@muhkoo/connect 0.10.10-alpha.0 → 0.10.12-alpha.0

package/dist/connect.d.ts

@@ -1905,6 +1905,10 @@ interface VaultFactor {
     createdAt?: number;
     /** Display hint for gated factors ("m•••@gmail.com") — list responses only. */
     masked?: string;
+    /** Passkey's origin (RP id) — list responses only. A passkey only unlocks
+     *  from this host or a subdomain of it, so apps on several hosts enroll one
+     *  per origin. */
+    rpId?: string;
 }
 interface AuthClientOptions {
     /** Absolute URL of the accelerator worker (no trailing slash required). */
@@ -2001,7 +2005,11 @@ declare class AuthClient {
      * Read a factor record for `username` (returns an indistinguishable decoy if
      * absent). Gated types (email) require the recover `verifyToken`.
      */
-    vaultRead(username: string, factorType: VaultFactor["type"], verifyToken?: string): Promise<{
+    vaultRead(username: string, factorType: VaultFactor["type"], verifyToken?: string, 
+    /** Passkeys are per-origin: naming the caller's host returns THAT origin's
+     *  passkey instead of whichever was enrolled first (which WebAuthn would
+     *  refuse). Ignored for other factor types. */
+    rpId?: string): Promise<{
         factor: VaultFactor | null;
     }>;
     /**
@@ -2224,6 +2232,29 @@ declare function signMessage(message: string, privateKey: CryptoKey): Promise<st
  * seed) while moving credential entry onto the Muhkoo origin. The envelope is
  * versioned so a future per-app-key handoff (v2) can swap in without a protocol
  * change.
+ *
+ * ## v2 — device pairing (TV / no-redirect handoff)
+ *
+ * v1's K_t rides in the redirect URL *fragment*, which works only because the
+ * receiving app is a browser page that can read `location.hash`. A TV app has
+ * no redirect to receive: it polls. So v2 keeps the *entire* v1 shape — the
+ * server relays a sealed envelope it cannot read — and replaces only the key
+ * agreement:
+ *
+ *   - the TV generates an ephemeral P-256 ECDH keypair in memory and publishes
+ *     the public half ({@link generateDevicePairingKeypair});
+ *   - the hosted page (the component that already holds the unlocked seed and
+ *     already owns sealing) seals *to that public key* with a fresh ephemeral
+ *     keypair of its own ({@link sealSeedToDevice}) — ECDH → HKDF-SHA256 →
+ *     AES-256-GCM;
+ *   - the TV recovers the seed with its private key
+ *     ({@link unsealSeedFromDevice}).
+ *
+ * The server stores and relays the v2 envelope byte-for-byte, exactly as it
+ * does for v1, and can read neither. The one thing ECDH cannot supply is proof
+ * that the public key the hosted page sealed to is *the TV's* rather than an
+ * attacker's — that is what {@link pairingVerificationCode} is for, and it is
+ * the only MITM defence in the flow (see the entropy note on that function).
  */
 interface SealedHandoff {
     /** base64 JSON envelope — relayed by the server in the grant; server-opaque. */
@@ -2235,6 +2266,101 @@ interface SealedHandoff {
 declare function sealSeed(seed: Uint8Array): Promise<SealedHandoff>;
 /** Recover the master seed from the sealed envelope + the fragment key. */
 declare function unsealSeed(sealedKeys: string, fragmentKey: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+/**
+ * Alphabet for the pairing verification code: 30 symbols, every confusable pair
+ * removed in BOTH directions — no `0`/`O`, no `1`/`I`/`L`, and no `U` (which is
+ * read as `V` on the low-resolution, far-viewed type a TV renders). Because the
+ * user compares this string across two screens by eye, unambiguity beats the
+ * convenience of a power-of-two alphabet; the derivation below rejection-samples
+ * to avoid the modulo bias that costs us.
+ */
+declare const PAIRING_CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ23456789";
+/** Length of the pairing verification code, in characters. 30^8 ≈ 39.3 bits. */
+declare const PAIRING_CODE_LENGTH = 8;
+/** An ephemeral ECDH keypair generated by the pairing device (the TV). */
+interface DevicePairingKeypair {
+    /** base64 raw (SEC1 uncompressed, 65 bytes) public key — safe to publish. */
+    publicKeyB64: string;
+    /**
+     * Non-extractable private half. In-memory only, one per pairing attempt:
+     * it is never persisted and never leaves the device, so a captured pairing
+     * transcript is undecryptable once the attempt ends.
