@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.6 → 0.2.7
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +28 -10
- package/README.zh-CN.md +24 -10
- package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +6 -0
- package/adapters/mcp/__init__.py +1 -0
- package/adapters/mcp/operations.py +174 -0
- package/adapters/mcp/requirements.txt +3 -0
- package/adapters/mcp/server.py +126 -0
- package/core/admission.py +388 -0
- package/core/audit.py +1 -1
- package/core/classifier.py +2 -1
- package/core/cleanup.py +297 -0
- package/core/delete_config.py +153 -0
- package/core/policy.py +35 -7
- package/core/recovery.py +10 -0
- package/docs/README.md +14 -9
- package/docs/design/architecture.md +12 -5
- package/docs/design/compatibility.md +181 -7
- package/docs/design/threat-model.md +53 -1
- package/docs/guides/cleanup-plan.md +227 -0
- package/docs/guides/deletion-limits.md +150 -0
- package/docs/guides/getting-started.md +25 -12
- package/docs/guides/harness-capabilities.md +19 -4
- package/docs/guides/mcp.md +293 -0
- package/docs/history/friction.md +99 -1
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.7.md +217 -0
- package/docs/releases/unreleased.md +139 -5
- package/docs/reports/test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md +1 -1
- package/docs/reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +3 -1
- package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +69 -1
- package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +66 -3
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +39 -9
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/cleanup.py +164 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py +22 -4
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +77 -1
package/docs/history/friction.md
CHANGED
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ F21–F23 changes subsequently shipped in 0.2.3; F24–F25 shipped in 0.2.4.
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F26–F31 subsequently shipped in 0.2.5-rc1. RC2 adds shared audit metadata and
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observer startup maintenance; publication is checked by its versioned receipts.
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Current scope is in the
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-
[
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[0.2.7 notes](../releases/release-notes-0.2.7.md); historical failures and
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test counts below are not rewritten by a later success.
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## Current feedback maintenance · status, explanations and retained storage
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@@ -567,3 +567,101 @@ Exact CLI/recovery paths and error diagnostics remain available, with the
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same mutation-intent durability and assessment/outcome failure behavior.
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Historical records, automatic session identity and other audit/output
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writers remain outside this change.
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<a id="f32-deletion-admission"></a>
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## F32 · Repeated admitted deletions could keep growing recovery storage
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The existing recovery path preserved valuable content but had no persistent
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session byte/entry budget, rolling operation rate or same-target-set limit.
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A caller could repeatedly delete/recreate content or launch fresh CLI
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processes while adding more recovery copies. The soft 30-day/5-GiB GC plan
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did not bound new admission and never purged automatically.
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**0.2.7 change:** covered relocations, Git-clean compensation and
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force-restore occupant preservation now check quarantine admission capacity.
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Regenerable direct deletion also consumes applicable session/rate/repeat
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budgets. Accounting is persisted before the guarded operation under a
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cross-process lock; admitted failures and subsequent restores do not refund
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it. Unnamed CLI processes share a stable bucket instead of receiving a fresh
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budget on every invocation.
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Defaults are 5 GiB/100000 quarantine entries, 1 GiB/10000 admitted session
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entries, 60 operations per 60 seconds and five admissions of the same
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normalized target set per window. `BLOCK_DELETE_LIMIT`, `BLOCK_DELETE_RATE`
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and `BLOCK_DELETE_REPEAT` are upgrade-visible refusals. Inspect `status` and
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the caller; rate/repeat windows can expire, while cumulative budgets require
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explicit operator review and interactive `RESET` or a deliberate policy
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adjustment. Do not switch session identity or remove state to bypass them.
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Capacity pressure never triggers automatic GC or a fallback to permanent
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deletion. Normal restore, explicit transaction GC and unprotected quarantine
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payload housekeeping remain available without a new deletion debit. Existing
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compound ASK and Git snapshots remain outside these counters. Logical
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accounting and same-UID state are accident suppression, not an OS disk quota
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or a complete anomaly detector. See [deletion limits](../guides/deletion-limits.md)
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for metadata/hardlink accounting and fixed inventory bounds.
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<a id="f33-batch-confirmation"></a>
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## F33 · Large automated deletion batches had no separate review gate
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A supported automated command could compensate many concrete targets under
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the existing deletion policy without an additional batch-size review. Looking
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at each segment separately also let one shell request contain several
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individually small deletions whose combined target set was large.
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**0.2.7 change:** the enforced checker combines covered rm/artifact
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and enumerated Git-clean targets before its first compensation. Operations
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above 256 MiB or 1000 filesystem entries return
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`BLOCK_DELETE_BATCH_CONFIRM`, directing the operator to the reviewed Cleanup
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plan. The default plan only proposes candidates; execution requires exact
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selection and terminal `EXECUTE`, followed by rescan and per-target
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safe_delete calls.
