@n8n/utils 1.46.1 → 1.48.0

package/dist/assert.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"assert.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/assert.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Asserts given condition\n */\nexport function assert(condition: unknown, message?: string): asserts condition {\n\tif (!condition) {\n\t\t// eslint-disable-next-line n8n-local-rules/no-plain-errors\n\t\tthrow new Error(message ?? 'Assertion failed');\n\t}\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAGA,SAAgB,OAAO,WAAoB,SAAqC;CAC/E,IAAI,CAAC,WAEJ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAE/C"}
+{"version":3,"file":"assert.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/assert.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Asserts given condition\n */\nexport function assert(condition: unknown, message?: string): asserts condition {\n\tif (!condition) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(message ?? 'Assertion failed');\n\t}\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAGA,SAAgB,OAAO,WAAoB,SAAqC;CAC/E,IAAI,CAAC,WACJ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAE/C"}

package/dist/assert.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"assert.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/assert.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Asserts given condition\n */\nexport function assert(condition: unknown, message?: string): asserts condition {\n\tif (!condition) {\n\t\t// eslint-disable-next-line n8n-local-rules/no-plain-errors\n\t\tthrow new Error(message ?? 'Assertion failed');\n\t}\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAGA,SAAgB,OAAO,WAAoB,SAAqC;CAC/E,IAAI,CAAC,WAEJ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAE/C"}
+{"version":3,"file":"assert.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/assert.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Asserts given condition\n */\nexport function assert(condition: unknown, message?: string): asserts condition {\n\tif (!condition) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(message ?? 'Assertion failed');\n\t}\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAGA,SAAgB,OAAO,WAAoB,SAAqC;CAC/E,IAAI,CAAC,WACJ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAE/C"}

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+//#region src/errors/get-error-message.ts
+/** Returns the message of `error`, or its string form if it is not an `Error`. */
+function getErrorMessage(error) {
+	return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.getErrorMessage = getErrorMessage;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=get-error-message.cjs.map

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"get-error-message.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/errors/get-error-message.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Returns the message of `error`, or its string form if it is not an `Error`. */\nexport function getErrorMessage(error: unknown): string {\n\treturn error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AACA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,OAAwB;CACvD,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAC7D"}

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/errors/get-error-message.d.ts
+declare function getErrorMessage(error: unknown): string;
+//#endregion
+export { getErrorMessage };
+//# sourceMappingURL=get-error-message.d.cts.map

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/errors/get-error-message.d.ts
+declare function getErrorMessage(error: unknown): string;
+//#endregion
+export { getErrorMessage };
+//# sourceMappingURL=get-error-message.d.mts.map

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+//#region src/errors/get-error-message.ts
+/** Returns the message of `error`, or its string form if it is not an `Error`. */
+function getErrorMessage(error) {
+	return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { getErrorMessage };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=get-error-message.mjs.map

package/dist/errors/get-error-message.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"get-error-message.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/errors/get-error-message.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Returns the message of `error`, or its string form if it is not an `Error`. */\nexport function getErrorMessage(error: unknown): string {\n\treturn error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AACA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,OAAwB;CACvD,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAC7D"}

package/dist/is-unknown-array.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+//#region src/is-unknown-array.ts
+function isUnknownArray(value) {
+	return Array.isArray(value);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.isUnknownArray = isUnknownArray;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=is-unknown-array.cjs.map

package/dist/is-unknown-array.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"is-unknown-array.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/is-unknown-array.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// `Array.isArray` narrows an `unknown` to `any[]`; this keeps the elements\n// opaque so downstream checks have to narrow them explicitly.\nexport function isUnknownArray(value: unknown): value is readonly unknown[] {\n\treturn Array.isArray(value);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AAEA,SAAgB,eAAe,OAA6C;CAC3E,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC3B"}

package/dist/is-unknown-array.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/is-unknown-array.d.ts
+declare function isUnknownArray(value: unknown): value is readonly unknown[];
+//#endregion
+export { isUnknownArray };
+//# sourceMappingURL=is-unknown-array.d.cts.map

package/dist/is-unknown-array.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/is-unknown-array.d.ts
+declare function isUnknownArray(value: unknown): value is readonly unknown[];
+//#endregion
+export { isUnknownArray };
+//# sourceMappingURL=is-unknown-array.d.mts.map

package/dist/is-unknown-array.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+//#region src/is-unknown-array.ts
+function isUnknownArray(value) {
+	return Array.isArray(value);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { isUnknownArray };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=is-unknown-array.mjs.map

package/dist/is-unknown-array.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"is-unknown-array.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/is-unknown-array.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// `Array.isArray` narrows an `unknown` to `any[]`; this keeps the elements\n// opaque so downstream checks have to narrow them explicitly.\nexport function isUnknownArray(value: unknown): value is readonly unknown[] {\n\treturn Array.isArray(value);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAEA,SAAgB,eAAe,OAA6C;CAC3E,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC3B"}

package/dist/redaction/redact-text.cjs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 const require_redaction_pii_patterns = require("./pii-patterns.cjs");
+const require_redaction_sensitive_key = require("./sensitive-key.cjs");
 //#region src/redaction/redact-text.ts
 const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = "[REDACTED]";
 /**
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ function redactText(input, opts = {}) {
 		secrets: opts.secrets ?? true,
 		detect: opts.detect ?? []
 	}, opts.piiPatterns);
-	const ordered = opts.preserveUrlStructure ? [...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === "url"), ...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== "url")] : patterns;
+	const ordered = [...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === "url"), ...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== "url")];
 	const matches = [];
 	let text = input;
 	for (const pattern of ordered) text = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {
@@ -82,7 +83,6 @@ function findMatchRanges(input, opts = {}) {
 	return ranges;
 }
 const MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;
-const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = /(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[._-])token$)/i;
 /**
 * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value
 * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ function redactDeep(value, opts = {}, depth = 0) {
 	return redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);
 }
 function redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth, key) {
-	if (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) return {
+	if (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && require_redaction_sensitive_key.isSensitiveKey(key)) return {
 		value: opts.placeholder ?? "[REDACTED]",
 		matches: [{ category: "secret" }]
 	};

