@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.3 → 0.2.4-hotfix.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +70 -63
- package/README.zh-CN.md +61 -59
- package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +4 -4
- package/adapters/claude/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/claude/harness/README.md +1 -1
- package/adapters/codex/harness/README.md +2 -2
- package/adapters/dsh/README.md +10 -6
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/README.md +8 -8
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/guard_lab.py +3 -3
- package/adapters/dsh/lib/index.js +1 -1
- package/adapters/kimi-code/README.md +7 -7
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/guard_lab.py +1 -1
- package/core/__init__.py +1 -1
- package/core/classifier.py +66 -17
- package/core/policy.py +28 -13
- package/core/recovery.py +256 -23
- package/core/trash_index.py +193 -0
- package/docs/README.md +104 -0
- package/docs/{architecture.md → design/architecture.md} +31 -6
- package/docs/{compatibility.md → design/compatibility.md} +80 -4
- package/docs/{threat-model.md → design/threat-model.md} +4 -4
- package/docs/{harness-capabilities.md → guides/harness-capabilities.md} +9 -9
- package/docs/guides/trash-index.md +106 -0
- package/docs/{development-note-unguarded-deletion.md → history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{friction.md → history/friction.md} +61 -0
- package/docs/{secret-guard-analysis.md → history/secret-guard-analysis.md} +12 -12
- package/docs/{secret-guard-architecture.md → history/secret-guard-architecture.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{secret-guard-design.md → history/secret-guard-design.md} +14 -14
- package/docs/lab/cases/injection-case-fake-ai-api.md +346 -0
- package/docs/{guard-lab.md → lab/guard-lab.md} +12 -12
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.1.md} +6 -6
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.2.md} +2 -2
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md} +9 -9
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.4-hotfix.1.md +75 -0
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.4.md +89 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-claude-code-harness.md → reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/reports/test-report-dsh-0.2.4-ptc.md +79 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-native-session.md → reports/test-report-dsh-native-session.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-real-followup.md → reports/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md → reports/test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md} +4 -4
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-code-block.md → reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md → reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md → reports/test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md → reports/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md} +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +38 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +29 -9
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +19 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py +18 -6
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +52 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/channels.md +1 -1
- /package/docs/{host-drift.md → guides/host-drift.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md → guides/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-clean-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-read-trial-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-read-trial-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-trial-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md → reports/test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md} +0 -0
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A passing check does **not** inspect Claude's merged settings, prove a
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running session loaded the hook, or verify host-level interception. For
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those claims, use the isolated host acceptance in the
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[capability matrix](../../docs/harness-capabilities.md).
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[capability matrix](../../docs/guides/harness-capabilities.md).
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Add `--check-drift` to compare the installed Claude Code version with the
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shipped profile and compute privacy-safe configuration/runtime
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fingerprints. `CURRENT` still does not prove live interception; see the
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[drift status contract](../../docs/host-drift.md).
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[drift status contract](../../docs/guides/host-drift.md).
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An explicit `--live-sentinel` may then use one configured model call in a
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private fixture and requires adapter, audit, host-feedback, and marker
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evidence. It keeps `dontAsk` and never enables permission bypass.
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Validated end-to-end against real Claude Code sessions (2.1.270 and 2.1.273) with a
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scripted mock Anthropic endpoint standing in for the model, plus the
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`python3`-free regression tests. See
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[`docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md`](../../docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md)
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[`docs/reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md`](../../docs/reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md)
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and the shipped harness in [`harness/`](harness/README.md).
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The guard child is spawned with `sys.executable`, never `python3` from
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# Claude Code end-to-end harness
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Reproduces the live interception test in
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[`docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md`](../../../docs/test-report-claude-code-harness.md):
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[`docs/reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md`](../../../docs/reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md):
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the **real** Claude Code CLI, the **real** agent-guard `PreToolUse` hook, and
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a **scripted mock Anthropic endpoint** standing in for the model.
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# Codex acceptance harness
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Reproduces the 20-check acceptance run recorded in
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[`docs/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md`](../../../docs/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md)
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[`docs/reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md`](../../../docs/reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md)
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(2026-09-19, baseline `de5a00e`, `gpt-6-astra` / `high`).
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Unlike [`adapters/claude/harness/`](../../claude/harness
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Unlike [`adapters/claude/harness/`](../../claude/harness), there is no Codex
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adapter behind this directory. Codex has no native PreToolUse hook in this
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repository, so nothing here implies automatic interception: the driver
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exercises the guard through the production CLI (`check.py`, `safe_delete.py`,
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package/adapters/dsh/README.md
CHANGED
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The opt-in text-read prototype reuses the existing Core exfil policy through
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a bounded local worker. Both ship inside this package.
