@molecule/api-ai-tools 1.0.0 → 1.0.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (2) hide show
  1. package/README.md +649 -0
  2. package/package.json +5 -4
package/README.md ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
1
+ <!--
2
+ AUTO-GENERATED — DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE.
3
+ Generated by `mlcl sync-docs` from the package's src/index.ts JSDoc + mlcl/registry.json.
4
+ Edits here are overwritten on the next commit (molecule's pre-commit hook regenerates).
5
+ To change this document, edit the module-level JSDoc in src/index.ts.
6
+ Generated: 2026-08-04T01:47:38.726Z
7
+ -->
8
+
9
+ # @molecule/api-ai-tools
10
+
11
+ > **Auto-generated, AI-first package reference** for the [molecule.dev](https://molecule.dev) ecosystem.
12
+ > It is written to be read by coding agents as much as by people, and is generated from this
13
+ > package's source — edit `src/index.ts` JSDoc, not this file.
14
+
15
+ Shared AI agent tool set for molecule.dev — filesystem, search, and shell
16
+ tools an LLM agent can call, with a swappable execution backend.
17
+
18
+ `buildTools(backend)` returns ready-to-use `AITool`s (the `@molecule/api-ai`
19
+ tool shape): `list_files`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `edit_file`,
20
+ `search_files`, `find_files`, `create_directory`, `rename_file`,
21
+ `delete_file`, `exec_command`, `save_plan`, `load_skill`. The backend decides
22
+ WHERE they act: `createLocalBackend(projectRoot)` (host filesystem) or
23
+ `createSandboxBackend(...)` (an isolated `@molecule/api-code-sandbox`
24
+ container). `buildAgentPrompt(ctx)` composes a matching system prompt
25
+ (identity, tool listing, project docs, discovered skills).
26
+
27
+ ## Quick Start
28
+
29
+ ```typescript
30
+ import { buildAgentPrompt, buildTools, createLocalBackend } from '@molecule/api-ai-tools'
31
+ import { requireProvider } from '@molecule/api-ai'
32
+
33
+ const backend = createLocalBackend('/path/to/project')
34
+ const tools = buildTools(backend, { include: ['read_file', 'edit_file', 'search_files'] })
35
+ const system = buildAgentPrompt({
36
+ agentName: 'My Agent',
37
+ projectRoot: backend.projectRoot,
38
+ tools: tools.map((t) => t.name),
39
+ })
40
+
41
+ // Hand them to the bonded AI provider (or an @molecule/api-ai-agents run).
42
+ for await (const event of requireProvider().chat({ system, tools, messages, stream: true })) {
43
+ // forward text chunks; tool calls are executed against the backend
44
+ }
45
+ ```
46
+
47
+ ## Type
48
+
49
+ `core`
50
+
51
+ ## Installation
52
+
53
+ ```bash
54
+ npm install @molecule/api-ai-tools @molecule/api-ai
55
+ ```
56
+
57
+ ## API
58
+
59
+ ### Interfaces
60
+
61
+ #### `ExecutionBackend`
62
+
63
+ Abstraction over the execution environment.
64
+ Implemented by SandboxBackend (Docker) and LocalBackend (host filesystem).
65
+
66
+ ```typescript
67
+ interface ExecutionBackend {
68
+ /** The root directory for all operations (e.g. '/workspace' or '/Users/.../project'). */
69
+ readonly projectRoot: string
70
+
71
+ /** Read a file's content as UTF-8 string. */
72
+ readFile(path: string): Promise<string>
73
+
74
+ /** Write content to a file. Creates parent directories as needed. */
75
+ writeFile(path: string, content: string): Promise<void>
76
+
77
+ /** Delete a file. */
78
+ deleteFile(path: string): Promise<void>
79
+
80
+ /** List entries in a directory. */
81
+ readDir(path: string): Promise<Array<{ name: string; type: 'file' | 'directory' }>>
82
+
83
+ /**
84
+ * Run a shell command. Returns stdout, stderr, and exit code.
85
+ * Backends implement this safely (sandbox.exec for Docker, execFile for local).
