@moduna/qcp 0.1.3-alpha.2 → 0.1.3-alpha.3

package/dist/qcp.js

@@ -2373,7 +2373,7 @@ var package_default;
 var init_package = __esm(() => {
   package_default = {
     name: "@moduna/qcp",
-    version: "0.1.3-alpha.2",
+    version: "0.1.3-alpha.3",
     description: "AI-powered CLI for querying PostgreSQL in natural language",
     type: "module",
     bin: {
@@ -80117,6 +80117,11 @@ function validateSql(sql) {
     }
     return report;
   }
+  const readOnlyViolation = findNonReadOnlyStatement(stmt);
+  if (readOnlyViolation) {
+    report.errors.push(`Dangerous operation rejected: ${readOnlyViolation} is not permitted inside this query. ` + `qcp is read-only — only SELECT and WITH are allowed.`);
+    return report;
+  }
   report.allowedStatement = true;
   report.readOnly = true;
   let processedSql = trimmedSql.replace(/;\s*$/, "");
@@ -80156,6 +80161,439 @@ function extractLimitValue(stmt) {
     return null;
   }
 }
+function findNonReadOnlyStatement(stmt) {
+  if (stmt.type === "select" || stmt.type === "values")
+    return null;
+  if (stmt.type === "union" || stmt.type === "union all") {
+    return findNonReadOnlyStatement(stmt.left) ?? findNonReadOnlyStatement(stmt.right);
+  }
+  if (stmt.type === "with") {
+    for (const binding of stmt.bind) {
+      const bindingViolation = findNonReadOnlyBinding(binding.statement);
+      if (bindingViolation)
+        return bindingViolation;
+    }
+    return findNonReadOnlyBinding(stmt.in);
+  }
+  if (stmt.type === "with recursive")
+    return "WITH RECURSIVE";
+  return DANGEROUS_STATEMENT_TYPES[stmt.type] ?? stmt.type.toUpperCase();
+}
+function findNonReadOnlyBinding(binding) {
+  if (binding.type === "select" || binding.type === "union" || binding.type === "union all" || binding.type === "values" || binding.type === "with") {
+    return findNonReadOnlyStatement(binding);
+  }
+  return DANGEROUS_STATEMENT_TYPES[binding.type] ?? binding.type.toUpperCase();
+}
+function enforceTenantIsolation(sql, schema, context) {
+  const report = {
+    safe: false,
+    errors: [],
+    warnings: [],
+    processedSql: sql.trim(),
+    injectedPredicates: [],
+    scopedTables: []
+  };
+  const contextResult = securityRequestContextSchema.safeParse(context);
+  if (!contextResult.success) {
+    report.errors.push("Trusted tenant context is required.");
+    return report;
+  }
+  let statements;
+  try {
+    statements = import_pgsql_ast_parser.parse(sql.trim(), { locationTracking: false });
+  } catch {
+    report.errors.push("SQL parsing failed during tenant isolation.");
+    return report;
+  }
+  if (statements.length !== 1) {
+    report.errors.push("Tenant isolation requires exactly one SQL statement.");
+    return report;
+  }
+  const statement = statements[0];
+  const readOnlyViolation = findNonReadOnlyStatement(statement);
+  if (readOnlyViolation) {
+    report.errors.push(`Tenant isolation rejected non-read-only statement: ${readOnlyViolation}.`);
+    return report;
+  }
+  const state = {
+    schema,
+    context: contextResult.data,
+    tableIndex: buildTableIndex(schema),
+    errors: report.errors,
+    warnings: report.warnings,
+    injectedPredicates: report.injectedPredicates,
+    scopedTables: report.scopedTables
+  };
+  const scopedStatement = scopeStatement(statement, state, new Set);
+  if (!scopedStatement || state.errors.length > 0) {
+    return report;
+  }
+  report.processedSql = import_pgsql_ast_parser.toSql.statement(scopedStatement);
+  report.safe = true;
+  return report;
+}
+function buildTableIndex(schema) {
+  const index = new Map;
+  for (const table of schema.tables) {
+    const fullName = tableKey(table.schema, table.name);
+    index.set(fullName, [table]);
+    const byName = index.get(table.name.toLowerCase()) ?? [];
+    byName.push(table);
+    index.set(table.name.toLowerCase(), byName);
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+function scopeStatement(statement, state, cteNames) {
+  if (statement.type === "with") {
+    return scopeWithStatement(statement, state, cteNames);
+  }
+  if (statement.type === "select" || statement.type === "union" || statement.type === "union all" || statement.type === "values") {
+    return scopeSelectStatement(statement, state, cteNames);
+  }
+  state.errors.push(`Tenant isolation supports SELECT and WITH only, not ${statement.type}.`);
+  return null;
+}
+function scopeWithStatement(statement, state, parentCteNames) {
