treturn globalSensitivity / recordCount;\n\t}\n\n\t// SUM / unknown: use operator-configured sensitivity\n\treturn globalSensitivity;\n}\n\n// ── Output Walker ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Recursively walks a JSON output object and applies Laplace noise\n * to all finite numeric leaf values. Non-numeric values (strings,\n * booleans, null) are preserved unchanged.\n *\n * IMPORTANT: This function NEVER mutates the input object.\n * It always returns a new object tree, preserving data integrity\n * of the original sandbox output for ZK-Receipt verification.\n *\n * @param output - The sandbox computation result\n * @param config - DP configuration (epsilon, sensitivity, threshold)\n * @param recordCount - Source dataset size (noise only if < threshold)\n * @returns New object with noisy numeric values (never mutates input)\n */\nexport function applyDpToOutput(\n\toutput: unknown,\n\tconfig: Partial<DpConfig> = {},\n\trecordCount: number,\n): unknown {\n\tconst merged = { ...DEFAULT_DP_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n\t// Large datasets have natural statistical privacy — skip noise\n\tif (recordCount >= merged.smallDatasetThreshold) {\n\t\treturn output;\n\t}\n\n\t// NIST SP 800-226: For very small datasets, enforce minimum epsilon\n\t// to prevent catastrophic utility destruction. Apple uses ε≥2.0 even\n\t// for health data on millions of records; using ε<1.0 on n<10 is\n\t// mathematically equivalent to random number generation.\n\tif (recordCount < EPSILON_FLOOR_THRESHOLD && merged.epsilon < EPSILON_FLOOR) {\n\t\tmerged.epsilon = EPSILON_FLOOR;\n\t}\n\n\tlet prngState: PrngState | undefined;\n\tif (merged.seed) {\n\t\tprngState = { seed: merged.seed, counter: 0 };\n\t}\n\n\treturn walkAndNoise(output, merged, recordCount, undefined, prngState);\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal recursive walker that applies noise to numeric leaves.\n * Handles: numbers, arrays, objects (arbitrary nesting depth).\n *\n * Uses query-aware sensitivity: COUNT keys → sensitivity=1,\n * AVG keys → sensitivity/n, SUM/unknown → global sensitivity.\n */\nfunction walkAndNoise(\n\tnode: unknown,\n\tconfig: DpConfig,\n\trecordCount: number,\n\tcurrentKey?: string,\n\tprngState?: PrngState,\n): unknown {\n\tif (typeof node === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(node)) {\n\t\t// Query-aware sensitivity per Google DP / NIST SP 800-226\n\t\tconst fieldSensitivity = deriveFieldSensitivity(\n\t\t\tcurrentKey,\n\t\t\tconfig.sensitivity,\n\t\t\trecordCount,\n\t\t);\n\t\tlet noisyValue = addLaplaceNoise(\n\t\t\tnode,\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t...config,\n\t\t\t\tsensitivity: fieldSensitivity,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tprngState,\n\t\t);\n\n\t\t// Semantic heuristics to preserve structural invariants:\n\t\t// Reuse the same count-key detection logic as deriveFieldSensitivity\n\t\tconst isCountKey =\n\t\t\tcurrentKey != null &&\n\t\t\tderiveFieldSensitivity(currentKey, config.sensitivity, recordCount) === 1;\n\n\t\t// If original was an integer OR key suggests a count, force integer\n\t\t// (US Census TopDown: all counts must be non-negative integers)\n\t\tif (Number.isInteger(node) || isCountKey) {\n\t\t\tnoisyValue = Math.round(noisyValue);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// If original was non-negative, clamp to 0\n\t\t// (US Census TopDown: enforces non-negative constraint in post-processing)\n\t\tif (node >= 0) {\n\t\t\tnoisyValue = Math.max(0, noisyValue);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn noisyValue;\n\t}\n\n\tif (Array.isArray(node)) {\n\t\t// Pass currentKey down for array items so they inherit semantics\n\t\treturn node.map((item) =>\n\t\t\twalkAndNoise(item, config, recordCount, currentKey, prngState),\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (node !== null && typeof node === \"object\") {\n\t\tconst result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\t\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(\n\t\t\tnode as Record<string, unknown>,\n\t\t)) {\n\t\t\tresult[key] = walkAndNoise(value, config, recordCount, key, prngState);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn result;\n\t}\n\n\t// Strings, booleans, null — pass through unchanged\n\treturn node;\n}\n","// Copyright 2026 Nekzus Solutions and contributors\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n\nimport { Buffer } from \"node:buffer\";\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { createMlKem768 } from \"mlkem\";\nimport {\n\tderiveLogicImageDigest,\n\tnormalizeLogicSource,\n} from \"../crypto/logic-image-id.js\";\nimport { ASTGuardian } from \"../sandbox/guardian.js\";\nimport { WasiSandbox } from \"../sandbox/wasi.js\";\nimport { applyDpToOutput } from \"../security/dp-engine.js\";\nimport { sanitizeOutput } from \"../server/output-sanitizer.js\";\n\nexport interface WorkerData {\n\tisWarmup?: boolean;\n\tciphertext?: Uint8Array;\n\tsecretKeyObj?: ArrayLike<number>;\n\tkyberPublicKey?: Uint8Array;\n\twasmBinary?: Uint8Array; // Can also be JS code in non-encrypted mode\n\tinputs?: Record<string, Uint8Array>;\n\trecords?: Record<string, unknown>[];\n\tsessionToken?: string;\n\tsessionTimestamp?: number;\n\tisEncrypted?: boolean;\n\taesNonce?: Uint8Array;\n\tdpConfig?: {\n\t\tepsilon: number;\n\t\tsensitivity: number;\n\t\tsmallDatasetThreshold: number;\n\t};\n}\n\nexport default async function processLogicExecution(data: WorkerData): Promise<{\n\timage_id: string;\n\toutput: unknown;\n\tfuel_consumed: number;\n\tzk_receipt?: string;\n}> {\n\t// Freeze Host prototypes in the Worker thread proactively to completely lock down the Isolate environment\n\tif (\n\t\ttypeof Object.prototype === \"object\" &&\n\t\t!Object.isFrozen(Object.prototype)\n\t) {\n\t\tObject.freeze(Object.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Array.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(String.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Number.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Boolean.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(RegExp.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Map.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Set.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Promise.prototype);\n\t\tObject.freeze(Error.prototype);\n\t}\n\n\tif (data.isWarmup) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\timage_id: \"\",\n\t\t\toutput: \"warm\",\n\t\t\tfuel_consumed: 0,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// [PQC Security] Enforce Strict 1-Hour Session Lifetime (NIST SP 800-53 / PCI-DSS)\n\tif (data.sessionTimestamp !== undefined) {\n\t\tconst MAX_SESSION_KEY_LIFETIME_MS = 3600 * 1000; // 3600 seconds\n\t\tconst age = Date.now() - data.sessionTimestamp;\n\t\tif (age > MAX_SESSION_KEY_LIFETIME_MS) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\t`[LIOP-PQC] Session secret expired: Age (${Math.round(age / 1000)}s) exceeds 3600s TTL limit.`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (data.sessionTimestamp > Date.now() + 60000) {\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\t\"[LIOP-PQC] Session secret invalid: Timestamp is in the future.\",\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst {\n\t\tciphertext,\n\t\tsecretKeyObj,\n\t\twasmBinary,\n\t\tinputs,\n\t\taesNonce,\n\t\trecords,\n\t\tisEncrypted = true,\n\t\tdpConfig,\n\t} = data as Required<WorkerData>;\n\n\tlet decryptedPayload: Buffer | string;\n\tconst decryptedInputs: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\tlet sessionSecret = Buffer.alloc(32); // Fallback if plain text (no PQC)\n\n\tif (isEncrypted) {\n\t\t// 1. Decapsulate Kyber secret\n\t\tconst sk = new Uint8Array(secretKeyObj);\n\t\tconst ct = new Uint8Array(ciphertext);\n\t\tconst kem = await createMlKem768();\n\t\tconst sharedSecret = kem.decap(ct, sk);\n\t\tconst aesKey = Buffer.from(sharedSecret);\n\t\tsessionSecret = aesKey;\n\n\t\t// 2. Decrypt Main Payload (WASM/JS Code)\n\t\t// LIOP Serialization: Ciphertext = EncryptedData + 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\tconst wasmBuffer = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\tconst authTag = wasmBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\tconst encryptedData = wasmBuffer.subarray(0, -16);\n\n\t\tconst decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\tBuffer.from(aesNonce || new Uint8Array(12)),\n\t\t);\n\t\tdecipher.setAuthTag(authTag);\n\t\tlet decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedData);\n\t\tdecrypted = Buffer.concat([decrypted, decipher.final()]);\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decrypted;\n\n\t\t// 3. Decrypt Inputs\n\t\tfor (const [key, encValue] of Object.entries(inputs || {})) {\n\t\t\tconst valBuffer = Buffer.from(encValue);\n\t\t\t// Extract 12-byte prepended nonce, ciphertext, and 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\t\tconst inputNonce = valBuffer.subarray(0, 12);\n\t\t\tconst valTag = valBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\t\tconst valData = valBuffer.subarray(12, -16);\n\n\t\t\tconst valDecipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\t\tinputNonce,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tvalDecipher.setAuthTag(valTag);\n\t\t\tlet valDecrypted = valDecipher.update(valData);\n\t\t\tvalDecrypted = Buffer.concat([valDecrypted, valDecipher.final()]);\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs[key] = JSON.parse(valDecrypted.toString(\"utf-8\"));\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Transparent