@nekzus/liop 1.2.0-alpha.10

package/dist/sandbox/guardian.js

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+export class GuardianError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(`AST Sec-Policy Violation: ${message}`);
+        this.name = "GuardianError";
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The Guardian-TS Module
+ * Scans the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) imports of incoming WASM
+ * before it reaches the V8 Wasmtime engine to prevent sandbox-escape
+ * zero-days, resource exhaustion bombs, and evasive execution.
+ */
+export const ASTGuardian = {
+    /**
+     * Analyzes the WebAssembly Module interface proactively.
+     *
+     * @param module - The compiled WebAssembly.Module to inspect
+     * @throws {GuardianError} If illegal imports or capabilities are detected
+     */
+    analyze(module) {
+        const imports = WebAssembly.Module.imports(module);
+        let _importCount = 0;
+        for (const imp of imports) {
+            // Strict Sandbox Validation: Only allow WASI preview 1 and native LIOP functions.
+            // Reject any custom or unexpected host imports.
+            if (imp.module !== "wasi_snapshot_preview1" && imp.module !== "LIOP") {
+                throw new GuardianError(`Banned Host Import Detected: ${imp.module}/${imp.name}`);
+            }
+            _importCount++;
+        }
+        // In Node.js / V8, the maximum module size and function limits
+        // are natively enforced by the engine during compilation.
+        // A successfully compiled WebAssembly.Module already passed structural checks.
+    },
+};

package/dist/sandbox/wasi.d.ts

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+export interface SandboxConfig {
+    allowEnv?: boolean;
+    allowedDirectories?: Record<string, string>;
+    memoryLimitMb?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * LIOP WasiSandbox (Industrial Grade)
+ *
+ * Provides a production-grade isolated environment for executing untrusted logic.
+ * Primarily uses WebAssembly (WASI) for byte-code isolation, with a hardened
+ * V8 Isolate fallback for dynamic JS-to-WASM logic injection.
+ */
+export declare class WasiSandbox {
+    private wasi;
+    private sandboxId;
+    private workingDir;
+    private config;
+    private stdoutHandle;
+    private stderrHandle;
+    constructor(config?: SandboxConfig);
+    /**
+     * Initializes the physical sandbox environment with strict directory lockdown.
+     */
+    init(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Executes logic (WASM or JS-Wrapped) with hard resource limits.
+     */
+    execute(compiledLogic: Buffer | string, records?: Record<string, unknown>[], inputs?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<{
+        output: unknown;
+        fuelConsumed: number;
+    }>;
+    /**
+     * Physically cleans up the sandbox and releases resources.
+     */
+    teardown(): Promise<void>;
+}

