@naturali/cli 0.196.0 → 0.198.0

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ var __exportAll = (all, no_symbols) => {
 };
 //#endregion
 //#region package.json
-var version = "0.196.0";
+var version = "0.198.0";
 //#endregion
 //#region ../sdk/src/generated/core/bodySerializer.gen.ts
 const serializeFormDataPair = (data, key, value) => {
@@ -3671,6 +3671,18 @@ var Listings = class {
 		});
 	}
 	/**
+	* Delete a listing
+	*
+	* Remove a listing and stop sharing its resource. Refused with `409 listing_has_installs` while any project holds an install, in any state: remove each one first, which takes two deletes of `/installs/{install_id}` for an `active` or `suspended` install. The listing's price stops applying from the next minute, and a later listing of the same resource starts from no price. The tool or agent itself is not touched.
+	*
+	*/
+	static deleteListing(options) {
+		return (options.client ?? client).delete({
+			url: "/v1/projects/{project_id}/listings/{listing_id}",
+			...options
+		});
+	}
+	/**
 	* Get a listing
 	*
 	* One of the project's listings.
@@ -16485,6 +16497,30 @@ const routes = {
 			}
 		]
 	},
+	"delete-listing": {
+		serviceClass: "Listings",
+		operationId: "deleteListing",
+		description: "Remove a listing and stop sharing its resource. Refused with `409 listing_has_installs` while any project holds an install, in any state: remove each one first, which takes two deletes of `/installs/{install_id}` for an `active` or `suspended` install. The listing's price stops applying from the next minute, and a later listing of the same resource starts from no price. The tool or agent itself is not touched.",
+		moduleDocsUrl: "https://naturali.ai/docs/modules/listings",
+		httpMethod: "delete",
+		pathParams: ["project_id", "listing_id"],
+		queryParams: [],
+		headerParams: [],
+		cookieParams: [],
+		flags: [{
+			"name": "project_id",
+			"description": "Project public ID (proj_ prefix).",
+			"required": true,
+			"type": "string",
+			"in": "path"
+		}, {
+			"name": "listing_id",
+			"description": "Listing public ID (lst_ prefix).",
+			"required": true,
+			"type": "string",
+			"in": "path"
+		}]
+	},
 	"submit-listing": {
 		serviceClass: "Listings",
 		operationId: "submitListing",
@@ -22383,14 +22419,14 @@ const routes = {
 			},
 			{
 				"name": "execute",
-				"description": "Execution config for http tools. Supported fields: `url` (required), `method` (default `POST`), `headers`, `body_mode` and `response_mode`. The `url` may contain `{paramName}` placeholders (e.g. `/users/{userId}`) that are replaced at call time with the corresponding tool argument value (URL-encoded). Arguments consumed as path parameters are excluded from the query string and request body. `body_mode` is `json` (default) or `multipart`. In `multipart` mode the merged tool arguments are sent as a `multipart/form-data` body: scalar fields become plain form fields and a field shaped like `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` is decoded from base64 and attached as a file part (the hardcoded `Content-Type: application/json` is dropped so `fetch` sets the multipart boundary itself). `response_mode` is `json` (default: the body parsed as JSON, else returned as text) or `base64`, which returns a 2xx body as `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` — the same file shape `multipart` accepts, so a pipeline step can relay a downloaded file. `filename` comes from `Content-Disposition` and is omitted when the target names none; a body over `TOOL_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `502 TOOL_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE`.\n\n`auth` adds a computed request credential, for targets whose `Authorization` value cannot be expressed as a static header. Supported `auth.type` values:\n\n- `aws_sigv4` — signs the request with AWS Signature Version 4. Requires `region`, `service`, `access_key_id` and `secret_access_key`; `session_token` is optional (temporary credentials). Incompatible with `body_mode: multipart`, whose body bytes are not known at signing time.\n- `gcp_service_account` — mints a Google OAuth 2.0 access token from a signed service account assertion and sends it as a bearer token. Requires `credentials` (the service account key file JSON, as a string) and `scopes` (a non-empty array). Tokens are cached per service account and scope set until shortly before they expire.\n\nCredential fields accept `{{secret:...}}` references and should use them — a tool is readable by anyone who can `GET /tools`, and the stored reference is what is echoed back, never the resolved value.