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Cleanup creates a ten-minute approval bound to the session, effective
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configuration, exact paths and measured metadata. Each path is consumed once;
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stale, changed, expired or replayed approval is refused. This lifts only the
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batch gate, not protection, session/rate/repeat or quarantine capacity.
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There is no new native host ASK/resume protocol; existing compound ASK and
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Git SNAPSHOT behavior remains separate. The optional MCP adapter does not
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expose approval creation or provide a `confirm=true` shortcut. See the
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[Cleanup workflow](../guides/cleanup-plan.md).
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<a id="f34-deletion-protection"></a>
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## F34 · Configured evidence and admission controls needed shared protection
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Existing hard-coded workspace/Git/recovery boundaries did not express
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additional project evidence roots or a shared protected-path list. Artifact
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classification and housekeeping could not rely on such a declaration, and
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new budget/configuration state needed protection from covered deletion.
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**0.2.7 change:** the optional workspace
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`.agent-guard/delete-policy.json` supplies literal protected paths and limits.
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Protection covers lexical/physical locations, descendants and ancestor
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deletion, before artifact or payload-housekeeping exemptions. The configuration
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directory, `admission.json`, temporary state and `admission.lock` are protected.
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Missing configuration uses documented defaults without creating the file;
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malformed, unreadable or unsupported configuration returns
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`BLOCK_DELETE_CONFIG_INVALID`. Overlap returns `BLOCK_DELETE_PROTECTED`;
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unusable admission inventory, lock or state returns
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`BLOCK_DELETE_STATE_INVALID` instead of silently disabling admission.
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Fix the reported configuration/storage issue or preserve the protected
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evidence; do not remove controls to make deletion proceed. This is cooperative
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path protection, not legal hold, minimum directory retention or immutable
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storage. Same-UID processes and unobserved writes/deletion channels remain
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outside its authority. Existing recovery format and explicit GC semantics
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are retained.
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The maintainer selected version 0.2.7 for these F32–F34
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changes as a bounded maintenance-version exception, recorded in
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[compatibility](../design/compatibility.md#027-candidate-bounded-maintainer-selected-exception).
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This does not relax the general minor-release promise for other patches.
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The pre-alignment 1090/1123-case runs and sampled Kimi results keep their
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original scope. At the 2026-10-29 versioned preparation checkpoint, 1129
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Python cases and both Node groups passed in 1194.265 seconds, and the
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155-file offline package passed installed MCP checks. That local checkpoint
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did not include remote CI or publication, and made no new real-model requests.
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See the [versioned validation record](../releases/release-notes-0.2.7.md#validation-status).
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# 0.2.7 — Cleanup, deletion limits and local MCP
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Version 0.2.7 adds Cleanup plans, shared deletion admission and optional local
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MCP tools to [0.2.6](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.6.md).
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Use the exact [GitHub release](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/releases/tag/0.2.7)
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and [npm version](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/v/0.2.7)
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to verify availability before installing; a manifest, checkout or local
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tarball alone does not establish publication. This version leaves the
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existing `rc` and `hotfix` channels unchanged. The separate 0.3.0 plan remains
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paused. Local preparation evidence below is dated 2026-10-29.
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本版收录 Cleanup Copilot、删除准入加固和可选本地 MCP 工具。新增预算与保护
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可能拒绝此前可执行的删除。安装前请确认精确版本的发行与包页面可用;下方
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版本化测试、打包与发布门记录单独保留,不能沿用旧 0.2.6 元数据工件的结论。
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<a id="candidate-scope"></a>
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## Version scope
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### Cleanup Copilot
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`agent-guard-cleanup` proposes workspace candidates with logical sizes,
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reasons and projected effects in four categories: regenerable, explicitly
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caller-declared discarded, uncertain and protected. Age, ignore status or
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being untracked alone does not make a file disposable.
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Default planning writes no workspace files, guard metadata or audit records.
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Execution requires an unchanged reviewed plan, explicit selection and terminal
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`EXECUTE` confirmation, then delegates to the existing safe_delete path.
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Valuable files retain recovery copies and disk use; only provably regenerable
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artifacts follow the existing physical-delete rules. See
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[the workflow and limits](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/guides/cleanup-plan.md).
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### Shared deletion admission
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Optional `.agent-guard/delete-policy.json` supplies protected paths and limits.
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Missing configuration uses defaults; malformed configuration or unusable
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admission state refuses covered execution instead of silently disabling it.
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The configuration directory and admission control files are protected.
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| Default | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Quarantine admission ceiling | 5 GiB / 100000 entries |
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| Cumulative session budget | 1 GiB / 10000 entries |
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| Rolling rate | 60 admissions per 60 seconds |
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| Repeated normalized target set | 5 admissions per window |
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| Batch review threshold | Above 256 MiB or 1000 entries |
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Measurement, durable debit and guarded mutation share a cross-process lock.
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Unnamed CLI processes use a stable shared budget; failures and later restores
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do not refund admitted bytes/entries. Rate windows expire, while cumulative
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budgets require explicit operator action. A repeated-target-set stop is a
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simple loop signal, not a general anomaly detector.