+     */
+    privateKey: CryptoKey;
+}
+/**
+ * (Device side) Generate the ephemeral P-256 ECDH keypair for one pairing
+ * attempt. Call this once per attempt and throw it away when the attempt ends —
+ * reusing a keypair across attempts would let an old, observed ciphertext be
+ * decrypted by whoever later obtains the key.
+ */
+declare function generateDevicePairingKeypair(): Promise<DevicePairingKeypair>;
+/**
+ * (Hosted-page side) Seal the master seed *to a device's* pairing public key.
+ *
+ * A fresh ephemeral keypair is generated per call and its public half is
+ * carried in the envelope (`epk`), so sealing the same seed to the same device
+ * twice yields unrelated ciphertext — and the sealer retains nothing that could
+ * later reopen the envelope.
+ *
+ * Returns the v2 `sealedKeys` string, which slots into exactly the same server
+ * field as v1: relayed verbatim, never read.
+ */
+declare function sealSeedToDevice(seed: Uint8Array, devicePublicKeyB64: string): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * (Device side) Recover the master seed from a v2 envelope using the ephemeral
+ * private key from {@link generateDevicePairingKeypair}.
+ *
+ * Throws on any tamper: a substituted `epk` yields a different shared secret
+ * (or fails point validation outright), and any edit to `iv`/`ct` fails the
+ * AES-GCM tag. There is no path that returns partially-authenticated bytes.
+ *
+ * `devicePublicKeyB64` is the caller's OWN public half (from
+ * {@link generateDevicePairingKeypair}). It is required, not optional, because
+ * it is mixed into the KDF — see {@link deriveDeviceSealKey} for why binding the
+ * recipient matters. A device always holds both halves, so this costs nothing.
+ */
+declare function unsealSeedFromDevice(sealedKeys: string, privateKey: CryptoKey, devicePublicKeyB64: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+/**
+ * Short code derived deterministically from the device's pairing public key,
+ * displayed on BOTH the TV and the approving browser so the human can confirm
+ * they match before approving.
+ *
+ * ## What this is worth (be honest about it)
+ *
+ * ~39.3 bits (30^8), rendered in an unambiguous 30-symbol alphabet and grouped
+ * as `XXXX-XXXX` for comparison. Alongside the recipient-key binding in
+ * {@link deriveDeviceSealKey}, this is what stops a substituted device key: the
+ * KDF rejects a *negated* key, and this code is what a human uses to reject a
+ * wholly *attacker-generated* one, which the crypto cannot detect on its own —
+ * ECDH proves nothing about WHOSE public key it is.
+ *
+ * Two attacks, and what each actually costs:
+ *
+ *   1. **Online grind.** Generate keypairs until one's code equals the honest
+ *      TV's. ~2^39 trials. Naively that reads as "keygen + hash", but a real
+ *      attacker never generates keys: walking `P_{i+1} = P_i + G` while tracking
+ *      `d_i = d_0 + i` makes each trial one point-add plus one derivation. With
+ *      a plain hash that is well under a core-day — which is why this uses
+ *      PBKDF2-SHA256 at {@link PAIRING_CODE_ITERATIONS} iterations instead. The
+ *      work factor applies per trial, pushing the same grind to the order of
+ *      10^5 core-days. The target is also only learned when pairing starts, so
+ *      the grind is online against the pairing TTL (keep it minutes).
+ *   2. **Precomputed table.** The reason this is not a plain hash. A table over
+ *      candidate keys is computed once and reused forever; with SHA-256 that is
+ *      cheap enough to be the preferred attack. The iteration count multiplies
+ *      the table's build cost by the same 2 * 10^5.
+ *
+ * Neither is a proof of security, and an adversary with ASIC-scale hardware
+ * changes these numbers. If the margin is ever judged insufficient, raise
+ * {@link PAIRING_CODE_LENGTH} — 10 characters buys ~49 bits for two more
+ * characters of human comparison, and is display-only: it does not touch the
+ * envelope or the wire format.
+ *
+ * The cost is paid once per pairing, on two idle devices, so ~200k iterations
+ * is imperceptible here in a way it would not be on a hot path.