\n\nA credential written as a **literal** is stored and still sent on every call, but it is masked on every read: `secret_access_key`, `session_token` and `credentials` under `auth`, and any credential-named `headers` value (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, or a name containing `api-key`/`token`/`secret`/`password`), come back as `{\"no_echo\": true}`. The mask is an object rather than a string so a read-edit-write round trip fails the schema check instead of writing the placeholder in as the credential. A value carrying a `{{secret:...}}` reference is the wiring, not the credential, and stays readable.\n\n`headers` values additionally accept `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved per call from the caller's `tool_context`, so a per-user credential can be placed in the real header the target expects (`Authorization: Bearer {{context:ocaToken}}`) instead of only in an `X-Naturali-Context-<key>` header. Valid **only** inside `headers` — a context value is caller-supplied, so it may not steer the `url` — and a key missing from the `tool_context` at call time fails the tool call with `MISSING_TOOL_CONTEXT_KEY` rather than sending an empty credential. See the Tool Context reference.\n",
+				"description": "Execution config for http tools. Supported fields: `url` (required), `method` (default `POST`), `headers`, `body_mode` and `response_mode`. The `url` may contain `{paramName}` placeholders (e.g. `/users/{userId}`) that are replaced at call time with the corresponding tool argument value (URL-encoded). Arguments consumed as path parameters are excluded from the query string and request body. `body_mode` is `json` (default) or `multipart`. In `multipart` mode the merged tool arguments are sent as a `multipart/form-data` body: scalar fields become plain form fields and a field shaped like `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` is decoded from base64 and attached as a file part (the hardcoded `Content-Type: application/json` is dropped so `fetch` sets the multipart boundary itself). `response_mode` is `json` (default: the body parsed as JSON, else returned as text) or `base64`, which returns a 2xx body as `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` — the same file shape `multipart` accepts, so a pipeline step can relay a downloaded file. `filename` comes from `Content-Disposition` and is omitted when the target names none; a body over `TOOL_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `502 TOOL_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE`.\n\n`auth` adds a computed request credential, for targets whose `Authorization` value cannot be expressed as a static header. Supported `auth.type` values:\n\n- `aws_sigv4` — signs the request with AWS Signature Version 4. Requires `region`, `service`, `access_key_id` and `secret_access_key`; `session_token` is optional (temporary credentials). Incompatible with `body_mode: multipart`, whose body bytes are not known at signing time.\n- `gcp_service_account` — mints a Google OAuth 2.0 access token from a signed service account assertion and sends it as a bearer token. Requires `credentials` (the service account key file JSON, as a string) and `scopes` (a non-empty array). Tokens are cached per service account and scope set until shortly before they expire.\n\nCredential fields accept `{{secret:...}}` references and should use them — a tool is readable by anyone who can `GET /tools`, and the stored reference is what is echoed back, never the resolved value.\n\nA credential slot takes a reference, never a literal: a literal `secret_access_key`, `session_token` or `credentials` under `auth`, a literal credential-named `headers` value (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, or a name containing `api-key`/`token`/`secret`/`password`), or a `url` carrying a password or a literal credential-named query parameter (those names, plus `key` and `sig`/`signature`) is refused with `400 LITERAL_CREDENTIAL`, `meta.paths` naming each one. A stored literal reads back as `{\"no_echo\": true}` (a `url` holding one is masked whole), an object rather than a string so a read-edit-write round trip fails the schema check instead of writing the placeholder in as the credential. A value carrying a `{{secret:...}}` reference is the wiring, not the credential, and stays readable.\n\n`headers` values additionally accept `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved per call from the caller's `tool_context`, so a per-user credential can be placed in the real header the target expects (`Authorization: Bearer {{context:ocaToken}}`) instead of only in an `X-Naturali-Context-<key>` header. Valid **only** inside `headers` — a context value is caller-supplied, so it may not steer the `url` — and a key missing from the `tool_context` at call time fails the tool call with `MISSING_TOOL_CONTEXT_KEY` rather than sending an empty credential. See the Tool Context reference.\n",
