@modusensus/dsh-mneme 0.6.9 → 0.6.10

package/.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-name: Test
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches: [master, main]
-  pull_request:
-    branches: [master, main]
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-jobs:
-  test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      matrix:
-        node-version: [24]
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: ${{ matrix.node-version }}
-      - name: Install dependencies
-        working-directory: dsh-mneme
-        run: npm ci
-      - name: Run tests
-        working-directory: dsh-mneme
-        run: npm run test:coverage
-      - name: Upload coverage to Codecov
-        uses: codecov/codecov-action@v4
-        with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
-          files: dsh-mneme/coverage/lcov.info
-          fail_ci_if_error: false

package/.release-notes-v0.6.9.md

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-## What's Changed
-
-### 修复
-- **autoDream 恒失败（Issue #26，P0）**：模型几乎必然为语义相关性产出跨类型 merge，而 `validateDecisions` 硬性禁止跨类型合并，此前「任意非法即整单拒绝」导致整批 consolidation 完全不应用（`applied=0`、空转一次 LLM 调用），并连带阻塞依赖 dream 成功的 `autoTag`。`dreamSkipInvalid` 默认开启后，逐条非法决策被跳过、合法子集照常应用，run 状态记为 `degraded`；审计行 `outcome.skipped` 记录被跳过的决策，`error` 注明跳过数。防洗白语义不变：显式覆盖率不足、update/create 超量等全局错误仍整单拒绝。`dreamSkipInvalid: false` 可恢复旧的整单拒绝行为。
-
-### 新增
-- **`allowCrossTypeMerge`（Issue #26，P1）**：默认 `false` 保持现有类型边界（`preference` 注入权重更高、`decision`/`project` 注入上下文不同，合并会丢失类型信息）；显式开启后跨类型 merge 被视为合法、可被应用，类型边界由用户自行承担。
-
-### 测试
-- 新增 7 条 skipInvalid / allowCrossTypeMerge / opt-out 用例。
-- 核心测试 114/114 通过；全量测试仅 `reranker.test.js` 因环境缺失 `@huggingface/transformers` 失败 1 例，与本次修复无关。
-
-**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/compare/v0.6.8...v0.6.9

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-All notable changes to dsh-mneme are documented here.
-
-## [Unreleased]
-
-- **诚实审计修复（v0.2.7，F-03）**
-  - autoDream 决策无变更且 summary 为空时，不再误报 ok:true——新增 `noop` 状态（ok:false，baseline 不刷新），避免空跑循环
-  - 有变更但 summary 缺失 → `degraded`（ok:true 但如实标记 summary 缺失）
-  - parseReceipt 支持 ok/noop/degraded/reconcile/failed
-  - 测试 259 → **263**
-
-- **社区贡献 · 嵌入式面板 UI 改进（PR #2，@Liuxin4950）**
-  - 记忆面板与设置面板的嵌入模式（settings.section 插槽）不再复用弹窗面板样式（去掉 boxShadow / background / borderRadius / padding），改为全宽平铺渲染，消除 DSH 设置页内多余的悬浮卡片与阴影
-  - 弹窗（portal）模式保持原有面板样式不变；新增回归测试锁定 embedded 分支不携带 modal chrome
-
-- **安全审计修复（v0.2.5）**
-  - 并发安全：CAS 冲突守卫——过期快照不再覆盖并发写入（防丢更新）
-  - 事务化决策应用：merge/archive 原子提交，receipt 反映已提交子步骤，部分提交 = reconcile（绝不虚报 ok）
-  - 压测硬断言：lost-update 与多步原子性失败即非零退出（`npm run stress`）
-  - 运行时人工编辑三方合并（three-way），不再静默覆盖
-  - 新增 `memory_archive` 工具（第 7 个模型工具）+ `memory_list include_archived`，归档可恢复
-  - reranker 改为 opt-in：`rerankEnabled=false`、`rerankProvider=none` 默认（裸装不加载 onnxruntime）
-  - npm `files` 纳入 scripts/test，tarball 内可直接跑压测
-  - 测试 236 → **258**（+22）
-
-- **安全加固（v0.2.4）**：API 鉴权 `apiToken`（写操作与密钥端点要求 Bearer 校验）+ `apiKey` 掩码回传 + timing-safe token 比对
-
-- **审查修复补丁（v0.2.3）**
-  - failure 记录增加 `before` JSON 快照（title/content/importance 变更可追溯，不只 content）
-  - vector-index `rebuildIndex` guard 改为检查 `embedSingle`（修复 embed/embedSingle 不一致导致的静默跳过）
-
-- **流水线补全（v0.2.2）**
