@mulmoclaude/core 1.13.0 → 1.14.1

package/dist/files/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/files/json.ts","../../src/files/safe.ts","../../src/files/byPath.ts","../../src/files/htmlFileRequest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { writeFileAtomic, type WriteAtomicOptions } from \"./atomic.js\";\n\nconst JSON_INDENT = 2;\n\n/** Atomic JSON write (2-space indent) — serialize then write through the atomic\n *  tmp-file + rename seam so a reader never sees a half-written document. */\nexport async function writeJsonAtomic(filePath: string, data: unknown, opts: WriteAtomicOptions = {}): Promise<void> {\n  await writeFileAtomic(filePath, JSON.stringify(data, null, JSON_INDENT), opts);\n}\n","import { realpathSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\n/** True for a `not found` filesystem error (ENOENT) — lets callers treat a\n *  missing file as an empty/default result instead of a thrown error. */\nexport function isEnoent(err: unknown): boolean {\n  return typeof err === \"object\" && err !== null && \"code\" in err && err.code === \"ENOENT\";\n}\n\n/** Realpath-based read-time containment: resolve `relPath` against the root's\n *  realpath and require the target's realpath to stay inside it. Returns null\n *  on ENOENT or traversal (symlink escapes included). `rootReal` MUST already\n *  be a realpath. The one implementation for host and plugins (#2461) — this\n *  security-critical primitive must not drift per consumer. */\nexport function resolveWithinRoot(rootReal: string, relPath: string): string | null {\n  const normalized = path.normalize(relPath || \"\");\n  const resolved = path.resolve(rootReal, normalized);\n  const resolvedReal = realpathOrNull(resolved);\n  if (resolvedReal === null) return null;\n  if (resolvedReal !== rootReal && !resolvedReal.startsWith(rootReal + path.sep)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return resolvedReal;\n}\n\nfunction realpathOrNull(absPath: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    return realpathSync(absPath);\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n","// Read / overwrite files the TOOL CALL named, rather than files the app minted.\n// `presentDocument(path)` / `presentHtml(path)` open a document that already\n// exists — a repo's `README.md`, `docs/report.html`, an absolute path — and the\n// user's edits in the view overwrite it in place.\n//\n// Shared by both hosts (MulmoClaude's `server/utils/files/by-path.ts` and\n// MulmoTerminal's backend bind their own workspace root to it), because the\n// judgement of what a `path` argument may reach is exactly the thing that must\n// not drift between them: a host that accepts what the other refuses turns one\n// tool call into two different behaviours.\n//\n// The rules:\n//   - `classifyFilePath` (also what the plugins' `path` gate calls) decides the\n//     shape: right extension, no NUL, no `.` / `..` / empty segment. That\n//     lexical guard is what stops a vetted path from being re-pointed later.\n//   - relative paths resolve against the injected root; absolute paths are taken\n//     as given. There is deliberately NO containment check — opening a file\n//     outside the workspace is the documented purpose of the `path` form. The\n//     agent can already read and write those files directly; what is new is that\n//     the view can too.\n//   - a value that is absolute only under ANOTHER platform's rules is refused:\n//     `classifyFilePath` recognises `C:\\proj\\x.md` everywhere (the value may\n//     come from a remote host), but on POSIX `path.resolve(\"C:/proj/x.md\")`\n//     lands under the process cwd — a file nobody named.\n//   - reads and writes require a REGULAR FILE, judged through `realpath` so a\n//     symlink is assessed by what it points at and a directory named `x.md`\n//     cannot masquerade as a document.\n//   - `write` overwrites only. Neither tool creates a file at a caller-supplied\n//     path, so a write to a path that does not exist means the view is stale or\n//     the path was wrong — refusing keeps a typo from scattering files.\n//   - `readDir` and `unlink` are refused outright: this capability exists to\n//     read and re-save ONE named document, not to browse or delete.\n\nimport { readFile, realpath, stat as fsStat } from \"node:fs/promises\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport { classifyFilePath } from \"../artifacts/paths.js\";\nimport { writeFileAtomic } from \"./atomic.js\";\n\nexport const MARKDOWN_EXTENSIONS = [\".md\"] as const;\nexport const HTML_EXTENSIONS = [\".html\", \".htm\"] as const;\n\n/** Minimal structural echo of gui-chat-protocol's `FileOps`. Declared here\n *  rather than imported so core keeps no dependency on the protocol package;\n *  a host assigns the result straight to a `FileOps`-typed capability. */\nexport interface ByPathFileOps {\n  read: (rel: string) => Promise<string>;\n  readBytes: (rel: string) => Promise<Uint8Array>;\n  write: (rel: string, content: string | Uint8Array) => Promise<void>;\n  readDir: (rel: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n  stat: (rel: string) => Promise<{ mtimeMs: number; size: number }>;\n  exists: (rel: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n  unlink: (rel: string) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** Absolute on-disk path for a caller-supplied path with one of `extensions`,\n *  or null when the value is not usable on this platform. */\nexport function resolveByPath(root: string, value: string, extensions: readonly string[]): string | null {\n  const kind = classifyFilePath(value, extensions);\n  if (kind === null) return null;\n  if (kind === \"relative\") return path.resolve(root, value);\n  return path.isAbsolute(value) ? path.resolve(value) : null;\n}\n\n/** True when the path names an existing regular file. */\nexport async function existsAsFile(root: string, value: string, extensions: readonly string[]): Promise<boolean> {\n  const absPath = resolveByPath(root, value, extensions);\n  return absPath === null ? false : (await regularFileTarget(absPath)) !== null;\n}\n\nexport interface ByPathOptions {\n  /** The root relative values resolve against, read PER CALL — hosts inject the\n   *  workspace after these ops are already bound into plugin closures. */\n  rootFor: () => string;\n  extensions: readonly string[];\n}\n\nfunction resolveOrThrow({ rootFor, extensions }: ByPathOptions, value: string): string {\n  const absPath = resolveByPath(rootFor(), value, extensions);\n  if (absPath === null) throw new Error(`invalid path: ${value}`);\n  return absPath;\n}\n\n/** The canonical REGULAR FILE a path names, or null when it is missing, is a\n *  directory, or is anything else (a FIFO would block a read forever).\n *  Resolved through `realpath` so a symlink is judged — and later written — by\n *  what it points at: `writeFileAtomic` renames a temp file into place, which\n *  through a link would replace the link itself and leave the real document\n *  untouched. */\nasync function regularFileTarget(absPath: string): Promise<string | null> {\n  try {\n    const target = await realpath(absPath);\n    return (await fsStat(target)).isFile() ? target : null;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** The file to read or overwrite. 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The one implementation for host and plugins (#2461) — this\n *  security-critical primitive must not drift per consumer. */\nexport function resolveWithinRoot(rootReal: string, relPath: string): string | null {\n  const normalized = path.normalize(relPath || \"\");\n  const resolved = path.resolve(rootReal, normalized);\n  const resolvedReal = realpathOrNull(resolved);\n  if (resolvedReal === null) return null;\n  if (resolvedReal !== rootReal && !resolvedReal.startsWith(rootReal + path.sep)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return resolvedReal;\n}\n\nfunction realpathOrNull(absPath: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    return realpathSync(absPath);\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n","// Read / overwrite files the TOOL CALL named, rather than files the app minted.\n// `presentDocument(path)` / `presentHtml(path)` open a document that already\n// exists — a repo's `README.md`, `docs/report.html`, an absolute path — and the\n// user's edits in the view overwrite it in place.\n//\n// Shared by both hosts (MulmoClaude's `server/utils/files/by-path.ts` and\n// MulmoTerminal's backend bind their own workspace root to it), because the\n// judgement of what a `path` argument may reach is exactly the thing that must\n// not drift between them: a host that accepts what the other refuses turns one\n// tool call into two different behaviours.\n//\n// The rules:\n//   - `classifyFilePath` (also what the plugins' `path` gate calls) decides the\n//     shape: right extension, no NUL, no `.` / `..` / empty segment. That\n//     lexical guard is what stops a vetted path from being re-pointed later.\n//   - relative paths resolve against the injected root; absolute paths are taken\n//     as given. There is deliberately NO containment check — opening a file\n//     outside the workspace is the documented purpose of the `path` form. The\n//     agent can already read and write those files directly; what is new is that\n//     the view can too.\n//   - a value that is absolute only under ANOTHER platform's rules is refused:\n//     `classifyFilePath` recognises `C:\\proj\\x.md` everywhere (the value may\n//     come from a remote host), but on POSIX `path.resolve(\"C:/proj/x.md\")`\n//     lands under the process cwd — a file nobody named.\n//   - reads and writes require a REGULAR FILE, judged through `realpath` so a\n//     symlink is assessed by what it points at and a directory named `x.md`\n//     cannot masquerade as a document.\n//   - `write` overwrites only. Neither tool creates a file at a caller-supplied\n//     path, so a write to a path that does not exist means the view is stale or\n//     the path was wrong — refusing keeps a typo from scattering files.