@mono-agent/agent-runtime 0.19.1 → 0.20.1

package/src/agent/tools/shared/path-resolver.js

@@ -29,31 +29,76 @@ export function isWritablePathAllowed(path, workdir, options = {}) {
   return isPathAllowedFor(path, workdir, "write", options);
 }
 
+// Protected filesystem operations use these metadata-free checks only as a
+// lexical policy preflight. The native sandbox remains responsible for
+// resolving symlinks and enforcing the real path at the operation syscall.
+export function isPathLexicallyAllowed(path, workdir, options = {}) {
+  return isPathLexicallyAllowedFor(path, workdir, "read", options);
+}
+
+export function isWritablePathLexicallyAllowed(path, workdir, options = {}) {
+  return isPathLexicallyAllowedFor(path, workdir, "write", options);
+}
+
 function isPathAllowedFor(path, workdir, access, options) {
   const ctx = options.ctx;
   const r = resolveToolPath(path, workdir, ctx);
   const policy = resolveSandboxPolicy(ctx ?? readToolRuntime(), options.sandboxPolicy);
   if (policy) {
     const field = access === "write" ? policy.writableRoots : policy.readableRoots;
-    return insideSandboxRoots(Array.isArray(field) ? field : [], r)
+    return !insideProtectedRoots(Array.isArray(policy.protectedRoots) ? policy.protectedRoots : [], r)
+      && insideSandboxRoots(Array.isArray(field) ? field : [], r)
       && (access !== "write" || !sandboxDeniesWrite(policy, r, ctx));
   }
   const { workspace, repoRoot } = configured(ctx);
   return insideLegacyRoots([workdir, workspace, repoRoot, process.cwd(), "/tmp"], r);
 }
 
+function isPathLexicallyAllowedFor(path, workdir, access, options) {
+  const ctx = options.ctx;
+  const r = resolveToolPath(path, workdir, ctx);
+  const policy = resolveSandboxPolicy(ctx ?? readToolRuntime(), options.sandboxPolicy);
+  if (policy) {
+    const field = access === "write" ? policy.writableRoots : policy.readableRoots;
+    return !insideLexicalRoots(Array.isArray(policy.protectedRoots) ? policy.protectedRoots : [], r)
+      && insideLexicalRoots(Array.isArray(field) ? field : [], r)
+      && (access !== "write" || !sandboxLexicallyDeniesWrite(policy, r, ctx));
+  }
+  const { workspace, repoRoot } = configured(ctx);
+  return insideLegacyRoots([workdir, workspace, repoRoot, process.cwd(), "/tmp"], r);
+}
+
 export function isWorkdirAllowed(workdir, options = {}) {
   if (!workdir) return true;
   const ctx = options.ctx;
   const r = resolve(workdir);
   const policy = resolveSandboxPolicy(ctx ?? readToolRuntime(), options.sandboxPolicy);
   if (policy) {
-    return insideSandboxRoots(Array.isArray(policy.readableRoots) ? policy.readableRoots : [], r);
+    return !insideProtectedRoots(Array.isArray(policy.protectedRoots) ? policy.protectedRoots : [], r)
+      && insideSandboxRoots(Array.isArray(policy.readableRoots) ? policy.readableRoots : [], r);
   }
   const { workspace, repoRoot } = configured(ctx);
   return insideLegacyRoots([workspace, repoRoot, process.cwd(), "/tmp"], r);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Protected descendants of one search root, as normalized relative paths.
+ * Search tools use these both as ripgrep exclusions and as a defensive output
+ * filter; actual reads still cross the native sandbox boundary.
+ */
+export function protectedRelativePaths(directory, options = {}) {
+  const ctx = options.ctx;
+  const policy = resolveSandboxPolicy(ctx ?? readToolRuntime(), options.sandboxPolicy);
+  if (!policy || !Array.isArray(policy.protectedRoots)) return [];
+  const root = resolve(directory);
+  const out = new Set();
+  for (const protectedRoot of normalizeRoots(policy.protectedRoots)) {
+    const rel = relative(root, protectedRoot);
+    if (rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel)) out.add(rel);
+  }
+  return [...out].sort();
+}
+
 // Sandbox roots also enforce realpath containment so a symlink inside an
 // allowed root cannot escape to a target outside the policy.
 function insideSandboxRoots(roots, target) {
@@ -63,6 +108,16 @@ function insideSandboxRoots(roots, target) {
     && allowedRoots.some((root) => isInsidePath(root, real));
 }
 