package/dist/redaction/redact-text.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"redact-text.cjs","names":["resolvePatterns"],"sources":["../../src/redaction/redact-text.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { PiiDetectionType, PiiPatternTable, RedactionCategory } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { resolvePatterns } from './pii-patterns';\n\nexport const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = '[REDACTED]';\n\nexport interface RedactionOptions {\n\t/** Scan for credential/secret patterns. Defaults to `true`. */\n\tsecrets?: boolean;\n\t/** PII categories to scan for. Defaults to none. */\n\tdetect?: readonly PiiDetectionType[];\n\t/** Replacement text for a match. Defaults to `[REDACTED]`. */\n\tplaceholder?: string;\n\t/** For `url` matches, keep origin + path + query names and redact the\n\t *  value-bearing parts: query values, token-like path segments (webhook\n\t *  secrets), userinfo, fragment. Off by default so guardrail behavior is\n\t *  unchanged; telemetry/trace scrubbing opts in. */\n\tpreserveUrlStructure?: boolean;\n\t/** Replace values under secret-shaped object keys. */\n\tredactSensitiveKeys?: boolean;\n\t/**\n\t * Detection table to resolve PII categories against. Defaults to the\n\t * browser-safe {@link PII_PATTERNS}; `@n8n/agents` passes a table whose\n\t * `crypto-wallet` entry carries the Node-only Base58Check validator.\n\t */\n\tpiiPatterns?: PiiPatternTable;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n\t/** The input with every detected match replaced by the placeholder. */\n\ttext: string;\n\t/** One entry per replaced match (category only — never the value). */\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact secret/PII patterns from a complete string. Pure and idempotent —\n * already-redacted placeholders are left untouched by the underlying patterns.\n */\nexport function redactText(input: string, opts: RedactionOptions = {}): RedactionResult {\n\tconst placeholder = opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER;\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\t// In preserve mode the url pass runs FIRST: it rewrites URLs with a URL-safe\n\t// placeholder before other patterns can plant one containing `]` mid-URL —\n\t// `]` stops the url regex, which would hide the URL's tail (and any secrets\n\t// in it) from this pass entirely.\n\tconst ordered = opts.preserveUrlStructure\n\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === 'url'),\n\t\t\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== 'url'),\n\t\t\t]\n\t\t: patterns;\n\n\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\tlet text = input;\n\n\tfor (const pattern of ordered) {\n\t\t// `replace` with a global regex scans from 0 and resets lastIndex, so the\n\t\t// shared precompiled regex is safe to reuse across calls.\n\t\ttext = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match)) return match;\n\t\t\tif (opts.preserveUrlStructure && pattern.category === 'url') {\n\t\t\t\tconst rebuilt = stripUrlSensitiveParts(match, placeholder);\n\t\t\t\tif (rebuilt !== match) matches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\t\treturn rebuilt;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmatches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn { text, matches };\n}\n\n/** True for a path segment that looks like an embedded token — webhook-style\n *  services (Slack/Discord/Telegram, …) carry their secret as a path segment.\n *  Shape-based on purpose: per-service URL grammars don't scale across hundreds\n *  of integrations. Conservative: words, readable slugs and digit-only ids are\n *  kept. */\nfunction isTokenLikeSegment(segment: string): boolean {\n\tif (segment.length >= 16 && /[A-Za-z]/.test(segment) && /\\d/.test(segment)) return true;\n\t// Long single-class opaque blob (e.g. a letters-only token) — real words stay\n\t// shorter and readable slugs contain separators.\n\treturn segment.length >= 24 && /^[A-Za-z]+$/.test(segment);\n}\n\n/** Keep origin + path (token-like segments redacted) + query names; redact\n *  query values, drop userinfo and fragment. The replacement is URL-safe (no\n *  `]`, which the url regex stops at) so re-scrubbing is stable. Unparseable ⇒\n *  fully redacted. */\nfunction stripUrlSensitiveParts(match: string, placeholder: string): string {\n\tconst urlPlaceholder = placeholder.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_.~-]/g, '') || 'REDACTED';\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst url = new URL(match);\n\t\tconst pathname = url.pathname\n\t\t\t.split('/')\n\t\t\t.map((segment) => (isTokenLikeSegment(segment) ? urlPlaceholder : segment))\n\t\t\t.join('/');\n\t\tconst names = [...url.searchParams.keys()];\n\t\tconst query =\n\t\t\tnames.length > 0\n\t\t\t\t? `?${names.map((name) => `${encodeURIComponent(name)}=${urlPlaceholder}`).join('&')}`\n\t\t\t\t: '';\n\t\treturn `${url.origin}${pathname}${query}`;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the `[start, end)` ranges of every (validated) match in `input`. Used by\n * the streaming redactor to avoid emitting through the middle of a complete\n * match that contains internal whitespace (e.g. a spaced credit-card number).\n */\nexport function findMatchRanges(\n\tinput: string,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n): Array<[number, number]> {\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\n\tconst ranges: Array<[number, number]> = [];\n\tfor (const pattern of patterns) {\n\t\tconst { regex } = pattern;\n\t\t// Reset before the scan loop; reusing the shared global regex is safe\n\t\t// because usage is synchronous and the loop always runs to completion.\n\t\tregex.lastIndex = 0;\n\t\tlet match: RegExpExecArray | null;\n\t\twhile ((match = regex.exec(input)) !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (match[0].length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tregex.lastIndex++;\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match[0])) continue;\n\t\t\tranges.push([match.index, match.index + match[0].length]);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ranges;\n}\n\nconst MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;\nconst SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN =\n\t/(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[._-])token$)/i;\n\nexport interface DeepRedactionResult {\n\tvalue: unknown;\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value\n * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only\n * string values are scanned. Recursion is depth-bounded as a cheap guard\n * against pathological/cyclic structures.\n */\nexport function redactDeep(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n\tdepth = 0,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\treturn redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);\n}\n\nfunction redactDeepValue(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions,\n\tdepth: number,\n\tkey?: string,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\tif (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) {\n\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER, matches: [{ category: 'secret' }] };\n\t}\n\n\tif (typeof value === 'string') {\n\t\tconst { text, matches } = redactText(value, opts);\n\t\treturn { value: text, matches };\n\t}\n\n\t// Fail closed at the recursion bound: a subtree we refuse to walk is withheld\n\t// rather than passed through unscanned. 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+{"version":3,"file":"redact-text.cjs","names":["resolvePatterns","isSensitiveKey"],"sources":["../../src/redaction/redact-text.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { PiiDetectionType, PiiPatternTable, RedactionCategory } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { resolvePatterns } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { isSensitiveKey } from './sensitive-key';\n\nexport const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = '[REDACTED]';\n\nexport interface RedactionOptions {\n\t/** Scan for credential/secret patterns. Defaults to `true`. */\n\tsecrets?: boolean;\n\t/** PII categories to scan for. Defaults to none. */\n\tdetect?: readonly PiiDetectionType[];\n\t/** Replacement text for a match. Defaults to `[REDACTED]`. */\n\tplaceholder?: string;\n\t/** For `url` matches, keep origin + path + query names and redact the\n\t *  value-bearing parts: query values, token-like path segments (webhook\n\t *  secrets), userinfo, fragment. Off by default so guardrail behavior is\n\t *  unchanged; telemetry/trace scrubbing opts in. */\n\tpreserveUrlStructure?: boolean;\n\t/** Replace values under secret-shaped object keys. */\n\tredactSensitiveKeys?: boolean;\n\t/**\n\t * Detection table to resolve PII categories against. Defaults to the\n\t * browser-safe {@link PII_PATTERNS}; `@n8n/agents` passes a table whose\n\t * `crypto-wallet` entry carries the Node-only Base58Check validator.\n\t */\n\tpiiPatterns?: PiiPatternTable;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n\t/** The input with every detected match replaced by the placeholder. */\n\ttext: string;\n\t/** One entry per replaced match (category only — never the value). */\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact secret/PII patterns from a complete string. Pure and idempotent —\n * already-redacted placeholders are left untouched by the underlying patterns.\n */\nexport function redactText(input: string, opts: RedactionOptions = {}): RedactionResult {\n\tconst placeholder = opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER;\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\t// The url pass runs FIRST: it rewrites URLs (whole, or with a URL-safe\n\t// placeholder in preserve mode) before other patterns can plant one\n\t// containing `]` mid-URL — `]` stops the url regex, which would hide the\n\t// URL's tail (and any secrets in it) from this pass entirely.\n\tconst ordered = [\n\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === 'url'),\n\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== 'url'),\n\t];\n\n\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\tlet text = input;\n\n\tfor (const pattern of ordered) {\n\t\t// `replace` with a global regex scans from 0 and resets lastIndex, so the\n\t\t// shared precompiled regex is safe to reuse across calls.\n\t\ttext = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match)) return match;\n\t\t\tif (opts.preserveUrlStructure && pattern.category === 'url') {\n\t\t\t\tconst rebuilt = stripUrlSensitiveParts(match, placeholder);\n\t\t\t\tif (rebuilt !== match) matches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\t\treturn rebuilt;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmatches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn { text, matches };\n}\n\n/** True for a path segment that looks like an embedded token — webhook-style\n *  services (Slack/Discord/Telegram, …) carry their secret as a path segment.\n *  Shape-based on purpose: per-service URL grammars don't scale across hundreds\n *  of integrations. Conservative: words, readable slugs and digit-only ids are\n *  kept. */\nfunction isTokenLikeSegment(segment: string): boolean {\n\tif (segment.length >= 16 && /[A-Za-z]/.test(segment) && /\\d/.test(segment)) return true;\n\t// Long single-class opaque blob (e.g. a letters-only token) — real words stay\n\t// shorter and readable slugs contain separators.\n\treturn segment.length >= 24 && /^[A-Za-z]+$/.test(segment);\n}\n\n/** Keep origin + path (token-like segments redacted) + query names; redact\n *  query values, drop userinfo and fragment. The replacement is URL-safe (no\n *  `]`, which the url regex stops at) so re-scrubbing is stable. Unparseable ⇒\n *  fully redacted. */\nfunction stripUrlSensitiveParts(match: string, placeholder: string): string {\n\tconst urlPlaceholder = placeholder.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_.~-]/g, '') || 'REDACTED';\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst url = new URL(match);\n\t\tconst pathname = url.pathname\n\t\t\t.split('/')\n\t\t\t.map((segment) => (isTokenLikeSegment(segment) ? urlPlaceholder : segment))\n\t\t\t.join('/');\n\t\tconst names = [...url.searchParams.keys()];\n\t\tconst query =\n\t\t\tnames.length > 0\n\t\t\t\t? `?${names.map((name) => `${encodeURIComponent(name)}=${urlPlaceholder}`).join('&')}`\n\t\t\t\t: '';\n\t\treturn `${url.origin}${pathname}${query}`;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the `[start, end)` ranges of every (validated) match in `input`. Used by\n * the streaming redactor to avoid emitting through the middle of a complete\n * match that contains internal whitespace (e.g. a spaced credit-card number).\n */\nexport function findMatchRanges(\n\tinput: string,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n): Array<[number, number]> {\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\n\tconst ranges: Array<[number, number]> = [];\n\tfor (const pattern of patterns) {\n\t\tconst { regex } = pattern;\n\t\t// Reset before the scan loop; reusing the shared global regex is safe\n\t\t// because usage is synchronous and the loop always runs to completion.\n\t\tregex.lastIndex = 0;\n\t\tlet match: RegExpExecArray | null;\n\t\twhile ((match = regex.exec(input)) !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (match[0].length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tregex.lastIndex++;\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match[0])) continue;\n\t\t\tranges.push([match.index, match.index + match[0].length]);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ranges;\n}\n\nconst MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;\n\nexport interface DeepRedactionResult {\n\tvalue: unknown;\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value\n * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only\n * string values are scanned. Recursion is depth-bounded as a cheap guard\n * against pathological/cyclic structures.\n */\nexport function redactDeep(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n\tdepth = 0,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\treturn redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);\n}\n\nfunction redactDeepValue(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions,\n\tdepth: number,\n\tkey?: string,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\tif (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && isSensitiveKey(key)) {\n\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER, matches: [{ category: 'secret' }] };\n\t}\n\n\tif (typeof value === 'string') {\n\t\tconst { text, matches } = redactText(value, opts);\n\t\treturn { value: text, matches };\n\t}\n\n\t// Fail closed at the recursion bound: a subtree we refuse to walk is withheld\n\t// rather than passed through unscanned. Real payloads don't nest this deep,\n\t// so the only things reaching here are pathological or cyclic.\n\tif (depth >= MAX_DEEP_DEPTH) {\n\t\tif (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n\t\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? 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package/dist/redaction/redact-text.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { resolvePatterns } from "./pii-patterns.mjs";
+import { isSensitiveKey } from "./sensitive-key.mjs";
 //#region src/redaction/redact-text.ts
 const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = "[REDACTED]";
 /**
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ function redactText(input, opts = {}) {
 		secrets: opts.secrets ?? true,
 		detect: opts.detect ?? []
 	}, opts.piiPatterns);
-	const ordered = opts.preserveUrlStructure ? [...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === "url"), ...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== "url")] : patterns;
+	const ordered = [...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === "url"), ...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== "url")];
 	const matches = [];
 	let text = input;
 	for (const pattern of ordered) text = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {
@@ -81,7 +82,6 @@ function findMatchRanges(input, opts = {}) {
 	return ranges;
 }
 const MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;
-const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = /(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[._-])token$)/i;
 /**
 * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value
 * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ function redactDeep(value, opts = {}, depth = 0) {
 	return redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);
 }
 function redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth, key) {
-	if (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) return {
+	if (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && isSensitiveKey(key)) return {
 		value: opts.placeholder ?? "[REDACTED]",
 		matches: [{ category: "secret" }]
 	};

