@molecule/api-code-sandbox-e2b 1.2.6 → 1.2.8

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ AUTO-GENERATED — DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE.
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  Generated by `mlcl sync-docs` from the package's src/index.ts JSDoc + mlcl/registry.json.
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  Edits here are overwritten on the next commit (molecule's pre-commit hook regenerates).
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  To change this document, edit the module-level JSDoc in src/index.ts.
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- Generated: 2026-10-04T09:45:27.540Z
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+ Generated: 2026-10-05T07:29:02.107Z
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  -->
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  # @molecule/api-code-sandbox-e2b
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ the official `e2b` SDK.
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  The design that makes it fast: a single golden SUPERSET template carries the
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  entire `@molecule` fleet node_modules + postgres + warmed Vite deps, so a boot
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  only copies the ONE selected app's source in and starts the dev servers — no
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- per-boot `npm install`. The 133 flagship template sources are NOT baked into
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- the image; they are copied from the control plane at boot, so templates and
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- `mlcl` stay private.
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+ per-boot `npm install`. The app template sources are not baked into the
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+ image; they are copied in at boot.
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  ## Quick Start
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@@ -181,7 +180,7 @@ interface E2BConfig {
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  * time; everything else is denied (`denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC]`). Wildcards like
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  * `*.npmjs.org` are supported. Empty/omitted means the bond does NOT
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  * constrain egress — prod must supply this or `verifyEgress` observes `open`
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- * and the control plane refuses to boot (Rule 18).
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+ * and the control plane refuses to boot.
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  *
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  * Verified against a live E2B sandbox: with `denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC]`, a
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  * non-allowlisted host AND a raw destination IP are both blocked — a stronger
@@ -401,8 +400,7 @@ Only the required surface (`create`/`get`/`list`/`destroy`) plus the boot-path
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  optionals are wired here; `verifyEgress` and `commitTemplate`/`getTemplate`
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  land in follow-up steps. Leaving `verifyEgress` UNimplemented is deliberate:
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  the control plane treats "unsupported" as `inconclusive` and refuses to boot
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- in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven
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- (Rule 18 — never trade cost for security).
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+ in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven.
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  ### Functions
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@@ -414,8 +412,7 @@ Turn the probe's curl codes into a verdict.
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  egress was OBSERVED;
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  - `inconclusive` whenever the allow-listed control host did not answer — a
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  probe sandbox with no network at all blocks everything, which says nothing
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- about the policy (2026-10-04: `host=000, rawIP=000, allowed=000` was read
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- as open and production refused to boot);
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+ about the policy;
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  - `filtered` only when the control host answered AND both denied probes were
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  blocked (`000` / empty).
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@@ -498,13 +495,19 @@ Peer dependencies:
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  - `@molecule/api-i18n`
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  - `e2b`
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- **`verifyEgress` OBSERVES, it never attests.** It boots a throwaway sandbox,
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- applies `{ allowOut: [npm], denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC] }`, and curls an
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- allow-listed host, a non-allow-listed host AND a raw IP from inside it;
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- `filtered` requires the last two to be blocked while the first answers. Any
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- failure to run that probe is `inconclusive` — never `filtered`, because "I
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- could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe"
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- (Rule 18: never trade cost for security).
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+ - `importFiles` spools an incoming archive into the sandbox in 8 MB pieces
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+ whatever the size of the chunks it is given; `exportFiles` reads the whole
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+ archive into memory once, so bound what you export.
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+ - `importFiles` trusts the stream's length: an archive cut exactly between two
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+ tar members extracts cleanly (tar exits 0) and is reported complete. Give it
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+ a stream that errors on truncation (an authenticated encrypted stream does)
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+ or check a length or hash yourself.
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+ **`verifyEgress` OBSERVES, it never attests.** It boots a throwaway sandbox,
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+ applies `{ allowOut: [npm], denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC] }`, and curls an
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+ allow-listed host, a non-allow-listed host AND a raw IP from inside it;
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+ `filtered` requires the last two to be blocked while the first answers. Any
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+ failure to run that probe is `inconclusive` — never `filtered`, because "I
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+ could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe".
