@nanhara/hara 0.122.3 → 0.122.4

package/dist/cron/runner.js

@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@ import { appendFileSync, chmodSync, closeSync, existsSync, fsyncSync, lstatSync,
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { platform } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
-import { loadJobs, recordRun, recordAlert, findJob, cronDir, logPath } from "./store.js";
+import { loadJobs, recordRun, recordRunStart, recoverInterruptedRuns, enqueueOutcomeNotifications, listPendingNotifications, acknowledgePendingNotification, deferPendingNotification, findJob, cronDir, logPath, } from "./store.js";
 import { isDue } from "./schedule.js";
 import { shellCommand } from "../sandbox.js";
 import { sensitiveShellCommandReason } from "../security/sensitive-files.js";
 import { createToolOutputLineRedactor, redactToolSubprocessOutput, terminateSubprocessTree, toolSubprocessEnv } from "../security/subprocess-env.js";
+import { compareProcessIdentity, defaultProcessIdentity } from "../process-identity.js";
 /** Jobs that are enabled AND due at `nowMs` (pure — for the tick and for testing). */
 export function dueJobs(jobs, nowMs) {
     return jobs.filter((j) => j.enabled && isDue(j, nowMs));
@@ -19,24 +20,80 @@ export function dueJobs(jobs, nowMs) {
 /** How to invoke hara again. Under node, argv[1] is the entry to hand back to node — either `dist/index.js`
  *  OR the installed `hara` bin symlink (node runs both); as a compiled single-binary, execPath itself IS hara
  *  (argv[1] is a user arg), so re-invoke the binary directly. Used by the cron tick + the chat gateway.
- *  Discriminator is whether execPath is node — NOT argv[1]'s extension (the bin symlink has no `.js`). */
-export function selfArgv() {
-    const exec = process.execPath;
+ *  Node and ordinary Bun scripts retain argv[1] (the bin symlink need not end in `.js`); only Bun's
+ *  `/$bunfs/…` compile-time virtual entry is omitted because execPath is already the standalone Hara. */
+export function selfArgvFor(exec, entry, versions) {
     const underNode = /(^|[\\/])node(\.exe)?$/i.test(exec);
-    return underNode && process.argv[1] ? [exec, process.argv[1]] : [exec];
+    const bunScript = typeof versions.bun === "string" && !!entry && !entry.replace(/\\/g, "/").startsWith("/$bunfs/");
+    return entry && (underNode || bunScript) ? [exec, entry] : [exec];
+}
+export function selfArgv() {
+    return selfArgvFor(process.execPath, process.argv[1], process.versions);
+}
+/** Add user-facing arguments to the runtime-aware self command. Exported separately so Node and compiled
+ *  argv construction can be unit-tested without launching a second CLI. */
+export function selfInvocation(args) {
+    const [command, ...entryArgs] = selfArgv();
+    return { command, args: [...entryArgs, ...args] };
+}
+/** Re-enter Hara as an attached foreground child without blocking this process's event loop. Inheriting all
+ *  stdio keeps readline/Ink attached to the real terminal; this is required by `hara resume <id>`. */
+export function runSelfAttached(args, cwd = process.cwd()) {
+    const invocation = selfInvocation(args);
+    return new Promise((resolveRun, rejectRun) => {
+        let settled = false;
+        const child = spawn(invocation.command, invocation.args, {
+            cwd,
+            env: process.env,
+            stdio: "inherit",
+        });
+        child.once("error", (error) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            rejectRun(error);
+        });
+        child.once("close", (code, signal) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            resolveRun({ code, signal });
+        });
+    });
 }
 const lockPath = () => join(cronDir(), ".tick.lock");
 const takeoverPath = () => join(cronDir(), ".tick.lock.takeover");
-// Generous: a live-PID owner is respected this long (so a genuinely long job isn't double-fired); past it
-// we assume PID reuse and take over. A *dead* owner is taken over within one tick regardless (see below).
-const LOCK_STALE_MS = 6 * 60 * 60_000;
-// A takeover/release guard protects only synchronous filesystem operations and should live for milliseconds.
