@mokuyoaxis/agent-guard 0.2.3-rc2 → 0.2.4-hotfix.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +132 -84
- package/README.zh-CN.md +109 -75
- package/adapters/INTEGRATION.md +4 -4
- package/adapters/claude/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/claude/harness/README.md +1 -1
- package/adapters/codex/harness/README.md +2 -2
- package/adapters/dsh/README.md +24 -15
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/README.md +75 -19
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/bootstrap.patch.yml +5 -0
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/bootstrap_init.mjs +48 -0
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/guard_lab.py +194 -32
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/native_session.py +41 -20
- package/adapters/dsh/harness/profiles.py +74 -22
- package/adapters/dsh/lib/index.js +1 -1
- package/adapters/kimi-code/README.md +15 -14
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/README.md +3 -3
- package/adapters/kimi-code/harness/guard_lab.py +1 -1
- package/core/__init__.py +1 -1
- package/core/classifier.py +66 -17
- package/core/lab.py +24 -1
- package/core/policy.py +28 -13
- package/core/recovery.py +256 -23
- package/core/redaction.py +157 -55
- package/core/trash_index.py +193 -0
- package/docs/README.md +104 -0
- package/docs/{architecture.md → design/architecture.md} +31 -6
- package/docs/{compatibility.md → design/compatibility.md} +80 -4
- package/docs/{threat-model.md → design/threat-model.md} +4 -4
- package/docs/{harness-capabilities.md → guides/harness-capabilities.md} +9 -9
- package/docs/guides/trash-index.md +106 -0
- package/docs/{development-note-unguarded-deletion.md → history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md} +8 -9
- package/docs/{friction.md → history/friction.md} +129 -4
- package/docs/{secret-guard-analysis.md → history/secret-guard-analysis.md} +23 -22
- package/docs/{secret-guard-architecture.md → history/secret-guard-architecture.md} +6 -4
- package/docs/{secret-guard-design.md → history/secret-guard-design.md} +19 -15
- package/docs/lab/cases/injection-case-fake-ai-api.md +346 -0
- package/docs/{guard-lab.md → lab/guard-lab.md} +18 -11
- package/docs/lab/tasks/guard-lab-read-trial-task.md +7 -0
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.0.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.0.md} +7 -7
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.1.md} +6 -6
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.2.md} +9 -10
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md} +4 -2
- package/docs/{release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md → releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md} +9 -9
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.3.md +84 -0
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.4-hotfix.1.md +75 -0
- package/docs/releases/release-notes-0.2.4.md +89 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-claude-code-harness.md → reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md} +5 -5
- package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md} +10 -11
- package/docs/reports/test-report-dsh-0.2.4-ptc.md +79 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-native-session.md → reports/test-report-dsh-native-session.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md → reports/test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-real-followup.md → reports/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md → reports/test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md} +1 -1
- package/docs/{test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md} +4 -4
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-code-block.md → reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md} +22 -23
- package/docs/{test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md → reports/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md} +3 -3
- package/docs/{test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md → reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md} +79 -1
- package/docs/reports/test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md +53 -0
- package/docs/{test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md → reports/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md} +11 -11
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md +40 -3
- package/skills/delete-guard/references/policy.md +29 -9
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/check.py +19 -0
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/restore.py +18 -6
- package/skills/delete-guard/scripts/status.py +52 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/SKILL.md +37 -7
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/channels.md +1 -1
- package/skills/exfil-guard/references/rules.md +84 -16
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/_payload.py +99 -0
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/check_span.py +14 -81
- package/skills/exfil-guard/scripts/sanitize.py +113 -34
- package/docs/release-notes-0.2.3.md +0 -45
- /package/docs/{host-drift.md → guides/host-drift.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md → guides/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-clean-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{guard-lab-trial-task.md → lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md → reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md → reports/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md} +0 -0
- /package/docs/{test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md → reports/test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md} +0 -0
package/core/redaction.py
CHANGED
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@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import platform
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import re
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Sequence, Set, Tuple
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from urllib.parse import unquote
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# ------------------------------------------------------------- span types
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@@ -50,8 +51,10 @@ RULE_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = "secret/aws-access-key-id"
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RULE_GITLAB_TOKEN = "secret/gitlab-token"
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RULE_SLACK_TOKEN = "secret/slack-token"
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RULE_STRIPE_KEY = "secret/stripe-key"
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RULE_PYPI_TOKEN = "secret/pypi-token"
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RULE_JWT = "secret/jwt"
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RULE_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = "secret/private-key-block"
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RULE_CONNECTION_PASSWORD = "secret/connection-password"
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# A value-free reference to a secret source (env var name / secret store).
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RULE_SECRET_SOURCE = "secret/source-reference"
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@@ -131,12 +134,27 @@ PLACEHOLDER_WORDS = frozenset({
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"dummy", "example", "sample", "fake", "test", "testing", "todo",
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"placeholder", "redacted", "none", "null", "notset", "unset",
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"xxxx", "xxxxxxxx", "yourtoken", "mysupersecret", "hunter2",
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"dummy_value", "dummy_key", "dummy_token", "example_secret",
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"example_key", "example_token", "sample_key", "sample_token",
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"fake_key", "fake_token", "test_key", "test_token",
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})
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_PLACEHOLDER_NORMALIZED_WORDS = frozenset(word.replace("-", "_") for word in PLACEHOLDER_WORDS)
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# Public AWS documentation examples, preserved as exact values rather than
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# granting amnesty to every random credential ending in "example".