-  - reflection 修复：failure 记录检查 title/importance 变化（不只 content）；支持 query 上下文（memory_update 加 `reason` 参数）；update 校验失败不污染 claimed；`failure_memories` 清理（`deleteOldFailures` + 启动自动清理 90 天前）
-  - 专项测试补全：`vector-index.test.js`（modelHash 漂移/重建/增量）+ `service-search.test.js`（hybrid/auto/rerank 端到端）
-  - api.js `/search` 的 mode 参数文档化
-  - 测试 212 → **233**
-
-- **反思更新（v0.2.1）**：`update` 决策 + 失败追踪
-  - autoDream 新增 `update` 决策类型：修正单条记忆的过时/错误内容（单 id、必须实际变化、非 summary、24h 保护、每次 ≤2）
-  - 审计记录 update 的 `_before` 快照；update 后向量索引同步
-  - `failure_memories` 表：记录用户纠正（user_correction）+ 查询/统计接口
-  - 配置：`reflectionUpdateEnabled` / `reflectionFailureTracking` / `reflectionUpdateMaxPerRun` / `reflectionUpdateMinAgeHours`
-
-- **Semantic 升级（v0.2.0-semantic）**：完全离线语义记忆引擎
-  - 本地 Embedding：`embedProvider: local`（ONNX bge-small-zh-v1.5，transformers.js/onnxruntime）或 `ollama`；原 `openai` 外部 API 保留为默认，向后兼容
-  - 向量索引层：`vector_meta` 模型指纹追踪 + 索引统计（`/api/dsh-mneme/semantic`）
-  - Rerank 精排：`rerankEnabled`（bge-reranker-base cross-encoder），召回后精排 Top-K，失败自动跳过
-  - 混合搜索：`memory_search` 新增 `mode: hybrid`（向量优先 + 关键词补位）；`auto` 保持关键词优先 + 向量补位
-  - autoDream 语义增强：K-Means 聚类预分组（k-means++）、`[潜在冲突]` 向量相似度标记、整理后向量索引重建
-  - 模型下载：断点续传 + 缓存（transformers.js 内置）；`.npmrc` 跳过 onnxruntime CUDA 下载避免安装失败
-  - 文档：`docs/SEMANTIC.md` / `docs/LOCAL_MODEL.md` / `docs/MIGRATION.md` + 基准脚本 `benchmark-embed` / `benchmark-rerank`
-- autoDream 裁决审计：每次运行写入 `dream_runs`（输入快照 sha256 digest + 完整输入快照 + LLM 决策清单 + 逐 id 去向 + receipt `dsh-mneme:run:<id>:<status>:<hash>:<count>:<applied>`），可离线回放、定位静默错误
-- 幂等决策应用：merge / conflict 重复应用无累积副作用（来源注释不重复追加），防并发/重放下的重复合并
-- 三轴线压测 `npm run stress`：长会话检索（Recall@k、陈旧残留率）/ 冲突裁决（可重放仲裁集）/ 多 Agent 并发（丢更新、重复合并、事务/崩溃恢复）
-
-## [0.1.6] - 2026-08-14
-
-- Vector (semantic) search via OpenAI-compatible embeddings endpoint, with automatic fallback to LIKE keyword search on failure
-- Web GUI memory panel: browse by type, full-text + semantic search
-
-## [0.1.5] - 2026-08-14
-
-- autoDream consolidation refinements: conflict resolution with source tracking, fail-safe decision validation
-
-## [0.1.4] - 2026-08-14
-
-- User settings: profile + behavior rules injected every turn
-- Custom slash commands (register, route to agent)
-
-## [0.1.3] - 2026-08-14
-
-- autoDream background consolidation: dedup / merge / archive / conflict resolution
-
-## [0.1.2] - 2026-08-14
-
-- Session summarization: auto-distill preferences / decisions / lessons at session end
-- Web panel improvements
-
-## [0.1.1] - 2026-08-13
-
-- Memory tools: memory_save / memory_search / memory_list / memory_update / memory_delete / memory_forget
-- Markdown mirror sync (human-editable, manual edits take priority)
-
-## [0.1.0] - 2026-08-13
-
-- Initial release: cross-session memory for DeepSeek Harness
-- SQLite store (node:sqlite, zero native deps) + human-editable Markdown mirror
-- Auto-injection of relevant memories at session start

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,544 +0,0 @@
-# Security Policy
-
-> **English** | [中文](#安全策略)
-
----
-
-## Supported Versions
-
-We actively maintain the latest minor version. Security fixes are backported to the latest patch release, and critical fixes may be backported to the previous minor version.
