@nanocollective/roster 0.1.0-beta.14 → 0.1.0-beta.15

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (49) hide show
  1. package/dist/agents-NMGVORU3.js +232 -0
  2. package/dist/chunk-E3EVPK4I.js +338 -0
  3. package/dist/chunk-QCKEGMXD.js +562 -0
  4. package/dist/cli.js +1689 -820
  5. package/dist/compose-56JIIIHA.js +15 -0
  6. package/dist/connectors-ZVEPXSAR.js +23 -0
  7. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/css/connectors.css +50 -0
  8. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/js/api.js +3 -0
  9. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/js/app.js +4 -1
  10. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/js/icons.js +2 -0
  11. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/js/state.js +11 -1
  12. package/dist/worker/assets/assets/js/views/connectors.js +290 -0
  13. package/dist/worker/assets/index.html +4 -0
  14. package/dist/worker/index.js +2743 -1014
  15. package/docs/README.md +1 -0
  16. package/docs/architecture.md +1 -1
  17. package/docs/commands.md +37 -1
  18. package/docs/connectors.md +157 -0
  19. package/docs/cost.md +1 -1
  20. package/docs/developing.md +2 -2
  21. package/docs/doctor-codes.md +5 -1
  22. package/docs/export.md +1 -1
  23. package/docs/extending.md +1 -1
  24. package/docs/hosting.md +12 -1
  25. package/docs/memory.md +1 -1
  26. package/docs/org-yaml.md +25 -1
  27. package/docs/portal.md +18 -1
  28. package/docs/prompts.md +1 -1
  29. package/docs/security.md +17 -1
  30. package/docs/session-workflow.md +23 -5
  31. package/docs/staff-yaml.md +1 -1
  32. package/docs/troubleshooting.md +1 -1
  33. package/docs/upgrading.md +1 -1
  34. package/docs/writing-a-charter.md +1 -1
  35. package/package.json +2 -1
  36. package/templates/brain/.github/workflows/%%STAFF%%-daily.yaml +8 -6
  37. package/templates/brain/.github/workflows/%%STAFF%%-mention.yaml +8 -6
  38. package/templates/ops/.github/workflows/session.yaml +52 -11
  39. package/templates/ops/agents.mjs +38 -11
  40. package/templates/ops/compose.mjs +12 -0
  41. package/templates/ops/connectors.mjs +722 -0
  42. package/templates/ops/prompts/_identity.md +14 -0
  43. package/templates/portal/css/connectors.css +50 -0
  44. package/templates/portal/index.html +4 -0
  45. package/templates/portal/js/api.js +3 -0
  46. package/templates/portal/js/app.js +4 -1
  47. package/templates/portal/js/icons.js +2 -0
  48. package/templates/portal/js/state.js +11 -1
  49. package/templates/portal/js/views/connectors.js +290 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,23 @@ on:
45
45
  required: false
46
46
  default: "Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob,Grep,WebFetch,WebSearch"
47
47
  type: string
48
+ # Which of the caller's secrets are this staff member's. A caller passes its secrets with
49
+ # `secrets: inherit`, so that a connector's key reaches the run without the caller naming
50
+ # it, and `secrets: inherit` cannot rename: CTO_APP_ID stays CTO_APP_ID. These say which
51
+ # names to read. Empty on a caller written before connectors, which maps the secrets by
52
+ # hand instead, and then the mapped names below are the ones read.
53
+ secret_prefix:
54
+ required: false
55
+ default: ""
56
+ type: string
57
+ public_secret_prefix:
58
+ required: false
59
+ default: ""
60
+ type: string
61
+ agent_secret:
62
+ required: false
63
+ default: ""
64
+ type: string
48
65
  # Trigger context. Empty on a scheduled run; set when a comment woke us.
49
66
  issue_number:
50
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  required: false
@@ -54,11 +71,13 @@ on:
54
71
  required: false
55
72
  default: ""
56
73
  type: string
74
+ # None of these is required, because a caller that inherits passes them under its own names
75
+ # (see secret_prefix above), and GitHub checks `required` against the names declared here.
57
76
  secrets:
58
77
  APP_ID:
59
- required: true
78
+ required: false
60
79
  APP_PRIVATE_KEY:
61
- required: true
80
+ required: false
62
81
  PUBLIC_APP_ID:
63
82
  required: false
64
83
  PUBLIC_APP_PRIVATE_KEY:
@@ -133,15 +152,18 @@ jobs:
133
152
 