+// A protected root rejects either spelling: the lexical request and its
+// existing/nearest-existing realpath. This closes symlink aliases in both
+// directions without weakening ordinary readable/writable root checks.
+function insideProtectedRoots(roots, target) {
+  const protectedRoots = normalizeRoots(roots);
+  const candidates = [...new Set([resolve(target), realTargetPath(target)])];
+  return candidates.some((candidate) =>
+    protectedRoots.some((root) => isInsidePath(root, candidate)));
+}
+
 // Without a sandbox policy, keep the historical literal containment check —
 // symlinks out of the workspace (npm link et al.) stay usable by default.
 function insideLegacyRoots(roots, target) {
@@ -70,6 +125,11 @@ function insideLegacyRoots(roots, target) {
   return allowedRoots.some((root) => isInsidePath(root, target));
 }
 
+function insideLexicalRoots(roots, target) {
+  const lexicalRoots = [...new Set(roots.filter(Boolean).map((path) => resolve(path)))];
+  return lexicalRoots.some((root) => isInsidePath(root, target));
+}
+
 function normalizeRoots(paths) {
   const out = new Set();
   for (const path of paths.filter(Boolean)) {
@@ -109,6 +169,11 @@ function sandboxDeniesWrite(policy, target, ctx) {
     patterns.some((pattern) => denyWritePatternMatches(policy, pattern, candidate, ctx)));
 }
 
+function sandboxLexicallyDeniesWrite(policy, target, ctx) {
+  const patterns = Array.isArray(policy.denyWrite) ? policy.denyWrite : [];
+  return patterns.some((pattern) => denyWritePatternMatches(policy, pattern, resolve(target), ctx));
+}
+
 function denyWritePatternMatches(policy, pattern, target, ctx) {
   if (!pattern || typeof pattern !== "string") return false;
   const normalizedPattern = normalizeMatchPath(pattern);