86
+ */
87
+ run(
88
+ command: string,
89
+ opts?: { cwd?: string; timeout?: number },
90
+ ): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string; exitCode: number }>
91
+ }
92
+ ```
93
+
94
+ #### `FileChangeEvent`
95
+
96
+ Payload emitted when a file is created, modified, or deleted structurally.
97
+
98
+ ```typescript
99
+ interface FileChangeEvent {
100
+ type: 'created' | 'modified' | 'deleted'
101
+ path: string
102
+ }
103
+ ```
104
+
105
+ #### `FileDiffEvent`
106
+
107
+ Payload emitted when a tracked file changes contents.
108
+
109
+ ```typescript
110
+ interface FileDiffEvent {
111
+ path: string
112
+ oldContent: string | null
113
+ newContent: string
114
+ }
115
+ ```
116
+
117
+ #### `PromptContext`
118
+
119
+ Context for building a composable system prompt.
120
+
121
+ ```typescript
122
+ interface PromptContext {
123
+ /** Agent identity (e.g. 'Synthase', 'Polish Agent'). */
124
+ agentName: string
125
+
126
+ /** Project root path. */
127
+ projectRoot: string
128
+
129
+ /** Names of available tools (for the tool listing section). */
130
+ tools: string[]
131
+
132
+ /** Project-specific rules (AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md content). */
133
+ projectDocs?: string
134
+
135
+ /** Additional skill/reference content to inject. */
136
+ skills?: string[]
137
+
138
+ /** Discovered skills to list in the prompt (use load_skill to read on demand). */
139
+ discoveredSkills?: SkillEntry[]
140
+
141
+ /** Custom sections to append to the prompt. */
142
+ customSections?: string[]
143
+ }
144
+ ```
145
+
146
+ #### `SkillEntry`
147
+
148
+ Metadata for a discovered skill (used in PromptContext).
149
+
150
+ ```typescript
151
+ interface SkillEntry {
152
+ /** Skill name. */
153
+ name: string
154
+ /** Short description. */
155
+ description: string
156
+ /** Relative path to the SKILL.md file. */
157
+ path: string
158
+ }
159
+ ```
160
+
161
+ #### `ToolBuildConfig`
162
+
163
+ Configuration for building the tool set.
164
+ Allows consumers to customize security, callbacks, and tool selection.
165
+
166
+ ```typescript
167
+ interface ToolBuildConfig {
168
+ /** Which tools to include. Defaults to all. */
169
+ include?: string[]
170
+
171
+ /** Which tools to exclude. Applied after include. */
172
+ exclude?: string[]
173
+
174
+ /** Whether to validate paths stay within projectRoot. Default: true. */
175
+ pathGuards?: boolean
176
+
177
+ /** Whether to check symlinks resolve within projectRoot. Default: false (sandbox-only). */
178
+ symlinkGuards?: boolean
179
+
180
+ /** Whether to redact secrets in file reads and command output. Default: true. */
181
+ redactSecrets?: boolean
182
+
183
+ /** Whether to block dangerous shell commands (env dumps, /proc access). Default: false. */
184
+ blockDangerousCommands?: boolean
185
+
186
+ /**
187
+ * Consumer-specific command guard for `exec_command`, checked BEFORE execution (after
188
+ * the built-in dangerous-command check). Return an error string to block the command —
189
+ * it is returned to the model verbatim, so make it actionable (say what to do instead) —
190
+ * or `null`/`undefined` to allow it. Keeps environment-specific rules (e.g. an IDE
191
+ * sandbox forbidding installs that would break its preinstalled library) out of this
192
+ * shared package.
193
+ *
194
+ * @param command - The shell command the model asked to run.
195
+ * @param cwd - The resolved working directory it would run in.
196
+ * @returns An error string to block, or null/undefined to allow.