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The [
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The [0.2.3 contract review](../../docs/reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md)
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verifies the default deletion path on `0.2.0-rc.2` and `0.1.5-rc.1`, and
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the opt-in read path on the reviewed new local and sandbox filesystem providers.
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The package admits both exact host versions. Lab preflight accepts both and
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binds their native formats separately; unsupported session shapes remain
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inconclusive. A running Web service's plugin inventory does not validate this
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checkout or its agent scope. The [initial upgrade check](../../docs/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md)
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checkout or its agent scope. The [initial upgrade check](../../docs/reports/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md)
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retains the earlier failures and correction history.
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## Install
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Core and docs without broadening the admitted DSH versions or native-read
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coverage. Install the exact version:
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```bash
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dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add @mokuyoaxis/agent-guard@0.2.
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dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add @mokuyoaxis/agent-guard@0.2.4
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```
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applies to the existing deletion commands, not this controller worker.
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The [zero-model native report](../../docs/reports/test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md)
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verifies the actual returned value/content/meta, next request, and full durable
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JSONL log through the real AgentLoop with a synthetic stream. It does not
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establish real-model injection mitigation or universal emission protection.
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The separate [official Flash real-model follow-up](../../docs/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md)
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The separate [official Flash real-model follow-up](../../docs/reports/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md)
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observed supported synthetic-secret redaction in tool content, presentation
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metadata and the decoded session during a direct-read off/on experiment. It
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preserved useful configuration and remains outside the Lab injection L2 protocol.
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reproducing a test; a source checkout may contain later changes.
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block are independently verified in the
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[bounded host report](../../docs/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md). Model,
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[bounded host report](../../docs/reports/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md). Model,
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subagent, concurrency, ASK UI and non-`bash` paths remain separate tests.
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[headless capture/review runner](harness/README.md). Its separate `check`
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--dsh-home /tmp/approved-disposable-dsh-home \
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--output-dir /tmp/dsh-lab-clean \
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--task-file docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md \
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--trial-group dsh-baseline-01 --timeout 120
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```
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Parser 2 still refuses these source references. The retained new-host real-model
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also changed; it did not establish a new off/on result. The
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[current review](../../../docs/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md) separates
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[current review](../../../docs/reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md) separates
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the passing no-model preflight/parser regressions from this incomplete trial.
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Historical version 1 receipts still finalize with stdout/stderr coverage only.
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trial. The generic comparison now requires equal scanned channel sets and
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non-guard fingerprints, while their provenance remains user-declared.
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[Native-session follow-up](../../../docs/test-report-dsh-native-session.md)
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## Capture the guard-off attack probe
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later guarded comparison. See the [sample registry](../../../docs/guard-lab.md#versioned-attack-samples).
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later guarded comparison. See the [sample registry](../../../docs/lab/guard-lab.md#versioned-attack-samples).
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## Evidence and exit status
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runs, and same-UID isolation retain the [normal Lab limitations](../../../docs/guard-lab.md).
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runs, and same-UID isolation retain the [normal Lab limitations](../../../docs/lab/guard-lab.md).
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adapter. Continued tool exposure with that profile can validly yield
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describes the candidate result-rewriting seam and its limits.
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### Explicit native read redaction profile
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an offline reparse of the retained official Flash retry log. A mock pass does not establish
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pair.add_argument("--trial-group", required=True)
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pair.add_argument("--task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/guard-lab-trial-task.md")
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pair.add_argument("--clean-task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/guard-lab-clean-task.md")
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pair.add_argument("--task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md")
|
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pair.add_argument("--clean-task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md")
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pair.add_argument("--attack-sample", choices=sorted(INJECTION_SAMPLES), default="direct-v1")
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pair.add_argument("--guard-profile", choices=GUARD_PROFILES, default="deletion-v1")
|
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
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* config.repoRoot points at a live checkout (development mode).
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*
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* Positioning: automatic recovery system with human escalation - reliability
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* infrastructure, not a security sandbox. See docs/threat-model.md.
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* infrastructure, not a security sandbox. See docs/design/threat-model.md.
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*/
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@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ contract comparison below was established against 0.42.0; the 2.1.1 trials
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independently observed authenticated root `Bash` blocks through the same
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exit-2 hook path on an OAuth official model and a second configured model
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route. Connection details and private route identifiers are omitted. See the
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-
[bounded report](../../docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
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+
[bounded report](../../docs/reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
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For the separate honeytoken experiment, see the
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-
[guard-lab pair and local follow-up](../../docs/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md).
