@mrciphersmith/keryx 0.3.5 → 0.3.7

package/src/gdskills/bundled/stacks/django/governance/eval.json

@@ -0,0 +1,1763 @@
+{
+  "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",
+  "reports": [
+    {
+      "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",
+      "skillId": "django/django-build-fix",
+      "strictness": "high",
+      "trials": 10,
+      "triggerAccuracy": {
+        "truePositive": 5,
+        "falsePositive": 1,
+        "positives": 7,
+        "negatives": 7
+      },
+      "evidence": "authored",
+      "scenarios": [
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "manage.py check is failing with ImproperlyConfigured, can you fix it",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "After merging release/2.1 into main, `makemigrations` reports two leaf nodes in the payments app's migration history for our Django project -- what's the right way to reconcile that before I merge?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Django app won't load, there's a circular import between two apps",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Type-checking chokes on `Invoice.objects` with an incompatible-type error even though django-stubs is installed -- any idea why?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "makemigrations wants to create a migration that conflicts with an existing one",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Pytest blows up before collecting a single test in our Django app -- traceback points to a bad import inside conftest.py. What's going on?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "ruff check is failing on this Django project",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Add a new feature to this Django view, the build is currently green",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Write more pytest-django tests for this already-passing view",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this Django migration for correctness, don't fix anything",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix this ModuleNotFoundError in our plain Python script with no Django",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix this FastAPI app that fails to start with a dependency resolution error",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix this failing Jest test in our React frontend",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "npm run build is failing in our Node.js service",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "migration-conflict-merge-not-hand-edit",
+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "Running `python manage.py makemigrations` fails with: 'Conflicting migrations detected; multiple leaf nodes in the migration graph: (0004_add_phone, 0004_add_address in accounts).' Fix it.",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 10,
+          "passes": 10,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "judge",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "trialRecords": [
+            {
+              "output": "The message means two migrations in `accounts` — `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` — both depend on the same parent (almost certainly `0003_...`), so the graph has two leaf nodes instead of one. This happens when two branches each added a `0004` migration independently and they got merged together. Django won't proceed until the graph has a single leaf per app.\n\nThe correct fix is to generate a merge migration — do not hand-edit `dependencies` or `operations` to force a resolution:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n```\n\nDjango will detect the two leaf nodes and generate something like `accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py` whose only content is:\n\n```python\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n    ]\n    operations = []\n```\n\nReview that generated merge before committing it. It should:\n- depend on exactly the two conflicting leaves (`0004_add_address` and `0004_add_phone`),\n- have an empty `operations` list (it's a pure graph join, not a schema change),\n- be named a `merge` migration or an auto-numbered migration whose name reflects the merge.\n\nIf `--merge` prompts interactively and you need it non-interactive, answer the prompt (choose \"yes\"/merge) rather than editing the file by hand.\n\nThen confirm the graph is single-leafed and the toolchain is green:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\n```\n\nA caveat on the root cause: if the two `0004` migrations actually touch **overlapping** schema (e.g. both alter the same field or table), the empty merge migration will make the graph consistent but the schema changes may still conflict or apply in an unintended order. In that case, don't just merge — inspect both migrations' `operations`, decide the intended final schema, and reconcile by editing/regenerating one of them (or the merge) so the resulting schema matches intent. The merge mechanism resolves the *graph* conflict; it does not by itself resolve a *schema* conflict.\n\nFor the pre-existing rows, nothing special is needed — a merge migration applies no SQL, so no data migration is required.\n\nWhy not the shortcuts: hand-editing `dependencies` to point one `0004` at the other fakes a linear history that never existed in environments where those migrations already ran, risking inconsistent migration state across the team/CI/prod; and skipping the `makemigrations --check` in CI only hides the drift. After the merge, verify `manage.py check`, `makemigrations --check --dry-run`, lint, type-check, and the test suite all exit 0, and that `git status` shows only the new merge migration (plus any genuine schema reconciliation), with no migration's `dependencies`/`operations` hand-edited.",
+              "outputSha256": "69b2382356e2c91c737e7d0a0a7c017b2a0672f0259ef78a70b50e60ec3990d7",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts` (criterion 1) and explicitly says 'Review that generated merge before committing it' with concrete review points (criterion 2). It warns against hand-editing dependencies rather than doing so, so no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "The error means two migrations in `accounts` — `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` — both branch off the same parent (probably both depend on `0003_*`), so the app now has two leaf nodes instead of one. This happens when two branches each add a migration from the same point. Fix it by generating a merge migration rather than touching `dependencies` by hand:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n```\n\nIf more than one app has the conflict, drop the app label and let it merge all of them:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge\n```\n\nThat produces something like `accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py` with both `0004` migrations in its `dependencies` and an empty `operations` list. **Open the generated file and confirm** it lists both `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` under `dependencies` and has no `operations` — if it does, it's a pure graph join and is safe.\n\nThen verify the graph is single-leafed and everything else is still green:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # should report no changes\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py migrate                            # apply the merge migration\npython manage.py test                               # or: pytest\n```\n\nIf `makemigrations --merge` complains it can't resolve automatically (e.g. the two branches also both altered the same field, a real semantic conflict), it will say so — in that case resolve the substantive field conflict in the generated migration's `operations` by hand, but only the actual field-level disagreement, not the `dependencies` graph, which the merge already joined correctly.\n\nDo **not** hand-edit either `0004`'s `dependencies` to point at the other, or delete one of them — that desyncs the migration graph from what has already been applied in other environments. The merge migration is the correct resolution.\n\nOnce `makemigrations --check --dry-run` reports no pending changes and `manage.py check` is clean, the conflict is fixed.",
+              "outputSha256": "cba8544eac82fab6b715b6f31fd6fd9038f0d734a3aaaef5560f2d09b113d046",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts` (and the no-label variant), satisfying criterion 1. Criterion 2 is met: it says 'Open the generated file and confirm' it lists both 0004s under dependencies and has no operations before applying. It explicitly warns against hand-editing dependencies, not committing that failure."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Fix: generate a merge migration rather than hand-editing `dependencies`.\n\n```\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge\n```\n\nThis detects the two leaf nodes (`accounts/migrations/0004_add_phone.py` and `accounts/migrations/0004_add_address.py`) that both branched from the same parent (`0003_...`), and creates a new `0005_merge_...` migration whose `dependencies` list references both leaves, collapsing the graph back to a single leaf.\n\nThen review the generated merge — it should contain an empty `operations` list and only the two `dependencies` entries. If it contains real operations, something is off in the branch state; investigate before committing.\n\nVerify:\n\n```\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nAll three must exit 0. `--check --dry-run` should now report \"No changes detected\" since the graph has one leaf again.\n\nDo not edit either `0004_*` file's `dependencies` to force one to point at the other. That would claim an ordering that didn't actually happen in the environment where the other migration already ran, desyncing the graph from applied state and producing exactly the kind of silent drift a merge migration exists to avoid.",
+              "outputSha256": "8ebcc2f532126a933b1fdd822d5cf21dece8486e4e7339bb33be33fd01617ad3",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge` (criterion 1) and explicitly says to review the generated merge before committing, checking it has empty operations and only two dependencies (criterion 2). It warns against hand-editing dependencies rather than doing so, so the fail criterion does not hold."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Two migrations in `accounts` both branched off the same parent, so the migration graph has two leaves. Don't hand-edit either file's `dependencies` — generate a merge migration.\n\n## Fix\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n```\n\nOr, if `accounts` isn't the only app with an unresolved conflict, let Django\nfind them all:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge\n```\n\nDjango inspects every app and only offers a merge where there is an actual\nconflict; it creates a new migration (e.g. `accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_address_0004_add_phone.py`).\n\nReview the generated merge — it should be essentially this shape, with both\nleaf migrations as dependencies and no `operations`:\n\n```python\nfrom django.db import migrations\n\n\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n    ]\n\n    operations = []\n```\n\nIf the merge's `dependencies` don't include both original leaves, or if it\ncarries `operations` of its own, stop and re-run `--merge` rather than editing\nit — that indicates the conflict wasn't the simple two-leaf case.\n\n## Verify\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # exits 0, no changes detected\npython manage.py migrate\npython manage.py test    # or pytest\n```\n\n`makemigrations --check --dry-run` reporting no changes confirms the graph is\nback to a single leaf. If it still reports a pending change, that's a separate\nunmigrated model diff — generate it normally with `makemigrations`, don't fold\nit into the merge.\n\n## Do not\n\n- Don't delete one of the two `0004_*` migrations to \"resolve\" it — that\n  discards the other branch's schema change and desyncs any environment that\n  already applied it.\n- Don't rewrite either `0004_*` file's `dependencies` to point at the other so\n  only one survives; both schema changes need to land, in a defined order,\n  which is exactly what the merge migration records.\n- Don't add `ignore_conflicts = True` or skip the check in CI — that hides\n  real divergence instead of resolving it.",
+              "outputSha256": "0f937ed425213e6a6bc09fbd97b122251a8124824fd60c4d046d0f282f8d4045",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts` (and plain `--merge`), generating a merge migration with both 0004 leaves as dependencies. It explicitly says 'Review the generated merge' and describes expected shape, plus warns against hand-editing dependencies. Both pass criteria met; no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# Fix: conflicting leaf nodes in `accounts`\n\nThis is the classic **two-branch migration conflict**: two migrations (`0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address`) were generated in parallel, both branching from the same parent (`0003_...`). Neither depends on the other, so the graph has two \"leaf\" nodes and Django can't decide which runs last.\n\n**Do not** hand-edit either migration's `dependencies` to force one to depend on the other — that desyncs the migration graph from what actually ran in other environments (CI, staging, other developers' DBs). The correct fix is a **merge migration**.\n\n## Steps\n\n1. **Confirm the conflict and the common parent** (read-only inspection):\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py showmigrations accounts\n   ```\n\n   You'll see `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` both marked `[ ]`, branching from the same `0003_*`.\n\n2. **Generate the merge migration** (this is the actual fix — let Django write it):\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n   ```\n\n   If there are conflicts in *other* apps too, drop the app label and let it merge everything:\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py makemigrations --merge\n   ```\n\n   Django creates something like `accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py`:\n\n   ```python\n   from django.db import migrations\n\n\n   class Migration(migrations.Migration):\n\n       dependencies = [\n           (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n           (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n       ]\n\n       operations = []\n   ```\n\n   This migration's only job is to declare that *both* branches must be applied before it — collapsing the two leaves into one. It contains no `operations`, which is correct and expected; **review it, don't rewrite it**.\n\n3. **Verify** the graph is linear again:\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py showmigrations accounts   # single leaf now\n   python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # exits 0, no pending changes\n   ```\n\n   If the merge was clean, `makemigrations` now reports \"No changes detected\" and the conflict is gone.\n\n4. **Apply and re-run the full gate**:\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py migrate\n   python manage.py check\n   ruff check .\n   ruff format --check .\n   mypy .\n   python manage.py test   # or pytest\n   ```\n\n   The test suite is run even though the failure looked migration-only — a merge can surface a runtime ordering issue static tooling won't catch.\n\n## If the merge is not clean\n\nA merge migration can collide if the two branches touched the **same model/field** (e.g. both added a `Meta` option or both altered `phone`). Django will warn about this. In that case, don't force it — resolve the semantic clash by adding a follow-up migration that reconciles the two states, or reorder the operations so the intended final schema is explicit. The invariant is the same: the migration graph must end with exactly one leaf, and it must be *generated/reviewed*, never hand-patched via `dependencies`.\n\n## Report\n\n```\nFixed: Conflicting migrations detected; multiple leaf nodes in the\n  migration graph: (0004_add_phone, 0004_add_address in accounts)\n  Root cause: two migrations added in parallel from the same parent\n    (accounts/0003_*) on divergent branches -> two leaf nodes.\n  Fix: generated accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address\n    via `makemigrations --merge accounts` (operations=[]).\n  Verified: makemigrations --check, migrate, check, ruff, mypy, test all green\n```\n\nNo migration's `dependencies`/`operations` were hand-edited; the conflict was resolved with a generated merge migration, and `git status` shows only the new merge file.",
+              "outputSha256": "72b81138473974879d83579dc48920d73f3b2c6ef30d320d72fac11192f415b7",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Step 2 explicitly runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts` (and the app-less variant) to generate the merge migration, showing the generated 0005_merge file with both 0004 dependencies. Step 2 also states 'review it, don't rewrite it', satisfying the review requirement. It warns against hand-editing dependencies rather than doing so, so no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Two `0004_*` migrations in `accounts` both depend on the same previously-leaf migration (`0003_*`), so the graph now has two leaf nodes instead of one. The fix is to generate a merge migration — not to hand-edit either file's `dependencies`.\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Confirm the current graph state:\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py showmigrations accounts\n   ```\n   You should see both `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` applied or unapplied, but both present as leaves.\n\n2. Generate the merge migration:\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n   ```\n   Django creates a new migration (e.g. `0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py`) whose `dependencies` lists both 0004 migrations and whose `operations` list is empty (a merge performs no schema change).\n\n3. **Review the generated file** before applying it:\n   - `dependencies` contains exactly the two conflicting 0004 migrations.\n   - `operations = []` — a merge must not carry schema operations.\n   - No `run_before`/`replaces` surprises.\n\n4. Apply it:\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py migrate accounts\n   ```\n\n5. Verify:\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # must report no changes\n   python manage.py showmigrations accounts            # single leaf node now\n   python manage.py test\n   ```\n\n## What NOT to do\n\n- Do **not** edit either `0004_*` file to invent a dependency between them, and do not delete one of them. Both carry real schema history that may already be applied in other environments; splicing or dropping one desyncs the graph from what actually ran elsewhere.\n- Do **not** add `MergeMigration` by hand without the `--merge` generator — easy to get `dependencies` wrong.\n\n## Why this happens\n\nTypically two branches each added a migration from the same parent `0003_*` and were merged without resolving the fork. `--merge` is Django's supported way to rejoin them; the resulting migration is a no-op operationally but a single, correct leaf.\n\n## Report\n\n```\nFixed: Conflicting migrations detected; multiple leaf nodes in accounts\n  (0004_add_phone, 0004_add_address)\n  Root cause: two branches each added a 0004 migration from the same\n    parent 0003_*, producing two leaf nodes in the migration graph.\n  Fix: generated accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py\n    via `makemigrations --merge accounts` (empty operations, depends on\n    both 0004s); reviewed and applied with `migrate accounts`.\n  Verified: makemigrations --check --dry-run clean, single leaf node in\n    showmigrations, test suite green.\n```",
+              "outputSha256": "5ea97de8c8f8f9d960f49ffae4218758d32d7e4a77bfa52f5a82cdaa850a0c17",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Step 2 runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts`, generating a merge migration depending on both 0004s. Step 3 explicitly says 'Review the generated file before applying it' with concrete checks (dependencies, empty operations). No hand-editing of dependencies; the 'What NOT to do' section only warns against it."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "This is a classic migration graph conflict: two migrations in the `accounts` app both branch off the same parent (likely `0003_...`), added independently (e.g. on two branches), so the graph now has two leaf nodes instead of one. Django refuses to run `makemigrations` until the graph has a single leaf.\n\n**Fix — generate a merge migration (do not hand-edit):**\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts --merge\n```\n\nThis creates something like `accounts/migrations/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py` with a `dependencies` list naming both conflicting leaves:\n\n```python\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n    ]\n    operations = []\n```\n\nThe merge migration has no `operations`; it only unifies the graph. Django auto-detects the conflicting leaves, so you can also run it without `--merge` (it will prompt), but passing `--merge` explicitly is clearer. **Commit the generated file** and review it before committing — never hand-edit `dependencies` to force a resolution, since that desyncs the graph from what actually ran in other environments.\n\n**Verify:**\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # should report no changes\npython manage.py migrate                            # applies the merge + both leaves\npython manage.py check\n```\n\n`--check --dry-run` exits 0 only once the graph has a single leaf, so it's the direct confirmation the conflict is resolved. Then run the rest of the toolchain (`ruff check .`, `mypy .`, the test suite) to confirm no regression.\n\n**Two things worth noting going forward:**\n\n- Both leaves are prefixed `0004_` — Django names migrations by sequence, and two parallel branches produced the same number. That's exactly the situation merge migrations exist for; it is not itself an error once merged.\n- If this keeps recurring, the underlying cause is that feature branches are adding model changes on `accounts` without rebasing before opening PRs. Rebasing before generating new migrations avoids the duplicate-leaf state in the first place.\n\nIf instead the conflict is reported *without* two clearly divergent branches, check `git log --oneline -- accounts/migrations/` to confirm the two `0004_` files really came from separate commits; if one was created accidentally, delete the stray file rather than merging, then re-run `makemigrations`.",
+              "outputSha256": "aefcc197c0de312fcd9478e33a294b3ac49aa6c49aba4a12ce093869296edfd2",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations accounts --merge` (criterion 1) and states the generated merge migration should be reviewed before committing: 'review it before committing' (criterion 2). It explicitly warns against hand-editing dependencies, not committing that anti-pattern."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Two migrations in `accounts` both depend on `0003_*` (or whichever is the shared parent) — this happens when two branches each added a `0004` from the same prior migration. You have a forked migration graph with two leaf nodes, and Django can't decide which branch is \"current.\"\n\nDo **not** hand-edit either migration's `dependencies` to point at the other, and do not delete one of them — both contain real schema operations that already ran in some environment.\n\n## Fix\n\nGenerate a merge migration, which is the only correct resolution for a fork:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge\n```\n\nDjango detects the multiple leaf nodes, shows you the two conflicting migrations, and (in non-interactive mode or when there's only one app involved) writes a new migration:\n\n```python\n# accounts/migrations/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n    ]\n    operations = []\n```\n\nThe merge migration has no operations of its own — it just declares both `0004`s as dependencies, collapsing the graph back to a single leaf (`0005_merge_...`).\n\n**If it prompts interactively** (multiple apps have conflicts), pass the app explicitly:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n```\n\n**Review the generated file before committing:**\n- Both `0004` dependencies are present, correctly named.\n- `operations` is empty (a merge migration never adds schema changes).\n- The filename doesn't collide with an existing migration.\n\n## Verify\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # must report \"No changes detected\"\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py migrate                            # applies 0005 merge\npython manage.py test                               # no runtime regression\n```\n\n`makemigrations --check` exiting 0 confirms the graph is single-leaf again. `migrate` confirms the merge is actually traversable at runtime (a correct-looking merge with a typo'd dependency name fails here, not in `check`).\n\n## Red flags to avoid\n\n| Shortcut | Why it's wrong |\n|---|---|\n| Hand-editing `0004_add_phone.dependencies` to add `0004_add_address` | Creates a cycle or an ordering that doesn't match what actually ran; the graph desyncs from other environments |\n| Deleting `0004_add_address` | Its schema operation already ran in some DB — deleting it means that DB never applies it on the next migrate |\n| `--fake` past the conflict | Marks migrations applied without running them; same desync, just hidden |\n| Skipping `makemigrations --check` in CI to avoid this | Hides real model/migration drift |\n\nReport it as: *Root cause — two branches each added a `0004` from the same parent in `accounts`. Fix — generated `0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address` via `makemigrations --merge`. Verified — `makemigrations --check`, `check`, `migrate`, and the test suite all exit 0; no migration `dependencies` were hand-edited.*",
+              "outputSha256": "2a5d492f68f2286b17b468318466f67d5a82ce2bfe22f0de004428b736c74251",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge` (and `--merge accounts`), showing the generated 0005 merge migration with both 0004 dependencies and empty operations. It explicitly says 'Review the generated file before committing' with concrete checks (both deps present, operations empty, filename collision). Hand-editing dependencies is only warned against, not recommended."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "The error means `accounts` has two migrations that both branch off `0003_*` as parents — typically from two branches each adding a `0004_*` migration in parallel. Django won't guess which order to apply them.\n\n**Fix: generate a merge migration, review it, and commit.**\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts\n```\n\nThis creates `accounts/0005_merge_20240101_1200.py` (name/timestamp vary) with both `0004_*` migrations listed as its `dependencies`:\n\n```python\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n    ]\n    operations = []\n```\n\nA merge migration has no `operations` — it is purely a graph join pointing both leaves at a single new leaf. Review it to confirm both parents are listed, then:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # should be silent, exit 0\npython manage.py migrate\n```\n\n**Why not hand-edit the `dependencies`.** Editing one of the `0004_*` migrations to depend on the other (or deleting one) desyncs the graph from what already ran in other environments — machines that already applied the \"deleted\" or re-parented migration will break, and the graph no longer reflects history. `--merge` is the sanctioned mechanism precisely because it records a truthful new node without rewriting past ones.\n\nIf `--merge` reports it will also generate *other* pending changes (i.e. there is genuine unmigrated model drift on top of the conflict), run `makemigrations` for those separately first, then re-run the merge so the merge migration contains only the join and no operations.\n\n**Verify**\n- `python manage.py check` — 0\n- `python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run` — silent, 0 (single leaf now)\n- `python manage.py migrate` — applies the merge cleanly\n- `python manage.py test` (or `pytest`) — 0\n\n`git status` should show only the new merge migration file — nothing else touched. If you had, say, an `apps.py` or settings change staged, that's unrelated and belongs to a different fix.",
+              "outputSha256": "aa73fecab4ec8159ea7185574f5ed4426c18656f7d8ad5b2c6070fabe7b79ce3",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations --merge accounts` (criterion 1) and explicitly says to review the generated merge migration before applying/committing: 'Review it to confirm both parents are listed, then: ... migrate' (criterion 2). It warns against hand-editing dependencies rather than doing so, so no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "This is the classic \"divergent leaf\" conflict: two migrations (`0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address`) both descend from `0003_*` in the `accounts` app, so the graph now has two leaf nodes instead of one. Django can't tell which is \"latest.\"\n\n## Diagnosis\n\nConfirm the shape before fixing:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py showmigrations accounts\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts --merge --dry-run\n```\n\nYou'll see both `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` depend on the same parent (typically `0003_...`), and neither depends on the other. This happens when two branches (or two teammates) each added a migration off the same base.\n\n## Fix — generate a merge migration (do not hand-edit)\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts --merge\n```\n\nThis produces `accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py` containing:\n\n```python\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_phone\"),\n        (\"accounts\", \"0004_add_address\"),\n    ]\n    operations = []\n```\n\nThen verify:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\npython manage.py migrate\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nAll must exit 0.\n\n## Rules I will not break here\n\n- **No hand-editing `dependencies`.** Editing `0004_add_address` to depend on `0004_add_phone` (or vice versa), or deleting one of the two migrations, desyncs the graph from what other environments already applied. If `0004_add_phone` and `0004_add_address` were both already applied in some environments and only one in others, a forced dependency produces a migration graph that no longer reflects reality. Generate the merge; let Django record both leaves as parents.\n- **No skipping the check in CI** (`makemigrations --check` removed or `--no-input` bypass) — that hides the real drift.\n- **No `# noqa`/suppressions** — none apply; this is a graph conflict, not a lint/type error.\n\n## If instead this were true model drift (not a conflict)\n\nThe reproducer says \"multiple leaf nodes,\" which is strictly a conflict — `--merge` is correct. But if `makemigrations --check` *also* reports an unmigrated model change, resolve that separately afterward with a normal `makemigrations`, not by folding it into the merge by hand.\n\n## Report\n\n```\nFixed: Conflicting migrations detected; multiple leaf nodes in the\n  migration graph: (0004_add_phone, 0004_add_address in accounts)\n  Root cause: two migrations in accounts both descend from the same\n    parent (0003_*), each added independently, so the graph has two\n    leaves and Django can't determine a single latest migration.\n  Fix: generated accounts/0005_merge_0004_add_phone_0004_add_address.py\n    via `makemigrations accounts --merge` (empty operations, both 0004s\n    as dependencies). No migration file hand-edited; no migration\n    deleted.\n  Verified: check, makemigrations --check --dry-run, migrate, test all green\n```\n\nDo not report done until `showmigrations accounts` shows a single leaf and every command above exits 0.",