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Large covered automated deletions return `BLOCK_DELETE_BATCH_CONFIRM` with
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Cleanup guidance. The shell checker combines supported rm/artifact/Git-clean
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targets across a request before its first compensation. Cleanup confirmation
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creates a ten-minute session/configuration/path/metadata-bound approval,
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consumed once per selected path; it lifts only the batch gate, not protection,
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capacity, budget or rate limits.
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The additive refusal codes are:
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_CONFIG_INVALID`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_PROTECTED`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_LIMIT`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_RATE`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_REPEAT`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_BATCH_CONFIRM`
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- `BLOCK_DELETE_STATE_INVALID`
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Existing Decision classes, check.py exit roles and recovery-manifest formats
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retain their contracts. No data/configuration migration or automatic GC is
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introduced. See [defaults, accounting and operator recovery](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/guides/deletion-limits.md)
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and the [compatibility contract](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/design/compatibility.md) for the bounded
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maintainer decision to select 0.2.7 for these additions.
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### Optional local MCP tools
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`agent-guard-mcp` exposes safe_delete, ordinary restore, transactions, status
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and GC-plan preview over local stdio. Workspace, local quarantine and stable
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session identity are fixed at trusted startup. Tools cannot supply a new
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workspace/session/environment, force restore, GC execution, budget reset or
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Cleanup approval. Quarantine targets are refused by MCP safe_delete to avoid
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a permanent-GC shortcut.
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The official MIT-licensed `mcp==2.3.0` SDK is installed separately in an
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optional Python 3.10+ environment. Core/CLI still requires Python 3.9+ and Git
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without third-party Python packages; npm does not install the SDK. No server
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network listener is provided. Follow the [MCP setup guide](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/guides/mcp.md).
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MCP is an explicit cooperative tool interface. It does not intercept shell,
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script or editor operations that bypass it. Startup session selection chooses
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the existing CLI authorization mode as well as budget. It does not inherit
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native host restrictions or an in-memory veto without trusted bridging.
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## Upgrade and operator notes
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- Covered automated filesystem compensation, regenerable direct deletion,
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Git-clean compensation and force-restore occupant preservation can newly
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refuse work when limits are reached. An earlier advisory assessment is not
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a capacity grant. A later refusal can follow completed earlier operations;
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inspect returned transaction IDs and the filesystem.
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- Normal restore remains available without a fresh deletion debit. Explicit
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transaction GC and existing unprotected quarantine housekeeping retain
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their exemptions; configuration/control-path protection still precedes
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housekeeping. The existing GC CLI's `--execute` does not require a TTY;
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MCP's preview-only scope does not change that separate interface.
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- Existing compound-command ASK and Git reset/restore/checkout SNAPSHOT paths
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are outside these new admission counters. Git stash storage can still grow.
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Do not describe this release as a limit on every destructive operation.
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- `status.py --reset-delete-budget` requires an interactive terminal and
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`RESET`, after investigation. It resets only the selected bucket and its
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approvals, without deleting recovery copies or altering capacity/limits.
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Agents must not change identity, remove state or manufacture confirmation
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to bypass a refusal.
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- Accounting uses bounded logical lstat inventory, including directory and
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symlink metadata and conservative per-entry hardlink counts. It is not an
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OS disk quota. Audit/manifest metadata and unrelated writers can still grow
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storage; scan/state bounds may refuse before a larger configured limit.
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- Package/Core changes affect doctor fingerprints. An old baseline may become
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`DRIFTED`; it is not silently replaced, and a new local baseline does not
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prove native-hook interception or model receipt of feedback.
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Existing installations require an explicit upgrade to acquire these additions.
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Installing a separate copy does not upgrade another existing installation;
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host configuration and hook activation remain separate steps.
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Same-UID, concurrency and uncovered-tool
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limitations remain in the [threat model](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/0.2.7/docs/design/threat-model.md).
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<a id="evaluate-the-unpublished-candidate"></a>
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## Install or evaluate version 0.2.7
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After confirming that the exact version is available on both publication
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pages above, install it into a chosen, stable prefix:
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```sh
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npm install --prefix /absolute/path/to/agent-guard-install @mokuyoaxis/agent-guard@0.2.7
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```
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For source review or before publication is available, use a reviewed checkout
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or a tarball produced and checked from that exact source. An already-built
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local tarball can be installed into a disposable prefix:
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
```sh
|
|
147
|
+
npm install --offline --ignore-scripts --legacy-peer-deps --no-audit --no-fund \
|
|
148
|
+
--prefix /absolute/path/to/agent-guard-review \
|
|
149
|
+
/absolute/path/to/mokuyoaxis-agent-guard-0.2.7.tgz
|
|
150
|
+
```
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
152
|
+
The optional MCP SDK remains a separate installation. Compare the selected
|
|
153
|
+
package with the release artifact checksum; local packaging and the version
|
|
154
|
+
string alone do not establish registry availability.