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_PUBLIC_EXAMPLE_VALUES = frozenset({"AKIA" + "IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", "ASIA" + "IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"})
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# Marker shapes: <REDACTED>, [REDACTED], ***, _<<REDACTED>>_ ...
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_PLACEHOLDER_SHAPE_RE = re.compile(
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r"^[\W_]*(?:redacted|removed|hidden|scrubbed|elided|omitted)[\W_]*$",
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re.IGNORECASE)
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_REDACTED_MARKER = "<REDACTED>"
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# Only remove a public, reviewed prefix before checking a whole placeholder
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# body. Words embedded in random credential bytes are never exemptions.
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_PLACEHOLDER_VENDOR_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
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r"^(?:sk-proj-|sk-ant-(?:api03-)?|sk-live-|sk-|(?:sk|rk)_live_|"
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r"(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_|github_pat_|glpat-|xox[baprs]-|pypi-|"
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r"AKIA|ASIA)")
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_PLACEHOLDER_TEMPLATE_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:<[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*>|\$\{[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\})\Z")
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# A token is only a placeholder if its *alphabet* is trivial (one symbol,
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# '*'/'x'/'.' runs, sequences like abcdef) or if it is a known word. The
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@@ -174,43 +192,25 @@ def is_placeholder(token: str) -> bool:
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def _is_placeholder(token: str) -> bool:
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value = token.strip().strip("'\"`()
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value = token.strip().strip("'\"`()").strip()
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if not value:
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return False
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if value
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return True # idempotence (design 2.5)
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if _PLACEHOLDER_SHAPE_RE.match(value):
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if value in _PUBLIC_EXAMPLE_VALUES:
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return True
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flat = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "", word)
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if collapsed == flat:
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return True
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# Prefixed/suffixed word: "EXAMPLE_SECRET", "sk-test", "fake-key".
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# Only the documented words count, so ordinary credentials are
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# untouched (a real key never ends in "token").
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if collapsed.startswith(flat) or collapsed.endswith(flat):
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return True
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value = _PLACEHOLDER_VENDOR_PREFIX_RE.sub("", value, count=1)
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if not value:
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return False
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if _PLACEHOLDER_SHAPE_RE.fullmatch(value) or _PLACEHOLDER_TEMPLATE_RE.fullmatch(value):
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return True # whole marker/template only
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normalized = value.lower().replace("-", "_")
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if normalized in _PLACEHOLDER_NORMALIZED_WORDS:
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return True # finite whole-word examples
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return _is_trivial_alphabet(value)
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def _looks_placeholderish(token: str) -> bool:
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"""
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return True
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if len(set(token)) <= 1:
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return True
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collapsed = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "", token).lower()
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if not collapsed:
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return True
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return any(w in collapsed for w in ("xxx", "redact", "placeholder",
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"changeme", "dummy"))
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"""Compatibility predicate with the same exact whole-value contract."""
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return is_placeholder(token)
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# -------------------------------------------------------- T1 vendor patterns
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# distinct enough that an anchored prefix + shape gives near-zero false
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# positives; where the format allows, a validator adds real structure
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# (design 2.2 rule 1 - a JWT is only a JWT if its header decodes).
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# ASCII identifier boundaries allow adjacent CJK prose, while still refusing
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# substrings of English identifiers. Unicode \b conflates those two cases.
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_TOKEN_START = r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])"
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_TOKEN_END = r"(?![A-Za-z0-9_])"
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_OPENAI_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"sk-(?:proj|ant|live)?-?([A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,})")
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_GITHUB_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}" + _TOKEN_END
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+ r"|" + _TOKEN_START + r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,255}" + _TOKEN_END)
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# The vendor's ghs_APPID_JWT wrapper; app ID is an opaque ASCII field.
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# No fixed total length, business claims or signature authentication.
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_GITHUB_INSTALLATION_RE = re.compile(
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_TOKEN_START + r"ghs_[A-Za-z0-9-]+_(?P<header>[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,})"
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r"\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}"
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r"(?![A-Za-z0-9_-]|\.[A-Za-z0-9_-])")
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# IAM group/user/role/policy IDs have separate public resource prefixes.
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# They are not access-key IDs; other credential contexts still apply.
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_AWS_KEY_ID_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}" + _TOKEN_END)
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_GITLAB_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}")
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_SLACK_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}")
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_STRIPE_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"(?:sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}")
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# PyPI's documented scanner format allows arbitrary Macaroon caveat length.
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# Capture the entire base64url body, rather than an 85-character prefix.
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_PYPI_RE = re.compile(_TOKEN_START + r"pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{85,}")
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_JWT_RE = re.compile(
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-
r"
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_TOKEN_START + r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{4,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{4,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{4,}")
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_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(
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r"-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z0-9]+ )*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?"
