@nanobpm/urban 0.84.0 → 0.86.0

package/dist/runtime/core/modules/mcp.js

@@ -0,0 +1,994 @@
+// mcp — the runtime-served Model Context Protocol surface (ADR 0067). A Streamable-HTTP MCP
+// endpoint the Urban runtime mounts UNCONDITIONALLY at `/app/mcp` (it answers `POST`, plus `DELETE`
+// to end a session; the optional `GET` server→client stream is declined with 405 at the string-body
+// host seam), exactly like the `/app/agent` brief and `/app/api-docs` docs surfaces — so an MCP
+// client (`copilot mcp add
+// --transport http <name> http://localhost:<port>/app/mcp`) discovers an app's operations as
+// tools with ZERO app-side MCP code.
+//
+// Derive-don't-declare (ADR 0053): the app tool list is PROJECTED from the SAME OpenAPI
+// enumeration `mountApi` routes from — `parseSpec` + `collectOperations` (openapi/spec.ts), read
+// through `readApiBinding` — never a second spec walker. Each projected operation becomes one tool
+// whose `operationId` is the tool name and whose request-body/params schema is the tool input
+// schema; a tool call is reconstructed into the operation's HTTP request and dispatched through the
+// SAME `mountApi` router, so it flows through the identical delegate registry + validation the HTTP
+// route uses (a tool call is equivalent to the corresponding HTTP call).
+//
+// This module (ADR 0067) exposes app operations as MCP tools — each authorized exactly as its own
+// HTTP route by the operation's OpenAPI `security` (a read or mutating op with no `security` is
+// open; there is NO extra MCP-level shared-secret guard on app operations). An operation opts out
+// of projection with the `x-mcp` extension. It also exposes framework-owned process-debugging tools
+// over BOTH truth planes: engine truth via existing `EngineClient` methods (reads, plus mutating
+// unstick tools — cancel/resolve/retry/set-variables, which ARE guarded by the app's shared secret
+// or the `mcp.allowMutations` opt-in), and the ADR 0065 canonical projection stores
+// (`urban_instance_state` / `urban_open_user_tasks`).
+// The app's system brief (`/app/agent.json`) is served as an MCP resource, plus one orientation
+// entry under MCP prompts.
+//
+// Transport: the SDK's Web-Standard Streamable-HTTP transport (`Request`→`Response`), bridged to
+// the runtime's host `HttpRequest`/`HttpResponse` seam — core/ imports no `node:*`; the MCP SDK is
+// an ordinary dependency. Access is loopback-only behind a manifest/env flag that defaults ON for
+// loopback.
+import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
+import { WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/webStandardStreamableHttp.js";
+import { CallToolRequestSchema, ErrorCode, GetPromptRequestSchema, isInitializeRequest, ListPromptsRequestSchema, ListResourcesRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema, McpError, ReadResourceRequestSchema, } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
+import { GENERATED_DIR } from "../../../toolkit/artifact.js";
+import { SYSTEM_BRIEF_JSON } from "../../../toolkit/derivers/system-brief.js";
+import { collectOperations, evaluateSecurity, isMutatingMethod, parseSpec, sharedSecretSchemeName, } from "../../../openapi/spec.js";
+import { errorMessage } from "../guards.js";
+import { presentFormIdentifier } from "../host.js";
+import { resolveBindMode } from "../manifest.js";
+import { json, makeRouter } from "../router.js";
+import { API_BASE, readApiBinding } from "./api.js";
+import { resolveAppPath } from "./datasource.js";
+import { InstanceStateStore } from "./instance-state-store.js";
+import { OpenUserTasksStore } from "./open-user-tasks-store.js";
+/** The mount path of the MCP endpoint — a sibling of `/app/api` / `/app/agent`, mounted
+ *  unconditionally so an MCP client always has a stable address to connect to. */
+const MCP_PATH = "/app/mcp";
+/** The header carrying the Streamable-HTTP session id (MCP spec). */
+const SESSION_HEADER = "mcp-session-id";
+/** Hard upper bound on concurrently-resident MCP sessions. Each session is a live `Server` +
+ *  transport pair, so an unbounded session map is a memory/handle-exhaustion vector: any local
+ *  process can repeatedly `initialize` without reusing its `mcp-session-id` and pin a fresh pair
+ *  each time. Capping the map (LRU-evicted, refreshed on use — see `evictExcessSessions` /
+ *  `touchSession`) categorically bounds growth regardless of client behaviour or timing. */
+const MAX_SESSIONS = 256;
+/** The MCP resource URI for the app's system brief (the `/app/agent.json` content). */
+const SYSTEM_BRIEF_URI = "urban://system-brief.json";
+/** The single orientation prompt registered under MCP `prompts`. */
+const ORIENTATION_PROMPT = "urban-orientation";
+/** The framework debug-tool name prefix — a reserved namespace. `loadReadOnlyOps` drops any app
+ *  `operationId` in this namespace before it is projected as a tool, so a framework tool can never
+ *  collide with (be shadowed by, or duplicate the name of) an app-projected tool. */
+const DEBUG_PREFIX = "urban_debug_";
+/** Mint a fresh MCP session id, host-agnostically. Prefers the Web Crypto `randomUUID` (a global,
+ *  not `node:crypto`) where present, with a time+random fallback so a host without `crypto` never
+ *  throws — mirroring how core treats Web Crypto as optional (see `mintRootRequestKey`). */
+export function newSessionId() {
+    const uuid = globalThis.crypto?.randomUUID?.();
+    if (uuid)
+        return uuid;
+    return `sess-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
+}
+/** Mark a session as most-recently-used. A `Map` preserves insertion order, so deleting and
+ *  re-inserting a live entry moves it to the tail — which makes the first key the least-recently-used
+ *  entry that `evictExcessSessions` reaps first. Refreshing on every use is what keeps an active
+ *  session from being evicted out from under a client that is still talking to it. */
+function touchSession(sessions, id, session) {
+    sessions.delete(id);
+    sessions.set(id, session);
+}
+/** Bound the live-session map to `max` by evicting least-recently-used entries (the `Map`'s leading
+ *  keys, given `touchSession` re-inserts on use), closing each victim best-effort so its transport /
+ *  server releases. This is the categorical fix for the unbounded-growth vector: no client can pin
+ *  more than `max` server/transport pairs, whatever its `initialize` cadence. Exported for a direct
+ *  unit test of the LRU eviction contract. */
+export async function evictExcessSessions(sessions, max, close) {
+    while (sessions.size > max) {
+        const oldest = sessions.keys().next().value;
+        if (oldest === undefined)
+            break;
+        const victim = sessions.get(oldest);
+        sessions.delete(oldest);
+        if (victim !== undefined) {
+            try {
+                await close(victim);
+            }
+            catch {
+                // Best-effort: a victim whose transport is already torn down must not abort eviction.