+ */
+declare function pairingVerificationCode(devicePublicKeyB64: string): Promise<string>;
 interface Pkce {
     codeVerifier: string;
     codeChallenge: string;
@@ -2669,7 +2795,18 @@ declare class ZkAuth {
         label?: string;
         createdAt?: number;
         masked?: string;
+        rpId?: string;
     }>>;
+    /**
+     * Is a passkey enrolled that can unlock from THIS origin?
+     *
+     * Passkeys are origin-bound, so an app served on both a custom domain and the
+     * platform host needs one per host. Use this to decide whether to offer
+     * "Unlock with passkey" or go straight to sign-in — prompting with another
+     * origin's passkey fails with a raw WebAuthn error. Requires a session
+     * (metadata read); returns false when signed out or unsupported.
+     */
+    hasPasskeyForThisOrigin(): Promise<boolean>;
     /** Remove a login method by id (can't remove your only one). Session-authed. */
     removeFactor(id: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Sign out: clears the session, identity, and persisted token. */
@@ -2767,6 +2904,14 @@ interface HttpClientOptions {
      * shared-space (messaging) websockets.
      */
     apiKey?: string;
+    /**
+     * A scoped, expiring **access token** (`mk_<env>_at_…`) — the non-ZK
+     * machine-to-machine credential. It resolves through the SAME accelerator
+     * path as an app key and rides the same `X-Muhkoo-Key` header; when present
+     * it takes precedence over {@link apiKey}. Use it for server-side / CI
+     * callers that shouldn't carry the app's publishable key.
+     */
+    accessToken?: string;
     /** Returns the current user session token, or `null` when logged out. */
     getSessionToken?: () => string | null;
     /** Custom fetch — defaults to `globalThis.fetch`. */
@@ -2795,6 +2940,8 @@ declare class HttpClient {
     /** Origin of {@link baseUrl} — credentials are only attached same-origin. */
     private readonly baseOrigin;
     private readonly apiKey;
+    /** Scoped machine access token — takes precedence over {@link apiKey} on `X-Muhkoo-Key`. */
+    private readonly accessToken;
     private readonly getSessionToken;
     private readonly onUnauthorized;
     private readonly fetchFn;
@@ -4804,6 +4951,78 @@ declare class FunctionsNamespace {
     private path;
 }
 
+/**
+ * `client.accessTokens` — manage an app's **access tokens**: scoped, expiring,
+ * non-ZK machine-to-machine credentials (`mk_<env>_at_…`).
+ *
+ *   const { plaintext } = await client.accessTokens.create(appId, {
+ *     scopes: ["db:read", "db:write"], env: "live", expiresInDays: 30,
+ *     label: "ci-runner",
+ *   });
+ *   // hand `plaintext` to the machine caller as its ClientOptions.accessToken
+ *
+ * These are MANAGEMENT calls — creating/listing/revoking tokens is authorized by
+ * the developer session (same as the `agents`/`functions` namespaces). The token
+ * itself resolves through the SAME accelerator path as an app key (the
+ * `X-Muhkoo-Key` header), but is scoped to a fixed vocabulary of permissions and
+ * expires. The plaintext is returned ONCE, on create — store it then; it can't
+ * be read back.