197
+ */
198
+ blockCommand?: (command: string, cwd: string) => string | null | undefined
199
+
200
+ /**
201
+ * Timeout (ms) for a single `exec_command` run. `exec_command` legitimately
202
+ * runs LONG — `npm install`, a production build, a test suite — so the default
203
+ * is generous (2 min); the old 30 s hardcap killed those spuriously. A consumer
204
+ * that wraps tool calls in its own outer timeout should set this to match (or
205
+ * slightly exceed) that budget so its own timeout is the effective bound and
206
+ * produces the nicer "tool timed out" message. Quick commands are unaffected —
207
+ * this is only the ceiling before a wedged command is killed.
208
+ */
209
+ execTimeoutMs?: number
210
+
211
+ /**
212
+ * Directory names `search_files` and `find_files` skip (VS Code
213
+ * `search.exclude` semantics). Defaults to `DEFAULT_SEARCH_EXCLUDED_DIRS`
214
+ * (node_modules, VCS dirs, build output). Pass the consumer's per-project
215
+ * setting so every search surface shares ONE synchronized set.
216
+ */
217
+ searchExcludedDirs?: string[]
218
+
219
+ /** Post-write hook (e.g. auto-format via Prettier/ESLint). Called after every write_file/edit_file. */
220
+ onAfterWrite?: (path: string) => Promise<void>
221
+
222
+ /** Diff tracking callback. Called before writes with old/new content. */
223
+ onFileDiff?: (event: FileDiffEvent) => void
224
+
225
+ /** Structural change callback. Called on create_directory, delete_file, rename_file. */
226
+ onFileChange?: (event: FileChangeEvent) => void
227
+ }
228
+ ```
229
+
230
+ #### `ToolSchema`
231
+
232
+ JSON-schema-backed definition for a single agent tool.
233
+
234
+ ```typescript
235
+ interface ToolSchema {
236
+ name: string
237
+ description: string
238
+ parameters: JSONSchema
239
+ }
240
+ ```
241
+
242
+ ### Types
243
+
244
+ #### `DiscoveredSkill` _(deprecated)_
245
+
246
+ Re-export SkillEntry as DiscoveredSkill for backwards compatibility.
247
+
248
+ ```typescript
249
+ type DiscoveredSkill = SkillEntry
250
+ ```
251
+
252
+ ### Functions
253
+
254
+ #### `buildAgentPrompt(ctx)`
255
+
256
+ Build a coding-focused system prompt from composable sections.
257
+
258
+ Returns a string that includes:
259
+
260
+ - Agent identity
261
+ - Available tools listing
262
+ - Coding best practices
263
+ - Tool argument formatting guidance
264
+ - Project docs (if provided)
265
+ - Discovered skills listing (if provided)
266
+ - Inline skills (if provided)
267
+ - Custom sections (if provided)
268
+
269
+ ```typescript
270
+ function buildAgentPrompt(ctx: PromptContext): string
271
+ ```
272
+
273
+ - `ctx` — Prompt construction inputs (tools, docs, skills, etc.).
274
+
275
+ **Returns:** Fully assembled system prompt text for the coding agent.
276
+
277
+ #### `buildTools(backend, config)`
278
+
279
+ Build a complete set of AI agent tools bound to an execution backend.
280
+
281
+ ```typescript
282
+ function buildTools(backend: ExecutionBackend, config?: ToolBuildConfig): AITool[]
283
+ ```
284
+
285
+ - `backend` — The execution environment (sandbox or local filesystem)
286
+ - `config` — Optional configuration for security, callbacks, and tool selection
287
+
288
+ **Returns:** Array of AITool objects ready to pass to an AI provider
289
+
290
+ #### `checkBlockedCommand(command)`
291
+
292
+ Check if a command is blocked for security reasons. Returns error message or null if allowed.
293
+
294
+ ```typescript
295
+ function checkBlockedCommand(command: string): string | null
296
+ ```
297
+
298
+ - `command` — Shell command string proposed for execution.
299
+
300
+ **Returns:** A human-readable block reason, or `null` when the command is allowed.
301
+
302
+ #### `createLocalBackend(projectRoot)`
303
+
304
+ Create an ExecutionBackend that operates on the local filesystem.