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+function isRecord(v) {
+    return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the MCP access policy from the manifest
+ * (`mcp: { enabled?, allowRemote?, allowMutations? }`, read reflectively until the app schema folds
+ * the field in — mirroring how `readApiBinding` reads `api`) and the environment
+ * (`URBAN_MCP_ENABLED`, `URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_REMOTE`, `URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_MUTATIONS`). The env flags win so
+ * an operator can force the surface off (or open it to a non-loopback bind, or enable mutating
+ * tools) without editing the manifest. Enabled defaults ON and access defaults to loopback-only
+ * ("defaults ON for loopback"); `allowMutations` defaults OFF (mutating tools stay closed).
+ */
+export function readMcpConfig(manifest, env) {
+    const raw = manifest && typeof manifest === "object" ? Reflect.get(manifest, "mcp") : undefined;
+    // Honour manifest flags only when they are actual booleans (mirroring `readApiBinding`'s strict
+    // type checks), so a stray non-boolean value falls back to the default instead of coercing
+    // surprisingly (e.g. the string `"false"` is not a boolean `false`).
+    const rawEnabled = isRecord(raw) ? Reflect.get(raw, "enabled") : undefined;
+    const rawAllowRemote = isRecord(raw) ? Reflect.get(raw, "allowRemote") : undefined;
+    const rawAllowMutations = isRecord(raw) ? Reflect.get(raw, "allowMutations") : undefined;
+    const manifestEnabled = typeof rawEnabled === "boolean" ? rawEnabled : undefined;
+    const manifestAllowRemote = typeof rawAllowRemote === "boolean" ? rawAllowRemote : undefined;
+    const manifestAllowMutations = typeof rawAllowMutations === "boolean" ? rawAllowMutations : undefined;
+    const envEnabled = env("URBAN_MCP_ENABLED");
+    const envAllowRemote = env("URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_REMOTE");
+    const envAllowMutations = env("URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_MUTATIONS");
+    const enabled = envEnabled === "false" ? false : envEnabled === "true" ? true : manifestEnabled !== false;
+    const allowRemote = envAllowRemote === "true" ? true : envAllowRemote === "false" ? false : manifestAllowRemote === true;
+    const allowMutations = envAllowMutations === "true" ? true : envAllowMutations === "false" ? false : manifestAllowMutations === true;
+    return { enabled, allowRemote, allowMutations };
+}
+/** The host portion of an HTTP `Host` header, lower-cased and stripped of any `:port` (and of the
+ *  `[...]` brackets around an IPv6 literal), or `undefined` when there is no Host header. */
+function hostName(req) {
+    const host = req.headers.get("host");
+    if (!host)
+        return undefined;
+    const trimmed = host.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith("[")) {
+        const end = trimmed.indexOf("]");
+        return end > 0 ? trimmed.slice(1, end) : trimmed.slice(1);
+    }
+    const colon = trimmed.indexOf(":");
+    return colon >= 0 ? trimmed.slice(0, colon) : trimmed;
+}
+/** Whether the request targets a loopback host — the best-effort loopback signal available at the
+ *  host seam (which carries no peer address). A missing Host header is treated as loopback (a direct
+ *  local client that sent none). */
+export function isLoopbackRequest(req) {
+    const name = hostName(req);
+    return name === undefined || name === "localhost" || name === "127.0.0.1" || name === "::1";
+}
+/** Read a header value from the SDK's per-request `requestInfo.headers` map (lower-cased keys,
+ *  values `string | string[] | undefined`). A repeated header (`string[]`, as Node's raw adapter
+ *  surfaces it) is comma-joined to MATCH `Headers.get()` semantics — the same read `mountApi` and
+ *  the reconstructed `toHttpRequest` use for OpenAPI route enforcement — so the shared-secret guard
+ *  cannot diverge from route enforcement on a repeated credential header. Returns `undefined` when
+ *  absent. Used to read the shared-secret credential the client presents on the MCP connection for a
+ *  mutating tool call. */
+export function readHeader(headers, name) {
+    const value = headers[name.toLowerCase()];
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.join(", ");
+    return value;
+}
+/** A minimal read of the `x-mcp` extension for a projected operation is done at parse time
+ *  (`OperationInfo.mcpExcluded`); here we only need the mutation classification, shared with the CI
+ *  parity guard via {@link isMutatingMethod}. Kept as a named predicate for readability at the call
+ *  sites (tool annotations + guard). */
+function isMutatingOperation(op) {
+    return isMutatingMethod(op.method);
+}
+/** A JSON Schema (OpenAPI object subset) describing a tool's input, derived from an operation's
+ *  path/query parameters and its request-body schema. Keeping the property schemas verbatim from the
+ *  spec means the tool input schema and the HTTP validation share one source of truth. */
+function toolInputSchema(op) {
+    const properties = {};
+    const required = [];
+    for (const p of op.parameters) {
+        if (p.in === "path" || p.in === "query") {
+            properties[p.name] = p.schema ?? {};
+            if (p.required)
+                required.push(p.name);
+        }
+    }
+    if (op.requestBodySchema) {
+        properties.body = op.requestBodySchema;
+        if (op.requestBodyRequired)
+            required.push("body");
+    }
+    const schema = { type: "object", properties };
+    if (required.length > 0)
+        schema.required = required;
+    return schema;
+}
+/** Substitute an operation's `{param}` path-template segments with the supplied arguments, building
+ *  the request path under the shared `/app/api` base so dispatch hits the exact `mountApi` route. */
+function fillPath(op, args) {
+    const path = op.path.replace(/\{([^}]+)\}/g, (_m, name) => {
+        const value = args[name];
+        return encodeURIComponent(value === undefined || value === null ? "" : String(value));
+    });
+    return `${API_BASE}${path}`;
+}
+/** Build the query string for a tool call from the operation's declared query parameters and the
+ *  supplied arguments — repeated (array) values become repeated keys, exactly as an HTTP client
+ *  would send them, so the reused dispatcher validates identical input. */
+function toolQuery(op, args) {
+    const query = new URLSearchParams();
+    for (const p of op.parameters) {
+        if (p.in !== "query")
+            continue;
+        const value = args[p.name];
+        if (value === undefined || value === null)
+            continue;
+        if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+            for (const item of value)
+                query.append(p.name, String(item));
+        }
+        else {
+            query.append(p.name, String(value));
+        }
+    }
+    return query;
+}
+/** Whether an argument is absent for presence purposes: unset (`undefined`/`null`), or a string that