-
-| Version | Supported | Status |
-|---|---|---|
-| 0.3.x | ✅ Yes | Active development |
-| 0.2.x | ⚠️ Best-effort | Critical fixes only |
-| < 0.2.0 | ❌ No | Please upgrade to 0.3.x |
-
-**End-of-life notice**: 0.2.x is in best-effort maintenance (critical fixes only). Its end-of-life date will be announced in advance; after that date no security fixes will be provided for 0.2.x.
-
----
-
-## Known Security Features
-
-The following security features are implemented and maintained in the project:
-
-| Feature | Description | Status |
-|---|---|---|
-| `apiToken` Authentication | All remote endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer <apiToken>` when a token is configured; comparison uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual` | ✅ Implemented |
-| `policyEpoch` Memory Governance | Bumping `policyEpoch` downgrades all prior `dream_runs` to historical evidence; their receipts no longer drive real-time memory decisions | ✅ Implemented |
-| `conflictFreezeEnabled` Conflict Freeze | Conflicting memories are not auto-merged; they are flagged as pending human review, preserving data integrity | ✅ Implemented |
-| CAS (Compare-and-Swap) Guard | Prevents concurrent write conflicts; ensures atomic write operations | ✅ Implemented |
-| Digest Baseline Audit | Memory updates are compared against digest baselines to detect unauthorized changes | ✅ Implemented |
-| `failure_memories` Audit Trail | Every failed write operation is logged for forensic analysis | ✅ Implemented |
-| `recall_run` Search Audit | Every search operation is recorded with timestamp and query metadata | ✅ Implemented |
-| Local-First Data Processing | All embeddings, reranking, and memory consolidation run locally; no data leaves the device | ✅ Implemented |
-| No Telemetry | No analytics, no remote logging, no network requests by design | ✅ Implemented |
-| Query Sanitization | LIKE-query escaping, bounded paging, and Markdown mirror escaping prevent injection and malformed input | ✅ Implemented |
-| `entityExtractionEnabled` Opt-In Entity Extraction | Entity extraction is opt-in via configuration (default: off), minimizing data processing by default | ✅ Implemented |
-| Graceful Degradation | System falls back to keyword search on component failure; no crash | ✅ Implemented |
-| Human-Editable Mirrors | All memories mirrored to Markdown files; users can verify and reconstruct data | ✅ Implemented |
-
----
-
-## Reporting a Vulnerability
-
-### Please DO NOT
-
-- Open a public issue for security vulnerabilities
-- Post exploit details in discussions or comments
-- Submit PRs that expose security flaws without prior coordination
-
-### Please DO
-
-1. **Email** `guanqishi26@gmail.com` (or open a **private security advisory** via [GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories))
-2. Include:
-   - A clear description of the vulnerability
-   - Steps to reproduce (minimal test case preferred)
-   - Impact assessment (data exposure? local-only? remote?)