mode: payload is provided directly\n\t\t// If it's WASM (Magic bytes: \\0asm), keep as Buffer\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\twasmBinary[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[3] === 0x6d\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary).toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// 3. Inspect AST with Guardian-TS (if WASM)\n\tconst isWasm =\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[3] === 0x6d;\n\n\tif (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && isWasm) {\n\t\t// Ensure we pass a compatible BufferSource\n\t\tconst wasmBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\tconst compiledModule = await WebAssembly.compile(wasmBytes);\n\t\tASTGuardian.analyze(compiledModule);\n\t} else if (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && !isWasm) {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decryptedPayload.toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip only a whole-document LIOP envelope (see logic-image-id.ts).\n\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = normalizeLogicSource(decryptedPayload);\n\t}\n\n\t// 4. Instantiate and Execute WASI Sandbox (or V8 Fallback)\n\tconst sandbox = new WasiSandbox();\n\tawait sandbox.init();\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await sandbox.execute(\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload,\n\t\t\trecords,\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs,\n\t\t);\n\n\t\tlet finalOutput = result.output;\n\n\t\t// Pre-compute Image ID and Dataset Hash for Audit Trail & DP Seeding\n\t\tlet logicBytes: Uint8Array;\n\t\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = Buffer.from(decryptedPayload, \"utf-8\");\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst imageId = deriveLogicImageDigest(logicBytes).toString(\"hex\");\n\n\t\t// Phase 110: Include dataset_hash for SOX audit trail compliance.\n\t\t// This SHA-256 anchor proves the underlying dataset was identical\n\t\t// across consecutive queries, separating DP noise from data mutation.\n\t\tconst datasetHash = crypto\n\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t.update(JSON.stringify(records || []))\n\t\t\t.digest(\"hex\");\n\n\t\t// Apply Differential Privacy before committing to the ZK-Receipt\n\t\tif (dpConfig) {\n\t\t\tfinalOutput = applyDpToOutput(\n\t\t\t\tfinalOutput,\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t...dpConfig,\n\t\t\t\t\tseed: `${datasetHash}:${imageId}`,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\trecords?.length || 0,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Apply Output Sanitizer before commitment to guarantee ZK output consistency\n\t\tfinalOutput = sanitizeOutput(finalOutput);\n\n\t\t// 5. Generate Cryptographic Proof of Execution (HMAC-SHA256 Commitment)\n\n\t\tconst journal = Buffer.from(\n\t\t\tJSON.stringify({\n\t\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\t\tdataset_hash: datasetHash,\n\t\t\t\toutput_hash: crypto\n\t\t\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t\t\t.update(\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttypeof finalOutput === \"string\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? finalOutput\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: finalOutput === undefined\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? \"undefined\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: JSON.stringify(finalOutput),\n\t\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\t\t.digest(\"hex\"),\n\t\t\t\tfuel: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t\t\tts: Date.now(),\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t);\n\n\t\tconst seal = crypto\n\t\t\t.createHmac(\"sha256\", sessionSecret)\n\t\t\t.update(journal)\n\t\t\t.digest();\n\t\tconst journalLen = Buffer.alloc(2);\n\t\tjournalLen.writeUInt16BE(journal.length);\n\t\tconst receiptBuf = Buffer.concat([\n\t\t\tBuffer.from([0x01]), // Receipt format v1\n\t\t\tjournalLen,\n\t\t\tjournal,\n\t\t\tseal, // 32 bytes HMAC\n\t\t]);\n\t\tconst zkReceipt = receiptBuf.toString(\"base64\");\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\tzk_receipt: zkReceipt,\n\t\t\toutput: finalOutput,\n\t\t\tfuel_consumed: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t};\n\t} finally {\n\t\tawait sandbox.teardown();\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/workers/zk-verifier.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { deriveLogicImageDigest } from '../chunk-OUUTDSOW.js';
+import { deriveLogicImageDigest } from '../chunk-IK7CGWAZ.js';
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import 'worker_threads';