@mseep/open-computer-use 1.0.0

package/.coderabbit.yaml

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+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://coderabbit.ai/integrations/schema.v2.json
+#
+# CodeRabbit configuration for open-computer-use.
+#
+# Enables CodeRabbit auto-review on PRs targeting `next/v1` (the long-lived
+# enterprise architecture branch) in addition to `main` (the repo default).
+# Without this, CodeRabbit auto-reviews only PRs targeting the default
+# branch and posts "Auto reviews are disabled on base/target branches other
+# than the default branch" on PRs to `next/v1`.
+#
+# Reference: https://docs.coderabbit.ai/reference/yaml-template
+language: en
+reviews:
+  profile: chill
+  request_changes_workflow: false
+  high_level_summary: true
+  poem: false
+  review_status: true
+  collapse_walkthrough: false
+  auto_review:
+    enabled: true
+    drafts: false
+    base_branches:
+      - main
+      - next/v1

package/.dockerignore

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+# Git
+.git
+.gitignore
+.gitattributes
+
+# Archive and backup
+.archive-original/
+*.zip
+*.tar
+*.tar.gz
+*.tgz
+*.rar
+*.7z
+
+# Documentation (not needed in image)
+README.md
+LICENSE
+CHANGELOG.md
+docs/
+*.md
+!requirements.txt
+
+# IDE and editors
+.vscode/
+.idea/
+*.swp
+*.swo
+*~
+.DS_Store
+
+# Python
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+*$py.class
+*.so
+.Python
+venv/
+env/
+ENV/
+*.egg-info/
+dist/
+build/
+
+# Node
+node_modules/
+npm-debug.log*
+yarn-debug.log*
+yarn-error.log*
+package-lock.json
+yarn.lock
+
+# Data directories (data/ mounted as volumes, skills/ copied into image)
+data/
+# skills/ - NOT ignored, copied into image
+
+# Docker
+docker-compose.yml
+.dockerignore
+
+# Environment files
+.env
+.env.local
+.env.*.local
+
+# Logs
+*.log
+logs/
+
+# Test files
+test/
+tests/
+*.test.js
+*.spec.js
+*.test.py
+*.spec.py
+
+# CI/CD
+.github/
+.gitlab-ci.yml
+.travis.yml
+Jenkinsfile
+
+# Temporary files
+tmp/
+temp/
+*.tmp
+
+# Claude Code settings
+.claude/
+
+# Scripts not needed during build
+scripts/
+
+# Setup script (not needed in image)
+setup.sh

