@nathapp/nax-agent 0.91.6 → 0.91.7-canary.10
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +40 -0
- package/dist/coding-tools/coding-tool-extras.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/coding-tools/coding-tool-extras.js +56 -0
- package/dist/coding-tools/coding-tool-support.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/coding-tools/coding-tool-support.js +12 -1
- package/dist/config/catalog-overrides.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/internal/argv-exec.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/internal/argv-exec.js +158 -63
- package/dist/mcp/connect.js +26 -3
- package/dist/mcp/types.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/native/adapter-deps.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/native/adapter-deps.js +2 -0
- package/dist/native/models.js +2 -0
- package/dist/native/session/loop-events/types.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/native/session-adapter.js +19 -5
- package/dist/permissions/approval-memory.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/permissions/approval-memory.js +88 -0
- package/dist/permissions/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/permissions/index.js +1 -0
- package/dist/permissions/types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/runtime/node-runtime.js +5 -0
- package/dist/sandbox/claude-settings.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/sandbox/claude-settings.js +7 -3
- package/dist/sandbox/defaults.js +1 -0
- package/dist/sandbox/launcher.js +7 -0
- package/dist/sandbox/types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/session/agent-session-command.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/session/agent-session-command.js +38 -0
- package/dist/session/agent-session-types.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/session/agent-session.js +86 -1
- package/dist/session/native-backend-options.d.ts +37 -2
- package/dist/session/native-backend-options.js +39 -3
- package/dist/session/native-backend.js +55 -5
- package/dist/session/native-posture-rules.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/session/native-posture-rules.js +33 -0
- package/dist/session/session-ask-link.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/session/session-ask-link.js +5 -0
- package/dist/session/session-ask-port.js +4 -0
- package/dist/session/session-backend.d.ts +23 -1
- package/dist/session/session-interaction.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/session/session-interaction.js +8 -1
- package/dist/session/session-tool-support.d.ts +49 -3
- package/dist/session/session-tool-support.js +66 -11
- package/dist/session-store/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/session-store/index.js +3 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-lock-guard.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-lock-guard.js +85 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-lock.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-lock.js +178 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-meta.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/session-store/session-meta.js +20 -0
- package/dist/session-store/storage.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/session-store/storage.js +164 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-request.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-request.js +30 -0
- package/dist/tools/bash-background.d.ts +74 -0
- package/dist/tools/bash-background.js +151 -0
- package/dist/tools/bash.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/tools/bash.js +77 -17
- package/dist/tools/git.js +10 -3
- package/dist/tools/policy-match.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/tools/policy-match.js +9 -6
- package/dist/tools/policy-paths-branch.js +4 -1
- package/dist/tools/provider-advertise.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/tools/provider-advertise.js +13 -1
- package/dist/tools/provider-types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/tools/run-command-exec.js +12 -0
- package/dist/tools/run-command-surface.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/tools/run-command-surface.js +109 -0
- package/dist/tools/run-command.d.ts +17 -16
- package/dist/tools/run-command.js +48 -68
- package/dist/tools/runtime-calltool.d.ts +101 -0
- package/dist/tools/runtime-calltool.js +112 -3
- package/dist/tools/runtime.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/tools/runtime.js +36 -18
- package/dist/tools/types.d.ts +8 -0
- package/package.json +3 -3
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import { openShadowTap } from "#src/command-safety/index";
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import { errorMessage } from "#src/infra/errors";
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import { getSafeLogger } from "#src/infra/index";
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import { ASK_CANCELLED_REASON } from "#src/permissions/index";
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import { askDenyReason, askSummary } from "./ask-request.js";
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import { askDenyReason, askSummary, unsandboxedReasonSuffix } from "./ask-request.js";
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import { redirectForArgv, redirectForCommand, redirectForVerb } from "./denial-redirect.js";
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import { BASH_TOOL_NAME, EXEC_TOOL_NAME } from "./types.js";
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/**
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@@ -38,6 +38,98 @@ export function resolvePolicyIdentity(name, tool, input) {
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const policyIdentity = hasArgv ? EXEC_TOOL_NAME : name;
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return { policyIdentity, argvField, hasArgv };
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}
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/** The content of the refusal a disabled escape request gets (spec US-005). */
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const UNSANDBOXED_NOT_ENABLED = "unsandboxed commands are not enabled for this session (allowUnsandboxedCommands)";
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/**
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* US-005: the sandbox-escape gate, run once per call BEFORE the policy.