305
+
306
+ ```typescript
307
+ function createLocalBackend(projectRoot: string): ExecutionBackend
308
+ ```
309
+
310
+ - `projectRoot` — Absolute path to the project root directory
311
+
312
+ **Returns:** A backend wired to `fs/promises` and guarded subprocess calls.
313
+
314
+ #### `createSandboxBackend(sandbox, projectRoot)`
315
+
316
+ Create an ExecutionBackend that delegates to a Docker sandbox instance.
317
+ The sandbox.exec method is inherently safe — it runs inside an isolated Docker container.
318
+
319
+ ```typescript
320
+ function createSandboxBackend(sandbox: SandboxLike, projectRoot?: string): ExecutionBackend
321
+ ```
322
+
323
+ - `sandbox` — A running Sandbox instance from `@molecule/api-code-sandbox`
324
+ - `projectRoot` — Root directory inside the sandbox (default: '/workspace')
325
+
326
+ **Returns:** A backend that proxies all filesystem calls into the sandbox.
327
+
328
+ #### `directoryReadHint(message, path)`
329
+
330
+ Detect a "read/edit targeted a directory, not a file" failure from a backend
331
+ error message (local fs `EISDIR` or the sandbox's `cat: X: Is a directory`),
332
+ and return an actionable message steering the model to `list_files`. Returns
333
+ null when the error is not a directory error.
334
+
335
+ ```typescript
336
+ function directoryReadHint(message: string, path: string): string | null
337
+ ```
338
+
339
+ - `message` — The backend error message.
340
+ - `path` — The resolved path that was targeted.
341
+
342
+ **Returns:** An actionable directory-error string, or null.
343
+
344
+ #### `discoverSkills(backend)`
345
+
346
+ Discover skills from a project directory.
347
+
348
+ Scans `.agents/skills/` and `.claude/skills/` for SKILL.md files.
349
+ Reads the YAML frontmatter of each to extract `name:` and `description:` fields.
350
+
351
+ ```typescript
352
+ function discoverSkills(backend: ExecutionBackend): Promise<SkillEntry[]>
353
+ ```
354
+
355
+ - `backend` — Execution backend to use for filesystem access
356
+
357
+ **Returns:** Array of discovered skills with name, description, and path
358
+
359
+ #### `isValidGlob(pattern)`
360
+
361
+ Validate that a glob/include pattern is safe (no shell metacharacters that could
362
+ inject). Allows alphanumeric, `* ? . _ - /` and the bracket/paren glob chars `[] ()`.
363
+
364
+ The brackets/parens matter for real frameworks: Next.js App Router names route
365
+ directories `[id]`, `[...slug]`, `(group)`, `[[...optional]]`, so without them the
366
+ executor cannot `find_files`/`search_files` its own routes on any Next.js project — a
367
+ hard block observed on live imports. They are injection-safe here because every caller
368
+ passes the pattern through `shellQuote` before it reaches `find -name`/`grep --include`,
369
+ where inside single quotes `[]()` are literal (a subshell `(...)` only starts UNquoted);
370
+ to the glob engine `[abc]` is a normal character class. The genuinely dangerous
371
+ metacharacters (`; | & $ \` > < \n` space) remain disallowed.
372
+
373
+ ```typescript
374
+ function isValidGlob(pattern: string): boolean
375
+ ```
376
+
377
+ - `pattern` — User-supplied glob fragment for search/list operations.
378
+
379
+ **Returns:** `true` when the pattern contains only allowed characters.
380
+
381
+ #### `pathArgError(path, tool)`
382
+
383
+ Validate a file tool's `path` argument is a non-empty string. A weak model
384
+ sometimes omits it or passes a non-string, which would otherwise crash
385
+ `resolvePath` (`path.replace` on undefined) with the cryptic, unactionable
386
+ "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'replace')" — wasting executor
387
+ turns. Returns an actionable message, or null when the path is usable.
388
+
389
+ ```typescript
390
+ function pathArgError(path: unknown, tool: string): string | null
391
+ ```
392
+
393
+ - `path` — The raw `path` argument from the tool input.