+  const cteNames = new Set(parentCteNames);
+  for (const binding of statement.bind) {
+    cteNames.add(binding.alias.name.toLowerCase());
+  }
+  const bindings = statement.bind.map((binding) => {
+    const scoped = scopeWithBinding(binding.statement, state, cteNames);
+    return scoped ? { ...binding, statement: scoped } : binding;
+  });
+  const scopedIn = scopeWithBinding(statement.in, state, cteNames);
+  if (!scopedIn)
+    return null;
+  return {
+    ...statement,
+    bind: bindings,
+    in: scopedIn
+  };
+}
+function scopeWithBinding(binding, state, cteNames) {
+  if (binding.type === "select" || binding.type === "union" || binding.type === "union all" || binding.type === "values" || binding.type === "with") {
+    return scopeSelectStatement(binding, state, cteNames);
+  }
+  state.errors.push(`Tenant isolation rejected non-read-only WITH binding: ${binding.type}.`);
+  return null;
+}
+function scopeSelectStatement(statement, state, cteNames) {
+  switch (statement.type) {
+    case "with":
+      return scopeWithStatement(statement, state, cteNames);
+    case "with recursive":
+      state.errors.push("WITH RECURSIVE is not supported by tenant isolation.");
+      return null;
+    case "union":
+    case "union all":
+      return scopeUnionStatement(statement, state, cteNames);
+    case "values":
+      return statement;
+    case "select":
+      return scopeSelectFromStatement(statement, state, cteNames);
+  }
+}
+function scopeUnionStatement(statement, state, cteNames) {
+  const left = scopeSelectStatement(statement.left, state, cteNames);
+  const right = scopeSelectStatement(statement.right, state, cteNames);
+  if (!left || !right)
+    return null;
+  return {
+    ...statement,
+    left,
+    right
+  };
+}
+function scopeSelectFromStatement(statement, state, cteNames) {
+  if (containsNestedSelect(statement)) {
+    state.errors.push("Nested subqueries are not supported by tenant isolation.");
+    return null;
+  }
+  const from = statement.from?.map((item) => scopeFrom(item, state, cteNames));
+  if (state.errors.length > 0)
+    return null;
+  const scopes = (from ?? []).flatMap((item) => collectTableScopes(item));
+  let where = statement.where;
+  for (const scope of scopes) {
+    const conflict = findConflictingScopePredicate(where, scope, state.context);
+    if (conflict) {
+      state.errors.push(conflict);
+      return null;
+    }
+    const predicates = buildScopePredicates(scope, state.context);
+    for (const predicate of predicates) {
+      where = andExpr(where, predicate.expr);
+      state.injectedPredicates.push(predicate.label);
+    }
+    state.scopedTables.push(scope.tableId);
+  }
+  return {
+    ...statement,
+    from,
+    where
+  };
+}
+function scopeFrom(from, state, cteNames) {
+  assertSafeJoin(from, state);
+  if (from.type === "call") {
+    state.errors.push("Table functions are not supported by tenant isolation.");
+    return from;
+  }
+  if (from.lateral) {
+    state.errors.push("LATERAL queries are not supported by tenant isolation.");
+    return from;
+  }
+  if (from.type === "statement") {
+    const scopedStatement = scopeSelectStatement(from.statement, state, cteNames);
+    return scopedStatement ? {
+      ...from,
+      statement: scopedStatement
+    } : from;
+  }
+  if (isCteReference(from, cteNames))
+    return from;
+  const scope = resolveTableScope(from, state);
+  return scope ? {
+    ...from,
+    __qcpScope: scope
+  } : from;
+}
+function collectTableScopes(from) {
+  const scope = from.__qcpScope;
+  return scope ? [scope] : [];
+}
+function assertSafeJoin(from, state) {
+  const joinType = from.join?.type;
+  if (!joinType)
+    return;
+  if (joinType === "INNER JOIN" || joinType === "CROSS JOIN")
+    return;
+  state.errors.push(`${joinType} is not supported by tenant isolation.`);
+}
+function isCteReference(from, cteNames) {
+  return !from.name.schema && cteNames.has(from.name.name.toLowerCase());
+}
+function resolveTableScope(from, state) {
+  const table = resolveSchemaTable(from.name, state);
+  if (!table)
+    return null;
+  const columns = new Set(table.columns.map((column) => column.name.toLowerCase()));
+  const tenantColumn = TENANT_COLUMNS.find((column) => columns.has(column));
+  const userColumn = USER_COLUMNS.find((column) => columns.has(column));
+  if (!tenantColumn && !userColumn) {