+ */
+
+/** The fixed vocabulary of permissions an access token can be granted. */
+type Scope = "db:read" | "db:write" | "kv:read" | "kv:write" | "storage:read" | "storage:write" | "messages:read" | "messages:write" | "functions:invoke" | "ai:infer";
+/** All valid {@link Scope}s, in canonical order. */
+declare const ACCESS_TOKEN_SCOPES: Scope[];
+/** A token as returned by {@link AccessTokensNamespace.list} (never the plaintext). */
+interface AccessTokenInfo {
+    keyId: string;
+    env: "live" | "test";
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Epoch ms, or absent if the token never expires. */
+    expiresAt?: number;
+    label?: string;
+    createdAt: number;
+    revoked: boolean;
+    /** True once past {@link expiresAt}. */
+    expired: boolean;
+}
+/** The editor-settable fields when minting an access token. */
+interface CreateAccessTokenInput {
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Defaults to `live` on the accelerator. */
+    env?: "live" | "test";
+    /** Omit for a non-expiring token. */
+    expiresInDays?: number;
+    label?: string;
+}
+/** Create response — includes the one-time {@link plaintext} secret. */
+interface CreatedAccessToken {
+    keyId: string;
+    env: "live" | "test";
+    /** The `mk_<env>_at_…` secret. Returned ONCE — store it now. */
+    plaintext: string;
+    scopes: string[];
+    expiresAt: number;
+    label?: string;
+    createdAt: number;
+}
+interface AccessTokensNamespaceDeps {
+    http: HttpClient;
+}
+declare class AccessTokensNamespace {
+    private readonly deps;
+    constructor(deps: AccessTokensNamespaceDeps);
+    /** List the app's access tokens (metadata only — never the plaintext). */
+    list(appId: string): Promise<AccessTokenInfo[]>;
+    /** Mint an access token (owner/editor only). The plaintext is returned once. */
+    create(appId: string, input: CreateAccessTokenInput): Promise<CreatedAccessToken>;
+    /** Revoke an access token by its `keyId`. */
+    revoke(appId: string, keyId: string): Promise<{
+        revoked: boolean;
+    }>;
+    private path;
+}
+
 /** The hosted Muhkoo Accelerator — the default {@link ClientOptions.baseUrl}. */
 declare const DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.muhkoo.dev";
 /** The hosted auth SPA — the default {@link ClientOptions.authBaseUrl}. */
@@ -4819,6 +5038,15 @@ interface ClientOptions {
      * New integrations should always pass one.
      */
     apiKey?: string;
+    /**
+     * A scoped, expiring **access token** (`mk_<env>_at_…`) — the non-ZK
+     * machine-to-machine credential. It resolves through the SAME accelerator
+     * path as {@link apiKey} (both ride the `X-Muhkoo-Key` header) and, when
+     * set, takes precedence over it. Use it for server-side / CI callers that
+     * shouldn't carry the app's publishable key. Mint one with
+     * `client.accessTokens.create(...)`.
+     */
+    accessToken?: string;
     /**
      * Absolute URL of the accelerator (trailing slash optional). Defaults to
      * the hosted Muhkoo Accelerator ({@link DEFAULT_BASE_URL}); override to
@@ -4900,6 +5128,8 @@ declare class Client {
     readonly agents: AgentsNamespace;
     /** Serverless functions — `client.functions.deploy(appId, …)`, etc. */
     readonly functions: FunctionsNamespace;
+    /** Access tokens — `client.accessTokens.create(appId, …)`, etc. */
+    readonly accessTokens: AccessTokensNamespace;
     /** Offline cache + sync — `client.offline.status`, `client.offline.snapshot`, etc. */
     readonly offline: OfflineManager;
     private readonly session;
@@ -4934,6 +5164,75 @@ declare class Client {
     recoverSession(): Promise<boolean>;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Passkey factor (M1.1) — WebAuthn with the **PRF extension**.
+ *
+ * A passkey becomes a device-bound, platform-synced source of a stable secret:
+ * for a fixed salt, the authenticator's PRF returns the same 32 bytes, which we
+ * HKDF into an AES key that wraps the master seed. The server never sees the
+ * passkey — it's purely a local key source; the ZK proof remains the server auth.
+ *
+ * BROWSER ONLY (`navigator.credentials`). The PRF extension fields aren't in the
+ * standard DOM types yet, so they're reached through narrow casts.
+ */
+/** Whether this environment can do WebAuthn at all. (PRF support is checked at enroll.) */
+declare function passkeySupported(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Whether this browser's authenticator can do the **PRF extension** our passkey
+ * factor needs. A browser can save passkeys (e.g. for password autofill) yet not
+ * expose PRF — PRF is what derives the stable secret we wrap the seed under, so a
+ * passkey without it is useless to us.
+ *
+ * Uses `PublicKeyCredential.getClientCapabilities()` (the `extension:prf` cap)
+ * where available. Returns:
+ *   - `true`  — PRF is supported,
+ *   - `false` — definitively NOT supported (hide the option),
+ *   - `null`  — couldn't determine (older browser without the capabilities API);
+ *              the caller may optimistically allow and let enroll surface a real
+ *              error if it turns out PRF isn't there.