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
## Validation status
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
**Local 0.2.7-versioned validation passed on 2026-10-29.** The explicit
|
|
159
|
+
219-file public candidate excluded private experiments. All 1129 Python cases
|
|
160
|
+
and both Node groups passed in 1194.265 seconds, with no failures, errors,
|
|
161
|
+
skips, timeouts or automatic retries. The existing diagnostic collector kept
|
|
162
|
+
`npm test`'s scope and original deadlines; npm itself was not invoked.
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
The 155-file 0.2.7 package passed offline installation, all 12 CLI entry-point
|
|
165
|
+
checks and actual installed stdio deletion, restoration, persistent-budget,
|
|
166
|
+
protection and batch-gate checks. MCP `serverInfo.version` matched package
|
|
167
|
+
version `0.2.7`; read-only tools left the workspace unchanged and forbidden
|
|
168
|
+
override/force/reset/GC-execute arguments were refused. A separate final
|
|
169
|
+
package consistency check verifies documentation-only updates against the
|
|
170
|
+
tested runtime and the final source.
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
Six release-gate tests executed the workflow's actual SDK preflight body:
|
|
173
|
+
missing/wrong/broken SDK and disabled/skipped/empty protocol suites were
|
|
174
|
+
refused. The same body also passed against the existing isolated SDK. The tag
|
|
175
|
+
workflow now installs that pinned SDK and requires enabled protocol coverage
|
|
176
|
+
before its unchanged `npm test` step. These are the **2026-10-29 local
|
|
177
|
+
preparation results**: they did not include final-commit remote CI or
|
|
178
|
+
publication checks and made no new real-model requests. Published artifact
|
|
179
|
+
and workflow results must be checked through the exact version links above.
|
|
180
|
+
|
|
181
|
+
Earlier local source evidence is retained with its original checkpoint:
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
| Checkpoint | Observed result |
|
|
184
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
185
|
+
| Cleanup-only | 1012 Python cases and both Node groups passed continuously in 979.997 seconds; 37 Cleanup/9 manifest checks and a 146-file offline package also passed |
|
|
186
|
+
| Deletion hardening | Three independent runs each passed 1090 Python cases and both Node groups in 1061.017 / 1025.315 / 1042.145 seconds; a 149-file offline package and three real Kimi root-Bash scenarios passed |
|
|
187
|
+
| MCP source, first full run | 1123 Python cases, one observer READY-startup error, no skips; 1156.312 seconds; Node did not start |
|
|
188
|
+
| Same MCP source, second full run | 1123 Python cases and both Node groups passed in 1143.435 seconds, without failures, errors, skips, timeouts or automatic retries |
|
|
189
|
+
| MCP source packaging | 154 files / 12 CLI checks, local offline installation and actual installed stdio deletion/recovery/budget/protection checks passed |
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
These source/package checks used 0.2.6 package metadata before selecting
|
|
192
|
+
version 0.2.7. They are not acceptance of a renamed 0.2.7 tarball. The first MCP
|
|
193
|
+
run's observer error remains unresolved; the unchanged case passed separate
|
|
194
|
+
SDK/system-Python checks in 4.409 / 2.979 seconds. The successful second run
|
|
195
|
+
does not establish a general timeout fix. Both full runs used the existing
|
|
196
|
+
diagnostic result collector with npm test's scope and original deadlines,
|
|
197
|
+
without invoking npm itself.
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
At the earlier 0.2.6-metadata MCP checkpoint, three real Kimi Code 2.3.0
|
|
200
|
+
root-agent native MCP trials passed: normal
|
|
201
|
+
deletion/model-driven restore (27.288 seconds), same-session budget refusal
|
|
202
|
+
and model-driven restore (26.121 seconds), and configured protection
|
|
203
|
+
(16.814 seconds). All 19 configured-route requests returned HTTP 200;
|
|
204
|
+
16 model-generated MCP calls matched native stdio requests, without Bash,
|
|
205
|
+
fixed replies, automatic trial retries or route changes. Restored bytes and
|
|
206
|
+
user configuration/auth fingerprints matched; restored budget remained
|
|
207
|
+
charged. The existing loopback gateway's server-side model identity was not
|
|
208
|
+
independently authenticated.
|
|
209
|
+
|
|
210
|
+
Local evidence is ARM64/PRoot POSIX, Python 3.13.5 and Node 22.23.4.
|
|
211
|
+
Without the optional SDK, seven real-stdio protocol cases skip; the local
|
|
212
|
+
0.2.7 full run included that SDK, and the release gate refuses skipped
|
|
213
|
+
protocol coverage. New SDK-backed CI declarations are not
|
|
214
|
+
remote-CI results. Protocol evidence exercised the classic 2025-06-18
|
|
215
|
+
handshake, not every extension/client version. Claude/Cursor/Codex examples
|
|
216
|
+
are documentation guidance; no new live-client, subagent, native Windows,
|
|
217
|
+
macOS or shared-Android-storage acceptance is claimed.