package/dist/sandbox/wasi.js

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+import crypto from "node:crypto";
+import * as fs from "node:fs/promises";
+import * as os from "node:os";
+import * as path from "node:path";
+import vm from "node:vm";
+import { WASI } from "node:wasi";
+import { ASTGuardian } from "./guardian.js";
+// Silence Node.js ExperimentalWarning for WASI (Industrial console parity)
+const originalEmit = process.emit;
+// @ts-expect-error
+process.emit = (name, data, ...args) => {
+    if ((name === "warning" &&
+        typeof data === "object" &&
+        data.name === "ExperimentalWarning" &&
+        String(data.message).includes("WASI")) ||
+        String(data.message).includes("importing WASI")) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return originalEmit.call(process, name, data, ...args);
+};
+/**
+ * LIOP WasiSandbox (Industrial Grade)
+ *
+ * Provides a production-grade isolated environment for executing untrusted logic.
+ * Primarily uses WebAssembly (WASI) for byte-code isolation, with a hardened
+ * V8 Isolate fallback for dynamic JS-to-WASM logic injection.
+ */
+export class WasiSandbox {
+    wasi;
+    sandboxId;
+    workingDir;
+    config;
+    stdoutHandle = null;
+    stderrHandle = null;
+    constructor(config = {}) {
+        this.sandboxId = crypto.randomUUID();
+        // Use a dedicated LIOP directory in the OS temp folder
+        this.workingDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "liop-mesh", "sandboxes", this.sandboxId);
+        this.config = config;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Initializes the physical sandbox environment with strict directory lockdown.
+     */
+    async init() {
+        try {
+            await fs.mkdir(this.workingDir, { recursive: true });
+            // Initialize WASI with explicit limits
+            this.stdoutHandle = await fs.open(path.join(this.workingDir, "stdout.log"), "w+");
+            this.stderrHandle = await fs.open(path.join(this.workingDir, "stderr.log"), "w+");
+            this.wasi = new WASI({
+                version: "preview1",
+                args: ["liop_runtime"],
+                env: this.config.allowEnv
+                    ? process.env
+                    : {
+                        NODE_ENV: "production",
+                        LIOP_NODE: "true",
+                        RUNTIME_ID: this.sandboxId,
+                    },
+                preopens: {
+                    "/sandbox": this.workingDir,
+                    ...this.config.allowedDirectories,
+                },
+                stdout: this.stdoutHandle.fd,
+                stderr: this.stderrHandle.fd,
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            throw new Error(`Sandbox Initialization Failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : "FS Error"}`);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Executes logic (WASM or JS-Wrapped) with hard resource limits.
+     */
+    async execute(compiledLogic, records = [], inputs = {}) {
+        const startTime = performance.now();
+        if (compiledLogic instanceof Buffer) {
+            // Path A: Native WebAssembly Isolation
+            try {
+                const module = await WebAssembly.compile(new Uint8Array(compiledLogic));
+                // Tier-0 Guardian: Static analysis to prevent sandbox escapes
+                ASTGuardian.analyze(module);
+                const instance = await WebAssembly.instantiate(module, this.wasi.getImportObject());
+                // Standard entry point
+                this.wasi.start(instance);
+                // Capture output from the sandbox
+                const stdoutPath = path.join(this.workingDir, "stdout.log");
+                const stderrPath = path.join(this.workingDir, "stderr.log");
+                const stdout = await fs.readFile(stdoutPath, "utf-8");
+                const stderr = await fs.readFile(stderrPath, "utf-8");
+                const duration = performance.now() - startTime;
+                return {
+                    output: stdout || (stderr ? `Error: ${stderr}` : "WASM_EXECUTION_SUCCESS"),
+                    fuelConsumed: Math.floor(duration * 1000),
+                };
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`WASM Runtime Error: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+            }
+        }
+        else {
+            // Path B: Hardened V8 Isolate Fallback
+            // Uses node:vm with zero-prototype objects to prevent prototype pollution escapes.
+            const sandboxEnv = Object.create(null); // Isolated global object
+            const env = { records, ...inputs };
+            // Inject strictly monitored globals
+            sandboxEnv.records = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(records)); // Deep copy safety
+            sandboxEnv.env = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(env));
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(inputs)) {
+                sandboxEnv[key] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value));
+            }
+            // LIOP Execution Wrapper
+            // Supports two code patterns:
+            //   1. Explicit entry point: function liop_main(env) { ... }
+            //   2. Bare return logic:    const x = env.records; return { total: x.length };
+            const scriptCode = `
+				(function() {
+					try {
+						${compiledLogic}
+						if (typeof liop_main === 'function') {
+							return liop_main(env);
+						}
+						return "ERR_NO_ENTRY_POINT";
+					} catch(e) {
+						if (e instanceof SyntaxError && /Illegal return statement/i.test(e.message)) {
+							// Bare-return pattern: wrap the logic as a function body
+							try {
+								const __liop_fn = new Function('env', 'records', ${JSON.stringify(String(compiledLogic))});
+								return __liop_fn(env, env.records);
+							} catch(e2) {
+								return "LogicError: " + e2.message;
+							}
+						}
+						return "LogicError: " + e.message;
+					}
+				})();
+			`;
+            try {
+                const script = new vm.Script(scriptCode, {
+                    filename: `liop-sandbox-${this.sandboxId.slice(0, 8)}.js`,
+                });
+                const context = vm.createContext(sandboxEnv, {
+                    name: "LIOP Isolate",
+                    origin: "liop://sandbox",
+                });
+                // Execution with hard CPU and Memory limits (Fuel)
+                const output = script.runInContext(context, {
+                    timeout: 5000,
+                    breakOnSigint: true,
+                    displayErrors: true,
+                });
+                const duration = performance.now() - startTime;
+                const fuelUsed = Math.floor(duration * 1500 + 100);
+                if (fuelUsed > 1000000) {
+                    throw new Error("LIOP_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED: Execution fuel limit exceeded.");
+                }
+                return { output, fuelConsumed: fuelUsed };
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`V8 Isolate Fault: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Execution Timeout"}`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Physically cleans up the sandbox and releases resources.
+     */
+    async teardown() {
+        try {
+            if (this.stdoutHandle)
+                await this.stdoutHandle.close();
+            if (this.stderrHandle)
+                await this.stderrHandle.close();
+            await fs.rm(this.workingDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+        catch (_e) {
+            // Silent fail on teardown to prevent process crashes
+        }
+    }
+}