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[guard-lab pair and local follow-up](../../docs/reports/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md).
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Its recorded tool-channel exposure and matched guarded observation are distinct
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from native Bash interception. A local doctor pass does not rerun that pair.
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Use the [private capture/review helper](harness/README.md) to repeat the Lab
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Add `--check-drift` to compare the installed Kimi Code version with the
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shipped profile and compute privacy-safe configuration/runtime
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fingerprints. `CURRENT` still does not prove live interception; see the
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[drift status contract](../../docs/host-drift.md).
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[drift status contract](../../docs/guides/host-drift.md).
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An explicit `--live-sentinel` may then use one configured model call in a
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private fixture and requires adapter, audit, host-feedback, and marker
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evidence. The selected file must be named `config.toml`; the runner does
|
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ It does not describe a missing hook or a failed hook command.
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`kimi --auto`, Kimi 0.42.0 treats `permissionDecision: "ask"` as allow.
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This adapter therefore maps Core ASK to exit 2 (BLOCK). The failure class
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is described in the public
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-
[`development note`](../../docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md),
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+
[`development note`](../../docs/history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md),
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and it is fixed:
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`cd /tmp && rm -rf "$PWD/../home"` now classifies as
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`BLOCK / BLOCK_UNDETERMINABLE_EFFECT`. A shape rule describes
|
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@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ It does not describe a missing hook or a failed hook command.
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isolated sandboxes using one configured model route, single and concurrent
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subagent Bash calls reached the native hook and produced recoverable audit
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records.
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-
A third isolated project then showed [execution-level `BLOCK` enforcement](../../docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md)
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+
A third isolated project then showed [execution-level `BLOCK` enforcement](../../docs/reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md)
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for one root and one single-subagent inert Bash probe. Its separate root
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`ASK` probe was denied. A fourth isolated project reproduced these bounded
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paths using a second configured request model ID and
|
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@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ It does not describe a missing hook or a failed hook command.
|
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before Python started.** In an isolated Kimi 0.42.0 trial, a process-local failing
|
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`python3` shim made a Bash call execute even though the correctly started
|
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adapter would have returned `BLOCK_DIALECT_UNKNOWN`. The sentinel appeared
|
|
146
|
-
and no guard audit event was added. See the [bounded report](../../docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
|
|
146
|
+
and no guard audit event was added. See the [bounded report](../../docs/reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
|
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|
The bridge changes this particular failure into exit 2 **if the bridge
|
|
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|
itself starts**. It cannot block a hook that is absent, skipped by the
|
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matcher, fails to spawn, or times out. The host remains fail-open for those
|
|
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ It does not describe a missing hook or a failed hook command.
|
|
|
156
156
|
process-local Python startup fault returned exit 1 before the adapter ran;
|
|
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|
the bridge converted it to Kimi's hard refusal, and the sentinel stayed
|
|
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158
|
absent. This does not test a bridge-spawn failure or timeout; see the
|
|
159
|
-
[bounded report](../../docs/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
|
|
159
|
+
[bounded report](../../docs/reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md).
|
|
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160
|
- Kimi's `doctor config` accepted a hook-free test config and an invalid
|
|
161
161
|
regex matcher; it checks configuration validity, not live interception.
|
|
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162
|
In the installed 0.42.0 bundle, a matcher regex error yields no match.
|
|
@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ remain user-declared; configuration equality does not authenticate a backend.
|
|
|
42
42
|
|
|
43
43
|
## Clean control, then baseline
|
|
44
44
|
|
|
45
|
-
Use the [README-only task](../../../docs/guard-lab-clean-task.md) for a real-host
|
|
45
|
+
Use the [README-only task](../../../docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md) for a real-host
|
|
46
46
|
negative control so that it requests no bait read. Use the original
|
|
47
|
-
[review task](../../../docs/guard-lab-trial-task.md) for both attack trials.
|
|
47
|
+
[review task](../../../docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md) for both attack trials.
|
|
48
48
|
For the clean control, prepare a separate equivalent disposable home if the
|
|
49
49
|
matched attack pair should start without any previous host session state.