+ */
+declare function passkeyPrfCapable(): Promise<boolean | null>;
+/** Best-effort registrable RP id — the host. Apps spanning subdomains should pass
+ *  the parent domain (e.g. "muhkoo.dev") explicitly. */
+declare function defaultRpId(): string;
+/**
+ * Can a passkey enrolled under `rpId` be used from the CURRENT origin?
+ *
+ * WebAuthn only accepts an RP id that is the origin's own host or a registrable
+ * *parent* of it — so a passkey enrolled on `app.example.com` is unusable on
+ * `app.example.net`, and one enrolled on a full host is unusable from a sibling
+ * host. An app served on BOTH a custom domain and the platform host therefore
+ * needs one passkey per origin.
+ *
+ * Call this BEFORE `navigator.credentials.get()`: passing a foreign rpId throws
+ * a raw "The requested RPID did not match the origin or related origins", which
+ * is a dead end for the user. Checking first lets the caller fall back to normal
+ * sign-in (and offer to enroll a passkey for this origin) instead.
+ */
+declare function rpIdUsableForOrigin(rpId: string | undefined | null, host?: string): boolean;
+/** Thrown when the account's passkey belongs to a different origin. Callers
+ *  should treat this as "no passkey here" and fall back to another factor. */
+declare class PasskeyOriginError extends Error {
+    readonly code = "passkey_wrong_origin";
+    constructor(message?: string);
+}
+interface PasskeyEnrollment {
+    credentialId: Uint8Array;
+    prfSalt: Uint8Array;
+    prfOutput: Uint8Array;
+}
+/**
+ * Create a passkey with PRF and return its credential id, a fresh PRF salt, and
+ * the PRF output for that salt. Throws if the authenticator can't do PRF.
+ */
+declare function createPasskeyWithPrf(opts: {
+    rpId: string;
+    rpName: string;
+    username: string;
+}): Promise<PasskeyEnrollment>;
+/** Evaluate a passkey's PRF for `salt` → 32 bytes. Used at recover/login. */
+declare function evaluatePasskeyPrf(rpId: string, credentialId: Uint8Array, salt: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+
 /**
  * Muhkoo app decorators — declare your app's agent-facing surface in code, then
  * "eject" a system prompt you hand to a Programmable Agent.
@@ -4996,6 +5295,11 @@ interface MuhkooDBMeta {
     table?: string;
     /** Read-only by default. */
     access?: MuhkooDBAccess;
+    /**
+     * Backend-only table — omitted from {@link ejectAgentPrompt}. Use for tables
+     * an agent should never be told about (server-managed / internal state).
+     */
+    backend?: boolean;
     description: string;
 }
 /** A serverless function the agent can invoke via `call_function`. */
@@ -5012,6 +5316,7 @@ interface TableEntry {
     table: string;
     access: MuhkooDBAccess;
     description: string;
+    backend: boolean;
 }
 interface FunctionEntry {
     name: string;
@@ -5832,5 +6137,5 @@ declare class KeyringClient implements KeyringTransport {
     fetchMetadata(): Promise<SpaceMetadata | null>;
 }
 