\n//   - `readDir` and `unlink` are refused outright: this capability exists to\n//     read and re-save ONE named document, not to browse or delete.\n\nimport { readFile, realpath, stat as fsStat } from \"node:fs/promises\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport { classifyFilePath } from \"../artifacts/paths.js\";\nimport { writeFileAtomic } from \"./atomic.js\";\n\nexport const MARKDOWN_EXTENSIONS = [\".md\"] as const;\nexport const HTML_EXTENSIONS = [\".html\", \".htm\"] as const;\n\n/** Minimal structural echo of gui-chat-protocol's `FileOps`. Declared here\n *  rather than imported so core keeps no dependency on the protocol package;\n *  a host assigns the result straight to a `FileOps`-typed capability. */\nexport interface ByPathFileOps {\n  read: (rel: string) => Promise<string>;\n  readBytes: (rel: string) => Promise<Uint8Array>;\n  write: (rel: string, content: string | Uint8Array) => Promise<void>;\n  readDir: (rel: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n  stat: (rel: string) => Promise<{ mtimeMs: number; size: number }>;\n  exists: (rel: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n  unlink: (rel: string) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** Absolute on-disk path for a caller-supplied path with one of `extensions`,\n *  or null when the value is not usable on this platform. */\nexport function resolveByPath(root: string, value: string, extensions: readonly string[]): string | null {\n  const kind = classifyFilePath(value, extensions);\n  if (kind === null) return null;\n  if (kind === \"relative\") return path.resolve(root, value);\n  return path.isAbsolute(value) ? path.resolve(value) : null;\n}\n\n/** True when the path names an existing regular file. */\nexport async function existsAsFile(root: string, value: string, extensions: readonly string[]): Promise<boolean> {\n  const absPath = resolveByPath(root, value, extensions);\n  return absPath === null ? false : (await regularFileTarget(absPath)) !== null;\n}\n\nexport interface ByPathOptions {\n  /** The root relative values resolve against, read PER CALL — hosts inject the\n   *  workspace after these ops are already bound into plugin closures. */\n  rootFor: () => string;\n  extensions: readonly string[];\n}\n\nfunction resolveOrThrow({ rootFor, extensions }: ByPathOptions, value: string): string {\n  const absPath = resolveByPath(rootFor(), value, extensions);\n  if (absPath === null) throw new Error(`invalid path: ${value}`);\n  return absPath;\n}\n\n/** The canonical REGULAR FILE a path names, or null when it is missing, is a\n *  directory, or is anything else (a FIFO would block a read forever).\n *  Resolved through `realpath` so a symlink is judged — and later written — by\n *  what it points at: `writeFileAtomic` renames a temp file into place, which\n *  through a link would replace the link itself and leave the real document\n *  untouched. */\nasync function regularFileTarget(absPath: string): Promise<string | null> {\n  try {\n    const target = await realpath(absPath);\n    return (await fsStat(target)).isFile() ? target : null;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** The file to read or overwrite. Throws rather than creating: neither tool\n *  ever writes to a path that does not already hold a document. */\nasync function existingFileFor(options: ByPathOptions, rel: string): Promise<string> {\n  const target = await regularFileTarget(resolveOrThrow(options, rel));\n  if (target === null) throw new Error(`no file exists at ${rel}`);\n  return target;\n}\n\n/** Browsing and deleting are NOT part of this capability: it exists so a view\n *  can read and re-save the ONE document the tool call named, not to enumerate\n *  a directory it was never pointed at or remove a file. */\nfunction unsupported(operation: string): () => Promise<never> {\n  return () => Promise.reject(new Error(`byPath FileOps does not support ${operation}`));\n}\n\n/** FileOps over caller-supplied paths — what a host injects as `files.byPath`\n *  for plugins whose `path` argument may leave their artifact directory. Every\n *  method takes the same value the tool call carried, not a scope-relative one. */\nexport function createByPathFileOps(options: ByPathOptions): ByPathFileOps {\n  return {\n    read: async (rel) => readFile(await existingFileFor(options, rel), \"utf-8\"),\n    readBytes: async (rel) => {\n      const buf = await readFile(await existingFileFor(options, rel));\n      return new Uint8Array(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, buf.byteLength);\n    },\n    write: async (rel, content) => writeFileAtomic(await existingFileFor(options, rel), content),\n    readDir: unsupported(\"readDir\"),\n    stat: async (rel) => {\n      const { mtimeMs, size } = await fsStat(resolveOrThrow(options, rel));\n      return { mtimeMs, size };\n    },\n    exists: (rel) => existsAsFile(options.rootFor(), rel, options.extensions),\n    unlink: unsupported(\"unlink\"),\n  };\n}\n","// Server half of the `/htmlfile` scheme (client half: `src/config/htmlFileUrl.ts`).