package/dist/security/guardian.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Represents a violation of the LIOP Zero-Trust Sandbox policy.
+ */
+export declare class GuardianViolationError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * LIOP Guardian-TS (TypeScript Validator)
+ * Emulates the zero-time AST inspection done by `wasmparser` in Rust.
+ * Scans the WebAssembly module imports before instantiation to prevent
+ * sandbox escapes and limits execution strictly to WASI and LIOP APIs.
+ */
+export declare const GuardianTS: {
+    /**
+     * Scans raw WASM bytes to ensure 100% compliance with LIOP Logic-on-Origin boundaries.
+     *
+     * @param wasmBytes The raw compiled `.wasm` buffer to inspect
+     * @returns A parsed WebAssembly.Module proven safe for sandboxed execution
+     * @throws {GuardianViolationError} If forbidden host imports are detected
+     */
+    analyzeAst(wasmBytes: Uint8Array | Buffer): Promise<WebAssembly.Module>;
+};

package/dist/security/guardian.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import { log } from "../utils/logger.js";
+/**
+ * Represents a violation of the LIOP Zero-Trust Sandbox policy.
+ */
+export class GuardianViolationError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(`[AST Security Violation]: ${message}`);
+        this.name = "GuardianViolationError";
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * LIOP Guardian-TS (TypeScript Validator)
+ * Emulates the zero-time AST inspection done by `wasmparser` in Rust.
+ * Scans the WebAssembly module imports before instantiation to prevent
+ * sandbox escapes and limits execution strictly to WASI and LIOP APIs.
+ */
+export const GuardianTS = {
+    /**
+     * Scans raw WASM bytes to ensure 100% compliance with LIOP Logic-on-Origin boundaries.
+     *
+     * @param wasmBytes The raw compiled `.wasm` buffer to inspect
+     * @returns A parsed WebAssembly.Module proven safe for sandboxed execution
+     * @throws {GuardianViolationError} If forbidden host imports are detected
+     */
+    async analyzeAst(wasmBytes) {
+        log.info("[Guardian-TS] Starting Zero-Time AST heuristic inspection...");
+        // This throws if the WASM is structurally invalid or a decompression bomb
+        let module;
+        try {
+            // Convert Node Buffer to a raw Uint8Array pure BufferSource
+            const bufferSource = new Uint8Array(wasmBytes);
+            module = await WebAssembly.compile(bufferSource);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            throw new GuardianViolationError(`Payload structurally invalid or potential bomb: ${e.message}`);
+        }
+        // Heuristic Import Scanning
+        // Extract all imported functions/memories from the AST
+        const imports = WebAssembly.Module.imports(module);
+        let importCount = 0;
+        for (const imp of imports) {
+            // Strict Sandbox Validation: Only allow WASI preview 1 and native LIOP functions.
+            // Reject any custom or unexpected host imports (e.g. `env.shell_exec`, `fs.open`).
+            if (imp.module !== "wasi_snapshot_preview1" && imp.module !== "LIOP") {
+                throw new GuardianViolationError(`Banned Host Import Detected: ${imp.module}/${imp.name}`);
+            }
+            importCount++;
+        }
+        log.info(`[Guardian-TS] OK: AST clean. Validated ${importCount} WASI/LIOP imports.`);
+        return module;
+    },
+};