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  **A probe that sees NO network is `inconclusive`, not `open`.** When the
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  allow-listed control host does not answer either, the probe sandbox itself has
@@ -585,8 +588,7 @@ can never be given a project's volume afterwards — a project that needs one
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  must be booted fresh with it.
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  **Volumes are a private beta on E2B.** An account without them answers
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- `403 use of volumes is not enabled` (measured on the production account,
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- 2026-08-16); ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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+ `403 use of volumes is not enabled`; ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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  that state rather than no-op-ing, because a control plane that believes it has
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  durable storage and does not is the failure this bond exists to prevent.
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package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@
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  * The design that makes it fast: a single golden SUPERSET template carries the
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  * entire `@molecule` fleet node_modules + postgres + warmed Vite deps, so a boot
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  * only copies the ONE selected app's source in and starts the dev servers — no
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- * per-boot `npm install`. The 133 flagship template sources are NOT baked into
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- * the image; they are copied from the control plane at boot, so templates and
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- * `mlcl` stay private.
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+ * per-boot `npm install`. The app template sources are not baked into the
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+ * image; they are copied in at boot.
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  *
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  * @example
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  * ```typescript
@@ -39,13 +38,19 @@
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  * ```
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  *
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  * @remarks
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+ * - `importFiles` spools an incoming archive into the sandbox in 8 MB pieces
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+ * whatever the size of the chunks it is given; `exportFiles` reads the whole
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+ * archive into memory once, so bound what you export.
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+ * - `importFiles` trusts the stream's length: an archive cut exactly between two
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+ * tar members extracts cleanly (tar exits 0) and is reported complete. Give it
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+ * a stream that errors on truncation (an authenticated encrypted stream does)
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+ * or check a length or hash yourself.
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  * **`verifyEgress` OBSERVES, it never attests.** It boots a throwaway sandbox,
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  * applies `{ allowOut: [npm], denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC] }`, and curls an
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  * allow-listed host, a non-allow-listed host AND a raw IP from inside it;
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  * `filtered` requires the last two to be blocked while the first answers. Any
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  * failure to run that probe is `inconclusive` — never `filtered`, because "I
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- * could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe"
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- * (Rule 18: never trade cost for security).
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+ * could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe".
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  *
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  * **A probe that sees NO network is `inconclusive`, not `open`.** When the
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  * allow-listed control host does not answer either, the probe sandbox itself has
@@ -126,8 +131,7 @@
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  * must be booted fresh with it.
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  *
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  * **Volumes are a private beta on E2B.** An account without them answers
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- * `403 use of volumes is not enabled` (measured on the production account,
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- * 2026-08-16); ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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+ * `403 use of volumes is not enabled`; ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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  * that state rather than no-op-ing, because a control plane that believes it has
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  * durable storage and does not is the failure this bond exists to prevent.
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  *
@@ -1 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiKG;AAEH,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,YAAY,CAAA"}
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@
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  * The design that makes it fast: a single golden SUPERSET template carries the
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  * entire `@molecule` fleet node_modules + postgres + warmed Vite deps, so a boot
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  * only copies the ONE selected app's source in and starts the dev servers — no
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- * per-boot `npm install`. The 133 flagship template sources are NOT baked into
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- * the image; they are copied from the control plane at boot, so templates and
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- * `mlcl` stay private.
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+ * per-boot `npm install`. The app template sources are not baked into the
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+ * image; they are copied in at boot.
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  *
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  * @example
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  * ```typescript
@@ -39,13 +38,19 @@
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  * ```
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  *
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  * @remarks
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+ * - `importFiles` spools an incoming archive into the sandbox in 8 MB pieces
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+ * whatever the size of the chunks it is given; `exportFiles` reads the whole
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+ * archive into memory once, so bound what you export.
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+ * - `importFiles` trusts the stream's length: an archive cut exactly between two
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+ * tar members extracts cleanly (tar exits 0) and is reported complete. Give it
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+ * a stream that errors on truncation (an authenticated encrypted stream does)
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+ * or check a length or hash yourself.
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  * **`verifyEgress` OBSERVES, it never attests.** It boots a throwaway sandbox,
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  * applies `{ allowOut: [npm], denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC] }`, and curls an
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  * allow-listed host, a non-allow-listed host AND a raw IP from inside it;
45
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  * `filtered` requires the last two to be blocked while the first answers. Any
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  * failure to run that probe is `inconclusive` — never `filtered`, because "I
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- * could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe"
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- * (Rule 18: never trade cost for security).