\n// Turns a request path into the absolute file to serve, or null.\n//\n// Shared by both hosts so the URL the View asks for and the file a host resolves\n// cannot drift apart.\n//\n// This mount is deliberately NOT contained to a root: presentHtml's `path` form\n// may name any HTML page on disk, and serving it is the point. What still holds:\n//\n//   - only `ws` (workspace-relative) and `abs` (absolute) scopes exist; anything\n//     else 404s, so a bare `/htmlfile/etc/passwd` is not a path at all.\n//   - no `.` / `..` / empty segment survives, so a vetted URL cannot be\n//     re-pointed by traversal, and no dotfile segment is reachable (same policy\n//     as `resolveArtifactRequestPath`, which the artifact mounts share).\n//   - extension allowlist, realpath and regular-file checks stay with the host's\n//     mount, which is also where the CSP header and rate limit are applied.\n//\n// The trust boundary is whatever the host applies to its `/artifacts/html`\n// mount — in MulmoClaude, the loopback-only listener plus `requireSameOrigin`\n// (bearer auth does not apply outside `/api`, and an iframe `src` request cannot\n// carry an Authorization header anyway).\n\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n// The scope constants are re-declared rather than imported: core must not\n// depend on a plugin (dependencies flow the other way). `html-plugin`'s\n// `htmlFileUrl` builds the URLs these parse, and the round-trip test in the host\n// is what keeps the two halves honest.\nconst HTML_FILE_SCOPE_WORKSPACE = \"ws\";\nconst HTML_FILE_SCOPE_ABSOLUTE = \"abs\";\n\nconst WINDOWS_DRIVE_ONLY_RE = /^[a-zA-Z]:$/;\n\nfunction decodeSegments(reqPath: string): string[] | null {\n  let decoded: string[];\n  try {\n    decoded = reqPath\n      .replace(/^\\//, \"\")\n      .split(\"/\")\n      .map((segment) => decodeURIComponent(segment));\n  } catch {\n    // Malformed escape (`%ZZ`) — fail closed rather than bubbling a URIError.\n    return null;\n  }\n  // Segmentation happens on the ENCODED path, so a `%2F` (or `%5C`) becomes a\n  // separator only after this decode — `a%2F..%2F..%2Ftmp%2Fx.html` would arrive\n  // as one segment that the `..` check below never sees, and then split apart\n  // inside `path.resolve`. A decoded segment that still contains a separator is\n  // never legitimate here, so refuse it.\n  return decoded.some((segment) => segment.includes(\"/\") || segment.includes(\"\\\\\")) ? null : decoded;\n}\n\n/** Absolute path for a `/htmlfile/<scope>/<segments…>` request, or null when\n *  the URL is malformed, uses an unknown scope, or touches a `.` / `..` /\n *  dotfile segment. `workspaceRoot` should already be a realpath. */\nexport function resolveHtmlFileRequestPath(workspaceRoot: string, reqPath: string): string | null {\n  const decoded = decodeSegments(reqPath);\n  if (decoded === null || decoded.length < 2) return null;\n  const [scope, ...rest] = decoded;\n  if (scope !== HTML_FILE_SCOPE_WORKSPACE && scope !== HTML_FILE_SCOPE_ABSOLUTE) return null;\n  const [firstRest] = rest;\n  if (firstRest === undefined) return null;\n  if (rest.some((segment) => segment === \"\" || segment === \".\" || segment === \"..\" || segment.startsWith(\".\") || segment.includes(\"\\0\"))) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  if (scope === HTML_FILE_SCOPE_WORKSPACE) return path.resolve(workspaceRoot, ...rest);\n  // `abs/C:/proj/page.html` — the drive letter arrives as its own segment, so\n  // rejoin it before resolving; everything else is rooted at `/`.\n  const candidate = WINDOWS_DRIVE_ONLY_RE.test(firstRest) ? rest.join(\"/\") : `/${rest.join(\"/\")}`;\n  // Only THIS platform's `path` can say whether that is really absolute: on\n  // POSIX, `path.resolve(\"C:/proj/page.html\")` would land under the process cwd\n  // rather than at any drive, silently serving the wrong file. 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package/dist/google/calendar.d.ts

@@ -39,47 +39,47 @@ export type CalendarEventSpan = {
 };
 export type CalendarEventInput = {
     summary: string;
-    description?: string;
-    location?: string;
+    description?: string | undefined;
+    location?: string | undefined;
     /** Calendar to create the event on; defaults to the user's primary. */
-    calendarId?: string;
+    calendarId?: string | undefined;
     /** Event colour (Google event palette id "1".."11"); omit to inherit the calendar's colour. */
-    colorId?: string;
+    colorId?: string | undefined;
     /** Caller-chosen event id. Google requires base32hex (`0-9a-v`), 5-1024 chars,
      *  and answers 409 when it is already taken. A collection push sets this so a
      *  locally-created record keeps its own record id as the event id, instead of
      *  being re-keyed to Google's after the fact — a re-key that is missed leaves
      *  a duplicate record on the next pull. */
-    eventId?: string;
+    eventId?: string | undefined;
 } & CalendarEventSpan;
 export interface UpdateCalendarEventInput {
     eventId: string;
-    summary?: string;