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*
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* Whether an escape is PERMITTED is the runtime's decision, not the tool's:
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* the tool only knows what the call asked for, and it runs exactly as it
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* always did once this gate lets it through. Three conditions narrow the field
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* to the calls that really are escape requests — the tool declares an
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* `unsandboxedField`, the policy identity is one the flag is defined for, and
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* the value is exactly `true` (a `"true"` string is not an escape: an opted-in
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* session's schema rejects it at the transport, and every other session reads
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* it as the ordinary call it is).
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*
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* - `error` — this session was not opened with `unsandboxed.enabled`, so the
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* call never reaches the policy, an ask or a spawn. Deciding it here rather
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* than in the tool is what makes "disabled" mean disabled.
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* - `unsandboxed` — the escape is allowed. `suffix` is the clause an ask this
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* call raises must carry, so the person approving it is told the command
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* runs outside the sandbox; `asksOnAllow` says whether an ALLOW still has to
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* be raised as one (US-006). The policy itself is evaluated unchanged: the
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* flag is not a policy input, so the verdict is the one the call would get
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* without it.
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*
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* The mode is read from the runtime's option rather than the compiled policy:
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* `bashApproval` decides how an ENABLED request is ROUTED, which is the
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* runtime's business, while the policy line answers only "is this command
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* form granted". An `Exec` (argv) call is routed by the same mode — it is the
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* other model-authored identity, and no separate Exec approval mode exists.
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*/
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export function resolveUnsandboxedCall(p) {
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const field = p.tool.scope.unsandboxedField;
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if (field === undefined)
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return undefined;
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if (p.identity !== BASH_TOOL_NAME && p.identity !== EXEC_TOOL_NAME)
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return undefined;
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if (p.input[field] !== true)
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return undefined;
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if (p.option?.enabled !== true)
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return { kind: "error", content: UNSANDBOXED_NOT_ENABLED };
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return {
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kind: "unsandboxed",
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suffix: unsandboxedReasonSuffix(p.input),
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asksOnAllow: p.option.alwaysAsk === true || p.option.bashApproval !== "raw",
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};
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}
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/** The reason a converted allow carries (spec US-006), before the suffix. */
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const UNSANDBOXED_ASK_REASON = "unsandboxed run requested";
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/**
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* US-006: the ask a permitted escape request raises where the policy only
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* allowed it.
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*
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* An allow says "this command form is granted", nothing about the sandbox:
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* under `gated` that same grant runs the command WRAPPED, and under `escalate`
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* only a grant MISS asks. So an escape request the policy merely allowed would
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* otherwise run unwrapped with nobody told, which is the whole thing the
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* approval exists to prevent. `raw` is exempt (`asksOnAllow`), and a verdict
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* that already asks or denies is left to the ordinary paths.
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*
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* The rule is SYNTHETIC — `Unsandboxed(<identity>)` is expressible in no
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* config — so it goes on `rule` only; `matchedRule` stays unset (see
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* `SYNTHETIC_UNSANDBOXED_RULE`). `resolvedPaths` is carried over so an
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* approved call admits exactly what the policy resolved.
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*/
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export function convertUnsandboxedAllow(p) {
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if (p.unsandboxed?.kind !== "unsandboxed" || !p.unsandboxed.asksOnAllow)
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return undefined;
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if (!p.verdict.allowed)
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return undefined;
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return {
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allowed: false,
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outcome: "ask",
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breach: false,
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rule: `Unsandboxed(${p.identity})`,
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reason: UNSANDBOXED_ASK_REASON,
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resolvedPaths: p.verdict.resolvedPaths,
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};
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}
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/**
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* The verdict this call raises an ask with, or undefined when it raises none.