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r"-----END (?:[A-Z0-9]+ )*PRIVATE KEY-----",
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re.DOTALL)
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# URI userinfo is an explicit credential context (RFC 3986 section 3.2.1).
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# Work on original coordinates instead of urlsplit: URL parsers normalize
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# input and cannot provide exact offsets for a serialized JSON payload.
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# A JSON-escaped slash is accepted only at the scheme separator. Other
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# encoded delimiters stay in the password's original, replaceable span.
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_CONNECTION_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+.-])[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,63}:(?:/|\\/){2}")
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_CONNECTION_AUTHORITY_RE = re.compile(r"[^\s/?#\"'`]+")
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_CONNECTION_TEMPLATE_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:<[^<>@]+>|\$\{[^{}@]+\}|%[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*%)\Z")
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def _connection_passwords(text: str, channel: str) -> List[SpanSpec]:
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"""Detect nonempty URI passwords; preserve account and host information.
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Plain weak passwords are still passwords. Unlike vendor test tokens,
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short/repeated literals and words such as 'test' are not exempt here.
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Only whole template expressions and redaction markers are exempt.
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Raw '/', '?', '#' and quoting delimit authority; they must be encoded
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within a URI password. This is not a general DSN or obfuscation parser.
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"""
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spans = []
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for prefix in _CONNECTION_PREFIX_RE.finditer(text):
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match = _CONNECTION_AUTHORITY_RE.match(text, prefix.end())
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if match is None:
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continue
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authority = match.group(0)
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at = authority.rfind("@")
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colon = authority.find(":")
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if colon < 0 or at <= colon + 1 or at == len(authority) - 1:
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continue
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# Last @ also withholds the complete password in a common malformed
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# spelling containing a literal @; never leave a password suffix.
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start, end = match.start() + colon + 1, match.start() + at
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raw = text[start:end]
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# Decode only to recognize an explicit template; arbitrary byte
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# passwords need not be UTF-8 and are still redacted as raw spans.
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decoded = unquote(raw, errors="replace")
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if (_CONNECTION_TEMPLATE_RE.fullmatch(raw) or
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_CONNECTION_TEMPLATE_RE.fullmatch(decoded) or
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_PLACEHOLDER_SHAPE_RE.fullmatch(decoded) or
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re.fullmatch(r"\*{3,}", decoded)):
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continue
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spans.append(SpanSpec(
|
|
293
|
+
raw=raw, start=start, end=end,
|
|
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|
+
rule_id=RULE_CONNECTION_PASSWORD, family=FAMILY_SECRET,
|
|
295
|
+
confidence=CONFIDENCE_DETERMINISTIC,
|
|
296
|
+
context="uri-userinfo", channel=channel,
|
|
297
|
+
notes=["nonempty password in URI userinfo; account and host retained"]))
|
|
298
|
+
return spans
|
|
299
|
+
|
|
300
|
+
|
|
234
301
|
# Secret-store file names: a *path* fact (design 2.4 item 3). Reading these
|
|
235
302
|
# on an outbound channel is refused rather than sanitized, because the
|
|
236
303
|
# guard cannot see the content it would be rewriting.
|
|
@@ -267,7 +334,7 @@ ENV_DUMP_RE = re.compile(
|
|
|
267
334
|
|
|
268
335
|
|
|
269
336
|
def _b64url_json_has_alg(segment: str) -> bool:
|
|
270
|
-
"""Structural
|
|
337
|
+
"""Structural JWS check: JSON object with a nonempty ASCII `alg` string."""
|
|
271
338
|
if len(segment) % 4 == 1:
|
|
272
339
|
return False
|
|
273
340
|
padded = segment + "=" * (-len(segment) % 4)
|
|
@@ -279,7 +346,12 @@ def _b64url_json_has_alg(segment: str) -> bool:
|
|
|
279
346
|
header = json.loads(decoded.decode("utf-8"))
|
|
280
347
|
except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
|
|
281
348
|
return False
|
|
282
|
-
|
|
349
|
+
if not isinstance(header, dict):
|
|
350
|
+
return False
|
|
351
|
+
alg = header.get("alg")
