@motebit/crypto-tpm 1.0.0 → 1.1.1

package/README.md

@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ TPM 2.0's `TPMS_ATTEST` structure is ~100 lines of big-endian length-prefixed ma
 
 - [`@motebit/crypto`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto) — dispatcher (pure permissive-floor; zero deps)
 - [`@motebit/crypto-appattest`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto-appattest) — iOS sibling
-- [`@motebit/crypto-play-integrity`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto-play-integrity) — Android sibling
+- [`@motebit/crypto-android-keystore`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto-android-keystore) — Android sibling (canonical sovereign-verifiable Android primitive)
 - [`@motebit/crypto-webauthn`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto-webauthn) — browser sibling
-- [`@motebit/verify`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/verify) — canonical CLI bundling all four leaves with motebit defaults
+- [`@motebit/crypto-play-integrity`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/crypto-play-integrity) — _(deprecated — see `crypto-android-keystore`)_
+- [`@motebit/verify`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@motebit/verify) — canonical CLI bundling the platform leaves with motebit defaults
 
 ## License
 

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import type { TpmVerifyResult } from "./verify.js";
 export { verifyTpmQuote } from "./verify.js";
 export type { TpmVerifyOptions, TpmVerifyResult, TpmVerifyError } from "./verify.js";
 export { parseTpmsAttest, composeTpmsAttestForTest, TPM_GENERATED_VALUE, TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE, type TpmsAttest, } from "./tpm-parse.js";
-export { DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS, INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM, TPM_PLATFORM, } from "./tpm-roots.js";
+export { DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS, INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM, TPM_PLATFORM, } from "./tpm-roots.js";
 /**
  * Shape the optional verifier injected into `@motebit/crypto`'s
  * `HardwareAttestationVerifiers.tpm` slot carries — mirrors the

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/index.js

@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
 import { verifyTpmQuote } from "./verify.js";
 export { verifyTpmQuote } from "./verify.js";
 export { parseTpmsAttest, composeTpmsAttestForTest, TPM_GENERATED_VALUE, TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE, } from "./tpm-parse.js";
-export { DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS, INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM, TPM_PLATFORM, } from "./tpm-roots.js";
+export { DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS, INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM, STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM, 
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-deprecated -- maintained for one minor cycle; consumers should migrate to the explicit RSA / ECC constants. Removed in 2.0.0.
+STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM, INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM, TPM_PLATFORM, } from "./tpm-roots.js";
 /**
  * Factory — build a `tpm` verifier bound to an optional test-root /
  * clock / context override. The returned function matches the