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*
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* One place decides both the ask the policy itself produced (US-005) and the
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* one an ALLOWED escape request is converted into (US-006), so `callTool`
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* keeps a single ask branch and the conversion cannot drift from the ordinary
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* route. A denial that is final — `outcome` absent or "denied" — is NOT an
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* ask and comes back undefined, leaving `resolveDenialOutcome` to answer it.
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*/
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export function resolveAskVerdict(p) {
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if (p.verdict.allowed)
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return convertUnsandboxedAllow(p);
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return p.verdict.outcome === "ask" ? p.verdict : undefined;
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}
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/**
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* P5: observe the command now (not awaited), settled from the caller's
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* logCall below. Undefined whenever the runtime has no shadow configured.
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return undefined;
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}
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}
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/**
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* US-004: `Unsandboxed(<identity>)` is the SYNTHETIC rule US-006's
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* converted-allow verdict carries — not an ask rule anyone configured. It is
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* kept on `rule` (the request has to name what it is) but never becomes
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* `matchedRule`, because a remembered approval derives its `origin` from that
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* field and would then remember a rule that exists in no config.
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*/
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const SYNTHETIC_UNSANDBOXED_RULE = /^Unsandboxed\(.*\)$/;
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/** The configured ask rule behind a verdict, or undefined when there is none. */
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function matchedRuleOf(verdict) {
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if (verdict.rule === undefined)
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return undefined;
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return SYNTHETIC_UNSANDBOXED_RULE.test(verdict.rule) ? undefined : verdict.rule;
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}
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/**
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* The ask branch: a call the policy gates matched an ask rule, so an
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* AskResolver decides. US-003: build the AskControl from the per-call
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...(context?.onWaiting !== undefined ? { onWaiting: context.onWaiting } : {}),
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};
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const ask = askSummary(p.identity, tool.scope, input);
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const askReason = p.unsandboxed === undefined ? verdict.reason : `${verdict.reason}${p.unsandboxed.suffix}`;
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const matchedRule = matchedRuleOf(verdict);
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let askVerdict;
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try {
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askVerdict = await p.askResolver.resolve({
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tool: p.identity,
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stage: p.stage ?? "unknown",
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rule: verdict.rule ?? verdict.reason,
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...(
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...(matchedRule !== undefined ? { matchedRule } : {}),
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summary: ask.summary,
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...(ask.unshowable ? { unshowable: true } : {}),
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...(typeof input[tool.scope.commandField ?? ""] === "string"
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? { command: input[tool.scope.commandField] }
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: {}),
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root: p.root,
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reason:
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reason: askReason,
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...(p.storyId !== undefined ? { storyId: p.storyId } : {}),
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...(p.unsandboxed !== undefined ? { unsandboxed: true } : {}),
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}, askControl);
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}
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catch (err) {
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package/dist/tools/runtime.d.ts
CHANGED
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import type { CommandInterceptor } from "#src/command-interceptor/index";
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import type { CommandShadow } from "#src/command-safety/index";
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import type { BashApprovalMode } from "#src/config/bash-approval";
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import { getSafeLogger } from "#src/infra/index";
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import { type AskResolver } from "#src/permissions/index";
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import type { OwnedPathsPolicy } from "./owned-paths.ts";
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protectedPaths?: ProtectedPathsPolicy;
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/** S3-2 port: placed on every ToolRunContext this runtime builds. */
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ownedPaths?: OwnedPathsPolicy;
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/**
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* US-005: whether this session may run one call OUTSIDE the OS sandbox, and
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* the Bash mode that routes an enabled request. ABSENT means disabled: a
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* `Bash`/`Exec` call carrying `unsandboxed: true` is then refused before the
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* policy evaluates it.
