@mux/ai 0.26.0 → 0.28.0

package/dist/{index-C5zhbQHK.d.ts → index-DUVBpnj5.d.ts}

@@ -1265,9 +1265,13 @@ interface AudioTranslationOptions extends MuxAIOptions {
     storageAdapter?: StorageAdapter;
     /** Expiry duration in seconds for S3 presigned GET URLs. Defaults to 86400 (24 hours). */
     s3SignedUrlExpirySeconds?: number;
+    /** Maximum time in seconds to wait before timing out. Defaults to 7200 (2 hours). */
+    dubbingPollTimeoutSeconds?: number;
 }
 declare function translateAudio(assetId: string, toLanguageCode: string, options?: AudioTranslationOptions): Promise<AudioTranslationResult>;
 
+declare function aggregateTokenUsage(usages: TokenUsage[]): TokenUsage;
+
 /** Output returned from `translateCaptions`. */
 interface TranslationResult {
     assetId: string;
@@ -1372,8 +1376,8 @@ declare const translationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
 }>;
 /** Inferred shape returned by `translationSchema`. */
 type TranslationPayload = z.infer<typeof translationSchema>;
+
 declare function shouldSplitChunkTranslationError(error: unknown): boolean;
-declare function aggregateTokenUsage(usages: TokenUsage[]): TokenUsage;
 /**
  * Normalise a model-returned VTT string for robustness against
  * provider wrapping quirks.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export { I as ISO639_1, a as ISO639_3, L as LanguageCodePair, S as SupportedISO639_1, b as SupportedISO639_3, g as getLanguageCodePair, c as getLanguageName, i as isUndeterminedLanguageCode, d as isValidISO639_1, e as isValidISO639_3, t as toISO639_1, f as toISO639_3, h as workflows } from './index-C5zhbQHK.js';
+export { I as ISO639_1, a as ISO639_3, L as LanguageCodePair, S as SupportedISO639_1, b as SupportedISO639_3, g as getLanguageCodePair, c as getLanguageName, i as isUndeterminedLanguageCode, d as isValidISO639_1, e as isValidISO639_3, t as toISO639_1, f as toISO639_3, h as workflows } from './index-DUVBpnj5.js';
 import { W as WorkflowCredentials, S as StoragePutObjectInput, a as StoragePresignGetObjectInput } from './shots-mGJfYGiO.js';
 export { A as AssetTextTrack, C as ChunkEmbedding, b as ChunkingStrategy, E as Encrypted, c as EncryptedPayload, I as ImageSubmissionMode, M as MuxAIOptions, d as MuxAsset, P as PlaybackAsset, e as PlaybackPolicy, f as StorageAdapter, T as TextChunk, g as TokenChunkingConfig, h as TokenUsage, i as ToneType, U as UsageMetadata, V as VTTChunkingConfig, j as VideoEmbeddingsResult, k as WorkflowCredentialsInput, l as WorkflowMuxClient, m as decryptFromWorkflow, n as encryptForWorkflow } from './shots-mGJfYGiO.js';
 import { WORKFLOW_SERIALIZE, WORKFLOW_DESERIALIZE } from '@workflow/serde';
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import '@ai-sdk/google';
 import '@ai-sdk/openai';
 import '@mux/mux-node';
 
-var version = "0.26.0";
+var version = "0.28.0";
 
 type MuxAiErrorType = "validation_error" | "processing_error" | "timeout_error";
 /**
@@ -39,32 +39,6 @@ declare class MuxAiError extends Error {
         retryable?: boolean;
     });
 }
-/**
- * Re-throws {@link MuxAiError} instances to preserve the structural brand,
- * wraps everything else in a plain `Error` with a contextual message.
- *
- * Use this in catch blocks that re-throw so a customer-safe error from a
- * callee isn't accidentally converted into an internal error.
- *
- * The upstream `detail` is scrubbed for **high-confidence** signs of a
- * system-prompt leak before being folded into the thrown message.
- * Rationale: the AI SDK and some providers include the offending model
- * output in their error messages (e.g. "Failed to parse structured
- * output: { reasoning: '<role>…' }"). If an injection payload caused
- * the parse failure, the raw output would otherwise bypass the
- * free-text scrubber and reach the caller through the error channel.
- *
- * Only the `canary` and `prompt_tag` detectors trigger suppression
- * here — they have very low false-positive rates. The `encoded_blob`
- * heuristic is intentionally NOT applied to error messages: legitimate
- * upstream errors from infrastructure (S3 errors containing ETags,
- * git errors containing SHAs, AWS request IDs, content hashes) can
- * match the encoded-blob shape without being a prompt leak. Suppressing
- * those would erase useful debugging information with no security
- * benefit, because an attacker exfiltrating through a shaped blob would
- * trigger the much stronger field-level scrubber on the preceding
- * model output.
- */
 declare function wrapError(error: unknown, message: string): never;
 
 /**