+ *  is empty or whitespace-only after trimming. This is the trimmed-presence rule
+ *  {@link presentFormIdentifier} enforces for form identifiers, reused here so MCP required/path args
+ *  and form resolution cannot drift on what "provided" means (a whitespace-only `"   "` is absent in
+ *  both). A non-string value (e.g. a numeric path id) is considered present. */
+function isBlankArg(value) {
+    if (value === undefined || value === null)
+        return true;
+    if (typeof value === "string")
+        return presentFormIdentifier(value) === undefined;
+    return false;
+}
+/** The required path parameters an operation declares that the tool `args` did not supply. Unlike
+ *  an HTTP request (whose path can't structurally omit a segment), a tool call can leave a
+ *  `{param}` unset or blank; `fillPath` would then substitute an empty string and silently mis-route
+ *  (a 404 route mismatch, or worse a different route shape), so a missing/blank path arg is rejected
+ *  up front. Blankness uses the shared trimmed-presence rule so a whitespace-only value is rejected
+ *  too. */
+function missingPathParams(op, args) {
+    return op.parameters
+        .filter((p) => p.in === "path" && isBlankArg(args[p.name]))
+        .map((p) => p.name);
+}
+/** The `required` keys a tool's `inputSchema` declares but the call omitted. Presence is decided
+ *  solely by {@link isBlankArg} — the single source of truth also used for path args — so a value is
+ *  "provided" unless it is absent (`undefined`/`null`) or a blank/whitespace-only string. A required
+ *  non-string input (e.g. a numeric/boolean/object arg) that is present is therefore accepted, not
+ *  wrongly reported missing. Derived from the schema's own `required` array so declaring a field
+ *  required is enough to have missing (or whitespace-only) calls rejected rather than silently
+ *  substituted with an empty string. */
+export function missingRequiredArgs(inputSchema, args) {
+    const required = inputSchema.required;
+    if (!Array.isArray(required))
+        return [];
+    const missing = [];
+    for (const key of required) {
+        if (typeof key !== "string")
+            continue;
+        if (isBlankArg(args[key]))
+            missing.push(key);
+    }
+    return missing;
+}
+/** Reconstruct the HTTP request an operation tool call is equivalent to, ready to hand to the
+ *  reused `mountApi` router. The JSON body is the tool's `body` argument (when the op declares one).
+ *  The MCP connection's request headers are FORWARDED (with `content-type` pinned to JSON) so the
+ *  reused router's `evaluateSecurity` sees the client's credential: a mutating (or a secured
+ *  read-only) app operation is then guarded exactly as its HTTP route is — the app operation tools
+ *  inherit the OpenAPI `security` contract rather than a bespoke MCP gate (ADR 0067 §4). */
+function toHttpRequest(op, args, forwardHeaders) {
+    const bodyText = op.requestBodySchema !== undefined && args.body !== undefined
+        ? JSON.stringify(args.body)
+        : "";
+    const headers = new Headers();
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(forwardHeaders)) {
+        if (typeof value === "string")
+            headers.set(key, value);
+        else if (Array.isArray(value))
+            for (const v of value)
+                headers.append(key, v);
+    }
+    headers.set("content-type", "application/json");
+    return {
+        method: op.method.toUpperCase(),
+        path: fillPath(op, args),
+        query: toolQuery(op, args),
+        headers,
+        text: () => Promise.resolve(bodyText),
+    };
+}
+/** Wrap a value as an MCP tool text result. A JSON payload is stringified; `isError` flags a
+ *  non-2xx dispatch so the client sees the failure (carrying the delegate's own error body). */
+function textResult(value, isError = false) {
+    const text = typeof value === "string" ? value : JSON.stringify(value ?? null);
+    return isError ? { content: [{ type: "text", text }], isError: true } : { content: [{ type: "text", text }] };
+}
+function readString(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return typeof v === "string" ? v : undefined;
+}
+/** Read an OPTIONAL string argument in its TRIMMED present form, or `undefined` when it is missing,
+ *  non-string, or blank/whitespace-only. The canonical read for identifying keys and filter values
+ *  (processInstanceKey/elementId/assignee/candidateGroup): it applies the SAME
+ *  {@link presentFormIdentifier} trimmed-presence rule that `missingRequiredArgs`/{@link isBlankArg}
+ *  use for presence, so a padded value like `"  pi-1  "` normalizes to `"pi-1"` instead of reaching
+ *  the engine untrimmed — where a filter would silently match nothing and a keyed lookup would target
+ *  a whitespace-padded entity that does not exist. The single source of truth {@link requireString}
+ *  also derives from, so required and optional reads cannot drift on how they normalize. */
+function readPresentString(args, key) {
+    return presentFormIdentifier(readString(args, key));
+}
+/** Read a REQUIRED non-empty string argument, TRIMMED, or throw `InvalidParams`. The canonical guard
+ *  the mutating debug tools use for their identifying keys (processInstanceKey/incidentKey/jobKey/
+ *  scopeKey): a missing, non-string, or blank value fails fast before any engine state is touched,
+ *  rather than silently degrading to `""` and performing a broken/misleading mutation. Derived from
+ *  {@link readPresentString} — the same trimmed-presence rule {@link isBlankArg} (hence
+ *  `missingRequiredArgs`) uses — so a padded key like `"  pi-1  "` cannot pass the required-arg check
+ *  yet reach the engine untrimmed and mis-target the entity. */
+function requireString(args, key) {
+    const present = readPresentString(args, key);
+    if (present === undefined)
+        throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, `${key} must be a non-empty string`);
+    return present;
+}
+function readStringArray(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    if (!Array.isArray(v))
+        return undefined;
+    const out = [];
+    for (const item of v)
+        if (typeof item === "string")
+            out.push(item);
+    return out;
+}
+function readProcessInstanceState(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return v === "ACTIVE" || v === "COMPLETED" || v === "TERMINATED" ? v : undefined;
+}
+function readUserTaskState(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return v === "CREATED" || v === "COMPLETED" || v === "CANCELED" || v === "FAILED" ? v : undefined;
+}
+function readWaitStateType(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return v === "JOB" || v === "MESSAGE" || v === "USER_TASK" || v === "TIMER" || v === "SIGNAL" || v === "CONDITION"
+        ? v
+        : undefined;
+}
+/** Narrow an argument to a real engine incident state — the `"UNKNOWN"` client-side sentinel is
+ *  deliberately NOT a selector (see `IncidentState`/`IncidentFilter`), so it is rejected here. */