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,136 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
#
|
|
1
|
+
# 0.2.7 changes and 0.2.6 maintenance history
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
<a id="unreleased-changes-and-026-maintenance-history"></a>
|
|
4
|
+
<a id="027-candidate-changes-and-026-maintenance-history"></a>
|
|
5
|
+
|
|
6
|
+
The maintainer selected **0.2.7** for Cleanup Copilot, deletion admission and
|
|
7
|
+
optional local MCP tools. Check its exact GitHub release and npm version
|
|
8
|
+
through the [version notes](release-notes-0.2.7.md) before installing; a source
|
|
9
|
+
version alone does not establish publication. This path is retained for
|
|
10
|
+
existing links. At the **2026-10-29 local preparation checkpoint**, versioned
|
|
11
|
+
validation passed:
|
|
12
|
+
1129 Python cases and both Node groups in 1194.265 seconds, with no failures,
|
|
13
|
+
errors, skips, timeouts or automatic retries, plus a 155-file offline package
|
|
14
|
+
and installed MCP identity/operation checks. The diagnostic collector kept
|
|
15
|
+
`npm test` scope/deadlines without invoking npm. Release SDK-gate fault checks
|
|
16
|
+
also passed; that checkpoint did not include final-commit remote CI or
|
|
17
|
+
publication. These results are separate from the historical checkpoints below; this preparation
|
|
18
|
+
made no new real-model requests. See
|
|
19
|
+
[version scope, upgrade effects and validation](release-notes-0.2.7.md).
|
|
20
|
+
The separate 0.3.0 plan remains paused.
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
<a id="local-mcp-tools-unreleased"></a>
|
|
23
|
+
<a id="local-mcp-tools-027-candidate"></a>
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
## Local MCP tools (0.2.7)
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
The checkout adds an optional local stdio server for explicit safe_delete,
|
|
28
|
+
ordinary restore, transaction/status queries and GC-plan preview. Workspace
|
|
29
|
+
and stable session identity are set at startup; tools cannot override them,
|
|
30
|
+
the environment or quarantine. Operations use the existing CLI without a
|
|
31
|
+
shell and retain deletion protection, budget, audit and recovery semantics.
|
|
32
|
+
Session selection chooses saved CLI authorization mode as well as budget;
|
|
33
|
+
without it, legacy CLI state and the shared default bucket apply. Reusing
|
|
34
|
+
state requires matching workspace/quarantine/session. Native host-session
|
|
35
|
+
restrictions or in-memory veto require trusted bridging and are not inherited
|
|
36
|
+
merely by registering this server.
|
|
37
|
+
No force restore, GC execution, budget reset or Cleanup approval is exposed;
|
|
38
|
+
safe-delete quarantine targets are also refused. The existing GC CLI remains
|
|
39
|
+
separate; preview-only MCP does not add a terminal requirement to that CLI.
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
The official MIT-licensed `mcp==2.3.0` SDK is an optional separate-environment
|
|
42
|
+
dependency, not a new Core/CLI requirement or automatic npm installation.
|
|
43
|
+
MCP tools do not replace native hooks or cover shell/script/editor actions
|
|
44
|
+
that bypass them. For the 2026-10-28 frozen candidate, the first full local
|
|
45
|
+
run finished 1123 Python cases with one observer READY-startup error in
|
|
46
|
+
1156.312 seconds; Node did not run. The original error remains unresolved.
|
|
47
|
+
The same case passed separate SDK/system-Python checks, and a second complete
|
|
48
|
+
run passed all 1123 Python cases and both Node groups in 1143.435 seconds,
|
|
49
|
+
without failures, errors, skips, timeouts, runtime changes or automatic retries.
|
|
50
|
+
The diagnostic collector preserved `npm test` scope/deadlines; npm itself was
|
|
51
|
+
not invoked. Default Core testing without the optional SDK skips seven
|
|
52
|
+
protocol cases; the two recorded full runs included it. An independent
|
|
53
|
+
SDK CI job is configured; the local preparation checkpoint included no
|
|
54
|
+
remote execution of that job.
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
The 154-file offline install/12 CLI checks and three real Kimi 2.3.0 native-MCP
|
|
57
|
+
trials passed: ordinary delete/restore, same-session budget and configured
|
|
58
|
+
protection. The model made 16 MCP calls across 19 real configured-route HTTP
|
|
59
|
+
200 requests, without Bash, fixed replies or route changes. Its gateway's
|
|
60
|
+
server-side model identity was not independently verified. Local evidence
|
|
61
|
+
covers ARM64/PRoot Python 3.13.5; there are no new Windows/macOS/shared-storage
|
|
62
|
+
or live Claude/Cursor/Codex tests. Their setup examples remain documentation
|
|
63
|
+
guidance. See [installation, failure history and limits](../guides/mcp.md).
|
|
64
|
+
Published 0.2.6 and its old evidence remain unchanged; 0.3.0 is still paused.