package/.env.example

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+# Open Computer Use — environment variables
+# Copy this file to `.env` and fill in the REQUIRED block below.
+# Sections are sorted by how often you actually change them.
+
+# ============================================================
+# REQUIRED — without these the system won't work
+# ============================================================
+
+# Admin account created on first Open WebUI startup. CHANGE BOTH.
+ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@open-computer-use.dev
+ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
+
+# Open WebUI session signing key. Generate: openssl rand -hex 32
+WEBUI_SECRET_KEY=change-me
+
+# PUBLIC_BASE_URL — browser-reachable URL of the Computer Use Server.
+# Must be a hostname YOUR BROWSER can reach, not Docker DNS.
+# Example:  http://your-host.lan:8081  or  https://compute.example.com
+#
+# This is the single source of truth for the public URL:
+#   • Baked into the /system-prompt text so the model writes correct file URLs.
+#   • Returned to the Open WebUI filter via the X-Public-Base-URL response
+#     header on /system-prompt — filter decorates iframe/archive links with it.
+# The filter no longer has its own public-URL Valve. See docs/openwebui-filter.md.
+PUBLIC_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8081
+
+# NOTE: Open WebUI needs 4 env vars on its own container AND 1 build-arg, AND
+# it must be built from openwebui/Dockerfile (not pulled from
+# ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui) for the patches to apply.
+# See README.md → "Required setup when embedding Open WebUI into your own stack".
+
+# LLM provider — any OpenAI-compatible API (OpenAI, OpenRouter, LiteLLM, ...)
+OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
+# OPENAI_API_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
+
+# MCP endpoint auth token. Empty = no auth. Set for anything beyond local dev.
+MCP_API_KEY=
+
+# PostgreSQL password for the embedded DB. Change for production.
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=openwebui
+
+
+# ============================================================
+# OPTIONAL FEATURES — enable as a group (all or nothing)
+# ============================================================
+
+# --- Vision (for describe-image skill) ---
+# Uncomment ALL THREE to enable:
+# VISION_API_KEY=
+# VISION_API_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
+# VISION_MODEL=gpt-4o
+
+# --- Claude Code sub-agent ---
+# Uncomment ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN to enable the sub_agent() tool:
+# ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=
+# ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://api.anthropic.com
+
+# --- Optional: Multi-CLI sub-agent runtime (v0.9.2.1+) ---
+# SUBAGENT_CLI selects which CLI runs sub-agent calls. Default unset = claude.
+# Accepted: claude | codex | opencode. Invalid value → orchestrator refuses to start.
+# See docs/multi-cli.md for the full guide + worked OpenCode + qwen3-coder + OpenRouter recipe.
+# SUBAGENT_CLI=
+
+# Per-CLI auth (set only the ones for your active SUBAGENT_CLI):
+#   SUBAGENT_CLI=claude    → uses ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN above (no extra setup)
+#   SUBAGENT_CLI=codex     → set OPENAI_API_KEY (and optionally OPENAI_BASE_URL for gateways):
+# OPENAI_API_KEY=
+# OPENAI_BASE_URL=
+# CODEX_SUB_AGENT_DEFAULT_MODEL=
+#   SUBAGENT_CLI=opencode  → set OPENROUTER_API_KEY (or OPENAI_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_API_KEY):
+# OPENROUTER_API_KEY=
+# OPENCODE_SUB_AGENT_DEFAULT_MODEL=openrouter/qwen/qwen-3-coder
+
+# --- External skill/token provider (GitLab tokens, custom skills) ---
+# Both must be set together, or leave empty for stock behaviour:
+# MCP_TOKENS_URL=
+# MCP_TOKENS_API_KEY=
+
+
+# ============================================================
+# TUNING — change only if you know why
+# ============================================================
+
+# Ports
+# MCP_PORT=8081
+# OPENWEBUI_PORT=3000
+
+# Workspace image + per-container resource limits
+# DOCKER_IMAGE=open-computer-use:latest
+# CONTAINER_MEM_LIMIT=2g
+# CONTAINER_CPU_LIMIT=1.0
+
+# Timeouts (seconds)
+# COMMAND_TIMEOUT=120
+# SUB_AGENT_TIMEOUT=3600
+
+# Single-user mode:
+#   unset = lenient (default container + warning when X-Chat-Id missing)
+#   true  = single container, no chat ID required
+#   false = strict multi-user, X-Chat-Id required
+# SINGLE_USER_MODE=
+
+# Tool-result truncation (prevents context-window blowouts on big outputs)
+# TOOL_RESULT_MAX_CHARS=50000
+# TOOL_RESULT_PREVIEW_CHARS=2000
+
+# Sub-agent tuning
+# SUB_AGENT_DEFAULT_MODEL=sonnet
+# SUB_AGENT_MAX_TURNS=25
+
+# Housekeeping (stale-container / stale-data cleanup)
+# CONTAINER_MAX_AGE_HOURS=24
+# DATA_MAX_AGE_DAYS=7
+
+
+# ============================================================
+# GATEWAY DEPLOY — only when routing Claude through a proxy/gateway
+# ============================================================
+# All of these pass through to the sandbox. Leave ALL commented for
+# standard Anthropic API. Uncomment as a group for gateway deploys.
+# ANTHROPIC_MODEL=
+# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL=
+# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL=
+# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL=
+# CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL=
+# CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_BETAS=
+# DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHING=
+# DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_SONNET=
+# DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_OPUS=
+# DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_HAIKU=
+
+
+# ============================================================
+# ADVANCED (rarely changed; for custom deploys)
+# ============================================================
+# OPENWEBUI_VERSION=0.8.12
+# ENABLE_OPENAI_API_SSL_VERIFY=true