+function readIncidentState(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return v === "ACTIVE" || v === "MIGRATED" || v === "PENDING" || v === "RESOLVED" ? v : undefined;
+}
+/** Read a plain JSON object argument (an MCP `object` input), else `undefined`. Used for the
+ *  `set_variables` payload — an arbitrary variable map handed to the engine verbatim. */
+function readObject(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return isRecord(v) ? v : undefined;
+}
+/** Read a finite integer argument (for a job's retry count), else `undefined`. */
+function readInteger(args, key) {
+    const v = args[key];
+    return typeof v === "number" && Number.isInteger(v) ? v : undefined;
+}
+const OPTIONAL_STRING = { type: "string" };
+/** Build the framework debug tools, closing over the app's engine (truth plane) and default data
+ *  source (the ADR 0065 projection stores). READ tools consume the engine's read accessors and the
+ *  projection stores; MUTATING tools (ADR 0067 Slice 3, gated by the shared-secret guard) drive the
+ *  Slice 2 seam extension — cancel an instance, resolve/retry an incident, set variables. */
+function buildDebugTools(app) {
+    const projectionDb = () => app.data.hasDefaultSource() ? app.data.source().db : undefined;
+    return [
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}search_process_instances`,
+            description: "Engine truth: search process instances by key and/or lifecycle state.",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: {
+                    processInstanceKeys: { type: "array", items: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                    state: { type: "string", enum: ["ACTIVE", "COMPLETED", "TERMINATED"] },
+                },
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const filter = {};
+                const keys = readStringArray(args, "processInstanceKeys");
+                if (keys)
+                    filter.processInstanceKeys = keys;
+                const state = readProcessInstanceState(args, "state");
+                if (state)
+                    filter.state = state;
+                return app.engine.searchProcessInstances(filter);
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}search_element_instance_wait_states`,
+            description: "Engine truth: search element-instance wait states (every park, not only user tasks).",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: {
+                    processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    elementId: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    waitStateType: {
+                        type: "string",
+                        enum: ["JOB", "MESSAGE", "USER_TASK", "TIMER", "SIGNAL", "CONDITION"],
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const filter = {};
+                const pik = readPresentString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                if (pik)
+                    filter.processInstanceKey = pik;
+                const elementId = readPresentString(args, "elementId");
+                if (elementId)
+                    filter.elementId = elementId;
+                const waitStateType = readWaitStateType(args, "waitStateType");
+                if (waitStateType)
+                    filter.waitStateType = waitStateType;
+                return app.engine.searchElementInstanceWaitStates(filter);
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}get_element_instance`,
+            description: "Engine truth: fetch a single element instance by key (null when absent).",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { elementInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                required: ["elementInstanceKey"],
+            },
+            run: (args) => app.engine.getElementInstance(requireString(args, "elementInstanceKey")),
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}search_user_tasks`,
+            description: "Engine truth: search user tasks by process instance, assignee, candidate group, and/or state.",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: {
+                    processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    assignee: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    candidateGroup: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    state: { type: "string", enum: ["CREATED", "COMPLETED", "CANCELED", "FAILED"] },
+                },
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const filter = {};
+                const pik = readPresentString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                if (pik)
+                    filter.processInstanceKey = pik;
+                const assignee = readPresentString(args, "assignee");
+                if (assignee)
+                    filter.assignee = assignee;
+                const candidateGroup = readPresentString(args, "candidateGroup");
+                if (candidateGroup)
+                    filter.candidateGroup = candidateGroup;
+                const state = readUserTaskState(args, "state");
+                if (state)
+                    filter.state = state;
+                return app.engine.searchUserTasks(filter);
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}search_incidents`,
+            description: "Engine truth: search incidents (stuck tokens — a job out of retries, an unhandled error, a failed gateway) by process instance and/or state. Read-only; each result carries the incidentKey/jobKey the mutating unstick tools take.",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: {
+                    processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    state: { type: "string", enum: ["ACTIVE", "MIGRATED", "PENDING", "RESOLVED"] },
+                },
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const filter = {};
+                const pik = readPresentString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                if (pik)
+                    filter.processInstanceKey = pik;
+                const state = readIncidentState(args, "state");
+                if (state)
+                    filter.state = state;
+                return app.engine.searchIncidents(filter);
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}cancel_instance`,
+            description: "MUTATING: cancel a running process instance. Requires the shared-secret guard.",
+            mutating: true,
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                required: ["processInstanceKey"],
+            },
+            run: async (args) => {
+                const processInstanceKey = requireString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                await app.engine.cancelInstance({ processInstanceKey });
+                return { cancelled: processInstanceKey };
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}resolve_incident`,
+            description: "MUTATING: resolve an open incident by key, unblocking the parked token (bump the job's retries first for a jobNoRetries incident — see retry_job). Requires the shared-secret guard.",