-   - Affected versions
-   - Your proposed fix (if any)
-   - Whether you are requesting credit / disclosure preferences
-
-### Response Timeline
-
-| Phase | Time | Action |
-|---|---|---|
-| Acknowledgment | Within 48 hours | We confirm receipt and assign a tracking ID |
-| Initial Assessment | Within 7 days | We validate severity and scope; we may request additional information |
-| Fix Development | Severity-dependent | Critical: ≤ 14 days; High: ≤ 30 days; Medium/Low: next release |
-| Validation & Testing | 1–3 days after fix | We run regression and security tests on the patch |
-| Coordinated Disclosure | At fix release | We publish a security advisory and release patch simultaneously |
-
-**Note**: For Critical vulnerabilities, if a full fix cannot be developed within 14 days, we will provide a temporary mitigation or workaround within that timeframe.
-
-### Severity Classification
-
-We follow the [CVSS v3.1](https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document) standard:
-
-- **Critical** (9.0–10.0): Remote code execution, unauthorized data exfiltration, bypass of core security controls
-- **High** (7.0–8.9): Local privilege escalation, significant data integrity compromise, DoS with high impact
-- **Medium** (4.0–6.9): Information disclosure under specific conditions, partial bypass of controls
-- **Low** (0.1–3.9): Minor information leakage, defense-in-depth improvements
-
----
-
-## Security Design Principles
-
-### 1. Local-First, Zero-Network
-
-- All embeddings, reranking, and memory consolidation run locally
-- Memory text **never** leaves the device
-- No telemetry, no analytics, no remote logging
-
-### 2. Fail-Safe by Default
-
-- Any component failure (LLM, embedder, reranker) degrades gracefully to keyword search
-- Malformed input never crashes the plugin or corrupts the database
-- Concurrent write conflicts are resolved via CAS (compare-and-swap) guards
-
-### 3. Audit Everything
-
-- Every `autoDream` run generates a cryptographically verifiable receipt
-- Every memory update creates a `failure_memories` audit trail
-- Every search records a `recall_run` for later inspection
-
-### 4. Human Sovereignty
-
-- All memories are mirrored to human-editable Markdown files
-- Machine writes vs. human edits are distinguished via digest baselines
-- Users can fully reconstruct the database from Markdown mirrors alone
-
-### 5. Minimal Remote Surface
-
-- Remote API endpoints are opt-in: they require a configured `apiToken`
-- When a token is set, every remote request is checked with a timing-safe comparison
-- When no token is set, remote endpoints are effectively disabled; all processing stays local
-
----
-
-## Dependency Vulnerability Handling
-
-### Process
-
-We follow a 5-step process for handling third-party dependency vulnerabilities:
-
-| Step | Action | Timeframe | Tooling |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1. Scan | Continuous automated scanning of all runtime and development dependencies | Automated (daily) | OrbisAI Security, npm audit |
-| 2. Assess | For each detected vulnerability, assess severity, exploitability, and impact on dsh-mneme | Within 48 hours of detection | CVSS v3.1, manual code analysis |
-| 3. Report | Document findings in the security tracker; report to maintainers | Immediately after assessment | Security tracker, maintainer channel |
-| 4. Fix | Upgrade dependency to a patched version or apply mitigation | Critical: ≤ 14 days; High: ≤ 30 days; Medium/Low: next release | npm/pnpm update, manual patching |
-| 5. Disclose | Publish security advisory with details and fixed version | At release of fixed version | GitHub Security Advisories + npm release notes |
-
-### Third-Party Dependency Policy
-
-- All new runtime dependencies must pass a security review before inclusion
-- Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities that cannot be fixed within the timeline will be replaced with alternatives
-- Dependency lockfiles (`package-lock.json`) are committed and reviewed in PRs
-
-### Recent Dependency Fixes
-
-| CVE | Package | Version (Before) | Version (After) | Severity | Fixed In |
-|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| CVE-2026-39244 | `adm-zip` | 0.5.18 | 0.6.0 | High | v0.3.4 |
-
----
-
-## Security Audit History
-
-### v0.2.10 — Security Hardening
-
-| ID | Finding | Severity | Status |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| F-NEW-01 | Concurrent write race on `store.js` | **Critical** | ✅ Fixed (CAS guard + atomic write) |
-| F-NEW-02 | Transactional inconsistency during mirror sync | **High** | ✅ Fixed (transactional mirror + rollback) |