 				"required": false,
 				"type": "object",
 				"in": "body"
 			},
 			{
 				"name": "mcp",
-				"description": "MCP server config (`url`, `headers`). `headers` values accept `{{secret:...}}` and `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved right before the outbound MCP request; `url` accepts `{{secret:...}}` only. A literal credential in `headers` is masked on read, exactly as in `execute`.",
+				"description": "MCP server config (`url`, `headers`). `headers` values accept `{{secret:...}}` and `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved right before the outbound MCP request; `url` accepts `{{secret:...}}` only. A literal credential in `headers` or `url` is refused, exactly as in `execute`.",
 				"required": false,
 				"type": "object",
 				"in": "body"
@@ -22525,14 +22561,14 @@ const routes = {
 			},
 			{
 				"name": "execute",
-				"description": "Execution config for http tools. Supported fields: `url` (required), `method` (default `POST`), `headers`, `body_mode` and `response_mode`. The `url` may contain `{paramName}` placeholders (e.g. `/users/{userId}`) that are replaced at call time with the corresponding tool argument value (URL-encoded). Arguments consumed as path parameters are excluded from the query string and request body. `body_mode` is `json` (default) or `multipart`. In `multipart` mode the merged tool arguments are sent as a `multipart/form-data` body: scalar fields become plain form fields and a field shaped like `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` is decoded from base64 and attached as a file part (the hardcoded `Content-Type: application/json` is dropped so `fetch` sets the multipart boundary itself). `response_mode` is `json` (default: the body parsed as JSON, else returned as text) or `base64`, which returns a 2xx body as `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` — the same file shape `multipart` accepts, so a pipeline step can relay a downloaded file. `filename` comes from `Content-Disposition` and is omitted when the target names none; a body over `TOOL_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `502 TOOL_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE`.\n\n`auth` adds a computed request credential, for targets whose `Authorization` value cannot be expressed as a static header. Supported `auth.type` values:\n\n- `aws_sigv4` — signs the request with AWS Signature Version 4. Requires `region`, `service`, `access_key_id` and `secret_access_key`; `session_token` is optional (temporary credentials). Incompatible with `body_mode: multipart`, whose body bytes are not known at signing time.\n- `gcp_service_account` — mints a Google OAuth 2.0 access token from a signed service account assertion and sends it as a bearer token. Requires `credentials` (the service account key file JSON, as a string) and `scopes` (a non-empty array). Tokens are cached per service account and scope set until shortly before they expire.\n\nCredential fields accept `{{secret:...}}` references and should use them — a tool is readable by anyone who can `GET /tools`, and the stored reference is what is echoed back, never the resolved value.\n\nA credential written as a **literal** is stored and still sent on every call, but it is masked on every read: `secret_access_key`, `session_token` and `credentials` under `auth`, and any credential-named `headers` value (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, or a name containing `api-key`/`token`/`secret`/`password`), come back as `{\"no_echo\": true}`. The mask is an object rather than a string so a read-edit-write round trip fails the schema check instead of writing the placeholder in as the credential. A value carrying a `{{secret:...}}` reference is the wiring, not the credential, and stays readable.\n\n`headers` values additionally accept `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved per call from the caller's `tool_context`, so a per-user credential can be placed in the real header the target expects (`Authorization: Bearer {{context:ocaToken}}`) instead of only in an `X-Naturali-Context-<key>` header. Valid **only** inside `headers` — a context value is caller-supplied, so it may not steer the `url` — and a key missing from the `tool_context` at call time fails the tool call with `MISSING_TOOL_CONTEXT_KEY` rather than sending an empty credential. See the Tool Context reference.\n",