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+ * could not look" must not reach a control plane as "I looked, and it is safe".
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  *
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  * **A probe that sees NO network is `inconclusive`, not `open`.** When the
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  * allow-listed control host does not answer either, the probe sandbox itself has
@@ -126,8 +131,7 @@
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  * must be booted fresh with it.
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  *
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  * **Volumes are a private beta on E2B.** An account without them answers
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- * `403 use of volumes is not enabled` (measured on the production account,
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- * 2026-08-16); ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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+ * `403 use of volumes is not enabled`; ask E2B support to enable them. Every volume method throws in
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  * that state rather than no-op-ing, because a control plane that believes it has
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  * durable storage and does not is the failure this bond exists to prevent.
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  *
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ import type { E2BConfig, E2BSandboxClientLike } from './types.js';
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  * optionals are wired here; `verifyEgress` and `commitTemplate`/`getTemplate`
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  * land in follow-up steps. Leaving `verifyEgress` UNimplemented is deliberate:
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  * the control plane treats "unsupported" as `inconclusive` and refuses to boot
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- * in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven
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- * (Rule 18 — never trade cost for security).
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+ * in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven.
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  */
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  export declare class E2BSandboxProvider implements SandboxProvider {
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  readonly name = "e2b";
@@ -284,8 +283,7 @@ export interface EgressProbeCodes {
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  * egress was OBSERVED;
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  * - `inconclusive` whenever the allow-listed control host did not answer — a
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  * probe sandbox with no network at all blocks everything, which says nothing
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- * about the policy (2026-10-04: `host=000, rawIP=000, allowed=000` was read
288
- * as open and production refused to boot);
286
+ * about the policy;
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  * - `filtered` only when the control host answered AND both denied probes were
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  * blocked (`000` / empty).
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  *
@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/provider.js CHANGED
@@ -26,6 +26,23 @@ const DEFAULT_SPAWN_TIMEOUT_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
26
26
  * this instead of the caller's whole timeout.
27
27
  */
28
28
  const SETTLE_PROBE_MS = 1_500;
29
+ /**
30
+ * How long to wait for the handle to REPORT the exit code after the started pid
31
+ * is confirmed gone. envd closes the output stream right behind a real exit, so
32
+ * a finished command's `end` event — the only thing that carries its exit code —
33
+ * lands within this window; only a stream held by a stranded descendant
34
+ * outlives it.
35
+ */
36
+ const EXIT_REPORT_GRACE_MS = 2_000;
37
+ /**
38
+ * The exit code reported when a command's outcome cannot be observed at all:
39
+ * the started pid is gone but the stream it was reading is still held, so the
40
+ * SDK never delivers the `end` event that carries the real code. 128+SIGKILL
41
+ * (137), the conventional status of a killed process — because "unknown" must
42
+ * read as failure, never as the fabricated `0` that once reported a killed
43
+ * build (partial `dist/` and all) as a successful one.
44
+ */
45
+ const EXIT_CODE_UNKNOWN = 137;
29
46
  /** Default lifetime for a PTY session; same reasoning as {@link DEFAULT_SPAWN_TIMEOUT_MS}. */
30
47
  const DEFAULT_PTY_TIMEOUT_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
31
48
  /**
@@ -309,6 +326,14 @@ class E2BSandbox {
309
326
  * running and the caller's own timeout is the right bound. Never a guess from
310
327
  * the shape of the command.
311
328
  *
329
+ * But "over" is not "succeeded": the SDK delivers the exit code on the
330
+ * stream's `end` event, and the descendant holding the stream keeps that
331
+ * event from ever arriving. A gone pid therefore gets a bounded grace window
332
+ * for the handle to report the real code, and a handle that never does is
333
+ * reported as {@link EXIT_CODE_UNKNOWN} — failure — because an outcome that
334
+ * cannot be observed (a build OOM-killed mid-run) must never be fabricated
335
+ * into success.
336
+ *
312
337
  * @param handle - The started command.
313
338
  * @returns The command's result.