package/dist/redaction/redact-text.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"redact-text.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/redact-text.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { PiiDetectionType, PiiPatternTable, RedactionCategory } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { resolvePatterns } from './pii-patterns';\n\nexport const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = '[REDACTED]';\n\nexport interface RedactionOptions {\n\t/** Scan for credential/secret patterns. Defaults to `true`. */\n\tsecrets?: boolean;\n\t/** PII categories to scan for. Defaults to none. */\n\tdetect?: readonly PiiDetectionType[];\n\t/** Replacement text for a match. Defaults to `[REDACTED]`. */\n\tplaceholder?: string;\n\t/** For `url` matches, keep origin + path + query names and redact the\n\t *  value-bearing parts: query values, token-like path segments (webhook\n\t *  secrets), userinfo, fragment. Off by default so guardrail behavior is\n\t *  unchanged; telemetry/trace scrubbing opts in. */\n\tpreserveUrlStructure?: boolean;\n\t/** Replace values under secret-shaped object keys. */\n\tredactSensitiveKeys?: boolean;\n\t/**\n\t * Detection table to resolve PII categories against. Defaults to the\n\t * browser-safe {@link PII_PATTERNS}; `@n8n/agents` passes a table whose\n\t * `crypto-wallet` entry carries the Node-only Base58Check validator.\n\t */\n\tpiiPatterns?: PiiPatternTable;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n\t/** The input with every detected match replaced by the placeholder. */\n\ttext: string;\n\t/** One entry per replaced match (category only — never the value). */\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact secret/PII patterns from a complete string. Pure and idempotent —\n * already-redacted placeholders are left untouched by the underlying patterns.\n */\nexport function redactText(input: string, opts: RedactionOptions = {}): RedactionResult {\n\tconst placeholder = opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER;\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\t// In preserve mode the url pass runs FIRST: it rewrites URLs with a URL-safe\n\t// placeholder before other patterns can plant one containing `]` mid-URL —\n\t// `]` stops the url regex, which would hide the URL's tail (and any secrets\n\t// in it) from this pass entirely.\n\tconst ordered = opts.preserveUrlStructure\n\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === 'url'),\n\t\t\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== 'url'),\n\t\t\t]\n\t\t: patterns;\n\n\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\tlet text = input;\n\n\tfor (const pattern of ordered) {\n\t\t// `replace` with a global regex scans from 0 and resets lastIndex, so the\n\t\t// shared precompiled regex is safe to reuse across calls.\n\t\ttext = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match)) return match;\n\t\t\tif (opts.preserveUrlStructure && pattern.category === 'url') {\n\t\t\t\tconst rebuilt = stripUrlSensitiveParts(match, placeholder);\n\t\t\t\tif (rebuilt !== match) matches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\t\treturn rebuilt;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmatches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn { text, matches };\n}\n\n/** True for a path segment that looks like an embedded token — webhook-style\n *  services (Slack/Discord/Telegram, …) carry their secret as a path segment.\n *  Shape-based on purpose: per-service URL grammars don't scale across hundreds\n *  of integrations. Conservative: words, readable slugs and digit-only ids are\n *  kept. */\nfunction isTokenLikeSegment(segment: string): boolean {\n\tif (segment.length >= 16 && /[A-Za-z]/.test(segment) && /\\d/.test(segment)) return true;\n\t// Long single-class opaque blob (e.g. a letters-only token) — real words stay\n\t// shorter and readable slugs contain separators.\n\treturn segment.length >= 24 && /^[A-Za-z]+$/.test(segment);\n}\n\n/** Keep origin + path (token-like segments redacted) + query names; redact\n *  query values, drop userinfo and fragment. The replacement is URL-safe (no\n *  `]`, which the url regex stops at) so re-scrubbing is stable. Unparseable ⇒\n *  fully redacted. */\nfunction stripUrlSensitiveParts(match: string, placeholder: string): string {\n\tconst urlPlaceholder = placeholder.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_.~-]/g, '') || 'REDACTED';\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst url = new URL(match);\n\t\tconst pathname = url.pathname\n\t\t\t.split('/')\n\t\t\t.map((segment) => (isTokenLikeSegment(segment) ? urlPlaceholder : segment))\n\t\t\t.join('/');\n\t\tconst names = [...url.searchParams.keys()];\n\t\tconst query =\n\t\t\tnames.length > 0\n\t\t\t\t? `?${names.map((name) => `${encodeURIComponent(name)}=${urlPlaceholder}`).join('&')}`\n\t\t\t\t: '';\n\t\treturn `${url.origin}${pathname}${query}`;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the `[start, end)` ranges of every (validated) match in `input`. Used by\n * the streaming redactor to avoid emitting through the middle of a complete\n * match that contains internal whitespace (e.g. a spaced credit-card number).\n */\nexport function findMatchRanges(\n\tinput: string,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n): Array<[number, number]> {\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\n\tconst ranges: Array<[number, number]> = [];\n\tfor (const pattern of patterns) {\n\t\tconst { regex } = pattern;\n\t\t// Reset before the scan loop; reusing the shared global regex is safe\n\t\t// because usage is synchronous and the loop always runs to completion.\n\t\tregex.lastIndex = 0;\n\t\tlet match: RegExpExecArray | null;\n\t\twhile ((match = regex.exec(input)) !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (match[0].length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tregex.lastIndex++;\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match[0])) continue;\n\t\t\tranges.push([match.index, match.index + match[0].length]);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ranges;\n}\n\nconst MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;\nconst SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN =\n\t/(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[._-])token$)/i;\n\nexport interface DeepRedactionResult {\n\tvalue: unknown;\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value\n * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only\n * string values are scanned. Recursion is depth-bounded as a cheap guard\n * against pathological/cyclic structures.\n */\nexport function redactDeep(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n\tdepth = 0,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\treturn redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);\n}\n\nfunction redactDeepValue(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions,\n\tdepth: number,\n\tkey?: string,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\tif (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) {\n\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER, matches: [{ category: 'secret' }] };\n\t}\n\n\tif (typeof value === 'string') {\n\t\tconst { text, matches } = redactText(value, opts);\n\t\treturn { value: text, matches };\n\t}\n\n\t// Fail closed at the recursion bound: a subtree we refuse to walk is withheld\n\t// rather than passed through unscanned. 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+{"version":3,"file":"redact-text.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/redact-text.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { PiiDetectionType, PiiPatternTable, RedactionCategory } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { resolvePatterns } from './pii-patterns';\nimport { isSensitiveKey } from './sensitive-key';\n\nexport const DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER = '[REDACTED]';\n\nexport interface RedactionOptions {\n\t/** Scan for credential/secret patterns. Defaults to `true`. */\n\tsecrets?: boolean;\n\t/** PII categories to scan for. Defaults to none. */\n\tdetect?: readonly PiiDetectionType[];\n\t/** Replacement text for a match. Defaults to `[REDACTED]`. */\n\tplaceholder?: string;\n\t/** For `url` matches, keep origin + path + query names and redact the\n\t *  value-bearing parts: query values, token-like path segments (webhook\n\t *  secrets), userinfo, fragment. Off by default so guardrail behavior is\n\t *  unchanged; telemetry/trace scrubbing opts in. */\n\tpreserveUrlStructure?: boolean;\n\t/** Replace values under secret-shaped object keys. */\n\tredactSensitiveKeys?: boolean;\n\t/**\n\t * Detection table to resolve PII categories against. Defaults to the\n\t * browser-safe {@link PII_PATTERNS}; `@n8n/agents` passes a table whose\n\t * `crypto-wallet` entry carries the Node-only Base58Check validator.\n\t */\n\tpiiPatterns?: PiiPatternTable;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n\t/** The input with every detected match replaced by the placeholder. */\n\ttext: string;\n\t/** One entry per replaced match (category only — never the value). */\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact secret/PII patterns from a complete string. Pure and idempotent —\n * already-redacted placeholders are left untouched by the underlying patterns.\n */\nexport function redactText(input: string, opts: RedactionOptions = {}): RedactionResult {\n\tconst placeholder = opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER;\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\t// The url pass runs FIRST: it rewrites URLs (whole, or with a URL-safe\n\t// placeholder in preserve mode) before other patterns can plant one\n\t// containing `]` mid-URL — `]` stops the url regex, which would hide the\n\t// URL's tail (and any secrets in it) from this pass entirely.\n\tconst ordered = [\n\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category === 'url'),\n\t\t...patterns.filter((pattern) => pattern.category !== 'url'),\n\t];\n\n\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\tlet text = input;\n\n\tfor (const pattern of ordered) {\n\t\t// `replace` with a global regex scans from 0 and resets lastIndex, so the\n\t\t// shared precompiled regex is safe to reuse across calls.\n\t\ttext = text.replace(pattern.regex, (match) => {\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match)) return match;\n\t\t\tif (opts.preserveUrlStructure && pattern.category === 'url') {\n\t\t\t\tconst rebuilt = stripUrlSensitiveParts(match, placeholder);\n\t\t\t\tif (rebuilt !== match) matches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\t\treturn rebuilt;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tmatches.push({ category: pattern.category });\n\t\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn { text, matches };\n}\n\n/** True for a path segment that looks like an embedded token — webhook-style\n *  services (Slack/Discord/Telegram, …) carry their secret as a path segment.\n *  Shape-based on purpose: per-service URL grammars don't scale across hundreds\n *  of integrations. Conservative: words, readable slugs and digit-only ids are\n *  kept. */\nfunction isTokenLikeSegment(segment: string): boolean {\n\tif (segment.length >= 16 && /[A-Za-z]/.test(segment) && /\\d/.test(segment)) return true;\n\t// Long single-class opaque blob (e.g. a letters-only token) — real words stay\n\t// shorter and readable slugs contain separators.\n\treturn segment.length >= 24 && /^[A-Za-z]+$/.test(segment);\n}\n\n/** Keep origin + path (token-like segments redacted) + query names; redact\n *  query values, drop userinfo and fragment. The replacement is URL-safe (no\n *  `]`, which the url regex stops at) so re-scrubbing is stable. Unparseable ⇒\n *  fully redacted. */\nfunction stripUrlSensitiveParts(match: string, placeholder: string): string {\n\tconst urlPlaceholder = placeholder.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_.~-]/g, '') || 'REDACTED';\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst url = new URL(match);\n\t\tconst pathname = url.pathname\n\t\t\t.split('/')\n\t\t\t.map((segment) => (isTokenLikeSegment(segment) ? urlPlaceholder : segment))\n\t\t\t.join('/');\n\t\tconst names = [...url.searchParams.keys()];\n\t\tconst query =\n\t\t\tnames.length > 0\n\t\t\t\t? `?${names.map((name) => `${encodeURIComponent(name)}=${urlPlaceholder}`).join('&')}`\n\t\t\t\t: '';\n\t\treturn `${url.origin}${pathname}${query}`;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn placeholder;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the `[start, end)` ranges of every (validated) match in `input`. Used by\n * the streaming redactor to avoid emitting through the middle of a complete\n * match that contains internal whitespace (e.g. a spaced credit-card number).\n */\nexport function findMatchRanges(\n\tinput: string,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n): Array<[number, number]> {\n\tconst patterns = resolvePatterns(\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tsecrets: opts.secrets ?? true,\n\t\t\tdetect: opts.detect ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\topts.piiPatterns,\n\t);\n\n\tconst ranges: Array<[number, number]> = [];\n\tfor (const pattern of patterns) {\n\t\tconst { regex } = pattern;\n\t\t// Reset before the scan loop; reusing the shared global regex is safe\n\t\t// because usage is synchronous and the loop always runs to completion.\n\t\tregex.lastIndex = 0;\n\t\tlet match: RegExpExecArray | null;\n\t\twhile ((match = regex.exec(input)) !== null) {\n\t\t\tif (match[0].length === 0) {\n\t\t\t\tregex.lastIndex++;\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.validate && !pattern.validate(match[0])) continue;\n\t\t\tranges.push([match.index, match.index + match[0].length]);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn ranges;\n}\n\nconst MAX_DEEP_DEPTH = 8;\n\nexport interface DeepRedactionResult {\n\tvalue: unknown;\n\tmatches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively redact string values inside an arbitrary JSON-like value\n * (tool results, structured payloads). Object keys are left intact; only\n * string values are scanned. Recursion is depth-bounded as a cheap guard\n * against pathological/cyclic structures.\n */\nexport function redactDeep(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions = {},\n\tdepth = 0,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\treturn redactDeepValue(value, opts, depth);\n}\n\nfunction redactDeepValue(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\topts: RedactionOptions,\n\tdepth: number,\n\tkey?: string,\n): DeepRedactionResult {\n\tif (opts.redactSensitiveKeys && key && isSensitiveKey(key)) {\n\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER, matches: [{ category: 'secret' }] };\n\t}\n\n\tif (typeof value === 'string') {\n\t\tconst { text, matches } = redactText(value, opts);\n\t\treturn { value: text, matches };\n\t}\n\n\t// Fail closed at the recursion bound: a subtree we refuse to walk is withheld\n\t// rather than passed through unscanned. Real payloads don't nest this deep,\n\t// so the only things reaching here are pathological or cyclic.\n\tif (depth >= MAX_DEEP_DEPTH) {\n\t\tif (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n\t\t\treturn { value: opts.placeholder ?? DEFAULT_PLACEHOLDER, matches: [{ category: 'secret' }] };\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { value, matches: [] };\n\t}\n\n\tif (Array.isArray(value)) {\n\t\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\t\tconst next = value.map((item) => {\n\t\t\tconst result = redactDeepValue(item, opts, depth + 1, key);\n\t\t\tmatches.push(...result.matches);\n\t\t\treturn result.value;\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn { value: next, matches };\n\t}\n\n\tif (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n\t\tconst matches: Array<{ category: RedactionCategory }> = [];\n\t\tconst next: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\t\tfor (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) {\n\t\t\tconst result = redactDeepValue(item, opts, depth + 1, key);\n\t\t\tmatches.push(...result.matches);\n\t\t\tnext[key] = result.value;\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { value: next, matches };\n\t}\n\n\treturn { value, matches: [] };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAIA,MAAa,sBAAsB;;;;;AAmCnC,SAAgB,WAAW,OAAe,OAAyB,CAAC,GAAoB;CACvF,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAA;CACzB,MAAM,WAAW,gBAChB;EACC,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW;EACzB,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;CACzB,GACA,KAAK,WACN;CAKA,MAAM,UAAU,CACf,GAAG,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,GAC1D,GAAG,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,CAC3D;CAEA,MAAM,UAAkD,CAAC;CACzD,IAAI,OAAO;CAEX,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,SAGrB,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,QAAQ,UAAU;EAC7C,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO;EACzD,IAAI,KAAK,wBAAwB,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;GAC5D,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,OAAO,WAAW;GACzD,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;GAClE,OAAO;EACR;EACA,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;EAC3C,OAAO;CACR,CAAC;CAGF,OAAO;EAAE;EAAM;CAAQ;AACxB;;;;;;AAOA,SAAS,mBAAmB,SAA0B;CACrD,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO;CAGnF,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,OAAO;AAC1D;;;;;AAMA,SAAS,uBAAuB,OAAe,aAA6B;CAC3E,MAAM,iBAAiB,YAAY,QAAQ,qBAAqB,EAAE,KAAK;CACvE,IAAI;EACH,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;EACzB,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,SACnB,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CACV,KAAK,YAAa,mBAAmB,OAAO,IAAI,iBAAiB,OAAQ,CAAC,CAC1E,KAAK,GAAG;EACV,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC;EACzC,MAAM,QACL,MAAM,SAAS,IACZ,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,mBAAmB,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,MACjF;EACJ,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,SAAS,WAAW;CACnC,QAAQ;EACP,OAAO;CACR;AACD;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,gBACf,OACA,OAAyB,CAAC,GACA;CAC1B,MAAM,WAAW,gBAChB;EACC,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW;EACzB,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;CACzB,GACA,KAAK,WACN;CAEA,MAAM,SAAkC,CAAC;CACzC,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;EAC/B,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU;EAGlB,MAAM,YAAY;EAClB,IAAI;EACJ,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM;GAC5C,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG;IAC1B,MAAM;IACN;GACD;GACA,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG;GACrD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;EACzD;CACD;CACA,OAAO;AACR;AAEA,MAAM,iBAAiB;;;;;;;AAavB,SAAgB,WACf,OACA,OAAyB,CAAC,GAC1B,QAAQ,GACc;CACtB,OAAO,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AAC1C;AAEA,SAAS,gBACR,OACA,MACA,OACA,KACsB;CACtB,IAAI,KAAK,uBAAuB,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG,GACxD,OAAO;EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,eAAA;EAAoC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;CAAE;CAG5F,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;EAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI;EAChD,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAM;EAAQ;CAC/B;CAKA,IAAI,SAAS,gBAAgB;EAC5B,IAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU,UACtC,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO,KAAK,eAAA;GAAoC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;EAAE;EAE5F,OAAO;GAAE;GAAO,SAAS,CAAC;EAAE;CAC7B;CAEA,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;EACzB,MAAM,UAAkD,CAAC;EAMzD,OAAO;GAAE,OALI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;IAChC,MAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;IACzD,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO;IAC9B,OAAO,OAAO;GACf,CACmB;GAAG;EAAQ;CAC/B;CAEA,IAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;EAChD,MAAM,UAAkD,CAAC;EACzD,MAAM,OAAgC,CAAC;EACvC,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;GAChD,MAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;GACzD,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO;GAC9B,KAAK,OAAO,OAAO;EACpB;EACA,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAM;EAAQ;CAC/B;CAEA,OAAO;EAAE;EAAO,SAAS,CAAC;CAAE;AAC7B"}