+    state.errors.push(`Table ${formatTableId(table)} has no supported tenant or user scope column.`);
+    return null;
+  }
+  return {
+    alias: from.name.alias ?? from.name.name,
+    tableId: formatTableId(table),
+    tenantColumn,
+    userColumn
+  };
+}
+function resolveSchemaTable(name, state) {
+  if (name.schema && SYSTEM_SCHEMAS.has(name.schema.toLowerCase())) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const key = name.schema ? tableKey(name.schema, name.name) : name.name.toLowerCase();
+  const matches = state.tableIndex.get(key) ?? [];
+  if (matches.length === 1)
+    return matches[0];
+  if (matches.length > 1) {
+    state.errors.push(`Table ${name.name} is ambiguous across schemas; qualify it explicitly.`);
+    return null;
+  }
+  state.errors.push(`Unknown table rejected by tenant isolation: ${name.name}.`);
+  return null;
+}
+function buildScopePredicates(scope, context) {
+  const predicates = [];
+  if (scope.tenantColumn) {
+    predicates.push({
+      expr: equalityExpr(scope.alias, scope.tenantColumn, context.tenantId),
+      label: `${scope.tableId}.${scope.tenantColumn} = [tenantId]`
+    });
+  }
+  if (scope.userColumn) {
+    predicates.push({
+      expr: equalityExpr(scope.alias, scope.userColumn, context.userId),
+      label: `${scope.tableId}.${scope.userColumn} = [userId]`
+    });
+  }
+  return predicates;
+}
+function equalityExpr(table, column, value2) {
+  return {
+    type: "binary",
+    op: "=",
+    left: {
+      type: "ref",
+      table: { name: table },
+      name: column
+    },
+    right: {
+      type: "string",
+      value: value2
+    }
+  };
+}
+function andExpr(left, right) {
+  if (!left)
+    return right;
+  return {
+    type: "binary",
+    op: "AND",
+    left,
+    right
+  };
+}
+function findConflictingScopePredicate(expr, scope, context) {
+  if (!expr)
+    return null;
+  if (expr.type === "binary") {
+    const directConflict = scopePredicateConflict(expr, scope, context);
+    if (directConflict)
+      return directConflict;
+    return findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.left, scope, context) ?? findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.right, scope, context);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "unary") {
+    return findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.operand, scope, context);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "ternary") {
+    return findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.value, scope, context) ?? findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.lo, scope, context) ?? findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.hi, scope, context);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "case") {
+    for (const when of expr.whens) {
+      const conflict = findConflictingScopePredicate(when.when, scope, context) ?? findConflictingScopePredicate(when.value, scope, context);
+      if (conflict)
+        return conflict;
+    }
+    return findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.else, scope, context);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "list" || expr.type === "array") {
+    for (const item of expr.expressions) {
+      const conflict = findConflictingScopePredicate(item, scope, context);
+      if (conflict)
+        return conflict;
+    }
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "cast") {
+    return findConflictingScopePredicate(expr.operand, scope, context);
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function scopePredicateConflict(expr, scope, context) {
+  if (expr.op !== "=")
+    return null;
+  const conflict = refLiteralConflict(expr.left, expr.right, scope, context) ?? refLiteralConflict(expr.right, expr.left, scope, context);
+  return conflict ? `Query attempted to override trusted ${conflict} scope.` : null;
+}
+function refLiteralConflict(ref, literal2, scope, context) {
+  if (ref.type !== "ref")
+    return null;
+  const tableName = ref.table?.name.toLowerCase();
+  if (tableName && tableName !== scope.alias.toLowerCase())
+    return null;
+  const literalValue = literalToString(literal2);
+  if (literalValue === null)
+    return null;
+  if (scope.tenantColumn && ref.name.toLowerCase() === scope.tenantColumn && literalValue !== context.tenantId) {
+    return "tenant";
+  }
+  if (scope.userColumn && ref.name.toLowerCase() === scope.userColumn && literalValue !== context.userId) {