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
<a id="deletion-admission-hardening-unreleased"></a>
|
|
67
|
+
<a id="deletion-admission-hardening-027-candidate"></a>
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
## Deletion admission hardening (0.2.7)
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
The current checkout adds quarantine capacity admission, persistent session
|
|
72
|
+
byte/entry budgets, short-window rate and repeated-target-set limits, and
|
|
73
|
+
shared protected paths in optional `.agent-guard/delete-policy.json`.
|
|
74
|
+
Cross-process locking covers measurement, durable admission debit and the
|
|
75
|
+
guarded mutation. Failures and restores do not refund session budget; unnamed
|
|
76
|
+
CLI processes share a default bucket. Configuration/state failures block new
|
|
77
|
+
admission instead of silently disabling limits.
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
Large batches require Cleanup's existing terminal review, followed by a
|
|
80
|
+
ten-minute approval bound to paths, metadata, configuration and session and
|
|
81
|
+
consumed once per selected path. Covered automated large-delete checks BLOCK with
|
|
82
|
+
Cleanup guidance; no new host approval/resume protocol is added. Approval
|
|
83
|
+
does not bypass capacity, budgets or protection. Status adds explicit
|
|
84
|
+
terminal-confirmed reset of the current budget only.
|
|
85
|
+
Existing compound-command ASK and Git snapshots remain outside the new
|
|
86
|
+
budget; normal restore, explicit GC and unprotected quarantine housekeeping
|
|
87
|
+
remain exempt. Configuration/control-path protection still applies.
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
Accounting uses logical `lstat` sizes including directory metadata and
|
|
90
|
+
conservative per-entry hardlink counts, not physical disk quotas. Audits,
|
|
91
|
+
metadata and unrelated writers can still grow storage. GC remains explicit;
|
|
92
|
+
capacity refusal never downgrades to permanent deletion. See
|
|
93
|
+
[defaults, reason codes and recovery](../guides/deletion-limits.md).
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
The 2026-10-28 frozen public runtime passed three independent full runs,
|
|
96
|
+
each with 1090 Python cases and both Node groups: 1061.017, 1025.315 and
|
|
97
|
+
1042.145 seconds, with no failures, errors, skips, timeouts or automatic retries.
|
|
98
|
+
The existing diagnostic collector retained `npm test` scope/deadlines without
|
|
99
|
+
invoking npm itself. An offline 149-file package and three real Kimi 2.3.0
|
|
100
|
+
root-Bash cases passed; nine configured-route model requests returned HTTP 200.
|
|
101
|
+
See the guide for POSIX-only validation, gateway identity and host/tool limits.
|
|
102
|
+
The earlier unexplained npm timeout did not recur; its history is retained.
|
|
103
|
+
The Cleanup-only results below predate these changes. Those earlier checks
|
|
104
|
+
used 0.2.6 package metadata without claiming the additions shipped in that
|
|
105
|
+
release. Subsequent versioned 0.2.7 tests and package checks passed as recorded
|
|
106
|
+
above; the separate 0.3.0 plan remains paused.
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
<a id="cleanup-copilot-unreleased"></a>
|
|
109
|
+
<a id="cleanup-copilot-027-candidate"></a>
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
## Cleanup Copilot (0.2.7)
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
The current checkout adds a metadata-only cleanup plan and an explicitly
|
|
114
|
+
confirmed CLI execution workflow. It reports regenerable, caller-declared
|
|
115
|
+
discarded, uncertain and protected targets with logical sizes, reasons and
|
|
116
|
+
projected deletion/quarantine effects. Execution still uses safe_delete;
|
|
117
|
+
ordinary quarantined files retain disk usage. The default plan writes no
|
|
118
|
+
workspace or guard metadata. See [usage and limits](../guides/cleanup-plan.md).
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
This initial addition is separate from published 0.2.6 and is included in
|
|
121
|
+
version 0.2.7. At its initial checkpoint it added no native host tool or
|
|
122
|
+
deletion-policy change. Subsequent admission hardening is described above. At the Cleanup-only
|
|
123
|
+
checkpoint, the runtime passed a continuous local ARM64/PRoot POSIX rerun:
|
|
124
|
+
1012 Python cases and both Node groups in 979.997 seconds, with no failures,
|
|
125
|
+
errors, skips or retries. This used the existing diagnostic result collector
|
|
126
|
+
with the same test scope and deadlines as `npm test`. The earlier literal
|
|
127
|
+
npm command's timeout remains recorded and unexplained; it did not recur
|
|
128
|
+
in this rerun. Focused cleanup/manifest checks and an offline package also passed,
|
|
129
|
+
including terminal confirmation, physical deletion and quarantine/restore.
|
|
130
|
+
See the guide's [validation scope](../guides/cleanup-plan.md#validation-scope)
|
|
131
|
+
for the local platform and host limits.