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/tpm-roots.d.ts

@@ -16,68 +16,114 @@
  *
  *   - Infineon          (`OptigaTrustM`, `SLB966x` families)
  *   - Nuvoton            (`NPCT7xx` family)
- *   - STMicroelectronics (`ST33TPHF2ESPI`, `ST33HTPH2E32AHB3` families)
+ *   - STMicroelectronics (`ST33TPHF2ESPI`, `ST33HTPH2E32AHB3`,
+ *                         `ST33KTPM2X` families) — RSA + ECC parallel
+ *                         roots; both pinned
  *   - Intel PTT          (firmware TPM bundled with Intel CSME)
  *
  * AMD fTPM (firmware TPM bundled with AMD PSP) uses a vendor-signed
  * chain that roots to AMD's EK CA; that root is additive and lands in
  * a subsequent pass once the first AMD-shaped test vector is captured.
  *
- * ## Operator follow-up — ship-blocking for production rollout
+ * ## Real-fixture coverage is a separate concern
  *
- * The PEMs below are declared as exported constants so the test suite
- * exercises the same chain-verification code path end-to-end. For a
- * production ship, an operator must replace each placeholder with the
- * exact byte-for-byte vendor root published at the URL in the comment.
- * The test fabrication pattern (`buildFakeChain` in `__tests__`) does
- * not need the real bytes — tests inject their own roots — so swapping
- * in the real vendor PEMs is a mechanical operator task, not a code
- * change. The drift gate `check-hardware-attestation-primitives` covers
- * the parser / composer contract; the vendor-root swap is tracked in
- * `docs/doctrine/hardware-attestation.md` §Non-goals.
+ * Pinning the production vendor root bytes (this file) is one half of
+ * the moat-provability claim. The other half — proving the verifier
+ * agrees with what real hardware emits in the wild — requires a
+ * captured TPM2_Quote from an actual device with its full AK→vendor-
+ * root chain. Real-device captures expose serial-number-grade chip
+ * identity (each device's EK cert is unique by design), so projects
+ * systemically don't publish them. Real-fixture coverage stays deferred
+ * to an owned-hardware capture session; see
+ * `docs/doctrine/hardware-attestation.md` §"Real TPM fixture status".
+ * The `rootPems` test override path remains for synthetic chain-
+ * verification tests that don't require a real-device fixture.
+ *
+ * Each constant below ships its real vendor-published bytes. Each
+ * comment names: source URL, subject DN, SHA-256 fingerprint, and
+ * validity window. The fingerprint is the audit anchor — a third-party
+ * verifier that fetches the same vendor URL and computes its own
+ * SHA-256 should reach the byte-identical value below.
  */
 /**
- * Infineon OPTIGA TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
- *
- * Published at: https://pki.infineon.com/OptigaEccRootCA/OptigaEccRootCA.crt
+ * Infineon OPTIGA(TM) ECC Root CA.
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://pki.infineon.com/OptigaEccRootCA/OptigaEccRootCA.crt
+ *   Subject:    C=DE, O=Infineon Technologies AG, OU=OPTIGA(TM) Devices,
+ *               CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) ECC Root CA
+ *   SHA-256:    cfeb02fecd55ad7a73c6e1d11985d4c47dee248ab63dcb66091a2489660443c3
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-384
+ *   Validity:   2013-07-26 → 2043-07-25
  */
-export declare const INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIBdjCCARygAwIBAgIJAIMw8f7k8+xyMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCIxIDAeBgNVBAMM\nF01vdGViaXQgSW5maW5lb24gUGxhY2Vob2xkZXIwHhcNMjYwNDIyMDAwMDAwWhcN\nNDYwNDIyMDAwMDAwWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQDDBdNb3RlYml0IEluZmluZW9uIFBsYWNl\naG9sZGVyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEKZ/4LNYqi/LAI4R6tS2K\nkRUnhkRzkYfi5hmz2E+35mqWVNqCb/FRhk6dEuxCNbwJxFPEK4Opf5lCOs0ZsRdF\n+KNCMEAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQp3ojpUGm1YB9N+9lQHg0s\nVpSoBTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCjxfFCCf6t\nCpGcGc7Gsk8h2RFQ7CFW8NzkjuvUZZ7bwwIhAJ/CB4+XzV5EhcOf0qRZN8zmJb8G\nB9Z9EFcZ7Nt1l4Tn\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+export declare const INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\n+O3Bdel9P5+cOgzIGANkOPEzBQM3VfJegfnriT/kaA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 /**
- * Nuvoton NPCT TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
+ * Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.
  *
- * Published at: https://www.nuvoton.com/security/NTC-TPM-EK-Cert/Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.cer
- *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://www.nuvoton.com/security/NTC-TPM-EK-Cert/Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.cer
+ *   Subject:    CN=Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110, O=Nuvoton Technology Corporation, C=TW
+ *   SHA-256:    4aebe77a51ed29959a7f9f5e07a24a558dee8167f3985d724995a541c258dfda
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-256