+              "outputSha256": "901f3b86c5fd73b3ec54953c1a19f8acdf52b607e8cbfe785a9545a5d67d35b2",
+              "promptSha256": "9cd648cf5bfd3c908fbea3bdbb0fcb0daceb914a0ba466388464bff6871be802",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer runs `python manage.py makemigrations accounts --merge` (criterion 1) and shows the generated merge migration with both 0004s as dependencies. It instructs verification before applying: `makemigrations --check --dry-run`, `check`, `migrate`, `test` all must exit 0, and 'Do not report done until...' (criterion 2). It explicitly refuses hand-editing dependencies, only warning against it, so no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "verdict": "fail",
+      "scope": "bundled",
+      "skillDigest": "d526094487413ca47f8f6f280c1d6c6ec7d888f2e40a691a31311d91dae5c455",
+      "catalogDigest": "d09b13e321c66a435263da60f337e323760ef9d3d394b30d1ab3f41817a01f39",
+      "judgePromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "runner": "deepseek",
+      "model": "deepseek-chat",
+      "runnerPromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "recordedAt": "2026-09-25T20:35:12.200Z",
+      "judge": "deepseek",
+      "judgeModel": "deepseek-chat"
+    },
+    {
+      "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",
+      "skillId": "django/django-code-review",
+      "strictness": "high",
+      "trials": 10,
+      "triggerAccuracy": {
+        "truePositive": 5,
+        "falsePositive": 1,
+        "positives": 6,
+        "negatives": 7
+      },
+      "evidence": "authored",
+      "scenarios": [
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Can you look over the changes in this Django PR (#482) and flag any N+1 query risk before it ships?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Check this Django PR for CSRF or XSS issues",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Audit this Django view for security problems around user input",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Review this Django migration to make sure it matches the model change",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Does this queryset in our Django Order model hit the DB once per row, or is select_related missing somewhere?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Review this Django REST Framework serializer for mass-assignment risk",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Implement this new feature in this Django view, don't just review it",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this plain Python module for bare except clauses",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this FastAPI endpoint for missing auth or CORS misconfiguration",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this Node.js Express route for injection vulnerabilities",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix the failing Django migration, don't just report what's wrong",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Write pytest tests covering this Django view's permission checks",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this React component for unnecessary re-renders",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "flag-raw-query-string-interpolation",
+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "Review this Django code for security issues:\n\n```python\ndef search_orders(request):\n    status = request.GET.get(\"status\", \"\")\n    orders = Order.objects.raw(\n        f\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = '{status}'\"\n    )\n    return render(request, \"orders/search.html\", {\"orders\": orders})\n```",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 10,
+          "passes": 10,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "judge",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "trialRecords": [
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] search_orders — `f\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = '{status}'\"`\n    `status` comes straight from `request.GET` and is interpolated into the\n    SQL string with an f-string. Any caller can send\n    `?status=' OR '1'='1` (or `'; DROP ...`, or a UNION) and have it executed.\n    An f-string/`%`/`.format()` into `.raw()`/`.extra()` is never safe — Django\n    cannot escape what it never sees as a parameter.\n    Fix: pass the value as a bound parameter, which lets the DB driver quote it:\n        Order.objects.raw(\n            \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]\n        )\n    (note: raw() uses `%s` placeholders and the `params` list argument — do not\n    quote the placeholder yourself).\n    Better still, if there is no genuine need for raw SQL here, use the ORM,\n    which parameterizes by construction:\n        Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n    and if `status` is a constrained choice set, validate it against the allowed\n    values before the query.\n\n  [csrf-adjacent] search_orders — GET-handler with a user-controlled SQL sink\n    `status` is read from `request.GET`, and the view performs a read it trusts\n    entirely from that value. Beyond injection, this means the query's shape is\n    driven by an unvalidated, unauthenticated-controlled parameter. Confirm the\n    view is behind the intended auth/permission check, and whitelist `status`\n    against the model's actual `choices` rather than accepting arbitrary\n    strings. (If this view ever gains a side effect, it will also need CSRF\n    protection — GET handlers must stay side-effect free.)\n\nNotes / non-findings:\n- The N+1 and XSS categories were checked: the un-evaluated `RawQuerySet` passed\n  into the template is a performance smell only if the template dereferences\n  related objects per row — not visible in this snippet, flag at the template if\n  `search.html` walks a FK per order.\n- This finding is not something `ruff`/`mypy`/`manage.py check` reliably catch,\n  so it belongs in the review.\n\nBottom line: the f-string into `.raw()` is the blocking issue — replace it with\nthe ORM `filter(status=status)` (preferred) or a `params`-bound `.raw()`, and\nwhitelist `status` against the field's choices.",
+              "outputSha256": "3b97b87e5165615a07de3e8e5447956cfbbc47dd2dbeb8abdcb774882612bc33",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 cites the exact f-string line `f\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = '{status}'\"`, calls it SQL injection with `status` from request.GET, and gives the concrete params fix: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`, noting raw() uses %s placeholders and the params list. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 3 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] views.py (the `Order.objects.raw(...)` call) — The query\n    is built by f-string interpolation of `status`, which comes straight\n    from `request.GET`. Any caller can break out of the quoted literal and\n    inject arbitrary SQL (e.g. `status=' OR '1'='1`, or a `UNION SELECT` /\n    stacked-statement payload depending on the backend). This is the most\n    severe finding. Fix: use the `params` argument so the driver\n    parameterizes it — `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE\n    status = %s\", [status])` — or, better, drop `.raw()` entirely and use\n    the ORM, which parameterizes for you:\n    `Order.objects.filter(status=status)`. The ORM form is preferred since\n    it also avoids depending on the raw SQL column list staying in sync with\n    the model.\n\n  [n+1] views.py (the `Order.objects.raw(...)` result) — A `.raw()` queryset\n    yields plain `Order` instances without the eager-loading behavior the\n    template may rely on. If `orders/search.html` dereferences any relation\n    per row (e.g. `{% for o in orders %}{{ o.customer.name }}`), that is one\n    query per row. `.raw()` also cannot chain `.select_related()`; this is\n    another reason to switch to `Order.objects.filter(...)`, which lets you\n    add `.select_related(\"customer\")` / `.prefetch_related(...)` to match\n    whatever the template accesses. (I can't see the template here — confirm\n    which relations it dereferences before closing this out.)\n\n  [information-disclosure / defensive default] views.py — `raw(\"SELECT *\n    FROM ...\")` selects every column, so any column the template or logging\n    happens to touch is exposed even if unintended. Prefer explicit column\n    selection or the ORM; this is minor relative to the injection above.\n\nNotes on what I did not flag:\n- No `@csrf_exempt`, no `mark_safe`/`|safe`, no settings/migration changes\n  in this snippet, so those categories are clean as shown.\n- This is a GET search view, so CSRF is not applicable to it (CSRF protects\n  state-changing methods); no finding there.\n\nBottom line: the f-string in `.raw()` is a genuine SQL injection and should\nblock the merge. Replacing the whole thing with\n`Order.objects.filter(status=status)` fixes the injection and gives you the\nORM's eager-loading options for the N+1 concern. I did not edit the code\n(read-only review); hand this to the author.",
+              "outputSha256": "c1745accc9b407c49a8ddaf977cab04de0ff96207b0b9cca17e7dfe31027b1a9",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 identifies the f-string interpolation of `status` from request.GET into the raw SQL as SQL injection, citing the `Order.objects.raw(...)` call and giving payload examples. It concretely recommends the params fix: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`, plus the ORM alternative. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] views.py:3-5 — `Order.objects.raw()` is built by\n    f-string interpolation of `status`, a value taken directly from the\n    query string. `raw()` does not escape its argument; it passes the\n    string through to the database verbatim, so `?status=' OR '1'='1` (or\n    a UNION/dropped-table payload) is executed as SQL. Fix: parameterize\n    the raw query and let the DB driver escape it —\n\n    ```python\n    Order.objects.raw(\n        \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]\n    )\n    ```\n\n    Better still, drop `raw()` entirely for something this simple and use\n    the ORM, which escapes by construction:\n\n    ```python\n    orders = Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n    ```\n\n  [csrf / input handling] views.py:2 — `status` is read from `request.GET`\n    and used unvalidated as a query filter value. This is the same\n    user-controlled input that feeds the finding above; even once the\n    injection is fixed, an unvalidated free-form `status` should be\n    constrained to the model's actual choices before it reaches a query.\n    Fix: validate against the field's `choices` and reject/ignore anything\n    else, e.g.\n\n    ```python\n    status = request.GET.get(\"status\", \"\")\n    valid = {c[0] for c in Order._meta.get_field(\"status\").choices}\n    if status and status not in valid:\n        status = \"\"\n    ```\n\nNotes on what was *not* flagged, so the report is complete:\n\n- Auto-escaping is intact — `orders/search.html` renders through normal\n  template escaping, and no `|safe`/`mark_safe` appears in this view, so\n  there is no XSS finding here. (Worth a separate look at the template if\n  the changed diff includes it, but nothing in the code shown triggers it.)\n- `@csrf_exempt` is not used, so there is no CSRF exemption to review.\n  A plain `GET` search view doesn't need one.\n- No N+1 pattern is present in the queryset construction itself; the one\n  query is issued up front. Whether `orders/search.html` dereferences a\n  related field per row (e.g. `order.customer.name`) can't be judged from\n  the code shown — if it does, add `.select_related(\"customer\")` to the\n  ORM version.\n- The N+1 check above is defensive: `raw()` returns model instances that\n  will lazily hit the DB on relation access, so the eager-loading advice\n  applies to the ORM replacement, not to `raw()` (which can't take\n  `select_related`).\n\nThe SQL injection at views.py:3-5 is the blocking finding — parameterize\nthe query (or switch to `Order.objects.filter(status=status)`) before this\nmerges. I have not edited any files.",
+              "outputSha256": "6be13e324f7f90b63289113e7217467cdd9dae7c89881aca7ee5c112ad463feb",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding [sql-injection] cites views.py:3-5, names the f-string interpolation of `status` into raw() as SQL injection, and gives the concrete fix: Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]), plus the ORM alternative. Both pass criteria met; no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 1 finding\n\n  [sqli] this view — `Order.objects.raw()` builds its SQL with an f-string\n    that interpolates `status` straight from `request.GET`; the value is\n    never quoted/escaped. `?status=x' OR '1'='1` (or a UNION/stacked\n    payload) becomes arbitrary SQL. Use the `params` argument instead of\n    interpolation:\n    `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`\n    — or, better, drop raw entirely:\n    `Order.objects.filter(status=status)` (Django parameterizes ORM\n    lookups, and this query is a plain equality check that the ORM\n    expresses directly).\n\nDetails\n\n- Category: SQL injection (Step 2, \"SQL injection\").\n- Location: the `search_orders` view as shown — the `raw()` call.\n- Why it is a real bug, not a style point: `status` is directly\n  user-controlled (`request.GET`), and `raw()` sends the built string to\n  the database verbatim. This is exactly the pattern `.raw()`/`.extra()`\n  with f-string/`%`/`.format()` interpolation is called out for; the\n  `params` argument exists so the driver parameterizes it.\n- Safe alternative, precisely: either\n  `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`\n  (note the `%s` placeholder and the list, not a formatted string), or\n  the ORM form `Order.objects.filter(status=status)`. Prefer the ORM\n  form — it is a plain equality filter, so raw SQL buys nothing here.\n\nScope notes\n\n- Only one finding: the pasted snippet contains a single view with no\n  template, model, migration, settings, or serializer changes, so the\n  N+1, XSS, CSRF, migration, and settings categories have no code in\n  scope to check. If the actual diff includes `orders/search.html` (does\n  it dereference `order.customer`/other relations per row? that would be\n  an N+1 candidate) or an accompanying `settings.py`/migration, those\n  files need to be in the review scope before this can be called\n  complete.\n- Not flagged (no code shown): `render()` uses a fixed template name and\n  the context value is a queryset, so there is no XSS concern visible\n  here; the view has no `@csrf_exempt`, and it is a GET/search view, so\n  CSRF is not applicable as shown.\n\nThis skill is read-only: I have not modified the file. The fix (prefer\nthe ORM `filter`, or at minimum the `params` form of `raw()`) belongs to\nthe author or to `django-implementation`.\n\nVerification status: the snippet was checked against the SQL-injection\ncategory and found defective; the other categories could not be\nexercised because no corresponding files were provided. No file was\nmodified.",
+              "outputSha256": "f197aabe2972bfd1d72f285df02ac0d12052bafa6a7fcbfab7a0f760602f4988",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer flags the f-string interpolation of `status` from request.GET into `Order.objects.raw()` as SQL injection, citing the raw() call and payload example. It concretely recommends the params fix: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`, noting the %s placeholder and list, plus the ORM filter alternative."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 1 finding\n\n  [sql-injection] views.py — `Order.objects.raw()` is built with an\n    f-string that interpolates `status` (from `request.GET`) directly into\n    the SQL string. `status = request.GET.get(\"status\", \"\")` is attacker-\n    controlled, so a value like `' OR '1'='1` — or worse, a `UNION`/stacked\n    payload — is compiled into the query as SQL rather than passed as data.\n    This is the classic `raw()` injection: f-string/`%`/`.format()`\n    interpolation of a query parameter defeats the parameterization Django\n    provides.\n\n    Fix — pass the value as a bound parameter to `params`:\n\n    ```python\n    def search_orders(request):\n        status = request.GET.get(\"status\", \"\")\n        orders = Order.objects.raw(\n            \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\",\n            [status],\n        )\n        return render(request, \"orders/search.html\", {\"orders\": orders})\n    ```\n\n    `raw()`'s `params` argument sends the value over the driver's bound-\n    parameter protocol, so it can never alter the query structure. Never\n    build the SQL string itself from request data.\n\nTwo things worth noting beyond the injection finding:\n\n- The `raw()` call is unnecessary here. A plain\n  `Order.objects.filter(status=status)` uses the ORM, is parameterized by\n  construction, and — unlike a raw `SELECT *` — keeps the model's field\n  mapping and relations intact so `select_related`/`prefetch_related` and\n  the rest of the ORM remain available. Prefer the ORM unless there's a\n  query the ORM genuinely can't express; if there is a reason here, it\n  should be commented.\n\n- I am not flagging the `render()` call as XSS without seeing\n  `orders/search.html`: if the template dereferences `order` fields\n  normally, Django's auto-escaping handles it. If any field above is\n  rendered with `|safe` or passed through `mark_safe`, that becomes a\n  separate finding — the template wasn't in scope here. If you share it\n  I'll check.\n\nNo CSRF concern: this is a read-only `GET` view, so `@csrf_exempt`\nexemption logic doesn't apply. No N+1 can be judged from the view alone —\nwhether `search.html` iterates `orders` and dereferences a relation per\nrow determines that; share the template to have it checked.\n\nReminder: this review is read-only — the fix above is for the author to\napply, not something I've edited.",
+              "outputSha256": "e216cd8c0f7825e6bb2ff8c8bed97995abb510a62a53a51ed7546d977a369762",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer flags the f-string interpolation of `status` from request.GET into the raw SQL as SQL injection, quoting the exact line and payload example. It concretely fixes it by passing status via params: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`, shown in full code. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] search_orders — `Order.objects.raw()` is built by\n    f-string-interpolating `status`, which comes straight from\n    `request.GET`. `status` is fully attacker-controlled, so a request like\n    `?status=' OR '1'='1` (or a `UNION SELECT` / stacked statement, depending\n    on the backend) rewrites the query. This is a real injection, not a\n    theoretical one: there is no quoting, escaping, or type coercion between\n    the query parameter and the SQL string.\n    Fix — never interpolate into `raw()`. Parameterize it:\n      ```python\n      orders = Order.objects.raw(\n          \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]\n      )\n      ```\n    Even better, drop to the ORM, which avoids the raw-SQL surface entirely\n    and keeps the queryset composable:\n      ```python\n      orders = Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n      ```\n    (Same rule applies to `.extra()` — build any dynamic fragment with its\n    `params=`/`select_params=` argument, never string formatting.)\n\n  [n+1] search_orders / search.html — `Order.objects.raw()` returns a\n    `RawQuerySet` that does not participate in `select_related`/\n    `prefetch_related`. If the template (`orders/search.html`) dereferences a\n    related object per row (e.g. `{{ order.customer.name }}`,\n    `{{ order.customer.email }}`), each iteration issues a fresh query —\n    an N+1 keyed off however many orders match. The raw query also cannot be\n    eager-loaded after the fact, so the fix has to happen at the query\n    definition.\n    Fix — with the ORM form above you can eager-load in one shot:\n      ```python\n      orders = (\n          Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n          .select_related(\"customer\")\n          .prefetch_related(\"items\")\n      )\n      ```\n    I could not confirm from the snippet alone which relations\n    `search.html` actually dereferences (the template wasn't in scope), so\n    treat this as conditional on the template touching a related field per\n    row — if it renders only scalar `Order` columns, this finding does not\n    apply. The injection finding above stands regardless.\n\nNotes on what I did not flag: no `mark_safe`/`|safe`, `@csrf_exempt`, model,\nmigration, or settings change appears in the submitted snippet, so the\nXSS, CSRF, migration-drift, and settings categories are out of scope here.\nNo file was modified.",
+              "outputSha256": "fde589e373d5324a88e26eff7a40c97762a41b38111289f9f930531fdcde90e1",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 identifies the f-string interpolation of `status` from request.GET into `Order.objects.raw()` as a real SQL injection, citing the exact line and giving a payload example. It concretely recommends parameterizing: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`, plus an ORM alternative. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion applies."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n[sqli] views.py:3 — `Order.objects.raw()` is built by f-string interpolation of `request.GET.get(\"status\")` directly into the SQL text. `status` is fully attacker-controlled (query parameter), so an input like `' OR '1'='1` or `'; DROP TABLE orders_order; --` is executed as SQL. This is a classic injection. Safe alternative: never interpolate parameters into the SQL string — pass them via `raw()`'s `params` argument, which the DB driver binds separately from the statement:\n\n```python\norders = Order.objects.raw(\n    \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\",\n    [status],\n)\n```\n\nEven better, avoid `raw()` entirely when the query is just an equality filter on a model field — use the ORM, which parameterizes automatically and returns model instances with the same shape the template expects:\n\n```python\norders = Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n```\n\n(Note: if you keep `raw()`, be careful that the extra `mark_safe`/escaping of any output isn't compensating for something — the ORM path sidesteps both this and the next point.)\n\n[xss] views.py:5 (template `orders/search.html`) — the same user-controlled `status` value is the natural candidate for being echoed back into the results page (search UIs almost always show \"results for: <status>\"). If the template renders it with `|safe`, `mark_safe()`, or inside a context that disables auto-escaping, this becomes reflected XSS in addition to the injection above. I can't see `search.html` in the diff, so this is conditional: verify whether `status` (or any value derived from `request.GET`) is rendered with `|safe`/`mark_safe`. If it is, remove that and let auto-escaping handle it; do not add escaping as a workaround for the injection — fix the query instead.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe blocker is finding 1: `raw()` with an f-string over a request parameter is an unparameterized SQL injection and must be fixed before merge. The correct fix is the `params` argument to `raw()` (or, preferably, replacing the `raw()` call with `Order.objects.filter(status=status)`, which is parameterized and returns model instances). Finding 2 is conditional on the template — I could not inspect `search.html`, so confirm the rendering of `status` before treating it as confirmed.\n\n## Notes on scope\n\n- This review is read-only; nothing was edited.\n- I did not flag generic Python issues or anything a configured `ruff`/`mypy`/`manage.py check` would already enforce.\n- Findings are limited to the snippet provided; the view has no authentication/CSRF annotation visible, but since it's a GET-only read view, CSRF does not apply here. If this view returns user-specific order data, confirm the view is access-controlled at the URL/`login_required`/permission layer — that is outside the snippet but worth checking before merge.",
+              "outputSha256": "bae3c118af979093ed9a46064a0ca3550dbf55024b4fbf1336c24434dc4c43f0",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 explicitly flags the f-string interpolation of request.GET status into raw() SQL as SQL injection, citing views.py:3 and the exact code, and concretely recommends passing status via raw()'s params argument, showing `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion applies."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] views.py — `Order.objects.raw(f\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = '{status}'\")` interpolates `request.GET[\"status\"]` directly into the SQL string. An attacker controls this parameter and can inject arbitrary SQL, e.g. `status=' OR '1'='1`, `status=' UNION SELECT ... --`, or stacked/destructive payloads depending on the backend. This is the highest-severity finding and blocks the change.\n\n    Safe alternative: never build SQL by string interpolation. `raw()` accepts a `params` argument; the driver parameterizes the `%s` placeholder:\n    ```python\n    orders = Order.objects.raw(\n        \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]\n    )\n    ```\n    Even better, avoid `raw()` entirely if there's no reason for it — the ORM is parameterized by construction and this is a plain equality filter:\n    ```python\n    orders = Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n    ```\n    (Note: the ORM's own `.raw()`/`.extra()` docs also warn against interpolating untrusted input; `params` is the supported mechanism.)\n\n  [n+1 / raw-queryset caveat] views.py — Related to the same line: `raw()` returns model instances, but any subsequent access to a related field in `orders/search.html` (e.g. `order.customer.name`) will trigger one extra query per row, since a raw queryset cannot eager-load like the ORM. If the template dereferences any FK, this is an N+1 in addition to the injection. The ORM form above fixes this cheaply with `.select_related(...)`, e.g. `Order.objects.filter(status=status).select_related(\"customer\")` — adjust the relation name to match the template.\n\nOut-of-scope note (not a finding here, no code shown): this view is not marked with any auth decorator and it isn't `@csrf_exempt`, so there's nothing to flag on the CSRF/authentication axis from this snippet alone — but confirm that order search is intended to be reachable by the caller and that results are scoped to what that caller may see; an unscoped `Order.objects...` here would leak other users' orders regardless of the SQL fix. That check needs the surrounding auth/permission context.\n\nFix the injection first (also verify `status` against an allowed set of statuses if one exists — a `Choices`/`TextChoices` constraint — which is cheap defense-in-depth), then address the eager-loading and result-scoping questions before merging. No files were modified.",
+              "outputSha256": "42a1db464cc8b98b034c682f3c9d5fc2fec2782b27d8e5fd89eeece50730fa0c",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 explicitly flags the f-string interpolation of status into raw() SQL as SQL injection, quoting the exact line, and concretely recommends params: Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]). Both pass criteria met; no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] `search_orders` — `Order.objects.raw()`\n    is built with an f-string, interpolating `status` (a query parameter)\n    directly into the SQL text. Because the query text is assembled before\n    it reaches the database driver, `status` is never treated as data —\n    `?status=x' OR '1'='1` (or worse, a stacked/`UNION` payload depending\n    on the backend) reaches the DB verbatim. This is the exact pattern the\n    Step 2 \"SQL injection\" category flags: `.raw()`/`.extra()` built with\n    an f-string/`%`/`.format()` instead of the `params` argument.\n    Safe alternative — pass the value through `params` so the driver\n    binds it:\n      ```python\n      Order.objects.raw(\n          \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\",\n          [status],\n      )\n      ```\n    Note also that `status` defaults to `\"\"`, so an empty parameter\n    produces `WHERE status = ''` rather than listing all orders; if the\n    intent is \"no filter when absent,\" handle that explicitly (e.g. fall\n    back to `Order.objects.all()` when `status` is falsy) rather than\n    inlining the value.\n\n  [raw-query-unnecessary] `search_orders` — the query selects every\n    column of `orders_order` and does nothing the ORM cannot do. Once the\n    injection is fixed, prefer the ORM so auto-escaping and parameter\n    binding are structural rather than something a future edit can\n    regress:\n      ```python\n      orders = Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n      ```\n    Keep `.raw()` only if a genuine raw-SQL need exists (a DB-specific\n    construct the ORM can't express); there is none visible here.\n\nNot flagged, deliberately:\n- No N+1 finding — `requests`/relations aren't dereferenced per row in\n  the snippet shown, and the template wasn't in scope; if\n  `orders/search.html` walks a relation per order, that would be a\n  separate N+1 finding.\n- No CSRF finding — this view only reads via `GET`; `@csrf_exempt` is\n  neither present nor warranted.\n- No XSS finding — `render()` with the default template engine\n  auto-escapes; no `mark_safe`/`|safe`/`format_html` raw-string use here.\n\nVerification status: I could only review the function as pasted — I have\nno tools or file access in this exercise, so I did not read `settings.py`,\nthe template, the model, or confirm there is no duplicate finding already\nenforced by the project's linter. The two findings above stand on the\ncode shown; treat the \"not flagged\" list as provisional pending that\ncontext. No file was modified.",
+              "outputSha256": "ea11716dabfeecc5ed440cae4f27ac8a15d2b697c55d3c87febb4e424900af9f",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 explicitly flags the f-string interpolation of `status` into `Order.objects.raw()` as SQL injection, quoting the exact pattern and payload. It concretely recommends the params fix, showing `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion applies."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "django-code-review: 2 findings\n\n  [sql-injection] search_orders view — `Order.objects.raw()` is built by\n    f-string interpolating `status` (a `request.GET` value) straight into the\n    SQL text. `status` is attacker-controlled, so a value like\n    `' OR '1'='1` (or a UNION/stacked-query payload depending on the DB\n    driver) rewrites the query entirely. This is the raw()/extra() +\n    string-interpolation pattern from Step 2, \"SQL injection.\" Fix: never\n    interpolate; pass the parameter through `.raw()`'s `params` argument so\n    the driver binds it:\n        Order.objects.raw(\n            \"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status]\n        )\n    Better still, drop to the ORM (which parameterizes for you) unless this\n    genuinely needs raw SQL:\n        Order.objects.filter(status=status)\n    Note: `request.GET.get(...)` returns `None` when the param is absent;\n    with the `%s` form that binds `None` (likely a no-match, not an error),\n    but confirm the intended default since the current code defaults to `\"\"`.\n\n  [xss — verify context] search_orders view -> orders/search.html — the\n    view itself is not an XSS source, but this finding is about where the\n    results land: if `orders/search.html` renders any order field that\n    traces back to user input (an order note, a customer-supplied name)\n    through `|safe`/`mark_safe()`, that is a stored-XSS sink. I could not\n    read the template in this pass, so this is flagged as needs-verification\n    rather than confirmed. Check `orders/search.html` for `|safe` /\n    `mark_safe()` applied to user-traceable data and remove it so Django's\n    auto-escaping applies.\n\nFindings I checked and did not flag, for transparency:\n\n- [csrf] — no `@csrf_exempt` on this view; not applicable.\n- [n+1] — `raw()` returns model instances; no per-row relation dereference\n  is visible in the view. Not assessable without the template, but nothing\n  in the view itself triggers it.\n- [migrations / settings / forms] — no model, migration, settings, or\n  form/serializer changes in the snippet.\n\nSummary: the blocking issue is the SQL injection in `Order.objects.raw()` —\nthat one must be fixed before merge. The XSS item is a template-context\ncheck, not a confirmed defect in the code shown.\n\nI made no edits to the code under review (read-only review).",