-// Five minutes tolerates long host pauses while still recovering a guard left by a crash or PID reuse.
-const TAKEOVER_GUARD_STALE_MS = 5 * 60_000;
-const DEFAULT_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60_000;
+// Malformed records have no process identity to verify. Keep a long poison window for the primary and a
+// shorter one for the synchronous transition guard; valid live/legacy records are never reclaimed by age.
+const MALFORMED_LOCK_POISON_MS = 6 * 60 * 60_000;
+const MALFORMED_GUARD_POISON_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+export const DEFAULT_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60_000;
+export const DEFAULT_CRON_TICK_TIMEOUT_MS = 60 * 60_000;
+export const MAX_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS = 24 * 60 * 60_000;
+// Keep normal scheduler ownership bounded even though a valid live owner is never reclaimed by wall-clock age.
+export const MAX_CRON_TICK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 60_000;
 const DEFAULT_RUN_LOG_BYTES = 1_000_000;
 const TERMINATE_GRACE_MS = 2_000;
+const ABORT_SETTLE_MS = 750;
+const FINAL_DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+function configuredTimeoutMs(explicit, envName, fallback, maximum) {
+    const envValue = process.env[envName]?.trim();
+    const candidate = explicit ?? (envValue ? Number(envValue) : fallback);
+    return Number.isFinite(candidate)
+        ? Math.min(Math.max(100, Math.trunc(candidate)), maximum)
+        : fallback;
+}
+/** Public for diagnostics/tests; scheduler deployments can override with HARA_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS. */
+export function cronJobTimeoutMs(explicit) {
+    return configuredTimeoutMs(explicit, "HARA_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS", DEFAULT_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS, MAX_CRON_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS);
+}
+/** Total scheduler-tick watchdog; configurable in milliseconds and hard-capped to bound normal ownership. */
+export function cronTickTimeoutMs(explicit) {
+    return configuredTimeoutMs(explicit, "HARA_CRON_TICK_TIMEOUT_MS", DEFAULT_CRON_TICK_TIMEOUT_MS, MAX_CRON_TICK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+}
 const MAX_LOCK_RECORD_BYTES = 512;
+const TICK_LOCK_UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/iu;
+const CURRENT_PROCESS_BIRTH_IDENTITY = defaultProcessIdentity(process.pid);
 function processIsAlive(pid) {
     try {
         process.kill(pid, 0);
@@ -69,11 +126,34 @@ function readTickLockFileSnapshot(path) {
 function parseTickLockSnapshot(file) {
     if (!file?.raw)
         return null;
-    const match = /^(\d+):([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12})$/iu.exec(file.raw);
-    const pid = Number(match?.[1]);
-    if (!match || !Number.isSafeInteger(pid) || pid <= 0)
-        return null;
-    return { ...file, raw: file.raw, pid };
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(file.raw);
+        if (!parsed
+            || typeof parsed !== "object"
+            || !Number.isSafeInteger(parsed.pid)
+            || parsed.pid <= 0
+            || typeof parsed.token !== "string"
+            || !TICK_LOCK_UUID.test(parsed.token)
+            || (parsed.birthIdentity !== undefined
+                && (typeof parsed.birthIdentity !== "string" || !/^[\x20-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(parsed.birthIdentity))))
+            return null;
+        return {
+            ...file,
+            raw: file.raw,
+            pid: parsed.pid,
+            token: parsed.token,
+            ...(typeof parsed.birthIdentity === "string" ? { birthIdentity: parsed.birthIdentity } : {}),
+        };
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Backward compatibility for the unpublished identity-less lock format. A live legacy PID is unknown,
+        // never stale evidence; a proven-dead PID remains safe to reclaim.