+ *   Validity:   2015-10-19 → 2035-10-15
  */
-export declare const NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nVDz6f2s3uFo=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+export declare const NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nB6Xtqm7J8L4CICjT3/Y+rrSnf8zrBXqWeHDh8Wi41+w2ppq6Ev9orZFI\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 /**
- * STMicroelectronics ST33 TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
+ * STSAFE RSA Root CA 02 — STMicroelectronics's RSA-PKI anchor for the
+ * ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family. Modern ST33xxx devices provision EK certs
+ * under either this RSA root or the parallel ECC root below; pin both.
  *
- * Published at: https://sw-center.st.com/STM_ROOT_CA_2.crt
+ *   Source:     https://sw-center.st.com/STSAFE/STSAFERsaRootCA02.crt
+ *   Reference:  ST Technical Note TN1330
+ *   Subject:    C=CH, O=STMicroelectronics NV, CN=STSAFE RSA Root CA 02
+ *   SHA-256:    c8f179943356e13d9d84b100201cefabbf408880241e5329e60d950ce1dea623
+ *   Public key: RSA-4096
+ *   Validity:   2022-01-20 → 9999-12-31
+ */
+export declare const STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nvdT+agOdZZJRB1MROQXDnACVdQB1ba/DTO4UNEou27D03Q==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+/**
+ * STSAFE ECC Root CA 02 — STMicroelectronics's ECC-PKI anchor for the
+ * ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family. Sibling of the RSA root above; modern ST33
+ * devices use one or the other depending on EK template firmware.
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://sw-center.st.com/STSAFE/STSAFEEccRootCA02.crt
+ *   Reference:  ST Technical Note TN1330
+ *   Subject:    C=CH, O=STMicroelectronics NV, CN=STSAFE ECC Root CA 02
+ *   SHA-256:    fd1e7b68accd825636b27b3177c67402d463a7f04c97b6c47ab705fcdc1a04f6
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-521
+ *   Validity:   2022-01-20 → 9999-12-31
  */
-export declare const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nH6Bvb0gQaG8=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+export declare const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nxRJfSy8RvtTJcPEqH7kpj5sZjlRC5GUG/3Sco8uX\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 /**
- * Intel PTT (Platform Trust Technology, firmware TPM inside Intel CSME)
- * Endorsement Key Root CA.
+ * Intel TPM EK Root Certificate (used by Intel PTT, the firmware TPM
+ * bundled with Intel CSME).
  *
- * Published at: https://upgrades.intel.com/content/CRL/ekcert/EKRootPublicKey.cer
+ *   Source:     https://upgrades.intel.com/content/CRL/ekcert/EKRootPublicKey.cer
+ *   Subject:    C=US, ST=CA, L=Santa Clara, O=Intel Corporation,
+ *               OU=TPM EK root cert signing, CN=www.intel.com
+ *   SHA-256:    2e1b3ba79af56d758be51697621bc4b9e8cee0983db3e749c55eb9b37c6d2ae0
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-256
+ *   Validity:   2014-01-15 → 2049-12-31
+ */
+export declare const INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nVILmTjHwSL7uZBU=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+/**
+ * @deprecated since 1.1.0, removed in 2.0.0. Use {@link STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM} (RSA-PKI) or {@link STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM} (ECC-PKI) directly.
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Reason: ST runs parallel RSA + ECC trust anchors for the
+ *   ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family; the single-PEM constant could only
+ *   ever name one of them, and modern ST33 devices may chain to
+ *   either depending on EK template firmware. Kept as an alias for
+ *   the ECC root (the modern default for most ST33 EK templates) for
+ *   one minor release cycle so existing consumers don't break the
+ *   moment they pull `1.1.0`.
  */
-export declare const INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\ngHQ4nCY=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+export declare const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nxRJfSy8RvtTJcPEqH7kpj5sZjlRC5GUG/3Sco8uX\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
 /**
  * Default pinned-root set returned when a caller passes no `rootPems`
- * override. Ordered by deployment prevalence — Infineon and Intel PTT
- * together cover the vast majority of Windows 11 hosts; Nuvoton and
- * STMicro cover most non-Intel Linux laptops.
+ * override. Five real vendor bytes covering the four major TPM 2.0
+ * silicon vendors (STMicroelectronics ships parallel RSA + ECC roots,
+ * both pinned). Ordered by deployment prevalence — Infineon and Intel
+ * PTT together cover the vast majority of Windows 11 hosts; Nuvoton
+ * and STMicro cover most non-Intel Linux laptops and ST33-based
+ * embedded systems.
  */
 export declare const DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS: readonly string[];
 /**