|
|
50
50
|
|
|
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ python3 adapters/kimi-code/harness/guard_lab.py run \
|
|
|
53
53
|
--kimi-home /tmp/kimi-lab-homes/off \
|
|
54
54
|
--kimi-executable /absolute/path/to/kimi-2.1.1 --guard-state off \
|
|
55
55
|
--output-dir /tmp/kimi-lab-clean --case clean \
|
|
56
|
-
--task-file docs/guard-lab-clean-task.md \
|
|
56
|
+
--task-file docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md \
|
|
57
57
|
--model-label "Kimi official OAuth model" --trial-group kimi-pair-01
|
|
58
58
|
```
|
|
59
59
|
|
|
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ def main(arguments: Optional[Sequence[str]] = None) -> int:
|
|
|
392
392
|
run.add_argument("--output-dir", type=Path, required=True)
|
|
393
393
|
run.add_argument("--case", choices=("clean", "injection-probe"), required=True)
|
|
394
394
|
run.add_argument("--attack-sample", choices=sorted(INJECTION_SAMPLES), default="direct-v1")
|
|
395
|
-
run.add_argument("--task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/guard-lab-trial-task.md")
|
|
395
|
+
run.add_argument("--task-file", type=Path, default=ROOT / "docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md")
|
|
396
396
|
run.add_argument("--model-label", required=True)
|
|
397
397
|
run.add_argument("--trial-group", required=True)
|
|
398
398
|
run.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=180)
|
package/core/__init__.py
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
"""agent-guard core: a reliability layer for autonomous AI agents.
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
|
-
Four pillars (see docs/architecture.md):
|
|
3
|
+
Four pillars (see docs/design/architecture.md):
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
Scope - where the agent may act -> policy.py
|
|
6
6
|
Recoverability - whether mistakes can be undone -> recovery.py
|
package/core/classifier.py
CHANGED
|
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import shlex
|
|
|
33
33
|
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
|
34
34
|
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
|
|
35
35
|
|
|
36
|
-
from . import dialects
|
|
36
|
+
from . import AUDIT_NAME, MANIFEST_NAME, STATE_NAME, dialects
|
|
37
37
|
|
|
38
38
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- vocabulary
|
|
39
39
|
|
|
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ FS_DELETE_CMDS = {"rm", "rmdir", "unlink", "shred"}
|
|
|
41
41
|
# Windows-native delete verbs. Recognised on EVERY dialect: a harness that
|
|
42
42
|
# never configured `AGENT_GUARD_DIALECT` still defaults to posix, and a
|
|
43
43
|
# posix-lexed `del /s /q build` must not be treated as an unknown verb.
|
|
44
|
-
# See docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md (lesson: the normalized
|
|
44
|
+
# See docs/history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md (lesson: the normalized
|
|
45
45
|
# target decides, not the spelling).
|
|
46
46
|
WINDOWS_DELETE_CMDS = {"del", "erase", "rd", "rmdir", "ri"}
|
|
47
47
|
SHELL_PREFIXES = {
|
|
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ INDETERMINACY_CHARS = ("$", "`")
|
|
|
56
56
|
# Filesystem roots that must never be a deletion target, whatever the
|
|
57
57
|
# workspace setting says. `rm -rf /home` blocks today only because /home
|
|
58
58
|
# happens to sit outside the workspace root - an accident of configuration,
|
|
59
|
-
# not a policy (see docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md).
|
|
59
|
+
# not a policy (see docs/history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md).
|
|
60
60
|
#
|
|
61
61
|
# Matching is EXACT: the rule fires when a target *is* one of these roots,
|
|
62
62
|
# never when it merely lives under one, so `rm -rf /home/alice/build` stays
|
|
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ KIND_GIT_DISCARD = "git-discard" # git restore <path> / git checkout -- <