-| F-NEW-03 | Mirror health state not validated before overwrite | **High** | ✅ Fixed (digest baseline + FSM validation) |
-
-### v0.3.4 — Dependency Security
-
-| CVE | Package | Severity | Status |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| CVE-2026-39244 | `adm-zip` 0.5.18 | **High** | ✅ Fixed (upgraded to 0.6.0) |
-
-### Ongoing
-
-- Automated dependency scanning via **OrbisAI Security**
-- Community security reviews welcome via private advisory
-
----
-
-## Security Advisory Channels
-
-Security advisories are published through the following channels simultaneously:
-
-1. **[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories)** — primary channel with detailed technical information
-2. **[npm Releases](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@modusensus/dsh-mneme)** — release notes include security advisories and fix summaries
-
-To receive security notifications:
-- **GitHub**: Watch the repository and enable "Security alerts" in repository settings
-- **npm**: Subscribe to package release notifications for `@modusensus/dsh-mneme`
-
----
-
-## Disclosure Policy
-
-We practice **coordinated disclosure**:
-
-1. Reporter submits vulnerability privately
-2. We investigate and acknowledge within 48 hours
-3. We develop fix and prepare advisory (timeline based on severity)
-4. We notify reporter of fix timeline and planned disclosure date
-5. We release patch + publish advisory simultaneously
-6. We credit the reporter (with their consent) in the advisory
-
-We do **not** pursue legal action against security researchers who:
-- Act in good faith
-- Do not exploit vulnerabilities beyond proof-of-concept
-- Do not access data belonging to others
-- Allow reasonable time for us to respond before public disclosure
-
-**Bug Bounty Policy**: This project does not currently offer monetary rewards. We provide public credit in the advisory (with the reporter's consent).
-
----
-
-## Security Logs & Data Retention
-
-All audit data is stored **locally** in the plugin database and never leaves the device:
-
-| Data Type | Storage Location | Notes |
-|---|---|---|
-| `failure_memories` audit logs | Local database | Every failed write is recorded; used for forensic analysis |
-| `recall_run` search logs | Local database | Every search is recorded with timestamp and query metadata |
-| AutoDream receipts | Local database + Markdown mirror | Cryptographically verifiable; persist until user deletes them |
-| Dependency scan reports | OrbisAI Security dashboard | Not stored on device |
-
-Retention is user-controlled: audit records live only as long as the local database does. There is no remote logging and no telemetry.
-
----
-
-## Security-Related Configuration
-
-```yaml
-# Hardened configuration example (all keys below match src/config.js where applicable)
-dsh-mneme:
-  # Disable autoDream if you want full manual control
-  autoDream: false
-
-  # Enable conflict freeze for sensitive environments
-  conflictFreezeEnabled: true
-
-  # Use local-only embedding (no network)
-  embedProvider: local
-
-  # Require Authorization: Bearer <apiToken> on remote endpoints (timing-safe)
-  apiToken: "set-a-strong-unique-token"
-
-  # Bump to downgrade all prior dream_runs to historical evidence
-  policyEpoch: 1
-
-  # Keep entity extraction off by default (data minimization)
-  entityExtractionEnabled: false
-```
-
----
-
-## Contributor Security Guidelines
-
-All contributors must comply with the following security requirements:
-
-1. **Dependency Audit**: Run `npm audit` before submitting a PR; newly introduced dependencies must pass security review
-2. **Secret Scanning**: Never commit API keys, tokens, or credentials to the repository
-3. **Input Validation**: All user inputs must be validated and sanitized (including LLM-derived content)
-4. **Secure Code Review**: PRs with security-relevant changes require approval from a maintainer with security expertise
-5. **Documentation**: New features must include a security impact analysis in the PR description
-6. **Responsible Disclosure**: Security vulnerabilities found during development must be reported via the appropriate channel, not in public PRs
-
----
-
-## Contact
-
-- **Security Team**: `guanqishi26@gmail.com`
-- **Private Advisory**: [GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories)
-- **GPG Key**: Available upon request for encrypted communication
-
----
-
-## License
-
-This project is licensed under the **MIT License**. See [LICENSE](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/blob/main/LICENSE) for details.