+        const match = /^(\d+):([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12})$/iu.exec(file.raw);
+        const pid = Number(match?.[1]);
+        if (!match || !Number.isSafeInteger(pid) || pid <= 0)
+            return null;
+        return { ...file, raw: file.raw, pid, token: match[2] };
+    }
 }
 function readTickLockSnapshot(path) {
     return parseTickLockSnapshot(readTickLockFileSnapshot(path));
@@ -90,12 +170,27 @@ function sameTickLockFile(left, right) {
 function sameTickLock(left, right) {
     return sameTickLockFile(left, right) && left.pid === right?.pid;
 }
-function staleTickLock(snapshot, nowMs) {
-    return nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= LOCK_STALE_MS || !processIsAlive(snapshot.pid);
+/** Only proof may retire a valid owner: dead PID, or same identity scheme with a different birth value.
+ * A live same/unknown/legacy owner fails closed even after host sleep or event-loop suspension. */
+function reclaimableTickLock(snapshot) {
+    if (!processIsAlive(snapshot.pid))
+        return true;
+    if (!snapshot.birthIdentity)
+        return false;
+    const current = snapshot.pid === process.pid
+        ? CURRENT_PROCESS_BIRTH_IDENTITY
+        : defaultProcessIdentity(snapshot.pid);
+    return compareProcessIdentity(snapshot.birthIdentity, current) === "different";
 }
-/** Recover only a complete, stable guard whose owner is proven dead or whose tiny synchronous lease is
- * far past its lifetime. Recovery deliberately ends this tick: a later invocation acquires a fresh guard,
- * keeping stale-guard deletion and new-guard creation out of the same contender's race window. */
+function newTickLockToken() {
+    return JSON.stringify({
+        pid: process.pid,
+        token: randomUUID(),
+        ...(CURRENT_PROCESS_BIRTH_IDENTITY ? { birthIdentity: CURRENT_PROCESS_BIRTH_IDENTITY } : {}),
+    });
+}
+/** Recover only a complete, stable guard whose owner is proven dead/reused. Age applies only to malformed
+ * poison, never to a valid live/legacy record. Recovery deliberately ends this tick. */
 function prepareTakeoverGuard(path, nowMs) {
     if (!existsSync(path))
         return "clear";
@@ -103,8 +198,8 @@ function prepareTakeoverGuard(path, nowMs) {
     if (!observedFile)
         return "active"; // unreadable/non-regular/unstable is not evidence that deletion is safe
     const observed = parseTickLockSnapshot(observedFile);
-    const staleRecord = (snapshot) => nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= TAKEOVER_GUARD_STALE_MS || !processIsAlive(snapshot.pid);
-    const staleMalformed = (snapshot) => nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= TAKEOVER_GUARD_STALE_MS;
+    const staleRecord = (snapshot) => reclaimableTickLock(snapshot);
+    const staleMalformed = (snapshot) => nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= MALFORMED_GUARD_POISON_MS;
     if (observed ? !staleRecord(observed) : !staleMalformed(observedFile))
         return "active";
     const currentFile = readTickLockFileSnapshot(path);
@@ -168,10 +263,10 @@ function removeOwnedLock(path, token) {
     }
     catch { /* best effort */ }
 }
-/** Release the primary lock under the same guard used for stale takeover. Without this, a >6h owner could
+/** Release the primary lock under the same guard used for stale takeover. Without this, a paused owner could
  * read its token, get descheduled while a reaper installs a successor, then unlink that successor by name. */
 function releasePrimaryTickLock(lock, takeover, token) {
-    const releaseToken = `${process.pid}:${randomUUID()}`;
+    const releaseToken = newTickLockToken();
     if (!writeExclusive(takeover, releaseToken))
         return; // an active reaper owns the transition
     try {
@@ -200,8 +295,11 @@ function capLog(log) {
 /** Run one job's task in a fresh hara process (full-auto, no prompts), appending output to its log.