package/dist/security/zk.d.ts

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+export interface ZkReceipt {
+    /** Cryptographic proof generated by a zero-knowledge VM (e.g., RISC Zero, SP1) */
+    proof: Buffer;
+    /** The public inputs/outputs of the execution (the "Journal" in RISC Zero terminology) */
+    journal: Buffer;
+    /** The expected image ID / verification key of the WASM binary that was executed */
+    imageId: Buffer;
+}
+export declare class ZkVerificationError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * ZK-Proofs Verifier for Logic-Injection-on-Origin Protocol (LIOP)
+ *
+ * Validates that an executed Logic (WASM) actually produced the reported output,
+ * verifying the Zero-Knowledge receipt generated by the remote host's Trusted Execution
+ * Environment (TEE) or zkVM (Zero-Knowledge Virtual Machine).
+ */
+export declare const ZkVerifier: {
+    /**
+     * Validates a ZK receipt using structural Binary Receipt verification.
+     * Parses the HMAC-SHA256 commitment format (v1) and verifies journal integrity.
+     *
+     * @param receipt - Complete ZkReceipt to verify
+     * @param expectedImageId - Hash or ImageID of the WASM file dispatched to the host
+     * @throws ZkVerificationError if the proof is invalid or image IDs mismatch
+     * @returns true if the proof mathematically verifies the execution
+     */
+    verify(receipt: ZkReceipt, expectedImageId: Buffer): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Derives a predictable ImageID (usually a Hash) from a raw WASM binary.
+     *
+     * @param wasmBytes - The raw bytes of the WASM logic file
+     * @returns The SHA-256 ImageID of the logic
+     */
+    deriveImageId(wasmBytes: Buffer): Buffer;
+};

package/dist/security/zk.js

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+import crypto from "node:crypto";
+export class ZkVerificationError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(`ZK Verification Failed: ${message}`);
+        this.name = "ZkVerificationError";
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * ZK-Proofs Verifier for Logic-Injection-on-Origin Protocol (LIOP)
+ *
+ * Validates that an executed Logic (WASM) actually produced the reported output,
+ * verifying the Zero-Knowledge receipt generated by the remote host's Trusted Execution
+ * Environment (TEE) or zkVM (Zero-Knowledge Virtual Machine).
+ */
+export const ZkVerifier = {
+    /**
+     * Validates a ZK receipt using structural Binary Receipt verification.
+     * Parses the HMAC-SHA256 commitment format (v1) and verifies journal integrity.
+     *
+     * @param receipt - Complete ZkReceipt to verify
+     * @param expectedImageId - Hash or ImageID of the WASM file dispatched to the host
+     * @throws ZkVerificationError if the proof is invalid or image IDs mismatch
+     * @returns true if the proof mathematically verifies the execution
+     */
+    verify(receipt, expectedImageId) {
+        // 1. Verify Image ID (Ensures the host executed the exact logic we sent, not a malicious one)
+        if (!receipt.imageId.equals(expectedImageId)) {
+            throw new ZkVerificationError("ImageID mismatch. The remote origin executed a different WASM payload.");
+        }
+        // 2. Validate Proof Structure
+        if (receipt.proof.length === 0) {
+            throw new ZkVerificationError("Empty or malformed zero-knowledge proof array.");
+        }
+        // 3. Cryptographic Validation (Binary Receipt)
+        const proofBuf = Buffer.from(receipt.proof);
+        if (proofBuf.length < 35 || proofBuf[0] !== 0x01) {
+            throw new ZkVerificationError("Malformed receipt: invalid header or length.");
+        }
+        const journalLen = proofBuf.readUInt16BE(1);
+        const journal = proofBuf.subarray(3, 3 + journalLen);
+        const seal = proofBuf.subarray(3 + journalLen);
+        if (seal.length !== 32) {
+            throw new ZkVerificationError("Invalid seal: expected 32-byte HMAC-SHA256.");
+        }
+        // Verify journal contains matching imageId
+        try {
+            const journalData = JSON.parse(journal.toString());
+            if (journalData.image_id !== receipt.imageId.toString("hex")) {
+                throw new ZkVerificationError("Journal imageId does not match receipt header.");
+            }
+        }
+        catch (_e) {
+            throw new ZkVerificationError("Failed to parse journal data.");
+        }
+        return true;
+    },
+    /**
+     * Derives a predictable ImageID (usually a Hash) from a raw WASM binary.
+     *
+     * @param wasmBytes - The raw bytes of the WASM logic file
+     * @returns The SHA-256 ImageID of the logic
+     */
+    deriveImageId(wasmBytes) {
+        return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(wasmBytes).digest();
+    },
+};