-
----
-
-# 安全策略
-
-> **中文** | [English](#security-policy)
-
----
-
-## 支持版本
-
-我们积极维护最新的 minor 版本。安全修复会 backport 到最新的 patch 版本，关键修复可能 backport 到前一个 minor 版本。
-
-| 版本 | 支持状态 | 说明 |
-|---|---|---|
-| 0.3.x | ✅ 支持 | 活跃开发中 |
-| 0.2.x | ⚠️ 尽力维护 | 仅关键修复 |
-| < 0.2.0 | ❌ 不支持 | 请升级至 0.3.x |
-
-**停止维护通知**：0.2.x 处于尽力维护阶段（仅关键修复）。停止维护的具体日期将提前公布；该日期之后将不再提供 0.2.x 的安全修复。
-
----
-
-## 已知安全特性
-
-项目已实现并维护以下安全特性：
-
-| 特性 | 描述 | 状态 |
-|---|---|---|
-| `apiToken` 鉴权 | 配置 token 后，所有远程端点需 `Authorization: Bearer <apiToken>`，比较使用 `crypto.timingSafeEqual` | ✅ 已实现 |
-| `policyEpoch` 记忆治理 | 提升 `policyEpoch` 后，所有先前的 `dream_runs` 降级为历史证据，其 receipt 不再驱动实时记忆决策 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| `conflictFreezeEnabled` 冲突冻结 | 冲突记忆不自动合并，标记为待人工复核，保护数据完整性 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| CAS（比较并交换）守卫 | 防止并发写入冲突，确保原子写操作 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| Digest 基线审计 | 记忆更新与 digest 基线比对，检测未授权修改 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| `failure_memories` 审计轨迹 | 每次写入失败均记录，供取证分析 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| `recall_run` 搜索审计 | 每次搜索操作均记录时间戳和查询元数据 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| 本地优先数据处理 | embedding、rerank、记忆整理均在本地完成，数据不离开设备 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| 无遥测 | 无分析、无远程日志，设计上无网络请求 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| 查询净化 | LIKE 查询转义、分页边界限制、Markdown 镜像转义，防止注入和畸形输入 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| `entityExtractionEnabled` 实体抽取 Opt-In | 实体抽取为配置项、默认关闭（数据最小化原则） | ✅ 已实现 |
-| 优雅降级 | 组件故障时自动回退至关键词搜索，不崩溃 | ✅ 已实现 |
-| 人工可编辑镜像 | 所有记忆镜像至 Markdown 文件，用户可验证和重建数据 | ✅ 已实现 |
-
----
-
-## 报告漏洞
-
-### 请不要
-
-- 在公开 issue 中披露安全漏洞
-- 在讨论区或评论中发布漏洞利用细节
-- 未经事先协调就提交暴露安全缺陷的 PR
-
-### 请这样做
-
-1. **发送邮件**至 `guanqishi26@gmail.com`（或通过 [GitHub 私有安全公告](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories) 提交）
-2. 邮件内容请包含：
-   - 漏洞的清晰描述
-   - 复现步骤（优先提供最小测试用例）
-   - 影响评估（数据泄露？仅本地？远程？）
-   - 受影响的版本
-   - 你建议的修复方案（如有）
-   - 是否要求在公告中署名 / 披露偏好
-
-### 响应时间线
-
-| 阶段 | 时间 | 行动 |
-|---|---|---|
-| 确认收到 | 48 小时内 | 我们确认收到并分配追踪 ID |
-| 初步评估 | 7 天内 | 我们验证严重程度和影响范围；可能需要更多信息 |
-| 修复开发 | 按严重程度 | 严重：≤ 14 天；高：≤ 30 天；中/低：下个版本 |