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
## Maintenance delivered in 0.2.6 / 0.2.6 维护说明
|
|
2
134
|
|
|
3
135
|
Updated 2026-10-22. The additions previously tracked here now ship in
|
|
4
136
|
[0.2.6](release-notes-0.2.6.md). This path is retained for existing links and
|
|
@@ -126,16 +258,18 @@ commands; restoration and repeat-Stop checks passed. This does not establish
|
|
|
126
258
|
all-model, subagent, background or long-running behavior. The new DSH
|
|
127
259
|
diagnostic checks made no external model requests.
|
|
128
260
|
|
|
129
|
-
|
|
261
|
+
<a id="中文摘要"></a>
|
|
262
|
+
|
|
263
|
+
## 0.2.6 中文摘要
|
|
130
264
|
|
|
131
|
-
|
|
265
|
+
以下为 0.2.6 历史维护摘要:Kimi 可选 Stop 恢复反馈、120 秒外层超时接入说明,以及
|
|
132
266
|
DSH Lab 版本/配置预检的原因、退出码和计时诊断,及 Kimi Stop 的独立 doctor 检查。
|
|
133
267
|
后续默认删除适配加入 DSH `0.2.1-alpha.4`,读取脱敏/Lab 不随之扩大。
|
|
134
268
|
Kimi Bash profile 新增精确版本 2.3.0;CLI/ACP 各八项固定响应试次提供有限根代理证据,
|
|
135
269
|
未调用外部模型,也未扩大 Kimi Lab 的 2.1.1 准入或子代理声明。
|
|
136
270
|
Stop 未配置不报错;配置或本地探针失败退出 1,模型送达始终未验证。已发布 0.2.5 的范围保持原记录;
|
|
137
|
-
|
|
271
|
+
这些功能自 0.2.6 起提供,Stop 另需显式配置;原页面路径为已有链接保留。
|
|
138
272
|
|
|
139
273
|
版本/文档对齐前,最终实现检查点的 974 项 Python 与两组 Node 已在同一冻结流程通过;
|
|
140
274
|
此前 962 项检查点和历史失败分别保留,原失败原因仍未确定。
|
|
141
|
-
|
|
275
|
+
上述 0.2.6 维护未改变删除策略、rm 通配符规则、恢复格式或手动 GC。
|
|
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ The pinned `read` tool's presentation metadata contains the returned lines.
|
|
|
97
97
|
Replacing only `content` therefore leaves a second copy of read text in the
|
|
98
98
|
private session/UI data.
|
|
99
99
|
|
|
100
|
-
The [native probe](
|
|
100
|
+
The [native probe](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/e73101666288735880d4ff70bb0a20a025d426b0/tests/probes/dsh_result_hook.mjs) instantiates the real
|
|
101
101
|
Cordis, SystemPrompt and ToolRuntime services, registers synthetic tools and
|
|
102
102
|
tests their results without a model, shell, session or network request:
|
|
103
103
|
|
|
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ old direct-Python hook-startup failure demonstrates a concrete fail-open
|
|
|
287
287
|
boundary; the later bridge trial shows only a bounded mitigation.
|
|
288
288
|
The fixtures and traces were preserved for review. Adapter-level regressions
|
|
289
289
|
for both inert command shapes live in
|
|
290
|
-
[`tests/test_kimi_adapter.py`](
|
|
290
|
+
[`tests/test_kimi_adapter.py`](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/75b51b888279583541792e00b14a4ceaf2a59fba/tests/test_kimi_adapter.py).
|
|
291
291
|
|
|
292
292
|
After the live trials, the Kimi adapter was tightened to reject malformed
|
|
293
293
|
`PreToolUse` JSON and missing required Bash fields. Unit tests verify this
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.7",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Harness-neutral reliability infrastructure for AI coding agents: recoverable destructive actions, disclosure checks, controlled synthetic behaviour experiments, and a shared Core with optional native adapters.",
|
|
5
5
|
"type": "module",
|
|
6
6
|
"engines": {
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"agent-guard-lab": "./guard_lab.py",
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"agent-guard-check": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py",
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"agent-guard-safe-delete": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py",
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"agent-guard-cleanup": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/cleanup.py",
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"agent-guard-mcp": "./adapters/mcp/server.py",
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"agent-guard-restore": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py",
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"agent-guard-status": "./skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py",
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"agent-guard-exfil-check": "./skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py",
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@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ description: >-
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# delete-guard
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Version **0.2.7** adds the Cleanup proposals and deletion admission described
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below; 0.2.6 lacks these additions. See the
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[0.2.7 scope, upgrade impact and exact-version availability checks](../../docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.7.md).
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You operate inside a workspace where irreversible destruction is not a
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default capability. This skill defines the deletion discipline the guard
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enforces and how to work with it productively. The four pillars:
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@@ -47,6 +51,66 @@ Globs passed to `safe_delete` are expanded explicitly before anything moves.
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That is why `safe_delete '*.log'` works while `rm *.log` is blocked: the
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guard refuses opaque target sets, not cleanup work.