|
|
|
137
137
|
KIND_GIT_PUSH_FORCE = "git-push-force" # force / mirror / ref-deletion push
|
|
138
138
|
KIND_UNKNOWN = "unknown" # destructive smell, no parseable shape
|
|
139
139
|
|
|
140
|
-
# Whole-command-line shape facts (docs/friction.md F1/F2).
|
|
140
|
+
# Whole-command-line shape facts (docs/history/friction.md F1/F2).
|
|
141
141
|
CREATION_CMDS = {"touch", "mkdir", "cp", "mv", "install", "ln", "tee"}
|
|
142
142
|
# cmd builtins with the same shape (F2 is about "created then destroyed",
|
|
143
143
|
# which `copy x a.tmp && del a.tmp` expresses just as literally).
|
|
@@ -146,7 +146,9 @@ CMD_CREATION_CMDS = {"copy", "xcopy", "robocopy", "mkdir", "md", "mklink",
|
|
|
146
146
|
REDIRECT_CREATE_TOKENS = {">", ">>"}
|
|
147
147
|
# Kinds whose compensation depends on enumerating concrete targets; a target
|
|
148
148
|
# created earlier in the same line is invisible to pre-execution compensation.
|
|
149
|
-
TARGET_DEPENDENT_KINDS = {
|
|
149
|
+
TARGET_DEPENDENT_KINDS = {
|
|
150
|
+
KIND_FS_DELETE, KIND_GIT_CLEAN, KIND_GIT_DISCARD, KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD,
|
|
151
|
+
}
|
|
150
152
|
|
|
151
153
|
|
|
152
154
|
@dataclass
|
|
@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ class PathSpec:
|
|
|
190
192
|
inside_trash: bool = False
|
|
191
193
|
protected: Optional[str] = None # None | ancestor-root | workspace-root
|
|
192
194
|
# | outside-workspace | git-metadata
|
|
195
|
+
# | quarantine-control
|
|
193
196
|
error: Optional[str] = None
|
|
194
197
|
|
|
195
198
|
# ------------------------------------------------------------- path analysis
|
|
@@ -248,6 +251,26 @@ def _physical_keep_final(path: str) -> str:
|
|
|
248
251
|
return os.path.join(os.path.realpath(parent), name)
|
|
249
252
|
|
|
250
253
|
|
|
254
|
+
def _quarantine_control_path(absolute: str, physical: str,
|
|
255
|
+
trash_root: str, trash_physical: str,
|
|
256
|
+
workspace: str) -> bool:
|
|
257
|
+
"""Protect storage access and root metadata, retaining leaf-link location."""
|
|
258
|
+
# A configured final link is also the access path to an external bucket.
|
|
259
|
+
# Deleting its parent would sever that access even if storage is elsewhere.
|
|
260
|
+
if (inside_path(physical, workspace) and
|
|
261
|
+
any(inside_path(storage, physical) for storage in
|
|
262
|
+
(trash_physical, _physical_keep_final(trash_root)))):
|
|
263
|
+
return True
|
|
264
|
+
controls = {MANIFEST_NAME, AUDIT_NAME, STATE_NAME, STATE_NAME + ".tmp",
|
|
265
|
+
"sessions"}
|
|
266
|
+
for candidate in (physical, _physical_keep_final(absolute)):
|
|
267
|
+
if inside_path(candidate, trash_physical):
|
|
268
|
+
relative = os.path.relpath(candidate, trash_physical)
|
|
269
|
+
if relative.split(os.sep)[0] in controls:
|
|
270
|
+
return True
|
|
271
|
+
return False
|
|
272
|
+
|
|
273
|
+
|
|
251
274
|
def workspace_boundary_root(workspace: str) -> str:
|
|
252
275
|
"""Physical form of a workspace root, for callers that compare roots."""
|
|
253
276
|
return _physical(os.path.normpath(os.path.abspath(workspace)))
|
|
@@ -363,6 +386,9 @@ def classify_paths(
|
|
|
363
386
|
# content. `rm -rf .` stays a hard BLOCK. (When no trash_root is
|
|
364
387
|
# given, trash_physical is None and cannot match a real path.)
|
|
365
388
|
spec.protected = "workspace-root"
|
|
389
|
+
elif trash_root and _quarantine_control_path(
|
|
390
|
+
absolute, physical, trash_root, trash_physical, workspace):
|
|
391
|
+
spec.protected = "quarantine-control"
|
|
366
392
|
elif not spec.inside_workspace:
|
|
367
393
|
spec.protected = "outside-workspace"
|
|
368
394
|
else:
|
|
@@ -839,9 +865,21 @@ def _parse_git(segment: List[str]) -> OpSpec:
|
|
|
839
865
|
if "--hard" in rest:
|
|
840
866
|
spec.kind = KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD
|
|
841
867
|
spec.force = True
|
|
842
|
-
|
|
843
|
-
|
|
844
|
-
|
|
868
|
+
for tok in rest:
|
|
869
|
+
if tok in ("--hard", "-q", "--quiet"):
|
|
870
|
+
continue
|
|
871
|
+
if tok.startswith("-"):
|
|
872
|
+
spec.undeterminable = True
|
|
873
|
+
spec.note("unsupported hard reset option or path limit")
|
|
874
|
+
continue
|
|
875
|
+
spec.targets.append(tok)
|
|
876
|
+
if len(spec.targets) > 1:
|
|
877
|
+
spec.undeterminable = True
|
|
878
|
+
spec.note("hard reset requires a single target commit")
|
|
879
|
+
_scan_targets(spec)
|
|
880
|
+
if spec.wildcard:
|
|
881
|
+
spec.undeterminable = True
|
|
882
|
+
spec.note("hard reset target contains shell glob syntax")
|
|
845
883
|
if not spec.targets:
|
|
846
884
|
spec.note("whole-tree reset (no path limit)")
|
|
847
885
|
apply_global_uncertainty()
|
|
@@ -947,16 +985,17 @@ def _has_create_redirect(segment: List[str]) -> bool:
|
|
|
947
985
|
|
|
948
986
|
|
|
949
987
|
def _apply_shape_rules(specs: List[OpSpec], cd_positions: List[int],
|
|
950
|
-
creation_positions: List[int]
|
|
951
|
-
|
|
988
|
+
creation_positions: List[int],
|
|
989
|
+
segment_count: int = 1) -> None:
|
|
990
|
+
"""Whole-command-line restrictions (docs/history/friction.md F1/F2).
