@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.3 → 0.2.5-rc1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +158 -571
- package/README.zh-CN.md +133 -490
- package/SECURITY.md +53 -0
- package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +8 -6
- package/adapters/claude/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/claude/harness/README.md +1 -1
- package/adapters/codex/harness/README.md +2 -2
- package/adapters/dsh/README.md +17 -6
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/README.md +8 -8
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/guard_lab.py +3 -3
- package/adapters/dsh/lib/index.js +1 -1
- package/adapters/kimi-code/README.md +7 -7
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/guard_lab.py +1 -1
- package/assets/linux-do-community.svg +19 -0
- package/core/__init__.py +1 -1
- package/core/classifier.py +66 -17
- package/core/policy.py +28 -13
- package/core/recovery.py +261 -24
- package/core/redaction.py +122 -21
- package/core/trash_index.py +193 -0
- package/docs/README.md +113 -0
- package/docs/{architecture.md → design/architecture.md} +51 -12
- package/docs/{compatibility.md → design/compatibility.md} +124 -4
- package/docs/{threat-model.md → design/threat-model.md} +10 -8
- package/docs/guides/getting-started.md +104 -0
- package/docs/{harness-capabilities.md → guides/harness-capabilities.md} +14 -9
- package/docs/guides/trash-index.md +106 -0
- package/docs/{development-note-unguarded-deletion.md → history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{friction.md → history/friction.md} +123 -0
- package/docs/{secret-guard-analysis.md → history/secret-guard-analysis.md} +12 -12
- package/docs/{secret-guard-architecture.md → history/secret-guard-architecture.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{secret-guard-design.md → history/secret-guard-design.md} +14 -14
- package/docs/lab/cases/injection-case-fake-ai-api.md +346 -0
- package/docs/{guard-lab.md → lab/guard-lab.md} +15 -13
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.1.md} +6 -6
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.2.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md} +9 -9
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.4.md +89 -0
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.5-rc1.md +91 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-claude-code-harness.md → reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/reports/test-report-dsh-0.2.4-ptc.md +79 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-native-session.md → reports/test-report-dsh-native-session.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-real-followup.md → reports/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md → reports/test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md} +4 -4
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-code-block.md → reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md → reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md → reports/test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md → reports/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md} +2 -2
- package/package.json +4 -2
- package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +80 -7
- package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +104 -8
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +22 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py +34 -7
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/safe_delete.py +52 -29
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +52 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/SKILL.md +23 -11
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/channels.md +9 -2
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/rules.md +83 -6
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/_payload.py +20 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py +5 -1
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/sanitize.py +6 -3
- /package/docs/{host-drift.md → guides/host-drift.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md → guides/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-clean-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-read-trial-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-read-trial-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-trial-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md → reports/test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md} +0 -0
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## Recorded real-model pair
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The [Lab documentation](guard-lab.md#bounded-kimi-reference-trial) records one
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The [Lab documentation](../lab/guard-lab.md#bounded-kimi-reference-trial) records one
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2026-09-28 matched pair with Kimi Code CLI 2.1.1 and the user-declared public
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label `Kimi official OAuth model`. Both runs used the same task SHA-256:
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## Repeatable capture helper and ordered repeat — 2026-09-30
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The [Kimi capture helper](
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The [Kimi capture helper](../../adapters/kimi-code/harness/README.md) now pins
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2.1.1, uses prompt mode with `stream-json`, derives matched private homes,
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checks non-Guard configuration equality, and separates assistant/tool/meta
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records before scanning. Empty/header-only, unknown, failed, timed-out,
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because the verified host contract cannot enforce it as approval. Missing,
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skipped, unspawned, or timed-out hooks, general file reads, background host
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collection, external receipt, and same-UID tampering retain the
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[adapter limitations](
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[adapter limitations](../../adapters/kimi-code/README.md). Neither the historical
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pair nor a current doctor pass establishes universal protection.
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authorization to commit/push rc2, run CI for that exact source, then prepare
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the approved `0.2.3` manifest/tests/README versions and validate its final
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artifact before authorizing the stable tag workflow. A
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[stable release-note draft](release-notes-0.2.3.md) is ready for that step.
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[stable release-note draft](../releases/release-notes-0.2.3.md) is ready for that step.
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Remote publication is not authorized by this review.
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## Stable preparation — 2026-10-03
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package/docs/{test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md → reports/test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md}
RENAMED
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records, and restoration with content intact. The resulting
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[Windows Core CI job](https://github.com/mokuyoaxis/agent-guard/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml) covers selected dialect,
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CLI, relocation/restore and exact-byte redaction regressions on Windows.
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See the [rc1 notes](release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md) for the fix scope.