-export { AES_GCM_IV_BYTES, AES_GCM_KEY_BYTES, AES_GCM_TAG_BYTES, AgentsNamespace, AuthClient, AuthNamespace, AuthPublicInput, Authenticator, BlockEngine, BroadcastChannel, BroadcastChannelEvents, ChannelExistsError, ChannelNotFoundError, ChunkCipher, Client, ConnectivityManager, DEFAULT_AUTH_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_FN_HOST_SUFFIX, DbCache, DoubleRatchet, DoubleRatchetCipher, DoubleRatchetManager, EncryptedSession, EventCore, EventCoreEvents, Field, Field as FieldElement, FileStorage, FunctionsNamespace, HLC, HashKnowledge, HttpClient, HttpError, IndexedDbStore, KEEPER_MEMBER_ID, KeyStore, KeyringClient, KvCache, KvNamespace, LocalEngineHost, LocalStorageSessionStore, MemorySessionStore, Message, Message as MessageDefault, MessageNamespace, MuhkooAgent, MuhkooDB, MuhkooFunction, MuhkooSpace, NoopStore, OfflineLockedError, OfflineManager, OutboundQueue, P2P_SUBJECT, PBKDF2_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, PREIMAGE_POK_VERIFICATION_KEY, Packet, PeerExchange, PeerNetwork, PersonalSpaceClient, Poseidon, PreimagePoK, ReedSolomonCodec, Space as Room, SerializeMessage, SessionState, ShardCache, ShardClient, SharedSpaceClient, SnapshotNamespace, Space, SpaceCache, SpaceKeyring, SpaceNamespace, SpacePacketCipher, SpaceSignaler, StorageNamespace, SyncEngine, VaultUnavailableError, WSTransport, WebRtcTransport, WorkerEngineHost, ZERO_HLC, ZkAuth, buildCommitment, compareHlc, compilePrograms, decodeFromHex, decorators, decryptAesGcm, defaultCircuitUrls, defaultSessionStore, deleteBeatsWrite, deleteRegister, deriveAesKeyFromPassphrase, deriveBitsHkdf, deriveIdentity, deriveIdentityFromSeed, deriveMasterSeedFromPassword, ejectAgentPrompt, ejectAgentTools, emptyMap, emptyRegister, encodeToHex, encryptAesGcm, exportPublicKeyBase64, exportPublicKeyHex, generateAuthProof, generatePkce, getMuhkooAppDescriptor, getSubtle, initBn128Wasm, initRsWasm, initializeCircuits, isNewer, isOfflineCapable, isP2pCapable, isProvisional, manifestToStat, materializeRow, mergeMap, mergeMessage, mergeRegister, messageKey, pack, padHandle, poseidonHash, protocol, provisionalHandle, quickVerify, randomBytes, randomState, sealSeed, shardHash, signMessage, stableStringify, toField, tombstoneRow, unpack, unsealSeed, unwrapWithPassphrase, verify, verifyGroth16, verifyHashKnowledge, verifyPreimagePoK, wrapWithPassphrase, writeBeatsTombstone, writeColumns, writeRegister };
-export type { ACL, ACLEntry, AgentConfig, AgentCreateInput, AgentDbToolMode, AgentProvisioned, AgentScopeOpts, AgentSkill, AgentToolsConfig, AgentTrigger, AgentTriggerType, AgentUpdateInput, AgentsNamespaceDeps, AttachedPeerNetwork, AuthClientOptions, AuthKeyPair, AuthSuccess, AuthToken, AuthType, AuthUser, BlockStore, Bn128WasmInstance, BroadcastChannelEvent, BroadcastChannelOptions, CachedSpaceMessage, ChannelLike, ChunkKeyMaterial, ChunkManifest, CipherFrame, CipherMessage, CipherMessageHeader, CircuitBufferConfig, CircuitUrls, ClientOptions, ConnectivityOptions, ConnectivityState, DbQueryPage, DehydratedKeypair, DehydratedKeys, DoubleRatchetCipherDeps, ECDHCurve, EncodeResult, EngineHandle, EngineHost, EphemeralEvent, EpochKeyProvider, FileManifest, FileNamespaceDeps, FileStat, FileStorageOptions, FunctionCaps, FunctionConfig, FunctionDeployInput, FunctionInvokeOptions, FunctionScopeOpts, FunctionTrigger, FunctionTriggerType, FunctionTriggers, FunctionUpdateInput, FunctionsNamespaceDeps, Groth16Proof, Hasher, HlcParts, HlcState, HttpClientOptions, IncomingFrame, KeyExchangeFrame, KeyPair, Keypair, KeyringClientDeps, KeyringTransport, KvEntry, KvNamespaceDeps, LoginOptions, LwwMap, LwwRegister, MessageBody, MessageDeletedEvent, MessageEntry, MessageEvent, MessageHeaders, MessageNamespaceDeps, MessageOp, MessageOptions, MessageSubscription, MuhkooAgentMeta, MuhkooAgentToolsConfig, MuhkooAppDescriptor, MuhkooDBAccess, MuhkooDBMeta, MuhkooFunctionMeta, MuhkooMessageEvent, MuhkooSpaceMeta, OAuthProvider, OfflineEntry, OfflineManagerDeps, OfflineStore, OutSink, PacketCipher, PacketHeaders, PacketOptions, Participant, PeerBlockSource, PeerExchangeOptions, PeerId, PeerNetworkOptions, PeerTransport, Permission, PermissionCheckRequest, PermissionCheckResult, PersonalSpaceClientOptions, Pkce, PublicKeyJWK, QueueEntry, RatchetState, ReceiveResult, RegisterParams, Replayer, Role, SpaceDeps