-    startDateTime?: string;
-    endDateTime?: string;
+    summary?: string | undefined;
+    startDateTime?: string | undefined;
+    endDateTime?: string | undefined;
     /** Structured span; wins over the flat pair when both are present. */
-    start?: CalendarEventTime;
-    end?: CalendarEventTime;
+    start?: CalendarEventTime | undefined;
+    end?: CalendarEventTime | undefined;
     /** `""` clears the description; omit to leave it untouched. */
-    description?: string;
+    description?: string | undefined;
     /** `""` clears the location; omit to leave it untouched. */
-    location?: string;
-    calendarId?: string;
-    colorId?: string;
+    location?: string | undefined;
+    calendarId?: string | undefined;
+    colorId?: string | undefined;
     /** Etag of the version this edit was computed against. Sent as `If-Match`, so
      *  Google answers 412 rather than letting the PATCH clobber a change that
      *  landed after the caller read the event. Omit for an unconditional write. */
-    ifMatch?: string;
+    ifMatch?: string | undefined;
 }
 export interface DeleteCalendarEventInput {
     eventId: string;
-    calendarId?: string;
+    calendarId?: string | undefined;
 }
 export interface ListEventsInput {
-    timeMin?: string;
-    maxResults?: number;
+    timeMin?: string | undefined;
+    maxResults?: number | undefined;
     /** Calendar to read; defaults to the user's primary. */
-    calendarId?: string;
+    calendarId?: string | undefined;
 }
 export interface CalendarEventSummary {
     id: string;
@@ -160,18 +160,18 @@ export declare function deleteCalendarEvent(accessToken: string, input: DeleteCa
 export declare function listCalendarEvents(accessToken: string, input?: ListEventsInput): Promise<CalendarEventSummary[]>;
 export interface SyncEventsInput {
     /** Calendar to sync; defaults to the user's primary. */
-    calendarId?: string;
+    calendarId?: string | undefined;
     /** Token from the previous sync. Omit for a full sync. */
-    syncToken?: string;
+    syncToken?: string | undefined;
     /** Page size for the underlying list calls. */
-    maxResults?: number;
+    maxResults?: number | undefined;
 }
 export interface CalendarSyncResult {
     /** Changed events since `syncToken` (all of them on a full sync). Deletions
      *  arrive here too, as `status: "cancelled"`. */
     events: CalendarEventSummary[];
     /** Token to pass to the NEXT sync. Absent only if Google omitted it. */
-    nextSyncToken?: string;
+    nextSyncToken?: string | undefined;
     /** The stored token had expired (410) — the caller must drop it and re-sync
      *  from scratch; no events are returned in that case. */
     fullResyncRequired: boolean;
@@ -189,23 +189,37 @@ export interface CalendarSyncResult {
 export declare function syncCalendarEvents(accessToken: string, input?: SyncEventsInput): Promise<CalendarSyncResult>;
 export interface CalendarListPage {
     items: unknown[];
-    nextPageToken?: string;
+    nextPageToken?: string | undefined;
 }
 /** Pagination loop for CalendarList.list, extracted so it can be tested without
  *  network. Stops at the last page (no token) or the runaway page cap. */
 export declare function collectCalendarPages(fetchPage: (pageToken?: string) => Promise<CalendarListPage>, maxPages?: number): Promise<CalendarSummary[]>;
+/** What a calendar absent from the user's list can still tell about itself. */
+export interface CalendarMeta {
+    /** IANA zone (`Asia/Tokyo`), `""` when Google omits it. */
+    timeZone: string;
+    /** `owner` / `writer` / `reader` / `freeBusyReader`, `""` when unreported. */
+    accessRole: string;
+}
+export declare const toCalendarMeta: (value: unknown) => CalendarMeta;
+/** One calendar's zone and the caller's role on it, read by id rather than
+ *  looked up in the user's list.
+ *
+ *  `calendarList` only holds calendars the user has ADDED; a calendar shared
+ *  with them can be readable and writable by id without appearing there, and a
+ *  push still needs its zone to send an offset-less `dateTime`.
+ *
+ *  Deliberately `events.list` and NOT `calendars.get`: the latter takes only
+ *  full-calendar scopes (`calendar`, `calendar.readonly`, `calendar.calendars*`)
+ *  and this app asks for none of them, so it answers 403 for every account it
+ *  links (#2735). The events list carries the same `timeZone` — plus the
+ *  `accessRole` the calendar resource does not have — under `calendar.events`,
+ *  which the push already holds because it writes with it. Only the envelope is
+ *  read; the one event asked for is the smallest page Google will serve. */
+export declare function getCalendarMeta(accessToken: string, calendarId: string | undefined): Promise<CalendarMeta>;
 /** The calendars the user has added/subscribed to (primary + secondary +
  *  shared), each with its id, name and colour, following pagination. Needs the
  *  calendar-list read scope (GOOGLE_CALENDARLIST_SCOPE). */
-/** One calendar's own resource, addressed by id rather than looked up in the
- *  user's list.