+            mutating: true,
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { incidentKey: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                required: ["incidentKey"],
+            },
+            run: async (args) => {
+                const incidentKey = requireString(args, "incidentKey");
+                await app.engine.resolveIncident({ incidentKey });
+                return { resolved: incidentKey };
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}retry_job`,
+            description: "MUTATING: set a failed job's remaining retries (making it activatable again — the 'retry' half of unsticking a jobNoRetries incident). Requires the shared-secret guard.",
+            mutating: true,
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { jobKey: OPTIONAL_STRING, retries: { type: "integer", minimum: 0 } },
+                required: ["jobKey", "retries"],
+            },
+            run: async (args) => {
+                const jobKey = requireString(args, "jobKey");
+                const retries = readInteger(args, "retries");
+                if (retries === undefined || retries < 0)
+                    throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, "retries must be a non-negative integer");
+                await app.engine.updateJobRetries({ jobKey, retries });
+                return { jobKey, retries };
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}set_variables`,
+            description: "MUTATING: merge variables into a scope (a process-instance or element-instance key); set `local` true to keep them in that local scope. Repairs state before resolving an incident. Requires the shared-secret guard.",
+            mutating: true,
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: {
+                    scopeKey: OPTIONAL_STRING,
+                    variables: { type: "object" },
+                    local: { type: "boolean" },
+                },
+                required: ["scopeKey", "variables"],
+            },
+            run: async (args) => {
+                const scopeKey = requireString(args, "scopeKey");
+                const variables = readObject(args, "variables");
+                if (variables === undefined)
+                    throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, "variables must be an object");
+                const input = {
+                    scopeKey,
+                    variables,
+                };
+                if (args.local === true)
+                    input.local = true;
+                await app.engine.setVariables(input);
+                return { scopeKey, set: Object.keys(variables) };
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}instance_state`,
+            description: "Projection (urban_instance_state, ADR 0065): the canonical engine-lifecycle state for an instance.",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                required: ["processInstanceKey"],
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const key = requireString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                const db = projectionDb();
+                if (!db)
+                    return Promise.resolve(null);
+                return Promise.resolve(new InstanceStateStore(db).getState(key) ?? null);
+            },
+        },
+        {
+            name: `${DEBUG_PREFIX}open_user_tasks`,
+            description: "Projection (urban_open_user_tasks, ADR 0065): the currently-open user tasks for an instance.",
+            inputSchema: {
+                type: "object",
+                properties: { processInstanceKey: OPTIONAL_STRING },
+                required: ["processInstanceKey"],
+            },
+            run: (args) => {
+                const key = requireString(args, "processInstanceKey");
+                const db = projectionDb();
+                if (!db)
+                    return Promise.resolve([]);
+                return Promise.resolve(new OpenUserTasksStore(db).openTasks(key));
+            },
+        },
+    ];
+}
+/**
+ * Mount the runtime-served MCP surface at `/app/mcp` (ADR 0067). Returns a single `*`-method route
+ * (mounted unconditionally, like `/app/agent`); the handler bridges the host request/response seam
+ * to the SDK's Web-Standard Streamable-HTTP transport, maintaining one MCP session per
+ * `mcp-session-id`. The tool projection reuses the SAME OpenAPI enumeration and dispatch path as
+ * `mountApi`, so a tool call is equivalent to the corresponding HTTP call.
+ */
+export function mountMcp(ctx, app, apiRoutes) {
+    const config = readMcpConfig(ctx.manifest, ctx.host.env);
+    // The effective HTTP bind interface. When the app is bound to all interfaces, the
+    // client-controlled `Host` header is not a trustworthy loopback signal (a remote caller can send
+    // `Host: localhost`), so a loopback-only surface must refuse EVERY caller rather than trust it.
+    const bindMode = resolveBindMode(ctx.manifest, ctx.host.env);
+    // Reuse the app's OpenAPI dispatch VERBATIM: `mountSurfaces` already built the `/app/api` router
+    // (validation + delegate registry) via `mountApi` and hands us its routes here, so tool and HTTP
+    // calls share ONE dispatcher instance (no forked dispatcher, no second doc/delegate cache). A tool
+    // call is reconstructed into the operation's HTTP request and routed through this same router.
+    const apiRouter = makeRouter(apiRoutes);
+    let docPromise;
+    const loadSpecDoc = () => {
+        if (!docPromise) {
+            docPromise = (async () => {
+                const binding = readApiBinding(ctx.manifest);
+                if (!binding)
+                    return { doc: undefined, failed: false };
+                const text = await ctx.host.readTextFile(resolveAppPath(ctx.root, binding.spec));
+                return { doc: parseSpec(text) };
+            })().catch((e) => {
+                docPromise = undefined; // don't cache the failure — let a later request retry
+                ctx.host.log("warn", "mcp: failed to load the app OpenAPI spec", { error: errorMessage(e) });
+                return { doc: undefined, failed: true };
+            });
+        }
+        return docPromise;
+    };
+    // The projected app operation table (read AND mutating), derived from the same enumeration
+    // `mountApi` routes. `x-mcp`-excluded operations are dropped (the security-relevant opt-out) as
+    // are reserved-namespace ids; the read/mutate split is applied at annotation + guard time via
+    // `isMutatingOperation`, never a forked walker. Memoized PER parsed spec document (keyed on the
+    // cached doc promise `loadSpecDoc` returns): `tools/list` and `tools/call` both hit this on every
+    // request, so recomputing `collectOperations` + the reserved-namespace filter (and re-emitting its
+    // warn) each time is avoidable overhead and log spam. When the spec fails to load `loadSpecDoc`
+    // resets its promise, so the key changes and the projection is recomputed on the retry.