package/.githooks/pre-commit

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+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
+# Copyright (c) 2025 Open Computer Use Contributors
+# Block commits containing Cyrillic characters.
+#
+# Repo policy (CLAUDE.md): English-only. No exceptions.
+#
+# Activation (one-time per clone):
+#   git config core.hooksPath .githooks
+#
+# To bypass for a specific commit (e.g. importing fixtures): git commit --no-verify
+# Do NOT use --no-verify casually.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Skip vendored / minified / generated paths and the test scripts that
+# intentionally contain non-ASCII patterns.
+SKIP_PATTERN='^(\.planning/|.*\.min\.js$|.*/locale\.js$|tests/test-no-cyrillic\.sh$)'
+
+# Collect staged files (added / copied / modified / renamed).
+STAGED=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR)
+[ -z "$STAGED" ] && exit 0
+
+# Filter out skipped files + binaries.
+TO_CHECK=()
+while IFS= read -r f; do
+    [ -z "$f" ] && continue
+    [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+    if echo "$f" | grep -qE "$SKIP_PATTERN"; then
+        continue
+    fi
+    if file --mime "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'charset=binary'; then
+        continue
+    fi
+    TO_CHECK+=("$f")
+done <<< "$STAGED"
+
+[ ${#TO_CHECK[@]} -eq 0 ] && exit 0
+
+# Scan staged content via Python (BSD grep on macOS has no PCRE).
+python3 - "${TO_CHECK[@]}" <<'PY' || exit 1
+import re, subprocess, sys
+
+CYR = re.compile(r'[\u0400-\u04FF]')
+bad = []
+
+for path in sys.argv[1:]:
+    try:
+        blob = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'show', f':{path}'], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+        text = blob.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
+    except Exception:
+        continue
+    for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
+        if CYR.search(line):
+            bad.append((path, lineno, line.rstrip()))
+
+if not bad:
+    sys.exit(0)
+
+print("ERROR: Cyrillic characters in staged content. Repo is English-only (CLAUDE.md).\n")
+for path, lineno, line in bad[:30]:
+    print(f"  {path}:{lineno}: {line}")
+if len(bad) > 30:
+    print(f"  ... and {len(bad) - 30} more")
+print("\nRewrite the affected lines in English, then re-stage and re-commit.")
+print("Bypass (only if you have a reason): git commit --no-verify")
+sys.exit(1)
+PY

package/.github/CODEOWNERS

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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: FSL-1.1-Apache-2.0
+# Copyright (c) 2025 Open Computer Use Contributors
+#
+# CODEOWNERS — review routing for the next/v1 architecture work.
+#
+# Per CLAUDE.md "Testing & QA discipline → Code-review discipline":
+#   "CODEOWNERS routes every PR to the right reviewer."
+#
+# Order matters: the LAST matching pattern wins for each file. Place
+# narrower patterns lower.
+#
+# Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/about-code-owners
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Default fallback — every file routes here unless overridden below.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*                                       @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Architecture work on next/v1 — bank-readiness territory.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# The Manifesto and its expanded sections — the load-bearing principles.
+/docs/architecture/MANIFESTO.md         @Wide-Moat/architects
+/docs/architecture/manifesto/           @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# ADRs — both the architects team and the original author (set per-ADR via
+# the `owner:` front-matter; GitHub doesn't read YAML, so we route the dir
+# to architects and rely on PROCESS.md to ensure the ADR author is also
+# requested as reviewer).
+/docs/architecture/adr/                 @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# Component specifications — architects review structurally, the component's
+# named owner (per spec front-matter) is added per-PR by PROCESS.md.
+/docs/architecture/components/          @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# Compliance mappings — security team's domain.
+/docs/architecture/compliance/          @Wide-Moat/security
+
+# Diagrams (Mermaid sources) — architects.
+/docs/architecture/diagrams/            @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# Glossary and PROCESS — architects (low traffic, high consistency cost).
+/docs/architecture/glossary.md          @Wide-Moat/architects
+/docs/architecture/PROCESS.md           @Wide-Moat/architects
+/docs/architecture/README.md            @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# CI, security, and supply-chain plumbing — security team owns the gates.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/.github/workflows/security.yml         @Wide-Moat/security
+/.github/workflows/supply-chain.yml     @Wide-Moat/security
+/.github/workflows/docs-lint.yml        @Wide-Moat/architects
+/.github/security-exceptions.yml        @Wide-Moat/security
+/.github/CODEOWNERS                     @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/architects
+/.vale/                                 @Wide-Moat/architects
+/.markdownlint.yaml                     @Wide-Moat/architects
+/.coderabbit.yaml                       @Wide-Moat/architects
+/lychee.toml                            @Wide-Moat/architects
+/scripts/docs-lint/                     @Wide-Moat/architects
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Licensing and project-instructions surface — needs careful change-control.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/LICENSE                                @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+/NOTICE                                 @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+/CLAUDE.md                              @Wide-Moat/architects @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md                @Wide-Moat/security
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# High-risk runtime + deployment surface — security review mandatory.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Sandbox base image; Docker socket; agent runtime — single highest-risk
+# file in the repo.
+/Dockerfile                             @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Deployment recipes — anyone landing here is shipping infra changes.
+/docker-compose.yml                     @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+/docker-compose.webui.yml               @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+/docker-compose.test.yml                @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+
+# Supply-chain entry points — dependency churn is a security event.
+/requirements.txt                       @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/package.json                           @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/package-lock.json                      @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/server.json                            @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Helm chart — bank deployment substrate, scanned by checkov.
+/helm/                                  @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/security
+
+# Orchestrator components — they hold the Docker socket.
+/computer-use-server/                   @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/openwebui/                             @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/settings-wrapper/                      @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/skills/                                @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/cron/                                  @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Shell scripts outside docs-lint — privileged execution paths.
+/scripts/                               @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/tests/                                 @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# All build/release/CI workflows — same blast radius as security.yml.
+/.github/workflows/build.yml            @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/.github/workflows/release.yml          @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/.github/workflows/release-chart.yml    @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/.github/workflows/helm.yml             @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+/.github/workflows/codeql.yml           @Wide-Moat/security
+
+# Dependency-bump automation — security + maintainers. Dependency bumps
+# break lockfiles, not just SBOMs, so build needs to sign off too.
+/.github/dependabot.yml                 @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Issue + advisory surface.
+/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/                @Wide-Moat/maintainers @Wide-Moat/architects
+# Dual-team on SECURITY.md so an out-of-office on one side does not
+# block a security policy edit.
+/SECURITY.md                            @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Secret-scanner allowlist — every edit is a potential gate bypass.
+# Dual-team for the same out-of-office reason.
+/.gitleaks.toml                         @Wide-Moat/security @Wide-Moat/maintainers
+
+# Release log.
+/CHANGELOG.md                           @Wide-Moat/maintainers