package/dist/tpm-roots.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"tpm-roots.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/tpm-roots.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqCG;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,+lBAWpC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,2lBAWnC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,2lBAWnC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,ulBAWjC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAKrD,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAG,KAAc,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"tpm-roots.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/tpm-roots.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8CG;AAEH;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,m4BAepC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,2wBAanC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,u6DA+BvC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,+3BAevC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,y6BAgBjC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,+3BAA8B,CAAC;AAEnE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAMrD,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAG,KAAc,CAAC"}

package/dist/tpm-roots.js

@@ -16,117 +16,210 @@
  *
  *   - Infineon          (`OptigaTrustM`, `SLB966x` families)
  *   - Nuvoton            (`NPCT7xx` family)
- *   - STMicroelectronics (`ST33TPHF2ESPI`, `ST33HTPH2E32AHB3` families)
+ *   - STMicroelectronics (`ST33TPHF2ESPI`, `ST33HTPH2E32AHB3`,
+ *                         `ST33KTPM2X` families) — RSA + ECC parallel
+ *                         roots; both pinned
  *   - Intel PTT          (firmware TPM bundled with Intel CSME)
  *
  * AMD fTPM (firmware TPM bundled with AMD PSP) uses a vendor-signed
  * chain that roots to AMD's EK CA; that root is additive and lands in
  * a subsequent pass once the first AMD-shaped test vector is captured.
  *
- * ## Operator follow-up — ship-blocking for production rollout
+ * ## Real-fixture coverage is a separate concern
  *
- * The PEMs below are declared as exported constants so the test suite
- * exercises the same chain-verification code path end-to-end. For a
- * production ship, an operator must replace each placeholder with the
- * exact byte-for-byte vendor root published at the URL in the comment.
- * The test fabrication pattern (`buildFakeChain` in `__tests__`) does
- * not need the real bytes — tests inject their own roots — so swapping
- * in the real vendor PEMs is a mechanical operator task, not a code
- * change. The drift gate `check-hardware-attestation-primitives` covers
- * the parser / composer contract; the vendor-root swap is tracked in
- * `docs/doctrine/hardware-attestation.md` §Non-goals.
+ * Pinning the production vendor root bytes (this file) is one half of
+ * the moat-provability claim. The other half — proving the verifier
+ * agrees with what real hardware emits in the wild — requires a
+ * captured TPM2_Quote from an actual device with its full AK→vendor-
+ * root chain. Real-device captures expose serial-number-grade chip
+ * identity (each device's EK cert is unique by design), so projects
+ * systemically don't publish them. Real-fixture coverage stays deferred
+ * to an owned-hardware capture session; see
+ * `docs/doctrine/hardware-attestation.md` §"Real TPM fixture status".
+ * The `rootPems` test override path remains for synthetic chain-
+ * verification tests that don't require a real-device fixture.
+ *
+ * Each constant below ships its real vendor-published bytes. Each
+ * comment names: source URL, subject DN, SHA-256 fingerprint, and
+ * validity window. The fingerprint is the audit anchor — a third-party
+ * verifier that fetches the same vendor URL and computes its own
+ * SHA-256 should reach the byte-identical value below.
  */
 /**
- * Infineon OPTIGA TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
- *
- * Published at: https://pki.infineon.com/OptigaEccRootCA/OptigaEccRootCA.crt
+ * Infineon OPTIGA(TM) ECC Root CA.
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://pki.infineon.com/OptigaEccRootCA/OptigaEccRootCA.crt
+ *   Subject:    C=DE, O=Infineon Technologies AG, OU=OPTIGA(TM) Devices,
+ *               CN=Infineon OPTIGA(TM) ECC Root CA
+ *   SHA-256:    cfeb02fecd55ad7a73c6e1d11985d4c47dee248ab63dcb66091a2489660443c3
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-384
+ *   Validity:   2013-07-26 → 2043-07-25
  */
 export const INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBdjCCARygAwIBAgIJAIMw8f7k8+xyMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCIxIDAeBgNVBAMM
-F01vdGViaXQgSW5maW5lb24gUGxhY2Vob2xkZXIwHhcNMjYwNDIyMDAwMDAwWhcN
-NDYwNDIyMDAwMDAwWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQDDBdNb3RlYml0IEluZmluZW9uIFBsYWNl
-aG9sZGVyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEKZ/4LNYqi/LAI4R6tS2K
-kRUnhkRzkYfi5hmz2E+35mqWVNqCb/FRhk6dEuxCNbwJxFPEK4Opf5lCOs0ZsRdF
-+KNCMEAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQp3ojpUGm1YB9N+9lQHg0s
-VpSoBTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCjxfFCCf6t
-CpGcGc7Gsk8h2RFQ7CFW8NzkjuvUZZ7bwwIhAJ/CB4+XzV5EhcOf0qRZN8zmJb8G
-B9Z9EFcZ7Nt1l4Tn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 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 `;
 /**
- * Nuvoton NPCT TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
- *
- * Published at: https://www.nuvoton.com/security/NTC-TPM-EK-Cert/Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.cer
+ * Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://www.nuvoton.com/security/NTC-TPM-EK-Cert/Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110.cer
+ *   Subject:    CN=Nuvoton TPM Root CA 2110, O=Nuvoton Technology Corporation, C=TW
+ *   SHA-256:    4aebe77a51ed29959a7f9f5e07a24a558dee8167f3985d724995a541c258dfda
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-256
+ *   Validity:   2015-10-19 → 2035-10-15
  */
 export const NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBczCCARmgAwIBAgIJAL7X6p2yXxJJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCAxHjAcBgNVBAMM
-FU1vdGViaXQgTnV2b3RvbiBQbGFjZWhvbGRlcjAeFw0yNjA0MjIwMDAwMDBaFw00