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+const require_scrub_secrets = require("../scrub-secrets.cjs");
+//#region src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.ts
+const QUOTED_URL_QUERY = /(["'])(https?:\/\/(?:(?!\1)[^\s?<>])+)(?:\?(?:\\.|(?!\1(?!\w))[^\s<>\\])*)?/gi;
+const BARE_URL_QUERY = /(https?:\/\/[^\s?<>]+)(?:\?[^\s<>]*)?/gi;
+function sanitizeErrorDetail(message, maxLength) {
+	return require_scrub_secrets.scrubSecretsInText(message).replace(QUOTED_URL_QUERY, "$1$2").replace(BARE_URL_QUERY, "$1").slice(0, maxLength);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.sanitizeErrorDetail = sanitizeErrorDetail;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize-error-detail.cjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sanitize-error-detail.cjs","names":["scrubSecretsInText"],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { scrubSecretsInText } from '../scrub-secrets';\n\n// A delimiter quote ends a quoted URL. An escaped quote stays inside the query.\n// An apostrophe inside a word also stays inside the query. A bare URL ends at\n// whitespace or an angle bracket. The optional query group matches URLs with and\n// without queries in one pass.\nconst QUOTED_URL_QUERY =\n\t/([\"'])(https?:\\/\\/(?:(?!\\1)[^\\s?<>])+)(?:\\?(?:\\\\.|(?!\\1(?!\\w))[^\\s<>\\\\])*)?/gi;\nconst BARE_URL_QUERY = /(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s?<>]+)(?:\\?[^\\s<>]*)?/gi;\n\nexport function sanitizeErrorDetail(message: string, maxLength: number): string {\n\treturn scrubSecretsInText(message)\n\t\t.replace(QUOTED_URL_QUERY, '$1$2')\n\t\t.replace(BARE_URL_QUERY, '$1')\n\t\t.slice(0, maxLength);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAMA,MAAM,mBACL;AACD,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAEvB,SAAgB,oBAAoB,SAAiB,WAA2B;CAC/E,OAAOA,sBAAAA,mBAAmB,OAAO,CAAC,CAChC,QAAQ,kBAAkB,MAAM,CAAC,CACjC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC,CAC7B,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS;AACrB"}