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See the [rc1 notes](../releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md) for the fix scope.
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## Withdrawn redaction finding
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## Relationship to prior history
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- **Codex `gpt-5.6-sol` evaluation** (`docs/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md`):
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- **Codex `gpt-5.6-sol` evaluation** (`docs/reports/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md`):
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the fail-closed compensation contract exercised here (`COMPENSATION_FAILED`
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on empty-repo `git reset --hard`) is the P0-3 remediation that report
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pinned; it held on Windows.
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- **DSH v0.1.1 report** (`docs/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md`): same decision
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- **DSH v0.1.1 report** (`docs/reports/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md`): same decision
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matrix methodology; its "Remaining matrix expansion" item "other harness
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live sessions" is advanced to a second harness family (ZCode) and a second
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model family (GLM Flash), on a third platform (win32/POSIX shell).
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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{
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"name": "@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard",
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"version": "0.2.
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"description": "Harness-neutral reliability infrastructure for AI coding agents:
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"version": "0.2.5-rc1",
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"description": "Harness-neutral reliability infrastructure for AI coding agents: recoverable destructive actions, disclosure checks, controlled synthetic behaviour experiments, and a shared Core with optional native adapters.",
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"type": "module",
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"main": "./adapters/dsh/lib/index.js",
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"exports": {
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"core",
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"skills",
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"docs",
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"doctor.py",
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"LICENSE",
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- **Scope** - you act inside the workspace; the workspace root, `.git`, and
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everything outside are never yours to delete.
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- **Recoverability** -
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with a manifest
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- **Recoverability** - supported valuable deletions relocate to the selected
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quarantine with a manifest; supported Git overwrites snapshot tracked state.
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Provably regenerable, ignored artifacts may be deleted directly.
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- **Authorization** - a human decides permission boundaries. You can be
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*downgraded* to RESTRICTED mode; you can never promote yourself back.
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- **Auditability** -
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JSONL.
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- **Auditability** - supported writers record decision/recovery metadata in
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JSONL according to their CLI contract. Mutation intents must be durable;
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assessment/blocked audit may be best effort, and early no-op paths may not
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write an audit. Calls outside the covered path are not automatically visible.
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## The one rule
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**Prefer `safe_delete` over `rm`.** It applies the guard's recovery policy.
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A block is not an error to route around. Retrying the same operation in a
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can bypass both protection and audit. Do not treat a missing audit as proof
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that no operation occurred.
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those paths, so a collision returns `BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION` without
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moving them or creating a snapshot. Preserve the conflicting content
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separately before retrying. Use a standalone reset without shell wrappers;
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## Compensation preflight and verification
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## Assessment and preflight
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but may create quarantine/audit metadata and a Git local exclude rule.
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They are not zero-write filesystem checks. Advisory exit 0 means the
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assessment completed; inspect the decision and never execute a BLOCK/ASK
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command merely because the exit was zero. Blocked safe_delete still exits 2
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undone. Use only a disposable fixture when verifying this behavior; the
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defines the no-match, existing-ignore and external-bucket branches.
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recovery IDs/counts rather than target paths or free-form reasons. `--reason`
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metadata. Exact recovery paths remain in the CLI result and manifest.
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Historical records and automatic session metadata are unchanged; see the
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## Quarantine location queries
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read-only query with a current-directory or user-selected scope:
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```bash
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python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py --trash-index --json
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python3 <repo>/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py --trash-index --trash <custom-store> --json
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```
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Report the scope, candidate count, metadata-identified count and read/budget
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errors. Do not claim that unconfirmed/unreadable locations are absent or that
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the result covers the whole host. Explain that these are bucket locations,
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not file/transaction totals. If you supplement the result yourself, identify
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that source separately. Existing native status tools may show the current
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project only; use the CLI for this indexed query. Location metadata and cached
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JSON are not authorization to purge, and recovery file contents must not be
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## RESTRICTED mode
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Housekeeping does not override those checks. Use the existing explicit
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`gc.py --execute --txid <id>` entry for a validated, audited transaction purge.
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Ordinary unprotected payload housekeeping retains its existing policy.
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GC plans omit `PURGED` history; they do not delete stored Git stashes.
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After a human veto, the session runs with narrowed powers: explicit
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recursive deletes, globs, and destructive git operations are refused. Only a
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With human `--force`, an existing occupant is first preserved by the normal
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relocation journal in a separate transaction. The result's optional
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`backup_txids` lists preservation attempts; an ID alone does not prove the
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copy completed. Inspect those IDs with `restore.py list --json` and the
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filesystem after any error. A failed old-version move must not be followed
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by deleting the preserved occupant. Restoring a completed backup transaction
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uses the same `restore.py <txid>` command; if the origin is occupied, the
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usual conflict/force rules apply again. Preserved versions consume quarantine
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manifest format.