- *
- *  `calendarList` only holds calendars the user has ADDED; a calendar shared
- *  with them can be readable and writable by id without appearing there. This is
- *  how a push learns such a calendar's `timeZone`. Note the resource carries no
- *  `accessRole` — that is a calendarList property — so reachability here says
- *  nothing about writability. */
-export declare function getCalendar(accessToken: string, calendarId: string | undefined): Promise<CalendarSummary>;
 export declare function listCalendars(accessToken: string): Promise<CalendarSummary[]>;
 /** Resolve a `colorId` (on an event or calendar) to its hex background/foreground. */
 export declare function getCalendarColors(accessToken: string): Promise<CalendarColors>;

package/dist/google/collectionPush.d.ts

@@ -5,21 +5,26 @@ import { ShadowEvent } from './calendarPushState.js';
 import { PushableSourceField } from './pushPlan.js';
 /** What the up-front writability gate knows about the target calendar. */
 export interface CalendarWriteTarget {
-    /** The role from the user's calendar LIST, or null when the calendar is not in
-     *  it. Null means unknown, never read-only: `calendarList` holds only the
-     *  calendars the user has added, so one shared with write access can be absent
-     *  from it (Codex review). */
+    /** The caller's role on the calendar, or null when neither source reported one.
+     *  Null means unknown, never read-only: hard-denying an unknown role would
+     *  refuse a calendar the user can in fact write to. */
     accessRole: string | null;
     /** IANA zone for rebuilding a zone-less stored clock, `""` when unreported. */
     timeZone: string;
 }
 /** Whether to refuse the whole push before touching a single event.
  *
- *  Only on POSITIVE evidence of a non-writable role. An unlisted calendar is
- *  unknown and must fall through: hard-denying it would block the feature
- *  outright for a calendar the user can in fact write to. Those attempts surface
- *  Google's own 403 per record if the write really is not allowed. */
+ *  Only on POSITIVE evidence of a non-writable role. A calendar whose role
+ *  neither source reported is unknown and must fall through: hard-denying it
+ *  would block the feature outright for a calendar the user can in fact write
+ *  to. Those attempts surface Google's own 403 per record if the write really is
+ *  not allowed. */
 export declare const isDeniedAccessRole: (accessRole: string | null) => boolean;
+/** A role Google left blank is UNKNOWN, not a denial. `isDeniedAccessRole`
+ *  refuses every role it does not recognise — `""` included — so passing an
+ *  unreported one straight through would refuse a calendar Google simply said
+ *  nothing about. */
+export declare const reportedAccessRole: (accessRole: string) => string | null;
 export interface CalendarCollectionPushResult {
     slug: string;
     created: number;

package/dist/google/collectionSync.d.ts

@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ export declare function groupByCalendar(collections: readonly LoadedCollection[]
  *  Structural so the rule can be exercised without building a LoadedCollection. */
 export interface CalendarDeclaring {
     googleCalendar?: {
-        calendarId?: string;
-    };
+        calendarId?: string | undefined;
+    } | undefined;
 }
 /** The canonical calendar whose sync token nothing needs any more, or null.
  *

package/dist/google/index.cjs

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 const require_rolldown_runtime = require("../rolldown-runtime-D6vf50IK.cjs");
-const require_dist = require("../dist-21pMsI1a.cjs");
+const require_dist = require("../dist-CsgSfWwR.cjs");
 const require_text = require("../text-CaAh9ZSO.cjs");
 const require_atomic = require("../atomic-C_7YpMiM.cjs");
 const require_utils_fetch = require("../utils/fetch.cjs");
-const require_calendarGrid = require("../calendarGrid-CaS9er8i.cjs");
-const require_project = require("../project-CCtT_fQr.cjs");
-const require_discovery = require("../discovery-DAoMnBYM.cjs");
+const require_calendarGrid = require("../calendarGrid-p8K-7cuB.cjs");
+const require_project = require("../project-C1ep9pvo.cjs");
+const require_discovery = require("../discovery-DSLgRQhN.cjs");
 let node_fs = require("node:fs");
 let node_path = require("node:path");
 node_path = require_rolldown_runtime.__toESM(node_path, 1);
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ var EXPIRY_MARGIN_MS = ONE_MINUTE_MS;
 var createClient = (secret, redirectUri) => new google_auth_library.OAuth2Client({
 	clientId: secret.client_id,
 	clientSecret: secret.client_secret,
-	redirectUri
+	...redirectUri !== void 0 ? { redirectUri } : {}
 });
 var persistRotatedTokens = (client, home) => {
 	client.on("tokens", (tokens) => {
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ var CALENDAR_LIST_PAGE_SIZE = 250;
 var MAX_CALENDAR_LIST_PAGES = 40;
 var EVENT_SYNC_PAGE_SIZE = 2500;
 var MAX_EVENT_SYNC_PAGES = 200;
+var CALENDAR_META_PAGE_SIZE = 1;
 var HTTP_GONE = 410;
 var EVENT_ABSENT_STATUSES = [404, HTTP_GONE];
 /** An `If-Match` write whose etag no longer matches — someone else changed the
@@ -804,20 +805,34 @@ async function collectCalendarPages(fetchPage, maxPages = MAX_CALENDAR_LIST_PAGE
 	}
 	return calendars;
 }
-/** The calendars the user has added/subscribed to (primary + secondary +
-*  shared), each with its id, name and colour, following pagination. Needs the
-*  calendar-list read scope (GOOGLE_CALENDARLIST_SCOPE). */
-/** One calendar's own resource, addressed by id rather than looked up in the
-*  user's list.