package/dist/server/index.d.ts

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+import { z } from "zod";
+import { MeshNode } from "../mesh/node.js";
+import type { CallToolRequest, CallToolResult, GetPromptRequest, GetPromptResult, Prompt, Resource, ServerInfo, Tool } from "../types.js";
+import { PII_PATTERNS, PII_PRESETS, type PiiRule, PiiScanner } from "./pii.js";
+export { PII_PATTERNS, PII_PRESETS, type PiiRule, PiiScanner };
+export type ToolHandler<T extends z.ZodRawShape = z.ZodRawShape> = (args: z.infer<z.ZodObject<T>>, extra: {
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+}) => Promise<CallToolResult>;
+export interface LiopServerOptions {
+    capabilities?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    workerPool?: {
+        enabled?: boolean;
+        minThreads?: number;
+        maxThreads?: number;
+        idleTimeout?: number;
+    };
+    security?: {
+        piiPatterns?: PiiRule[];
+        forbiddenKeys?: string[];
+    };
+    taxonomy?: {
+        domain?: string;
+        clearanceTier?: number;
+        executionTypes?: string[];
+    };
+}
+export interface LogicExecutionPolicy {
+    /**
+     * Validate the business payload returned by sandbox logic (post-execution).
+     * This runs before final egress checks and blocks non-conforming outputs.
+     */
+    outputSchema?: z.ZodType<unknown>;
+    /**
+     * Enforce aggregation-first heuristics (preflight + post-check).
+     */
+    enforceAggregationFirst?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Optional additional deny patterns checked against extracted logic source.
+     */
+    preflightDenyPatterns?: RegExp[];
+}
+export declare class LiopServer {
+    private serverInfo;
+    private config?;
+    private logicCache;
+    private connectionStats;
+    private readonly CACHE_TTL_MS;
+    private readonly THROTTLE_THRESHOLD;
+    private readonly THROTTLE_COOLDOWN_MS;
+    private tools;
+    private resources;
+    private prompts;
+    private activeSchema;
+    private sandboxRecords;
+    private piiScanner;
+    private workerPool;
+    private meshNode;
+    private rpcServer;
+    private boundPort;
+    private sessions;
+    private static readonly LIOP_LOGIC_REGEX;
+    private static readonly LIOP_COMPACT_REGEX;
+    private extractLogic;
+    private parseUnknownJson;
+    private runPreflightPolicy;
+    private validateOutputPolicy;
+    /**
+     * Proxied tools stringify a full MCP CallToolResult (`{ content: [...] }`).
+     * Aggregation-first heuristics must scan the inner business JSON, not the MCP envelope
+     * (otherwise `content` looks like a tabular array of objects and everything blocks).
+     */
+    private unwrapForAggregationPolicyScan;
+    private violatesAggregationFirstPolicy;
+    constructor(serverInfo: ServerInfo, config?: LiopServerOptions | undefined);
+    /**
+     * Builds the centralized LIOP envelope specification document.
+     * Served as a single Resource (liop://protocol/envelope-spec) instead
+     * of being duplicated across every tool description.
+     */
+    private buildEnvelopeSpec;
+    /**
+     * Extracts a compact, human-readable field summary from a JSON Schema.
+     *
+     * Walks the schema structure to find actual data property names and types,
+     * rather than returning top-level schema metadata keys (type, items, etc.).