+    let projectedOps;
+    const loadProjectedOps = () => {
+        const docKey = loadSpecDoc();
+        if (projectedOps?.docKey !== docKey) {
+            const ops = docKey.then(({ doc }) => {
+                if (!doc)
+                    return [];
+                const projected = collectOperations(doc).filter((op) => !op.mcpExcluded);
+                // The `urban_debug_` namespace is framework-reserved (see DEBUG_PREFIX). A `urban_debug_*`
+                // operationId is a legal safe path segment, so an app could declare one — but `CallTool`
+                // resolves `debugByName` before app ops, so such an op would be shadowed by the framework
+                // tool AND surface a duplicate name in `tools/list`. Drop reserved-namespace app ops here
+                // (the single projection source both `tools/list` and `CallTool` read), warning per drop,
+                // so the collision is impossible by construction rather than order-dependent.
+                return projected.filter((op) => {
+                    if (op.operationId.startsWith(DEBUG_PREFIX)) {
+                        ctx.host.log("warn", "mcp: dropped app operation using reserved framework tool namespace", {
+                            operationId: op.operationId,
+                            reservedPrefix: DEBUG_PREFIX,
+                        });
+                        return false;
+                    }
+                    return true;
+                });
+            });
+            projectedOps = { docKey, ops };
+        }
+        return projectedOps.ops;
+    };
+    const debugTools = buildDebugTools(app);
+    const debugByName = new Map(debugTools.map((t) => [t.name, t]));
+    // A minimal `OperationInfo` that requires ONLY the app's shared-secret scheme, so the framework
+    // mutating tools reuse `evaluateSecurity` VERBATIM (constant-time compare, misconfig→500, absent
+    // credential→401) rather than a bespoke comparison — the same enforcement path an app operation's
+    // own `security` takes. It is never routed; only its `security` field is read.
+    const sharedSecretOp = (schemeName) => ({
+        operationId: "__mcp_mutation_guard__",
+        method: "post",
+        path: "/__mcp_mutation_guard__",
+        parameters: [],
+        requestBodyRequired: false,
+        responseSchemas: [],
+        security: [{ [schemeName]: [] }],
+        eject: false,
+        mcpExcluded: false,
+    });
+    // Decide whether a mutating tool call is authorized. Either an explicit runtime opt-in
+    // (`mcp.allowMutations` / `URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_MUTATIONS`) opens mutations credential-free — but only
+    // LOOPBACK-ONLY (`!allowRemote`), so exposing the surface to non-loopback callers can never
+    // silently drop the guard — OR the client presented the app's shared secret (the apiKey header
+    // scheme, via `x-nano-secret-env`). With no shared-secret scheme configured and no (in-scope)
+    // opt-in, mutations are refused (fail closed).
+    const NO_SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME_ERROR = "mutating MCP tools require the app's shared secret (an apiKey header security scheme with x-nano-secret-env), or the explicit mcp.allowMutations opt-in (honoured loopback-only, i.e. when mcp.allowRemote is off)";
+    const authorizeMutation = async (headers) => {
+        // The credential-free opt-in is loopback-only: with `allowRemote` on, a non-loopback caller
+        // could otherwise reach mutating `urban_debug_*` tools with no shared-secret guard at all, which
+        // contradicts the "trusted, purely local box" intent. When remote exposure is enabled we ignore
+        // the bypass and fall through to require the shared secret.
+        if (config.allowMutations && !config.allowRemote)
+            return { ok: true };
+        const loaded = await loadSpecDoc();
+        if (!loaded.doc && loaded.failed) {
+            // A broken/unparseable spec is a server misconfiguration (500) — already logged by
+            // `loadSpecDoc` — not a missing credential (401): with no parsed spec we cannot even tell
+            // whether a shared-secret scheme exists to authorize against, so mirror `mountApi` and surface
+            // a 500 (the CallTool handler logs it) rather than a misleading 401.
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                status: 500,
+                error: "mutating MCP tools cannot be authorized: the app OpenAPI spec failed to load (server misconfiguration — see the logged 'mcp: failed to load the app OpenAPI spec' error)",
+            };
+        }
+        // A misconfigured spec — more than one candidate shared-secret scheme, so which one guards
+        // mutations would depend on authoring order — is a 500 (see `sharedSecretSchemeName`), not a
+        // missing/bad credential. Surface it like the other misconfiguration branches above.
+        let schemeName;
+        try {
+            schemeName = loaded.doc ? sharedSecretSchemeName(loaded.doc) : undefined;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return { ok: false, status: 500, error: errorMessage(e) };
+        }
+        if (!loaded.doc || !schemeName) {
+            return { ok: false, status: 401, error: NO_SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME_ERROR };
+        }
+        return evaluateSecurity(loaded.doc, sharedSecretOp(schemeName), (name) => readHeader(headers, name), () => undefined, (envVar) => ctx.host.env(envVar));
+    };
+    const dispatchOperationTool = async (op, args, headers) => {
+        const missing = missingPathParams(op, args);
+        if (missing.length > 0) {
+            // Surface as an error tool result (like a reused-validator failure), not a silent 404 from an
+            // empty-string substitution — the calling agent sees exactly which required params it omitted.
+            return textResult({ error: `validation failed: missing required path parameter(s): ${missing.join(", ")}` }, true);
+        }
+        // Forward the MCP connection's headers so the reused router enforces the operation's own
+        // OpenAPI `security` (a mutating — or secured read — app op is guarded exactly as its HTTP
+        // route). A `401`/`403`/`500` from that enforcement flows back as an error tool result.