|
|
352
|
+
# RFC 7515 4.1.1 declares ASCII StringOrURI. Do not infer authentication,
|
|
353
|
+
# validate business claims or restrict the caller to a known enum.
|
|
354
|
+
return isinstance(alg, str) and bool(alg) and alg.isascii()
|
|
283
355
|
|
|
284
356
|
|
|
285
357
|
def _note_context(text: str, index: int) -> str:
|
|
@@ -301,7 +373,7 @@ def detect_secrets(text: str, channel: str = "") -> List[SpanSpec]:
|
|
|
301
373
|
|
|
302
374
|
def add(match: "re.Match[str]", rule_id: str, notes: Iterable[str] = ()):
|
|
303
375
|
raw = match.group(0)
|
|
304
|
-
if is_placeholder(raw)
|
|
376
|
+
if is_placeholder(raw):
|
|
305
377
|
return
|
|
306
378
|
spans.append(SpanSpec(
|
|
307
379
|
raw=raw, start=match.start(), end=match.end(), rule_id=rule_id,
|
|
@@ -316,6 +388,9 @@ def detect_secrets(text: str, channel: str = "") -> List[SpanSpec]:
|
|
|
316
388
|
add(match, RULE_OPENAI_KEY, ["vendor prefix + length + charset"])
|
|
317
389
|
for match in _GITHUB_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
318
390
|
add(match, RULE_GITHUB_TOKEN, ["fixed-format vendor prefix"])
|
|
391
|
+
for match in _GITHUB_INSTALLATION_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
392
|
+
if len(match.group(0)) >= 40 and _b64url_json_has_alg(match.group("header")):
|
|
393
|
+
add(match, RULE_GITHUB_TOKEN, ["vendor installation wrapper + structural JWT header"])
|
|
319
394
|
for match in _AWS_KEY_ID_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
320
395
|
add(match, RULE_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ["reserved vendor prefix"])
|
|
321
396
|
for match in _GITLAB_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
@@ -324,11 +399,14 @@ def detect_secrets(text: str, channel: str = "") -> List[SpanSpec]:
|
|
|
324
399
|
add(match, RULE_SLACK_TOKEN, ["vendor prefix"])
|
|
325
400
|
for match in _STRIPE_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
326
401
|
add(match, RULE_STRIPE_KEY, ["prefix + live mode (test keys exempt)"])
|
|
402
|
+
for match in _PYPI_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
403
|
+
add(match, RULE_PYPI_TOKEN, ["vendor prefix + documented base64url minimum"])
|
|
327
404
|
for match in _JWT_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
328
405
|
header = match.group(0).split(".", 1)[0]
|
|
329
406
|
if not _b64url_json_has_alg(header):
|
|
330
407
|
continue
|
|
331
408
|
add(match, RULE_JWT, ["header segment decodes to JSON containing alg"])
|
|
409
|
+
spans.extend(_connection_passwords(text, channel))
|
|
332
410
|
return merge_spans(spans)
|
|
333
411
|
|
|
334
412
|
|
|
@@ -859,11 +937,31 @@ SECRET_STORE_RE = re.compile(
|
|
|
859
937
|
# A variable *name* that marks its value as secret-bearing. Classification
|
|
860
938
|
# is by name only; the guard never reads the value (design 2.4 item 1).
|
|
861
939
|
SECRET_NAME_RE = re.compile(
|
|
862
|
-
r"
|
|
863
|
-
r"(
|
|
864
|
-
r"|\$
|
|
865
|
-
r"|%([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*
|
|
866
|
-
|
|
940
|
+
r"\$env:([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)"
|
|
941
|
+
r"|\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)(?:\}|(?=[:/#%+?=\-]))"
|
|
942
|
+
r"|\$([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)"
|
|
943
|
+
r"|%([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)%", re.IGNORECASE)
|
|
944
|
+
_SECRET_NAME_COMPONENTS = frozenset({
|
|
945
|
+
"KEY", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PASSWD", "CRED", "AUTH", "APIKEY",
|
|
946
|
+
"CREDENTIAL", "CREDENTIALS",
|
|
947
|
+
})
|
|
948
|
+
_SECRET_NAME_METADATA = frozenset({"COUNT", "LENGTH", "ENABLED"})
|
|
949
|
+
|
|
950
|
+
|
|
951
|
+
def _secret_bearing_name(name: str, *, explicit_environment: bool = False) -> bool:
|
|
952
|
+
# Preserve acronym/camelCase components: ApiKey, APIKey, accessToken.
|
|
953
|
+
separated = re.sub(r"([A-Z]+)([A-Z][a-z])", r"\1_\2", name)
|
|
954
|
+
separated = re.sub(r"([a-z0-9])([A-Z])", r"\1_\2", separated)
|
|
955
|
+
components = [part.upper() for part in separated.split("_") if part]
|
|
956
|
+
# A lone lower/title-case `key` is also a common dictionary/schema key
|
|
957
|
+
# in template expressions. Do not infer a credential from that word
|
|
958
|
+
# alone. KEY, qualified apiKey and explicit env syntax stay protected.
|
|
959
|
+
# This is a name ambiguity, not a JavaScript/file-extension exemption.
|
|
960
|
+
if (components == ["KEY"] and name.strip("_") != "KEY"
|
|
961
|
+
and not explicit_environment):
|
|
962
|
+
return False
|
|
963
|
+
return (bool(components) and components[-1] not in _SECRET_NAME_METADATA
|
|
964
|
+
and any(part in _SECRET_NAME_COMPONENTS for part in components))
|
|
867
965
|
|
|
868
966
|
|
|
869
967
|
def _secret_source_reference(text: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, int, int, str]]:
|
|
@@ -889,11 +987,12 @@ def _secret_source_reference(text: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, int, int, str]]:
|
|
|
889
987
|
if match:
|
|
890
988
|
return match.group(0), match.start(), match.end(), \
|
|
891
989
|
"secret store: " + match.group(0)
|
|
892
|
-
match
|
|
893
|
-
if match:
|
|
990
|
+
for match in SECRET_NAME_RE.finditer(text):
|
|
894
991
|
name = next(g for g in match.groups() if g)
|
|
895
|
-
|
|
896
|
-
|
|
992
|
+
explicit_environment = match.group(1) is not None or match.group(4) is not None
|
|
993
|
+
if _secret_bearing_name(name, explicit_environment=explicit_environment):
|
|
994
|
+
return match.group(0), match.start(), match.end(), \
|
|
995
|
+
"secret-bearing name: " + name
|
|
897
996
|
return None
|
|
898
997
|
|
|
899
998
|
|
|
@@ -1044,8 +1143,8 @@ def scan_text(text: str, channel: str = "",
|
|
|
1044
1143
|
exemption: Optional[Exemption] = None) -> ScanResult:
|
|
1045
1144
|
"""Detect every secret/path span in `text` (facts only).