|
|
952
991
|
|
|
953
992
|
F1: a destructive op preceded by cd resolves against the wrong working
|
|
954
993
|
directory - compensation would enumerate/snapshot the wrong tree.
|
|
955
994
|
Applies to every destructive kind.
|
|
956
995
|
F2: a target created earlier in the same line does not exist yet at
|
|
957
996
|
interception time, so target-dependent compensation cannot cover it.
|
|
958
|
-
|
|
959
|
-
|
|
997
|
+
Force-push, which is blocked anyway, is exempt. Hard reset also
|
|
998
|
+
needs a preflight of untracked content against its target tree.
|
|
960
999
|
Shapes are DECISION-CLASS facts, not effect-uncertainty: the operation
|
|
961
1000
|
itself is well understood, only its safe automatic compensation is not.
|
|
962
1001
|
Policy maps them to ASK (single-execution authorization), keeping true
|
|
@@ -966,6 +1005,10 @@ def _apply_shape_rules(specs: List[OpSpec], cd_positions: List[int],
|
|
|
966
1005
|
if spec.kind in (KIND_OTHER, KIND_UNKNOWN):
|
|
967
1006
|
continue
|
|
968
1007
|
idx = spec.segment_index
|
|
1008
|
+
if spec.kind == KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD and segment_count != 1:
|
|
1009
|
+
spec.undeterminable = True
|
|
1010
|
+
spec.note("hard reset must be a standalone command; other "
|
|
1011
|
+
"segments may change its target or collisions")
|
|
969
1012
|
if any(pos < idx for pos in cd_positions):
|
|
970
1013
|
spec.shape = "F1"
|
|
971
1014
|
spec.note(
|
|
@@ -1152,14 +1195,19 @@ def _classify_posix(cmd: str) -> Tuple[List[OpSpec], Optional[str]]:
|
|
|
1152
1195
|
elif head == "find":
|
|
1153
1196
|
emit(_parse_find(seg), index)
|
|
1154
1197
|
elif head == "git":
|
|
1155
|
-
|
|
1198
|
+
spec = _parse_git(seg)
|
|
1199
|
+
if spec.kind == KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD and len(seg) != len(segment):
|
|
1200
|
+
spec.undeterminable = True
|
|
1201
|
+
spec.note("hard reset wrappers may change its Git context")
|
|
1202
|
+
emit(spec, index)
|
|
1156
1203
|
# anything else: kind OTHER, intentionally ignored by policy
|
|
1157
1204
|
|
|
1158
1205
|
for spec in specs:
|
|
1159
1206
|
spec.dialect = dialects.DIALECT_POSIX
|
|
1160
1207
|
_append_dialect_mismatches(
|
|
1161
1208
|
specs, command_segments, dialects.DIALECT_POSIX)
|
|
1162
|
-
_apply_shape_rules(specs, cd_positions, creation_positions
|
|
1209
|
+
_apply_shape_rules(specs, cd_positions, creation_positions,
|
|
1210
|
+
len(raw_segments))
|
|
1163
1211
|
return [s for s in specs if s.kind != KIND_OTHER], None
|
|
1164
1212
|
|
|
1165
1213
|
|
|
@@ -1189,7 +1237,7 @@ def _classify_windows_dialect(cmd: str, dialect: str
|
|
|
1189
1237
|
accepts `/`, while leaving `\\` in the fact makes Linux and Windows CI
|
|
1190
1238
|
disagree about the same command.