-| 验证与测试 | 修复完成后 1–3 天 | 对补丁进行回归测试和安全测试 |
-| 协调披露 | 修复发布时 | 同时发布安全公告和补丁版本 |
-
-**备注**：对于严重漏洞，如果 14 天内无法提供完整修复，我们将在该时间内提供临时缓解措施或替代方案。
-
-### 严重程度分级
-
-我们遵循 [CVSS v3.1](https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document) 标准：
-
-- **严重** (9.0–10.0)：远程代码执行、未授权数据外泄、核心安全控制绕过
-- **高** (7.0–8.9)：本地权限提升、重大数据完整性破坏、高影响 DoS
-- **中** (4.0–6.9)：特定条件下的信息泄露、部分控制绕过
-- **低** (0.1–3.9)：轻微信息泄露、纵深防御改进
-
----
-
-## 安全设计原则
-
-### 1. 本地优先，零网络
-
-- 所有 embedding、rerank、记忆整理均在本地运行
-- 记忆文本**永不**离开设备
-- 无遥测、无分析、无远程日志
-
-### 2. 默认 Fail-Safe
-
-- 任何组件故障（LLM、embedder、reranker）均优雅降级到关键词搜索
-- 畸形输入不会导致插件崩溃或数据库损坏
-- 并发写入冲突通过 CAS（比较并交换）守卫解决
-
-### 3. 全面审计
-
-- 每次 `autoDream` 运行生成密码学可验证的 receipt
-- 每次记忆更新创建 `failure_memories` 审计轨迹
-- 每次搜索记录 `recall_run` 供后续检查
-
-### 4. 人类主权
-
-- 所有记忆镜像到人类可编辑的 Markdown 文件
-- 机器写入 vs 人工编辑通过 digest 基线区分
-- 用户可仅凭 Markdown 镜像完整重建数据库
-
-### 5. 最小远程暴露面
-
-- 远程 API 端点为可选：需配置 `apiToken` 才生效
-- 配置 token 后，每个远程请求均经过 timing-safe 比较
-- 未配置 token 时，远程端点实际处于禁用状态，所有处理均在本地
-
----
-
-## 依赖漏洞处理
-
-### 处理流程
-
-我们采用 5 步流程处理第三方依赖漏洞：
-
-| 步骤 | 行动 | 时间要求 | 工具 |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1. 扫描 | 对所有运行时和开发依赖进行持续自动扫描 | 自动（每日） | OrbisAI Security、npm audit |
-| 2. 评估 | 对每个检测到的漏洞评估严重程度、可利用性和对 dsh-mneme 的影响 | 检测后 48 小时内 | CVSS v3.1、人工代码分析 |
-| 3. 上报 | 将发现记录到安全追踪器，并上报给维护者 | 评估后立即 | 安全追踪器、维护者通道 |
-| 4. 修复 | 升级依赖至已修复版本或应用缓解措施 | 严重：≤ 14 天；高：≤ 30 天；中/低：下个版本 | npm/pnpm 更新、手动补丁 |
-| 5. 披露 | 发布包含详情和已修复版本的安全公告 | 修复版本发布时 | GitHub Security Advisories + npm 发布说明 |
-
-### 第三方依赖政策
-
-- 所有新增运行时依赖需通过安全审查后方可引入
-- 存在已知严重漏洞且在期限内无法修复的依赖将被替换为替代方案
-- 依赖锁文件（`package-lock.json`）已提交并在 PR 中审查
-
-### 近期依赖修复
-
-| CVE | 包 | 修复前版本 | 修复后版本 | 严重程度 | 修复版本 |
-|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| CVE-2026-39244 | `adm-zip` | 0.5.18 | 0.6.0 | 高 | v0.3.4 |
-
----
-
-## 安全审计历史
-
-### v0.2.10 — 安全加固
-
-| ID | 发现 | 严重程度 | 状态 |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| F-NEW-01 | `store.js` 并发写入竞态 | **严重** | ✅ 已修复（CAS 守卫 + 原子写入） |
-| F-NEW-02 | 镜像同步期间事务不一致 | **高** | ✅ 已修复（事务化镜像 + 回滚） |
-| F-NEW-03 | 覆盖前未验证镜像健康状态 | **高** | ✅ 已修复（digest 基线 + FSM 验证） |
-
-### v0.3.4 — 依赖安全
-
-| CVE | 包 | 严重程度 | 状态 |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| CVE-2026-39244 | `adm-zip` 0.5.18 | **高** | ✅ 已修复（升级至 0.6.0） |