|
|
1046
1145
|
|
|
1047
|
-
Never returns a partial result as clean: an over-cap payload
|
|
1048
|
-
|
|
1146
|
+
Never returns a partial result as clean: an over-cap payload or an
|
|
1147
|
+
internal scanner error is reported via
|
|
1049
1148
|
`scanned=False`, which `policy.decide_spans` turns into
|
|
1050
1149
|
BLOCK_OUTPUT_UNSCANNABLE (design 6.3, fail closed).
|
|
1051
1150
|
"""
|
|
@@ -1090,7 +1189,10 @@ def scan_text(text: str, channel: str = "",
|
|
|
1090
1189
|
notes=["value-free reference detection", reason]))
|
|
1091
1190
|
if exemption is None:
|
|
1092
1191
|
exemption = load_exemption(workspace)
|
|
1093
|
-
|
|
1094
|
-
|
|
1095
|
-
|
|
1192
|
+
# A source-reference fact must survive even inside a redaction span:
|
|
1193
|
+
# masking a literal URI password is not permission to resolve an env
|
|
1194
|
+
# secret embedded there. The aggregate BLOCK prevents plan application.
|
|
1195
|
+
spans.sort(key=lambda span: (span.start, -span.length))
|
|
1196
|
+
result.spans = apply_exemption(spans, exemption, path, workspace)
|
|
1197
|
+
result.exempted = len(spans) - len(result.spans)
|
|
1096
1198
|
return result
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""Read-only quarantine locations for CLI, agent and future UI callers.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
This queries directory layout, not recovery contents or purge authority. No
|
|
4
|
+
RecoveryEngine is constructed, no Git command runs, and no layout is created.
|
|
5
|
+
"""
|
|
6
|
+
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
import errno
|
|
9
|
+
import os
|
|
10
|
+
import stat
|
|
11
|
+
from typing import Any, Dict, Iterable, List
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
from . import AUDIT_NAME, MANIFEST_NAME, STATE_NAME, TRASH_DIRNAME
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
|
|
17
|
+
DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 3
|
|
18
|
+
DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES = 10_000
|
|
19
|
+
EXCLUDED_DIRS = (".git", "node_modules", ".internal", "__pycache__")
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
def _paths(values: Iterable[str]) -> List[str]:
|
|
23
|
+
if isinstance(values, (str, bytes)):
|
|
24
|
+
raise ValueError("paths must be a sequence of text paths")
|
|
25
|
+
try:
|
|
26
|
+
values = iter(values)
|
|
27
|
+
except TypeError:
|
|
28
|
+
raise ValueError("paths must be a sequence of text paths") from None
|
|
29
|
+
result = []
|
|
30
|
+
for value in values:
|
|
31
|
+
try:
|
|
32
|
+
value = os.fspath(value)
|
|
33
|
+
except TypeError:
|
|
34
|
+
raise ValueError("paths must contain text paths") from None
|
|
35
|
+
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or "\0" in value:
|
|
36
|
+
raise ValueError("paths must contain nonempty text paths")
|
|
37
|
+
normalized = os.path.normpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(value)))
|
|
38
|
+
if normalized not in result:
|
|
39
|
+
result.append(normalized)
|
|
40
|
+
return result
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
def _error_code(exc: OSError) -> str:
|
|
44
|
+
if exc.errno in (errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM):
|
|
45
|
+
return "PERMISSION_DENIED"
|
|
46
|
+
if exc.errno == errno.ENOENT:
|
|
47
|
+
return "NOT_FOUND"
|
|
48
|
+
if exc.errno == errno.ENOTDIR:
|
|
49
|
+
return "NOT_DIRECTORY"
|
|
50
|
+
return "IO_ERROR"
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
def list_trash_locations(
|
|
54
|
+
roots: Iterable[str] = (), *, trash_paths: Iterable[str] = (),
|
|
55
|
+
max_depth: int = DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH,
|
|
56
|
+
max_entries: int = DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
57
|
+
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
58
|
+
"""Return schema v1 location candidates within explicit bounded roots.
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
Depth counts directories below a root: depth 0 still checks that root's
|
|
61
|
+
.agent-trash. A recognized bucket is never traversed. Ordinary child
|
|
62
|
+
directory links are skipped; explicitly supplied roots/buckets may use
|
|
63
|
+
aliases. Expected marker names are lstat'ed, never opened.