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/adr-proposal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+name: ADR proposal
+about: Propose an architecture decision
+title: "Decision: <title>"
+labels: ["architecture", "adr-proposal", "next/v1"]
+assignees: []
+---
+
+<!--
+Per docs/architecture/PROCESS.md "Adding an ADR (3 steps)":
+  1. Open this issue.
+  2. Create adr/NNNN-<slug>.md from 0000-template.md (status: proposed).
+  3. Open PR. ADR moves to status: accepted only after PR merges.
+
+ADRs are reserved for decisions that are (a) load-bearing, (b) hard to
+reverse, or (c) cross ≥ 2 components. If your decision doesn't meet that
+bar, write it inline in the relevant component spec instead.
+-->
+
+## Question
+
+What's the decision being made? One sentence, no preamble.
+
+## Why is this an ADR (not an inline note)
+
+- [ ] Load-bearing — other components depend on it being decided.
+- [ ] Hard to reverse — undoing costs more than a typical refactor.
+- [ ] Cross-component — affects ≥ 2 components or boundaries.
+
+## Constraints
+
+NFRs, threat-model entries, prior ADRs, regulatory requirements that bound the decision.
+
+## Options (at least 2)
+
+1. **Option A** — sketch
+2. **Option B** — sketch
+
+## Compliance / license / threat-model impact (early read)
+
+Which framework controls might this affect? Any FSL dependency-policy interaction? Any threat-model entry it would mitigate?

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+name: Bug report
+about: Report something that's broken
+title: "[Bug] "
+labels: ["bug"]
+assignees: []
+---
+
+> ## ⛔ Stop — is this a security issue?
+>
+> Auth bypass, sandbox escape, credential exposure, RCE, or any other
+> finding that could be exploited against a deployment **must NOT be
+> filed here**. Use the private channel:
+>
+> <https://github.com/Wide-Moat/open-computer-use/security/advisories/new>
+>
+> Public bug reports do not get embargoed. Once submitted you cannot
+> un-disclose the finding.
+
+## What's broken
+
+One sentence stating the observed behaviour. No marketing tone, no preamble.
+
+## Steps to reproduce
+
+1.
+2.
+3.
+
+## Expected behaviour
+
+What you thought would happen.
+
+## Actual behaviour
+
+What actually happened. Include error output, stack traces, log lines.
+
+## Environment
+
+- Branch / version:
+- Deployment (Docker Compose / Helm / direct):
+- OS + arch:
+- Host kernel (`uname -a`):
+- Container runtime (runc / kata / gVisor):
+- Browser (if reporting an Open WebUI / Computer Use UI bug):
+
+## Notes
+
+Anything else the maintainer needs to reproduce.