-
-### 持续进行
-
-- 通过 **OrbisAI Security** 进行自动化依赖扫描
-- 欢迎社区通过私有公告提交安全审查
-
----
-
-## 安全公告渠道
-
-安全公告通过以下渠道同时发布：
-
-1. **[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories)** — 主要渠道，包含详细技术信息
-2. **[npm Releases](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@modusensus/dsh-mneme)** — 发布说明中包含安全公告和修复摘要
-
-接收安全通知方式：
-- **GitHub**：Watch 仓库并在仓库设置中启用“安全警报”
-- **npm**：订阅 `@modusensus/dsh-mneme` 的发布通知
-
----
-
-## 披露政策
-
-我们实行**协调披露**：
-
-1. 报告者私下提交漏洞
-2. 我们在 48 小时内确认收到
-3. 我们开发修复并准备公告（时间取决于严重程度）
-4. 我们通知报告者修复时间线和计划披露日期
-5. 我们同时发布补丁和安全公告
-6. 我们在公告中致谢报告者（经其同意）
-
-我们**不会**对以下安全研究人员采取法律行动：
-- 出于善意行事
-- 不将漏洞利用超出概念验证范围
-- 不访问属于他人的数据
-- 在公开披露前给予我们合理的响应时间
-
-**漏洞赏金政策**：本项目目前不提供经济奖励。我们会在公告中公开致谢报告者（经其同意）。
-
----
-
-## 安全日志与数据保留
-
-所有审计数据**本地**存储于插件数据库，不离开设备：
-
-| 数据类型 | 存储位置 | 说明 |
-|---|---|---|
-| `failure_memories` 审计日志 | 本地数据库 | 每次写入失败均记录，供取证分析 |
-| `recall_run` 搜索日志 | 本地数据库 | 每次搜索均记录时间戳和查询元数据 |
-| AutoDream receipts | 本地数据库 + Markdown 镜像 | 密码学可验证；保留至用户删除 |
-| 依赖扫描报告 | OrbisAI Security 控制台 | 不存储于设备 |
-
-保留期由用户控制：审计记录仅随本地数据库存续。无远程日志、无遥测。
-
----
-
-## 安全相关配置
-
-```yaml
-# 加固配置示例（键均对应 src/config.js 实际配置，除注明外）
-dsh-mneme:
-  # 如需完全手动控制，可禁用 autoDream
-  autoDream: false
-
-  # 敏感环境启用冲突冻结
-  conflictFreezeEnabled: true
-
-  # 仅使用本地 embedding（无网络）
-  embedProvider: local
-
-  # 远程端点需 Authorization: Bearer <apiToken>（timing-safe）
-  apiToken: "set-a-strong-unique-token"
-
-  # 提升以将先前的 dream_runs 降级为历史证据
-  policyEpoch: 1
-
-  # 实体抽取默认关闭（数据最小化）
-  entityExtractionEnabled: false
-```
-
----
-
-## 贡献者安全指南
-
-所有贡献者必须遵守以下安全要求：
-
-1. **依赖审计**：提交 PR 前运行 `npm audit`；新增依赖必须通过安全审查
-2. **密钥扫描**：禁止向仓库提交 API 密钥、令牌或凭据
-3. **输入验证**：所有用户输入必须验证和净化（包括 LLM 相关内容）
-4. **安全代码审查**：涉及安全相关变更的 PR 需获得具有安全专业知识维护者的批准
-5. **文档记录**：新功能必须在 PR 描述中包含安全影响分析
-6. **负责任的披露**：开发过程中发现的安全漏洞必须通过适当渠道报告，而非在公开 PR 中提交
-
----
-
-## 联系方式
-
-- **安全团队**：`guanqishi26@gmail.com`
-- **私有公告**：[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/security/advisories)
-- **GPG 密钥**：如需加密通信，可应请求提供
-
----
-
-## 许可协议
-
-本项目基于 **MIT License** 开源。详见 [LICENSE](https://github.com/modusensus/dsh-mneme/blob/main/LICENSE)。
-
----
-
-*Last updated: 2026-08-16*  
-*Policy version: 2.1*