@namzu/sdk 46.0.0 → 48.1.0

package/src/peers/dir.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/**
+ * The private per-user runtime directory peer sockets and the live-session
+ * registry live in.
+ *
+ * Boundary = the OS user (design: cross-session messaging §1.1). Any process
+ * of the same user can already read the user's files, so the directory only
+ * has to keep OTHER users and the network out, and every candidate is
+ * checked the same way: created 0700, refused if it turns out to be a
+ * symlink, and — on POSIX — verified by `lstat` to really be owned by this
+ * uid and to carry no group/other permission.
+ *
+ * The SDK cannot depend on the CLI's `ensurePrivateStateDirectory`
+ * (`packages/cli/src/integrations/state/private-directory.ts`, which also
+ * tightens a Windows ACL); {@link hardenPeerRuntimeDir} is the small subset
+ * of that contract this module needs, reimplemented here so the dependency
+ * direction (`sdk` never imports `cli`) holds. A caller with its own
+ * directory-hardening policy may supply `hardenDirectory` instead.
+ *
+ * @experimental
+ */
+
+import { chmodSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+
+export class PeerDirectoryError extends Error {
+	override readonly name = 'PeerDirectoryError'
+}
+
+const PRIVATE_DIR_MODE = 0o700
+
+/**
+ * Session ids are UUIDv7 (`generateSessionId`, `utils/id.ts`): 36 characters.
+ * `.sock` is the longest suffix {@link peerSocketFileName} ever appends, so
+ * this is the longest socket filename the peers module creates — the figure
+ * {@link resolvePeerRuntimeDir} subtracts from the platform's
+ * `sockaddr_un.sun_path` limit before choosing a runtime directory.
+ */
+export const LONGEST_PEER_SOCKET_FILE_NAME_LENGTH = 36 + '.sock'.length
+
+/** The socket filename for one session, placed directly inside the runtime directory. */
+export function peerSocketFileName(sessionId: string): string {
+	return `${sessionId}.sock`
+}
+
+const DARWIN_SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 104
+/** Linux, and every other POSIX platform this runs on. */
+const DEFAULT_SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108
+
+function platformSocketPathLimit(platform: NodeJS.Platform): number {
+	return platform === 'darwin' ? DARWIN_SUN_PATH_LIMIT : DEFAULT_SUN_PATH_LIMIT
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a socket file directly inside `dir` fits the platform's
+ * `sockaddr_un.sun_path`. Windows named pipes live in a virtual namespace,
+ * not the filesystem, so no directory ever fails this check there.
+ */
+function fitsSocketPath(dir: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform): boolean {
+	if (platform === 'win32') return true
+	// +1 for the path separator joining `dir` to the socket filename.
+	return dir.length + 1 + LONGEST_PEER_SOCKET_FILE_NAME_LENGTH <= platformSocketPathLimit(platform)
+}
+
+/** Harden one directory in place; see {@link hardenPeerRuntimeDir}. Injectable for tests. */
+export type HardenPeerDirectory = (path: string, uid: number | undefined) => void
+
+/**
+ * Create (or re-verify) a private directory for peer sockets and registry
+ * records.
+ *
+ * Existing directories are tightened (`chmod`) on POSIX, then re-checked by
+ * `lstat` — tightening a directory this uid does not own would fail, which is
+ * exactly the outcome wanted, so the check afterward is the real gate. Skips
+ * the POSIX-only steps on win32, where `chmod` only toggles the read-only
+ * attribute and there is no uid to compare (`process.getuid` does not exist).