  *  Exported so `hara cron run <id>` can fire a job on demand, ignoring its schedule. */
 export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
+    if (options.signal?.aborted) {
+        return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, error: "interrupted before cron job start by agent run deadline or cancellation", output: "", interrupted: true });
+    }
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
-        const timeoutMs = Math.min(Math.max(100, options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_JOB_TIMEOUT_MS), 24 * 60 * 60_000);
+        const timeoutMs = cronJobTimeoutMs(options.timeoutMs);
         const maxLogBytes = Math.min(Math.max(4_096, options.maxLogBytes ?? DEFAULT_RUN_LOG_BYTES), 16 * 1024 * 1024);
         mkdirSync(join(cronDir(), "logs"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
         try {
@@ -257,6 +355,10 @@ export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
             ? toolSubprocessEnv(process.env, { HARA_CRON: "1" })
             : { ...process.env, HARA_CRON: "1", HARA_CRON_NAME: job.name };
         const processGroup = platform() !== "win32";
+        if (options.signal?.aborted) {
+            resolve({ ok: false, error: "interrupted before cron job start by agent run deadline or cancellation", output: "", interrupted: true });
+            return;
+        }
         let child;
         try {
             child = spawn(cmd, argv, { cwd: job.cwd, env, detached: processGroup });
@@ -275,6 +377,8 @@ export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
         let logCapped = false;
         let done = false;
         let timedOut = false;
+        let aborted = false;
+        let abortFallback;
         let forceIssued = false;
         let closeBeforeForce = false;
         let cancelTermination;
@@ -309,6 +413,9 @@ export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
                 return;
             done = true;
             clearTimeout(timeoutTimer);
+            if (abortFallback)
+                clearTimeout(abortFallback);
+            options.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", abortRun);
             // Keep a timeout-triggered group KILL scheduled even if the direct child closed on TERM. The default
             // cancellation removes only the hard-settle fallback; it deliberately does not cancel escalation.
             cancelTermination?.();
@@ -320,6 +427,19 @@ export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
                 output: tail,
             });
         };
+        const abortRun = () => {
+            if (done || timedOut || aborted)
+                return;
+            aborted = true;
+            // A parent run deadline is already the hard boundary: kill immediately rather than adding the normal
+            // cron timeout grace. The owned process group includes shell/node descendants.
+            terminateSubprocessTree(child, { force: true, processGroup });
+            abortFallback = setTimeout(() => {
+                child.stdout?.destroy();
+                child.stderr?.destroy();
+                settle({ ok: false, error: "interrupted by agent run deadline or cancellation", output: tail, interrupted: true });
+            }, 750);
+        };
         const timeoutTimer = setTimeout(() => {
             if (done)
                 return;
@@ -331,79 +451,255 @@ export function runJobOnce(job, options = {}) {
                 onForce: () => {
                     forceIssued = true;
                     if (closeBeforeForce)
-                        settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail });
+                        settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail, timedOut: true });
                 },
                 onFallback: () => {
                     child.stdout?.destroy();
                     child.stderr?.destroy();
-                    settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail });
+                    settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail, timedOut: true });
                 },
             });
         }, timeoutMs);
-        child.stdout?.on("data", (d) => { if (!done && !timedOut)
+        options.signal?.addEventListener("abort", abortRun, { once: true });
+        if (options.signal?.aborted)
+            abortRun();
+        child.stdout?.on("data", (d) => { if (!done && !timedOut && !aborted)
             stdout.push(d.toString()); });
-        child.stderr?.on("data", (d) => { if (!done && !timedOut)
+        child.stderr?.on("data", (d) => { if (!done && !timedOut && !aborted)
             stderr.push(d.toString()); });
         child.on("error", (e) => {
+            if (aborted) {
+                settle({ ok: false, error: "interrupted by agent run deadline or cancellation", output: tail, interrupted: true });
+                return;
+            }
             if (timedOut && !forceIssued) {
                 closeBeforeForce = true;
                 return;
             }
             settle(timedOut
-                ? { ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail }
+                ? { ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail, timedOut: true }
                 : { ok: false, error: String(e?.message ?? e), output: tail });
         });
         child.on("close", (code) => {
+            if (aborted) {
+                settle({ ok: false, error: "interrupted by agent run deadline or cancellation", output: tail, interrupted: true });
+                return;
+            }
             if (timedOut && !forceIssued) {
                 closeBeforeForce = true;
                 return;
             }
             if (timedOut)
-                settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail });
+                settle({ ok: false, error: `timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`, output: tail, timedOut: true });
             else
                 settle(code === 0 ? { ok: true, output: tail } : { ok: false, error: `exited ${code}`, output: tail });
         });
     });
 }
-/** After a run: push the outcome to the job's deliver channel, and — on repeated failures — a 🚨 alert
- *  (threshold `alertAfter` (default 3), 6h cooldown). Best-effort: a delivery error only hits the log.