+        const res = await apiRouter(toHttpRequest(op, args, headers));
+        const status = res.status ?? 200;
+        return textResult(res.body ?? "", status >= 400);
+    };
+    const readSystemBrief = async () => {
+        const path = resolveAppPath(ctx.root, `${GENERATED_DIR}/${SYSTEM_BRIEF_JSON}`);
+        if (!(await ctx.host.exists(path))) {
+            throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, "system brief not generated — run `urban gen`");
+        }
+        return ctx.host.readTextFile(path);
+    };
+    const orientationText = () => [
+        `# ${ctx.manifest.name ?? "Urban app"} — MCP orientation`,
+        "",
+        "This endpoint is the app's runtime-served MCP surface (ADR 0067).",
+        "",
+        `- Read the \`${SYSTEM_BRIEF_URI}\` resource first for the app's system model (processes, service-task call graph, decisions, ownership).`,
+        "- App tools mirror the app's HTTP operations one-to-one: a tool call is equivalent to the corresponding `/app/api` HTTP call, validated identically and authorized exactly as that HTTP route by the operation's own OpenAPI `security` (an operation with no `security` is open — there is no extra MCP-level guard). An operation is exposed unless it opts out with the `x-mcp` extension (a security-relevant authoring switch).",
+        `- \`${DEBUG_PREFIX}*\` READ tools are framework-owned process-debugging tools: engine truth (process instances, wait states, element instances, user tasks, incidents) and the ADR 0065 projection stores (instance state, open user tasks). They are unauthenticated on loopback.`,
+        `- \`${DEBUG_PREFIX}*\` MUTATING tools (cancel_instance, resolve_incident, retry_job, set_variables) are framework-GUARDED: present the app's shared secret as its apiKey header on the MCP connection, or the operator must set the mcp.allowMutations opt-in (honoured loopback-only — when mcp.allowRemote is enabled, mutations always require the shared secret). A mutating call without the credential is refused. (App operation tools are NOT covered by this guard — they are authorized by their own OpenAPI \`security\`, above.)`,
+    ].join("\n");
+    /** Build a fresh low-level MCP `Server` with this app's tools/resources/prompts wired. One is
+     *  created per session and connected to that session's transport. */
+    const buildServer = () => {
+        const server = new Server({ name: "urban", version: "1.0.0" }, { capabilities: { tools: {}, resources: {}, prompts: {} } });
+        server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => {
+            const ops = await loadProjectedOps();
+            const appTools = ops.map((op) => {
+                const mutating = isMutatingOperation(op);
+                return {
+                    name: op.operationId,
+                    description: op.summary ?? `${op.method.toUpperCase()} ${op.path}`,
+                    inputSchema: toolInputSchema(op),
+                    annotations: { readOnlyHint: !mutating, destructiveHint: mutating },
+                };
+            });
+            const frameworkTools = debugTools.map((t) => ({
+                name: t.name,
+                description: t.description,
+                inputSchema: t.inputSchema,
+                annotations: { readOnlyHint: !t.mutating, destructiveHint: t.mutating === true },
+            }));
+            return { tools: [...appTools, ...frameworkTools] };
+        });
+        server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request, extra) => {
+            const { name } = request.params;
+            const args = isRecord(request.params.arguments) ? request.params.arguments : {};
+            // The client presents its shared-secret credential as a header on the MCP connection; the SDK
+            // surfaces the request's headers here via `requestInfo`. Empty when a host cannot supply them
+            // (then a mutating call falls back to refuse unless the runtime opt-in is set).
+            const headers = extra.requestInfo?.headers ?? {};
+            const debug = debugByName.get(name);
+            if (debug) {
+                if (debug.mutating) {
+                    const authz = await authorizeMutation(headers);
+                    if (!authz.ok) {
+                        const status = authz.status ?? 401;
+                        // Mirror `mountApi`'s security handling: a `500` refusal means the shared-secret scheme
+                        // is misconfigured (unknown/unsupported scheme, or an unset secret env var) rather than a
+                        // bad/absent credential. Log it — as `mountApi` does for its OpenAPI security — so an
+                        // operator can diagnose the misconfiguration, and carry the status in the error payload
+                        // so a client can distinguish a `500` misconfig from a `401` unauthorized.
+                        if (status === 500) {
+                            ctx.host.log("error", "mcp mutating tool security is misconfigured (ADR 0059)", {
+                                tool: name,
+                                reason: authz.error,
+                            });
+                        }
+                        return textResult({ error: authz.error ?? "unauthorized", status }, true);
+                    }
+                }
+                const missing = missingRequiredArgs(debug.inputSchema, args);
+                if (missing.length > 0) {
+                    // Fail fast like an operation-tool validation error, instead of substituting an empty
+                    // string that makes an invalid call look like a legitimate "not found" result.
+                    return textResult({ error: `validation failed: missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(", ")}` }, true);
+                }
+                try {
+                    return textResult(await debug.run(args));
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    return textResult({ error: errorMessage(e) }, true);
+                }
+            }
+            const ops = await loadProjectedOps();
+            const op = ops.find((o) => o.operationId === name);
+            if (!op) {
+                throw new McpError(ErrorCode.MethodNotFound, `no such tool: ${name}`);
+            }
+            // App operation tools inherit their OpenAPI `security` — the forwarded headers let the reused
+            // router enforce it, so a mutating (or secured read) app op is guarded exactly as its HTTP route.