+    return "user";
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function literalToString(expr) {
+  if (expr.type === "string")
+    return expr.value;
+  if (expr.type === "integer" || expr.type === "numeric") {
+    return String(expr.value);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "cast")
+    return literalToString(expr.operand);
+  return null;
+}
+function containsNestedSelect(statement) {
+  const expressions = [
+    ...statement.columns?.map((column) => column.expr) ?? [],
+    statement.where,
+    statement.having,
+    ...statement.groupBy ?? [],
+    ...statement.orderBy?.map((orderBy) => orderBy.by) ?? []
+  ].filter((expr) => !!expr);
+  return expressions.some(exprContainsSelect);
+}
+function exprContainsSelect(expr) {
+  if (expr.type === "select" || expr.type === "with" || expr.type === "union" || expr.type === "union all" || expr.type === "values" || expr.type === "array select") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "binary") {
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.left) || exprContainsSelect(expr.right);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "unary")
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.operand);
+  if (expr.type === "ternary") {
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.value) || exprContainsSelect(expr.lo) || exprContainsSelect(expr.hi);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "cast")
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.operand);
+  if (expr.type === "case") {
+    return expr.whens.some((when) => exprContainsSelect(when.when) || exprContainsSelect(when.value)) || (expr.else ? exprContainsSelect(expr.else) : false);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "call")
+    return expr.args.some(exprContainsSelect);
+  if (expr.type === "list" || expr.type === "array") {
+    return expr.expressions.some(exprContainsSelect);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "member")
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.operand);
+  if (expr.type === "arrayIndex") {
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.array) || exprContainsSelect(expr.index);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "overlay") {
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.value) || exprContainsSelect(expr.placing) || exprContainsSelect(expr.from) || (expr.for ? exprContainsSelect(expr.for) : false);
+  }
+  if (expr.type === "substring") {
+    return exprContainsSelect(expr.value) || (expr.from ? exprContainsSelect(expr.from) : false) || (expr.for ? exprContainsSelect(expr.for) : false);
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function tableKey(schema, name) {
+  return `${schema.toLowerCase()}.${name.toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+function formatTableId(table) {
+  return table.schema === "public" ? table.name : `${table.schema}.${table.name}`;
+}
+function sanitizeSensitiveData(value2) {
+  return sanitizeUnknown(value2);
+}
+function sanitizeUnknown(value2) {
+  if (typeof value2 === "string")
+    return sanitizeString(value2);
+  if (Array.isArray(value2))
+    return value2.map((item) => sanitizeUnknown(item));
+  if (isPlainRecord(value2)) {
+    const sanitized = {};
+    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value2)) {
+      sanitized[key] = sanitizeUnknown(item);
+    }
+    return sanitized;
+  }
+  return value2;
+}
+function sanitizeString(value2) {
+  return SENSITIVE_STRING_PATTERNS.reduce((current, [pattern, replacement]) => current.replace(pattern, replacement), value2);
+}
+function isPlainRecord(value2) {
+  return typeof value2 === "object" && value2 !== null && (Object.getPrototypeOf(value2) === Object.prototype || Object.getPrototypeOf(value2) === null);
+}
+function sanitizeDatabaseError(_error) {
+  return "Database query failed. The request was not completed.";
+}
 function detectSensitiveTables(sql, patterns) {
   const lower = sql.toLowerCase();
   const found = patterns.filter((p) => lower.includes(p.toLowerCase()));
@@ -80178,8 +80616,12 @@ function getApprovalReasons(sql, _report, sensitivePatterns, estimatedRows) {
   }
   return reasons;
 }
-var import_pgsql_ast_parser, ALLOWED_STATEMENT_TYPES, DANGEROUS_STATEMENT_TYPES, MAX_LIMIT = 100, EXPLAIN_REGEX;
+function requiresSensitiveApproval(sql, report, sensitivePatterns) {
+  return getApprovalReasons(sql, report, sensitivePatterns).some((reason) => reason.type === "sensitive_table");