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
count includes unconfirmed/unreadable candidates; identified_count only
|
|
66
|
+
counts existing metadata layouts. Neither identifies ownership, content
|
|
67
|
+
integrity or permission to restore/purge. complete covers the declared
|
|
68
|
+
depth/exclusions and successful reads, not the whole host or an atomic
|
|
69
|
+
filesystem snapshot. Errors retain partial results.
|
|
70
|
+
"""
|
|
71
|
+
if type(max_depth) is not int or max_depth < 0:
|
|
72
|
+
raise ValueError("max_depth must be a nonnegative integer")
|
|
73
|
+
if type(max_entries) is not int or max_entries < 1:
|
|
74
|
+
raise ValueError("max_entries must be a positive integer")
|
|
75
|
+
roots, trash_paths = _paths(roots), _paths(trash_paths)
|
|
76
|
+
if not roots and not trash_paths:
|
|
77
|
+
raise ValueError("provide roots or trash_paths")
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
buckets: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
|
|
80
|
+
errors: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
|
|
81
|
+
visited: Dict[str, int] = {}
|
|
82
|
+
examined = 0
|
|
83
|
+
exhausted = False
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
def error(path: str, code: str) -> None:
|
|
86
|
+
record = {"path": path, "code": code}
|
|
87
|
+
if record not in errors:
|
|
88
|
+
errors.append(record)
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
def charge(path: str) -> bool:
|
|
91
|
+
nonlocal examined, exhausted
|
|
92
|
+
if examined >= max_entries:
|
|
93
|
+
if not exhausted:
|
|
94
|
+
error(path, "ENTRY_LIMIT_REACHED")
|
|
95
|
+
exhausted = True
|
|
96
|
+
return False
|
|
97
|
+
examined += 1
|
|
98
|
+
return True
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
def bucket(path: str, source: str) -> None:
|
|
101
|
+
try:
|
|
102
|
+
if not stat.S_ISDIR(os.stat(path).st_mode):
|
|
103
|
+
error(path, "NOT_DIRECTORY")
|
|
104
|
+
return
|
|
105
|
+
resolved = os.path.normpath(os.path.realpath(path))
|
|
106
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
107
|
+
error(path, _error_code(exc))
|
|
108
|
+
return
|
|
109
|
+
key = os.path.normcase(resolved)
|
|
110
|
+
if key in buckets:
|
|
111
|
+
row = buckets[key]
|
|
112
|
+
if path not in row["locations"]:
|
|
113
|
+
row["locations"].append(path)
|
|
114
|
+
if source not in row["sources"]:
|
|
115
|
+
row["sources"].append(source)
|
|
116
|
+
return
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
present = unreadable = False
|
|
119
|
+
for name in (MANIFEST_NAME, AUDIT_NAME, STATE_NAME, "sessions"):
|
|
120
|
+
try:
|
|
121
|
+
mode = os.lstat(os.path.join(path, name)).st_mode
|
|
122
|
+
present |= (stat.S_ISDIR(mode) if name == "sessions"
|
|
123
|
+
else stat.S_ISREG(mode))
|
|
124
|
+
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
125
|
+
continue
|
|
126
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
127
|
+
unreadable = True
|
|
128
|
+
error(path, _error_code(exc))
|
|
129
|
+
status = ("unreadable" if unreadable else
|
|
130
|
+
"metadata_present" if present else "unconfirmed")
|
|
131
|
+
buckets[key] = {
|
|
132
|
+
"trash_root": path, "resolved_trash_root": resolved,
|
|
133
|
+
"directory": os.path.dirname(path), "locations": [path],
|
|
134
|
+
"sources": [source], "status": status,
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
|
|
137
|
+
for path in trash_paths:
|
|
138
|
+
if not charge(path):
|
|
139
|
+
break
|
|
140
|
+
bucket(path, "declared")
|
|
141
|
+
|
|
142
|
+
for root in roots:
|
|
143
|
+
if exhausted:
|
|
144
|
+
break
|
|
145
|
+
stack = [(root, 0)]
|
|
146
|
+
while stack and not exhausted:
|
|
147
|
+
directory, depth = stack.pop()
|
|
148
|
+
if not charge(directory):
|
|
149
|
+
break
|
|
150
|
+
if os.path.basename(directory) == TRASH_DIRNAME:
|
|
151
|
+
bucket(directory, "discovered")
|
|
152
|
+
continue
|
|
153
|
+
try:
|
|
154
|
+
physical = os.path.normcase(os.path.realpath(directory))
|
|
155
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
156
|
+
error(directory, _error_code(exc))
|
|
157
|
+
continue
|
|
158
|
+
remaining = max_depth - depth
|
|
159
|
+
if visited.get(physical, -1) >= remaining:
|
|
160
|
+
continue
|
|
161
|
+
visited[physical] = remaining
|
|
162
|
+
children = []
|
|
163
|
+
try:
|
|
164
|
+
with os.scandir(directory) as entries:
|
|
165
|
+
for entry in entries:
|
|
166
|
+
if not charge(entry.path):
|
|
167
|
+
break
|
|
168
|
+
if entry.name == TRASH_DIRNAME:
|
|
169
|
+
bucket(entry.path, "discovered")
|
|
170
|
+
elif (depth < max_depth and entry.name not in EXCLUDED_DIRS
|
|
171
|
+
and entry.is_dir(follow_symlinks=False)):
|
|
172
|
+
children.append(entry.path)
|
|
173
|
+
except OSError as exc:
|
|
174
|
+
error(directory, _error_code(exc))