- *  `deliver` + `nowMs` injectable for tests. */
-export async function deliverOutcome(job, r, deliver = deliverResult, nowMs = Date.now()) {
-    if (!job.deliver)
-        return;
-    const snippet = (r.output ?? "").trim().slice(-1_500);
-    const head = r.ok ? `⏰ ${job.name} ✓` : `⏰ ${job.name} ✗ ${r.error ?? "failed"}`;
-    const err = await deliver(job.deliver, snippet ? `${head}\n${snippet}` : head);
-    if (err) {
+function terminalStatus(result) {
+    return result.ok ? "ok" : result.timedOut ? "timed_out" : "error";
+}
+function safeRunFailure(error) {
+    return {
+        ok: false,
+        error: redactToolSubprocessOutput(error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)),
+        output: "",
+    };
+}
+/** Manual-run lifecycle wrapper: persistence happens before the child starts and is always closed out. */
+export async function runJobTracked(job, options = {}) {
+    const startedAt = Date.now();
+    let runningToken;
+    try {
+        runningToken = recordRunStart(job.id, startedAt);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return { ok: false, error: `failed to persist cron running state: ${safeRunFailure(error).error}` };
+    }
+    if (!runningToken) {
+        let current;
         try {
-            appendFileSync(logPath(job.id), `\n[deliver] ${err}\n`);
+            current = findJob(job.id);
+            if (current?.lastStatus === "running") {
+                // A dead parent may still have a detached child. Persist the same fail-closed recovery used by ticks,
+                // but do not continue into a new run: the operator must inspect and retry explicitly.
+                const recovered = recoverInterruptedRuns(startedAt, job.id).find((entry) => entry.job.id === job.id);
+                if (recovered) {
+                    return {
+                        ok: false,
+                        error: `previous cron attempt was interrupted and the job was disabled; Hara refused to overlap a possible orphaned child. Inspect the process/workspace, then run \`hara cron run ${job.id}\` again explicitly`,
+                        output: "",
+                    };
+                }
+                current = findJob(job.id);
+                if (current?.lastStatus === "running") {
+                    const pid = current.runningPid ? ` (owner pid ${current.runningPid})` : "";
+                    return {
+                        ok: false,
+                        error: `cron job already has an unresolved running attempt${pid}; Hara refused to overlap it. Wait for it to finish or stop/recover that owner before retrying`,
+                        output: "",
+                    };
+                }
+            }
         }
-        catch {
-            /* best-effort */
+        catch (error) {
+            return { ok: false, error: `failed to inspect/recover cron running state: ${safeRunFailure(error).error}`, output: "" };
         }
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            error: current?.lastError
+                ? `cron job could not start: ${current.lastError}`
+                : "cron job could not start because it no longer exists or its state changed concurrently",
+            output: "",
+        };
     }
-    if (!r.ok) {
-        const fresh = findJob(job.id); // recordRun already bumped consecutiveErrors
-        const count = fresh?.consecutiveErrors ?? 0;
-        const threshold = job.alertAfter ?? 3;
-        const cooled = !fresh?.lastAlertAt || nowMs - fresh.lastAlertAt > 6 * 3_600_000;
-        if (count >= threshold && cooled) {
-            await deliver(job.deliver, `🚨 ${job.name} has failed ${count}× in a row — latest: ${r.error ?? "unknown"}. Log: ${logPath(job.id)}`);
-            recordAlert(job.id, nowMs);
+    let result;
+    try {