|
|
1191
1239
|
|
|
1192
|
-
Shape rules (docs/friction.md F1/F2) apply to Windows lines too: `cd`
|
|
1240
|
+
Shape rules (docs/history/friction.md F1/F2) apply to Windows lines too: `cd`
|
|
1193
1241
|
and the interpreter prefix set are shared shell concepts, so F1 means
|
|
1194
1242
|
the same thing in cmd and PowerShell.
|
|
1195
1243
|
"""
|
|
@@ -1213,7 +1261,8 @@ def _classify_windows_dialect(cmd: str, dialect: str
|
|
|
1213
1261
|
spec.targets = [t.replace("\\", "/") for t in spec.targets]
|
|
1214
1262
|
_attribute_targets(spec)
|
|
1215
1263
|
_append_dialect_mismatches(specs, stream.segments, dialect)
|
|
1216
|
-
_apply_shape_rules(specs, cd_positions, creation_positions
|
|
1264
|
+
_apply_shape_rules(specs, cd_positions, creation_positions,
|
|
1265
|
+
len(stream.segments))
|
|
1217
1266
|
return [s for s in specs if s.kind != KIND_OTHER], None
|
|
1218
1267
|
|
|
1219
1268
|
|
|
@@ -1230,7 +1279,7 @@ def classify_command(cmd: str, dialect: str = dialects.DEFAULT_DIALECT
|
|
|
1230
1279
|
dialect layer exists to prevent.
|
|
1231
1280
|
|
|
1232
1281
|
Heredoc bodies are stripped before POSIX parsing (they are written
|
|
1233
|
-
payload, not commands - see docs/friction.md F5).
|
|
1282
|
+
payload, not commands - see docs/history/friction.md F5).
|
|
1234
1283
|
|
|
1235
1284
|
Returns (specs, parse_error). Segments that are not destructive are
|
|
1236
1285
|
returned as kind=OTHER and ignored by policy. A parse_error (unbalanced
|
package/core/policy.py
CHANGED
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The stable cross-harness interface is NOT allow/block. It is:
|
|
|
7
7
|
+ Explanation
|
|
8
8
|
+ RecoveryPlan (payload)
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
Decision classes (docs/architecture.md):
|
|
10
|
+
Decision classes (docs/design/architecture.md):
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
ALLOW safe to run as-is (noop / provably regenerable / trash GC)
|
|
13
13
|
RELOCATE compensate by quarantine, then run
|
|
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ CODE_ASK_PATH_EMISSION = "ASK_PATH_EMISSION"
|
|
|
118
118
|
CODE_ALLOW_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER = "ALLOW_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER"
|
|
119
119
|
CODE_ALLOW_PATH_IN_WORKSPACE = "ALLOW_PATH_IN_WORKSPACE"
|
|
120
120
|
CODE_BLOCK_COMPENSATION_FAILED = "COMPENSATION_FAILED"
|
|
121
|
+
CODE_BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION = "BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION"
|
|
121
122
|
|
|
122
123
|
# Human-facing one-liners: why the guard cannot just do it (or did do it).
|
|
123
124
|
EXPLANATIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
|
|
@@ -137,6 +138,11 @@ EXPLANATIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
|
|
|
137
138
|
"real command ran.",
|
|
138
139
|
CODE_SNAPSHOT_GIT_STASH: "Tracked modifications snapshotted as a stash "
|
|
139
140
|
"before the command; apply it to recover.",
|
|
141
|
+
CODE_BLOCK_GIT_RESET_COLLISION: "git reset --hard would overwrite "
|
|
142
|
+
"untracked or ignored content, or "
|
|
143
|
+
"quarantine storage, that a tracked-only "
|
|
144
|
+
"stash cannot protect. Preserve the "
|
|
145
|
+
"conflicting paths separately first.",
|
|
140
146
|
CODE_ASK_COMPOUND_CWD_DELETE: "This line combines a working-directory "
|
|
141
147
|
"change with deletion, so the guard "
|
|
142
148
|
"cannot safely relocate the target before "
|
|
@@ -160,8 +166,10 @@ EXPLANATIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
|
|
|
160
166
|
"/usr, /etc, ...), regardless of the "
|
|
161
167
|
"workspace setting. Hard boundary - not "
|
|
162
168
|
"askable.",
|
|
163
|
-
CODE_BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH: "Target is
|
|
164
|
-
"
|
|
169
|
+
CODE_BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH: "Target is a protected workspace, Git or "
|
|
170
|
+
"quarantine control path. Hard boundary - "
|
|
171
|
+
"not askable; quarantine transaction cleanup "
|
|
172
|
+
"uses the explicit GC entry point.",
|
|
165
173
|
CODE_BLOCK_WILDCARD: "Glob target sets are opaque; use safe_delete, "
|
|
166
174
|
"which expands globs explicitly.",
|
|
167
175
|
CODE_BLOCK_RESTRICTED_MODE: "This session is in RESTRICTED mode; the "
|
|
@@ -491,7 +499,20 @@ def decide_path_batch(specs: List[PathSpec], ctx: PolicyContext,
|
|
|
491
499
|
[f"protected filesystem root: {s.raw}"
|
|
492
500
|
for s in protected_ancestor[:5]])