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.d.ts
+declare function sanitizeErrorDetail(message: string, maxLength: number): string;
+//#endregion
+export { sanitizeErrorDetail };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize-error-detail.d.cts.map

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.d.ts
+declare function sanitizeErrorDetail(message: string, maxLength: number): string;
+//#endregion
+export { sanitizeErrorDetail };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize-error-detail.d.mts.map

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { scrubSecretsInText } from "../scrub-secrets.mjs";
+//#region src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.ts
+const QUOTED_URL_QUERY = /(["'])(https?:\/\/(?:(?!\1)[^\s?<>])+)(?:\?(?:\\.|(?!\1(?!\w))[^\s<>\\])*)?/gi;
+const BARE_URL_QUERY = /(https?:\/\/[^\s?<>]+)(?:\?[^\s<>]*)?/gi;
+function sanitizeErrorDetail(message, maxLength) {
+	return scrubSecretsInText(message).replace(QUOTED_URL_QUERY, "$1$2").replace(BARE_URL_QUERY, "$1").slice(0, maxLength);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { sanitizeErrorDetail };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize-error-detail.mjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sanitize-error-detail.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sanitize-error-detail.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { scrubSecretsInText } from '../scrub-secrets';\n\n// A delimiter quote ends a quoted URL. An escaped quote stays inside the query.\n// An apostrophe inside a word also stays inside the query. A bare URL ends at\n// whitespace or an angle bracket. The optional query group matches URLs with and\n// without queries in one pass.\nconst QUOTED_URL_QUERY =\n\t/([\"'])(https?:\\/\\/(?:(?!\\1)[^\\s?<>])+)(?:\\?(?:\\\\.|(?!\\1(?!\\w))[^\\s<>\\\\])*)?/gi;\nconst BARE_URL_QUERY = /(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s?<>]+)(?:\\?[^\\s<>]*)?/gi;\n\nexport function sanitizeErrorDetail(message: string, maxLength: number): string {\n\treturn scrubSecretsInText(message)\n\t\t.replace(QUOTED_URL_QUERY, '$1$2')\n\t\t.replace(BARE_URL_QUERY, '$1')\n\t\t.slice(0, maxLength);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AAMA,MAAM,mBACL;AACD,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAEvB,SAAgB,oBAAoB,SAAiB,WAA2B;CAC/E,OAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO,CAAC,CAChC,QAAQ,kBAAkB,MAAM,CAAC,CACjC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC,CAC7B,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS;AACrB"}

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-headers.ts
+const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS = [
+	"authorization",
+	"proxy-authorization",
+	"x-authorization",
+	"cookie",
+	"set-cookie",
+	"x-api-key",
+	"api-key",
+	"apikey",
+	"x-auth-token",
+	"x-access-token",
+	"x-refresh-token",
+	"x-csrf-token",
+	"x-xsrf-token"
+];
+//#endregion
+exports.ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS = ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-headers.cjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sensitive-headers.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sensitive-headers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS: readonly string[] = [\n\t'authorization',\n\t'proxy-authorization',\n\t'x-authorization',\n\t'cookie',\n\t'set-cookie',\n\t'x-api-key',\n\t'api-key',\n\t'apikey',\n\t'x-auth-token',\n\t'x-access-token',\n\t'x-refresh-token',\n\t'x-csrf-token',\n\t'x-xsrf-token',\n];\n"],"mappings":";;AAAA,MAAa,2BAA8C;CAC1D;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACD"}

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-headers.d.ts
+declare const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS: readonly string[];
+//#endregion
+export { ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-headers.d.cts.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-headers.d.ts
+declare const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS: readonly string[];
+//#endregion
+export { ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-headers.d.mts.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-headers.ts
+const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS = [
+	"authorization",
+	"proxy-authorization",
+	"x-authorization",
+	"cookie",
+	"set-cookie",
+	"x-api-key",
+	"api-key",
+	"apikey",
+	"x-auth-token",
+	"x-access-token",
+	"x-refresh-token",
+	"x-csrf-token",
+	"x-xsrf-token"
+];
+//#endregion
+export { ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-headers.mjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-headers.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sensitive-headers.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sensitive-headers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export const ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_HEADERS: readonly string[] = [\n\t'authorization',\n\t'proxy-authorization',\n\t'x-authorization',\n\t'cookie',\n\t'set-cookie',\n\t'x-api-key',\n\t'api-key',\n\t'apikey',\n\t'x-auth-token',\n\t'x-access-token',\n\t'x-refresh-token',\n\t'x-csrf-token',\n\t'x-xsrf-token',\n];\n"],"mappings":";AAAA,MAAa,2BAA8C;CAC1D;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACD"}

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-key.ts
+const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = /(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|passwd|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[^a-z0-9])token$)/i;
+function isSensitiveKey(key) {
+	return SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN;
+exports.isSensitiveKey = isSensitiveKey;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-key.cjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sensitive-key.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sensitive-key.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// A bare `token` counts as a suffix after any separator (`bot_token`, `x.token`,\n// `auth:token`). It does not count as a prefix (`token_type`, `token_count`) or\n// inside a word (`mytoken`).\nexport const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN =\n\t/(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|passwd|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[^a-z0-9])token$)/i;\n\nexport function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean {\n\treturn SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AAGA,MAAa,wBACZ;AAED,SAAgB,eAAe,KAAsB;CACpD,OAAO,sBAAsB,KAAK,GAAG;AACtC"}

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-key.d.ts
+declare const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN: RegExp;
+declare function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean;
+//#endregion
+export { SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN, isSensitiveKey };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-key.d.cts.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-key.d.ts
+declare const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN: RegExp;
+declare function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean;
+//#endregion
+export { SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN, isSensitiveKey };
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-key.d.mts.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+//#region src/redaction/sensitive-key.ts
+const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = /(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|passwd|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[^a-z0-9])token$)/i;
+function isSensitiveKey(key) {
+	return SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN, isSensitiveKey };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=sensitive-key.mjs.map

package/dist/redaction/sensitive-key.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sensitive-key.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/redaction/sensitive-key.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// A bare `token` counts as a suffix after any separator (`bot_token`, `x.token`,\n// `auth:token`). It does not count as a prefix (`token_type`, `token_count`) or\n// inside a word (`mytoken`).\nexport const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN =\n\t/(api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|cookie|credentials?|password|passwd|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|(?:^|[^a-z0-9])token$)/i;\n\nexport function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean {\n\treturn SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.test(key);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAGA,MAAa,wBACZ;AAED,SAAgB,eAAe,KAAsB;CACpD,OAAO,sBAAsB,KAAK,GAAG;AACtC"}

package/dist/scrub-secrets.cjs

@@ -14,14 +14,17 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output
 * unreadable.
 */
-const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token";
+const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token";
+const QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX = "(?:[\\w.-]*[._-])?";
 const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS = [
 	/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
 	/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,
-	/\b(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}/gi,
+	/(?<=\bauthorization\s*[:=]\s*["']?)(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+(?:\\.|[^\s"',;\\])+/gi,
+	/\b(?:Bearer\s+[^\s"',;]{12,}|(?:Basic|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,})/gi,
 	/\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,
 	/\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,
 	/\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g,
+	/\bya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}\b/g,
 	/\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,
 	/\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
 	/\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,
@@ -30,9 +33,9 @@ const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS = [
 	/\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\b/g,
 	/\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
 	/(?<=:\/\/)[^\s:/@]+:[^\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,
-	new RegExp(`"(?:${SECRET_KEYS})"\\s*:\\s*"(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^"\\]]*)?\\]")(?:[^"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*"`, "gi"),
-	new RegExp(`'(?:${SECRET_KEYS})'\\s*:\\s*'(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^'\\]]*)?\\]')(?:[^'\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*'`, "gi"),
-	new RegExp(`(?<!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\b(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\s*[:=]\\s*(?!\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\b)\\S+`, "gi")
+	new RegExp(`(["'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\1\\s*:\\s*(["'])(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\]]*)?\\]\\2)(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*\\2`, "gi"),
+	new RegExp(`\\\\(["'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\\\1\\s*:\\s*\\\\(["'])(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\]]*)?\\]\\\\\\2)(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\\\\\(?:\\\\.|[^\\\\\\r\\n]))*\\\\\\2`, "gi"),
+	new RegExp(`(?<!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\b(?:[\\w.-]{0,128}[._-])?(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\s*[:=]\\s*(?!\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\b)(?:"(?:[^"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*"|'(?:[^'\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*'|\\S+)`, "gi")
 ];
 function scrubSecretsInText(input) {
 	let out = input;