+              "outputSha256": "49550f188573d7112da078cd62a8af77e7f6081cb59e06bc15a4f92c86ac5354",
+              "promptSha256": "a4b01fdaf3d0c0e5620732b79e72b4aa5dc09a503732a9fdb5a2302b329c0d4c",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Finding 1 identifies the f-string interpolation of `status` (a request.GET value) into `Order.objects.raw()` SQL as SQL injection, quoting the exact pattern and a payload. It concretely recommends passing status via params: `Order.objects.raw(\"SELECT * FROM orders_order WHERE status = %s\", [status])`. Both pass criteria hold; no fail criterion applies."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "verdict": "fail",
+      "scope": "bundled",
+      "skillDigest": "c8475c8b76eefeaa8411c193d06ae210a4a48688143b65a885734cc4d58bba34",
+      "catalogDigest": "d09b13e321c66a435263da60f337e323760ef9d3d394b30d1ab3f41817a01f39",
+      "judgePromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "runner": "deepseek",
+      "model": "deepseek-chat",
+      "runnerPromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "recordedAt": "2026-09-25T20:36:03.022Z",
+      "judge": "deepseek",
+      "judgeModel": "deepseek-chat"
+    },
+    {
+      "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",
+      "skillId": "django/django-implementation",
+      "strictness": "high",
+      "trials": 10,
+      "triggerAccuracy": {
+        "truePositive": 6,
+        "falsePositive": 0,
+        "positives": 7,
+        "negatives": 7
+      },
+      "evidence": "authored",
+      "scenarios": [
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Add a Django model for Invoice with a status field and generate the migration",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Write a Django REST Framework view that lists a customer's orders with their line items",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Implement a class-based view in Django that shows a book's detail page along with its author",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "We need a standalone app to own the subscription-billing logic -- can you scaffold a Django app with models, admin, and urls set up?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Write a Django form that validates a signup submission with cross-field checks",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Implement a queryset method on this Django model that returns only pending orders",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Add a manager method to the Order model that avoids N+1 when listing items",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Implement this in plain Python with no framework, just a script that parses a CSV",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Implement this FastAPI path operation that returns a list of users, not a Django view",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Write a pytest test for this FastAPI endpoint that returns a list of users",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this Node.js Express route for security issues",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Add type hints to this untyped Python function in our shared utils package",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Implement a React component that renders a list of the same orders",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix this ModuleNotFoundError when importing mypkg.util in our plain Python service",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "select-related-n1",
+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "Write a Django view function `book_list` that renders every Book in a template, where the template also displays each book's author name.",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 10,
+          "passes": 10,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "judge",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "trialRecords": [
+            {
+              "output": "Here's a function-based view that lists every `Book` and, because the template also shows each book's author name, loads the author in the same query to avoid an N+1.\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nPoints worth calling out:\n\n- `select_related(\"author\")` is the key line. Because the template dereferences `book.author.name` for every row, a plain `Book.objects.all()` would issue one extra query per book (the N+1 problem). `select_related` joins the author in at the SQL level, so it's a single query. Use `prefetch_related` instead only if `author` were a many-to-many or reverse FK; for a forward FK, `select_related` is correct.\n- The queryset is lazy, so passing it straight into the context is fine — it won't execute until the template iterates it.\n- I named the template `library/book_list.html` and the context key `books`; match these to your app's existing template layout and naming convention (check neighboring views/templates first).\n\nCorresponding template skeleton:\n\n```django\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>Books</h1>\n  <ul>\n    {% for book in books %}\n      <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n    {% endfor %}\n  </ul>\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\n`{{ book.author.name }}` is auto-escaped by Django's template engine, so no `|safe` is needed (and shouldn't be added here).\n\nAnd the URL wiring, using a namespaced path rather than a hand-built string:\n\n```python\n# library/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"library\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"books/\", views.book_list, name=\"book_list\"),\n]\n```\n\nTwo things to verify in your project before finalizing: that `Book.author` is a forward `ForeignKey` (or `OneToOneField`), which is what makes `select_related` valid here, and that `related_name`/field name `author` is what your model actually uses. If the author relation is nullable and some books have none, `{{ book.author.name }}` renders as empty rather than erroring, but you may want an explicit `{% if book.author %}` guard in the template.",
+              "outputSha256": "974fe7143a080452dcc6224b9e255af6e6344af411f45b06a548fad800d42696",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "The view code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")` and returns it via `render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})`. The template iterates `books` and accesses `{{ book.author.name }}`, so the author is joined in the same query, avoiding per-row queries. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Here's the view, following the query-planning rule from Step 2 (avoid N+1) and the project-convention discovery in Step 1 — it uses `select_related(\"author\")` so each author name renders without a per-row query:\n\n```python\n# books/views.py\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")\n    return render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nKey points:\n\n- `select_related(\"author\")` — the template iterates every book and dereferences `book.author.name`, so without this you get one query for the list plus one query per book (N+1). `select_related` joins the author in the single query.\n- `order_by(\"title\")` — an unordered queryset gives the database freedom to return rows in any order; pin it so the page is stable and so the later `.select_related()` join has deterministic ordering.\n- `render()` bundles `RequestContext` (including CSRF and any context processors) and returns the `HttpResponse`; don't build the response manually.\n- The template and URL come next: `{% url %}`/`reverse()` for the URL name, and the template loops `{% for book in books %}{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}{% endfor %}` — no `|safe` needed since Django escapes `{{ }}` by default (Red Flags: don't add `|safe` to avoid escaping).\n\nTemplate (`books/book_list.html`), escaped by default — no `|safe`:\n\n```html\n<ul>\n  {% for book in books %}\n    <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n  {% empty %}\n    <li>No books yet.</li>\n  {% endfor %}\n</ul>\n```\n\nURL wiring (`books/urls.py`), reversed by name rather than hand-built:\n\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"books\"\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"books/\", views.book_list, name=\"book_list\"),\n]\n```\n\nTwo things to confirm once you have file access (Step 1 discovery I can't do without tools):\n\n- **Convention** — if this project prefers class-based generic views for list pages, the equivalent is `ListView` with `model = Book`, `queryset = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")`, and `template_name = \"books/book_list.html\"`; match whatever the neighboring `views.py` uses. DRF's `ListAPIView` would set `serializer_class` and override `get_queryset()` with the same `select_related`.\n- **Model shape** — this assumes `Book.author` is a `ForeignKey` (many-to-one). If it's `ManyToManyField(\"Author\")`, `select_related` does not apply — use `prefetch_related(\"author\")` instead, since the join is across an intermediate table.\n\nBefore reporting done, run the Step 4 checks: `python manage.py check`, `makemigrations --check --dry-run` (no model change here, so it should report no changes), `ruff check .`, `ruff format --check .`, `mypy .`, and the test command (`manage.py test` or `pytest`) — prefixing with `uv run`/`poetry run` if that's this project's run prefix.",
+              "outputSha256": "2ccafff938fca2323a6b13303f31cebf997a4b87e065844ba47d854e99378153",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "The view code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` and returns it via `render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})`. The template loops `{% for book in books %}` accessing `{{ book.author.name }}`, so the author is fetched in the same query, avoiding per-row queries. Both pass criteria are concretely satisfied."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")\n    return render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\n`select_related(\"author\")` is the important part here: the template dereferences `book.author.name` for every row, so without it Django would issue one extra query per book (an N+1). Since `Book.author` is a forward `ForeignKey`, `select_related` does it in a single joined query.\n\nTemplate (`books/book_list.html`), relying on Django's default auto-escaping for both values:\n\n```django\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>Books</h1>\n  <ul>\n    {% for book in books %}\n      <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n    {% else %}\n      <li>No books yet.</li>\n    {% endfor %}\n  </ul>\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\nNotes / assumptions to confirm against the project:\n\n- This assumes a `Book` model with a `ForeignKey` to an author-like model exposing `.name`. If the related field is named differently (e.g. `authors` M2M), swap to `prefetch_related` and iterate `book.authors.all`.\n- The `{% else %}` branch on `{% for %}` handles the empty case without a separate `{% if %}`.\n- No `|safe`/`mark_safe` is used; `{{ book.title }}` and `{{ book.author.name }}` stay auto-escaped.\n- URL wiring (namespaced, e.g. `books:book-list`) and a `get_absolute_url` on `Book` are left to the project's existing conventions — match the neighboring views rather than assuming.\n\nIf the project is a DRF API rather than template-rendered, say so and I'll give the serializer/view equivalent instead.",
+              "outputSha256": "7a8f1ffd1e7b98820898249b6389affb98481c89860da4df2216d567da53c881",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` and returns it via render to books/book_list.html; template iterates books and accesses `{{ book.author.name }}`, so the author is fetched in the same joined query (no N+1). Both pass criteria concretely satisfied; no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").all()\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nTemplate `library/book_list.html`:\n\n```django\n<ul>\n  {% for book in books %}\n    <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n  {% endfor %}\n</ul>\n```\n\nNotes:\n\n- `select_related(\"author\")` resolves each book's author in the same query, so `book.author.name` inside the loop does not trigger an N+1 query per row. Without it, the template would issue one extra `SELECT` per book.\n- `{{ book.author.name }}` is auto-escaped by Django's template engine, so no `|safe` is needed here.\n- Confirm the actual `related_name` on the `Book.author` FK (or use `book.author` if none is set) and the real model/template paths before wiring this in — they should match the project's existing conventions rather than the assumed `library/` app label and `author.name` field.\n\nIf `author` is nullable, guard the template with `{% if book.author %}` or use `{{ book.author.name|default:\"—\" }}` to avoid a blank or error.",
+              "outputSha256": "f056c9ccc9ac51d384edeebe5b0fc9d340b10669f10fc61b3073d5f517af6b74",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").all()` and returns it via render to the template, which loops `{{ book.author.name }}`. This satisfies both pass criteria: select_related on the author FK is concretely shown, and the same queryset is rendered so no per-row query occurs. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Here's the view, assuming `Book.author` is a `ForeignKey` to `Author` with a `name` field:\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").all()\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nPoint worth flagging: the template will access `book.author.name` for every row, so `select_related(\"author\")` collapses what would otherwise be one query per book into a single `JOIN`. Without it, rendering a list of N books issues N+1 queries.\n\nThe template (`library/book_list.html`) would look like:\n\n```django\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>Books</h1>\n  <ul>\n    {% for book in books %}\n      <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n    {% endfor %}\n  </ul>\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\nA few things I assumed and you should adjust to your project:\n\n- **App/URL layout.** I used a `library` app and a `library/book_list.html` template path. If your template lives in a global `templates/` dir, drop the app prefix.\n- **`author.name`.** If the related model uses `get_full_name()` or a `__str__` method instead of a `name` field, use that in the template. `{{ book.author }}` also calls `__str__` and would work if it's defined to return the display name.\n- **Field names.** I assumed `Book.title`. Swap for your actual field.\n- **`select_related` vs `prefetch_related`.** Use `select_related(\"author\")` for a forward `ForeignKey`/`OneToOne` (a single JOIN). If `author` were a `ManyToManyField` — e.g. a book with multiple authors — you'd instead need `prefetch_related(\"authors\")` and a `{% for author in book.authors.all %}` loop in the template.\n\nIf this is a REST endpoint rather than a rendered page, swap `render` for a `BookSerializer(books, many=True)` response and keep the same `select_related` — the N+1 concern is identical.",
+              "outputSha256": "72537d6e70ce33a39e473f7daa3c23a419b537141c5f211305dae7cffbc94431",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer shows actual code `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").all()` and returns it via `render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})`. Template accesses `{{ book.author.name }}` per row, and the answer explains select_related collapses N+1 into a single JOIN. Both pass criteria concretely met; no fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom library.models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = (\n        Book.objects\n        .select_related(\"author\")\n        .order_by(\"title\")\n    )\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\n```django\n{# library/templates/library/book_list.html #}\n<ul>\n  {% for book in books %}\n    <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n  {% empty %}\n    <li>No books yet.</li>\n  {% endfor %}\n</ul>\n```\n\nNotes on the choices here:\n\n- `select_related(\"author\")` is doing real work: the template dereferences\n  `book.author.name` for every row, so without it you'd get one extra query\n  per book (an N+1). `select_related` is the right tool rather than\n  `prefetch_related` because `Book.author` is a forward `ForeignKey`, so the\n  join is a single extra column on the one query, not a second round trip.\n- `order_by(\"title\")` gives the page a deterministic order. Django doesn't\n  guarantee row order without one, so pagination or any test that inspects\n  the list would otherwise be flaky.\n- The name is `book_list`, matching the FBV convention; if the project\n  prefers CBVs, `ListView` with `queryset = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")`\n  is the equivalent and should match whatever neighboring views do.\n- Field names (`author`, `author.name`) are assumed — adjust to the actual\n  model. If the FK uses a `related_name` or the display name is built via\n  `get_full_name()`/`__str__`, use that instead.\n- The template path follows the app-templates convention; if the project\n  uses a `TEMPLATES[\"DIRS\"]` layout instead, point at the path the project uses.",
+              "outputSha256": "5c5bbcb86159e9d908e48e51bd0865190de5792cb0b988fbd5516ad7a7fb9856",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View builds `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` in actual code and passes it to render; template loops `{% for book in books %}` accessing `{{ book.author.name }}`, so the author is fetched in the same query with no per-row query. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nNotes on the two decisions that matter here:\n\n- **`select_related(\"author\")`** — the template renders each book's author name (`{{ book.author.name }}`), so without this the queryset would issue one extra `author` query per book: an N+1. `select_related` does a single SQL join for this forward FK. (If you were instead rendering a *reverse* FK/many-to-many per row — e.g., every book an author has — use `prefetch_related` instead.)\n- **`order_by(\"title\")`** — a `ListView`-style list without a deterministic order gives an unstable pagination/display order; set it explicitly (or on `Book.Meta.ordering`).\n\nTemplate (`library/book_list.html`):\n\n```django\n{% if books %}\n  <ul>\n    {% for book in books %}\n      <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n    {% endfor %}\n  </ul>\n{% else %}\n  <p>No books yet.</p>\n{% endif %}\n```\n\nNo `|safe`/`mark_safe` anywhere: `title` and `author.name` are template variables, so Django autoescapes them. Keep it that way — adding `|safe` to stop the escaping would reintroduce XSS if any of that text ever traces back to user input.\n\nURL wiring (`urls.py` in the app):\n\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"library\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"books/\", views.book_list, name=\"book-list\"),\n]\n```\n\n`select_related(\"author\")` assumes the FK is named `author` with `Book.author` a non-nullable or nullable forward relation — a join works for either. If your model instead names it `authors` as a `ManyToManyField`, swap to `.prefetch_related(\"authors\")` and iterate `{% for a in book.authors.all %}`.\n\nThis is a plain function-based view. If the project's neighboring views are class-based (check that before committing to this shape — the repo's convention wins), the equivalent is a generic `ListView`:\n\n```python\nfrom django.views.generic import ListView\n\n\nclass BookListView(ListView):\n    model = Book\n    template_name = \"library/book_list.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"books\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        return Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")\n```",
+              "outputSha256": "fb565a7c7aa3975c299d37451ca09ed09e4c5344f216bff936bc3854187ff99c",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View builds `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` in actual code and passes it via render to the template, which accesses `{{ book.author.name }}` per row — so the author is fetched in the same join query, no N+1. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Here is a function-based view that lists every `Book` and renders a template where each book's author name is shown — with the N+1 pitfall called out.\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom library.models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = (\n        Book.objects\n        .select_related(\"author\")  # avoids an N+1 when the template reads book.author.name\n        .order_by(\"title\")\n    )\n    return render(request, \"library/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nKey points, per the skill's workflow:\n\n- **`select_related(\"author\")` is the whole reason this view is worth a second look.** If the template accesses `{{ book.author.name }}` per row without it, Django issues one query per book — the N+1 this skill flags. `select_related` is correct here because `Book -> author` is a forward `ForeignKey`/one-to-one (a single JOIN). If instead you were walking a reverse `ForeignKey` or a `ManyToManyField` per row, use `prefetch_related` instead.\n\n- **Assume the `author` relation exists as a FK.** If your actual model names it differently (e.g. `authors` as a M2M, or a `written_by` FK), swap the relation name in `select_related` to match. Check the model before assuming — Step 1 of this skill's discovery.\n\n- **`order_by` is explicit.** Never rely on the database's incidental row order; pin it so pagination and tests are deterministic.\n\n- **Scope the queryset, not the template.** If only some books should appear (published, not archived, owned by the request user), filter in the queryset — `Book.objects.filter(...)` — before rendering, not with `{% if %}` inside the template.\n\n- **Don't hand-build the template path string with the app name if the app layout differs.** `\"library/book_list.html\"` assumes a `templates/library/` directory; match the project's own template layout discovered in Step 1.\n\nThe matching template needs only:\n\n```django\n{% for book in books %}\n  <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n{% endfor %}\n```\n\n`{{ book.author.name }}` stays auto-escaped; do **not** add `|safe` to it even if author names contain punctuation — that would reintroduce XSS on a user-traceable value (see `rules/security.mdc`).\n\nThis view depends on the `Book` → `author` relation existing. If `Book` has no such field yet, add it to the model and run `python manage.py makemigrations` to generate the migration — don't hand-write the migration operations.",
+              "outputSha256": "6bb442255d87a7938761ba2917692766489ce07052d6b4de08741882a7a47070",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "The view builds `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` in actual code and passes it to render() as {\"books\": books}, so the template's per-row `{{ book.author.name }}` is fetched via the JOIN, not one query per book. Both pass criteria are concretely satisfied."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Here's the view. The key detail that matters here is the queryset: the template dereferences `book.author.name` for every row, so a plain `Book.objects.all()` would trigger one extra query per book (the N+1 problem). `select_related(\"author\")` collapses that into a single JOIN.\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")\n    return render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\nAnd the template (`books/book_list.html`), which is what drives the query decision above:\n\n```django\n<ul>\n  {% for book in books %}\n    <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n  {% endfor %}\n</ul>\n```\n\nNotes on the choices:\n\n- **`select_related`, not `prefetch_related`.** `author` is a forward foreign key (a single related object per book), which is exactly what `select_related` is for — it builds the JOIN in the same query. `prefetch_related` would issue a second query and join in Python; it's the right tool for reverse FKs and many-to-many, not this case.\n- **`render()` over `render_to_response`.** `render()` takes the `request` and supplies it to the template context's context processors, so `{% csrf_token %}`, `request.user`, and `{{ STATIC_URL }}` work in the template.\n- **Escaping is on by default.** `{{ book.title }}` is HTML-escaped, so a title or author name containing `<script>` is inert. Do not add `|safe` to these to \"fix\" how they display.\n- **Function-based view is fine here.** This is a pure read with no forms or per-method behavior, so a CBV like `ListView` buys little. If your project has already standardized on `ListView` (check a neighboring `views.py`, per step 1), the equivalent is:\n\n  ```python\n  from django.views.generic import ListView\n\n  class BookListView(ListView):\n      model = Book\n      template_name = \"books/book_list.html\"\n\n      def get_queryset(self):\n          return Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")\n  ```\n\nOne thing I couldn't confirm without the project: I've assumed the related object is reachable as `book.author`. If the FK was declared with a different name (e.g. `author = models.ForeignKey(..., related_name=\"books\")` on the Author, or the FK field is named `writer`), the template attribute and the `select_related` argument must match that field name. When I have file access, I'd read `models.py` to confirm before finalizing, and match the app's template directory convention (I used `books/book_list.html`; yours may be `book_list.html` or namespace its templates under the app).",
+              "outputSha256": "0139c1e8e2f081d48b02b4e5d6edfa3db1680cd70eba8365f441ec14c225ef74",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")` and `render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})`, returning that queryset. Template accesses `{{ book.author.name }}` per row, so the JOIN avoids N+1. No fail criterion: no plain Book.objects.all() is rendered."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# `book_list` view\n\nGiven the requirement to render every `Book` and also show each book's\nauthor name, the author relation is dereferenced once per row in the\ntemplate — so the queryset needs `select_related(\"author\")` to avoid an\nN+1 (one extra query per book).\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Book\n\n\ndef book_list(request):\n    books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")\n    return render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})\n```\n\n## Why `select_related` here\n\nWithout it, the template's `{{ book.author.name }}` triggers one query per\nbook. `select_related(\"author\")` turns that into a single JOIN. Only use\n`select_related` for a forward FK/one-to-one like this; for a reverse FK or\nM2M you would use `prefetch_related` instead.\n\n## Matching template\n\n```django\n{# books/book_list.html #}\n<ul>\n  {% for book in books %}\n    <li>{{ book.title }} — {{ book.author.name }}</li>\n  {% empty %}\n    <li>No books yet.</li>\n  {% endfor %}\n</ul>\n```\n\nDjango autoescapes `book.title` and `book.author.name` in the template, so\nno `|safe`/`mark_safe` is needed or wanted here — that would reintroduce\nXSS if either field ever holds user-supplied text.\n\n## Notes for adapting to the project\n\n- **Conventions first:** this assumes a function-based-view project. If the\n  surrounding app uses class-based views, use `ListView` and set\n  `queryset = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\")` rather than mixing\n  styles.\n- **URL wiring:** point a namespaced route at it, e.g.\n  `path(\"books/\", views.book_list, name=\"book_list\")`, and reverse it with\n  `{% url 'books:book_list' %}` rather than a hand-built path.\n- **Pagination:** if \"every Book\" can be large, swap the plain queryset for\n  `Paginator` (or a `ListView` with `paginate_by`) instead of rendering the\n  whole table.\n- **Ordering:** the explicit `order_by(\"title\")` avoids relying on\n  unspecified database ordering; adjust to the model's `Meta.ordering` if\n  one is defined.",
+              "outputSha256": "8a6f9bf4f8152be1e2a40740bdafde717366fdea2140b524a46fd458083d367f",
+              "promptSha256": "692e975047f3b5cbfdde58a831b2212b6b38043bfb3f91a029448e5a6350f221",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View code shows `books = Book.objects.select_related(\"author\").order_by(\"title\")` and returns it via `render(request, \"books/book_list.html\", {\"books\": books})`. Template accesses `{{ book.author.name }}` per row, and the answer explains select_related avoids the N+1. Both pass criteria met; no fail criterion (no unoptimized all() rendering)."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            }
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "no-mark-safe-on-user-bio",
+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "Implement a Django view that renders a user's bio -- submitted earlier through a profile-edit form -- on their public profile page template.",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 10,
+          "passes": 10,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "judge",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "trialRecords": [
+            {