package/src/agent/tools/shared/process-jobs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// @ts-check
+
+import { types as nodeUtilTypes } from "node:util";
+
+import { startPreparedProcess } from "./process-runner.js";
+
+/**
+ * Kernel-local structural controller seam. The typed public interface lives in
+ * runtime-adapter; this package deliberately has no workspace dependencies.
+ *
+ * @typedef {Object} ProcessJobsController
+ * @property {(request: {
+ *   tool: "Exec"|"Bash",
+ *   prepared: import("../../sandbox-seam.js").PreparedSandboxCommand,
+ *   summary: string,
+ *   timeoutMs?: number,
+ *   maxOutputChars?: number,
+ *   launch: (options?: {timeoutMs?: number, signal?: AbortSignal, maxBufferBytes?: number, onStdout?: (chunk: Buffer) => void, onStderr?: (chunk: Buffer) => void}) => ReturnType<typeof startPreparedProcess>,
+ * }) => Promise<{jobId: string, state: "queued"|"starting"|"running", startedAt: string|null}>} start
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Transfer one prepared command to the injected host controller. From the
+ * instant `start()` is invoked, the controller owns cleanup on every path.
+ *
+ * @param {{
+ *   controller: ProcessJobsController,
+ *   tool: "Exec"|"Bash",
+ *   prepared: import("../../sandbox-seam.js").PreparedSandboxCommand,
+ *   summary: string,
+ *   timeoutMs?: number,
+ *   maxOutputChars?: number,
+ *   startedAt: number,
+ *   failed: (text: string, code: string, startedAt: number) => any,
+ * }} input
+ */
+export async function handOffProcessJob({
+  controller,
+  tool,
+  prepared,
+  summary,
+  timeoutMs,
+  maxOutputChars,
+  startedAt,
+  failed,
+}) {
+  const ownedPrepared = withCleanupOnce(prepared);
+  const boundEnvironment = mergedProcessEnvironment(ownedPrepared.env);
+  let launched = false;
+  try {
+    const result = await controller.start({
+      tool,
+      prepared: ownedPrepared,
+      summary,
+      ...(timeoutMs === undefined ? {} : { timeoutMs }),
+      ...(maxOutputChars === undefined ? {} : { maxOutputChars }),
+      launch(options = {}) {
+        if (launched) throw new Error("Process-job prepared command was already launched.");
+        launched = true;
+        return startPreparedProcess({ ...ownedPrepared, env: boundEnvironment }, {
+          ...options,
+          waitForProcessGroup: true,
+          exactEnvironment: true,
+        });
+      },
+    });
+    if (!validProcessJobStartResult(result)) {
+      if (!launched) {
+        try {
+          await ownedPrepared.cleanup?.();
+        } catch {
+          return failed(
+            `Error: ${PUBLIC_BACKGROUND_START_FAILURES.process_job_cleanup_incomplete}`,
+            "process_job_cleanup_incomplete",
+            startedAt,
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      return failed("Error: Process-job controller returned an invalid start result.", "process_job_controller_invalid", startedAt);
+    }
+    const payload = {
+      job_id: result.jobId,
+      state: result.state,
+      started_at: result.startedAt,
+    };
+    return {
+      text: JSON.stringify(payload),
+      outcome: {
+        status: "ok",
+        code: "background_started",
+        retryable: false,
+        attempts: 1,
+        durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+        bytes: 0,
+        truncated: false,
+        exitCode: null,
+        signal: null,
+        timedOut: false,
+        background: true,
+        ...payload,
+      },
+      error: false,
+    };
+  } catch (error) {
+    const failure = publicBackgroundStartFailure(error);
+    return failed(
+      `Error: ${failure.message}`,
+      failure.code,
+      startedAt,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+const PUBLIC_BACKGROUND_START_FAILURES = Object.freeze({
+  background_unsupported: "Background process jobs are unsupported for this tool call.",
+  background_unsupported_channel: "Background process jobs are unsupported for this channel.",
+  process_job_disabled: "Process jobs are disabled.",
+  process_job_controller_unavailable: "The process-job controller is unavailable.",
+  process_job_platform_unsupported: "Process jobs are unsupported on this platform.",
+  process_job_not_found: "The process job was not found.",
+  process_job_conflict: "The process job is no longer in the required state.",
+  process_job_capacity: "Process-job capacity is full.",
+  process_job_conversation_capacity: "This conversation reached its process-job capacity.",
+  process_job_queue_full: "The process-job queue is full.",
+  process_job_queue_expired: "The process job expired before launch.",
+  process_job_chain_depth_exceeded: "The process-job chain-depth limit was reached.",
+  process_job_spawn_failed: "The process job could not be launched.",
+  process_job_failed: "The process job failed.",
+  process_job_timeout: "The process job exceeded its runtime limit.",
+  process_job_cancelled: "The process job was cancelled.",
+  process_job_agent_restarted: "The process job was interrupted by an agent restart.",
+  process_job_cleanup_incomplete: "Process-job cleanup could not be confirmed.",
+  process_job_store_error: "Process-job storage failed.",
+  process_job_wake_failed: "Process-job wake delivery failed.",
+  process_job_response_too_large: "The process-job response exceeded its size limit.",
+  process_job_invalid: "The process-job request is invalid.",
+});
+
+function publicBackgroundStartFailure(error) {
+  let code = "process_job_controller_unavailable";
+  try {
+    if (typeof error === "object" && error !== null && !nodeUtilTypes.isProxy(error)) {
+      const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(error, "code");
+      if (descriptor !== undefined
+        && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(descriptor, "value")
+        && typeof descriptor.value === "string"
+        && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PUBLIC_BACKGROUND_START_FAILURES, descriptor.value)) {
+        code = descriptor.value;
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Proxies and revoked proxies are hostile input at this boundary.
+  }
+  return { code, message: PUBLIC_BACKGROUND_START_FAILURES[code] };
+}
+
+function mergedProcessEnvironment(overrides = {}) {
+  const environment = { ...process.env };
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(overrides)) {
+    if (value === undefined) delete environment[name];
+    else environment[name] = value;
+  }
+  return environment;
+}
+
+function withCleanupOnce(prepared) {
+  if (typeof prepared.cleanup !== "function") return prepared;
+  /** @type {Promise<void>|undefined} */
+  let cleanup;
+  const original = prepared.cleanup;
+  return {
+    ...prepared,
+    cleanup: async () => {
+      if (!cleanup) cleanup = Promise.resolve().then(() => original());
+      await cleanup;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function validProcessJobStartResult(value) {
+  if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return false;
+  if (typeof value.jobId !== "string" || value.jobId.trim().length === 0 || value.jobId.length > 256) return false;
+  if (value.state !== "queued" && value.state !== "starting" && value.state !== "running") return false;
+  if (value.startedAt === null) return true;
+  if (typeof value.startedAt !== "string") return false;
+  const timestamp = Date.parse(value.startedAt);
+  return Number.isFinite(timestamp) && new Date(timestamp).toISOString() === value.startedAt;
+}