package/dist/scrub-secrets.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"scrub-secrets.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/scrub-secrets.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replace common credential patterns in free-form text with `[REDACTED]`.\n *\n * Used before persisting or transmitting user-supplied text (telemetry\n * excerpts, eval report HTML, free-form feedback) where keys/tokens\n * accidentally pasted into prompts or command lines could otherwise leak\n * downstream.\n *\n * Conservative by design: matches well-known prefixed tokens, explicit\n * `key=value` pairs, and quoted JSON/JS-object fields with sensitive\n * names. We don't attempt to redact arbitrary long opaque strings — false\n * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output\n * unreadable.\n */\nexport const SECRET_KEYS =\n\t'password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token';\n\nexport const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n\t// PEM private-key blocks (RSA/EC/DSA/OpenSSH/PGP). Whole block, multiline.\n\t/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n\t// JWTs: `eyJ<header>.eyJ<payload>.<signature>` (both leading segments are\n\t// base64url of a `{\"` object, which makes this highly distinctive).\n\t/\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,\n\t// Authorization-header substrings: `Bearer <token>`, `Basic <token>`, `Token <token>`\n\t/\\b(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}/gi,\n\t// OpenAI / Anthropic API keys\n\t/\\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,\n\t// Stripe secret/restricted/publishable keys (`sk_live_…`, `rk_test_…`, …)\n\t/\\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,\n\t// Google API keys\n\t/\\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Slack tokens (xoxb, xoxp, xoxa, xoxr, xoxs, xoxo)\n\t/\\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n\t// GitHub tokens (ghp, ghs, gho, ghr, ghu)\n\t/\\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// GitHub fine-grained personal access tokens\n\t/\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,\n\t// AWS access key id\n\t/\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n\t// Telegram bot token (`<bot id>:<35-char secret>`, also inside `/bot…/` URLs)\n\t/\\b(?:bot)?\\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Discord bot token: three base64url segments, the first being the encoded\n\t// application id (so it starts with the encoding of a snowflake's leading digit).\n\t/\\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\\b/g,\n\t// Linear API keys (`lin_api_…`) and OAuth tokens (`lin_oauth_…`)\n\t/\\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// Credentials embedded in a URL: `scheme://user:password@` — redact the userinfo.\n\t/(?<=:\\/\\/)[^\\s:/@]+:[^\\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,\n\t// JSON-shaped `\"key\": \"value\"` — matches the quoted field as a whole.\n\t// Run before the loose pattern so nested objects like\n\t// `{\"credentials\": {\"apiKey\": \"...\"}}` don't have the outer key consume\n\t// the inner key on its way to a non-quoted (object) value. The value\n\t// body uses the unrolled JSON-string idiom `(?:[^\"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*`: the\n\t// negated class excludes the backslash so a backslash can only be consumed\n\t// by the `\\\\.` escape branch. Keep the two alternatives disjoint (don't\n\t// fold `\\\\` back into the negated class) — that keeps every run of\n\t// backslashes to a single, unambiguous parse, so matching stays fast on any\n\t// input. An escaped quote inside the value (`\"abc\\\"def\"`) still doesn't end\n\t// the match early, via the escape branch. The negative lookahead skips\n\t// values that are already a `[redacted]` / `[REDACTED]` / typed\n\t// `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` placeholder so this stays idempotent when\n\t// chained behind upstream object-walking redaction (langsmith trace\n\t// payloads, mcp-browser markers).\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`\"(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*\"(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\"\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\")(?:[^\"\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\"`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// JS-object-shaped `'key': 'value'`\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`'(?:${SECRET_KEYS})'\\\\s*:\\\\s*'(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^'\\\\]]*)?\\\\]')(?:[^'\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*'`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// Generic `password=...` / `api_key=...` / `secret=...` style assignments.\n\t// The negative lookbehind skips a keyword sitting at the `<type>` position of\n\t// an upstream `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` marker (e.g. mcp-browser output), so\n\t// the `secret:1]` tail isn't re-matched into a nested `[REDACTED:[REDACTED]`.\n\t// Checking only the `[REDACTED:` prefix suffices: inside a marker a keyword can\n\t// only start a `\\b` match right after that prefix — every other keyword-shaped\n\t// substring is preceded by `_` (snake_case type slug) or a digit, so no word\n\t// boundary opens there. The value lookahead skips values that are already a\n\t// redaction placeholder (bracketed, typed, or URL-safe bare form) — the same\n\t// idempotency convention as the quoted forms.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`(?<!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\\\b(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*(?!\\\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\\\b)\\\\S+`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n];\n\nexport function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string {\n\tlet out = input;\n\tfor (const pattern of SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tout = out.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcA,MAAa,cACZ;AAED,MAAa,wBAA2C;CAEvD;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAgBA,IAAI,OACH,OAAO,YAAY,uFACnB,IACD;CAEA,IAAI,OACH,OAAO,YAAY,uFACnB,IACD;CAWA,IAAI,OACH,uCAAuC,YAAY,oDACnD,IACD;AACD;AAEA,SAAgB,mBAAmB,OAAuB;CACzD,IAAI,MAAM;CACV,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,uBACrB,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;CAExC,OAAO;AACR"}
+{"version":3,"file":"scrub-secrets.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/scrub-secrets.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replace common credential patterns in free-form text with `[REDACTED]`.\n *\n * Used before persisting or transmitting user-supplied text (telemetry\n * excerpts, eval report HTML, free-form feedback) where keys/tokens\n * accidentally pasted into prompts or command lines could otherwise leak\n * downstream.\n *\n * Conservative by design: matches well-known prefixed tokens, explicit\n * `key=value` pairs, and quoted JSON/JS-object fields with sensitive\n * names. We don't attempt to redact arbitrary long opaque strings — false\n * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output\n * unreadable.\n */\nexport const SECRET_KEYS =\n\t'password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token';\n\n// `\\b` never fires inside a compound key (`webhook_secret`, `bot_token`)\n// because `_` is a word character, so key patterns also accept an optional\n// snake/kebab/dotted prefix (`slack.token`) before the secret word. The\n// quoted-field matchers can only start at a quote, so scanning the whole key\n// stays linear. The unanchored assignment matcher can start at every `\\b` of a\n// long hyphenated or dotted non-secret token, where an unbounded prefix\n// backtracks through every separator at every start position (quadratic) — so\n// that one is length-bounded, and a `_`-joined unquoted key with a longer\n// prefix is the accepted gap.\nconst QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX = '(?:[\\\\w.-]*[._-])?';\nconst BOUNDED_KEY_PREFIX = '(?:[\\\\w.-]{0,128}[._-])?';\n\nexport const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n\t// PEM private-key blocks (RSA/EC/DSA/OpenSSH/PGP). Whole block, multiline.\n\t/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n\t// JWTs: `eyJ<header>.eyJ<payload>.<signature>` (both leading segments are\n\t// base64url of a `{\"` object, which makes this highly distinctive).\n\t/\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,\n\t// Authorization-header substrings. After an `Authorization:` label, match\n\t// the `Bearer`, `Basic`, and `Token` schemes with values of any length. The\n\t// value can be quoted. Elsewhere, a 12+ character minimum keeps prose such\n\t// as \"a Bearer token\" or \"basic usage\" readable. Scheme values are opaque\n\t// in practice (`id|secret`, `user:key`), so they run to the next delimiter\n\t// rather than a token68 character class.\n\t// An escaped character inside the value is part of the value.\n\t/(?<=\\bauthorization\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']?)(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\\s+(?:\\\\.|[^\\s\"',;\\\\])+/gi,\n\t/\\b(?:Bearer\\s+[^\\s\"',;]{12,}|(?:Basic|Token)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,})/gi,\n\t// OpenAI / Anthropic API keys\n\t/\\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,\n\t// Stripe secret/restricted/publishable keys (`sk_live_…`, `rk_test_…`, …)\n\t/\\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,\n\t// Google API keys\n\t/\\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Google OAuth access tokens\n\t/\\bya29\\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}\\b/g,\n\t// Slack tokens (xoxb, xoxp, xoxa, xoxr, xoxs, xoxo)\n\t/\\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n\t// GitHub tokens (ghp, ghs, gho, ghr, ghu)\n\t/\\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// GitHub fine-grained personal access tokens\n\t/\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,\n\t// AWS access key id\n\t/\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n\t// Telegram bot token (`<bot id>:<35-char secret>`, also inside `/bot…/` URLs)\n\t/\\b(?:bot)?\\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Discord bot token: three base64url segments, the first being the encoded\n\t// application id (so it starts with the encoding of a snowflake's leading digit).\n\t/\\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\\b/g,\n\t// Linear API keys (`lin_api_…`) and OAuth tokens (`lin_oauth_…`)\n\t/\\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// Credentials embedded in a URL: `scheme://user:password@` — redact the userinfo.\n\t/(?<=:\\/\\/)[^\\s:/@]+:[^\\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,\n\t// Quoted `\"key\": \"value\"` (JSON) and `'key': 'value'` (JS object) fields,\n\t// matched as a whole. The key's quote and the value's quote are captured\n\t// separately so a mixed form like `\"password\": 'secret'` is covered too.\n\t// Run before the loose pattern so nested objects like\n\t// `{\"credentials\": {\"apiKey\": \"...\"}}` don't have the outer key consume\n\t// the inner key on its way to a non-quoted (object) value. The value\n\t// body uses the unrolled JSON-string idiom `(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*`: the\n\t// negated class excludes the backslash so a backslash can only be consumed\n\t// by the `\\\\.` escape branch. Keep the two alternatives disjoint (don't\n\t// fold `\\\\` back into the negated class) — that keeps every run of\n\t// backslashes to a single, unambiguous parse, so matching stays fast on any\n\t// input. An escaped quote inside the value (`\"abc\\\"def\"`) still doesn't end\n\t// the match early, via the escape branch. The negative lookahead skips\n\t// values that are already a `[redacted]` / `[REDACTED]` / typed\n\t// `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` placeholder so this stays idempotent when\n\t// chained behind upstream object-walking redaction (langsmith trace\n\t// payloads, mcp-browser markers).\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`([\"'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\1\\\\s*:\\\\s*([\"'])(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\\\\2)(?:(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\\\\2`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// The same field inside a JSON-encoded string (an upstream response body\n\t// serialized into an error `message`) has every quote escaped:\n\t// `\\\"api_key\\\": \\\"…\\\"`. The pattern above can't see it because the key is\n\t// followed by `\\`, not by its quote. Here the value body has three units that\n\t// are disjoint by their first two characters — a plain character, a `\\x`\n\t// escape other than the closing `\\\"`, or `\\\\` together with the token it\n\t// escapes — so an inner escaped quote (`\\\\\\\"`) is consumed as one unit rather\n\t// than ending the match early, and every input still has a single parse.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`\\\\\\\\([\"'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\\\\\\\\\1\\\\s*:\\\\s*\\\\\\\\([\"'])(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\\\\\\\\\\\\2)(?:(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\(?:\\\\\\\\.|[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]))*\\\\\\\\\\\\2`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// Generic `password=...` / `api_key=...` / `secret=...` style assignments.\n\t// The negative lookbehind skips a keyword sitting at the `<type>` position of\n\t// an upstream `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` marker (e.g. mcp-browser output), so\n\t// the `secret:1]` tail isn't re-matched into a nested `[REDACTED:[REDACTED]`.\n\t// Checking only the `[REDACTED:` prefix suffices: inside a marker a keyword can\n\t// only start a `\\b` match right after that prefix — every other keyword-shaped\n\t// substring is preceded by `_` (snake_case type slug) or a digit, so no word\n\t// boundary opens there. The value lookahead skips values that are already a\n\t// redaction placeholder (bracketed, typed, or URL-safe bare form) — the same\n\t// idempotency convention as the quoted forms. A quoted value is consumed as\n\t// a whole, including escapes, so `secret=\"alpha beta\"` does not leave a tail.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`(?<!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\\\b${BOUNDED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*(?!\\\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\\\b)(?:\"(?:[^\"\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\"|'(?:[^'\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*'|\\\\S+)`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n];\n\nexport function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string {\n\tlet out = input;\n\tfor (const pattern of SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tout = out.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcA,MAAa,cACZ;AAWD,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAG1B,MAAa,wBAA2C;CAEvD;CAGA;CAQA;CACA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAkBA,IAAI,OACH,SAAS,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY,uGAC5C,IACD;CASA,IAAI,OACH,aAAa,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY,0KAChD,IACD;CAYA,IAAI,OACH,+DAA4D,YAAY,gHACxE,IACD;AACD;AAEA,SAAgB,mBAAmB,OAAuB;CACzD,IAAI,MAAM;CACV,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,uBACrB,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;CAExC,OAAO;AACR"}