+				"description": "Execution config for http tools. Supported fields: `url` (required), `method` (default `POST`), `headers`, `body_mode` and `response_mode`. The `url` may contain `{paramName}` placeholders (e.g. `/users/{userId}`) that are replaced at call time with the corresponding tool argument value (URL-encoded). Arguments consumed as path parameters are excluded from the query string and request body. `body_mode` is `json` (default) or `multipart`. In `multipart` mode the merged tool arguments are sent as a `multipart/form-data` body: scalar fields become plain form fields and a field shaped like `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` is decoded from base64 and attached as a file part (the hardcoded `Content-Type: application/json` is dropped so `fetch` sets the multipart boundary itself). `response_mode` is `json` (default: the body parsed as JSON, else returned as text) or `base64`, which returns a 2xx body as `{ content_type, filename, data_base64 }` — the same file shape `multipart` accepts, so a pipeline step can relay a downloaded file. `filename` comes from `Content-Disposition` and is omitted when the target names none; a body over `TOOL_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `502 TOOL_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE`.\n\n`auth` adds a computed request credential, for targets whose `Authorization` value cannot be expressed as a static header. Supported `auth.type` values:\n\n- `aws_sigv4` — signs the request with AWS Signature Version 4. Requires `region`, `service`, `access_key_id` and `secret_access_key`; `session_token` is optional (temporary credentials). Incompatible with `body_mode: multipart`, whose body bytes are not known at signing time.\n- `gcp_service_account` — mints a Google OAuth 2.0 access token from a signed service account assertion and sends it as a bearer token. Requires `credentials` (the service account key file JSON, as a string) and `scopes` (a non-empty array). Tokens are cached per service account and scope set until shortly before they expire.\n\nCredential fields accept `{{secret:...}}` references and should use them — a tool is readable by anyone who can `GET /tools`, and the stored reference is what is echoed back, never the resolved value.\n\nA credential slot takes a reference, never a literal: a literal `secret_access_key`, `session_token` or `credentials` under `auth`, a literal credential-named `headers` value (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, or a name containing `api-key`/`token`/`secret`/`password`), or a `url` carrying a password or a literal credential-named query parameter (those names, plus `key` and `sig`/`signature`) is refused with `400 LITERAL_CREDENTIAL`, `meta.paths` naming each one. A stored literal reads back as `{\"no_echo\": true}` (a `url` holding one is masked whole), an object rather than a string so a read-edit-write round trip fails the schema check instead of writing the placeholder in as the credential. A value carrying a `{{secret:...}}` reference is the wiring, not the credential, and stays readable.\n\n`headers` values additionally accept `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved per call from the caller's `tool_context`, so a per-user credential can be placed in the real header the target expects (`Authorization: Bearer {{context:ocaToken}}`) instead of only in an `X-Naturali-Context-<key>` header. Valid **only** inside `headers` — a context value is caller-supplied, so it may not steer the `url` — and a key missing from the `tool_context` at call time fails the tool call with `MISSING_TOOL_CONTEXT_KEY` rather than sending an empty credential. See the Tool Context reference.\n",
 				"required": false,
 				"type": "object",
 				"in": "body"
 			},
 			{
 				"name": "mcp",
-				"description": "MCP server config (`url`, `headers`). `headers` values accept `{{secret:...}}` and `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved right before the outbound MCP request; `url` accepts `{{secret:...}}` only. A literal credential in `headers` is masked on read, exactly as in `execute`.",
+				"description": "MCP server config (`url`, `headers`). `headers` values accept `{{secret:...}}` and `{{context:<key>}}` references, resolved right before the outbound MCP request; `url` accepts `{{secret:...}}` only. A literal credential in `headers` or `url` is refused, exactly as in `execute`.",
 				"required": false,
 				"type": "object",
 				"in": "body"

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@naturali/cli",
-  "version": "0.196.0",
+  "version": "0.198.0",
   "description": "Command-line interface for the naturali.ai API, generated from its OpenAPI specs",
   "keywords": [
     "naturali",
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
     "yaml": "^2.9.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@naturali/sdk": "0.196.0",
+    "@naturali/sdk": "0.198.0",
     "@ttoss/openapi-codegen": "^0.5.0",
     "@types/node": "^26.5.1",
     "tsdown": "^0.23.0",