134
153
  # `issues: write` is for the failure notice alone, which falls back to this job's own token
135
154
  # when the App's cannot be minted. `actions: write` starts a follow-on run. A called workflow
136
- # cannot raise what its caller granted, so the callers ask for the same.
155
+ # cannot raise what its caller granted, so the callers ask for the same. `id-token: write`
156
+ # lets a run prove to the hosted portal which repo it is, which is how it collects a
157
+ # signed-in connector's access token without a shared secret.
137
158
  permissions:
138
159
  contents: read
139
160
  issues: write
140
161
  actions: write
162
+ id-token: write
141
163
 
142
164
  # secrets are not usable in a step-level `if`, so the presence check is hoisted here.
143
165
  env:
144
- HAS_PUBLIC_APP: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_APP_ID != '' }}
166
+ HAS_PUBLIC_APP: ${{ (secrets.PUBLIC_APP_ID || secrets[format('{0}_APP_ID', inputs.public_secret_prefix)]) != '' }}
145
167
  # Nothing is listening once the agent ends its turn: the session is over and a background
146
168
  # job dies with the runner. Claude Code moves any command past its timeout (ten minutes by
147
169
  # default) into the background, and an agent told "you will be notified" ends its turn to
@@ -160,8 +182,8 @@ jobs:
160
182
  id: private
161
183
  uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v2
162
184
  with:
163
- app-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
164
- private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
185
+ app-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID || secrets[format('{0}_APP_ID', inputs.secret_prefix)] }}
186
+ private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY || secrets[format('{0}_APP_PRIVATE_KEY', inputs.secret_prefix)] }}
165
187
  owner: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
166
188
 
167
189
  # A PR opened with the default GITHUB_TOKEN does not trigger pull_request workflows, so CI
@@ -171,8 +193,8 @@ jobs:
171
193
  if: env.HAS_PUBLIC_APP == 'true'
172
194
  uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v2
173
195
  with:
174
- app-id: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_APP_ID }}
175
- private-key: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
196
+ app-id: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_APP_ID || secrets[format('{0}_APP_ID', inputs.public_secret_prefix)] }}
197
+ private-key: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_APP_PRIVATE_KEY || secrets[format('{0}_APP_PRIVATE_KEY', inputs.public_secret_prefix)] }}
176
198
  owner: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
177
199
 
178
200
  # Tell the human it was heard. This is the only signal between the request and the reply
@@ -347,7 +369,7 @@ jobs:
347
369
  # forty lines into a log, after the checkout has already happened.
348
370
  - name: Check the agent has a credential
349
371
  env:
350
- A: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
372
+ A: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN || secrets[inputs.agent_secret] }}
351
373
  B: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
352
374
  run: |
353
375
  if [ -z "$A" ] && [ -z "$B" ]; then
@@ -355,8 +377,27 @@ jobs:
355
377
  exit 1
356
378
  fi
357
379
 
380
+ # The services this staff member may use (`connectors:` in org.yaml), written as the
381
+ # running agent's own MCP config, with each key read from the caller's secrets. The file
382
+ # goes in the runner's temp directory, outside every checkout, so no commit can carry it.
383
+ # Never fatal: a connector without its key is left out and named in the summary, and the
384
+ # run goes ahead without it.
385
+ #
386
+ # `toJSON(secrets)` is read by this step alone. Nothing else in the job sees the secrets
387
+ # it does not name, and the agent sees only the keys of its own connectors, inside the file.
388
+ - name: Connect services
389
+ id: connectors
390
+ if: hashFiles('roster-ops/connectors.mjs') != ''
391
+ continue-on-error: true
392
+ env:
393
+ ROSTER_SECRETS: ${{ toJSON(secrets) }}
394
+ ROSTER_PORTAL_TOKEN_URL: ${{ vars.ROSTER_PORTAL_URL }}
395
+ run: node roster-ops/connectors.mjs --staff "${{ inputs.staff }}" --ops roster-ops --brains . --out "$RUNNER_TEMP/roster-connectors" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
396
+
358
397
  - name: Work out which agent runs this
359
398
  id: agent
399
+ env:
400
+ ROSTER_CONNECTORS: ${{ steps.connectors.outputs.file }}
360
401
  run: node roster-ops/agents.mjs --staff "${{ inputs.staff }}" --ops roster-ops --brains . >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
361
402
 