314
339
  */
@@ -328,11 +353,29 @@ class E2BSandbox {
328
353
  const alive = await this.isProcessAlive(handle.pid);
329
354
  if (alive)
330
355
  return finished;
331
- // The process is gone; whatever still holds the stream is not it.
356
+ // The process is gone; whatever still holds the stream is not it. The real
357
+ // exit code rides the stream's `end` event, so give the handle a bounded
358
+ // window to deliver it — when the process truly finished, envd closes the
359
+ // stream right behind it and the result lands here.
360
+ const reported = await Promise.race([
361
+ finished,
362
+ new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(() => resolve(null), EXIT_REPORT_GRACE_MS)),
363
+ ]);
364
+ if (reported)
365
+ return reported;
366
+ if (typeof handle.exitCode === 'number') {
367
+ return { stdout: handle.stdout ?? '', stderr: handle.stderr ?? '', exitCode: handle.exitCode };
368
+ }
369
+ // Still nothing: the exit code is UNKNOWN. Reporting `0` here used to
370
+ // fabricate success for exactly this shape — a killed build whose stranded
371
+ // daemon held the stream shipped its partial `dist/` as a finished site —
372
+ // so fail closed instead, with a line that says why the code is missing.
373
+ const unknownNote = `e2b: exit code unknown — the started process (pid ${handle.pid}) is gone but its ` +
374
+ 'output stream is still held, so its real outcome cannot be observed; reporting failure';
332
375
  return {
333
376
  stdout: handle.stdout ?? '',
334
- stderr: handle.stderr ?? '',
335
- exitCode: handle.exitCode ?? 0,
377
+ stderr: handle.stderr ? `${handle.stderr}\n${unknownNote}` : unknownNote,
378
+ exitCode: EXIT_CODE_UNKNOWN,
336
379
  };
337
380
  }
338
381
  /**
@@ -646,7 +689,8 @@ class E2BSandbox {
646
689
  * Extract a POSIX tar stream into the sandbox at `path`.
647
690
  *
648
691
  * The transfer primitive the scaffold path uses to copy a project tree in.
649
- * Buffers the stream, writes it as one blob, and `tar x`-tracts it.
692
+ * Spools the stream into the sandbox in 8 MB pieces, so the archive is never
693
+ * held whole in memory, then extracts it with `tar x`.
650
694
  * `--no-same-owner --no-same-permissions` enforces the contract that a
651
695
  * caller/tenant-authored archive's ownership + setuid/setgid bits are NOT
652
696
  * restored (they arrive owned by the sandbox user, no privilege bits).
@@ -679,10 +723,18 @@ class E2BSandbox {
679
723
  };
680
724
  try {
681
725
  for await (const chunk of archive) {
682
- pending.push(chunk);
683
- pendingBytes += chunk.length;
684
- if (pendingBytes >= IMPORT_PIECE_BYTES)
685
- await flush();
726
+ // Sliced into the piece: a single chunk larger than a piece (a whole
727
+ // archive yielded at once) must not become one huge write (R93-B9).
728
+ let offset = 0;
729
+ while (offset < chunk.length) {
730
+ const room = IMPORT_PIECE_BYTES - pendingBytes;
731
+ const slice = chunk.subarray(offset, offset + room);
732
+ pending.push(slice);
733
+ pendingBytes += slice.length;
734
+ offset += slice.length;
735
+ if (pendingBytes >= IMPORT_PIECE_BYTES)
736
+ await flush();
737
+ }
686
738
  }
687
739
  await flush();
688
740
  if (pieces === 0)
@@ -710,9 +762,6 @@ class E2BSandbox {
710
762
  * <name>`), so `exportFiles('/workspace/my-app')` yields `my-app/…` — the
711
763
  * shape Docker's archive endpoint produces and the shape every consumer
712
764
  * (`importFiles(<parent>)`, host-side unpackers with `strip: 1`) expects.
713
- * The previous `tar -C <path> .` rooting yielded `./…`, which
714
- * `importFiles('/')` extracted at the filesystem root instead of the
715
- * directory it was taken from.
716
765
  *
717
766
  * @param path - Absolute path inside the sandbox to archive (not `/`).
718
767
  * @returns A POSIX tar byte stream of that path's contents.