+              "output": "Before writing the view, Step 1 (discover conventions) would normally read `settings.py`, the target app's `models.py`/`views.py`, and a neighboring template to confirm CBV vs FBV, `AUTH_USER_MODEL`, and response conventions. Without tool access I can't read those, so the code below is written to the most standard Django 5.x pattern and flagged with the assumptions it makes.\n\n**Assumptions made (verify against the actual project):**\n- The project uses the stock `User` model, or a custom user model with a `bio` field reachable as `user.bio`.\n- `bio` is stored as a `TextField(blank=True)` (possibly rendered through a curated formatter on the profile-edit path).\n- A template already exists at `profiles/profile_detail.html`.\n- A URL name like `profiles:profile_detail` is expected by templates.\n\n**`profiles/views.py`**\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass ProfileDetailView(DetailView):\n    model = User\n    template_name = \"profiles/profile_detail.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile_user\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # Only ever fetch the one row this page renders; no related\n        # objects are dereferenced per-row here, so no select_related\n        # is needed unless the template also walks a relation.\n        return User.objects.filter(is_active=True)\n```\n\n**`profiles/urls.py`**\n\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom .views import ProfileDetailView\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"<int:pk>/\", ProfileDetailView.as_view(), name=\"profile_detail\"),\n]\n```\n\n**`templates/profiles/profile_detail.html` (the bio line)**\n\n```django\n<h1>{{ profile_user.get_username }}</h1>\n\n{% if profile_user.bio %}\n  {# Auto-escaped by default: the profile-edit form's submission #}\n  {# is rendered inert as text, never as HTML. #}\n  <div class=\"bio\">{{ profile_user.bio|linebreaks }}</div>\n{% else %}\n  <p class=\"bio bio--empty\">No bio yet.</p>\n{% endif %}\n```\n\n**The point that matters for this specific feature.** The bio is\nuser-submitted data, so it is exactly the value that is wrong to render with\n`|safe` or `mark_safe()`. `{{ profile_user.bio }}` already escapes it, and\n`|linebreaks` (or `|linebreaksbr`) escapes *then* inserts paragraph/`<br>`\nmarkup of its own — it does not open an injection hole. Do **not** reach for\n`mark_safe(profile_user.bio)` to \"make the line breaks work\"; that is the one\nchange here that would introduce stored XSS from the profile-edit form.\n\n**Function-based equivalent**, if the project's convention is FBVs:\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import render, get_object_or_404\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\ndef profile_detail(request, pk):\n    profile_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=pk, is_active=True)\n    return render(request, \"profiles/profile_detail.html\", {\"profile_user\": profile_user})\n```\n\n**To verify once I have shell access** (Step 4):\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # this change adds no model; expect no new migrations\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nEach prefixed with the project's own run prefix (`uv run`, `poetry run`) if it uses one.\n\n**Two things I'd confirm against the real project rather than assume:**\n\n1. If `bio` lives on a separate `Profile` model (a `OneToOneField` to `User`), the view's `get_queryset` should use `select_related(\"profile\")` and the template should read `profile_user.profile.bio` — otherwise the template's per-request `profile` access is a hidden extra query. The code above assumes `bio` is on the user model directly.\n2. If the profile-edit form stores a *sanitized/rendered* HTML bio (e.g. it runs the input through a curated sanitizer at save time), the template should render the stored field with `|safe` **only** because the sanitization happened upstream, and that decision belongs on the form/save path, not here. Absent that, keep the default escaping shown above.\n\nPer this skill's scope, I've left test files out of the change set — the new view needs a `ProfileDetailView` test (bio shows for a user who has one, empty state otherwise, inactive user 404s); hand that off to `django-testing` rather than folding it in here.",
+              "outputSha256": "61d381d9b7de4dccc94f28fb4a688995bc5bb7c5c0f46065ceb605611f226bf4",
+              "promptSha256": "d84e23670f63e2e0e03c5bb3ad18fd7e1314b73087039f27d855eae1ceb9f19a",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View passes bio as ordinary context var (context_object_name='profile_user'; FBV render dict {'profile_user': profile_user}) and template renders {{ profile_user.bio|linebreaks }} with default auto-escaping. No mark_safe() or |safe applied to bio; mark_safe/|safe only mentioned to warn against use. Concrete view, urls, and template code shown."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I'll implement this. First, the discovery step matters a lot here, because the single most important fact about this feature is how the bio reaches the template — and \"submitted earlier through a profile-edit form\" is exactly the kind of phrasing that hides a stored-XSS decision. I'll lay out the code and be explicit about the one line that is load-bearing.\n\n## Assumptions to confirm in Step 1 (discover conventions)\n\n- The project has a `Profile` model (or `User.profile` via `OneToOneField`) with a `bio` field. I'm assuming a separate `Profile` model with `OneToOneField(User, ...)`.\n- The public profile is keyed by username: `/u/<username>/`.\n- `settings.py` points `AUTH_USER_MODEL` at the project's user model; I'll reference `get_user_model()` rather than importing `User` directly.\n- View style: I'll use a CBV (`DetailView`) since \"one object, one template\" maps onto it directly; if the neighboring views are FBVs, use the function variant at the end instead.\n\n## models.py (only if the field doesn't already exist)\n\n```python\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True, max_length=2000)\n```\n\n`bio` is a plain `TextField`. It stores whatever the user typed, verbatim. There is intentionally no `safe`/`mark_safe` concept at the model layer — escaping is a rendering concern, handled by the template engine.\n\nIf `bio` is new, generate the migration; do not hand-write it:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations\n```\n\n## views.py\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404, render\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass PublicProfileView(DetailView):\n    model = Profile\n    template_name = \"accounts/public_profile.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile\"\n    slug_field = \"user__username\"\n    slug_url_kwarg = \"username\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # select_related avoids a second query when the template reads\n        # profile.user.username / display name.\n        return (\n            Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\")\n            .filter(user__is_active=True)\n        )\n```\n\nTwo intentional decisions:\n\n- `filter(user__is_active=True)` means a deactivated account 404s rather than rendering a public page. If the project's policy is different, drop it — but make it a deliberate choice, not a default.\n- `select_related(\"user\")` because the template dereferences `profile.user`. Without it, `DetailView` alone would already do an extra query for the user row; this collapses it to one.\n\n## urls.py\n\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom .views import PublicProfileView\n\napp_name = \"accounts\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<str:username>/\", PublicProfileView.as_view(), name=\"public-profile\"),\n]\n```\n\n## templates/accounts/public_profile.html\n\n```html\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>{{ profile.user.get_full_name|default:profile.user.username }}</h1>\n\n  {# Django auto-escapes this. Do NOT add |safe. #}\n  {% if profile.bio %}\n    <p class=\"profile-bio\">{{ profile.bio }}</p>\n  {% else %}\n    <p class=\"profile-bio profile-bio--empty\">No bio yet.</p>\n  {% endif %}\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\n## The one line that matters\n\n`{{ profile.bio }}` renders with Django's autoescaping on. Every `<`, `>`, `&`, `\"`, `'` in the stored bio is HTML-entity-encoded before it reaches the browser, so a bio containing `<script>alert(1)</script>` renders as visible text, not executable script. This is the correct and only handling for user-submitted text.\n\nI want to name the failure mode directly, because it's the one people reach for here: if you \"improve\" the rendering by adding `{{ profile.bio|safe }}` — say, to stop apostrophes showing up as `&#x27;`, or because \"it's just a bio, it's harmless\" — you have reintroduced stored XSS. The bio was submitted by the user through a form, stored verbatim, and rendered to every visitor of that profile page. `|safe` on that field turns the profile page into a script-injection vector for any logged-in user, including one whose payload targets an admin who views the page. So: no `|safe`, no `mark_safe()` anywhere on the path from the form to this template.\n\nIf the product genuinely wants rich text in bios (bold, links), the fix is not `|safe` — it's a allow-list sanitizer (e.g. `bleach.clean(bio, tags=[...], attributes={...})`) applied at write time *or* as a template filter, and even then the sanitized output is the thing marked safe, never the raw input. That's a bigger change; flag it as a separate decision rather than smuggling it into this view.\n\n## If the project uses function-based views\n\nMatch the neighbors instead:\n\n```python\ndef public_profile(request, username):\n    profile = get_object_or_404(\n        Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\").filter(user__is_active=True),\n        user__username=username,\n    )\n    return render(request, \"accounts/public_profile.html\", {\"profile\": profile})\n```\n\n## If this is a DRF API instead of a template\n\nThe XSS question becomes a different one (the client is responsible for rendering), but the serializer must still list `fields` explicitly — never `\"__all__\"` — and should not expose anything the profile page doesn't intend to publish:\n\n```python\nclass PublicProfileSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):\n    username = serializers.CharField(source=\"user.username\", read_only=True)\n\n    class Meta:\n        model = Profile\n        fields = [\"username\", \"bio\"]   # explicit; not \"__all__\"\n```\n\n## Verify (Step 4)\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # if a model field was added\nruff check . && ruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test   # or pytest, if pytest-django is configured\n```\n\n## Report\n\n```\nImplemented: accounts/views.py, accounts/urls.py,\n             accounts/templates/accounts/public_profile.html\n  - PublicProfileView (DetailView) serves /u/<username>/ from Profile\n  - select_related(\"user\") avoids the extra query when the template\n    dereferences profile.user\n  - bio rendered with autoescaping ON; no |safe / mark_safe on the path\n  - deactivated accounts 404 (user__is_active=True) -- confirm this is policy\n  - manage.py check / makemigrations --check / ruff / mypy: pending run\n```\n\nTwo things I'd want confirmed before calling it done: whether deactivated users should 404, and whether the bio needs a max length enforced at the form layer (the `max_length=2000` above is a model-level guard, and the profile-edit form should carry the matching limit). I'd also want a test that posts a bio containing `<script>` and asserts it comes back entity-encoded in the response body — that's the regression test for the one decision this whole view hinges on, and it's worth handing to `django-testing` rather than folding into this change.",
+              "outputSha256": "efe482aee5a0edc5d7aaa7d8c4a879767be76c072a8e443f1a9b9652dd008334",
+              "promptSha256": "d84e23670f63e2e0e03c5bb3ad18fd7e1314b73087039f27d855eae1ceb9f19a",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Template shows `{{ profile.bio }}` with autoescaping and comment 'Do NOT add |safe'; view passes profile via DetailView context_object_name='profile' and FBV render(...{'profile': profile}) with no mark_safe. Concrete code shown for view, url, template. |safe/mark_safe only mentioned to warn against."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I can't write that view against your actual project, because I have no repository access in this session — and this feature touches exactly the places where guessing wrong is expensive: which app owns `Profile`, whether it's `AUTH_USER_MODEL` or a `OneToOneField`, whether `bio` is a `TextField` or application-specific rich text, and whether the project uses DRF or plain template views. I'll give you the view with those seams left explicit, so you can drop in your real names.\n\n## The implementation\n\n```python\n# accounts/views.py\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass PublicProfileView(DetailView):\n    \"\"\"\n    Render one user's public profile page, including the bio they\n    previously saved via the profile-edit form.\n\n    Dispatch-level lookup by pk (not slug/username) keeps this\n    predictable regardless of which user identifier your app exposes.\n    \"\"\"\n    model = User\n    context_object_name = \"profile_user\"\n    template_name = \"accounts/public_profile.html\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # Only pull the relation you actually dereference in the template.\n        # If the template also shows N related rows (skills, links), add\n        # prefetch_related() for those here rather than looping lazily.\n        return super().get_queryset().select_related(\"profile\")\n\n    # If privacy matters, narrow the queryset instead of guarding in the\n    # template — a hidden field is still rendered into the response:\n    #\n    # def get_queryset(self):\n    #     return (super().get_queryset()\n    #             .filter(is_active=True, profile__is_public=True)\n    #             .select_related(\"profile\"))\n```\n\n```python\n# accounts/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"accounts\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<int:pk>/\", views.PublicProfileView.as_view(), name=\"public-profile\"),\n]\n```\n\n```html\n{# accounts/templates/accounts/public_profile.html #}\n<h1>{{ profile_user.get_full_name|default:profile_user.username }}</h1>\n\n{% if profile_user.profile.bio %}\n  {{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }}\n  {# |linebreaks is the right escape hatch for an existing TextField:\n     it preserves paragraph breaks and still auto-escapes. #}\n{% else %}\n  <p>This user hasn't written a bio yet.</p>\n{% endif %}\n```\n\n## The parts I had to guess — check each against your project\n\n- **The user model.** I used `get_user_model()` because hardcoding\n  `django.contrib.auth.models.User` breaks on any project with a custom\n  user model, and custom user models are the norm by the time a profile\n  form exists. If your project does use the stock `User`, this still works.\n- **How the bio is reached.** I assumed a related object (`profile.bio`),\n  because a bio submitted through a *profile-edit form* almost always lives\n  on a `Profile` model, not directly on the user. If yours is\n  `user.bio`, drop the `.profile` and the `select_related(\"profile\")`.\n- **The lookup key.** `pk` is the safe default. If your profile URLs are\n  `/u/<username>/`, switch to `slug_field = \"username\"` and\n  `slug_url_kwarg = \"username\"`.\n- **Rendering the bio.** `linebreaks` is correct *if* `bio` is a plain\n  `TextField`. If the bio was submitted through a rich-text editor and\n  stored as HTML, you cannot use `linebreaks` and you must not reach for\n  `|safe` — that is the XSS hole. Instead sanitize on write (bleach,\n  nh3, or an equivalent allowlist) and mark the result as the one trusted\n  field, or store it as Markdown and render it server-side.\n- **Privacy.** A public profile view is where \"who can see this\" is\n  decided. I left a commented narrowing of the queryset because that\n  belongs in `get_queryset`, not in a template `{% if %}` — templating\n  a hidden field still ships the value to the client.\n\n## What I did not do\n\nI did not run `python manage.py check`, `makemigrations --check --dry-run`,\n`ruff`, `mypy`, or the test suite, because I have no shell here. Before you\ntrust this view in a deployed branch, run those in your environment, and\nconfirm:\n\n- The URL conf includes `accounts/urls.py` under some `include()`.\n- `select_related(\"profile\")` is valid — it fails loudly at query time if\n  the relation name differs.\n- If a hidden/private profile should 404 rather than render, the\n  `get_queryset` narrowing above is actually enabled (it is commented out\n  as written, so the view is currently public to any active object).\n\nIf you paste your `Profile` model, the URL shape you want, and whether the\nbio is plain text or rich text, I can produce the exact version instead of\nthis parameterized one.",
+              "outputSha256": "96b602d4a2547580f548393acc0da256c4b69733389f22f2718e29003fdec966",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Template renders {{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }} with normal auto-escaping; no mark_safe() or |safe applied to bio (|safe only mentioned to warn against it). Concrete view code (PublicProfileView DetailView) and template code are shown, satisfying both pass criteria."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "**Cannot implement against your codebase from here** — I have no file access in this exercise, and Step 1 of the workflow (read `settings.py`, the app's conventions, the template dir) can't be done blind. What follows is the shape of the change, with the exact decisions you must confirm against your project before it's correct.\n\n## The realistic version of this task\n\nA bio is a plain `TextField` the user edits through a `ModelForm` and a `UpdateView`, then reads back on `ProfileDetailView`. The interesting parts of \"implement this\" are almost all in the model/view/form trio, not in the template.\n\n### 1. Model (only if the field doesn't exist yet)\n\n```python\n# profiles/models.py\nfrom django.conf import settings\nfrom django.db import models\n\n\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(\n        blank=True,\n        max_length=2000,\n        help_text=\"A short public description. Rendered on your profile page.\",\n    )\n\n    def __str__(self) -> str:\n        return f\"Profile of {self.user}\"\n```\n\nThen generate the migration — never hand-write it:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations profiles\n```\n\nReview the generated file, then apply it.\n\n### 2. The edit form (validation lives here, not in the model)\n\n```python\n# profiles/forms.py\nfrom django import forms\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileBioForm(forms.ModelForm):\n    class Meta:\n        model = Profile\n        fields = [\"bio\"]          # explicit list — never \"__all__\"\n```\n\nIf you need a cross-field or domain rule (e.g. \"bio must not be only\nwhitespace\"), put it in `clean_bio()` here; if it must hold for *every*\nwrite path, put it on the model as a `CheckConstraint` instead.\n\n### 3. The edit view — where the bio was submitted\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py\nfrom django.contrib.auth.mixins import LoginRequiredMixin\nfrom django.urls import reverse_lazy\nfrom django.views.generic import UpdateView\n\nfrom .forms import ProfileBioForm\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileEditView(LoginRequiredMixin, UpdateView):\n    model = Profile\n    form_class = ProfileBioForm\n    template_name = \"profiles/profile_edit.html\"\n    success_url = reverse_lazy(\"profiles:detail\")\n\n    def get_object(self, queryset=None):\n        # One profile per user; edit your own, never someone else's by PK.\n        return self.request.user.profile\n```\n\nNote what this does *not* need: no `@csrf_exempt`, no manual `request.POST`\nparsing. `UpdateView` renders the CSRF token via the template's\n`{% csrf_token %}` and re-validates through the form on POST. The bio string\nis stored raw in the DB; escaping is the template's job.\n\n### 4. The public profile view — the actual deliverable\n\nThis is the one that renders the bio:\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileDetailView(DetailView):\n    model = Profile\n    template_name = \"profiles/profile_detail.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # Public page: it must not 500 when the viewer is anonymous,\n        # and it must not leak unrelated profiles.\n        return (\n            Profile.objects\n            .select_related(\"user\")          # template touches profile.user.username\n            .filter(user__is_active=True)\n        )\n```\n\n`select_related(\"user\")` is the whole performance story here: if the template\nprints `{{ profile.user.username }}`, a `DetailView` without it fires one\nextra query per rendered profile page. (For a single-object detail view\nyou're paying one query either way, so measure — but it costs nothing and\ndocuments the intent; the N+1 risk is real if this same pattern is copied\ninto a list view.)\n\n### 5. Template — the escaping decision\n\n```django\n{# profiles/profile_detail.html #}\n<h1>{{ profile.user.username }}</h1>\n\n{% if profile.bio %}\n    {# Intentionally NOT |safe: bio is user-submitted. #}\n    <p class=\"bio\">{{ profile.bio }}</p>\n{% else %}\n    <p class=\"bio bio--empty\">No bio yet.</p>\n{% endif %}\n```\n\nThe `{{ profile.bio }}` line is the security-relevant one. Django\nauto-escapes it, so a bio containing `<script>alert(1)</script>` renders as\nliteral text. **Do not** reach for `|safe` or `mark_safe()` because the\noutput \"looks wrong\" — that is the escaping working. If you genuinely need\nrich formatting (paragraph breaks, links), sanitize on the way *in* with a\nvetted library (e.g. `bleach` / `nh3`) and only then mark the result safe,\nwith a comment saying why. Never mark raw user input safe.\n\n### 6. URL\n\n```python\n# profiles/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"me/edit/\", views.ProfileEditView.as_view(), name=\"edit\"),\n    path(\"<str:username>/\", views.ProfileDetailView.as_view(), name=\"detail\"),\n    # or path(\"me/\", ...) if profiles aren't publicly addressable by username\n]\n```\n\n```django\n{# reverse by name, never hand-build the path #}\n<a href=\"{% url 'profiles:detail' username=profile.user.username %}\">\n```\n\n## Verification checklist — all must pass before this is \"done\"\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .                      # if django-stubs is configured\npython manage.py test       # or pytest, if pytest-django is configured\n```\n\nPlus, specific to this change:\n\n- [ ] `makemigrations` produced the `bio` field migration; it was reviewed, not hand-written.\n- [ ] The detail queryset uses `select_related(\"user\")` (or the template was changed to not touch `profile.user`).\n- [ ] `{{ profile.bio }}` is rendered **without** `|safe`.\n- [ ] The detail view works for an anonymous viewer and does not expose other users' profiles.\n- [ ] `ProfileEditView` uses `get_object()` scoped to `request.user.profile` — not a URL PK anyone could tamper with.\n- [ ] No `mark_safe`, no `.raw()`/`.extra()` string interpolation, no `@csrf_exempt` introduced.\n\nIf this feature needs new tests, that's a handoff to `django-testing` rather\nthan something to fold into this change set.\n\n**What I'd need from you to make this concrete:** your app name, whether\n`Profile` already exists and what your `AUTH_USER_MODEL` is, whether the\nproject uses DRF (then the detail view is an `APIView`/`ViewSet` and the bio\nis a `CharField` on a `Serializer`), and whether profiles are public-by-\nusername or only visible to their owner. Those four answers pin down every\nbranch above.",
+              "outputSha256": "38f1e209aa4d9ed0ecc73c416a7eca0986384f05d03fb5639130a8a925fdfe10",
+              "promptSha256": "d84e23670f63e2e0e03c5bb3ad18fd7e1314b73087039f27d855eae1ceb9f19a",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Template shows `<p class=\"bio\">{{ profile.bio }}</p>` with comment 'Intentionally NOT |safe', and view passes bio via DetailView context_object_name='profile' with no mark_safe. Concrete view/template code is shown. mark_safe/|safe only mentioned to warn against use on user input."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I'll walk through implementing this following the skill's workflow, then give you the concrete code.\n\n## Step 1: Discover project conventions\n\nBefore writing anything, I'd check:\n\n- `settings.py` for `AUTH_USER_MODEL` (a custom user model vs. Django's `User`), installed apps, and whether DRF is present.\n- A neighboring `views.py`/`urls.py` in the same app for CBV-vs-FBV convention and URL-naming style.\n- Whether the profile data lives on the user model itself or a separate `Profile` model with a `OneToOneField`.\n\nThe key design question the bio raises: **the bio is rendered publicly but edited privately**. That's the crux of correctness here — you must never render an unescaped bio, because it is user-submitted free text.\n\n## Step 2: Design\n\n- **Model**: assume a `Profile` model with `user = OneToOneField(settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL, ...)` and a `bio = models.TextField(blank=True)`.\n- **View shape**: a `DetailView` keyed on the user, resolving the `Profile` via a related object.\n- **Query path**: the template touches `profile.user` (for the username/display), so `select_related(\"user\")` avoids an extra query per page. This is the per-row relation the skill's `rules/patterns.mdc` calls out — even for a single object, fetch the relation you dereference.\n- **Validation ownership**: length limits / profanity filtering belong on the *form* (the edit path); the model just stores text. Nothing here needs a DB constraint.\n\n## Step 3: The code\n\n**models.py** (assuming not already present):\n```python\nfrom django.conf import settings\nfrom django.db import models\n\n\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True)\n\n    def __str__(self):\n        return f\"{self.user} profile\"\n```\n\n**views.py**:\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileDetailView(DetailView):\n    model = Profile\n    template_name = \"profiles/profile_detail.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # select_related(\"user\"): the template reads profile.user, so fetch\n        # it in the same query instead of triggering a second hit.\n        return (\n            Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\")\n            .filter(user__is_active=True)\n        )\n\n    def get_object(self, queryset=None):\n        # URL by username, not profile PK, so public URLs are stable/readable.\n        if queryset is None:\n            queryset = self.get_queryset()\n        return get_object_or_404(\n            queryset, user__username=self.kwargs[\"username\"]\n        )\n```\n\n**urls.py**:\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom .views import ProfileDetailView\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<str:username>/\", ProfileDetailView.as_view(), name=\"detail\"),\n]\n```\n\n**templates/profiles/profile_detail.html** — this is where the escaping guarantee lives:\n```django\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block title %}{{ profile.user.username }}'s profile{% endblock %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>{{ profile.user.username }}</h1>\n\n  {# Django auto-escapes {{ profile.bio }}; do NOT add |safe here. #}\n  {% if profile.bio %}\n    <p class=\"bio\">{{ profile.bio }}</p>\n  {% else %}\n    <p class=\"bio bio--empty\">No bio provided.</p>\n  {% endif %}\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\nThe single most important line is `{{ profile.bio }}` **without** `|safe`. Django's template engine HTML-escapes variable output by default; the bio is free text from a form, so escaping is correct. The skill's red-flag table explicitly rejects `|safe` \"to stop the escaping\" — that reintroduces XSS on a publicly rendered, user-submitted value.\n\nNote there's no `@csrf_exempt` and no raw SQL here at all — the edit form (separate view) is the only write path and keeps CSRF protection intact.\n\n## Step 4: Verify\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nPrefix with the project's runner (`uv run`, `poetry run`) if it uses one.\n\nSelf-check against the skill's Verification section:\n- No model change was needed if `Profile`/`bio` already exist; if `bio` were new, the length-limit/field addition would get its own `makemigrations`-generated, reviewed migration — never hand-edited.\n- `select_related(\"user\")` covers the one relation the template dereferences.\n- `manage.py check`, `makemigrations --check`, `ruff`, `mypy`, `test` all expected to exit 0.\n- No `mark_safe`/`|safe`, no `.raw()`/`.extra()`, no `@csrf_exempt` introduced.\n\n## Step 5: Report\n\n```\nImplemented: profiles/views.py, profiles/urls.py, templates/profiles/profile_detail.html\n  - ProfileDetailView keyed on username; select_related(\"user\") to avoid\n    the extra query when the template reads profile.user\n  - bio rendered with default auto-escaping (no |safe); empty-bio fallback\n  - manage.py check / makemigrations --check / ruff / mypy / test: all green\n```\n\n## Notes and assumptions\n\n- If your project stores `bio` directly on a custom user model instead of a `Profile`, drop the extra hop and query `get_user_model().objects` with the same `select_related`-free path — the escaping guarantee in the template is unchanged.\n- A `OneToOneField` guarantees one profile per user, so `get_object_or_404` on `user__username` is correct; if profiles could be missing for some users, this returns 404 cleanly rather than erroring.\n- If the profile page should be editable only by its owner while public to all, keep the *edit* view login-required and CSRF-protected; this read-only public view needs no auth.",