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The candidate's restore audit records counts and transaction associations rather
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than duplicate paths/error text. CLI results and recovery manifests still
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contain the exact data needed to inspect and restore; a failed CLI result
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must still be checked against the filesystem and preservation attempts.
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1
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# delete-guard policy reference (V1)
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-
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The shared Core supports POSIX/cmd/PowerShell command facts. Full suites run
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on Linux/macOS; focused Windows Core evidence is available, while complete
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native Windows harness execution remains unverified. POSIX hook bridges have
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their own platform requirements. See the
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[compatibility contract](../../../docs/design/compatibility.md).
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This reference describes the 0.2.5-rc1 source candidate. The published 0.2.4
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baseline does not include its control-path, GC and audit-writer maintenance.
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## Decision Protocol
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@@ -25,6 +32,41 @@ RESTRICTED prohibitions) are policy violations and never askable.
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check.py exit codes: 0 proceed/advisory-ok · 2 blocked · 3 ask · 1 error.
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### Assessment and dry-run side effects
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Advisory `check.py` and `safe_delete.py --dry-run` keep command targets
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unchanged. They do not execute the assessed shell text, relocate targets,
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create Git stashes or create recovery transactions. They may still write
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metadata through their existing best-effort audit path:
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| Invocation | Exit / target behavior | Possible metadata writes |
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|---|---|---|
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| Advisory `check.py`, including ALLOW, ASK or BLOCK | Exit 0 with the actual decision; targets unchanged | Layout initialization and an appended `check` audit |
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| `safe_delete.py --dry-run` with concrete targets, including absent literals | Exit 0 unless BLOCK; targets unchanged | An advisory audit, or a blocked-decision audit |
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| Policy-blocked `safe_delete.py` before compensation, including dry-run | Exit 2; targets unchanged | Best-effort blocked-decision audit |
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| Unmatched-glob-only `safe_delete.py` | Exit 0 before layout/audit setup | None from that invocation |
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| Non-dry-run `safe_delete.py` with an absent literal / ALLOW_NOOP | Exit 0 without mutation or layout setup | None from that invocation |
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Layout initialization may create the selected quarantine directory and
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`audit.jsonl`. If a quarantine inside a Git workspace is not already ignored,
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it may append an ignore entry to Git's local `info/exclude`, including the
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resolved exclude path of a linked worktree. It does not edit tracked
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`.gitignore`. A preexisting ignore rule or an external bucket avoids that
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exclude write. Repeated checks append audit lines without duplicating the
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exclude rule; recovery manifests and authorization state are not created by
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these assessment paths. Git status may hide metadata that was previously
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untracked, so an unchanged Git status alone does not prove zero writes.
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If audit/layout setup fails, assessments retain their decision and report
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an audit warning; partial metadata changes may remain. `ensure_layout`
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establishes the Git ignore rule before creating the bucket. Audit failure
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after that step does not roll it back. This best-effort behavior is distinct
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from enforced execution/ASK intents, which must be durable or execution is
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refused. Advisory exit 0 must never be treated as authorization to run a
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BLOCK or ASK command. Failed real compensations can leave partial target
|
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changes and recovery IDs; this table does not promise rollback for them.
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No general zero-write assessment flag is introduced.
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### Dialects
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`check.py` lexes the command line for a shell dialect: `--dialect posix`
|
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@@ -46,16 +88,19 @@ different effects (`-wi`, `-c`, `-p`) stays unknown and BLOCKs.
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## Rule table (first match wins)
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The quarantine control-path changes below belong to the 0.2.5-rc1 source candidate;
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the published 0.2.4 artifact retains its original housekeeping order.