|
|
175
|
+
# Reverse push gives stable lexical order among directory children.
|
|
176
|
+
stack.extend((path, depth + 1) for path in sorted(children, reverse=True))
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
rows = sorted(buckets.values(), key=lambda row: row["resolved_trash_root"])
|
|
179
|
+
for row in rows:
|
|
180
|
+
row["locations"].sort()
|
|
181
|
+
row["sources"].sort()
|
|
182
|
+
row["trash_root"] = row["locations"][0]
|
|
183
|
+
row["directory"] = os.path.dirname(row["trash_root"])
|
|
184
|
+
return {
|
|
185
|
+
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
|
186
|
+
"roots": roots, "trash_paths": trash_paths,
|
|
187
|
+
"max_depth": max_depth, "max_entries": max_entries,
|
|
188
|
+
"excluded_dirs": list(EXCLUDED_DIRS), "examined": examined,
|
|
189
|
+
"complete": not errors,
|
|
190
|
+
"count": len(rows),
|
|
191
|
+
"identified_count": sum(row["status"] == "metadata_present" for row in rows),
|
|
192
|
+
"entries": rows, "errors": errors,
|
|
193
|
+
}
|
package/docs/README.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Documentation / 文档导航
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Start with the [harness capability matrix](guides/harness-capabilities.md) for
|
|
4
|
+
current coverage, the [architecture](design/architecture.md) for the shared
|
|
5
|
+
Core, and the [Lab guide](lab/guard-lab.md) for experiment semantics.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
先看当前能力矩阵、架构和 Lab 指南。测试报告按所测版本与配置保留;发布记录、
|
|
8
|
+
历史设计和外部案例各自归档,不能据此扩展当前产品的承诺。
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
| Category / 分类 | Contents / 内容 |
|
|
11
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
12
|
+
| [Guides](#guides) / 使用指南 | 宿主接入证据、漂移检查、维护者发布指南 |
|
|
13
|
+
| [Design](#design) / 架构与契约 | 当前架构、威胁模型与兼容契约 |
|
|
14
|
+
| [Lab](#lab) / 实验与候选素材 | Lab 流程、任务模板、外部攻击案例 |
|
|
15
|
+
| [Reports](#reports) / 测试报告 | 按宿主、版本和观察范围记录的证据 |
|
|
16
|
+
| [Releases](#releases) / 发布记录 | 正式版与预览版各自的范围 |
|
|
17
|
+
| [History](#history) / 历史设计与经验 | 早期设计、实现教训和事故探索 |
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
## Guides
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
22
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
23
|
+
| [Harness capabilities](guides/harness-capabilities.md) | 当前接入范围、证据等级与未验证路径 |
|
|
24
|
+
| [Host drift](guides/host-drift.md) | 宿主版本、配置与本地基线检查 |
|
|
25
|
+
| [Trash locations](guides/trash-index.md) | 0.2.4 的只读位置查询、Agent/前端共享 JSON 契约 |
|
|
26
|
+
| [Publishing from ephemeral environments](guides/publishing-from-ephemeral-environments.md) | 临时环境中的 GitHub 发布操作参考 |
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
Adapter setup remains in [adapters/](../adapters/INTEGRATION.md). Skill contracts
|
|
29
|
+
remain in [skills/](../skills/delete-guard/SKILL.md).
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
## Design
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
34
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
35
|
+
| [Architecture](design/architecture.md) | Core、Decision Protocol、适配器与数据流 |
|
|
36
|
+
| [Threat model](design/threat-model.md) | 资产、可信假设与已知防护边界 |
|
|
37
|
+
| [Compatibility](design/compatibility.md) | 适配器契约、接口兼容与版本约定 |
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
## Lab
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
42
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
43
|
+
| [Guard Lab guide](lab/guard-lab.md) | 操作流程、信道、L0/L1/L2 语义与限制 |
|
|
44
|
+
| [Clean task](lab/tasks/guard-lab-clean-task.md) | 干净对照任务模板 |
|
|
45
|
+
| [Injection trial task](lab/tasks/guard-lab-trial-task.md) | 提示注入试次任务模板 |
|
|
46
|
+
| [Native-read trial task](lab/tasks/guard-lab-read-trial-task.md) | 原生读取脱敏任务模板 |
|
|
47
|
+
| [fake-ai-api reference](lab/cases/injection-case-fake-ai-api.md) | 外部攻击端候选素材;尚未作为 Lab 样本验证 |
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
Task templates and external case references are separate from completed test
|
|
50
|
+
reports. A scripted provider checks host behavior; a real-model injection
|
|
51
|
+
trial needs an effective unguarded baseline before a matched comparison.