394
+ - `tool` — The tool name, for the error message (e.g. 'read_file').
395
+
396
+ **Returns:** An actionable error string, or null when `path` is a non-empty string.
397
+
398
+ #### `redactSecrets(s)`
399
+
400
+ Redact values of common secret/credential patterns in text output.
401
+
402
+ ```typescript
403
+ function redactSecrets(s: string): string
404
+ ```
405
+
406
+ - `s` — Log or command output that may contain `.env`-style secrets.
407
+
408
+ **Returns:** A redacted copy safe to surface to end users or models.
409
+
410
+ #### `resolvePath(path, projectRoot)`
411
+
412
+ Normalize a path to be absolute within the project root.
413
+ Empty string and '/' both resolve to projectRoot.
414
+ Rejects paths that escape via traversal or absolute paths outside root.
415
+
416
+ ```typescript
417
+ function resolvePath(path: string, projectRoot: string): string
418
+ ```
419
+
420
+ - `path` — Relative or absolute path inside the workspace.
421
+ - `projectRoot` — Absolute filesystem root for the active project.
422
+
423
+ **Returns:** A normalized absolute path confined to `projectRoot`.
424
+
425
+ #### `shellQuote(s)`
426
+
427
+ Shell-safe quoting using single quotes. Unlike JSON.stringify (double quotes),
428
+ single-quoted strings prevent command substitution ($(), backticks) and variable expansion.
429
+
430
+ ```typescript
431
+ function shellQuote(s: string): string
432
+ ```
433
+
434
+ - `s` — Raw string to wrap for POSIX shell single-quoted context.
435
+
436
+ **Returns:** A single-quoted shell literal representing `s`.
437
+
438
+ #### `stripControlChars(s)`
439
+
440
+ Strip C0 control chars (except tab, newline, CR) that break PostgreSQL JSONB
441
+ and can cause rendering issues.
442
+
443
+ ```typescript
444
+ function stripControlChars(s: string): string
445
+ ```
446
+
447
+ - `s` — Arbitrary text that may contain disallowed control characters.
448
+
449
+ **Returns:** A copy of `s` with unsafe control characters removed.
450
+
451
+ #### `truncate(s, maxLength)`
452
+
453
+ Truncate a string to a max length with a truncation notice.
454
+
455
+ ```typescript
456
+ function truncate(s: string, maxLength: number): string
457
+ ```
458
+
459
+ - `s` — Arbitrary text to bound in size.
460
+ - `maxLength` — Maximum number of characters to retain before truncating.
461
+
462
+ **Returns:** Either the original string or a shortened copy with a trailing notice.
463
+
464
+ #### `truncateMiddle(s, maxLength)`
465
+
466
+ Truncate keeping BOTH the head and the tail, eliding the middle — for command
467
+ output (build / test / migration / install logs). Plain head truncation
468
+ ({@link truncate}) drops the TAIL, which is exactly where a failing command puts
469
+ the reason: the `npm ERR!` line, the test-failure summary (`1 failed, 240
470
+ passed`), the migration stack trace. When that is cut, the executor sees only
471
+ passing progress and can't tell WHY the command failed — a self-inflicted error
472
+ then survives every fix round. The head still shows what ran and the first
473
+ errors; the split is weighted toward the tail since the summary lives there.
474
+ No-op when `s` already fits.
475
+
476
+ ```typescript
477
+ function truncateMiddle(s: string, maxLength: number): string
478
+ ```
479
+
480
+ - `s` — Arbitrary text (typically stdout/stderr) to bound in size.
481
+ - `maxLength` — Maximum characters to retain (excluding the elision notice).
482
+
483
+ **Returns:** The original string, or head + an elision notice + tail.