package/dist/scrub-secrets.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 //#region src/scrub-secrets.d.ts
-declare const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token";
+declare const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token";
 declare const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[];
 declare function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string;
 //#endregion

package/dist/scrub-secrets.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 //#region src/scrub-secrets.d.ts
-declare const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token";
+declare const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token";
 declare const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[];
 declare function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string;
 //#endregion

package/dist/scrub-secrets.mjs

@@ -13,14 +13,17 @@
 * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output
 * unreadable.
 */
-const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token";
+const SECRET_KEYS = "password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token";
+const QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX = "(?:[\\w.-]*[._-])?";
 const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS = [
 	/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
 	/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,
-	/\b(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}/gi,
+	/(?<=\bauthorization\s*[:=]\s*["']?)(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+(?:\\.|[^\s"',;\\])+/gi,
+	/\b(?:Bearer\s+[^\s"',;]{12,}|(?:Basic|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,})/gi,
 	/\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,
 	/\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,
 	/\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g,
+	/\bya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}\b/g,
 	/\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,
 	/\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
 	/\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,
@@ -29,9 +32,9 @@ const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS = [
 	/\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\b/g,
 	/\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
 	/(?<=:\/\/)[^\s:/@]+:[^\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,
-	new RegExp(`"(?:${SECRET_KEYS})"\\s*:\\s*"(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^"\\]]*)?\\]")(?:[^"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*"`, "gi"),
-	new RegExp(`'(?:${SECRET_KEYS})'\\s*:\\s*'(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^'\\]]*)?\\]')(?:[^'\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*'`, "gi"),
-	new RegExp(`(?<!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\b(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\s*[:=]\\s*(?!\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\b)\\S+`, "gi")
+	new RegExp(`(["'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\1\\s*:\\s*(["'])(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\]]*)?\\]\\2)(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*\\2`, "gi"),
+	new RegExp(`\\\\(["'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\\\1\\s*:\\s*\\\\(["'])(?!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\]]*)?\\]\\\\\\2)(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\\\\\(?:\\\\.|[^\\\\\\r\\n]))*\\\\\\2`, "gi"),
+	new RegExp(`(?<!\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\b(?:[\\w.-]{0,128}[._-])?(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\s*[:=]\\s*(?!\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\b)(?:"(?:[^"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*"|'(?:[^'\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*'|\\S+)`, "gi")
 ];
 function scrubSecretsInText(input) {
 	let out = input;