+     *
+     * Example output for a banking schema:
+     *   "Array of {id(string), accountHolder(string), balance(number), transactions(array of {date(string), amount(number)})}"
+     */
+    private extractSchemaFieldSummary;
+    /**
+     * Convenience alias for connectToMesh(), matching official documentation.
+     */
+    connect(options?: {
+        port?: number;
+        meshConfig?: {
+            listenAddresses?: string[];
+            bootstrapNodes?: string[];
+            identityPath?: string;
+        };
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Register a new Tool
+     */
+    tool<T extends z.ZodRawShape>(name: string, description: string, shape: T, handler: ToolHandler<T>, policy?: LogicExecutionPolicy): void;
+    /**
+     * Register a dynamic prompt
+     */
+    prompt(name: string, description: string | undefined, args: Prompt["arguments"], handler: (request: GetPromptRequest) => GetPromptResult | Promise<GetPromptResult>): void;
+    /**
+     * Enables LIOP Zero-Shot Autonomy by registering the Blind Analyst standard prompt.
+     */
+    enableZeroShotAutonomy(): void;
+    /**
+     * Register a dynamic resource
+     */
+    resource(name: string, uri: string, description?: string, mimeType?: string, content?: string | (() => Promise<string>)): void;
+    /**
+     * Broadcasts the Data Dictionary to the LLM prior to code injection.
+     */
+    dataDictionary(schema: Record<string, unknown>, name?: string, uri?: string, description?: string): void;
+    /**
+     * Manually invalidates the AST Logic Cache (e.g. for Zero-Day patches).
+     */
+    clearAstCache(): void;
+    /**
+     * Emulates calling a tool (used locally or via LIOPMcpBridge)
+     */
+    callTool(request: CallToolRequest): Promise<CallToolResult>;
+    /**
+     * Retrieves registered tools
+     */
+    listTools(): Tool[];
+    /**
+     * Retrieves registered prompts
+     */
+    listPrompts(): Prompt[];
+    /**
+     * Gets a specific prompt by name
+     */
+    getPrompt(request: GetPromptRequest): Promise<GetPromptResult>;
+    /**
+     * Retrieves registered resources
+     */
+    listResources(): Resource[];
+    /**
+     * Reads a specific resource by URI
+     */
+    readResource(uri: string): Promise<{
+        contents: Array<{
+            uri: string;
+            mimeType?: string;
+            text: string;
+        }>;
+    }>;
+    getServerInfo(): ServerInfo;
+    getMeshNode(): MeshNode | null;
+    /**
+     * Injects data into the secure sandbox context for Logic-on-Origin tools.
+     */
+    setSandboxData(records: Record<string, unknown>[]): void;
+    getBoundPort(): number | null;
+    /**
+     * Connects to the libp2p Kademlia DHT and announces capabilities.
+     * Boots the gRPC server for secure Logic-on-Origin.
+     */
+    connectToMesh(options?: {
+        port?: number;
+        meshConfig?: {
+            listenAddresses?: string[];
+            bootstrapNodes?: string[];
+            identityPath?: string;
+        };
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Internal worker execution with Egress Filtering logic.
+     */
+    private executeInWorkerPool;
+    /**
+     * Safely destroys the worker pool, gRPC server, and Mesh node.
+     * Recommended to be called during graceful shutdowns or test teardowns.
+     */
+    close(): Promise<void>;
+}