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| # | Condition | Verdict code | Effect |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 1 | dry run / no targets | `ALLOW_NOOP` | proceed unchanged |
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| 2 | unresolvable targets: shell vars, command substitution, unbalanced quotes, `bash -c` with destructive smell, `find -delete`, `find -exec rm`, stdin-fed (`xargs`) | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse - allowing it would forfeit the core guarantee |
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|
| 2a | SHAPE F1: destructive op preceded by `cd` in the same command line, target in-workspace and resolvable | `ASK` (`COMPOUND_CWD_DELETE`) | single-execution authorization; splitting the command avoids the prompt. A shape rule describes *compensation* difficulty, never effect scope: if the target set also trips rule 2, 4, 5 or 6, that BLOCK wins (`tests/test_incident_regression.py`) |
|
|
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|
-
| 2b | SHAPE F2: file-creation op (`touch/mkdir/cp/mv/install/ln/tee`, `>`/`>>`) precedes a target-dependent destructive op in the same line | `ASK` (`COMPOUND_CREATE_DELETE`) | single-execution authorization;
|
|
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|
+
| 2b | SHAPE F2: file-creation op (`touch/mkdir/cp/mv/install/ln/tee`, `>`/`>>`) precedes a target-dependent destructive op in the same line | `ASK` (`COMPOUND_CREATE_DELETE`) | single-execution authorization; force-push is refused separately. Hard reset in a compound line is effect-uncertain and BLOCKED before shape rules |
|
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100
|
| 2c | target *is* a filesystem root (`/`, `/home`, `/usr`, `/etc`, `/var`, `/tmp`, `/opt`, `/boot`, `$HOME`, ...) | `BLOCK_PROTECTED_ANCESTOR` | refuse. Matched exactly, so paths *under* these roots keep the ordinary codes; enforced by identity rather than workspace geometry, so it holds even when the workspace is `/` |
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
+
| 5 | workspace root, `.git` metadata, quarantine root/control paths, or an in-workspace parent containing configured storage | `BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH` | refuse before the housekeeping exemption; root manifest/audit/state, state temp and sessions are control paths |
|
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+
| 3 | explicit ordinary unprotected payload inside quarantine (`.agent-trash/`) | `ALLOW_TRASH_GC` | opaque globs BLOCK_WILDCARD; safe_delete may enumerate first, and an audited transaction purge uses gc.py --execute |
|
|
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|
| 4 | target outside workspace | `BLOCK_OUT_OF_WORKSPACE` | refuse |
|
|
58
|
-
| 5 | target is workspace root or `.git` (any depth) | `BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH` | refuse |
|
|
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|
| 6 | any glob target | `BLOCK_WILDCARD` | refuse; use safe_delete which enumerates |
|
|
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|
| 7 | RESTRICTED mode, git/remote destructive op | `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | refuse |
|
|
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106
|
| 8 | RESTRICTED mode, fs delete | narrow files only -> `RELOCATE_NARROW`, else `BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE` | refuse or quarantine |
|
|
@@ -64,7 +109,9 @@ different effects (`-wi`, `-c`, `-p`) stays unknown and BLOCKs.
|
|
|
64
109
|
| 11 | supported `git clean -f...` | `RELOCATE_VIA_CLEAN_ENUMERATE` | enumerate via `clean -n`, decode every Git-quoted path, relocate every match, proceed only on full coverage |
|
|
65
110
|
| 11a | `git clean -ff`, interactive `-i`, or exclude `-e` | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse; nested-repository and interactive/exclusion semantics are not safely mirrored |
|
|
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111
|
| 11b | supported `git clean -f...` whose target set cannot be enumerated (not a repository, `git` cannot run) | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse; the targets exist but their set is unknowable, so nothing was attempted and nothing may be reported as a failed compensation |
|
|
67
|
-
| 12 | `git reset --hard
|
|
112
|
+
| 12 | supported `git reset --hard [commit]` without untracked/ignored collisions, `git restore <path>`, `git checkout -- <path>` | `SNAPSHOT_GIT_STASH` | hard reset first checks its target tree; `git stash create`+`store` then protects tracked modifications; any create/store failure blocks |
|
|
113
|
+
| 12a | hard reset target overlaps untracked/ignored content or quarantine storage | `BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION` | refuse before compensation; preserve conflicting paths separately before retrying |
|
|
114
|
+
| 12b | hard reset target cannot be resolved/enumerated, has unsupported options or submodule effects, is stash-relative, or uses shell wrappers/compound commands | `BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT` | refuse before compensation; use a standalone reset with an explicit stable commit |
|
|
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115
|
| 13 | all targets git-ignored AND match artifact patterns | `ALLOW_REGENERABLE` | direct delete |
|
|
69
116
|
| 14 | rooted recursive delete | `RELOCATE_TREE` | quarantine whole tree, proceed |
|
|
70
117
|
| 15 | named files/dirs | `RELOCATE_PATHS` | quarantine, proceed |
|
|
@@ -131,6 +178,44 @@ Soft policy: 30-day retention, 5 GiB cap. Thresholds only MARK transactions
|
|
|
131
178
|
`QUARANTINED -> RESTORABLE -> GC_ELIGIBLE -> PURGED`; the audit log itself
|
|
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179
|
is never garbage-collected.
|
|
133
180
|
|
|
181
|
+
Local maintenance excludes `PURGED` tombstones from active GC inventory and
|
|
182
|
+
age/capacity plans. History remains in the manifest and transaction listing;
|
|
183
|
+
a directory recreated under a purged ID is unmanaged. Failed purges retain
|
|
184
|
+
their prior state and can still be planned. This does not add stash pruning.
|
|
185
|
+
|
|
186
|
+
Restore audit metadata now records `restored_count`, `conflict_count` and
|
|
187
|
+
`error_count` instead of raw path arrays/error bodies. Known `txid`, `force`,
|
|
188
|
+
`ok` and preservation `backup_txids` retain correlation; invalid/unknown input
|
|
189
|
+
IDs use `txid_sha256`. Exact restoration paths and errors remain in the
|
|
190
|
+
recovery journal and CLI result. Historical audit lines are not rewritten;
|
|
191
|
+
automatic session metadata and other generic audit writers are unchanged.