+              "outputSha256": "65d63634c45b055df8da4c10508944667d335fe4f1e37269475be60064634ec6",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Template shows `{{ profile.bio }}` with no `|safe` and no mark_safe anywhere; view passes bio via context_object_name='profile' with normal auto-escaping. Concrete view, urls, model, and template code all shown. Comment explicitly warns against |safe, which is not a violation."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I'll implement this following the skill's workflow, noting up front that I have no file access in this exercise, so I'm producing the code you'd place into your project rather than editing files directly.\n\n## Step 1: Conventions to confirm in your project\n\nBefore pasting anything, check these in your own repo, since the skill requires matching existing conventions:\n\n- Is this a plain Django template view, or a DRF API endpoint? A \"renders a bio on a public profile page\" reads as a **template-rendering view**, so I've written the plain-Django version.\n- The `AUTH_USER_MODEL` setting — I reference `settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL` rather than `auth.User` directly.\n- The `related_name` used on your existing `Profile` model's FK to the user (I've assumed `profile`, matching the common `OneToOneField(..., related_name=\"profile\")` idiom — adjust if yours differs).\n- The URL namespace for the profile app (I've assumed `profiles`).\n\n## Step 2: The view\n\nThe bio is user-submitted text rendered into an HTML template, so the two things that matter here are (a) not making an extra query and (b) not defeating Django's auto-escaping.\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass PublicProfileView(DetailView):\n    \"\"\"Render a user's public profile page, including their bio.\"\"\"\n\n    context_object_name = \"profile_user\"\n    template_name = \"profiles/public_profile.html\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # select_related pulls the Profile row in the same query, so the\n        # template's {{ profile_user.profile.bio }} dereference does not\n        # trigger an N+1 (one extra SELECT per profile page otherwise).\n        return (\n            User.objects.filter(is_active=True)\n            .select_related(\"profile\")\n        )\n\n    def get_object(self, queryset=None):\n        # Look up by a public-facing identifier, not the raw PK, and 404\n        # on an inactive/nonexistent user rather than leaking existence.\n        return get_object_or_404(\n            self.get_queryset(),\n            username=self.kwargs[\"username\"],\n        )\n```\n\nIf your project uses function-based views consistently, the equivalent is:\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py (FBV variant)\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404, render\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\ndef public_profile(request, username):\n    profile_user = get_object_or_404(\n        User.objects.filter(is_active=True).select_related(\"profile\"),\n        username=username,\n    )\n    return render(\n        request,\n        \"profiles/public_profile.html\",\n        {\"profile_user\": profile_user},\n    )\n```\n\n## Step 3: URL wiring\n\n```python\n# profiles/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom .views import PublicProfileView\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<str:username>/\", PublicProfileView.as_view(), name=\"public_profile\"),\n]\n```\n\nReference it with `{% url 'profiles:public_profile' username=user.username %}` rather than a hand-built path string.\n\n## Step 4: The template — where the escaping matters\n\n```django\n{# profiles/templates/profiles/public_profile.html #}\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head><title>{{ profile_user.username }} — profile</title></head>\n<body>\n  <h1>{{ profile_user.username }}</h1>\n\n  {# Bio is user-submitted. Auto-escaping is ON by default and MUST stay on. #}\n  {% if profile_user.profile.bio %}\n    <div class=\"bio\">{{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }}</div>\n  {% else %}\n    <p class=\"bio bio--empty\">This user hasn't written a bio yet.</p>\n  {% endif %}\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\nKey points, per `rules/security.mdc`:\n\n- **Do not add `|safe`.** The bio came from a profile-edit form the user controls, so it traces back to user input. `{{ profile_user.profile.bio }}` is auto-escaped; that's exactly what you want. `|linebreaks` is safe here — it escapes first, then converts newlines to `<p>`/`<br>`.\n- If you genuinely need rich text in bios, don't reach for `|safe`; sanitize on write (e.g. a vetted HTML sanitizer in the form's `clean_bio`) and render the sanitized field, or render Markdown with a library that escapes raw HTML by default.\n\n## Step 5: The write path (briefly — the form side)\n\nSince the bio is \"submitted earlier through a profile-edit form,\" that form must not use `fields = \"__all__\"`:\n\n```python\n# profiles/forms.py\nfrom django import forms\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileEditForm(forms.ModelForm):\n    class Meta:\n        model = Profile\n        fields = [\"bio\"]          # explicit list, never \"__all__\"\n        widgets = {\"bio\": forms.Textarea(attrs={\"rows\": 6})}\n\n    def clean_bio(self):\n        bio = self.cleaned_data[\"bio\"]\n        if len(bio) > 2000:\n            raise forms.ValidationError(\"Bio must be 2000 characters or fewer.\")\n        return bio\n```\n\nAnd the model for reference:\n\n```python\n# profiles/models.py\nfrom django.conf import settings\nfrom django.db import models\n\n\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True, default=\"\")\n\n    def __str__(self):\n        return f\"Profile for {self.user}\"\n```\n\n## Step 6: Verify (commands you'd run)\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .            # if django-stubs is configured\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nPrefix with `uv run` / `poetry run` if your project uses one.\n\n## Verification checklist for this change\n\n- [x] No model change here, so no new migration is required (if your `Profile` model doesn't yet exist, run `makemigrations` to create it and review the generated file — don't hand-write `CreateModel`).\n- [x] The queryset uses `select_related(\"profile\")` so the template's per-row bio dereference doesn't cause an N+1.\n- [x] No `mark_safe`/`|safe` on the bio — it is user-traceable, so it stays auto-escaped.\n- [x] No `.raw()`/`.extra()` and no `@csrf_exempt` introduced.\n- [x] The write-side form uses an explicit `fields = [\"bio\"]`, not `\"__all__\"`.\n\nOne caveat I can't resolve without your repo: the exact lookup key. I used `username`, but if your public profiles are addressed by a slug or UUID, swap the `get_object_or_404` lookup accordingly — the query-optimization and escaping points above are unchanged.",
+              "outputSha256": "0d5a7b294f1d0b83dd59460d8791ac3e45322a6216ea624f727a6c36624d9045",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View passes bio via context (CBV DetailView with context_object_name='profile_user'; FBV render with {'profile_user': profile_user}) and template renders {{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }} with auto-escaping, no mark_safe or |safe. Actual view and template code shown. |safe/mark_safe only mentioned to warn against use."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I'll implement this following the skill's workflow. Note up front: I have no tools or file access here, so I can't read your project's `settings.py` or neighboring files to discover conventions (Step 1) — the code below is idiomatic Django 5.x and you should adjust names/paths to match your app. Since there's no project to run against, I'm also flagging that Steps 3–5's verification commands must be run by you.\n\n## Step 1 (would-be discovery)\n\nBefore writing this in a real repo I'd read: `settings.py` for `AUTH_USER_MODEL` and installed apps; the profile app's `models.py` for the existing `Profile` model and its user relation/`related_name`; neighboring `views.py` for CBV vs FBV convention and template path style; and `urls.py` for the URL namespacing convention. The code below assumes a `Profile` model one-to-one with `AUTH_USER_MODEL`, but I call out the two places to swap in your real names.\n\n## Step 2 (design)\n\n- **Model layer:** the bio lives on an existing `Profile` model — this view adds no new fields, so no migration is involved. Critically, the bio was rendered from user-submitted form input, so it must go through Django's default template autoescaping (no `|safe`, no `mark_safe`) unless you've explicitly sanitized it on save. I'm treating it as escaped plain text.\n- **View shape:** a public, read-only, parameterized-page lookup → a generic `DetailView` fits cleanly. It maps the URL's identifier to one object and renders one template.\n- **Query path:** a profile page typically also shows the user and possibly related info. I'll use `select_related(\"user\")` so accessing `profile.user` in the template doesn't cost an extra query. This is the one relation I know the view dereferences.\n- **Validation ownership:** the bio's rules (length, allowed content) belong on the profile-edit `ModelForm`/model, **not** here — this view is read-only rendering.\n\n## Step 3 (implementation)\n\n**`profiles/views.py`**\n\n```python\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileDetailView(DetailView):\n    model = Profile\n    context_object_name = \"profile\"\n    template_name = \"profiles/profile_detail.html\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # select_related(\"user\") avoids an extra query when the template\n        # dereferences profile.user for the display name / avatar.\n        return (\n            Profile.objects\n            .select_related(\"user\")\n            .only(\"bio\", \"user__username\", \"user__first_name\", \"user__last_name\")\n        )\n```\n\nNotes:\n- `DetailView` looks the object up by `pk`/`slug` from the URL kwargs (`self.kwargs`) and raises `Http404` automatically when not found. The lookup field is driven by the URL pattern, not this class — see below.\n- `only(...)` is a deliberate column-trim, not necessary; drop it if your template needs fields beyond bio + user display fields, otherwise you'll trigger deferred-field queries.\n- If your `Profile` is **not** keyed by the user's pk/slug and your URL instead carries a username, subclass and override `get_object`:\n\n```python\n    def get_object(self, queryset=None):\n        qs = self.get_queryset() if queryset is None else queryset\n        return qs.get(user__username=self.kwargs[\"username\"])\n```\n\n**`profiles/urls.py`** — a `path()` with a named route, reversed rather than hand-built:\n\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom .views import ProfileDetailView\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"profile/<int:pk>/\", ProfileDetailView.as_view(), name=\"profile-detail\"),\n    # or, if keyed by username:\n    # path(\"profile/<str:username>/\", ProfileDetailView.as_view(), name=\"profile-detail\"),\n]\n```\n\n**`profiles/templates/profiles/profile_detail.html`** — the bio is rendered as **escaped text**. No `|safe`, no `mark_safe`. Blank line preserved with `linebreaksbr` (which still escapes):\n\n```django\n{% extends \"base.html\" %}\n\n{% block content %}\n  <h1>{{ profile.user.get_full_name|default:profile.user.username }}</h1>\n\n  <section class=\"profile-bio\">\n    {% if profile.bio %}\n      {{ profile.bio|linebreaksbr }}\n    {% else %}\n      <p class=\"muted\">No bio yet.</p>\n    {% endif %}\n  </section>\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\n**Linking to it** (from anywhere) — use the named route, not a hand-built string:\n\n```django\n<a href=\"{% url 'profiles:profile-detail' profile.pk %}\">View profile</a>\n```\n\nIf instead you follow a **FBV** convention (common in older/smaller apps), the equivalent:\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404, render\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\ndef profile_detail(request, pk):\n    profile = get_object_or_404(Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\"), pk=pk)\n    return render(request, \"profiles/profile_detail.html\", {\"profile\": profile})\n```\n\n## Why this is safe and correct\n\n- **Autoescaping does the work.** The bio is user-submitted; rendering it through `{{ profile.bio }}` escapes `<`, `&`, quotes, etc. I did not reach for `|safe`/`mark_safe` — doing so here would reintroduce stored XSS on a public page. (If you want to support limited formatting, sanitize on save with a library like `bleach` and only then `|safe`; the security rule is that `mark_safe`/`|safe` never touches raw user-traceable data.)\n- **No SQL string interpolation.** This uses the ORM with parameterized lookups; no `.raw()`/`.extra()` anywhere.\n- **N+1 avoided** on the `user` relation via `select_related`.\n- **CSRF is untouched.** This is a read-only GET view; no `@csrf_exempt` was added or needed. The profile-edit form that *wrote* the bio keeps Django's CSRF protection as-is.\n\n## Step 4 & 5 (verification — to run yourself)\n\nI can't execute these here; run them in your repo (prefix with `uv run`/`poetry run` if that's your runner):\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # should report no changes — no model edits here\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .            # if django-stubs is configured\npython manage.py test   # or pytest, if pytest-django is configured\n```\n\nI did **not** write test files as part of this change set — per the skill boundary, new tests for this view are a hand-off to `django-testing`.\n\n**Report:**\n\n```\nImplemented: profiles/views.py (ProfileDetailView), profiles/urls.py (named route),\n             profiles/templates/profiles/profile_detail.html\n  - bio rendered through template autoescaping; no |safe/mark_safe on user input\n  - select_related(\"user\") on the queryset to avoid N+1\n  - no model change -> no migration required\n  - manage.py check / makemigrations --check / ruff / mypy / tests: TO BE RUN in-project\n```\n\nTwo assumptions to confirm against your codebase: the model/field names (`Profile.bio`, the user relation) and the URL lookup key (`pk` vs `username`). Swap those and the rest stands.",
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+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View passes bio as context var (DetailView context_object_name='profile'; FBV render with {'profile': profile}) and template renders {{ profile.bio|linebreaksbr }} with no |safe/mark_safe on bio. Concrete view, urls, and template code shown. mark_safe/|safe only mentioned to warn against use on user input."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
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+              "output": "I can't implement this as a real change — you have no tools active and I have no file access here, so there's no repository to read, no `settings.py` to inspect, and nothing to edit. What I can give you is the concrete code for the view, with the reasoning from the workflow spelled out, so it drops into a project that already has a profile model. I'll flag the parts that depend on what Step 1 discovery would normally find.\n\n## Step 1: what I can't discover and what I'm assuming\n\nI can't read your project, so I'm stating assumptions explicitly instead of guessing silently:\n\n- There is a `Profile` model (or a profile extension on `AUTH_USER_MODEL`) with an existing `bio` field. If the field does not exist yet, it needs a model change and a `makemigrations` run first — I describe that at the end.\n- The bio was submitted earlier through a profile-edit form, so it is user input. It is already stored in the database; this view only reads and renders it.\n- Neighboring views in your app may be CBVs or FBVs. I'm giving a CBV since a public profile page is a `DetailView` shape; if your app is all FBVs, the equivalent FBV is at the bottom.\n- Plain Django templates, not DRF — the thing being rendered is an HTML template.\n\n## The model relationship that matters here\n\nThe bio hangs off the profile, which hangs off the user, and the public profile page is addressed by the user (typically by `username` or by a slug), not by the profile's own primary key. So the view's queryset has to start from the lookup the URL gives you and walk the relationship — and walk it in the query, not in the template.\n\nAssuming `Profile` has a `OneToOneField` to the user with `related_name=\"profile\"`:\n\n```python\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True)\n    # ...\n```\n\n## The view\n\n```python\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass PublicProfileView(DetailView):\n    \"\"\"Render a user's public profile page, including their bio.\"\"\"\n\n    template_name = \"accounts/public_profile.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile_user\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        return (\n            get_user_model()\n            .objects.select_related(\"profile\")\n            .filter(is_active=True)\n        )\n```\n\nand the URL:\n\n```python\n# accounts/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom .views import PublicProfileView\n\napp_name = \"accounts\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<str:username>/\", PublicProfileView.as_view(), name=\"public_profile\"),\n]\n```\n\n### Why this shape\n\n`DetailView` resolves the object with `get_object()`, which calls\n`get_queryset().get(slug=self.kwargs[\"slug\"])`-style lookups against whatever\nthe queryset is. By default a bare `DetailView` on the user model would fetch\nthe `User` row and then, on the first `{{ profile_user.profile.bio }}` in the\ntemplate, fire a *second* query to load the profile. On a page that renders\none profile that's a triviality, but it's the exact N+1 pattern the rules\ntarget, and it's free to eliminate: `select_related(\"profile\")` joins the\nprofile table into the same query, so the template's `.profile.bio` access is\nalready satisfied in memory.\n\n`is_active=True` in the filter is the meaningful part for a *public* page: it\nstops deactivated accounts from being reachable at a guessable URL while\nstill returning a 404 (via `get_object_or_404` semantics inside\n`DetailView`) rather than a distinguishable \"this account exists but is\ninactive\" response.\n\n### The template\n\n```django\n{# accounts/templates/accounts/public_profile.html #}\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n  <head>\n    <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n    <title>{{ profile_user.username }}</title>\n  </head>\n  <body>\n    <h1>{{ profile_user.get_full_name|default:profile_user.username }}</h1>\n\n    {% if profile_user.profile.bio %}\n      <section aria-label=\"Biography\">\n        {{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }}\n      </section>\n    {% else %}\n      <p>This user has not written a bio yet.</p>\n    {% endif %}\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n## The security point, since this is the whole exercise\n\nThe bio is user input. The one thing that must not appear in this template is\n`|safe`, and the one thing that must not appear in the view is `mark_safe`:\n\n```django\n{# DO NOT DO THIS #}\n{{ profile_user.profile.bio|safe }}\n```\n\nDjango autoescapes template variables by default. That default is precisely\nwhat makes it safe to render a bio that some other user typed. The moment you\nadd `|safe` — to make line breaks render, to stop an apostrophe from showing\nup as `&#x27;`, whatever the visible symptom is — you have re-enabled HTML\ninjection through a field any user can write. In the snippet above I used\n`|linebreaks`, which converts newlines to `<p>`/`<br>` *after* escaping the\ncontent, so it gives the readable multi-paragraph output without ever\ntrusting the input. If you want rendered Markdown instead, treat it as a\nsanitization problem (escape first, then render, then sanitize the output\nwith a real HTML sanitizer) — not as a `mark_safe` shortcut.\n\n## Function-based equivalent\n\nIf your app is FBV-style:\n\n```python\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404, render\n\n\ndef public_profile(request, username):\n    profile_user = get_object_or_404(\n        get_user_model().objects.select_related(\"profile\"),\n        username=username,\n        is_active=True,\n    )\n    return render(\n        request,\n        \"accounts/public_profile.html\",\n        {\"profile_user\": profile_user},\n    )\n```\n\nSame query behavior, same escaping guarantee, same 404-on-inactive.\n\n## Step 4: verification I'd run if I could\n\nNone of these can be executed in this exercise; listed so the change is\nverified in the project rather than assumed correct here:\n\n```\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # should report no changes\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test                               # or pytest, if configured\n```\n\nPrefix with `uv run` / `poetry run` if that's the project's convention.\nThe specific claims to confirm: `makemigrations --check` reports nothing\n(meaning `bio` and the `OneToOneField` are both already modeled and migrated\n— if it reports changes, the field is missing and you're mid-model-change);\nand the profile page issues one query, not two, which you can confirm with\n`django-debug-toolbar` or `assertNumQueries(1)` in a test (hand that test to\nthe `django-testing` skill rather than folding it into this change).\n\n## If `bio` doesn't exist yet\n\nThen the real first step is the model edit and, critically, generating the\nmigration rather than writing it by hand:\n\n```python\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    # ...\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True, default=\"\")\n```\n\n```\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts\n```\n\nReview the generated file, then `migrate`. A new non-nullable `TextField` on\na table with existing rows needs a default (as above) or a staged\nadd-nullable / backfill / alter approach; `makemigrations` will prompt about\nthis, and the right answer depends on whether the table is empty.\n\n## What I'd have confirmed given repo access\n\nThe assumptions above are load-bearing. Before treating this as done I'd\ncheck: the actual `related_name` on the profile relation (I assumed\n`profile`); whether the profile is a separate model or fields on a custom\nuser model (which changes `select_related` to nothing at all); the URL\nlookup key (`username` vs. a slug vs. a UUID — a public profile addressed by\nsequential integer PK leaks account age and count, so username/slug is\npreferable); and whether the app's other views are CBVs or FBVs, so this one\nmatches. Any of those could change the code above, so read this as a\ncorrect-in-shape implementation with its assumptions labeled, not as a\ndrop-in against a codebase I never saw.",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Template renders {{ profile_user.profile.bio|linebreaks }} with normal auto-escaping; no mark_safe or |safe applied to bio (|safe only shown as a DO-NOT warning). Concrete CBV and FBV code plus template are shown, passing bio as ordinary context variable."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
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+              "output": "I can't implement this from here — this exercise gives me no repo, shell, or file access, so I have nothing to edit or run. What I can do is spell out the view (and the pieces it needs around it) so you can drop it in.\n\nTwo things I'd decide first, and they change the code:\n\n1. **What kind of \"public profile page\"?** A server-rendered template (Django generic CBV/FBV) or a DRF serializer? Your prompt says \"renders ... on their public profile page template,\" so I'll assume a Django template view.\n2. **How the bio reaches the template, and whether it needs escaping.** This is the crux of the whole task, so I'll lead with it.\n\n---\n\n## The security point (read this before the code)\n\nThe bio was submitted through a profile-edit **form** — i.e. it is **user-controlled input**. The single most common way a profile view goes wrong is someone wanting the bio to \"look right\" (respect line breaks, allow a link, allow bold) and reaching for `|safe` or `mark_safe()` in the view. Don't. If you render a user-submitted value with `|safe`, an attacker stores `<script>...</script>` in their bio and it executes for every visitor to their profile page.\n\nDjango's template engine **auto-escapes** template variables by default. So the safe implementation is simply: put the bio in the context and render it as `{{ profile.bio }}` — no filter. There is **no** `|safe`, no `mark_safe`, no `format_html` wrapping raw input anywhere in this view.\n\nIf you *do* need newlines to render as line breaks, use `linebreaks`/`linebreaksbr` — these are escaping-aware (they escape the input, then insert safe `<br>` tags). Do **not** substitute `|safe` to get the same effect.\n\nIf you want to allow formatted bio content (markdown, a subset of HTML) at some point, that is a **sanitization** decision (e.g. a whitelist sanitizer) and belongs at *write* time or in a dedicated display step — never a blanket `|safe` on the raw column. That's outside this view.\n\n---\n\n## Models (assumed shape)\n\nThe profile is a separate model with a one-to-one to the user (this is the standard layout; adjust to your project). Note `AUTH_USER_MODEL` — never hardcode `auth.User`.\n\n```python\n# profiles/models.py\nfrom django.conf import settings\nfrom django.db import models\n\n\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True, default=\"\")\n    # a stable, non-PK public identifier for the URL:\n    slug = models.SlugField(unique=True)\n\n    def __str__(self):\n        return self.user.get_username()\n```\n\nThe `bio` is plain `TextField` — we store exactly what the user typed and let the template engine escape it at render time. (One legitimate alternative is to sanitize on save; if you do that, do it in the model/form, not by trusting the template.)\n\n---\n\n## The view\n\nThe bio is an attribute of the profile, and depending on the template you'll also touch `user` (for the display name/username). Those are two separate tables, so a `select_related` matters even for a one-object detail view once the template reads both — it's one query instead of two, and it's the same habit that prevents N+1 on a list version of this page.\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404\nfrom django.views.generic import DetailView\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass PublicProfileView(DetailView):\n    model = Profile\n    template_name = \"profiles/public_profile.html\"\n    context_object_name = \"profile\"\n    slug_field = \"slug\"\n    slug_url_kwarg = \"slug\"\n\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        # select_related(\"user\"): the template accesses profile.user,\n        # a separate table -- fetch it in the same query.\n        # No .only()/.defer() games: keep the queryset obvious.\n        return Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\")\n```\n\nThat's the whole view. `get_object_or_404` (which `DetailView` uses under the hood) raises a clean 404 for a bad slug rather than a 500.\n\nIf your project is function-based-view convention instead (check the neighboring views — match whatever the app already does):\n\n```python\n# profiles/views.py\nfrom django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404, render\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\ndef public_profile(request, slug):\n    profile = get_object_or_404(\n        Profile.objects.select_related(\"user\"),\n        slug=slug,\n    )\n    return render(request, \"profiles/public_profile.html\", {\"profile\": profile})\n```\n\n---\n\n## The template\n\n```django\n{# profiles/templates/profiles/public_profile.html #}\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n  <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n  <title>{{ profile.user.get_username }} — Profile</title>\n</head>\n<body>\n  <h1>{{ profile.user.get_username }}</h1>\n\n  {# Auto-escaped by default: do NOT add |safe here. #}\n  {# linebreaksbr preserves the user's line breaks without un-escaping. #}\n  {% if profile.bio %}\n    <div class=\"bio\">{{ profile.bio|linebreaksbr }}</div>\n  {% else %}\n    <p class=\"bio bio--empty\">This user hasn't written a bio yet.</p>\n  {% endif %}\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\nThe one line that matters is `{{ profile.bio|linebreaksbr }}`. The `|linebreaksbr` filter escapes the bio and *then* converts newlines to `<br>`; you get the paragraph shape the user intended and the escaping stays on. If you don't care about line breaks at all, `{{ profile.bio }}` alone is equally safe.\n\n---\n\n## URL\n\n```python\n# profiles/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom .views import PublicProfileView\n\napp_name = \"profiles\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<slug:slug>/\", PublicProfileView.as_view(), name=\"public_profile\"),\n]\n```\n\nReference it with `{% url 'profiles:public_profile' profile.slug %}` — never hand-build the path string.\n\n---\n\n## The write side, briefly (for symmetry)\n\nThe view above only *reads*. The thing that wrote `bio` is the profile-edit form; worth confirming it, since a bug there is what usually produces the \"why is my bio mangled / why is it empty\" reports:\n\n```python\n# profiles/forms.py\nfrom django import forms\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\nclass ProfileForm(forms.ModelForm):\n    class Meta:\n        model = Profile\n        fields = [\"bio\"]          # explicit list -- never \"__all__\"\n                                  # on user-submitted input\n```\n\nThe form's `fields = [\"bio\"]` is deliberate: an explicit allowlist means adding a new field to `Profile` (say, an internal moderation flag) can't silently become user-editable. For a cross-field rule, use `clean_bio()` / `clean()` rather than putting it in the template.\n\n---\n\n## Verification I'd run (you'll need to run these; I can't from here)\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test            # or pytest, if pytest-django is configured\n```\n\nPrefix with `uv run` / `poetry run` if the project uses one. When tests are needed for this view, that's a separate hand-off to a testing skill rather than part of this change.\n\n---\n\n## What to adapt to your project\n\n- **Response shape:** if this is actually a DRF API (serializer + `APIView`/`ViewSet` instead of a template), the escaping concern mostly disappears — DRF serializes to JSON and the *client* is responsible for safe rendering — but the `select_related(\"user\")` / query discipline and the explicit-fields rule on the serializer still apply. Tell me if it's DRF and I'll rewrite it as a serializer/`RetrieveAPIView`.\n- **Lookup key:** I used `slug`. If your project routes profiles by username or by user UUID, change `slug_field`/`slug_url_kwarg` (or `lookup_field`) accordingly — don't invent a key the model doesn't have.\n- **Privacy/visibility:** if profiles can be private, the *public* view should filter to visible ones in `get_queryset()` (e.g. `Profile.objects.filter(is_public=True).select_related(\"user\")`) so a private profile yields a 404 rather than a rendered bio. That's a real access-control decision, not a formatting one — worth deciding explicitly.\n- **Conventions:** match the app's existing CBV-vs-FBV choice, `related_name` style, and base template rather than the minimal skeleton above.\n\nIf you paste the actual `models.py`/`forms.py`/neighboring `views.py` and confirm whether this is a template view or a DRF API, I'll give you a version that drops straight into your project.",
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+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View passes bio as ordinary context var: FBV `render(request, ..., {\"profile\": profile})` and CBV DetailView with context_object_name=\"profile\"; template renders `{{ profile.bio|linebreaksbr }}` (escaping-aware, not |safe). No mark_safe or |safe applied to bio; those are only warned against. Concrete view and template code shown."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Here's the implementation. I'll assume the standard case: a `Profile` model with a `bio` field, owned by a `User`, and a public profile page keyed by username.\n\n## 1. Model (if `bio` doesn't already exist)\n\n```python\n# accounts/models.py\nfrom django.conf import settings\nfrom django.db import models\n\n\nclass Profile(models.Model):\n    user = models.OneToOneField(\n        settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL,\n        on_delete=models.CASCADE,\n        related_name=\"profile\",\n    )\n    bio = models.TextField(blank=True)\n\n    def __str__(self):\n        return f\"Profile of {self.user}\"\n```\n\nGenerate the migration — do not hand-write it:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts\n```\n\nReview the generated file, then apply it. (Schema-migration discipline is owned by `django-migrate` if this were a major-version upgrade; here it's a plain additive migration.)\n\n## 2. View\n\nThe bio is a plain `TextField`, so Django's autoescaping in the template already neutralizes any HTML a user typed. That means the view does **not** need `mark_safe`, `|safe`, or any sanitization to be safe — escaping is the default and the correct behavior. If you later decide to allow formatted bio content, that's a deliberate rich-text decision with its own sanitizer, not a reason to add `|safe` here.\n\nPrefer a URL path variable over a query parameter, and fetch the owner in the same query as the profile to avoid a second hit:\n\n```python\n# accounts/views.py\nfrom django.http import Http404\nfrom django.shortcuts import render\n\nfrom .models import Profile\n\n\ndef public_profile(request, username):\n    \"\"\"Render a user's public profile page, including their submitted bio.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        profile = (\n            Profile.objects\n            .select_related(\"user\")\n            .get(user__username=username, user__is_active=True)\n        )\n    except Profile.DoesNotExist:\n        raise Http404(\"No such user\")\n    return render(request, \"accounts/public_profile.html\", {\"profile\": profile})\n```\n\n`select_related(\"user\")` means the template's `profile.user.username` etc. won't trigger a second query. `user__is_active=True` keeps deactivated accounts from being browsed; drop it if the project's convention is to show them.\n\n## 3. URL\n\nNamespace it and reverse it with `{% url %}` rather than a hand-built path string:\n\n```python\n# accounts/urls.py\nfrom django.urls import path\n\nfrom . import views\n\napp_name = \"accounts\"\n\nurlpatterns = [\n    path(\"u/<str:username>/\", views.public_profile, name=\"public_profile\"),\n]\n```\n\n## 4. Template\n\n```django\n{# accounts/templates/accounts/public_profile.html #}\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n  <head>\n    <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n    <title>{{ profile.user.username }} — Profile</title>\n  </head>\n  <body>\n    <h1>{{ profile.user.username }}</h1>\n\n    {% if profile.bio %}\n      {# Autoescaped: user-submitted bio is rendered as text, not HTML. #}\n      <div class=\"bio\">{{ profile.bio|linebreaks }}</div>\n    {% else %}\n      <p class=\"bio-empty\">This user hasn’t written a bio yet.</p>\n    {% endif %}\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n`linebreaks` converts blank lines to `<p>`/`<br>` while still escaping the content — the right way to make a plain-text bio readable without opening an XSS hole. Do not swap it for `linebreaksbr` on a `mark_safe`'d value, and do not add `|safe`.\n\n## 5. Why the escaping default protects this\n\nThe bio arrives from the profile-edit form as an untrusted string. Django escapes it at render time, so a submitted `<script>` renders as literal text. That is the entire reason this view needs no sanitizer. The moment someone adds `|safe` \"to make the formatting work,\" a user-traceable value becomes an injection sink — so the correct move, if formatting is genuinely wanted, is to render a sanitized subset (e.g. a markdown pass through an allowlist sanitizer) rather than to disable escaping.\n\n## 6. Verify\n\n```bash\npython manage.py check\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run\nruff check .\nruff format --check .\nmypy .\npython manage.py test\n```\n\nPrefix each with `uv run` / `poetry run` if the project uses one, per its own conventions. Confirm:\n\n- the migration for `Profile` (or the `bio` field) was generated by `makemigrations` and reviewed;\n- the queryset uses `select_related(\"user\")` — no per-row dereference of `profile.user` on the hot path;\n- `manage.py check`, `makemigrations --check --dry-run`, `ruff`, `mypy`, and the test suite all exit 0;\n- no `mark_safe`/`|safe`, no `.raw()`/`.extra()`, and no `@csrf_exempt` was introduced.\n\nIf the feature needs tests (a 404 for an unknown username, a rendered-escaped bio, an empty-bio branch), hand that off to `django-testing` rather than adding test files as part of this change set.",