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<a id="cleanup-proposals-027-candidate"></a>
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## Cleanup proposals (0.2.7)
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When asked to investigate workspace cleanup, start with a read-only plan:
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```bash
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python3 /absolute/path/to/agent-guard/skills/delete-guard/scripts/cleanup.py --json
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```
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The planner separates regenerable, explicitly discarded, uncertain and
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protected entries, with sizes, reasons and projected effects. Declare known
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discarded paths with `--discard PATH` and evidence/backup roots with
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`--protect PATH`. Age, ignore status and untracked status alone do not prove
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discardability. `.internal`, Git metadata and recovery boundaries are pruned.
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Only propose the plan by default. Execution requires `--execute`, the
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reviewed `--plan-id`, exact `--select PATH` entries and a human's terminal
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acknowledgement. Do not answer that prompt on the user's behalf. The tool
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rechecks the plan after confirmation and delegates to existing safe_delete;
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ordinary files retain recovery copies and disk usage. This CLI adds no
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native host tool or human-identity guarantee. See the
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[workflow, effects and limits](../../docs/guides/cleanup-plan.md).
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<a id="deletion-admission-027-candidate"></a>
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## Deletion admission (0.2.7)
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Covered deletion paths now share persistent session byte/entry budgets,
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short-window rate/repeated-target-set limits and quarantine capacity admission.
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The optional workspace `.agent-guard/delete-policy.json` configures limits
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and protected paths; its directory and admission control files are protected.
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Protection wins over artifact and housekeeping exemptions. Missing configuration
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uses defaults; malformed configuration or state blocks new admission.
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Defaults are 5 GiB/100000 entries for quarantine admission, 1 GiB/10000
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entries per persistent session, 60 operations per 60 seconds, five repeated
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admissions of one target set per window, and batch review above 256 MiB or
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1000 entries. Counts include filesystem entries and logical metadata; these
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limits are not an OS storage quota. Updating the package does not silently
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reset existing counters or replace a drifted doctor baseline.
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Unnamed CLI processes share a stable budget. Failed admitted operations and
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restores do not refund it. A limit refusal is not permission to change session
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identity, remove state, disguise the delete or purge recovery copies. Inspect
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status and explain the reason. Large batches require the reviewed Cleanup
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workflow; covered automated checks BLOCK rather than creating a new host ASK flow.
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Cleanup's ten-minute, one-use-per-path approval still obeys budgets, capacity
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and protection. No limit automatically triggers permanent deletion or GC.
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Existing compound ASK and Git snapshot paths are outside this new budget;
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normal restore, explicit GC and unprotected quarantine housekeeping retain
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their exemptions. Configuration/control-path protection still applies.
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After investigation, an operator can explicitly reset the current bucket with
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`status.py --reset-delete-budget`, an interactive terminal and `RESET`.
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Do not supply this acknowledgement on the user's behalf. Reset does not free
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storage or change limits; normal restore and explicit GC remain separate.
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Portable state and TTY remain advisory against same-UID processes. See
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[defaults, accounting and limits](../../docs/guides/deletion-limits.md).
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## If you run `rm` / destructive git anyway
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A harness adapter may intercept the command before execution. Verdicts you
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| `BLOCK_OUT_OF_WORKSPACE` / `BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH` / `BLOCK_PROTECTED_ANCESTOR` | outside boundary, workspace root, `.git`, or a filesystem root (`/`, `/home`, `/usr`, `$HOME`) | do not retry; this is a hard boundary. Ask the human if it is truly needed |
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| `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | session is downgraded | only explicit single-file deletes are permitted; ask the human for anything more |
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| `BLOCK_FORCE_PUSH` | remote history destruction | do not retry; escalate to the human |
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| `BLOCK_DELETE_CONFIG_INVALID` / `BLOCK_DELETE_STATE_INVALID` | invalid configuration, state or admission machinery | stop and report; do not remove state to bypass the refusal |
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| `BLOCK_DELETE_PROTECTED` | configured protection or deletion configuration overlap | preserve the target and its protected descendants |
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| `BLOCK_DELETE_LIMIT` / `BLOCK_DELETE_RATE` / `BLOCK_DELETE_REPEAT` | capacity, cumulative budget or short-window limit | inspect status/loop; wait only when the reported window can expire |
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| `BLOCK_DELETE_BATCH_CONFIRM` | large operation or stale/consumed Cleanup approval | propose and review a fresh Cleanup plan |
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Shape rules on compound commands: a single line that `cd`s anywhere before a
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destructive op (F1), or that creates files (`touch/mkdir/cp/mv/tee`,
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See `references/policy.md` for the complete rule table, verdict codes, and
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manifest format.
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-
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Restore audit records counts and transaction associations rather
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than duplicate paths/error text. CLI results and recovery manifests still
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contain the exact data needed to inspect and restore; a failed CLI result
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must still be checked against the filesystem and preservation attempts.
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