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
## Reports
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
Each report preserves its original version, configuration, result and limits.
|
|
56
|
+
Use the [capability matrix](guides/harness-capabilities.md) to interpret current
|
|
57
|
+
coverage rather than treating every historical result as current acceptance.
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
60
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
61
|
+
| [0.2.3 contract review](reports/test-report-release-readiness-0.2.3.md) | 发布前契约复核与 DSH 原生验收 |
|
|
62
|
+
| [0.2.4 official Flash / PTC](reports/test-report-dsh-0.2.4-ptc.md) | 实模主/子代理碰撞拒绝;原始主 PTC 任务失败与独立收尾分别记录 |
|
|
63
|
+
| [Claude Code harness](reports/test-report-claude-code-harness.md) | 脚本模型驱动的真实宿主 hook 验证 |
|
|
64
|
+
| [Kimi Code blocking](reports/test-report-kimi-code-block.md) | 所测版本的 Bash BLOCK 与故障路径 |
|
|
65
|
+
| [Kimi Code Lab](reports/test-report-kimi-guard-lab.md) | 历史配对试次与后续本地复核 |
|
|
66
|
+
| [Codex / GPT-6 Astra](reports/test-report-codex-gpt-6-astra-high.md) | Skill/CLI 验收,不声明原生拦截 |
|
|
67
|
+
| [Codex / GPT-5.6 Sol](reports/test-report-codex-gpt-5.6-sol.md) | v0.1.1 历史 Skill/CLI 评估 |
|
|
68
|
+
| [DSH 0.1.5-rc.1](reports/test-report-dsh-0.1.5-rc.1.md) | 打包插件与执行级 Bash 验收 |
|
|
69
|
+
| [DSH 0.2 upgrade](reports/test-report-dsh-0.2-upgrade.md) | 升级初期兼容快照,后续状态见契约复核 |
|
|
70
|
+
| [DSH Lab baseline](reports/test-report-dsh-guard-lab.md) | 真实模型基线;未形成 L2 结论 |
|
|
71
|
+
| [DSH native sessions](reports/test-report-dsh-native-session.md) | 原生工具结果捕获与保留日志复核 |
|
|
72
|
+
| [DSH paired Lab](reports/test-report-dsh-paired-lab.md) | 配对工作流与结果改写契约调查 |
|
|
73
|
+
| [DSH retry evidence](reports/test-report-dsh-retry-evidence.md) | 失败尝试、重试会话与证据解析 |
|
|
74
|
+
| [DSH read redaction](reports/test-report-dsh-read-redaction.md) | 零模型原生读取、下一请求与落盘检查 |
|
|
75
|
+
| [DSH real follow-up](reports/test-report-dsh-real-followup.md) | 真实读取开关对照;不等于注入 L2 |
|
|
76
|
+
| [DSH v0.1.1](reports/test-report-dsh-v0.1.1.md) | 历史真机测试 |
|
|
77
|
+
| [WorkBuddy / Windows Core](reports/test-report-workbuddy-windows-core.md) | 社区 Core/CLI 反馈与修复回归 |
|
|
78
|
+
| [ZCode / Windows](reports/test-report-zcode-glm-flash.md) | 历史 CLI/hook 试次及许可绕过观察 |
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
## Releases
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
83
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
84
|
+
| [0.2.4](releases/release-notes-0.2.4.md) | 恢复维护、trash 查询及兼容性例外 |
|
|
85
|
+
| [0.2.3](releases/release-notes-0.2.3.md) | 正式版范围与证据边界 |
|
|
86
|
+
| [0.2.3-rc2](releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc2.md) | 离线 Lab 与已复核 DSH 契约 |
|
|
87
|
+
| [0.2.3-rc1](releases/release-notes-0.2.3-rc1.md) | Windows Core 与预发布范围 |
|
|
88
|
+
| [0.2.2](releases/release-notes-0.2.2.md) | 宿主漂移、实时哨兵与 DSH 打包验收 |
|
|
89
|
+
| [0.2.1](releases/release-notes-0.2.1.md) | adapter/doctor 变更 |
|
|
90
|
+
| [0.2.0](releases/release-notes-0.2.0.md) | exfil 与配置安全视图等发布范围 |
|
|
91
|
+
| [0.2.0-rc1](releases/release-notes-0.2.0-rc1.md) | 早期源码预览范围 |
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
## History
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
These documents explain earlier proposals and implementation experience.
|
|
96
|
+
Current behavior is defined by the Core, Skills and current guides.
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
| Document / 文档 | Scope / 范围 |
|
|
99
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
100
|
+
| [Friction log](history/friction.md) | F1–F20 实现发现与修复经验 |
|
|
101
|
+
| [Unguarded deletion note](history/development-note-unguarded-deletion.md) | 去标识化事故探索与恢复方向 |
|
|
102
|
+
| [Secret Guard analysis](history/secret-guard-analysis.md) | 实现前的需求分析 |
|
|
103
|
+
| [Secret Guard design](history/secret-guard-design.md) | 早期设计候选与原范围 |
|
|
104
|
+
| [Secret Guard architecture](history/secret-guard-architecture.md) | 早期架构草图;不代表拦截点已交付 |
|