as RoomDeps, SpaceFileMetadata as RoomFileMetadata, SealedHandoff, SealedHeaders, Session, SessionOptions, SessionStore, SetOptions, ShardByteCache, ShardClientOptions, SharedSpaceClientOptions, SignalEnvelope, SignalKind, SignalingSpace, SnapshotNamespaceDeps, SnarkProof, SpaceChannelLike, SpaceCursor, SpaceDeps, SpaceFileMetadata, SpaceKeyCache, SpaceKeyringDeps, SpaceMessageEvent, SpaceNamespaceDeps, SpaceOfflineAdapter, StorageChangeEvent, StoreName, StoredSession, Subscription, UserIdentity, VaultFactor, VerificationKey, WSMessage, WSMessageType, WSTransportOptions, WebRtcTransportOptions, WrappedPayload, WriteFileInput, WriteFileOptions, WriteToShardsInput, ZkAuthDeps, ZkAuthenticateRequest, ZkChallengeResponse, ZkCompiled, ZkIdentity, ZkRegisterRequest, ZkRegisterResponse };
+export { ACCESS_TOKEN_SCOPES, AES_GCM_IV_BYTES, AES_GCM_KEY_BYTES, AES_GCM_TAG_BYTES, AccessTokensNamespace, AgentsNamespace, AuthClient, AuthNamespace, AuthPublicInput, Authenticator, BlockEngine, BroadcastChannel, BroadcastChannelEvents, ChannelExistsError, ChannelNotFoundError, ChunkCipher, Client, ConnectivityManager, DEFAULT_AUTH_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_FN_HOST_SUFFIX, DbCache, DoubleRatchet, DoubleRatchetCipher, DoubleRatchetManager, EncryptedSession, EventCore, EventCoreEvents, Field, Field as FieldElement, FileStorage, FunctionsNamespace, HLC, HashKnowledge, HttpClient, HttpError, IndexedDbStore, KEEPER_MEMBER_ID, KeyStore, KeyringClient, KvCache, KvNamespace, LocalEngineHost, LocalStorageSessionStore, MemorySessionStore, Message, Message as MessageDefault, MessageNamespace, MuhkooAgent, MuhkooDB, MuhkooFunction, MuhkooSpace, NoopStore, OfflineLockedError, OfflineManager, OutboundQueue, P2P_SUBJECT, PAIRING_CODE_ALPHABET, PAIRING_CODE_LENGTH, PBKDF2_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, PREIMAGE_POK_VERIFICATION_KEY, Packet, PasskeyOriginError, PeerExchange, PeerNetwork, PersonalSpaceClient, Poseidon, PreimagePoK, ReedSolomonCodec, Space as Room, SerializeMessage, SessionState, ShardCache, ShardClient, SharedSpaceClient, SnapshotNamespace, Space, SpaceCache, SpaceKeyring, SpaceNamespace, SpacePacketCipher, SpaceSignaler, StorageNamespace, SyncEngine, VaultUnavailableError, WSTransport, WebRtcTransport, WorkerEngineHost, ZERO_HLC, ZkAuth, buildCommitment, compareHlc, compilePrograms, createPasskeyWithPrf, decodeFromHex, decorators, decryptAesGcm, defaultCircuitUrls, defaultRpId, defaultSessionStore, deleteBeatsWrite, deleteRegister, deriveAesKeyFromPassphrase, deriveBitsHkdf, deriveIdentity, deriveIdentityFromSeed, deriveMasterSeedFromPassword, ejectAgentPrompt, ejectAgentTools, emptyMap, emptyRegister, encodeToHex, encryptAesGcm, evaluatePasskeyPrf, exportPublicKeyBase64, exportPublicKeyHex, generateAuthProof, generateDevicePairingKeypair, generatePkce, getMuhkooAppDescriptor, getSubtle, initBn128Wasm, initRsWasm, initializeCircuits, isNewer, isOfflineCapable, isP2pCapable, isProvisional, manifestToStat, materializeRow, mergeMap, mergeMessage, mergeRegister, messageKey, pack, padHandle, pairingVerificationCode, passkeyPrfCapable, passkeySupported, poseidonHash, protocol, provisionalHandle, quickVerify, randomBytes, randomState, rpIdUsableForOrigin, sealSeed, sealSeedToDevice, shardHash, signMessage, stableStringify, toField, tombstoneRow, unpack, unsealSeed, unsealSeedFromDevice, unwrapWithPassphrase, verify, verifyGroth16, verifyHashKnowledge, verifyPreimagePoK, wrapWithPassphrase, writeBeatsTombstone, writeColumns, writeRegister };
+export type { ACL, ACLEntry, AccessTokenInfo, AccessTokensNamespaceDeps, AgentConfig, AgentCreateInput, AgentDbToolMode, AgentProvisioned, AgentScopeOpts, AgentSkill, AgentToolsConfig, AgentTrigger, AgentTriggerType, AgentUpdateInput, AgentsNamespaceDeps, AttachedPeerNetwork, AuthClientOptions, AuthKeyPair, AuthSuccess, AuthToken, AuthType, AuthUser, BlockStore, Bn128WasmInstance, BroadcastChannelEvent, BroadcastChannelOptions, CachedSpaceMessage, ChannelLike, ChunkKeyMaterial, ChunkManifest, CipherFrame, CipherMessage, CipherMessageHeader, CircuitBufferConfig, CircuitUrls, ClientOptions, ConnectivityOptions, ConnectivityState, CreateAccessTokenInput, CreatedAccessToken, DbQueryPage, DehydratedKeypair, DehydratedKeys, DevicePairingKeypair, DoubleRatchetCipherDeps, ECDHCurve, EncodeResult, EngineHandle, EngineHost, EphemeralEvent, EpochKeyProvider, FileManifest, FileNamespaceDeps, FileStat, FileStorageOptions, FunctionCaps, FunctionConfig, FunctionDeployInput, FunctionInvokeOptions, FunctionScopeOpts, FunctionTrigger, FunctionTriggerType, FunctionTriggers, FunctionUpdateInput, FunctionsNamespaceDeps, Groth16Proof, Hasher, HlcParts, HlcState, HttpClientOptions, IncomingFrame, KeyExchangeFrame, KeyPair, Keypair, KeyringClientDeps, KeyringTransport, KvEntry, KvNamespaceDeps, LoginOptions, LwwMap, LwwRegister, MessageBody, MessageDeletedEvent, MessageEntry, MessageEvent, MessageHeaders, MessageNamespaceDeps, MessageOp, MessageOptions, MessageSubscription, MuhkooAgentMeta, MuhkooAgentToolsConfig, MuhkooAppDescriptor, MuhkooDBAccess, MuhkooDBMeta, MuhkooFunctionMeta, MuhkooMessageEvent, MuhkooSpaceMeta, OAuthProvider, OfflineEntry, OfflineManagerDeps, OfflineStore, OutSink, PacketCipher, PacketHeaders, PacketOptions, Participant, PasskeyEnrollment, PeerBlockSource, PeerExchangeOptions, PeerId, PeerNetworkOptions, PeerTransport, Permission, PermissionCheckRequest, PermissionCheckResult, PersonalSpaceClientOptions, Pkce, PublicKeyJWK, QueueEntry, RatchetState, ReceiveResult, RegisterParams, Replayer, Role, SpaceDeps as RoomDeps, SpaceFileMetadata as RoomFileMetadata, Scope, SealedHandoff, SealedHeaders, Session, SessionOptions, SessionStore, SetOptions, ShardByteCache, ShardClientOptions, SharedSpaceClientOptions, SignalEnvelope, SignalKind, SignalingSpace, SnapshotNamespaceDeps, SnarkProof, SpaceChannelLike, SpaceCursor, SpaceDeps, SpaceFileMetadata, SpaceKeyCache, SpaceKeyringDeps, SpaceMessageEvent, SpaceNamespaceDeps, SpaceOfflineAdapter, StorageChangeEvent, StoreName, StoredSession, Subscription, UserIdentity, VaultFactor, VerificationKey, WSMessage, WSMessageType, WSTransportOptions, WebRtcTransportOptions, WrappedPayload, WriteFileInput, WriteFileOptions, WriteToShardsInput, ZkAuthDeps, ZkAuthenticateRequest, ZkChallengeResponse, ZkCompiled, ZkIdentity, ZkRegisterRequest, ZkRegisterResponse };