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
### safe_delete audit metadata
|
|
194
|
+
|
|
195
|
+
New `safe_delete` audit events keep `event`, `tool`, `decision`, `code` and
|
|
196
|
+
`target_count`, plus `phase`/static `outcome` where applicable. Established
|
|
197
|
+
relocation reports add `txid`, `moved_count` and `skipped_count`, including
|
|
198
|
+
partial relocation and storage-failure decisions. `target_count` counts
|
|
199
|
+
classified entries after glob expansion, including absent literals and
|
|
200
|
+
unresolved/rejected entries in a BLOCK assessment; it is not a count of
|
|
201
|
+
existing or deletable files. Unmatched patterns are excluded; duplicate
|
|
202
|
+
input entries remain separate entries.
|
|
203
|
+
`skipped_count` counts the engine's skipped entries, not every target left
|
|
204
|
+
unmoved after a storage failure.
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
Target arrays, policy reason bodies, free-form `--reason` and moved/skipped
|
|
207
|
+
payloads are not copied into these events. `--reason` remains accepted but
|
|
208
|
+
its text is no longer persisted in the audit or `tx-start.meta`. Exact
|
|
209
|
+
origin/trash paths, write-ahead relocation records and failure diagnostics
|
|
210
|
+
stay in the recovery manifest; CLI target/recovery paths and errors stay
|
|
211
|
+
accurate. Those surfaces can still contain sensitive text.
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
Mutation intents remain durable before deletion; assessment and outcome
|
|
214
|
+
audits retain their existing best-effort behavior. Historical audit lines
|
|
215
|
+
and manifest metadata are not rewritten. Automatic `ts`/`session` fields
|
|
216
|
+
and generic `core.audit.append`/`tail` behavior are unchanged; this writer's
|
|
217
|
+
minimization is not a guarantee that every audit field is sanitized.
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
134
219
|
Authority model: `gc.py --execute` is intentionally permitted
|
|
135
220
|
non-interactively (scheduled maintenance is legitimate; purging
|
|
136
221
|
already-quarantined evidence is lower-risk than capability escalation,
|
|
@@ -154,8 +239,19 @@ model tool.
|
|
|
154
239
|
|
|
155
240
|
- Command-level interception covers the recognized vocabulary; arbitrary
|
|
156
241
|
scripts that delete internally are invisible to `check.py` (see
|
|
157
|
-
`docs/threat-model.md`).
|
|
158
|
-
- `git stash create` captures tracked modifications
|
|
159
|
-
|
|
242
|
+
`docs/design/threat-model.md`).
|
|
243
|
+
- `git stash create` captures tracked modifications only. `reset --hard`
|
|
244
|
+
can delete untracked and ignored content that obstructs its target tree.
|
|
245
|
+
`check.py` checks file/directory/ancestor collisions and refuses them;
|
|
246
|
+
this version does not automatically archive those paths. It also refuses
|
|
247
|
+
target-tree writes into quarantine. Ordinary unrelated untracked files
|
|
248
|
+
remain allowed. Only `--hard`, optional `-q`/`--quiet`, and at most one
|
|
249
|
+
commit are supported; submodules and stash-relative targets are refused.
|
|
250
|
+
- Hard reset must be standalone without shell wrappers: other segments can
|
|
251
|
+
change its revision or create a collision after preflight; wrappers can
|
|
252
|
+
change its Git environment. The preflight and host execution are separate;
|
|
253
|
+
concurrent changes are not atomically excluded.
|
|
254
|
+
Direct callers of `snapshot_git` receive a tracked-only snapshot and must
|
|
255
|
+
run the hard-reset preflight themselves before authorizing that operation.
|
|
160
256
|
- Windows cmd/PowerShell, databases, cloud resources: future skills
|
|
161
257
|
(`git-guard`, `database-guard`, `cloud-guard`) on the same core.
|
|
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
|
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
Advisory mode (default): prints the verdict and does not mutate command
|
|
8
8
|
targets. It records the assessment when audit storage is available.