+}
+var import_pgsql_ast_parser, ALLOWED_STATEMENT_TYPES, DANGEROUS_STATEMENT_TYPES, MAX_LIMIT = 100, TENANT_COLUMNS, USER_COLUMNS, SYSTEM_SCHEMAS, securityRequestContextSchema, EXPLAIN_REGEX, SENSITIVE_STRING_PATTERNS;
 var init_safety = __esm(() => {
+  init_zod();
   import_pgsql_ast_parser = __toESM(require_pgsql_ast_parser(), 1);
   ALLOWED_STATEMENT_TYPES = new Set(["select", "with"]);
   DANGEROUS_STATEMENT_TYPES = {
@@ -80205,7 +80647,38 @@ var init_safety = __esm(() => {
     copy: "COPY",
     do: "DO (procedural block)"
   };
+  TENANT_COLUMNS = [
+    "organization_id",
+    "tenant_id",
+    "org_id",
+    "workspace_id",
+    "account_id"
+  ];
+  USER_COLUMNS = ["user_id", "owner_id"];
+  SYSTEM_SCHEMAS = new Set(["information_schema", "pg_catalog"]);
+  securityRequestContextSchema = exports_external.object({
+    tenantId: exports_external.string().min(1),
+    userId: exports_external.string().min(1)
+  });
   EXPLAIN_REGEX = /^\s*EXPLAIN\s*(\([^)]*\))?\s*/i;
+  SENSITIVE_STRING_PATTERNS = [
+    [/\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b/gi, "[REDACTED_EMAIL]"],
+    [
+      /\b(?:\+?1[\s.-]?)?(?:\(?\d{3}\)?[\s.-]?)\d{3}[\s.-]?\d{4}\b/g,
+      "[REDACTED_PHONE]"
+    ],
+    [/\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/g, "[REDACTED_SSN]"],
+    [
+      /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b/g,
+      "[REDACTED_TOKEN]"
+    ],
+    [/\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{16,}\b/gi, "Bearer [REDACTED_TOKEN]"],
+    [
+      /\b(api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)(["'\s:=]+)([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,})\b/gi,
+      "$1$2[REDACTED_SECRET]"
+    ],
+    [/\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}\b/g, "[REDACTED_SECRET]"]
+  ];
 });
 
 // node_modules/@mastra/core/dist/chunk-TBHKQLPL.js
@@ -285476,6 +285949,7 @@ import { existsSync as existsSync7, readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "node:f
 function createPrismaTools(options2) {
   const queryExecutor = options2.queryExecutor ?? executeQuery;
   const explainExecutor = options2.explainExecutor ?? explainQuery;
+  const sensitiveTablePatterns = [...options2.sensitiveTablePatterns ?? []];
   return {
     qcp_validate_sql: createTool({
       id: "qcp_validate_sql",
@@ -285498,21 +285972,37 @@ function createPrismaTools(options2) {
     qcp_execute_read_sql: createTool({
       id: "qcp_execute_read_sql",
       description: "Execute a SQL query only after qcp AST validation succeeds. Rejected SQL is returned as a structured safety error.",
+      strict: true,
       inputSchema: exports_external.object({
         sql: exports_external.string().min(1)
       }),
+      requestContextSchema: securityRequestContextSchema,
       outputSchema: exports_external.discriminatedUnion("ok", [
         exports_external.object({
           ok: exports_external.literal(true),
           safety: safetyReportSchema,
-          result: queryResultSchema
+          isolation: tenantIsolationReportSchema,
+          result: queryResultSchema,
+          approvalReasons: exports_external.array(approvalReasonSchema)
         }),
         exports_external.object({
           ok: exports_external.literal(false),
           safety: safetyReportSchema,
-          error: exports_external.string()
+          isolation: tenantIsolationReportSchema.optional(),
+          error: exports_external.string(),
+          approvalReasons: exports_external.array(approvalReasonSchema)
         })
       ]),
+      requireApproval: async ({ sql }, context2) => shouldRequirePrismaToolApproval({
+        sql,
+        databaseUrl: options2.databaseUrl,
+        schema: options2.schema,
+        sensitiveTablePatterns,
+        explainExecutor,
+        requestContext: context2?.requestContext
+      }),
+      toModelOutput: sanitizedToolModelOutput,
+      transform: secureToolTransform(),
       mcp: {
         annotations: {
           title: "Execute Read SQL",
@@ -285522,38 +286012,48 @@ function createPrismaTools(options2) {
           openWorldHint: false
         }
       },
-      execute: async ({ sql }) => {
-        const safety = validateSql(sql);
-        if (!safety.safe) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            safety,
-            error: safety.errors[0] ?? "SQL rejected by qcp safety policy."