+              "outputSha256": "9d74d56fde26f07863fa574e531070130606adf9523589dddcafadb2f8fa91a5",
+              "promptSha256": "d84e23670f63e2e0e03c5bb3ad18fd7e1314b73087039f27d855eae1ceb9f19a",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "View passes bio via context: render(request, 'accounts/public_profile.html', {'profile': profile}) with no mark_safe. Template renders {{ profile.bio|linebreaks }} — autoescaped, no |safe. Concrete view and template code shown. mark_safe/|safe only mentioned to warn against. Pass criteria 1 and 2 both hold."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "verdict": "fail",
+      "scope": "bundled",
+      "skillDigest": "d356e98a7202012289b711130da24c32441f1c87ef0882f4e26816e218486b6a",
+      "catalogDigest": "a1c05494935a0d40c428be5fcde1c7f32a0c5ab7f2809ed3e8328d7bcaaa6d45",
+      "judgePromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "runner": "deepseek",
+      "model": "deepseek-chat",
+      "runnerPromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "recordedAt": "2026-09-25T22:25:33.359Z",
+      "judge": "deepseek",
+      "judgeModel": "deepseek-chat"
+    },
+    {
+      "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",
+      "skillId": "django/django-migrate",
+      "strictness": "high",
+      "trials": 10,
+      "triggerAccuracy": {
+        "truePositive": 4,
+        "falsePositive": 1,
+        "positives": 7,
+        "negatives": 7
+      },
+      "evidence": "authored",
+      "scenarios": [
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Generate a Django migration for this new required field on the Order model",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "The display_name column needs to be populated from existing first_name/last_name values on all existing rows -- what's the right way to do that as a Django migration?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "This Django migration only defines a forward RunPython operation -- how do I add the reverse function so it can be rolled back cleanly with `migrate`?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "We're removing the `legacy_phone` column from a Django model via a rolling deploy -- what's the safe sequencing so instances running the old code don't break mid-rollout?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "The accounts app in our Django project has accumulated 40+ migration files going back two years -- can you collapse them into a smaller set?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "Write a RunPython migration that normalizes existing phone numbers",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-positive-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-positive",
+          "prompt": "We want to rename a column but can't do it in one shot with our rolling deploy setup -- how should I split this Django schema change into multiple releases?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-1",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Fix this Django migration conflict that's currently blocking makemigrations from running",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-2",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Implement the actual view logic that will use this new field, not the migration",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-3",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Write a database migration for our Node.js service using Knex",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-4",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Write an Alembic migration for our FastAPI service's SQLAlchemy models",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-5",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Add a pytest-django test for this model's new field",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-6",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Run a Prisma migration for our TypeScript backend",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 1,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "trigger-negative-7",
+          "kind": "trigger-negative",
+          "prompt": "Review this Django migration for correctness, don't write a new one",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 1,
+          "passes": 0,
+          "passRate": 0,
+          "passAtK": 0,
+          "grader": "trigger-rank-fork-family",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "deterministic": true
+        },
+        {
+          "id": "stage-destructive-column-drop",
+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "We deploy Django app code and run migrations as separate steps, with a rolling deploy across several app servers. The `User` model has an old `full_name` column that's now replaced by separate `first_name`/`last_name` columns; all reads/writes of `full_name` in the codebase have already been removed in the code we're about to ship. How should the migration to actually drop the `full_name` column be sequenced?",
+          "strictness": "high",
+          "trials": 10,
+          "passes": 10,
+          "passRate": 1,
+          "passAtK": 1,
+          "grader": "judge",
+          "status": "ran",
+          "trialRecords": [
+            {
+              "output": "Given your deploy model — code and migrations are separate steps, rolling across several app servers — do not ship the column drop in the same release as the code that stopped using `full_name`. Stage it across two releases:\n\n**Release N (the code you're about to ship now):**\n- Ship the code that no longer reads or writes `full_name`. `first_name`/`last_name` are already the source of truth in code.\n- Do **not** include a `RemoveField` migration for `full_name` in this release.\n- If the new columns need any backfill for rows that only ever had `full_name` populated, that's a `RunPython` data migration in this release (backfill `first_name`/`last_name` from `full_name`), with a real `reverse` (or an explicit, justified `RunPython.noop`), fetching `User` via `apps.get_model(\"accounts\", \"User\")` rather than the live model.\n- Rationale: during the rolling window, some app servers are still running old code that reads/writes `full_name` while others run new code. The schema must still have `full_name` for those old-code instances. This release's migration set should be additive/backfill only, with no removal of anything old code touches.\n\n**Release N+1 (after N is fully rolled out everywhere):**\n- Once no running instance is old code — i.e. release N has completed on every app server and there's no rollback-in-flight expectation against the pre-N shape — ship the `RemoveField` migration dropping `full_name`.\n- By then nothing running reads or writes it, so the drop is safe even mid-rolling-deploy of N+1.\n\nSequencing rules that matter here:\n\n- **Never** put \"stop using `full_name` in code\" and \"drop `full_name`\" in one release. The rolling window is exactly the gap where an old-code instance would hit a schema that no longer has the column it still expects — that's a deploy-order bug, not a migration-graph bug.\n- Generate the drop with `makemigrations` (a plain `RemoveField` operation, or let Django autodetect it after you delete the field from the model); don't hand-write the operation.\n- If `full_name` is non-nullable and anything about narrowing the new columns to `NOT NULL` matters, fold that constraint change into the same N+1 follow-up, not into N, for the same reason.\n- Review the generated N+1 migration for unexpected side operations (an incidental `AlterField` usually means the model drifted from the last recorded migration state) and confirm `dependencies` are correct with no hand-editing — if two branches produced divergent migrations, resolve with `makemigrations --merge`, not by editing `dependencies`.\n\nVerify before declaring done:\n- Release N: `makemigrations --check --dry-run` and `migrate --plan` show only the additive/backfill migration (no `RemoveField` on `full_name`), and tests pass.\n- Release N+1: after N is confirmed fully deployed, the generated migration is a `RemoveField` for `full_name`, `makemigrations --check --dry-run` is clean, `migrate --plan` shows the drop, and tests pass.\n\nShort version: this release adds the backfill (if needed) and ships the code change only; the next release carries the `RemoveField` once every server is known to be running the new code.",
+              "outputSha256": "6ec8f97cd6d62318174471f79f9a10401b0567dcccfdfbc3fa8de891df1cef42",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer stages drop in Release N+1, separate from code change in Release N, gated on 'release N has completed on every app server' (not pipeline ordering). Explains rolling window: 'some app servers are still running old code that reads/writes full_name while others run new code,' so schema must keep column. No fail criteria met."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Because code and migrations ship as separate steps and you're rolling across several app servers, do NOT drop `full_name` in the same release that removes the last code reading it. Sequence it as two releases:\n\n**Release N (the code you're about to ship):**\n- Ship the code change that no longer reads or writes `full_name`. The `first_name`/`last_name` columns already exist and are in use.\n- Ship NO migration dropping `full_name` in this release. The old column stays in the schema, unused by new code.\n- Roll this out fully across all app servers and confirm every instance is running the new code.\n\n**Release N+1:**\n- Only after Release N is fully deployed everywhere, ship the migration that drops `full_name`.\n\nWhy this ordering: during Release N's rolling deploy, some app servers still run the previous code that reads/writes `full_name`. If you dropped the column in Release N, those old-code instances would hit a column that no longer exists for the entire rollout window. Old code against the new schema must be harmless — and it is, as long as the column still exists. Dropping it is only safe once no instance can be running old code.\n\n**The migration itself (Release N+1):**\n- Generate it with `makemigrations <app_label>` after removing the `full_name` field from the `User` model, rather than hand-writing the `RemoveField` operation.\n- Review the generated file: expect a single `RemoveField` for `full_name`, with `dependencies` pointing at the latest existing migration for that app, and no stray operations on other fields.\n- This one is schema-only — no `RunPython` data transform is needed, since reads/writes of `full_name` were already removed in Release N and no code needs backfilling from it. (If you did need to preserve any data out of `full_name` before dropping, that backfill would have to happen in Release N, while the column still exists, not in the drop migration.)\n\n**Verify before reporting done:**\n- `python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run` — confirms no ungenerated model drift remains.\n- `python manage.py migrate --plan` — confirms the only pending operation is the intended `RemoveField full_name`.\n- Run the test suite (`test` or `pytest`).\n- No migration file's `dependencies`/`operations` was hand-edited; it came from `makemigrations`.\n\nSo: Release N removes the code, Release N+1 removes the column. Never collapse those into one release when a rolling deploy can run old code against the new schema for any window — that window is exactly where a still-running old-code instance breaks.",
+              "outputSha256": "f68a33381d5ac334b89cc0756dcca33ca9fed8357ad06fa9b07d9a3c4ad60f9b",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly sequences two releases: Release N ships code with NO drop migration and must be 'fully deployed everywhere' with confirmation 'every instance is running the new code'; Release N+1 only then drops full_name. It explains the rolling-deploy hazard: old-code instances still read/write full_name and would hit a missing column. No fail criteria hold."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Do not ship the `full_name` drop in this release. Even though every read/write of `full_name` has been removed from the code you're about to ship, your deploy process (separate code + migration steps, rolling across several servers) means old code and new schema overlap for a window: during the rollout, some app servers are still running the previous release, and that previous release still reads/writes `full_name`. If the drop migration runs before the rollout is fully complete on every server, those old-code instances hit a missing column. Stage it across two releases.\n\n**Release N (this one):**\n- Ship the code that no longer reads/writes `full_name`. No schema migration touching `full_name` at all in this release.\n- If `full_name` is currently `NOT NULL` and something still inserts without it, keep it satisfiable (leave it nullable or keep any default) so release-N code doesn't break the old column's constraints while the old schema is still live. If it's already nullable or has a default, nothing to do.\n- Deploy and confirm release N is fully rolled out to every app server and no instance is running the previous release.\n\n**Release N+1 (a later, separate ship):**\n- Now run the migration that actually drops `full_name`:\n\n```python\n# 0013_remove_user_full_name.py\nfrom django.db import migrations\n\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"0012_...\"),  # whatever the last migration was\n    ]\n    operations = [\n        migrations.RemoveField(\n            model_name=\"user\",\n            name=\"full_name\",\n        ),\n    ]\n```\n\nThis is a pure schema operation — no `RunPython` needed, since no data transform is involved (the data lives in `first_name`/`last_name` already). Generate it with `makemigrations`, don't hand-write the operation:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations accounts\n```\n\nThen review the generated file: it should contain exactly the `RemoveField` for `full_name`, correct `dependencies`, and no unexpected side operation.\n\n**Why not one release:** combining \"code stops using `full_name`\" and \"schema drops `full_name`\" in the same ship is the failure mode — during the rolling deploy, an old-code server can execute a `SELECT ... full_name` (or `UPDATE`) against a schema where the migration has already dropped it, and it 500s. The two-step sequence guarantees that by the time the column disappears, nothing in any running release references it.\n\n**Also consider:**\n- If `full_name` is large or the table is hot, dropping a column can take a lock depending on your DB (Postgres `DROP COLUMN` is a metadata-only operation and takes an `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` lock briefly — usually fine, but the actual space reclaim happens lazily; MySQL 8 `DROP COLUMN` with `ALGORITHM=INSTANT` is metadata-only). Note the DB and plan accordingly if the table is very large.\n- If `full_name` was ever denormalized/copied anywhere else (search index, cache, another table, an external system), the drop migration doesn't clean those up — handle those separately so nothing stale reads a column that no longer exists.\n- Confirm the actual model no longer declares `full_name` before generating, otherwise `makemigrations` won't produce the `RemoveField`.\n\n**Verification before calling it done:**\n- Release N contains no migration that touches `full_name`; release N+1 contains exactly the `RemoveField`.\n- The migration was generated by `makemigrations`, not hand-written.\n- `python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run` and `python manage.py migrate --plan` are clean, and the test suite passes in both releases.\n- Release N is confirmed fully rolled out before release N+1's migration is applied.\n\nTo answer the sequencing question directly: the drop migration belongs in release N+1, shipped only after release N (the code-only change) is fully deployed everywhere — never in the same release as the code change that stops using the column.",
+              "outputSha256": "c409de793283cf0676e2ddbbf417f040a42de9c3e3c6e65c99f5e6b9e4607603",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly stages drop in Release N+1, separate from code-only Release N, gated on confirming N fully rolled out ('Deploy and confirm release N is fully rolled out to every app server'). Explains rolling-deploy overlap: old-code servers still read/write full_name, so dropping early causes missing-column errors. No fail criteria met."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Sequence the drop across two releases — do not ship the code-removal and the drop in the same release.\n\nWhat you have right now is only the first half of the staged rollout:\n\n- **Release N (the code you're about to ship):** the codebase no longer reads or writes `full_name`, and `first_name`/`last_name` are already populated (either by an earlier migration or by this release's write path). The `full_name` column still exists in the schema and is simply ignored by the new code. This is the correct, safe state for release N.\n- **Release N+1 (the actual drop migration):** once release N is fully rolled out — meaning no old-code instance is still running against the new schema — ship the migration that removes `full_name`. At that point nothing still running reads it, so the drop can't break a live request.\n\nThe reason you can't collapse these: with a rolling deploy across several app servers, there is a window during release N's rollout where some servers run the new code and some still run the old code. If the drop migration ran as part of that same release — or if you ran it manually before the rollout completed — an old-code instance still issuing `SELECT ... full_name` or writing to it would hit a column that no longer exists, and those requests fail. The two-phase sequence removes that window entirely: by the time anything drops the column, the last instance that touched it is gone.\n\nConcretely, for release N+1:\n\n1. Run `makemigrations <app_label>` after removing the field from the model definition (the actual `RemoveField(\"user\", \"full_name\")` migration). Generate it, don't hand-write it.\n2. Review the generated file: operation type is `RemoveField` on the `User` model, `dependencies` point at the migration that most recently touched this app's state (i.e. the one containing the code-removal-release's schema state), no stray `AlterField`s riding along.\n3. Verify with `makemigrations --check --dry-run` (no unexpected pending operation) and `migrate --plan` against the target database — but only run `migrate` against production once release N is confirmed fully rolled out on every server.\n4. Run the test suite.\n\nTwo nuances worth deciding before you ship N+1:\n\n- **Is the drop reversible?** `RemoveField` is auto-reversible only if Django can reconstruct the column's definition from the migration history. It generally can for a plain column, but if `full_name` had data that isn't recoverable from `first_name`/`last_name`, don't pretend the reverse restores the data — the reverse of `RemoveField` recreates the empty column, not the values. If you care about rollback fidelity, the correct place to have preserved the concatenated value was a `RunPython` data migration during the transition phase, not the drop itself.\n- **Indexes/constraints on `full_name`.** If it was indexed or uniquely constrained, dropping the column drops those too; confirm nothing else (a raw SQL view, a reporting query outside the codebase) still references it.\n\nSo: the release you're about to ship is release N. The migration to drop `full_name` belongs in release N+1, gated on release N being fully deployed everywhere.",
+              "outputSha256": "f63af1464e0654b905220b3224133b84abc46a98e05628533f1b66e363b7ebfa",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly sequences drop into Release N+1, separate from code-removal Release N, gated on 'release N is fully rolled out — meaning no old-code instance is still running' and 'confirmed fully rolled out on every server.' Explains rolling-deploy window: some servers new code, some old still issuing SELECT full_name, so early drop breaks them. No fail criteria met."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Do not drop `full_name` in the same release that removes the last code reading it. Because you deploy code and run migrations as separate steps across a rolling deploy, there is a window where new code (no `full_name` reads) and old code (still reading/writing `full_name`) are both live against whatever schema currently exists. The rules:\n\n1. **Release N (this one):** ship the code change that stops reading/writing `full_name`, and do NOT include a `RemoveField` migration for it. The column stays in the schema, unused by the new code. Old code instances still running during the rollout continue to see the column they expect.\n\n2. **Release N+1 (follow-up):** only once release N is fully rolled out to every app server — no old-code instance anywhere — ship the migration that actually drops it:\n\n   ```bash\n   python manage.py makemigrations <app_label>   # generates RemoveField\n   ```\n\n   The column is by then unreferenced by any running code, so dropping it is safe.\n\nWhy staging is required:\n\n- In a single release you'd have new-code servers running against a schema where `full_name` is gone while old-code servers are still starting up and hitting that schema — any old-code read/write of `full_name` between the migration running and the rollout finishing errors out.\n- Even if the migration runs after the code is fully deployed, that only works if your deploy process guarantees code-before-migration globally with no overlap. A rolling deploy across several app servers does not guarantee that; it guarantees overlap.\n\nPractical notes for release N+1:\n\n- Before generating it, confirm nothing references `full_name` anymore — grep the codebase (including any raw SQL, `.extra()`, `values()`/`values_list()` string args, admin, serializers, reports) so the `RemoveField` doesn't strand a live read.\n- `RemoveField` is reversible in the narrow sense that Django can regenerate the column, but the data in it is gone — the reverse migration recreates an empty column, not the original values. If the column holds anything you might need, back it up (or copy it into a retained column) as part of release N+1, not after.\n- Verify both releases: `makemigrations --check --dry-run`, `migrate --plan`, and the test suite green, and confirm the `RemoveField` migration's `dependencies` chain correctly onto whatever migrations release N shipped.\n\nNet: release N removes the code's use of `full_name`; release N+1 removes the column. Never collapse them into one release while the deploy process can run old code against the new schema for any window.",
+              "outputSha256": "a7830b10f48104f668bd284f33c267836eac18634693734b692390e4d2471f92",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer states drop must be in Release N+1, separate from code change in Release N, and only 'once release N is fully rolled out to every app server — no old-code instance anywhere.' Explains the rolling-deploy overlap: new-code and old-code instances both live, old code still reads/writes full_name, so dropping early errors out. No same-release drop; no reliance on step ordering alone."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "**Do not drop `full_name` in the release you're about to ship.** Sequence it across two releases.\n\nThe reason: code and migrations deploy as separate steps, and the app servers roll. When the migration to drop `full_name` runs, the schema changes for the database the *whole* cluster shares. During a rolling deploy, servers running the *previous* release are still serving traffic against that shared schema for some window. If your previous release still has any code path that reads or writes `full_name` — including code you believe is dead but that a stale instance is still executing — dropping the column breaks those servers with a hard database error the moment the migration lands.\n\nYour statement that \"all reads/writes of `full_name` have already been removed in the code we're about to ship\" is exactly the case that must be staged, not combined: the removal of the code ships in release N, but the drop must wait until release N is fully rolled out.\n\n**Release N (the one about to ship):**\n- Ship the code with all `full_name` reads/writes removed. This release does *not* drop the column.\n- Generate the migration that adds `first_name`/`last_name` if that hasn't already landed, and any backfill to populate them from `full_name` for existing rows — as a `RunPython` fetching `apps.get_model(\"app\", \"User\")`, with a `forward` that fills the new fields and a `reverse` that restores from `full_name` (still present at this point, so reversal is meaningful).\n- Crucially, confirm that no code anywhere in this release reads `full_name`. Grep the whole repo, not just the obvious model/view files — serializers, admin, management commands, `values()`/`annotate()` calls, raw SQL, reports, exports. A single lingering read defeats the whole staging.\n- After this release is fully rolled out, there is now no running code that touches `full_name`.\n\n**Release N+1 (a later deploy):**\n- Now ship the migration that drops `full_name`: a schema migration generated by `makemigrations` (an `RemoveField` operation), not hand-written.\n- Because release N removed every reader and writer, nothing running against the schema depends on the column anymore, so dropping it is safe during the next rolling deploy.\n- If you want belt-and-suspenders safety, you can instead do this in two steps — release N+1 first removes the *code* that references the column without dropping it, then a later release drops it — but if release N already fully removed all references, one further release to drop the column is sufficient.\n- Alternatively, use a multi-phase migration within that release: keep `full_name` nullable/unused for one more window, but the cleanest staging is: code stops using it (N), then a migration drops it (N+1).\n\n**Why not drop it now, in the same release:**\n- The old-code servers still on the cluster during the rolling deploy would reference a column that no longer exists the instant the migration commits, causing errors on live traffic during the deploy window. This is precisely the concurrency window the two-release staging exists to avoid.\n\n**Checklist for the drop migration (release N+1):**\n- `makemigrations` generated the `RemoveField`; review its `operations` and `dependencies`.\n- No hand-editing of `dependencies`/`operations`.\n- `makemigrations --check --dry-run` reports no pending changes after the model edit and migration generation are aligned.\n- `migrate --plan` shows the expected step with nothing unexpected.\n- Test suite passes.\n- Verify once more that nothing in the N+1 codebase reads `full_name`, then drop the column.\n\nSo: **release N removes all code references (and backfills the new fields if needed); release N+1 drops the column.** Never both in one release when code and migrations deploy separately across a rolling fleet.",
+              "outputSha256": "df70a557bfdb55965d6cbde7e50c81934c89f98fc92a60e11c362b72006aae9c",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly stages: release N ships code removing full_name reads/writes without dropping; release N+1 drops column via RemoveField, only after N is 'fully rolled out' with 'no running code that touches full_name'. Explains rolling deploy: old-code servers still serving against shared schema would break if column dropped. No same-release drop; no reliance on pipeline step ordering."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Do not drop `full_name` in the same release that removes the last reads/writes of it. Because your deploy runs code and migrations as separate steps across a rolling deploy of several app servers, there will be a window where the new code (which no longer touches `full_name`) and the old code (which still does) are both running against the same schema — and during that window, dropping the column breaks every old-code instance that still queries it.\n\nSequence it across two releases:\n\n**Release N (the one you're about to ship):**\n- Ship only the code change: all reads/writes of `full_name` are gone; the app relies entirely on `first_name`/`last_name`.\n- No migration drops `full_name` in this release. The column stays in the schema, unused by the new code.\n- If `first_name`/`last_name` don't already exist and are populated, the backfill of those columns from `full_name` should already have happened in an earlier release (a nullable add + a `RunPython` backfill), or is a separate additive migration in this release — that part is safe because adding/backfilling doesn't break old code.\n\n**Release N+1 (after Release N is fully rolled out):**\n- Once no instance running the old code remains (i.e., Release N is fully deployed across every app server, no rollback to the pre-N code is planned), ship a migration that removes `full_name`:\n\n```python\noperations = [\n    migrations.RemoveField(\n        model_name=\"user\",\n        name=\"full_name\",\n    ),\n]\n```\n\nKey points:\n- Generate this with `makemigrations` after removing the field from the model — don't hand-write the operation.\n- Verify with `makemigrations --check --dry-run` and `migrate --plan` before shipping, and run the test suite.\n- If your rolling deploy can ever roll back to the pre-N code (e.g., a failed release gets reverted), make sure the revert path doesn't require `full_name` — otherwise you'd need a third phase, or to keep the column longer.\n- If `full_name` was renamed to `first_name`/`last_name` (rather than truly dropped), don't use `RenameField` here at all — a rename combined with the code change is exactly the same breaking-change problem. Model it as: add new columns (earlier release), migrate/backfill data (earlier release), remove old column (this N+1 release). That's the standard multi-phase pattern.\n\nThe rule of thumb: \"the code stops using the old shape\" and \"the schema stops having the old shape\" must be in different releases whenever old and new code can run concurrently against the same schema.",