package/dist/scrub-secrets.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"scrub-secrets.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/scrub-secrets.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replace common credential patterns in free-form text with `[REDACTED]`.\n *\n * Used before persisting or transmitting user-supplied text (telemetry\n * excerpts, eval report HTML, free-form feedback) where keys/tokens\n * accidentally pasted into prompts or command lines could otherwise leak\n * downstream.\n *\n * Conservative by design: matches well-known prefixed tokens, explicit\n * `key=value` pairs, and quoted JSON/JS-object fields with sensitive\n * names. We don't attempt to redact arbitrary long opaque strings — false\n * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output\n * unreadable.\n */\nexport const SECRET_KEYS =\n\t'password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token';\n\nexport const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n\t// PEM private-key blocks (RSA/EC/DSA/OpenSSH/PGP). Whole block, multiline.\n\t/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n\t// JWTs: `eyJ<header>.eyJ<payload>.<signature>` (both leading segments are\n\t// base64url of a `{\"` object, which makes this highly distinctive).\n\t/\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,\n\t// Authorization-header substrings: `Bearer <token>`, `Basic <token>`, `Token <token>`\n\t/\\b(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}/gi,\n\t// OpenAI / Anthropic API keys\n\t/\\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,\n\t// Stripe secret/restricted/publishable keys (`sk_live_…`, `rk_test_…`, …)\n\t/\\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,\n\t// Google API keys\n\t/\\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Slack tokens (xoxb, xoxp, xoxa, xoxr, xoxs, xoxo)\n\t/\\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n\t// GitHub tokens (ghp, ghs, gho, ghr, ghu)\n\t/\\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// GitHub fine-grained personal access tokens\n\t/\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,\n\t// AWS access key id\n\t/\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n\t// Telegram bot token (`<bot id>:<35-char secret>`, also inside `/bot…/` URLs)\n\t/\\b(?:bot)?\\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Discord bot token: three base64url segments, the first being the encoded\n\t// application id (so it starts with the encoding of a snowflake's leading digit).\n\t/\\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\\b/g,\n\t// Linear API keys (`lin_api_…`) and OAuth tokens (`lin_oauth_…`)\n\t/\\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// Credentials embedded in a URL: `scheme://user:password@` — redact the userinfo.\n\t/(?<=:\\/\\/)[^\\s:/@]+:[^\\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,\n\t// JSON-shaped `\"key\": \"value\"` — matches the quoted field as a whole.\n\t// Run before the loose pattern so nested objects like\n\t// `{\"credentials\": {\"apiKey\": \"...\"}}` don't have the outer key consume\n\t// the inner key on its way to a non-quoted (object) value. The value\n\t// body uses the unrolled JSON-string idiom `(?:[^\"\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*`: the\n\t// negated class excludes the backslash so a backslash can only be consumed\n\t// by the `\\\\.` escape branch. Keep the two alternatives disjoint (don't\n\t// fold `\\\\` back into the negated class) — that keeps every run of\n\t// backslashes to a single, unambiguous parse, so matching stays fast on any\n\t// input. An escaped quote inside the value (`\"abc\\\"def\"`) still doesn't end\n\t// the match early, via the escape branch. The negative lookahead skips\n\t// values that are already a `[redacted]` / `[REDACTED]` / typed\n\t// `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` placeholder so this stays idempotent when\n\t// chained behind upstream object-walking redaction (langsmith trace\n\t// payloads, mcp-browser markers).\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`\"(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*\"(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\"\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\")(?:[^\"\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\"`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// JS-object-shaped `'key': 'value'`\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`'(?:${SECRET_KEYS})'\\\\s*:\\\\s*'(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^'\\\\]]*)?\\\\]')(?:[^'\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*'`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// Generic `password=...` / `api_key=...` / `secret=...` style assignments.\n\t// The negative lookbehind skips a keyword sitting at the `<type>` position of\n\t// an upstream `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` marker (e.g. mcp-browser output), so\n\t// the `secret:1]` tail isn't re-matched into a nested `[REDACTED:[REDACTED]`.\n\t// Checking only the `[REDACTED:` prefix suffices: inside a marker a keyword can\n\t// only start a `\\b` match right after that prefix — every other keyword-shaped\n\t// substring is preceded by `_` (snake_case type slug) or a digit, so no word\n\t// boundary opens there. The value lookahead skips values that are already a\n\t// redaction placeholder (bracketed, typed, or URL-safe bare form) — the same\n\t// idempotency convention as the quoted forms.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`(?<!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\\\b(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*(?!\\\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\\\b)\\\\S+`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n];\n\nexport function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string {\n\tlet out = input;\n\tfor (const pattern of SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tout = out.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcA,MAAa,cACZ;AAED,MAAa,wBAA2C;CAEvD;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAgBA,IAAI,OACH,OAAO,YAAY,uFACnB,IACD;CAEA,IAAI,OACH,OAAO,YAAY,uFACnB,IACD;CAWA,IAAI,OACH,uCAAuC,YAAY,oDACnD,IACD;AACD;AAEA,SAAgB,mBAAmB,OAAuB;CACzD,IAAI,MAAM;CACV,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,uBACrB,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;CAExC,OAAO;AACR"}
+{"version":3,"file":"scrub-secrets.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/scrub-secrets.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replace common credential patterns in free-form text with `[REDACTED]`.\n *\n * Used before persisting or transmitting user-supplied text (telemetry\n * excerpts, eval report HTML, free-form feedback) where keys/tokens\n * accidentally pasted into prompts or command lines could otherwise leak\n * downstream.\n *\n * Conservative by design: matches well-known prefixed tokens, explicit\n * `key=value` pairs, and quoted JSON/JS-object fields with sensitive\n * names. We don't attempt to redact arbitrary long opaque strings — false\n * positives on file paths, IDs, or base64 payloads would make the output\n * unreadable.\n */\nexport const SECRET_KEYS =\n\t'password|passwd|secret|credentials?|api[_-]?key|authorization|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|session[_-]?cookie|token';\n\n// `\\b` never fires inside a compound key (`webhook_secret`, `bot_token`)\n// because `_` is a word character, so key patterns also accept an optional\n// snake/kebab/dotted prefix (`slack.token`) before the secret word. The\n// quoted-field matchers can only start at a quote, so scanning the whole key\n// stays linear. The unanchored assignment matcher can start at every `\\b` of a\n// long hyphenated or dotted non-secret token, where an unbounded prefix\n// backtracks through every separator at every start position (quadratic) — so\n// that one is length-bounded, and a `_`-joined unquoted key with a longer\n// prefix is the accepted gap.\nconst QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX = '(?:[\\\\w.-]*[._-])?';\nconst BOUNDED_KEY_PREFIX = '(?:[\\\\w.-]{0,128}[._-])?';\n\nexport const SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n\t// PEM private-key blocks (RSA/EC/DSA/OpenSSH/PGP). Whole block, multiline.\n\t/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n\t// JWTs: `eyJ<header>.eyJ<payload>.<signature>` (both leading segments are\n\t// base64url of a `{\"` object, which makes this highly distinctive).\n\t/\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g,\n\t// Authorization-header substrings. After an `Authorization:` label, match\n\t// the `Bearer`, `Basic`, and `Token` schemes with values of any length. The\n\t// value can be quoted. Elsewhere, a 12+ character minimum keeps prose such\n\t// as \"a Bearer token\" or \"basic usage\" readable. Scheme values are opaque\n\t// in practice (`id|secret`, `user:key`), so they run to the next delimiter\n\t// rather than a token68 character class.\n\t// An escaped character inside the value is part of the value.\n\t/(?<=\\bauthorization\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']?)(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\\s+(?:\\\\.|[^\\s\"',;\\\\])+/gi,\n\t/\\b(?:Bearer\\s+[^\\s\"',;]{12,}|(?:Basic|Token)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,})/gi,\n\t// OpenAI / Anthropic API keys\n\t/\\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,\n\t// Stripe secret/restricted/publishable keys (`sk_live_…`, `rk_test_…`, …)\n\t/\\b(?:sk|rk|pk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/g,\n\t// Google API keys\n\t/\\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Google OAuth access tokens\n\t/\\bya29\\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}\\b/g,\n\t// Slack tokens (xoxb, xoxp, xoxa, xoxr, xoxs, xoxo)\n\t/\\bxox[abprso]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n\t// GitHub tokens (ghp, ghs, gho, ghr, ghu)\n\t/\\bgh[psoru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// GitHub fine-grained personal access tokens\n\t/\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/g,\n\t// AWS access key id\n\t/\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n\t// Telegram bot token (`<bot id>:<35-char secret>`, also inside `/bot…/` URLs)\n\t/\\b(?:bot)?\\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}\\b/g,\n\t// Discord bot token: three base64url segments, the first being the encoded\n\t// application id (so it starts with the encoding of a snowflake's leading digit).\n\t/\\b[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}\\b/g,\n\t// Linear API keys (`lin_api_…`) and OAuth tokens (`lin_oauth_…`)\n\t/\\blin_(?:api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n\t// Credentials embedded in a URL: `scheme://user:password@` — redact the userinfo.\n\t/(?<=:\\/\\/)[^\\s:/@]+:[^\\s:/@]+(?=@)/g,\n\t// Quoted `\"key\": \"value\"` (JSON) and `'key': 'value'` (JS object) fields,\n\t// matched as a whole. The key's quote and the value's quote are captured\n\t// separately so a mixed form like `\"password\": 'secret'` is covered too.\n\t// Run before the loose pattern so nested objects like\n\t// `{\"credentials\": {\"apiKey\": \"...\"}}` don't have the outer key consume\n\t// the inner key on its way to a non-quoted (object) value. The value\n\t// body uses the unrolled JSON-string idiom `(?:(?!\\2)[^\\\\\\r\\n]|\\\\.)*`: the\n\t// negated class excludes the backslash so a backslash can only be consumed\n\t// by the `\\\\.` escape branch. Keep the two alternatives disjoint (don't\n\t// fold `\\\\` back into the negated class) — that keeps every run of\n\t// backslashes to a single, unambiguous parse, so matching stays fast on any\n\t// input. An escaped quote inside the value (`\"abc\\\"def\"`) still doesn't end\n\t// the match early, via the escape branch. The negative lookahead skips\n\t// values that are already a `[redacted]` / `[REDACTED]` / typed\n\t// `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` placeholder so this stays idempotent when\n\t// chained behind upstream object-walking redaction (langsmith trace\n\t// payloads, mcp-browser markers).\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`([\"'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\1\\\\s*:\\\\s*([\"'])(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\\\\2)(?:(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\\\\2`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// The same field inside a JSON-encoded string (an upstream response body\n\t// serialized into an error `message`) has every quote escaped:\n\t// `\\\"api_key\\\": \\\"…\\\"`. The pattern above can't see it because the key is\n\t// followed by `\\`, not by its quote. Here the value body has three units that\n\t// are disjoint by their first two characters — a plain character, a `\\x`\n\t// escape other than the closing `\\\"`, or `\\\\` together with the token it\n\t// escapes — so an inner escaped quote (`\\\\\\\"`) is consumed as one unit rather\n\t// than ending the match early, and every input still has a single parse.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`\\\\\\\\([\"'])${QUOTED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\\\\\\\\\1\\\\s*:\\\\s*\\\\\\\\([\"'])(?!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED)(?::[^\\\\]]*)?\\\\]\\\\\\\\\\\\2)(?:(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\(?!\\\\2)[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\(?:\\\\\\\\.|[^\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]))*\\\\\\\\\\\\2`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n\t// Generic `password=...` / `api_key=...` / `secret=...` style assignments.\n\t// The negative lookbehind skips a keyword sitting at the `<type>` position of\n\t// an upstream `[REDACTED:<type>:<index>]` marker (e.g. mcp-browser output), so\n\t// the `secret:1]` tail isn't re-matched into a nested `[REDACTED:[REDACTED]`.\n\t// Checking only the `[REDACTED:` prefix suffices: inside a marker a keyword can\n\t// only start a `\\b` match right after that prefix — every other keyword-shaped\n\t// substring is preceded by `_` (snake_case type slug) or a digit, so no word\n\t// boundary opens there. The value lookahead skips values that are already a\n\t// redaction placeholder (bracketed, typed, or URL-safe bare form) — the same\n\t// idempotency convention as the quoted forms. A quoted value is consumed as\n\t// a whole, including escapes, so `secret=\"alpha beta\"` does not leave a tail.\n\tnew RegExp(\n\t\t`(?<!\\\\[(?:redacted|REDACTED):)\\\\b${BOUNDED_KEY_PREFIX}(?:${SECRET_KEYS})\\\\s*[:=]\\\\s*(?!\\\\[?(?:redacted|REDACTED)\\\\b)(?:\"(?:[^\"\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*\"|'(?:[^'\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\n]|\\\\\\\\.)*'|\\\\S+)`,\n\t\t'gi',\n\t),\n];\n\nexport function scrubSecretsInText(input: string): string {\n\tlet out = input;\n\tfor (const pattern of SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tout = out.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcA,MAAa,cACZ;AAWD,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAG1B,MAAa,wBAA2C;CAEvD;CAGA;CAQA;CACA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAEA;CAGA;CAEA;CAEA;CAkBA,IAAI,OACH,SAAS,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY,uGAC5C,IACD;CASA,IAAI,OACH,aAAa,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY,0KAChD,IACD;CAYA,IAAI,OACH,+DAA4D,YAAY,gHACxE,IACD;AACD;AAEA,SAAgB,mBAAmB,OAAuB;CACzD,IAAI,MAAM;CACV,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,uBACrB,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;CAExC,OAAO;AACR"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 {
   "name": "@n8n/utils",
   "type": "module",
-  "version": "1.46.1",
+  "version": "1.48.0",
   "files": [
     "dist",
-    "LICENSE.md",
-    "LICENSE_EE.md"
+    "LICENSE_EE.md",
+    "LICENSE.md"
   ],
   "exports": {
     "./dist/*": {
@@ -27,19 +27,19 @@
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "nanoid": "3.3.18",
-    "@n8n/constants": "0.37.1"
+    "@n8n/constants": "0.39.0",
+    "nanoid": "3.3.18"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
+    "@n8n/eslint-config": "0.0.1",
+    "@n8n/typescript-config": "1.12.0",
+    "@n8n/vitest-config": "1.22.0",
     "@testing-library/jest-dom": "^6.6.3",
-    "@testing-library/user-event": "^14.6.1",
+    "fast-check": "^3.23.2",
     "tsdown": "^0.22.8",
     "typescript": "7.0.2",
     "vite": "^8.0.2",
-    "vitest": "^4.1.9",
-    "@n8n/eslint-config": "0.0.1",
-    "@n8n/typescript-config": "1.11.0",
-    "@n8n/vitest-config": "1.21.0"
+    "vitest": "^4.1.9"
   },
   "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
   "homepage": "https://n8n.io",