|
|
9
|
+
Audit setup may create the quarantine, append audit.jsonl, and add a Git
|
|
10
|
+
local exclude rule. Advisory exit 0 is not execution authorization; inspect
|
|
11
|
+
the decision. It creates no relocation, snapshot or recovery transaction.
|
|
9
12
|
--enforce: performs the compensations first (relocate targets / git snapshot
|
|
10
13
|
/ git-clean enumeration+relocation) and tells the caller to PROCEED, or
|
|
11
14
|
refuses with BLOCKED. Any BLOCK in the line means nothing is executed.
|
|
@@ -105,6 +108,25 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
105
108
|
specs, parse_error = [], None
|
|
106
109
|
verdicts = [policy.decide_dialect_failure(resolution)]
|
|
107
110
|
|
|
111
|
+
# Preflight every reset before ANY compensation in the line. Advisory
|
|
112
|
+
# and enforced checks agree, and a later unsafe reset cannot leave an
|
|
113
|
+
# earlier filesystem relocation half-applied. Stash create only saves
|
|
114
|
+
# tracked modifications, so it cannot authorize an untracked collision.
|
|
115
|
+
if not policy.worst(verdicts).blocked:
|
|
116
|
+
for index, (spec, verdict) in enumerate(zip(specs, verdicts)):
|
|
117
|
+
if spec.kind != classifier.KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD or \
|
|
118
|
+
verdict.decision != policy.DECISION_SNAPSHOT:
|
|
119
|
+
continue
|
|
120
|
+
collisions, error = engine.preflight_git_reset_hard(
|
|
121
|
+
cwd=base, target=spec.targets[0] if spec.targets else "HEAD")
|
|
122
|
+
if error or collisions:
|
|
123
|
+
verdicts[index] = policy.Verdict(
|
|
124
|
+
policy.DECISION_BLOCK,
|
|
125
|
+
policy.CODE_BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT if error else
|
|
126
|
+
policy.CODE_BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION,
|
|
127
|
+
[error or "untracked/ignored or quarantine collision"],
|
|
128
|
+
)
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
108
130
|
top = policy.worst(verdicts)
|
|
109
131
|
latency_ms = round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 1)
|
|
110
132
|
check_id = audit.new_txid()
|
|
@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@
|
|
|
5
5
|
restore.py TXID [--force] [--json]
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
Restore is non-destructive by default: it refuses to overwrite anything now
|
|
8
|
-
occupying an origin path. --force
|
|
8
|
+
occupying an origin path. --force preserves that occupant in a separate
|
|
9
|
+
transaction before restoring. Inspect backup_txids after success or failure.
|
|
9
10
|
"""
|
|
10
11
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
11
12
|
|
|
12
13
|
import argparse
|
|
14
|
+
import hashlib
|
|
13
15
|
import json
|
|
14
16
|
import os
|
|
15
17
|
import sys
|
|
@@ -28,6 +30,26 @@ def context():
|
|
|
28
30
|
return recovery.RecoveryEngine(workspace, trash_root)
|
|
29
31
|
|
|
30
32
|
|
|
33
|
+
def restore_audit_event(txid, force, report):
|
|
34
|
+
"""Non-recovery metadata only; exact paths/errors stay in the result/journal."""
|
|
35
|
+
event = {
|
|
36
|
+
"event": "restore", "force": force, "ok": report.get("ok"),
|
|
37
|
+
"restored_count": len(report.get("restored", [])),
|
|
38
|
+
"conflict_count": len(report.get("conflicts", [])),
|
|
39
|
+
"error_count": len(report.get("errors", [])) + bool(report.get("error")),
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
if report.get("error"):