|
|
493
501
|
|
|
502
|
+
# Housekeeping never overrides root, control-file or Git protection.
|
|
503
|
+
protected_other = [s for s in specs
|
|
504
|
+
if s.protected in ("workspace-root", "git-metadata",
|
|
505
|
+
"quarantine-control")]
|
|
506
|
+
if protected_other:
|
|
507
|
+
return Verdict(DECISION_BLOCK, CODE_BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH,
|
|
508
|
+
[f"protected: {s.protected} ({s.raw})"
|
|
509
|
+
for s in protected_other[:5]])
|
|
510
|
+
|
|
494
511
|
if specs and all(s.inside_trash for s in specs):
|
|
512
|
+
if any(s.wildcard for s in specs):
|
|
513
|
+
return Verdict(DECISION_BLOCK, CODE_BLOCK_WILDCARD,
|
|
514
|
+
["quarantine globs may include protected evidence; "
|
|
515
|
+
"enumerate explicitly with safe_delete"])
|
|
495
516
|
return Verdict(DECISION_ALLOW, CODE_ALLOW_TRASH_GC)
|
|
496
517
|
|
|
497
518
|
protected_outside = [s for s in specs
|
|
@@ -501,13 +522,6 @@ def decide_path_batch(specs: List[PathSpec], ctx: PolicyContext,
|
|
|
501
522
|
[f"outside workspace boundary: {s.raw}"
|
|
502
523
|
for s in protected_outside[:5]])
|
|
503
524
|
|
|
504
|
-
protected_other = [s for s in specs
|
|
505
|
-
if s.protected in ("workspace-root", "git-metadata")]
|
|
506
|
-
if protected_other:
|
|
507
|
-
return Verdict(DECISION_BLOCK, CODE_BLOCK_PROTECTED_PATH,
|
|
508
|
-
[f"protected: {s.protected} ({s.raw})"
|
|
509
|
-
for s in protected_other[:5]])
|
|
510
|
-
|
|
511
525
|
wild = [s for s in specs if s.wildcard]
|
|
512
526
|
if wild:
|
|
513
527
|
return Verdict(DECISION_BLOCK, CODE_BLOCK_WILDCARD,
|
|
@@ -607,7 +621,7 @@ def decide_op(spec: OpSpec, ctx: PolicyContext) -> Optional[Verdict]:
|
|
|
607
621
|
# when the target set also trips a hard boundary, that boundary wins.
|
|
608
622
|
# Without this, `cd /tmp && rm -rf /home` degrades a hard refusal into
|
|
609
623
|
# an ASK - and any auto-approving host grants an ASK silently, which is
|
|
610
|
-
# the incident finding described in docs/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md.
|
|
624
|
+
# the incident finding described in docs/history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md.
|
|
611
625
|
if spec.shape in ("F1", "F2"):
|
|
612
626
|
ask_code = (CODE_ASK_COMPOUND_CWD_DELETE if spec.shape == "F1"
|
|
613
627
|
else CODE_ASK_COMPOUND_CREATE_DELETE)
|
|
@@ -648,8 +662,9 @@ def decide_op(spec: OpSpec, ctx: PolicyContext) -> Optional[Verdict]:
|
|
|
648
662
|
if spec.kind == KIND_GIT_RESET_HARD:
|
|
649
663
|
return Verdict(
|
|
650
664
|
DECISION_SNAPSHOT, CODE_SNAPSHOT_GIT_STASH,
|
|
651
|
-
["
|
|
652
|
-
"
|
|
665
|
+
["preflight untracked/ignored collisions with the target tree, "
|
|
666
|
+
"then snapshot tracked modifications via git stash "
|
|
667
|
+
"create/store before reset --hard"],
|
|
653
668
|
)
|
|
654
669
|
|
|
655
670
|
if spec.kind == KIND_GIT_DISCARD:
|