362
403
  # `uses:` cannot be an expression, so an Action-based runner has to be written out
@@ -369,7 +410,7 @@ jobs:
369
410
  GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.private.outputs.token }}
370
411
  PUBLIC_TOKEN: ${{ steps.public.outputs.token }}
371
412
  with:
372
- claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN || secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
413
+ claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN || secrets.AGENT_TOKEN || secrets[inputs.agent_secret] }}
373
414
  # The action refuses to run for a bot unless it is named here. A peer's ask is opened
374
415
  # by that peer's App, so on a peer run, and only then, the one bot that opened it is
375
416
  # allowed. The caller has already checked it is an App, not this staff member's own,
@@ -405,7 +446,7 @@ jobs:
405
446
  AGENT_FLAGS: ${{ steps.agent.outputs.flags }}
406
447
  # Kept for a custom `run` written before permissions existed.
407
448
  AGENT_TOOLS: ${{ inputs.allowed_tools }}
408
- AGENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN }}
449
+ AGENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AGENT_TOKEN || secrets[inputs.agent_secret] }}
409
450
  FALLBACK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
410
451
  TOKEN_ENV: ${{ steps.agent.outputs.token_env }}
411
452
  INSTALL: ${{ steps.agent.outputs.install }}
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export const PRESETS = {
136
136
  * anything written out longhand. A tenant that needs an agent nobody has heard of writes
137
137
  * `install`, `run` and `token_env` and never touches this file.
138
138
  */
139
- export function resolveAgent(org, staff = {}) {
139
+ export function resolveAgent(org, staff = {}, extra = {}) {
140
140
  const asked = staff.agent ?? org.agent ?? {};
141
141
  const spec = typeof asked === "string" ? { id: asked } : asked;
142
142
  const id = spec.id ?? "claude-code-action";
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ export function resolveAgent(org, staff = {}) {
163
163
  token_env: merged.token_env,
164
164
  // The staff member's own model wins; then the agent's default. Empty means "the agent's".
165
165
  model: staff.model ?? merged.model ?? "",
166
- flags: flagsFor(merged, spec, org, staff),
166
+ flags: flagsFor(merged, spec, org, staff, extra),
167
167
  config: merged.config ?? null,
168
168
  };
169
169
  }
@@ -183,24 +183,27 @@ export const LEVELS = ["read-only", "workspace", "full"];
183
183
  * `options` is the escape hatch, in that agent's own vocabulary, spelled onto its command line
184
184
  * by the preset. Anything roster does not model is still reachable without waiting for us.
185
185
  */
186
- function flagsFor(merged, spec, org, staff) {
186
+ function flagsFor(merged, spec, org, staff, extra = {}) {
187
187
  const out = [];
188
- const asked = staff.permissions ?? spec.permissions ?? org.permissions ?? "full";
189
- if (!LEVELS.includes(asked)) {
190
- throw new Error(`unknown permissions "${asked}". One of: ${LEVELS.join(", ")}`);
191
- }
188
+ const asked = permissionOf(org, staff);
192
189
 
193
190
  /* `allowed_tools` predates the levels and is Claude's own vocabulary, so it still wins for
194
191
  an agent that takes a tool list. Nothing translates it for the others: a list written for
195
192
  one tool is not a permission level for another, and guessing would be worse than saying so. */
196
193
  const tools = staff.allowed_tools ?? org.defaults?.allowed_tools;
197
194
  const table = merged.permissions;
198
- if (tools && table === CLAUDE_TOOLS) {
199
- const list = Array.isArray(tools) ? tools.join(",") : String(tools);
200
- out.push(`--allowedTools "${list.replace(/\s+/g, "")}"`);
195
+ /* A connector's tools join the list, or Claude would be handed an MCP server and forbidden
196
+ to call it. Only for an agent that takes a list: the others gate a server by its config. */
197
+ const more = (extra.tools ?? []).filter(Boolean);
198
+ if (table === CLAUDE_TOOLS) {
199
+ const base = tools
200
+ ? (Array.isArray(tools) ? tools.join(",") : String(tools)).replace(/\s+/g, "")
201
+ : CLAUDE_TOOLS[asked].match(/"([^"]*)"/)[1];
202
+ out.push(`--allowedTools "${[base, ...more].filter(Boolean).join(",")}"`);
201
203
  } else if (table) {
202
204
  out.push(table[asked]);
203
205
  }
206
+ if (extra.flags) out.push(extra.flags);
204
207
 