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/component-proposal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+name: Component proposal
+about: Propose a new component for the next/v1 architecture
+title: "Component proposal: <name>"
+labels: ["architecture", "component-proposal", "next/v1"]
+assignees: []
+---
+
+<!--
+Per docs/architecture/PROCESS.md "Adding a component (3 steps)":
+  1. Open this issue.
+  2. Create components/<NN>-<name>.md stub from the template.
+  3. Open PR. Discuss in PR review.
+-->
+
+## Purpose
+
+One sentence: what role does this component play, and for whom?
+
+## Boundaries (sketch)
+
+What crosses in, what crosses out, what state does it own? Bullet points OK at this stage.
+
+## Why now (not later)
+
+What forces the decision now? If the answer is "in case", file this as a TBD instead.
+
+## NFRs / trust zones it interacts with
+
+Cite manifesto/02-nfrs.md entries or architecture/02-trust-boundaries.md zones it touches.
+
+## Dependencies (BoM impact)
+
+Does this introduce new third-party deps? List candidates and license — see CLAUDE.md "Dependency policy".
+
+## Anti-pattern alternatives
+
+What we explicitly will NOT do for this component.

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: FSL-1.1-Apache-2.0
+# Copyright (c) 2025 Open Computer Use Contributors
+#
+# Issue chooser configuration. Disables the free-form "Open a blank
+# issue" option so contributors pick a template — keeps backlog
+# triagable and matches PROCESS.md flows.
+
+blank_issues_enabled: false
+contact_links:
+  - name: Architecture discussion
+    url: https://github.com/Wide-Moat/open-computer-use/discussions/categories/architecture
+    about: For open-ended architecture discussion that isn't yet a concrete decision or component proposal. Promote to an issue once the question crystallizes.
+  - name: Security disclosure
+    url: https://github.com/Wide-Moat/open-computer-use/security/advisories/new
+    about: Report a security vulnerability privately. Do NOT open a public issue for security problems.

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/dependency-proposal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+name: Dependency proposal
+about: Propose a new third-party dependency (Bill of Materials)
+title: "Dependency proposal: <component> = <pick>"
+labels: ["architecture", "dependency", "next/v1"]
+assignees: []
+---
+
+<!--
+Per docs/architecture/PROCESS.md "Adding a dependency (Bill of Materials)":
+  1. Open this issue.
+  2. Add a row to manifesto/05-licensing-posture.md BoM.
+  3. Reject if any of: AGPL (any), BSL, BUSL (other than our own past
+     versions), SSPL, CC-NC, commercial-only-source, sole-maintainer
+     npm/PyPI without provenance.
+
+"Heavier and vendor-backed beats lighter and unknown."
+-->
+
+## What component this satisfies
+
+E.g. "identity provider", "secrets store", "egress proxy".
+
+## Proposed dependency
+
+- Name + repo URL:
+- Version pin (initial):
+- License:
+- Bundled or not-bundled (per CLAUDE.md "Dependency policy"):
+- Supply-chain attestation:
+  - [ ] SBOM published upstream
+  - [ ] Reproducible build documented
+  - [ ] Signed releases (Cosign / Sigstore / equivalent)
+  - [ ] Cosign-attested artifacts
+  - Fulcio certificate identity verified against (paste the
+    `--certificate-identity-regexp` you used):
+
+## Maintainer health (CLAUDE.md "Supply-chain gate")
+
+- Named maintainers in the last 12 months (`git shortlog -sne --since=12.months`):
+- Bus factor: how many people merged ≥ 5% of commits? **≥ 2 required.**
+- Last release date and cadence:
+- Open security advisories on the project:
+- Sole-maintainer? **REJECT** unless a foundation owns the namespace.
+
+## License gate
+
+- [ ] Apache-2.0, MIT, BSD-2/3, MPL-2.0, LGPL-2.1 (separate service), PostgreSQL ✓
+- [ ] AGPL (any), BSL, BUSL (not ours), SSPL, CC-NC, commercial-only — REJECT
+
+## Enterprise-grade check
+
+- [ ] Vendor-backed or named foundation (CNCF, ASF, OpenInfra, ...)?
+- [ ] Bank-audit-ready upstream maintenance posture?
+- [ ] Alternatives considered (≥ 1):
+
+## Anti-pattern alternatives we explicitly reject
+
+E.g. "we will not pin Vault (BUSL) directly — OpenBao instead."

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+name: Feature Request
+about: Suggest a new feature or improvement
+title: '[Feature] '
+labels: enhancement
+---
+
+## Problem
+What problem does this solve?
+
+## Proposed Solution
+How should it work?
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+Any other approaches you've thought about.