-          };
-        }
-        const result = await queryExecutor(options2.databaseUrl, safety.processedSql);
-        return { ok: true, safety, result };
-      }
+      execute: async ({ sql }, context2) => executeSecurePrismaReadQuery({
+        databaseUrl: options2.databaseUrl,
+        schema: options2.schema,
+        queryExecutor,
+        sensitiveTablePatterns
+      }, sql, context2)
     }),
     qcp_explain_read_sql: createTool({
       id: "qcp_explain_read_sql",
       description: "Run EXPLAIN for a SQL query only after qcp AST validation succeeds.",
+      strict: true,
       inputSchema: exports_external.object({
         sql: exports_external.string().min(1)
       }),
+      requestContextSchema: securityRequestContextSchema,
       outputSchema: exports_external.discriminatedUnion("ok", [
         exports_external.object({
           ok: exports_external.literal(true),
           safety: safetyReportSchema,
+          isolation: tenantIsolationReportSchema,
           plan: exports_external.string(),
-          estimatedRows: exports_external.number()
+          estimatedRows: exports_external.number(),
+          approvalReasons: exports_external.array(approvalReasonSchema)
         }),
         exports_external.object({
           ok: exports_external.literal(false),
           safety: safetyReportSchema,
-          error: exports_external.string()
+          isolation: tenantIsolationReportSchema.optional(),
+          error: exports_external.string(),
+          approvalReasons: exports_external.array(approvalReasonSchema)
         })
       ]),
+      requireApproval: async ({ sql }, context2) => shouldRequirePrismaToolApproval({
+        sql,
+        databaseUrl: options2.databaseUrl,
+        schema: options2.schema,
+        sensitiveTablePatterns,
+        explainExecutor,
+        requestContext: context2?.requestContext
+      }),
+      toModelOutput: sanitizedToolModelOutput,
+      transform: secureToolTransform(),
       mcp: {
         annotations: {
           title: "Explain Read SQL",
@@ -285563,23 +286063,12 @@ function createPrismaTools(options2) {
           openWorldHint: false
         }
       },
-      execute: async ({ sql }) => {
-        const safety = validateSql(sql);
-        if (!safety.safe) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            safety,
-            error: safety.errors[0] ?? "SQL rejected by qcp safety policy."
-          };
-        }
-        const explain = await explainExecutor(options2.databaseUrl, safety.processedSql);
-        return {
-          ok: true,
-          safety,
-          plan: explain.plan,
-          estimatedRows: explain.estimatedRows
-        };
-      }
+      execute: async ({ sql }, context2) => executeSecurePrismaExplainQuery({
+        databaseUrl: options2.databaseUrl,
+        schema: options2.schema,
+        explainExecutor,
+        sensitiveTablePatterns
+      }, sql, context2)
     }),
     qcp_read_prisma_context: createTool({
       id: "qcp_read_prisma_context",
@@ -285608,6 +286097,169 @@ function createPrismaTools(options2) {
     })
   };
 }
+async function executeSecurePrismaReadQuery(options2, sql, context2) {
+  const base2 = prepareSecurePrismaQuery(sql, options2.schema, options2.sensitiveTablePatterns ?? [], context2);
+  if (!base2.ok)
+    return base2;
+  const queryExecutor = options2.queryExecutor ?? executeQuery;
+  try {
+    const result = await queryExecutor(options2.databaseUrl, base2.isolation.processedSql);
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      safety: base2.safety,
+      isolation: base2.isolation,
+      result: sanitizeSensitiveData(result),
+      approvalReasons: base2.approvalReasons
+    };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      safety: base2.safety,
+      isolation: base2.isolation,
+      error: sanitizeDatabaseError(err),
+      approvalReasons: base2.approvalReasons
+    };
+  }
+}
+async function executeSecurePrismaExplainQuery(options2, sql, context2) {
+  const base2 = prepareSecurePrismaQuery(sql, options2.schema, options2.sensitiveTablePatterns ?? [], context2);
+  if (!base2.ok)
+    return base2;