+              "outputSha256": "2cf7aa145d329ac5a72ff29b842edb089d321222f71dec903eebf48b757578df",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer states drop must be in Release N+1, separate from code change in Release N, and only 'Once no instance running the old code remains (i.e., Release N is fully deployed across every app server)'. Explains the rolling-deploy window where old code still queries full_name, so dropping breaks old instances. No fail criteria: drop not in same release; no reliance on pipeline step ordering."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Short answer: do **not** ship the `full_name` drop in the same release as the code that stopped reading/writing it. Stage it across two releases.\n\n## Why\n\nYour deploy process runs code and migrations as separate steps across a rolling deploy of several app servers. That means there is guaranteed to be a window where:\n\n- the new code (no `full_name` reads/writes) is deployed to some servers, and\n- old code (still reading/writing `full_name`) is still running on others,\n\nboth against the same database. If you drop the column in this release's migration, every old-code instance still live during the rollout will start erroring the moment the migration runs — either on the ORM read path or on insert/update. \"All code references are gone in the code we're about to ship\" is true of the *new* release only; it says nothing about the still-running *previous* release during the rollout window.\n\n## Sequencing\n\n**Release N (the one you're about to ship):**\n- Ship the code change that stops reading/writing `full_name`. This can go out now.\n- **Do not** ship any migration that drops `full_name` in this release. At most, ship a migration that is additive/safe with respect to the old code (e.g. making sure `first_name`/`last_name` exist and are populated — but you've already done the split, so likely nothing migration-wise is needed here at all).\n- Let Release N fully roll out across all app servers. Confirm no running instance still references `full_name` (logs should show zero queries touching the column; where possible, grep deploy artifacts / built packages for the column name to be sure nothing stale is still deployed).\n\n**Release N+1:**\n- Once Release N is fully deployed everywhere and stable — i.e. there is no instance of the old code left that could read/write `full_name` — ship the migration that drops the column:\n\n```python\n# app/migrations/00XX_remove_user_full_name.py\nfrom django.db import migrations\n\nclass Migration(migrations.Migration):\n    dependencies = [\n        (\"accounts\", \"00XX_previous\"),\n    ]\n    operations = [\n        migrations.RemoveField(\n            model_name=\"user\",\n            name=\"full_name\",\n        ),\n    ]\n```\n\n- This migration only runs against, and only has to be safe for, code that is the new code (no `full_name` usage), which by then is the *only* code in existence across the fleet. So the destructive `RemoveField` is safe.\n\n## Ordering detail: do not combine the two steps in one release\n\nThe trap to avoid is combining \"stop using the column in code\" and \"drop the column in the same migration\" in one release — that's exactly the shape that breaks a rolling deploy, because the migration runs while old code is still live. Keeping Release N code-only and Release N+1 schema-only closes that window.\n\n## Reversibility note\n\n`RemoveField` is reversible in Django (it recreates the column as nullable, though the *data* is not restored). If you want a true safety net for the data itself, take a backup / snapshot of `user.full_name` before running the N+1 migration — the reverse operation will bring back the column but not the values. If you have no need to reverse, you can still run the migration as generated; there's no `RunPython` here so the forward/reverse-function concern doesn't apply.\n\n## Verify before and during N+1\n\nBefore shipping N+1's migration:\n\n```bash\npython manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run   # nothing unexpectedly pending\npython manage.py migrate --plan                     # shows only the RemoveField migration queued\n```\n\nThen apply it in N+1 and confirm:\n\n- `migrate --plan` showed only the single `RemoveField` operation for this app;\n- the test suite passes;\n- post-deploy, no errors reference `full_name` (there shouldn't be any reads left, but watch for an overlooked raw SQL query or a stale serialized object).\n\nSo the sequence in one line: **Release N ships the code that drops all `full_name` usage (no column drop); once N is fully rolled out, Release N+1 ships the migration that actually drops the `full_name` column.**",
+              "outputSha256": "1bb4250e462d2c36c89a2ae73911cf82f321c461ae5b66e9e7e758baa9cbcc39",
+              "promptSha256": "0dd6520440c91bf0008fee54ebc7c29a4a511eacf4c84a27ed4036ccc4a0fd15",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly stages across two releases: Release N ships code-only, Release N+1 drops column only 'once Release N is fully deployed everywhere and stable — i.e. there is no instance of the old code left.' Explains rolling-deploy window where old code still reads/writes full_name while new code runs, so dropping early breaks old instances. Shows RemoveField migration. No fail criteria met."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Short answer: do not drop `full_name` in the migration that ships with this release. Stage it across two releases, because your deploy process is explicitly the case where staged rollout is required — code and migrations ship as separate steps, rolling across several app servers.\n\nHere's the sequencing:\n\n**Release N (the one you're about to ship)**\n- The code change removing all reads/writes of `full_name` goes out. The schema still has `full_name`.\n- Ship no migration that drops it. If you want, this release's migrations are limited to whatever else is pending (e.g. the `first_name`/`last_name` columns were presumably added in an earlier release; if not, that's a separate split-phase concern).\n- Why: during the rolling deploy, some app servers are still running the *previous* release's code, which still reads/writes `full_name`. Until every server runs the new code, the column must keep existing. Since code and migrations are separate steps, you cannot assume \"new code everywhere\" has happened just because the migration ran somewhere.\n\n**Release N+1 (a later release, after N is fully rolled out everywhere)**\n- Ship the migration that drops `full_name`. By this point no running code touches it, so the drop is safe across the whole fleet.\n- That migration is schema-only: a `RemoveField` operation generated by `makemigrations`. No `RunPython` is needed here, because the data transform (reading `full_name` to populate `first_name`/`last_name`) should already have happened in an earlier phase — see the caveat below.\n\n**The backfill caveat (likely relevant to you)**\n`first_name`/`last_name` presumably already exist and were populated at some point. If they were populated by a `RunPython` data migration, that migration must have run *before* release N's code starts writing to those fields, and it must fetch the model via `apps.get_model(...)`, not the live import. If `full_name` was the only source for existing rows and you haven't backfilled yet, that backfill is its own migration and belongs in an earlier release than the drop — never in the same release as the drop.\n\n**Verification before calling it done**\n- `python manage.py makemigrations <app>` to generate the `RemoveField` migration in N+1 — do not hand-write the operation.\n- In release N, run `python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run` and confirm there is *no* pending drop of `full_name` sneaking in (a model edit that already removed the field will generate one; if you removed the field from the model in N, you must hold the drop migration for N+1 — i.e. either keep the field on the model for this release with a comment, or generate the migration now and explicitly not ship it until N+1).\n- `python manage.py migrate --plan` to confirm ordering, and the test suite green.\n\nOne thing to nail down: whether you removed `full_name` from the *model* in this same release. If yes, `makemigrations` will want to emit the `RemoveField` right now. Either keep the field declared on the model for release N (mark it clearly as pending removal) and drop it, with the migration, in N+1, or generate the migration now but hold the file back from release N. The schema drop and the last code that reads it must not land in the same release while a rolling deploy can run old code against the new schema.",
+              "outputSha256": "0b028efba8e156a88a4557b2c3a226396272cb6b3edc0093867f66fefd0c4f6a",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer explicitly stages the drop across two releases: Release N ships code removing full_name usage with no drop migration; Release N+1 (after N fully rolled out everywhere) ships the RemoveField drop. It explains the rolling-deploy reason: 'some app servers are still running the previous release's code, which still reads/writes full_name. Until every server runs the new code, the column must keep existing.' No fail criteria hold."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "Ship the `full_name` column removal in a **later release than the one that stops using it** — not in the release that removes the code reads/writes, given your rolling deploy across several app servers.\n\nHere's why, and how to sequence it:\n\n**The hazard.** Even though the code you're about to ship no longer reads or writes `full_name`, a rolling deploy means that for some window of time, some app servers are running the *new* code (ignoring `full_name`) while others are still running the *previous* release (which still reads/writes it). If you drop the column in the same release, the migration will run against the database while old-code instances are still live on other servers — and those instances will start throwing `OperationalError`/`ProgrammingError` the moment the column disappears. Dropping a column is destructive to any code still running the prior release.\n\n**The sequence:**\n\n1. **Release N (the one you're about to ship).** Ships only the code change — reads/writes of `full_name` are gone. The schema is untouched; the `full_name` column still exists, it's just unused. No migration that alters `full_name` ships here at all. Let this release fully roll out and be the only version running across all app servers.\n\n2. **Release N+1.** Once Release N is fully deployed and no live app server is running the old code, ship the migration that drops `full_name`. Nothing still running reads it by then, so the drop is safe.\n\n**A few things to get right when you do write that drop migration:**\n\n- Generate it with `makemigrations <app_label>` after removing the field from the model — don't hand-write the `RemoveField` operation.\n- `RemoveField` is not reversible in any meaningful sense (the data in the dropped column is gone), so your schema migration is fine to be effectively one-way, but be deliberate about that rather than surprised by it.\n- If you want to preserve the data before it's dropped, do that in a `RunPython` step *before* the `RemoveField`, fetching models via `apps.get_model(\"app\", \"User\")` (never the live model class), with both a `forward` and a `reverse` (or an explicit, justified `RunPython.noop`). A common pattern is: backfill/verify that `first_name`/`last_name` fully cover what `full_name` held, and only then drop the column.\n- Verify before shipping: `python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run` (no unexpected pending ops), `python manage.py migrate --plan`, and the test suite all green.\n\nThe one-line rule: never combine \"remove the last code that reads the column\" with \"drop the column\" in the same release when your deploy process can run old code against the new schema for any window. Two releases — code first, schema drop second.",
+              "outputSha256": "fa8c5d1b10bbf973ecd9c77e6aa2b1900f522f41fbeb6d26c3b6b3b69fd83e13",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer states drop must be in a later release (Release N+1) than the code change (Release N), gated on Release N being 'fully deployed and no live app server is running the old code.' Explains the rolling-deploy hazard: some servers run new code while others still run old code reading/writing full_name, so dropping early throws OperationalError/ProgrammingError. No fail criteria met."
+              },
+              "passed": true
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+          "prompt": "Write a Django test for the InvoiceDetailView that checks a logged-out user gets redirected",
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+          "kind": "behavior",
+          "prompt": "Write a Django test for `InvoiceDetailView`, a class-based view that should only be reachable by the invoice's owner (it redirects anyone else to a 403 page).",
+          "strictness": "high",
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+            {
+              "output": "I'll write a Django test for `InvoiceDetailView` covering both the authorized and unauthorized paths, matching whatever test style the project already uses.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\nfrom billing.factories import InvoiceFactory, UserFactory\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    def setUp(self):\n        self.owner = UserFactory()\n        self.other_user = UserFactory()\n        self.invoice = InvoiceFactory(owner=self.owner)\n        self.url = reverse(\"billing:invoice-detail\", args=[self.invoice.pk])\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"object\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_redirected_to_403(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other_user)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_redirected_to_login(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertIn(reverse(\"login\"), response.url)\n```\n\nNotes on the choices made here:\n\n- **Style discovery comes first.** I used `TestCase` + `self.client` + `force_login` because that's the most common convention. If your project is `pytest-django`, the equivalent would use the `client` and `db` fixtures and a `@pytest.mark.django_db` marker instead of subclassing `TestCase`. Match what's already in the repo.\n- **Both authorization outcomes are asserted.** A view that \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" is only proven to enforce that by hitting it as a non-owner. Testing only the owner path tells you nothing about the permission check.\n- **`force_login` is used deliberately.** The test is about authorization/ownership, not the login mechanism, so bypassing password auth is appropriate and keeps the test focused.\n- **The request goes through `self.client`.** This exercises URL resolution, middleware (where the owner-check likely lives), and the view dispatch — calling the view function directly would skip all of that and let a broken URL config or middleware ordering pass unnoticed.\n- **The 403 assertion assumes a real `PermissionDenied`.** If your view instead issues an explicit `HttpResponse(status=403)` or redirects to a custom `/403/` page, adjust the expected status/target accordingly. Likewise, if login is enforced by `LoginRequiredMixin`, the anonymous case returns a 302 to login rather than a 403 — I included that as a separate test.\n\nIf your project uses `factory_boy`, the factories would be minimal:\n\n```python\n# billing/factories.py\nimport factory\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\nclass UserFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):\n    class Meta:\n        model = get_user_model()\n\n    username = factory.Sequence(lambda n: f\"user{n}\")\n\n\nclass InvoiceFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):\n    class Meta:\n        model = Invoice\n\n    owner = factory.SubFactory(UserFactory)\n```\n\nKeep factories to the fields a test actually asserts on or a constraint requires; over-specifying every field makes them brittle to unrelated schema changes.\n\nRun with `python manage.py test billing` (or `pytest billing` for pytest-django) and confirm the suite exits 0. Only test files, factories, and `conftest.py` should appear in `git status` when you're done — no changes to the view itself.",
+              "outputSha256": "9a45154e03b192da8131ac980eeeb62b00a1b0c2f0450b9ed983cd711ad38786",
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+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "test_owner_can_view_invoice uses self.client.force_login(self.owner) and self.client.get(self.url) asserting status_code 200; test_non_owner_is_redirected_to_403 logs in other_user via self.client and asserts 403. Full code with imports, reverse, factories shown. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I can't write a runnable test for `InvoiceDetailView` in a vacuum — nothing here tells me the view's URL name/path, the `Invoice` model's owner field, whether the project uses `TestCase` or `pytest-django`, or how it builds model data. Guessing at those would produce a file that either doesn't import or silently tests the wrong thing. What follows is the test as I'd actually write it once those conventions are confirmed, followed by the exact gaps I'd fill in first.\n\n**Assumptions made explicit (all must be verified against the repo before running):**\n\n- `Invoice` has an `owner` FK to `settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL`.\n- The detail URL is named `invoice-detail` and takes a `pk`.\n- The project uses plain `django.test.TestCase` (not pytest-django). If it uses pytest-django, this becomes a `client`/`django_user_model` fixture pair instead — the assertions are identical.\n\n```python\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewPermissionTests(TestCase):\n    def setUp(self):\n        User = get_user_model()\n        self.owner = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner\"\n        )\n        self.stranger = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"stranger\", password=\"pw-stranger\"\n        )\n\n        self.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(\n            owner=self.owner,\n            number=\"INV-0001\",\n            amount=100,\n        )\n\n        self.url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"invoice\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_other_user_is_denied(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.stranger)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        # The spec says \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\". A 403 page\n        # reached via a redirect is a 302, not a 403. Assert whichever the\n        # view actually does -- see the note below.\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_denied(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n```\n\nPoints that matter in this test and are easy to get wrong:\n\n**The 403-vs-302 ambiguity is the crux of this test.** A view that \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" sends a `302`, not a `403` — the client has to follow the redirect to see the 403. So `assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)` in `test_other_user_is_denied` would fail against a correct view, and passing it would mean the view is *not* redirecting as specified. I'd run the unauthorized case once to observe the actual status and redirect target, then assert on that concrete behavior (and, if it's a 302, on `response[\"Location\"]` pointing at the 403 URL) rather than trusting the description's wording.\n\n**`force_login` vs `login`.** Auth is not what's under test here — the *permission check* is. `force_login` is correct and avoids depending on the password hashing/auth backend being configured in a particular way.\n\n**A stranger, not just an anonymous user.** An anonymous user being denied proves only that the view is login-gated. A logged-in *non-owner* being denied is what proves the ownership check runs, and it's the case that's most often missing. I included both because the spec says \"only the invoice's owner.\"\n\n**`response.context[\"invoice\"]` assumes the view puts it there.** If the view is a `DetailView` this holds; if it's hand-rolled with a different context key, adjust or drop that assertion.\n\n**`Invoice.objects.create(...)` assumes no required fields beyond these three, and that `number`/`amount` exist.** If the model has required fields or a non-`id` primary key, this line changes. If the project uses `factory_boy`, replace the creation lines with `InvoiceFactory(owner=self.owner)` — but only if a factory already exists or the repo's convention is to add one per app.\n\nBefore this file is written into the repo I'd confirm: the install style (`TestCase` vs pytest-django, from `pytest.ini`/`pyproject.toml` and dependencies), the view's real URL name and kwargs, the owner field's name and `on_delete`/nullability, the `Invoice` model's required fields, how neighboring test files construct users and invoices, and the actual status code the unauthorized path returns. With those in hand this becomes a concrete file; without them it's a template that would need rework on first run.",
+              "outputSha256": "2eacc2dd8402626568d84e0813ab53c537d15d3e3e777faecabffc4a1fbd04ed",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "fail",
+                "reason": "Criterion 2 requires a test asserting a non-owner logged-in user gets a 403. The answer's test_other_user_is_denied asserts 302, not 403, and explicitly argues 403 would be wrong. So no test asserts the required 403 response; the unauthorized case is not covered as specified."
+              },
+              "passed": false
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# Testing `InvoiceDetailView` (owner-only access)\n\n## Assumptions and what I'd confirm first\n\nI'm writing this without file access, so I'm assuming the following from the description and standard Django conventions. If any differ, adjust the names:\n\n- The view is a `DetailView` subclass registered at a URL name like `invoice-detail`, taking the invoice's `pk`.\n- Ownership is a `user` FK on `Invoice` (or `invoice.owner`); the view returns **403** for a logged-in non-owner.\n- Anonymous users: \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" — I'll treat both an unauthenticated request and an authenticated-but-not-owner request as 403, and assert the 403 explicitly. If your project instead redirects anonymous users to login, swap that one assertion for a `302` to the login URL.\n- The project uses plain `django.test.TestCase` (via `manage.py test`). If it uses `pytest-django`, replace `setUp` with fixtures and `self.client` with the `client` fixture — but don't mix styles in one module.\n\nI'd verify these by reading a neighboring test file and the URL conf before writing.\n\n## The test\n\n```python\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    @classmethod\n    def setUpTestData(cls):\n        # setUpTestData runs once per class and wraps in a rolled-back\n        # transaction, so this setup cost isn't paid per test method.\n        cls.owner = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner-123\",\n        )\n        cls.other_user = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"other\", password=\"pw-other-123\",\n        )\n        cls.staff_user = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"staff\", password=\"pw-staff-123\", is_staff=True,\n        )\n        cls.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(user=cls.owner, amount=100)\n\n    def _url(self):\n        return reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[self.invoice.pk])\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_their_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"object\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_gets_403(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other_user)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_staff_without_ownership_gets_403(self):\n        # Being staff is not the same as owning the invoice; this guards\n        # against an accidental \"is_staff\" bypass in the permission check.\n        self.client.force_login(self.staff_user)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_gets_403(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_only_owner_sees_invoice_data(self):\n        # Guards against a leak where the 403 page still renders the\n        # invoice's fields in the body.\n        self.client.force_login(self.other_user)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertNotContains(response, str(self.invoice.amount))\n```\n\n## Why it's shaped this way\n\n- **Both paths asserted.** The owner case proves the happy path renders; the non-owner, staff, and anonymous cases prove the permission check actually runs. A happy-path-only test would still pass if the permission check were deleted.\n- **Via `self.client`, not the view callable directly.** Going through the client exercises URL resolution, middleware, and template rendering — the real request path. Calling `InvoiceDetailView.as_view()(request)` by hand would skip all of that.\n- **`force_login` over `login`.** The auth mechanism itself isn't under test here, so I skip the password round-trip. If I were testing the login flow, I'd use `self.client.login(username=..., password=...)`.\n- **Staff case included deliberately.** \"Owner-only\" is easy to accidentally weaken into \"owner or staff\"; testing it pins the intent.\n- **`setUpTestData`** over `setUp` since none of these tests mutate the objects, so the per-class setup is safe and cheaper.\n\n## What I'm *not* testing here\n\n- A wrong/missing `pk` (404) — that belongs in a separate test, since it's a different concern than ownership.\n- The shape of the 403 response body beyond the leak check — the exact template is an implementation detail.\n\n## Running it\n\n```bash\npython manage.py test billing.tests.test_views.InvoiceDetailViewTests\n```\n\nI'd iterate up to a few times if anything fails, fixing the *test* (wrong URL name, wrong field name) rather than the view. If a failure looks like a genuine view bug, I'd stop and report it rather than patch source.\n\n## If any assumption above is wrong\n\nTell me which and I'll adjust: e.g. if non-owners should get a 404 (to avoid leaking whether the invoice exists), the non-owner/staff/anonymous assertions become `assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)`; if the URL takes a slug instead of `pk`, `reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[self.invoice.slug])`; if it's a `pytest-django` project, the whole module becomes `db`/`client`/factory fixtures instead of a `TestCase`.",
+              "outputSha256": "8fe5dbde6e8ee2a4e2cd286902fec8489534d12d74939587d8aee3404a098289",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "test_owner_can_view_their_invoice uses self.client.force_login(owner) + self.client.get(self._url()) and asserts 200; test_non_owner_gets_403 logs in other_user and asserts 403 on the same URL. Full code with imports, reverse, setUpTestData shown. No fail criterion holds."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I can't write this test as a file since I have no tools here, but here's the complete test you can drop into your suite. I'm assuming `pytest-django` + `factory_boy` conventions, but I'll note the plain `TestCase` alternative at the end.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nimport pytest\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.factories import InvoiceFactory\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\npytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db\n\n\nclass TestInvoiceDetailView:\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self, client, django_user_model):\n        owner = django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw\"\n        )\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory(owner=owner)\n        client.force_login(owner)\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code == 200\n        assert response.context[\"invoice\"] == invoice\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_redirected_to_403(self, client, django_user_model):\n        owner = django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw\"\n        )\n        intruder = django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"intruder\", password=\"pw\"\n        )\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory(owner=owner)\n        client.force_login(intruder)\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code == 302\n        assert response.url == reverse(\"forbidden\")  # or your 403 URL name\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_cannot_view_invoice(self, client):\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory()\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code == 302\n        assert response.url.startswith(reverse(\"login\"))\n```\n\nKey points that make this test actually prove the permission check works:\n\n1. **Two users, one invoice.** The intruder is a real, authenticated user — not anonymous. This is the case a happy-path-only test misses. A view that only checks `request.user.is_authenticated` would pass the anonymous test but fail here.\n2. **The owner test asserts `response.context[\"invoice\"] == invoice`.** A 200 status alone doesn't prove the *right* invoice rendered; asserting on the context object catches a view that fetches the wrong object or leaks a different user's data.\n3. **The anonymous case is separate.** Even if your view redirects non-owners to a 403 page, an unauthenticated user may take a different branch (login redirect via `LoginRequiredMixin`). Testing both branches documents the actual behavior.\n\nIf your view does an ownership check in `get_queryset()` and raises `Http404` instead of redirecting, swap the non-owner assertion for:\n\n```python\nassert response.status_code == 404\n```\n\nThat's a legitimate pattern (it avoids leaking whether the invoice exists), but the *test* must match whatever the view actually does — don't write the assertion first and patch the view to match.\n\nFor the plain `django.test.TestCase` style instead:\n\n```python\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    def setUp(self):\n        self.owner = User.objects.create_user(\"owner\", password=\"pw\")\n        self.intruder = User.objects.create_user(\"intruder\", password=\"pw\")\n        self.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(owner=self.owner, ...)\n\n    def test_owner_can_view(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[self.invoice.pk]))\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n\n    def test_non_owner_redirected(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.intruder)\n        response = self.client.get(reverse(\"invoice-detail\", args=[self.invoice.pk]))\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n```\n\nTwo things to verify before running: the URL name (`\"invoice-detail\"`) and the redirect target name (`\"forbidden\"`) have to match what's actually in your `urls.py` — I'm inferring those. Once you run it and it's green, that satisfies the authorized-plus-unauthorized requirement for this view.",
+              "outputSha256": "779cbe7431e8a701f5a4ad3f8c7ced763f6c6c829f961e4193aed290cebc8315",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "fail",
+                "reason": "The non-owner test asserts status_code 302 and a redirect to a 'forbidden' URL, not a 403 response as required by pass criterion 2. The answer even offers a 404 alternative. No test asserts a 403 for the non-owner, so criterion 2 fails."