|
|
42
|
+
# Invalid/unknown caller input is not an established transaction ID.
|
|
43
|
+
# Keep correlation without copying arbitrary input into the audit log.
|
|
44
|
+
event["txid_sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(
|
|
45
|
+
txid.encode("utf-8", errors="surrogatepass")).hexdigest()
|
|
46
|
+
else:
|
|
47
|
+
event["txid"] = txid
|
|
48
|
+
if report.get("backup_txids"):
|
|
49
|
+
event["backup_txids"] = report["backup_txids"]
|
|
50
|
+
return event
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
31
53
|
def main() -> int:
|
|
32
54
|
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
|
33
55
|
sub = ap.add_subparsers(dest="cmd", required=True)
|
|
@@ -68,21 +90,26 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
68
90
|
return 0
|
|
69
91
|
|
|
70
92
|
report = engine.restore(args.txid, force=args.force)
|
|
71
|
-
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
73
|
-
|
|
74
|
-
|
|
75
|
-
|
|
76
|
-
|
|
93
|
+
event = restore_audit_event(args.txid, args.force, report)
|
|
94
|
+
try:
|
|
95
|
+
audit.append(event, os.path.join(engine.trash_root, AUDIT_NAME))
|
|
96
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
97
|
+
report["ok"] = False
|
|
98
|
+
report.setdefault("errors", []).append(
|
|
99
|
+
"restore audit could not be stored; inspect filesystem state")
|
|
77
100
|
if args.as_json:
|
|
78
101
|
print(json.dumps(report, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
|
|
79
102
|
else:
|
|
103
|
+
for txid in report.get("backup_txids", []):
|
|
104
|
+
print(f"current-version preservation transaction: {txid} (inspect state)")
|
|
80
105
|
for path in report.get("restored", []):
|
|
81
106
|
print(f"restored: {path}")
|
|
82
107
|
for path in report.get("conflicts", []):
|
|
83
108
|
print(f"conflict (exists; use --force): {path}")
|
|
84
109
|
for err in report.get("errors", []):
|
|
85
110
|
print(f"error: {err}", file=sys.stderr)
|
|
111
|
+
if report.get("error"):
|
|
112
|
+
print(f"error: {report['error']}", file=sys.stderr)
|
|
86
113
|
if report.get("errors"):
|
|
87
114
|
return 1
|
|
88
115
|
if report.get("conflicts"):
|
|
@@ -4,8 +4,13 @@
|
|
|
4
4
|
safe_delete.py [--json] [--dry-run] [--reason TEXT] PATH...
|
|
5
5
|
|
|
6
6
|
Globs are expanded here, explicitly, before classification: an opaque
|
|
7
|
-
wildcard never reaches the filesystem unexamined.
|
|
8
|
-
|
|
7
|
+
wildcard never reaches the filesystem unexamined. Assessments are best-effort
|
|
8
|
+
audited; an unmatched glob returns before audit setup. --dry-run and policy
|
|
9
|
+
refusals before compensation leave command targets unchanged, but may create
|
|
10
|
+
quarantine/audit metadata and a Git local exclude rule. Policy blocks exit 2
|
|
11
|
+
even in dry-run. A failed real compensation can leave partial target changes.
|
|
12
|
+
New audit events contain decisions, counts and recovery IDs, not target paths
|
|
13
|
+
or free-form --reason text. Exact recovery paths stay in the manifest/result.
|
|
9
14
|
"""
|
|
10
15
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
11
16
|
|
|
@@ -53,12 +58,35 @@ def delete_directly(spec):
|
|
|
53
58
|
return "absent"
|
|
54
59
|
|
|
55
60
|
|
|
61
|
+
def safe_delete_audit_event(event, decision, code, target_count, *,
|
|
62
|
+
phase=None, report=None, outcome=None):
|
|
63
|
+
"""Build this writer's metadata; never copy input paths/reasons/errors.
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
Codes and outcome labels come from this CLI. Transaction IDs come from
|
|
66
|
+
the recovery engine; exact moved/skipped payloads stay in its journal
|
|
67
|
+
and the CLI result. Automatic audit session metadata is unchanged.
|
|
68
|
+
"""
|
|
69
|
+
entry = {"event": event, "tool": "safe_delete", "decision": decision,
|
|
70
|
+
"code": code, "target_count": target_count}
|
|
71
|
+
if phase is not None:
|
|
72
|
+
entry["phase"] = phase
|
|
73
|
+
if outcome is not None:
|
|
74
|
+
entry["outcome"] = outcome
|
|
75
|
+
if report is not None:
|
|
76
|
+
if report.get("txid"):
|
|
77
|
+
entry["txid"] = report["txid"]
|
|
78
|
+
entry["moved_count"] = len(report.get("moved", []))
|
|
79
|
+
entry["skipped_count"] = len(report.get("skipped", []))
|
|
80
|
+
return entry
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
56
83
|
def main() -> int:
|
|
57
84
|
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
|
58
85
|
ap.add_argument("paths", nargs="+", help="paths or globs to delete")
|
|
59
86
|
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", dest="as_json")
|
|
60
87
|
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
|
|
61
|
-
ap.add_argument("--reason", default="",
|
|
88
|
+
ap.add_argument("--reason", default="",
|
|
89
|
+
help="why this deletion is needed (text is not persisted)")
|
|
62
90
|
args = ap.parse_args()
|
|
63
91
|
|
|
64
92
|
base = os.getcwd()
|
|
@@ -88,6 +116,7 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
88
116
|
return 0
|
|
89
117
|
verdict = policy.decide_path_batch(specs, ctx, recursive=True)
|
|
90
118
|
engine = recovery.RecoveryEngine(workspace, trash_root)
|
|
119
|
+
relocation_report = None
|
|
91
120
|
|
|
92
121
|
result = {
|
|
93
122
|
"tool": "safe_delete",
|
|
@@ -119,10 +148,8 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
119
148
|
return False
|
|
120
149
|
|
|
121
150
|
if verdict.blocked:
|
|
122
|
-
record(
|
|
123
|
-
|
|
124
|
-
"reasons": verdict.reasons, "targets": result["targets"],
|
|
125
|
-
"reason": args.reason})
|
|
151
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
152
|
+
"decision", "BLOCK", verdict.code, len(specs)))
|
|
126
153
|
result["exit"] = 2
|
|
127
154
|
print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) if args.as_json
|
|
128
155
|
else f"BLOCKED [{verdict.code}]: {verdict.reasons}")