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*/
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unsandboxed?: {
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readonly enabled: boolean;
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readonly bashApproval: BashApprovalMode;
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readonly alwaysAsk?: boolean;
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};
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}): CodingToolRuntime;
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package/dist/tools/runtime.js
CHANGED
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import { readTool } from "./read.js";
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import { getCodingTool, registerBuiltinTool } from "./registry.js";
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import { requestCapabilityTool } from "./request-capability.js";
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import { openCallShadowTap, resolveAskOutcome, resolveDenialOutcome, resolveGuardDenial, resolvePolicyIdentity, } from "./runtime-calltool.js";
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import { openCallShadowTap, resolveAskOutcome, resolveAskVerdict, resolveDenialOutcome, resolveGuardDenial, resolvePolicyIdentity, resolveUnsandboxedCall, } from "./runtime-calltool.js";
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import { scratchpadListTool, scratchpadReadTool, scratchpadWriteTool } from "./scratchpad.js";
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import { applyModelTruncationPolicy } from "./spill.js";
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import { createNoOpToolAuditSink } from "./tool-audit.js";
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const { policyIdentity, argvField, hasArgv } = resolvePolicyIdentity(name, tool, input);
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// Settled by `logCall`, which is declared FIRST so the refusal that
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// precedes the policy can ledger through the same wrapper. Undefined
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// until the shadow opens: nothing observed, nothing to settle.
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let tap;
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// Every ledger outcome of this call settles the tap exactly once, with
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// `denied:ask` and `decidedBy` intact -- which CodingToolOutcome.kind
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// alone would lose (spec 4.2). The audit is a named parameter, not a
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// rest-array index: `log`'s positional shape can then change without
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// silently shifting what the tap settles with.
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const logCall = (tool, outcome, resultBytes, input, context, breach, reason, routineErrors, audit, resultBytesPreTruncation) => {
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log(tool, outcome, resultBytes, input, context, breach, reason, routineErrors, audit, resultBytesPreTruncation);
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tap?.settle(outcome, audit?.approval?.decidedBy, audit?.executed === undefined
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? undefined
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: {
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executed: audit.executed,
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...(audit.cwd !== undefined ? { cwd: audit.cwd } : {}),
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});
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};
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// US-005: a `Bash`/`Exec` escape request is answered before the policy,
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// the ask chain and any spawn — refused when this session never enabled
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// it, and otherwise marked so the ask below carries the reason suffix.
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const unsandboxed = resolveUnsandboxedCall({ identity: policyIdentity, tool, input, option: opts.unsandboxed });
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if (unsandboxed?.kind === "error") {
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logCall(policyIdentity, "error", unsandboxed.content.length, input, context, false, unsandboxed.content);
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+
return unsandboxed;
|
|
227
|
+
}
|
|
202
228
|
const verdict = opts.policy.check(policyIdentity, tool.scope, input);
|
|
203
229
|
// P5: observe the command now (not awaited), settle from logCall below.
|
|
204
|
-
|
|
230
|
+
tap = openCallShadowTap({
|
|
205
231
|
shadow: opts.commandShadow,
|
|
206
232
|
identity: policyIdentity,
|
|
207
233
|
tool,
|
|
@@ -216,20 +242,6 @@ export function createCodingToolRuntime(opts) {
|
|
|
216
242
|
context,
|
|
217
243
|
verdict,
|
|
218
244
|
});
|
|
219
|
-
// Every ledger outcome of this call settles the tap exactly once, with
|
|
220
|
-
// `denied:ask` and `decidedBy` intact -- which CodingToolOutcome.kind
|
|
221
|
-
// alone would lose (spec 4.2). The audit is a named parameter, not a
|
|
222
|
-
// rest-array index: `log`'s positional shape can then change without
|
|
223
|
-
// silently shifting what the tap settles with.