+var toCalendarMeta = (value) => {
+	const record = asRecord(value);
+	return {
+		timeZone: stringField(record, "timeZone"),
+		accessRole: stringField(record, "accessRole")
+	};
+};
+/** One calendar's zone and the caller's role on it, read by id rather than
+*  looked up in the user's list.
 *
 *  `calendarList` only holds calendars the user has ADDED; a calendar shared
-*  with them can be readable and writable by id without appearing there. This is
-*  how a push learns such a calendar's `timeZone`. Note the resource carries no
-*  `accessRole` — that is a calendarList property — so reachability here says
-*  nothing about writability. */
-async function getCalendar(accessToken, calendarId) {
-	return toCalendarSummary(await googleRequest(CALENDAR_API_LABEL, accessToken, `${CALENDAR_BASE_URL}/calendars/${encodeURIComponent(canonicalCalendarId(calendarId))}`));
+*  with them can be readable and writable by id without appearing there, and a
+*  push still needs its zone to send an offset-less `dateTime`.
+*
+*  Deliberately `events.list` and NOT `calendars.get`: the latter takes only
+*  full-calendar scopes (`calendar`, `calendar.readonly`, `calendar.calendars*`)
+*  and this app asks for none of them, so it answers 403 for every account it
+*  links (#2735). The events list carries the same `timeZone` — plus the
+*  `accessRole` the calendar resource does not have — under `calendar.events`,
+*  which the push already holds because it writes with it. Only the envelope is
+*  read; the one event asked for is the smallest page Google will serve. */
+async function getCalendarMeta(accessToken, calendarId) {
+	const params = new URLSearchParams({ maxResults: String(CALENDAR_META_PAGE_SIZE) });
+	return toCalendarMeta(await googleRequest(CALENDAR_API_LABEL, accessToken, `${eventsUrl(calendarId)}?${params.toString()}`));
 }
+/** The calendars the user has added/subscribed to (primary + secondary +
+*  shared), each with its id, name and colour, following pagination. Needs the
+*  calendar-list read scope (GOOGLE_CALENDARLIST_SCOPE). */
 async function listCalendars(accessToken) {
 	return collectCalendarPages(async (pageToken) => {
 		const params = new URLSearchParams({ maxResults: String(CALENDAR_LIST_PAGE_SIZE) });
@@ -868,9 +883,7 @@ async function readLockRaw(lockPath) {
 function parseLock(raw) {
 	try {
 		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
-		if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) return null;
-		const { holder } = parsed;
-		return typeof holder === "string" ? { holder } : null;
+		return require_dist.hasStringProp(parsed, "holder") ? { holder: parsed.holder } : null;
 	} catch {
 		return null;
 	}
@@ -1369,7 +1382,7 @@ var PUSHABLE_SOURCE_FIELDS = [
 	"description",
 	"location"
 ];
-var isPushableSource = (source) => PUSHABLE_SOURCE_FIELDS.includes(source);
+var isPushableSource = (source) => PUSHABLE_SOURCE_FIELDS.some((field) => field === source);
 /** The subset of a schema's `map` a push can act on: collection field → event field. */
 function pushableMap(map) {
 	return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(map).filter((entry) => isPushableSource(entry[1])));
@@ -1491,21 +1504,28 @@ function locallyDeletedIds(shadow, presentIds) {
 var WRITABLE_ACCESS_ROLES = ["owner", "writer"];
 /** Whether to refuse the whole push before touching a single event.
 *
-*  Only on POSITIVE evidence of a non-writable role. An unlisted calendar is
-*  unknown and must fall through: hard-denying it would block the feature
-*  outright for a calendar the user can in fact write to. Those attempts surface
-*  Google's own 403 per record if the write really is not allowed. */
+*  Only on POSITIVE evidence of a non-writable role. A calendar whose role
+*  neither source reported is unknown and must fall through: hard-denying it
+*  would block the feature outright for a calendar the user can in fact write
+*  to. Those attempts surface Google's own 403 per record if the write really is
+*  not allowed. */
 var isDeniedAccessRole = (accessRole) => accessRole !== null && !WRITABLE_ACCESS_ROLES.includes(accessRole);
+/** A role Google left blank is UNKNOWN, not a denial. `isDeniedAccessRole`
+*  refuses every role it does not recognise — `""` included — so passing an
+*  unreported one straight through would refuse a calendar Google simply said
+*  nothing about. */
+var reportedAccessRole = (accessRole) => accessRole || null;
 /** Resolve the calendar a schema names, for its writability and its timezone.