-NjA0MjIwMDAwMDBaMCAxHjAcBgNVBAMMFU1vdGViaXQgTnV2b3RvbiBQbGFjZWhv
-bGRlcjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABJgPwHoU+cVjX3HzkXpEksdn
-f3KPRwMbFYvE3tkqDcW8JqzG8qO5VwPKFPwoAEE2C8dJpKHEk7fA4iGrSXz7x/6j
-QjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUNskUYy3Uz8Tvuvbu/B5VTJA2
-lLcwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAAbU6/dL06n8Cw
-CYI/rHo/cLWEFQKH5VnzDJH4RN5fIgIgAN0F3fYbTBa9H8OXCJdXUDxSDr2iT8E5
-VDz6f2s3uFo=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 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 `;
 /**
- * STMicroelectronics ST33 TPM 2.0 Endorsement Key Root CA.
+ * STSAFE RSA Root CA 02 — STMicroelectronics's RSA-PKI anchor for the
+ * ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family. Modern ST33xxx devices provision EK certs
+ * under either this RSA root or the parallel ECC root below; pin both.
  *
- * Published at: https://sw-center.st.com/STM_ROOT_CA_2.crt
- *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://sw-center.st.com/STSAFE/STSAFERsaRootCA02.crt
+ *   Reference:  ST Technical Note TN1330
+ *   Subject:    C=CH, O=STMicroelectronics NV, CN=STSAFE RSA Root CA 02
+ *   SHA-256:    c8f179943356e13d9d84b100201cefabbf408880241e5329e60d950ce1dea623
+ *   Public key: RSA-4096
+ *   Validity:   2022-01-20 → 9999-12-31
  */
-export const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBdDCCARqgAwIBAgIJAMZ4+9xZHMuaMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCExHzAdBgNVBAMM
-Fk1vdGViaXQgU1RNaWNybyBQbGFjZWhvbGRlcjAeFw0yNjA0MjIwMDAwMDBaFw00
-NjA0MjIwMDAwMDBaMCExHzAdBgNVBAMMFk1vdGViaXQgU1RNaWNybyBQbGFjZWhv
-bGRlcjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABLnK3t7y4JBJxzE0EFq+zsOV
-+m9n9D1YDUFb7k6hVIsKvfoH9o3rZkc4uRuSsz7fjC+IsKsMrJKXaU0mxH6ncjej
-QjBAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUe/x8wdJYzEypFT3M0K1Jy5C6
-1j8wDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAc9Ln4qhL7fZ5c
-oUbLFsTVTEc4aeBMkxqzLrJpZOYVegIgWSfLj2Q5CQ8OFvJx8fVDkxN9OXjYT6Jm
-H6Bvb0gQaG8=
+export const STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 `;
 /**
- * Intel PTT (Platform Trust Technology, firmware TPM inside Intel CSME)
- * Endorsement Key Root CA.
+ * STSAFE ECC Root CA 02 — STMicroelectronics's ECC-PKI anchor for the
+ * ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family. Sibling of the RSA root above; modern ST33
+ * devices use one or the other depending on EK template firmware.
  *
- * Published at: https://upgrades.intel.com/content/CRL/ekcert/EKRootPublicKey.cer
+ *   Source:     https://sw-center.st.com/STSAFE/STSAFEEccRootCA02.crt
+ *   Reference:  ST Technical Note TN1330
+ *   Subject:    C=CH, O=STMicroelectronics NV, CN=STSAFE ECC Root CA 02
+ *   SHA-256:    fd1e7b68accd825636b27b3177c67402d463a7f04c97b6c47ab705fcdc1a04f6
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-521
+ *   Validity:   2022-01-20 → 9999-12-31
+ */
+export const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+`;
+/**
+ * Intel TPM EK Root Certificate (used by Intel PTT, the firmware TPM
+ * bundled with Intel CSME).
  *
- * Placeholder PEM — replace with the real vendor bytes before
- * production rollout. Tests override via `rootPems` option.
+ *   Source:     https://upgrades.intel.com/content/CRL/ekcert/EKRootPublicKey.cer
+ *   Subject:    C=US, ST=CA, L=Santa Clara, O=Intel Corporation,
+ *               OU=TPM EK root cert signing, CN=www.intel.com
+ *   SHA-256:    2e1b3ba79af56d758be51697621bc4b9e8cee0983db3e749c55eb9b37c6d2ae0
+ *   Public key: ECDSA P-256
+ *   Validity:   2014-01-15 → 2049-12-31
  */
 export const INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBcjCCARegAwIBAgIJAOQz8pPRrTIxMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMB8xHTAbBgNVBAMM
-FE1vdGViaXQgSW50ZWwgUGxhY2Vob2xkZXIwHhcNMjYwNDIyMDAwMDAwWhcNNDYw
-NDIyMDAwMDAwWjAfMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRNb3RlYml0IEludGVsIFBsYWNlaG9sZGVy
-MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEkxD3N3JQMgVV8gRZEiQLBPyxX5jw
-WHNJCt8Fc0BbzQZVZ6Vkg4J1oHkLXIpsWcNOwU1RXcE/Pzr2yIjTnJW2VKNCMEAw
-DgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQxu9vHJmf+rQznfCVCd9vNQTRwPjAP
-BgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQCbX9rmZqJgk7lYPXGj
-WBR+oXt4AYzQ8pQvTSfkG/DBYwIgEY/oKZl5QL3Jt7lJx6lJxF3vLkaKBnJ9t4K4
-gHQ4nCY=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 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 `;
+/**
+ * @deprecated since 1.1.0, removed in 2.0.0. Use {@link STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM} (RSA-PKI) or {@link STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM} (ECC-PKI) directly.
+ *
+ *   Reason: ST runs parallel RSA + ECC trust anchors for the
+ *   ST33 / STSAFE-TPM family; the single-PEM constant could only
+ *   ever name one of them, and modern ST33 devices may chain to
+ *   either depending on EK template firmware. Kept as an alias for
+ *   the ECC root (the modern default for most ST33 EK templates) for
+ *   one minor release cycle so existing consumers don't break the
+ *   moment they pull `1.1.0`.
+ */
+export const STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM = STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM;
 /**
  * Default pinned-root set returned when a caller passes no `rootPems`
- * override. Ordered by deployment prevalence — Infineon and Intel PTT
- * together cover the vast majority of Windows 11 hosts; Nuvoton and
- * STMicro cover most non-Intel Linux laptops.
+ * override. Five real vendor bytes covering the four major TPM 2.0
+ * silicon vendors (STMicroelectronics ships parallel RSA + ECC roots,
+ * both pinned). Ordered by deployment prevalence — Infineon and Intel
+ * PTT together cover the vast majority of Windows 11 hosts; Nuvoton
+ * and STMicro cover most non-Intel Linux laptops and ST33-based
+ * embedded systems.
  */
 export const DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS = [
     INFINEON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM,
     NUVOTON_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM,
-    STMICRO_TPM_EK_ROOT_PEM,
+    STMICRO_TPM_EK_RSA_ROOT_PEM,
+    STMICRO_TPM_EK_ECC_ROOT_PEM,
     INTEL_PTT_EK_ROOT_PEM,
 ];
 /**