+              },
+              "passed": false
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# Test for `InvoiceDetailView` owner-only access\n\nSince I don't have the actual project in front of me, I'll write this test against a reasonable assumed shape for `InvoiceDetailView` and flag the one or two places you'll need to reconcile against your real model/view. I'm assuming:\n\n- An `Invoice` model with an `owner` FK to `User`.\n- `InvoiceDetailView` resolves invoices by `pk` via the URL, and rejects non-owners (redirect or 403 response — I'll cover the redirect-to-403 case you described).\n- The URL is named something like `invoice-detail` and takes a `pk`.\n\nBelow is a `pytest-django` style test. If your project uses plain `django.test.TestCase`, the same assertions translate directly — I note the swap at the end.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nimport pytest\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef owner(django_user_model):\n    return django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n        username=\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner-123\"\n    )\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef other_user(django_user_model):\n    return django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n        username=\"other\", password=\"pw-other-123\"\n    )\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef invoice(owner):\n    return Invoice.objects.create(owner=owner, amount=\"42.00\")\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_invoice_detail_owner_can_view(client, owner, invoice):\n    client.force_login(owner)\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    assert response.status_code == 200\n    assert response.context[\"invoice\"] == invoice\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_invoice_detail_non_owner_is_redirected_to_403(\n    client, other_user, invoice\n):\n    client.force_login(other_user)\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    # Redirect toward the 403 page.\n    assert response.status_code == 302\n    assert response.url == reverse(\"403\")  # adjust to your actual 403 route\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_invoice_detail_anonymous_is_redirected_to_login(client, invoice):\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    assert response.status_code == 302\n    assert reverse(\"login\") in response.url\n```\n\n## Why this covers the behavior you asked about\n\nThe rule that matters here is that a permission-gated view gets **both** the authorized and unauthorized cases asserted. A test that only checks the owner gets a 200 proves the view renders, but it silently passes even if the owner check is deleted entirely. The non-owner test is the one that actually exercises the gate.\n\nThree cases are worth distinguishing rather than collapsing:\n\n1. **Owner** → renders (200).\n2. **Authenticated non-owner** → the 403 redirect path.\n3. **Anonymous user** → typically login redirect, *not* the 403 redirect.\n\nI split cases 2 and 3 deliberately. If your view funnels both through the same 403 redirect, that's a legitimate design, but you should assert it as such rather than assume it — the two paths often diverge in the middleware/permission stack, and that divergence is exactly the kind of thing that breaks silently.\n\n## Reconciliation points\n\nA few things I guessed that you should verify against the real code:\n\n- **The `context[\"invoice\"]` assertion.** This assumes the view injects `invoice` into the context via `get_context_data`. If the view uses a different context key or an object name, adjust. If you don't want to couple the test to the context shape, drop that line and assert on a piece of rendered content instead.\n- **The 403 redirect target.** I used `reverse(\"403\")`. Your project may redirect to a named `permission-denied` route, a literal `/403/`, or a custom handler. Check `test_views.py` neighbors or the view's `get()`/`dispatch()` for the actual target.\n- **`amount=\"42.00\"`.** Match whatever your `Invoice` model actually requires — if `amount` is a `DecimalField`, the string form is fine; if there are other non-null fields without defaults, the factory call needs them too. This is where a `factory_boy` factory would pay off if the model grows.\n\n## If your project uses `django.test.TestCase` instead\n\nThe logic is identical; the fixtures become a `setUp` and `self.client`:\n\n```python\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    def setUp(self):\n        User = get_user_model()\n        self.owner = User.objects.create_user(\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner-123\")\n        self.other = User.objects.create_user(\"other\", password=\"pw-other-123\")\n        self.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(owner=self.owner, amount=\"42.00\")\n        self.url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"invoice\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_redirected_to_403(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertEqual(response.url, reverse(\"403\"))\n\n    def test_anonymous_is_redirected_to_login(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertIn(reverse(\"login\"), response.url)\n```\n\nI used `force_login` in every case because the auth mechanism itself isn't under test here — only the ownership check is. If you later want to prove login actually works end-to-end, that's a separate test using `login(username=..., password=...)`, and it belongs with your auth tests, not here.\n\n## To finish the job locally\n\n1. Confirm the URL name, the 403 redirect target, and the context key against the real code.\n2. Run it: `pytest billing/tests/test_views.py` (or `python manage.py test billing.tests.test_views`).\n3. Expect one or two reconciliation failures on the first run for the guessed names — those are the only edits needed; the assertion structure stands.\n\nOne caveat I'll be direct about: everything above the \"Reconciliation points\" section is written against an assumed `Invoice` shape. I'd rather flag that plainly than present guessed field names as if I'd seen your model. The three-case structure — owner, non-owner, anonymous — is the part that transfers regardless of how your model is actually defined.",
+              "outputSha256": "aedbc5663d1b6cc619677336fa4c94296b9aacedc74e896c6770a188dba2ee4b",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "fail",
+                "reason": "The non-owner test asserts a 302 redirect to a 403 route, not a 403 response. Pass criterion 2 requires asserting a 403 status for the non-owner; the answer explicitly asserts `response.status_code == 302` and even notes the view 'redirects' rather than returning 403. No test asserts a 403 status code."
+              },
+              "passed": false
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I'll write the test, following the discover-plan-write-run workflow, and flag the one thing that has to be confirmed against your actual code before this is green.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nimport pytest\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.factories import InvoiceFactory, UserFactory\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\nclass TestInvoiceDetailView:\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self, client):\n        owner = UserFactory()\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory(owner=owner)\n        client.force_login(owner)\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"billing:invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code == 200\n        assert response.context[\"invoice\"] == invoice\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_denied(self, client):\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory()\n        other_user = UserFactory()\n        client.force_login(other_user)\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"billing:invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code == 403\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_denied(self, client):\n        invoice = InvoiceFactory()\n\n        response = client.get(reverse(\"billing:invoice-detail\", args=[invoice.pk]))\n\n        assert response.status_code in (301, 302, 403)\n```\n\n**Confirm before running**\n\n1. **URL name and namespace.** I guessed `billing:invoice-detail`. If your `urls.py` names it differently (e.g. `invoice_detail` with no namespace), `reverse()` raises `NoReverseMatch` and every test errors before it reaches a view. Fix the string, not the view.\n2. **The 403 mechanism.** \"Redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" is ambiguous, and the assertion depends on which it actually is:\n   - `PermissionDenied` raised in the view → Django returns **403** with the `403.html` template. The assertion above is correct.\n   - `HttpResponseForbidden` returned → also **403**. Correct as written.\n   - A `RedirectView`/`redirect()` to a `/403/` URL → the response is **302**, and asserting `403` will fail. If that's the reality, change the non-owner assertion to `assert response.status_code == 302` and `assert response.url == reverse(\"error-403\")` — redirecting rather than returning 403 in-place is generally the wrong pattern for an authorization failure, but the test must describe what the code does.\n3. **Anonymous behavior.** If the view is also permission-gated with `LoginRequiredMixin`, anonymous gets a 302 to login. If it raises `PermissionDenied` for anonymous too, it gets a 403. The third test accepts either because I don't know; tighten it once you've confirmed.\n\n**Factory note (Step 2).** I assumed `InvoiceFactory` takes an `owner` and creates one via `SubFactory` if omitted, and that `UserFactory` exists. If `factory_boy` isn't in the project, replace `UserFactory()` with `get_user_model().objects.create_user(username=..., password=...)` and construct the invoice with `InvoiceFactory` only if that factory exists — otherwise build the model directly. Don't introduce a factory layer the project doesn't already have just for these three tests.\n\n**What I deliberately did not do.** I did not touch the view, the URL conf, or the model. If `test_non_owner_is_denied` fails because the view genuinely lets a non-owner through, that's a real authorization bug — report it, don't \"fix\" it by weakening the assertion. A permission test that passes because it asserts the wrong status code is worse than no test.\n\n**Report**\n\n```\nGenerated: billing/tests/test_views.py\n  - 3 test cases (owner 200, non-owner 403, anonymous 302/403)\n  - BLOCKED: confirm URL name and 403 mechanism (permission-denied vs\n    redirect) before this is green\n  - no source files modified\n```\n\nI can't run `pytest` here (no shell), so the \"exits 0\" verification step is unconfirmed — run it yourself and fix `reverse()` names from the `NoReverseMatch` output if it errors.",
+              "outputSha256": "d81e4d7807aebae39f4f06f29cc3b82a3c39ce2b40095a1b7cb192ebeb4b26bb",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Answer shows concrete pytest code: test_owner_can_view_invoice uses client.force_login(owner) and asserts status_code==200; test_non_owner_is_denied logs in other_user and asserts status_code==403 for the same reverse URL. Imports, client calls, and assertions are all present, satisfying all three pass criteria."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# Test for `InvoiceDetailView`\n\nSince I can't inspect your project, here is the test written to the conventions the skill recommends, with the two spots you'll need to line up with your actual code marked.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\nfrom billing.factories import InvoiceFactory\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    \"\"\"InvoiceDetailView is owner-only; non-owners get a 403.\"\"\"\n\n    def setUp(self):\n        self.owner = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pass-owner-123\"\n        )\n        self.other = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"other\", password=\"pass-other-123\"\n        )\n        self.invoice = InvoiceFactory(owner=self.owner)\n\n    def _url(self):\n        # Adjust to your actual URL name / kwargs.\n        return reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"invoice\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_denied(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other)\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_redirected_to_login(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertIn(reverse(\"login\"), response[\"Location\"])\n\n    def test_nonexistent_invoice_returns_404(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(\n            reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": 999999})\n        )\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)\n```\n\n## Why it's shaped this way\n\n- **`force_login` in most tests.** The auth mechanism itself isn't what's under test here — the ownership check is. `force_login` skips the login form and gets straight to the permission path.\n- **Both the authorized and unauthorized case are asserted.** A happy-path-only test cannot catch a permission check that never runs, which is exactly the class of bug this view is most likely to have.\n- **Two distinct denial cases.** An authenticated non-owner should hit a 403; an anonymous user hitting a `LoginRequiredMixin` view gets a 302 to the login page first. These are different code paths and are worth asserting separately if your view uses `LoginRequiredMixin` — if it uses a custom `dispatch` that raises `PermissionDenied` for anonymous users too, change the anonymous test to assert 403 instead.\n- **404 for a missing invoice.** Worth having so a later change to the ownership queryset can't silently turn \"does not exist\" into a 403 or a 500.\n- **Requests go through `self.client`**, so URL resolution, middleware, and any template rendering are all exercised — not a hand-built `RequestFactory` call straight into the view function.\n- **No source files touched.** The view, model, and URL conf are read-only inputs here.\n\n## Minimal factory, if you don't already have one\n\n```python\n# billing/factories.py\nimport factory\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\nclass InvoiceFactory(factory.django.DjangoModelFactory):\n    class Meta:\n        model = Invoice\n\n    owner = factory.SubFactory(\n        factory.django.DjangoModelFactory, model=get_user_model()\n    )\n    # Set only the fields the view/tests care about or that the model\n    # requires; let defaults handle the rest.\n    amount = factory.Faker(\"pydecimal\", left_digits=5, right_digits=2, positive=True)\n```\n\nIf your project already has an `InvoiceFactory`, use it and drop `owner=self.owner` only if the factory's default owner is what you want to test against.\n\n## Run it\n\n```bash\npython manage.py test billing.tests.test_views\n# or, if pytest-django is configured:\npytest billing/tests/test_views.py\n```\n\n## Report (once it passes)\n\n```\nGenerated: billing/tests/test_views.py\n  - 4 test cases: owner 200, non-owner 403, anonymous 302->login, missing 404\n  - all passing via <manage.py test | pytest>\n```\n\nTwo things to confirm against your actual code before trusting the result: the URL name used in `reverse`, and whether anonymous users get a 302→login or a straight 403. Everything else should hold as written.",
+              "outputSha256": "81be11bb41253dbb7b04bc86a3f04a1b85a50403480bd0044974002e5b974c01",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "test_owner_can_view_invoice uses self.client.force_login(self.owner) then self.client.get and asserts status_code 200; test_non_owner_is_denied force_logins self.other and asserts 403. Full code with imports, reverse, client calls, assertions shown."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "The important thing about this request is that \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" is ambiguous — a redirect is a 302 to a URL, a 403 is a 403 status, and the two are different assertions. So I need to test both the authorized path and the unauthorized path, and I should decide deliberately whether the unauthorized assertion is `assertRedirects` or `assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)`. Since you said \"redirects... to a 403 page,\" I'll treat it as a redirect to a forbidden page and assert on the redirect target, but I'll flag it so you can flip it to a plain 403 if that's what the view actually does.\n\nI'm assuming the standard shape: the app is `billing`, a `User` model, an `Invoice` with an `owner` FK, a URL name `invoice-detail` taking a pk, and the project's test suite follows the `TestCase` + `self.client` convention. Adjust names to match your project.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    @classmethod\n    def setUpTestData(cls):\n        cls.owner = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner-123\"\n        )\n        cls.other = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"other\", password=\"pw-other-123\"\n        )\n        cls.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(owner=cls.owner, amount=100)\n\n    def setUp(self):\n        self.url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_their_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"invoice\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_redirected_to_forbidden(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertRedirects(response, reverse(\"forbidden\"))\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_redirected_to_login(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertIn(reverse(\"login\"), response.url)\n\n    def test_missing_invoice_returns_404(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n        response = self.client.get(\n            reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk + 999})\n        )\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)\n```\n\nNotes on the choices I made, so you can adjust rather than take them on faith:\n\n- **`force_login` vs `login`.** I used `force_login` because the auth mechanism is not what's under test — the ownership check is. If you're specifically testing that login works, use `self.client.login(username=..., password=...)` instead.\n- **`setUpTestData`.** The owner, the other user, and the invoice are the same for every test in the class, so they belong in `setUpTestData` (runs once per class, wrapped in a transaction) rather than `setUp` (runs per test). The `url` is cheap to compute and unique per instance, so it lives in `setUp`.\n- **The unauthorized assertion is the whole point.** A happy-path-only test here would pass even if the view returned every invoice to anyone. The non-owner test is the one that actually proves the ownership check runs. I split out the anonymous case separately because \"not logged in\" and \"logged in but not the owner\" can take genuinely different code paths (login redirect vs forbidden redirect) and should be asserted independently.\n- **`test_missing_invoice_returns_404`** guards the get-object path — a view that fetches by pk without scoping can 500 or leak existence of other invoices; 404 is the safe behavior.\n\nIf your view actually returns a 403 status code rather than redirecting, replace the non-owner test body with:\n\n```python\n    def test_non_owner_gets_403(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.other)\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n```\n\nRun it with `python manage.py test billing.tests.test_views` (or `pytest billing/tests/test_views.py` if the project is on pytest-django). Names of the URL (`invoice-detail`, `forbidden`, `login`) and the app label are the parts most likely to need changing to match your project — check the neighboring test files and `urls.py` before running.",
+              "outputSha256": "1d313cfa429ac4ec319521cea5b8398901cdaeb5cabd5e2dd9c6854c72a02796",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "fail",
+                "reason": "The non-owner test asserts assertRedirects(response, reverse(\"forbidden\")) — a 302 redirect, not a 403 status. The 403 assertion is only offered as an optional alternative ('If your view actually returns a 403... replace'), so no test actually asserts a 403 for the non-owner, matching fail criterion 1."
+              },
+              "passed": false
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "I can't write a runnable test for `InvoiceDetailView` without seeing the project, but I can give you a complete, correct pattern that follows the Django testing skill's rules — matched to both common styles so you can drop it into whichever suite the project already uses. The key requirement is that you assert **both** the owner path (200) and the non-owner path (403), since a happy-path-only test never proves the permission check runs.\n\nFirst, two things I genuinely need from the codebase before this is final (I'm stating them rather than guessing silently):\n\n- **The URL name and its kwargs.** I'm assuming `reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})`. If your `urls.py` uses a different `name=` or a `slug` instead of `pk`, the reverse call must change.\n- **How the 403 is produced.** \"Redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" is ambiguous: does it raise `PermissionDenied` (which Django turns into a 403 response), or `redirect()` to a dedicated 403 URL (which is a 302, not a 403)? The assertions differ — `assertEqual(resp.status_code, 403)` versus `assertRedirects(resp, reverse(\"forbidden\"))`. I've written the version below assuming a real 403 status, and flagged the alternative in the comment.\n\nI also need the `Invoice` model's required fields and its owner FK name (I've assumed `owner`). Build the factory with only the fields the test needs.\n\n### Style A — `pytest-django` + `factory_boy` (if the project already uses it)\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nimport pytest\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef owner(django_user_model):\n    return django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n        username=\"owner\", password=\"pw\"\n    )\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef stranger(django_user_model):\n    return django_user_model.objects.create_user(\n        username=\"stranger\", password=\"pw\"\n    )\n\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef invoice(owner):\n    # Only the fields this test depends on — don't hard-code the whole schema.\n    return Invoice.objects.create(owner=owner, amount=100)\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_owner_can_view_invoice(client, owner, invoice):\n    client.force_login(owner)  # auth mechanism isn't what we're testing\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    assert response.status_code == 200\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_non_owner_gets_403(client, stranger, invoice):\n    client.force_login(stranger)\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    # If the view *redirects* to a 403 page instead of raising PermissionDenied,\n    # replace this with:\n    #   assertRedirects(response, reverse(\"forbidden\"))\n    assert response.status_code == 403\n\n\n@pytest.mark.django_db\ndef test_anonymous_redirected_to_login(client, invoice):\n    # Cover the unauthenticated case too — it's a different code path than\n    # \"authenticated but not the owner\".\n    url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": invoice.pk})\n\n    response = client.get(url)\n\n    assert response.status_code == 302\n    assert reverse(\"login\") in response.url\n```\n\n### Style B — plain `django.test.TestCase` (if the project uses `manage.py test`)\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    @classmethod\n    def setUpTestData(cls):\n        cls.owner = User.objects.create_user(username=\"owner\", password=\"pw\")\n        cls.stranger = User.objects.create_user(username=\"stranger\", password=\"pw\")\n        cls.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(owner=cls.owner, amount=100)\n\n    def setUp(self):\n        self.url = reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n\n    def test_non_owner_gets_403(self):\n        self.client.force_login(self.stranger)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        # If it redirects to a 403 page, use assertRedirects here instead.\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n\n    def test_anonymous_redirected_to_login(self):\n        response = self.client.get(self.url)\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 302)\n        self.assertIn(reverse(\"login\"), response.url)\n```\n\n### Why it's written this way\n\n- **Both authorized and unauthorized cases are asserted** — per the skill, a permission-gated view without an explicit non-owner assertion has no coverage of the permission check at all. I added the anonymous case because unauthenticated access is a genuinely different branch than \"authenticated but not the owner,\" and it's the most common thing to forget.\n- **Requests go through `self.client` / the `client` fixture**, never `InvoiceDetailView.as_view()(request)` directly — calling the view bypasses URL resolution, middleware, and the permission machinery you're trying to test.\n- **`setUpTestData` (Style B) is a classmethod** so the DB rows are created once for the whole class rather than per test; that's the idiomatic Django choice for read-only-per-test fixtures. In the pytest style the `invoice`/`owner` fixtures are function-scoped by default, which is the right default — widening scope would be wrong here since these rows are treated as mutable per test.\n- **`force_login`** is correct because auth itself isn't under test; use `login(username=..., password=...)` only if you were testing the login flow.\n\n### Before you call this done\n\n- Run `python manage.py test` or `pytest` (whichever the project configures) and confirm it exits 0.\n- Confirm the fixture/factory style matches what's already in the repo — don't introduce `pytest-django` into a suite that's all `TestCase`, or vice versa.\n- `git status` should show only test files changed; if a test fails, fix the test, not the view.\n\nTell me the URL name/args, the owner field name, and whether the 403 is a real status or a redirect, and I'll tighten this to the exact project.",
+              "outputSha256": "697ef304441f189b553029cda4a53d3eaf2088b58e5633660240c52a738d94d7",
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+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "pass",
+                "reason": "Both styles show concrete code: test_owner_can_view_invoice uses self.client.force_login(owner) then self.client.get(url) and asserts 200; test_non_owner_gets_403 uses self.client.force_login(stranger) and asserts 403. Imports, reverse, and assertions are all shown, not described. Anonymous case is extra, not a substitute."
+              },
+              "passed": true
+            },
+            {
+              "output": "# Testing `InvoiceDetailView` for owner-only access\n\nWithout seeing the actual view/model, here is a complete, convention-flexible test module. It uses plain `django.test.TestCase` and the test `Client`, matches the layout of a typical Django app (`billing/tests/test_views.py`), and covers both the authorized and unauthorized paths — the key requirement for a permission-gated class-based view.\n\n```python\n# billing/tests/test_views.py\nfrom django.test import TestCase\nfrom django.urls import reverse\nfrom django.contrib.auth import get_user_model\n\nfrom billing.models import Invoice\n\nUser = get_user_model()\n\n\nclass InvoiceDetailViewTests(TestCase):\n    @classmethod\n    def setUpTestData(cls):\n        cls.owner = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"owner\", password=\"pw-owner-123\"\n        )\n        cls.other = User.objects.create_user(\n            username=\"other\", password=\"pw-other-123\"\n        )\n        cls.invoice = Invoice.objects.create(\n            owner=cls.owner,\n            amount=100,\n            status=\"open\",\n        )\n\n    def _url(self):\n        return reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": self.invoice.pk})\n\n    def test_owner_can_view_invoice(self):\n        \"\"\"The invoice's owner gets a 200 with the invoice in context.\"\"\"\n        self.client.force_login(self.owner)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n\n        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n        self.assertEqual(response.context[\"object\"], self.invoice)\n\n    def test_non_owner_is_denied(self):\n        \"\"\"A logged-in non-owner is redirected, not served the invoice.\"\"\"\n        self.client.force_login(self.other)\n\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n\n        # The spec says \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\". If the view\n        # literally redirects (302) to a 403 template, assert that; if it\n        # renders a 403 directly, assert 403. Match whichever the view does.\n        self.assertIn(response.status_code, (302, 403))\n        if response.status_code == 302:\n            self.assertEqual(response.url, reverse(\"invoice-forbidden\"))\n\n    def test_anonymous_user_is_denied(self):\n        \"\"\"An unauthenticated request never sees the invoice.\"\"\"\n        response = self.client.get(self._url())\n\n        # Either bounced to login or straight to 403 — never a 200.\n        self.assertIn(response.status_code, (302, 403))\n        self.assertNotEqual(response.status_code, 200)\n```\n\n## Why it's written this way\n\n**Both paths are asserted.** A happy-path-only test cannot prove the owner check runs at all — a bug that serves every invoice to everyone would still pass `test_owner_can_view_invoice`. The non-owner test is the one that actually exercises the permission logic.\n\n**The client, not the view function.** Everything goes through `self.client.get(...)`, so URL resolution, the auth middleware, the CBV's `dispatch()`, and template rendering all run. Calling `InvoiceDetailView.as_view()(request)` by hand would skip most of that and could hide a URL/permission wiring bug that only shows up through the real stack.\n\n**`force_login`, not `login`,** because the login mechanism (`authenticate`/session) is not what's under test here — only the ownership check is. If you were testing the login flow itself, you'd drive `login(username=..., password=...)` instead.\n\n**`setUpTestData` for shared fixtures.** The two users and one invoice are created once per `TestCase` class, in a transaction that's rolled back — the standard Django idiom for read-only shared setup.\n\n## Run it\n\n```bash\npython manage.py test billing.tests.test_views.InvoiceDetailViewTests\n```\n\n## Two things to confirm against your actual view\n\n1. **The URL name / kwargs.** I used `reverse(\"invoice-detail\", kwargs={\"pk\": ...})`. If your URLconf uses `slug` or a different name, adjust the `_url` helper. Grepping the URLconf for `InvoiceDetailView` will confirm both.\n2. **302-vs-403 for non-owners.** Your description says \"redirects anyone else to a 403 page\" — that phrasing is ambiguous: it could be a `302` to a forbidden URL, or a direct `403` render. The test accepts either and additionally checks the redirect target when it's a 302. Once you've run it, tighten the assertion to the one shape your view actually produces — a test that accepts both forever is weaker than one that pins the contract.\n\nIf your project uses `pytest-django` + `factory_boy` instead of `TestCase`, say the word and I'll rewrite this as fixtures and a factory in the project's own style.",
+              "outputSha256": "5a6a016c262fadb1d6023144a640dfac491d15306646d1d9aaae0a28e99f4e7a",
+              "promptSha256": "53b963da5a7072e20aaf0953ca212556f78a0ad76e66b6e90fb83ad35e1c15a8",
+              "deterministic": [],
+              "judge": {
+                "verdict": "fail",
+                "reason": "Pass criterion 2 requires a test asserting a 403 for a non-owner. The non-owner test asserts `assertIn(response.status_code, (302, 403))`, accepting 302 as valid, so it does not concretely assert 403. The answer even admits the assertion is ambiguous and should be tightened later."
+              },
+              "passed": false
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "verdict": "fail",
+      "scope": "bundled",
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+      "judgePromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "runner": "deepseek",
+      "model": "deepseek-chat",
+      "runnerPromptVersion": "2026-09-25.1",
+      "recordedAt": "2026-09-25T20:40:06.245Z",
+      "judge": "deepseek",
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+}