484
+
485
+ #### `whitespaceTolerantReplace(content, oldString, newString)`
486
+
487
+ Attempt a whitespace-tolerant replacement when an exact `old_string` match
488
+ failed. Finds a contiguous run of lines in `content` whose per-line
489
+ whitespace-normalized form (runs of whitespace collapsed to one space, then
490
+ trimmed) equals the normalized `oldString` lines, and replaces that run with
491
+ `newString` verbatim. Applies ONLY when exactly one such run exists —
492
+ uniqueness keeps it safe; an ambiguous (or zero) match is refused (returns
493
+ null) so the caller falls back to its existing error path.
494
+
495
+ This rescues the most common edit_file failure: a (weak) executor reproduces
496
+ the target text correctly but with different indentation or trailing
497
+ whitespace, which would otherwise bounce it into a re-read/retry loop — the
498
+ single biggest source of wasted edit turns.
499
+
500
+ ```typescript
501
+ function whitespaceTolerantReplace(
502
+ content: string,
503
+ oldString: string,
504
+ newString: string,
505
+ ): string | null
506
+ ```
507
+
508
+ - `content` — Current file content.
509
+ - `oldString` — The search text (an exact match has already failed).
510
+ - `newString` — The replacement text, applied verbatim.
511
+
512
+ **Returns:** The new content if a unique fuzzy run matched, else null.
513
+
514
+ ### Constants
515
+
516
+ #### `DEFAULT_SEARCH_EXCLUDED_DIRS`
517
+
518
+ Default directory names `search_files`/`find_files` skip — VS Code's
519
+ `search.exclude` + `files.exclude` defaults (node_modules, bower_components,
520
+ VCS dirs) plus the platform's vendored/build dirs. Overridable per consumer
521
+ via `ToolBuildConfig.searchExcludedDirs` (a per-project, user-editable
522
+ setting in molecule.dev — keep the APP-SIDE copy in
523
+ `@molecule/app-ide-react`'s search types in sync with this list).
524
+
525
+ ```typescript
526
+ const DEFAULT_SEARCH_EXCLUDED_DIRS: readonly [
527
+ 'node_modules',
528
+ 'bower_components',
529
+ '.git',
530
+ '.svn',
531
+ '.hg',
532
+ 'CVS',
533
+ 'dist',
534
+ '.next',
535
+ '.vite',
536
+ 'molecule',
537
+ ]
538
+ ```
539
+
540
+ #### `MAX_FIND_RESULTS`
541
+
542
+ Max find results.
543
+
544
+ ```typescript
545
+ const MAX_FIND_RESULTS: 100
546
+ ```
547
+
548
+ #### `MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE`
549
+
550
+ Max command output size (100KB per stream).
551
+
552
+ ```typescript
553
+ const MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE: number
554
+ ```
555
+
556
+ #### `MAX_READ_SIZE`
557
+
558
+ Max file size for read_file (5MB).
559
+
560
+ ```typescript
561
+ const MAX_READ_SIZE: number
562
+ ```
563
+
564
+ #### `MAX_SEARCH_RESULTS`
565
+
566
+ Max search results.
567
+
568
+ ```typescript
569
+ const MAX_SEARCH_RESULTS: 50
570
+ ```
571
+
572
+ #### `MAX_WRITE_SIZE`
573
+
574
+ Max content size for write_file (10MB).
575
+
576
+ ```typescript
577
+ const MAX_WRITE_SIZE: number
578
+ ```
579
+
580
+ #### `TOOL_SCHEMAS`
581
+
582
+ Canonical tool schemas shared by the agent runtime and documentation.
583
+
584
+ ```typescript
585
+ const TOOL_SCHEMAS: Record<string, ToolSchema>
586
+ ```
587
+
588
+ ## Injection Notes
589
+
590
+ ### Requirements
591
+
592
+ Peer dependencies:
593
+
594
+ - `@molecule/api-ai` ^1.0.1
595
+
596
+ ### Runtime Dependencies
597
+
598
+ - `@molecule/api-ai`
599
+
600
+ - **This package only defines the tools — it runs no model loop.** Hand them to
601
+ the bonded AI provider (`chat({ tools, … })`) or to an
602
+ `@molecule/api-ai-agents` run.