 *
-*  The list is consulted first because only it reports `accessRole`, which is
-*  what lets a read-only calendar be refused with the real reason instead of an
-*  opaque per-event 403. `"primary"` is matched on the `primary` flag, not the
-*  id — the primary calendar's own id is the account's email address, which never
-*  equals the literal the schema declares.
+*  The list is consulted first because it answers for every added calendar in
+*  one call the push already makes. `"primary"` is matched on the `primary`
+*  flag, not the id — the primary calendar's own id is the account's email
+*  address, which never equals the literal the schema declares.
 *
-*  A calendar absent from the list is NOT denied: it is fetched by id for its
-*  timezone and its role left unknown. A 404 there means the calendar really is
+*  A calendar absent from the list is NOT denied: `calendarList` holds only the
+*  calendars the user has added, so one shared with write access can be missing
+*  from it (Codex review). It is asked about itself instead, which reports the
+*  same zone AND the real role. A 404 there means the calendar is genuinely
 *  unreachable, and propagates as a `failed` outcome. */
 async function liveCalendarMeta(accessToken, calendarId) {
 	const key = canonicalCalendarId(calendarId);
@@ -1515,10 +1535,13 @@ async function liveCalendarMeta(accessToken, calendarId) {
 		accessRole: listed.accessRole,
 		timeZone: listed.timeZone
 	};
-	const direct = await getCalendar(accessToken, calendarId);
-	log.info("google", "calendar is not in the user's list — pushing without an up-front role check", { calendarId: key });
+	const direct = await getCalendarMeta(accessToken, calendarId);
+	log.info("google", "calendar is not in the user's list — role read from the calendar itself", {
+		calendarId: key,
+		accessRole: direct.accessRole
+	});
 	return {
-		accessRole: null,
+		accessRole: reportedAccessRole(direct.accessRole),
 		timeZone: direct.timeZone
 	};
 }
@@ -1703,9 +1726,9 @@ async function createOrAdopt(ctx, eventId, record) {
 }
 /** A 403 on a write is a permissions answer, but `googleApiError` appends the
 *  "is the API enabled for the Cloud project?" hint to every 403 — true for a
-*  disabled API, misleading here. Reached when the up-front role check could not
-*  run because the calendar is not in the user's list, which is exactly when the
-*  user needs the real reason. */
+*  disabled API, misleading here. Reached when the up-front gate let the push
+*  through on an unknown role, which is exactly when the user needs the real
+*  reason. */
 function writeFailure(eventId, error) {
 	if (isGoogleApiError(error) && error.status === 403) return {
 		kind: "skipped",
@@ -2734,9 +2757,9 @@ exports.deleteGoogleTokens = deleteGoogleTokens;
 exports.deleteTask = deleteTask;
 exports.fieldText = fieldText;
 exports.findClientSecretPath = findClientSecretPath;
-exports.getCalendar = getCalendar;
 exports.getCalendarColors = getCalendarColors;
 exports.getCalendarEvent = getCalendarEvent;
+exports.getCalendarMeta = getCalendarMeta;
 exports.getGoogleAccessToken = getGoogleAccessToken;
 exports.googleApiError = googleApiError;
 exports.googleAuthFlow = googleAuthFlow;
@@ -2783,6 +2806,7 @@ exports.pushCollectionNow = pushCollectionNow;
 exports.pushableMap = pushableMap;
 exports.readDriveFile = readDriveFile;
 exports.releaseOrphanedCalendarToken = releaseOrphanedCalendarToken;
+exports.reportedAccessRole = reportedAccessRole;
 exports.resolveEventSpan = resolveEventSpan;
 exports.saveCalendarShadow = saveCalendarShadow;
 exports.saveCalendarSyncToken = saveCalendarSyncToken;
@@ -2794,6 +2818,7 @@ exports.syncCalendarForCollection = syncCalendarForCollection;
 exports.syncCalendarGroup = syncCalendarGroup;
 exports.syncDueCalendarCollections = syncDueCalendarCollections;
 exports.syncNewCalendarCollections = syncNewCalendarCollections;
+exports.toCalendarMeta = toCalendarMeta;
 exports.toCalendarSummary = toCalendarSummary;
 exports.toCollectionDateTime = toCollectionDateTime;
 exports.toCollectionRecord = toCollectionRecord;