|
|
@@ -151,16 +178,14 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
151
178
|
# Authorization/intent must be durable before direct deletion. Dry-run
|
|
152
179
|
# assessments are best-effort audited but never fail for audit storage.
|
|
153
180
|
if args.dry_run:
|
|
154
|
-
record(
|
|
155
|
-
|
|
156
|
-
|
|
157
|
-
"reason": args.reason})
|
|
181
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
182
|
+
"decision", verdict.decision, verdict.code, len(specs),
|
|
183
|
+
phase="advisory"))
|
|
158
184
|
elif verdict.code != policy.CODE_ALLOW_NOOP:
|
|
159
185
|
try:
|
|
160
|
-
record(
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
162
|
-
|
|
163
|
-
"reason": args.reason}, required=True)
|
|
186
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
187
|
+
"decision", verdict.decision, verdict.code, len(specs),
|
|
188
|
+
phase="intent"), required=True)
|
|
164
189
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
165
190
|
result["verdict"] = {
|
|
166
191
|
"decision": "BLOCK",
|
|
@@ -189,7 +214,8 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
189
214
|
result["deleted"] = deleted
|
|
190
215
|
else: # RELOCATE_*
|
|
191
216
|
report = engine.relocate(specs, meta={
|
|
192
|
-
"tool": "safe_delete", "code": verdict.code
|
|
217
|
+
"tool": "safe_delete", "code": verdict.code})
|
|
218
|
+
relocation_report = report
|
|
193
219
|
if report.get("storage_failure"):
|
|
194
220
|
# Hard principle: capacity limits never downgrade to deletion.
|
|
195
221
|
result["verdict"] = {
|
|
@@ -200,10 +226,9 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
200
226
|
}
|
|
201
227
|
result["outcome"] = "BLOCKED: quarantine cannot accept relocation"
|
|
202
228
|
result["exit"] = 2
|
|
203
|
-
record(
|
|
204
|
-
|
|
205
|
-
|
|
206
|
-
"targets": result["targets"], "reason": args.reason})
|
|
229
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
230
|
+
"decision", "BLOCK", policy.CODE_BLOCK_RELOCATE_FAILED_STORAGE,
|
|
231
|
+
len(specs), report=report))
|
|
207
232
|
print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
|
|
208
233
|
if args.as_json else result["outcome"])
|
|
209
234
|
return 2
|
|
@@ -222,11 +247,9 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
222
247
|
result["moved"] = report["moved"]
|
|
223
248
|
result["skipped"] = report["skipped"]
|
|
224
249
|
result["exit"] = 2
|
|
225
|
-
record(
|
|
226
|
-
|
|
227
|
-
|
|
228
|
-
"targets": result["targets"], "txid": report["txid"],
|
|
229
|
-
"reason": args.reason})
|
|
250
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
251
|
+
"decision", "BLOCK", policy.CODE_BLOCK_COMPENSATION_FAILED,
|
|
252
|
+
len(specs), report=report))
|
|
230
253
|
print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
|
|
231
254
|
if args.as_json else result["outcome"])
|
|
232
255
|
return 2
|
|
@@ -236,10 +259,10 @@ def main() -> int:
|
|
|
236
259
|
result["skipped"] = report["skipped"]
|
|
237
260
|
|
|
238
261
|
if not args.dry_run and verdict.code != policy.CODE_ALLOW_NOOP:
|
|
239
|
-
record(
|
|
240
|
-
|
|
241
|
-
|
|
242
|
-
|
|
262
|
+
record(safe_delete_audit_event(
|
|
263
|
+
"outcome", verdict.decision, verdict.code, len(specs),
|
|
264
|
+
phase="complete", report=relocation_report,
|
|
265
|
+
outcome=result.get("outcome")))
|
|
243
266
|
result["exit"] = 0
|
|
244
267
|
if args.as_json:
|
|
245
268
|
print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
|