+            return dispatchOperationTool(op, args, headers);
+        });
+        server.setRequestHandler(ListResourcesRequestSchema, async () => ({
+            resources: [
+                {
+                    uri: SYSTEM_BRIEF_URI,
+                    name: "system-brief",
+                    title: "App system brief",
+                    description: "The app's derived institutional-memory brief (the /app/agent.json content).",
+                    mimeType: "application/json",
+                },
+            ],
+        }));
+        server.setRequestHandler(ReadResourceRequestSchema, async (request) => {
+            const { uri } = request.params;
+            if (uri !== SYSTEM_BRIEF_URI) {
+                throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, `no such resource: ${uri}`);
+            }
+            const text = await readSystemBrief();
+            return { contents: [{ uri, mimeType: "application/json", text }] };
+        });
+        server.setRequestHandler(ListPromptsRequestSchema, async () => ({
+            prompts: [
+                {
+                    name: ORIENTATION_PROMPT,
+                    title: "Orient on this app",
+                    description: "How to use this app's MCP surface: its read tools, debug tools, and system-brief resource.",
+                    arguments: [],
+                },
+            ],
+        }));
+        server.setRequestHandler(GetPromptRequestSchema, async (request) => {
+            if (request.params.name !== ORIENTATION_PROMPT) {
+                throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidParams, `no such prompt: ${request.params.name}`);
+            }
+            return {
+                description: "Orientation for working against this app over MCP.",
+                messages: [{ role: "user", content: { type: "text", text: orientationText() } }],
+            };
+        });
+        return server;
+    };
+    const sessions = new Map();
+    const createSession = async () => {
+        const transport = new WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport({
+            sessionIdGenerator: () => newSessionId(),
+            enableJsonResponse: true,
+            onsessionclosed: (id) => {
+                sessions.delete(id);
+            },
+        });
+        transport.onclose = () => {
+            if (transport.sessionId)
+                sessions.delete(transport.sessionId);
+        };
+        const server = buildServer();
+        await server.connect(transport);
+        return { server, transport };
+    };
+    /** Convert the host request into the Web-Standard `Request` the SDK transport consumes. The body
+     *  is passed separately (as `parsedBody`) so the transport never re-reads it; the Request carries
+     *  the method + headers (Accept, content-type, `mcp-session-id`, protocol version) it inspects. */
+    const toWebRequest = (req) => {
+        const search = req.query.toString();
+        const url = `http://localhost${req.path}${search ? `?${search}` : ""}`;
+        const headers = new Headers();
+        for (const [key, value] of req.headers)
+            headers.set(key, value);
+        return new Request(url, { method: req.method, headers });
+    };
+    const toHttpResponse = async (res) => {
+        const headers = {};
+        for (const [key, value] of res.headers)
+            headers[key] = value;
+        return { status: res.status, headers, body: await res.text() };
+    };
+    const methodNotAllowed = () => ({
+        status: 405,
+        headers: { allow: "POST, DELETE", "content-type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+            jsonrpc: "2.0",
+            error: { code: -32000, message: "Method Not Allowed: the MCP endpoint accepts POST (and DELETE to end a session)." },
+            id: null,
+        }),
+    });
+    const handle = async (req) => {
+        if (!config.enabled)
+            return json({ error: "MCP surface is disabled" }, 404);
+        if (!config.allowRemote) {
+            // Bound to all interfaces, `Host` can't be trusted as a loopback proof: refuse everyone
+            // unless remote access is explicitly opted in (mcp.allowRemote / URBAN_MCP_ALLOW_REMOTE).
+            if (bindMode === "all") {
+                return json({ error: "MCP surface is loopback-only, but the app is bound to all interfaces; set mcp.allowRemote to expose it" }, 403);
+            }
+            if (!isLoopbackRequest(req)) {
+                return json({ error: "MCP surface is loopback-only" }, 403);
+            }
+        }
+        const method = req.method.toUpperCase();
+        // The string-body host seam cannot hold open an SSE stream, so the optional GET server→client
+        // stream is declined with 405 (spec-compliant): clients fall back to POST request/response.
+        if (method !== "POST" && method !== "DELETE")
+            return methodNotAllowed();
+        const rawBody = method === "POST" ? await req.text() : "";
+        let parsedBody;
+        if (rawBody) {
+            try {
+                parsedBody = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return json({ jsonrpc: "2.0", error: { code: ErrorCode.ParseError, message: "request body is not valid JSON" }, id: null }, 400);
+            }
+        }
+        const sessionId = req.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER) ?? undefined;
+        let session = sessionId ? sessions.get(sessionId) : undefined;
+        // Refresh an existing session's recency so an actively-used session is never the LRU victim.
+        if (session && sessionId)
+            touchSession(sessions, sessionId, session);
+        if (!session) {
+            const messages = Array.isArray(parsedBody) ? parsedBody : [parsedBody];
+            if (!messages.some((m) => isInitializeRequest(m))) {
+                return json({
+                    jsonrpc: "2.0",
+                    error: { code: -32000, message: "Bad Request: no valid session id, and not an initialize request." },
+                    id: null,
+                }, 400);
+            }
+            session = await createSession();
+        }
+        const webResponse = await session.transport.handleRequest(toWebRequest(req), { parsedBody });
+        // A newly-initialized session assigns its id during handleRequest — register it so the client's
+        // follow-up requests (carrying `mcp-session-id`) resolve back to this same server/transport.
+        const assignedId = session.transport.sessionId;
+        if (assignedId && !sessions.has(assignedId)) {
+            sessions.set(assignedId, session);
+            // Enforce the hard cap once the freshly-initialized session is registered, evicting the
+            // least-recently-used pairs (never this one — it is now the newest) so the map stays bounded.
+            await evictExcessSessions(sessions, MAX_SESSIONS, (s) => s.server.close());
+        }
+        return toHttpResponse(webResponse);
+    };
+    const routes = [
+        { method: "*", path: MCP_PATH, source: "surface:mcp", handler: handle },
+    ];
+    ctx.host.log("info", "mcp surface mounted", {
+        path: MCP_PATH,
+        enabled: config.enabled,
+        loopbackOnly: !config.allowRemote,
+    });
+    return {
+        name: "mcp",
+        routes,
+        enabled: config.enabled,
+        describe: () => ({
+            mcp: {
+                path: MCP_PATH,
+                enabled: config.enabled,
+                loopbackOnly: !config.allowRemote,
+                allowMutations: config.allowMutations,
+            },
+        }),
+    };
+}