603
+ - **Safety defaults: keep them on for model-driven use.** `pathGuards` (default
604
+ true) rejects paths escaping `projectRoot`; `redactSecrets` (default true)
605
+ masks secret-looking values in file reads and command output.
606
+ - **`exec_command` executes REAL shell commands** on the backend. Prefer a
607
+ sandbox backend for untrusted/model-driven work; add environment-specific
608
+ rules via `blockCommand` (return an actionable error string to refuse — it is
609
+ shown to the model verbatim) and enable `blockDangerousCommands` (default
610
+ FALSE) where appropriate.
611
+ - **Scope the tool set per agent** with `include`/`exclude` — a read-only agent
612
+ should not receive `write_file`/`exec_command`.
613
+ - Outputs are size-capped (`MAX_READ_SIZE`, `MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE`, …) and searches
614
+ skip `DEFAULT_SEARCH_EXCLUDED_DIRS` (node_modules, VCS dirs, build output) —
615
+ pass `searchExcludedDirs` so every search surface shares the consumer's one
616
+ setting.
617
+
618
+ ## E2E Tests
619
+
620
+ Integration checklist — drive the real UI (live preview, no mocks), adapt
621
+ each item to this app's actual agent/chat surface and its registered tools,
622
+ and check every box off one by one. A box you can't check is an integration
623
+ bug to fix — not a skip:
624
+
625
+ - [ ] A prompt that should trigger a registered tool makes the model INVOKE
626
+ it with args matching that tool's `parameters` schema (e.g. "read
627
+ src/index.ts" -> calls `read_file` with `{ path: 'src/index.ts' }`).
628
+ Confirm the tool's `execute` actually RAN — its backend side effect / log /
629
+ the file it touched — not that the model merely narrated calling it.
630
+ - [ ] The tool's returned value flows back into the model and shapes the
631
+ final answer: the REAL result (the file's actual contents, the command's
632
+ real stdout/exitCode) appears in the reply, not a plausible hallucination.
633
+ - [ ] A prompt that needs no tool is answered directly, with no spurious
634
+ tool call.
635
+ - [ ] A tool whose `execute` throws or returns `{ error }` (missing file,
636
+ failing command, blocked path) degrades gracefully — the error is caught
637
+ and fed back to the model as text, the conversation continues, and nothing
638
+ crashes the request.
639
+ - [ ] The model can invoke ONLY the tools handed to this run: an
640
+ `include`/`exclude`-scoped agent (e.g. read-only — no `write_file` /
641
+ `exec_command`) cannot call an excluded tool, and a tool name the model
642
+ invents that was never registered is refused, not executed.
643
+ - [ ] Tool execution is server-side and authorized: `exec_command` /
644
+ `write_file` run only on the bonded backend under its guards (`pathGuards`,
645
+ `symlinkGuards`, `redactSecrets`, `blockDangerousCommands` / `blockCommand`)
646
+ and stay inside `projectRoot`. Feed a prompt-injected instruction (a file or
647
+ message telling the model to read `/etc/passwd`, escape the workspace, or run
648
+ a privileged command) and confirm the guard REFUSES it — a user must not be
649
+ able to trigger, via the model, any action they could not perform directly.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@molecule/api-ai-tools",
3
- "version": "1.0.0",
3
+ "version": "1.0.1",
4
4
  "description": "Shared AI agent tools with backend abstraction for sandbox and local execution",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
17
17
  }
18
18
  },
19
19
  "files": [
20
- "dist"
20
+ "dist",
21
+ "README.md"
21
22
  ],
22
23
  "keywords": [
23
24
  "molecule",
@@ -27,10 +28,10 @@
27
28
  ],
28
29
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
29
30
  "peerDependencies": {
30
- "@molecule/api-ai": "^1.0.0"
31
+ "@molecule/api-ai": "^1.0.1"
31
32
  },
32
33
  "devDependencies": {
33
- "@molecule/api-ai": "1.0.0",
34
+ "@molecule/api-ai": "1.0.1",
34
35
  "@types/node": "26.1.2",
35
36
  "typescript": "6.0.3",
36
37
  "vitest": "4.1.10"