+        result = await runJobOnce(job, options);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        result = safeRunFailure(error);
+    }
+    const finishedAt = Date.now();
+    recordRun(job.id, finishedAt, terminalStatus(result), result.error, finishedAt - startedAt, runningToken);
+    return result;
+}
+/** Attempt a bounded slice of the durable queue. Transport failure updates backoff but never removes the
+ * effect; confirmed success atomically acknowledges it (and starts alert cooldown). */
+export async function deliverPendingNotifications(deliver = deliverResult, nowMs = Date.now(), signal, options = {}) {
+    const pending = listPendingNotifications(nowMs, options.limit ?? 8, options.jobId)
+        .filter((notification) => !options.ids || options.ids.has(notification.id));
+    let acknowledged = 0;
+    for (const notification of pending) {
+        if (signal?.aborted)
+            break;
+        let error;
+        try {
+            error = await deliver(notification.target, notification.text, signal, notification.id);
+        }
+        catch (cause) {
+            error = `delivery failed: ${safeRunFailure(cause).error ?? "transport request failed"}`;
+        }
+        if (!error) {
+            acknowledgePendingNotification(notification.jobId, notification.id, Date.now());
+            acknowledged++;
+            continue;
+        }
+        deferPendingNotification(notification.jobId, notification.id, error, Date.now());
+        try {
+            appendFileSync(logPath(notification.jobId), `\n[${notification.kind === "alert" ? "alert" : "deliver"}] ${error}\n`);
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* the durable queue is authoritative; the human-readable log is best effort */
         }
     }
+    return acknowledged;
+}
+/** Public one-off wrapper retained for embedders/tests. Unlike the old best-effort implementation, intent is
+ * persisted before transport and keeps the same idempotency key until confirmed. Production ticks enqueue
+ * atomically inside recordRun and call `deliverPendingNotifications` directly. */
+export async function deliverOutcome(job, r, deliver = deliverResult, nowMs = Date.now(), signal) {
+    const ids = enqueueOutcomeNotifications(job.id, r, nowMs);
+    if (!ids.length)
+        return;
+    await deliverPendingNotifications(deliver, nowMs, signal, {
+        limit: Math.min(64, ids.length),
+        jobId: job.id,
+        ids: new Set(ids),
+    });
+}
+/** Hard-race a runner as well as passing it a signal. The race is intentional: a buggy/custom runner that
+ * ignores AbortSignal must not retain the global tick lock forever. The production runner owns a detached
+ * process group and force-kills it synchronously when this controller aborts. */
+async function runOneWithinTick(job, run, jobTimeoutMs, tickTimeoutMs, tickSignal, tickWatchdogSignal) {
+    const jobDeadline = new AbortController();
+    const signal = AbortSignal.any([tickSignal, jobDeadline.signal]);
+    let jobTimer;
+    let settleTimer;
+    let onTickAbort;
+    let jobTimedOut = false;
+    const boundary = new Promise((resolve) => {
+        let settled = false;
+        const finish = (outcome) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            resolve(outcome);
+        };
+        jobTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            const error = `timed out after ${jobTimeoutMs}ms`;
+            jobTimedOut = true;
+            jobDeadline.abort(new Error(error));
+            // Production runJobOnce force-kills its owned process group synchronously, then settles on close. Give
+            // that cleanup a short bounded window before starting the next due job; a runner that ignores both the
+            // signal and the hard race still cannot retain the tick forever.
