@mohsinonxrm/pptb-dataverse-request-studio 1.1.3 → 1.1.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/SECURITY.md CHANGED
@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
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- # Security Policy
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-
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- ## Reporting a Vulnerability
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-
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- Please do **not** open a public issue for security concerns. Use GitHub
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- Security Advisories (private):
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- <https://github.com/mohsinonxrm/pptb-mxrm-dataverse-request-studio/security/advisories/new>
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-
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- I'll acknowledge receipt within a few business days and coordinate a fix +
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- disclosure timeline with you.
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-
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- ## Scope
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-
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- The studio is a client-side composer + executor for Dataverse Web API
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- requests, running either embedded in Power Platform ToolBox or standalone
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- in a browser. Vulnerability reports of interest:
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-
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- - **Authentication / token handling** — any path that could leak a
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- Dataverse access token, the PPTB session token, or a Connection's
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- credentials from the host bridge.
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- - **Cross-site / injection** — XSS, HTML / Markdown injection in
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- user-supplied request fields, code-tab snippet output, or results-grid
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- cell rendering.
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- - **CSP / sandbox escape** — anything that lets DRS code execute outside
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- the iframe / host's allowed origins, or fetch from a non-Dataverse host.
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- - **Dataverse request integrity** — paths where the studio could emit a
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- request that escalates privileges, bypasses documented `MSCRM.*` header
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- rules, or alters another tool's state.
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- - **Saved-request library** — paths where a crafted saved-request payload
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- triggers code execution on load, exfiltrates localStorage from another
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- org scope, or escapes the per-org scoping bucket.
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- - **Dependency vulnerabilities** — known CVEs in production dependencies
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- (`@fluentui/*`, `monaco-editor`, `@pptb/types`, etc.) that affect the
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- shipped bundle.
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-
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- ## Out of scope
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-
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- - **Mistakes the user makes against their own environment** — DRS lets you
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- Delete, Update, and Merge records. Destructive operations require typed
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- confirmation; beyond that, the user is responsible for what they send.
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- - **Standalone-mode network errors** — the standalone build (`npm run dev`)
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- has no host bridge; Execute returns 501. This is by design, not a bug.
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- - **Antipattern advisories** — the studio surfaces guidance per the
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- Microsoft query-antipatterns doc, but it's advisory only; the request
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- still goes through if the user proceeds.
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-
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- ## Supported versions
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-
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- Only the latest released minor version on `main` receives security fixes.
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-
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- Thanks for helping keep the tool safe.
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+ # Security Policy
2
+
3
+ ## Reporting a Vulnerability
4
+
5
+ Please do **not** open a public issue for security concerns. Use GitHub
6
+ Security Advisories (private):
7
+ <https://github.com/mohsinonxrm/pptb-mxrm-dataverse-request-studio/security/advisories/new>
8
+
9
+ I'll acknowledge receipt within a few business days and coordinate a fix +
10
+ disclosure timeline with you.
11
+
12
+ ## Scope
13
+
14
+ The studio is a client-side composer + executor for Dataverse Web API
15
+ requests, running either embedded in Power Platform ToolBox or standalone
16
+ in a browser. Vulnerability reports of interest:
17
+
18
+ - **Authentication / token handling** — any path that could leak a
19
+ Dataverse access token, the PPTB session token, or a Connection's
20
+ credentials from the host bridge.
21
+ - **Cross-site / injection** — XSS, HTML / Markdown injection in
22
+ user-supplied request fields, code-tab snippet output, or results-grid
23
+ cell rendering.
24
+ - **CSP / sandbox escape** — anything that lets DRS code execute outside
25
+ the iframe / host's allowed origins, or fetch from a non-Dataverse host.
26
+ - **Dataverse request integrity** — paths where the studio could emit a
27
+ request that escalates privileges, bypasses documented `MSCRM.*` header
28
+ rules, or alters another tool's state.
29
+ - **Saved-request library** — paths where a crafted saved-request payload
30
+ triggers code execution on load, exfiltrates localStorage from another
31
+ org scope, or escapes the per-org scoping bucket.
32
+ - **Dependency vulnerabilities** — known CVEs in production dependencies
33
+ (`@fluentui/*`, `monaco-editor`, `@pptb/types`, etc.) that affect the
34
+ shipped bundle.
35
+
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+ ## Out of scope
37
+
38
+ - **Mistakes the user makes against their own environment** — DRS lets you
39
+ Delete, Update, and Merge records. Destructive operations require typed
40
+ confirmation; beyond that, the user is responsible for what they send.
41
+ - **Standalone-mode network errors** — the standalone build (`npm run dev`)
42
+ has no host bridge; Execute returns 501. This is by design, not a bug.
43
+ - **Antipattern advisories** — the studio surfaces guidance per the
44
+ Microsoft query-antipatterns doc, but it's advisory only; the request
45
+ still goes through if the user proceeds.
46
+
47
+ ## Supported versions
48
+
49
+ Only the latest released minor version on `main` receives security fixes.
50
+
51
+ Thanks for helping keep the tool safe.