+ */
+export function hardenPeerRuntimeDir(path: string, uid: number | undefined): void {
+	mkdirSync(path, { recursive: true, mode: PRIVATE_DIR_MODE })
+	const created = lstatSync(path)
+	if (created.isSymbolicLink()) {
+		throw new PeerDirectoryError(`Refusing peer runtime path ${path}: it is a symbolic link.`)
+	}
+	if (!created.isDirectory()) {
+		throw new PeerDirectoryError(`Refusing peer runtime path ${path}: it is not a directory.`)
+	}
+	if (process.platform === 'win32') return
+	chmodSync(path, PRIVATE_DIR_MODE)
+	const entry = lstatSync(path)
+	if (uid !== undefined && entry.uid !== uid) {
+		throw new PeerDirectoryError(
+			`Refusing peer runtime path ${path}: it belongs to uid ${entry.uid}, not ${uid}.`,
+		)
+	}
+	if ((entry.mode & 0o777) !== PRIVATE_DIR_MODE) {
+		throw new PeerDirectoryError(
+			`Refusing peer runtime path ${path}: mode ${(entry.mode & 0o777).toString(8)} is not 0700.`,
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+export interface ResolvePeerRuntimeDirOptions {
+	readonly env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv
+	readonly namzuHome: string
+	/** `undefined` models a platform with no uid (win32; `process.getuid` does not exist there). */
+	readonly uid: number | undefined
+	/** Default `process.platform`; override for tests. */
+	readonly platform?: NodeJS.Platform
+	/** Default `os.tmpdir()`; override for tests, matching `TempRootOptions.tmpdir` in `session/paths.ts`. */
+	readonly tmpDir?: string
+	/** Overrides {@link hardenPeerRuntimeDir}; primarily for tests that need to fabricate a failure. */
+	readonly hardenDirectory?: HardenPeerDirectory
+}
+
+export interface PeerRuntimeDir {
+	/** The directory sockets are created in. */
+	readonly path: string
+	/** `<path>/sessions`, holding one registry record per live session. */
+	readonly sessionsDir: string
+}
+
+function peerRuntimeDirCandidates(options: ResolvePeerRuntimeDirOptions): readonly string[] {
+	const candidates: string[] = []
+	if (options.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR) candidates.push(join(options.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, 'namzu'))
+	candidates.push(join(options.namzuHome, 'run'))
+	candidates.push(join(options.tmpDir ?? tmpdir(), `namzu-${options.uid ?? 'user'}`))
+	return candidates
+}
+
+/**
+ * Choose and harden the per-session peer runtime directory.
+ *
+ * Candidates, in order: `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/namzu`, `$NAMZU_HOME/run`,
+ * `$TMPDIR/namzu-<uid>`. Every candidate whose resulting socket paths fit
+ * this platform's `sockaddr_un` limit is a length-eligible candidate; among
+ * those, the first that can actually be created and hardened 0700 (see
+ * {@link hardenPeerRuntimeDir}), along with its `sessions/` subdirectory, is
+ * the one used.
+ *
+ * Fitting the length budget and being hardenable are different failure
+ * modes, so they get different handling. A candidate that is too long for
+ * this platform's socket path is never even attempted — trying it would
+ * only fail later, at `listen()`, with a less useful error. A candidate
+ * that DOES fit but cannot be hardened (owned by another uid, a symlink, a
+ * permission this process cannot chmod away) is skipped in favour of the
+ * next length-eligible candidate rather than failing the whole call: a
+ * hostile or merely misconfigured `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` should not deny peer
+ * messaging to a session that could perfectly well fall back to
+ * `$NAMZU_HOME/run`. Only when every length-eligible candidate has failed to
+ * harden does this throw, naming each one and why.
+ */
+export function resolvePeerRuntimeDir(options: ResolvePeerRuntimeDirOptions): PeerRuntimeDir {
+	const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform
+	const harden = options.hardenDirectory ?? hardenPeerRuntimeDir
+	const candidates = peerRuntimeDirCandidates(options)
+	const fitting = candidates.filter((candidate) => fitsSocketPath(candidate, platform))
+	if (fitting.length === 0) {
+		throw new PeerDirectoryError(
+			`No candidate peer runtime directory fits this platform's socket path limit (${platformSocketPathLimit(platform)} bytes): ${candidates.join(', ')}`,
+		)
+	}
+	const failures: string[] = []
+	for (const candidate of fitting) {
+		try {
+			harden(candidate, options.uid)
+			const sessionsDir = join(candidate, 'sessions')
+			harden(sessionsDir, options.uid)
+			return { path: candidate, sessionsDir }
+		} catch (error) {
+			failures.push(`${candidate}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`)
+		}
+	}
+	throw new PeerDirectoryError(
+		`No candidate peer runtime directory could be hardened:\n${failures.join('\n')}`,
+	)
+}