+            settleTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+                finish({ result: { ok: false, error, output: "", timedOut: true } });
+            }, ABORT_SETTLE_MS);
+        }, jobTimeoutMs);
+        onTickAbort = () => {
+            const watchdog = tickWatchdogSignal.aborted;
+            const error = watchdog ? `tick watchdog timed out after ${tickTimeoutMs}ms` : "tick cancelled by caller";
+            finish({
+                result: {
+                    ok: false,
+                    error,
+                    output: "",
+                    ...(watchdog ? { timedOut: true } : { interrupted: true }),
+                },
+                stopTick: watchdog ? "watchdog" : "cancelled",
+            });
+        };
+        tickSignal.addEventListener("abort", onTickAbort, { once: true });
+        if (tickSignal.aborted)
+            onTickAbort();
+    });
+    const execution = Promise.resolve()
+        .then(() => run(job, { timeoutMs: jobTimeoutMs, signal }))
+        .then((result) => jobTimedOut && !tickSignal.aborted
+        ? { result: { ...result, ok: false, error: `timed out after ${jobTimeoutMs}ms`, timedOut: true, interrupted: undefined } }
+        : { result }, (error) => jobTimedOut && !tickSignal.aborted
+        ? { result: { ok: false, error: `timed out after ${jobTimeoutMs}ms`, output: "", timedOut: true } }
+        : { result: safeRunFailure(error) });
+    const outcome = await Promise.race([execution, boundary]);
+    if (jobTimer)
+        clearTimeout(jobTimer);
+    if (settleTimer)
+        clearTimeout(settleTimer);
+    if (onTickAbort)
+        tickSignal.removeEventListener("abort", onTickAbort);
+    return outcome;
+}
+/** Await auxiliary work without allowing a non-cooperative delivery adapter to outlive the tick lock. */
+async function completesBeforeTick(work, tickSignal) {
+    const completed = Promise.resolve(work).then(() => true, () => true);
+    if (tickSignal.aborted) {
+        void completed;
+        return false;
+    }
+    let onAbort;
+    const aborted = new Promise((resolve) => {
+        onAbort = () => resolve(false);
+        tickSignal.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
+        if (tickSignal.aborted)
+            onAbort();
+    });
+    const result = await Promise.race([completed, aborted]);
+    if (onAbort)
+        tickSignal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
+    return result;
 }
 /** One scheduler tick: run every due job (sequentially), recording each outcome. Lock-guarded so an
  *  overlapping tick (launchd fires every 60s; a job may run longer) skips instead of double-firing.
  *  `run` is injectable for tests. Returns the job ids that ran. */
-export async function runTick(nowMs, run = runJobOnce) {
+export async function runTick(nowMs, run = runJobOnce, options = {}) {
     mkdirSync(cronDir(), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
     try {
         chmodSync(cronDir(), 0o700);
     }
     catch { /* best effort */ }
     const lock = lockPath();
-    const token = `${process.pid}:${randomUUID()}`;
+    const token = newTickLockToken();
     const takeover = takeoverPath();
     let acquired = false;
     const guardState = prepareTakeoverGuard(takeover, nowMs);
@@ -429,11 +725,11 @@ export async function runTick(nowMs, run = runJobOnce) {
         if (!observedFile)
             return { ran: [], skipped: "another tick is in progress" };
         const observed = parseTickLockSnapshot(observedFile);
-        const malformedStale = (snapshot) => nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= LOCK_STALE_MS;
-        if (observed ? !staleTickLock(observed, nowMs) : !malformedStale(observedFile)) {
+        const malformedStale = (snapshot) => nowMs - snapshot.mtimeMs >= MALFORMED_LOCK_POISON_MS;
+        if (observed ? !reclaimableTickLock(observed) : !malformedStale(observedFile)) {
             return { ran: [], skipped: "another tick is in progress" };
         }
-        const takeoverToken = `${process.pid}:${randomUUID()}`;
+        const takeoverToken = newTickLockToken();
         if (!writeExclusive(takeover, takeoverToken))
             return { ran: [], skipped: "another tick is taking over a stale lock" };
         try {
@@ -447,7 +743,7 @@ export async function runTick(nowMs, run = runJobOnce) {
                 }
                 const current = parseTickLockSnapshot(currentFile);
                 if (observed) {
-                    if (!sameTickLock(observed, current) || !current || !staleTickLock(current, nowMs)) {
+                    if (!sameTickLock(observed, current) || !current || !reclaimableTickLock(current)) {
                         return { ran: [], skipped: "the tick lock changed during stale takeover" };
                     }
                 }
@@ -468,18 +764,80 @@ export async function runTick(nowMs, run = runJobOnce) {
         chmodSync(lock, 0o600);
     }
     catch { /* best effort */ }
+    const tickTimeoutMs = cronTickTimeoutMs(options.tickTimeoutMs);
+    const jobTimeoutMs = Math.min(cronJobTimeoutMs(options.jobTimeoutMs), tickTimeoutMs);
+    const deliver = options.deliver ?? deliverResult;
+    const tickDeadline = new AbortController();
+    const tickTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+        tickDeadline.abort(new Error(`tick watchdog timed out after ${tickTimeoutMs}ms`));
+    }, tickTimeoutMs);
+    const tickSignal = options.signal ? AbortSignal.any([options.signal, tickDeadline.signal]) : tickDeadline.signal;
     try {
-        const due = dueJobs(loadJobs(), nowMs);
+        // A prior scheduler/manual process may have died after persisting `running`. Recovery atomically records
+        // terminal state + durable notifications before selecting due work. Live, non-expired owners are preserved.