|
|
224
|
-
const logCall = (tool, outcome, resultBytes, input, context, breach, reason, routineErrors, audit, resultBytesPreTruncation) => {
|
|
225
|
-
log(tool, outcome, resultBytes, input, context, breach, reason, routineErrors, audit, resultBytesPreTruncation);
|
|
226
|
-
tap?.settle(outcome, audit?.approval?.decidedBy, audit?.executed === undefined
|
|
227
|
-
? undefined
|
|
228
|
-
: {
|
|
229
|
-
executed: audit.executed,
|
|
230
|
-
...(audit.cwd !== undefined ? { cwd: audit.cwd } : {}),
|
|
231
|
-
});
|
|
232
|
-
};
|
|
233
245
|
/**
|
|
234
246
|
* Executes a permitted call and records its outcome. Shared by the
|
|
235
247
|
* ordinary allow path and an ask verdict an AskResolver approved, so an
|
|
@@ -283,13 +295,17 @@ export function createCodingToolRuntime(opts) {
|
|
|
283
295
|
return { kind: "error", content };
|
|
284
296
|
}
|
|
285
297
|
}
|
|
286
|
-
|
|
298
|
+
// US-005/US-006: the ONE ask route. A verdict the policy raised as an
|
|
299
|
+
// ask goes there as it always did; an ALLOWED escape request is
|
|
300
|
+
// converted into one unless the mode already let it run (`raw`).
|
|
301
|
+
const askVerdict = resolveAskVerdict({ identity: policyIdentity, verdict, unsandboxed });
|
|
302
|
+
if (askVerdict !== undefined) {
|
|
287
303
|
return resolveAskOutcome({
|
|
288
304
|
identity: policyIdentity,
|
|
289
305
|
tool,
|
|
290
306
|
input,
|
|
291
307
|
context,
|
|
292
|
-
verdict,
|
|
308
|
+
verdict: askVerdict,
|
|
293
309
|
runtimeSignal: signal,
|
|
294
310
|
askResolver,
|
|
295
311
|
stage: opts.pipelineStage,
|
|
@@ -297,6 +313,8 @@ export function createCodingToolRuntime(opts) {
|
|
|
297
313
|
root: opts.policy.root,
|
|
298
314
|
logCall,
|
|
299
315
|
runTool,
|
|
316
|
+
// US-004/US-005: the ask says the command runs outside the sandbox.
|
|
317
|
+
...(unsandboxed?.kind === "unsandboxed" ? { unsandboxed: { suffix: unsandboxed.suffix } } : {}),
|
|
300
318
|
});
|
|
301
319
|
}
|
|
302
320
|
if (!verdict.allowed) {
|
package/dist/tools/types.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -110,6 +110,14 @@ export interface ToolScope {
|
|
|
110
110
|
* tool declaring it must be granted explicitly, since no profile grants one.
|
|
111
111
|
*/
|
|
112
112
|
readonly commandField?: string;
|
|
113
|
+
/**
|
|
114
|
+
* US-003: the input field by which a call asks to run OUTSIDE the OS sandbox
|
|
115
|
+
* (`Bash`'s `unsandboxed`). Declared unconditionally, so the runtime can read
|
|
116
|
+
* the field whether or not the session advertises it; whether the argument is
|
|
117
|
+
* OFFERED (schema + description) is the session's `unsandboxedCommands`
|
|
118
|
+
* option, and whether a call is PERMITTED is the runtime's decision.
|
|
119
|
+
*/
|
|
120
|
+
readonly unsandboxedField?: string;
|
|
113
121
|
}
|
|
114
122
|
/**
|
|
115
123
|
* `breach` separates "you may not write there" from "that path is not in this
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@nathapp/nax-agent",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.91.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.91.7-canary.10",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "nax's native coding agent: session contract, native loop, tools, permissions, sandbox, command-safety.",
|
|
5
5
|
"license": "MIT",
|
|
6
6
|
"author": "William Khoo",
|
|
@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@
|
|
|
47
47
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
48
48
|
"@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime": "0.0.77",
|
|
49
49
|
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.32.1",
|
|
50
|
-
"@nathapp/nax-ai": "0.91.
|
|
50
|
+
"@nathapp/nax-ai": "0.91.7-canary.10",
|
|
51
51
|
"zod": "^4.3.6"
|
|
52
52
|
},
|
|
53
53
|
"publishConfig": {
|
|
54
54
|
"access": "public",
|
|
55
55
|
"registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/",
|
|
56
56
|
"provenance": true,
|
|
57
|
-
"tag": "
|
|
57
|
+
"tag": "canary"
|
|
58
58
|
}
|
|
59
59
|
}
|