package/dist/tpm-roots.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"tpm-roots.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/tpm-roots.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqCG;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;CAWvC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;CAWtC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;CAWtC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;CAWpC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAsB;IACzD,wBAAwB;IACxB,uBAAuB;IACvB,uBAAuB;IACvB,qBAAqB;CACtB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,KAAc,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"tpm-roots.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/tpm-roots.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8CG;AAEH;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CAevC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;;CAatC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CA+B1C,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CAe1C,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CAgBpC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAEnE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAsB;IACzD,wBAAwB;IACxB,uBAAuB;IACvB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,2BAA2B;IAC3B,qBAAqB;CACtB,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,KAAc,CAAC"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@motebit/crypto-tpm",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.1",
   "description": "Apache-2.0 verifier for TPM 2.0 Endorsement-Key hardware-attestation credentials — offline chain verification against pinned vendor EK roots (Infineon, Nuvoton, STMicro, Intel PTT) plus binary TPMS_ATTEST parsing. Plugs into @motebit/crypto's HardwareAttestationVerifiers dispatcher to validate TPM-attested motebit identities on Windows/Linux hosts.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@peculiar/x509": "^1.12.0",
-    "@motebit/protocol": "1.0.0",
-    "@motebit/crypto": "1.0.0"
+    "@motebit/protocol": "1.2.0",
+    "@motebit/crypto": "1.2.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@noble/curves": "~1.9.0",