205
208
  const options = { ...(spec.options ?? {}), ...(staff.options ?? {}) };
206
209
  const speller = merged.option;
@@ -217,10 +220,24 @@ function flagsFor(merged, spec, org, staff) {
217
220
  return out.filter(Boolean).join(" ");
218
221
  }
219
222
 
223
+ /** The level a staff member runs at: their own, else the agent's, else the org's, else full. */
224
+ export function permissionOf(org, staff = {}) {
225
+ const agent = staff.agent ?? org.agent;
226
+ const spec = agent && typeof agent === "object" ? agent : {};
227
+ const level = staff.permissions ?? spec.permissions ?? org.permissions ?? "full";
228
+ if (!LEVELS.includes(level)) {
229
+ throw new Error(`unknown permissions "${level}". One of: ${LEVELS.join(", ")}`);
230
+ }
231
+ return level;
232
+ }
233
+
220
234
  function strip(o) {
221
235
  const out = {};
222
236
  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(o)) if (v !== undefined && v !== null && v !== "") out[k] = v;
223
237
  delete out.id;
238
+ // The spec's `permissions` is a level, one word, and permissionOf reads it from the spec.
239
+ // Merged in, it would replace the preset's table of spellings and leave no flags at all.
240
+ delete out.permissions;
224
241
  return out;
225
242
  }
226
243
 
@@ -248,7 +265,17 @@ if (import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`) {
248
265
  /* A staff member with no manifest is doctor's problem; the org's default still resolves. */
249
266
  }
250
267
 
251
- const agent = resolveAgent(org, manifest);
268
+ /* What connectors.mjs wired up for this run, if anything: flags for the command line and
269
+ tool names for the allowlist. Paths only; the keys are in files this never reads. */
270
+ let wiring = {};
271
+ if (process.env.ROSTER_CONNECTORS) {
272
+ try {
273
+ wiring = JSON.parse(readFileSync(process.env.ROSTER_CONNECTORS, "utf8"));
274
+ } catch {
275
+ process.stderr.write("agents: the connectors' wiring could not be read, so none are used\n");
276
+ }
277
+ }
278
+ const agent = resolveAgent(org, manifest, wiring);
252
279
  const out = [
253
280
  `kind=${agent.kind}`,
254
281
  `id=${agent.id}`,
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
14
14
  import * as nodeFs from "node:fs";
15
15
  import { join, dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
16
16
  import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
17
+ // Beside this file in a tenant, but read without failing when it is not: an ops repo vendored
18
+ // before connectors existed still composes, with no services in its prompts.
19
+ const { connectorsOf } = await import("./connectors.mjs").catch(() => ({ connectorsOf: () => [] }));
17
20
 
18
21
  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19
22
  // A strict, tiny YAML subset: nested maps, lists of scalars, lists of inline
@@ -388,6 +391,15 @@ export function compose({
388
391
  humans_extra: humanSentence(humans.slice(1)),
389
392
  // Who can read along and cannot rule. Empty, and the paragraph gone, when nobody is.
390
393
  humans_viewing: humanSentence(everyone.filter((h) => h.viewOnly)),
394
+ // The services this staff member may use, as a list for the prompt. Empty, and the section
395
+ // gone, when they have none. Whether each one's key is present is only known in the run.
396
+ connectors: connectorsOf(org, staff)
397
+ .filter((c) => !c.problem)
398
+ .map((c) => {
399
+ const ro = c.readOnly || self.permissions === "read-only";
400
+ return `- **${c.name}**, as the \`${c.id}\` MCP server${ro ? ", read only" : ""}`;
401
+ })
402
+ .join("\n"),
391
403
  };
392
404
 
393
405
  // "staff:foo.md" resolves inside the staff member's own brain repo, which is how a