+        let due;
+        try {
+            recoverInterruptedRuns(nowMs);
+            due = dueJobs(loadJobs(), nowMs);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            return { ran: [], stopped: `cron store unavailable: ${safeRunFailure(error).error}` };
+        }
+        // Every OS tick retries a bounded alert-first slice, including disabled/orphaned/one-shot jobs which may
+        // never run again. A transport failure remains queued with backoff instead of disappearing into a log.
+        const drained = await completesBeforeTick(deliverPendingNotifications(deliver, nowMs, tickSignal, { limit: 8 }), tickSignal);
+        if (!drained || tickSignal.aborted) {
+            return {
+                ran: [],
+                stopped: tickDeadline.signal.aborted
+                    ? `tick watchdog timed out after ${tickTimeoutMs}ms`
+                    : "tick cancelled by caller",
+            };
+        }
         const ran = [];
+        let stopped;
         for (const job of due) {
-            const r = await run(job);
-            recordRun(job.id, nowMs, r.ok ? "ok" : "error", r.error);
-            await deliverOutcome(job, r);
+            if (tickSignal.aborted) {
+                stopped = tickDeadline.signal.aborted
+                    ? `tick watchdog timed out after ${tickTimeoutMs}ms`
+                    : "tick cancelled by caller";
+                break;
+            }
+            const startedAt = Date.now();
+            let runningToken;
+            try {
+                // Re-check enabled/existence under the store mutex. A disable/remove racing the earlier due snapshot
+                // wins cleanly and is never overwritten by this tick.
+                runningToken = recordRunStart(job.id, startedAt, true);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                stopped = `could not persist running state for ${job.id}: ${safeRunFailure(error).error}`;
+                break; // fail closed: never launch a job whose running state was not durably recorded
+            }
+            if (!runningToken)
+                continue;
+            const bounded = await runOneWithinTick(job, run, jobTimeoutMs, tickTimeoutMs, tickSignal, tickDeadline.signal);
+            const r = bounded.result;
+            const finishedAt = Date.now();
+            const recorded = recordRun(job.id, finishedAt, terminalStatus(r), r.error, finishedAt - startedAt, runningToken, r);
             ran.push(job.id);
+            // Even the total watchdog/caller cancellation must produce the promised visible failure alert. Give
+            // that final delivery its own small hard boundary instead of skipping it or extending the tick forever.
+            const deliverySignal = tickSignal.aborted ? AbortSignal.timeout(FINAL_DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_MS) : tickSignal;
+            const delivered = !recorded
+                ? true // a newer attempt/removal owns state now; do not send this stale attempt's outcome
+                : await completesBeforeTick(deliverPendingNotifications(deliver, finishedAt, deliverySignal, { limit: 8, jobId: job.id }), deliverySignal);
+            if (bounded.stopTick || !delivered || tickSignal.aborted) {
+                stopped = tickDeadline.signal.aborted
+                    ? `tick watchdog timed out after ${tickTimeoutMs}ms`
+                    : "tick cancelled by caller";
+                break;
+            }
         }
-        return { ran };
+        return { ran, ...(stopped ? { stopped } : {}) };
     }
     finally {
+        clearTimeout(tickTimer);
         // Remove only the lock instance we created; never unlink a successor after a stale-lock takeover.
         releasePrimaryTickLock(lock, takeover, token);
     }