@@ -725,15 +774,22 @@ class E2BSandbox {
725
774
  if (!trimmed.startsWith('/') || !name) {
726
775
  throw new Error(`exportFiles: path must be an absolute directory below "/" (got "${path}")`);
727
776
  }
728
- const tarPath = `/tmp/mol-export-${Date.now().toString(36)}.tar`;
729
- const r = await this.sbx.commands.run(`tar cf ${tarPath} -C ${shellQuote(parent)} ${shellQuote(name)}`, { timeoutMs: 300_000 });
730
- if (r.exitCode !== 0) {
731
- throw new Error(`exportFiles: tar create failed (${r.exitCode}): ${r.stderr.slice(0, 300)}`);
777
+ // A unique name (two exports in one millisecond collided on Date.now()
778
+ // alone), removed whether the tar or the read succeeds or not (R93-B8).
779
+ const tarPath = `/tmp/mol-export-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}.tar`;
780
+ let bytes;
781
+ try {
782
+ const r = await this.sbx.commands.run(`tar cf ${tarPath} -C ${shellQuote(parent)} ${shellQuote(name)}`, { timeoutMs: 300_000 });
783
+ if (r.exitCode !== 0) {
784
+ throw new Error(`exportFiles: tar create failed (${r.exitCode}): ${r.stderr.slice(0, 300)}`);
785
+ }
786
+ bytes = await this.sbx.files.read(tarPath, { format: 'bytes' });
787
+ }
788
+ finally {
789
+ await this.sbx.commands.run(`rm -f ${tarPath}`, { timeoutMs: 20_000 }).catch((_error) => {
790
+ // intentional noop — leftover /tmp tar is harmless; the sandbox is ephemeral.
791
+ });
732
792
  }
733
- const bytes = await this.sbx.files.read(tarPath, { format: 'bytes' });
734
- await this.sbx.commands.run(`rm -f ${tarPath}`, { timeoutMs: 20_000 }).catch((_error) => {
735
- // intentional noop — leftover /tmp tar is harmless; the sandbox is ephemeral.
736
- });
737
793
  return (async function* () {
738
794
  yield bytes;
739
795
  })();
@@ -765,8 +821,7 @@ class E2BSandbox {
765
821
  * optionals are wired here; `verifyEgress` and `commitTemplate`/`getTemplate`
766
822
  * land in follow-up steps. Leaving `verifyEgress` UNimplemented is deliberate:
767
823
  * the control plane treats "unsupported" as `inconclusive` and refuses to boot
768
- * in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven
769
- * (Rule 18 — never trade cost for security).
824
+ * in prod, which is the correct safe default until egress observation is proven.
770
825
  */
771
826
  export class E2BSandboxProvider {
772
827
  name = 'e2b';
@@ -1344,8 +1399,7 @@ export class E2BSandboxProvider {
1344
1399
  * egress was OBSERVED;
1345
1400
  * - `inconclusive` whenever the allow-listed control host did not answer — a
1346
1401
  * probe sandbox with no network at all blocks everything, which says nothing
1347
- * about the policy (2026-10-04: `host=000, rawIP=000, allowed=000` was read
1348
- * as open and production refused to boot);
1402
+ * about the policy;
1349
1403
  * - `filtered` only when the control host answered AND both denied probes were
1350
1404
  * blocked (`000` / empty).
1351
1405
  *
package/dist/types.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ export interface E2BConfig {
42
42
  * time; everything else is denied (`denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC]`). Wildcards like
43
43
  * `*.npmjs.org` are supported. Empty/omitted means the bond does NOT
44
44
  * constrain egress — prod must supply this or `verifyEgress` observes `open`
45
- * and the control plane refuses to boot (Rule 18).
45
+ * and the control plane refuses to boot.
46
46
  *
47
47
  * Verified against a live E2B sandbox: with `denyOut: [ALL_TRAFFIC]`, a
48
48
  * non-allowlisted host AND a raw destination IP are both blocked — a stronger
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@molecule/api-code-sandbox-e2b",
3
- "version": "1.2.6",
3
+ "version": "1.2.8",
4
4
  "description": "E2B (e2b.dev) code sandbox provider — Firecracker microVMs with golden templates, fork, and pause/resume",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "main": "dist/index.js",