+  const explainExecutor = options2.explainExecutor ?? explainQuery;
+  try {
+    const explain = await explainExecutor(options2.databaseUrl, base2.isolation.processedSql);
+    const approvalReasons = getApprovalReasons(base2.isolation.processedSql, base2.safety, [...options2.sensitiveTablePatterns ?? []], explain.estimatedRows);
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      safety: base2.safety,
+      isolation: base2.isolation,
+      plan: sanitizeSensitiveData(explain.plan),
+      estimatedRows: explain.estimatedRows,
+      approvalReasons
+    };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      safety: base2.safety,
+      isolation: base2.isolation,
+      error: sanitizeDatabaseError(err),
+      approvalReasons: base2.approvalReasons
+    };
+  }
+}
+function prepareSecurePrismaQuery(sql, schema, sensitiveTablePatterns, context2) {
+  const safety = validateSql(sql);
+  if (!safety.safe) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      safety,
+      error: safety.errors[0] ?? "SQL rejected by qcp safety policy.",
+      approvalReasons: []
+    };
+  }
+  const securityContext = extractSecurityRequestContext(context2);
+  if (!securityContext) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      safety,
+      error: "Trusted tenant context is required.",
+      approvalReasons: []
+    };
+  }
+  const isolation = enforceTenantIsolation(safety.processedSql, schema, securityContext);
+  if (!isolation.safe) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      safety,
+      isolation,
+      error: isolation.errors[0] ?? "Query rejected by qcp tenant isolation policy.",
+      approvalReasons: []
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    safety,
+    isolation,
+    approvalReasons: getApprovalReasons(isolation.processedSql, safety, [...sensitiveTablePatterns])
+  };
+}
+async function shouldRequirePrismaToolApproval(options2) {
+  const safety = validateSql(options2.sql);
+  if (!safety.safe)
+    return false;
+  const securityContext = extractSecurityRequestContext({
+    requestContext: options2.requestContext
+  });
+  if (!securityContext)
+    return false;
+  const isolation = enforceTenantIsolation(safety.processedSql, options2.schema, securityContext);
+  if (!isolation.safe)
+    return false;
+  if (requiresSensitiveApproval(isolation.processedSql, safety, [...options2.sensitiveTablePatterns])) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  try {
+    const explain = await options2.explainExecutor(options2.databaseUrl, isolation.processedSql);
+    const reasons = getApprovalReasons(isolation.processedSql, safety, [...options2.sensitiveTablePatterns], explain.estimatedRows);
+    return reasons.some((reason) => reason.type === "high_cost");
+  } catch {
+    return true;
+  }
+}
+function extractSecurityRequestContext(context2) {
+  const requestContext = getRecordValue(context2, "requestContext") ?? context2;
+  const candidates = [];
+  if (isRequestContextLike(requestContext)) {
+    candidates.push({
+      tenantId: requestContext.get("tenantId"),
+      userId: requestContext.get("userId")
+    });
+  }
+  const all = getRecordValue(requestContext, "all");
+  if (all)
+    candidates.push(all);
+  candidates.push(requestContext);
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    const result = securityRequestContextSchema.safeParse(candidate);
+    if (result.success)
+      return result.data;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function isRequestContextLike(value2) {
+  return typeof value2 === "object" && value2 !== null && typeof value2.get === "function";
+}
+function getRecordValue(value2, key) {
+  if (typeof value2 !== "object" || value2 === null)
+    return;
+  return value2[key];
+}
+function sanitizedToolModelOutput(output) {
+  return {
+    type: "json",
+    value: sanitizeSensitiveData(output)
+  };
+}
+function secureToolTransform() {
+  return {
+    display: {
+      input: redactedToolInput,
+      output: ({ output }) => sanitizeSensitiveData(output),
+      error: sanitizedToolError
+    },
+    transcript: {
+      input: redactedToolInput,
+      output: ({ output }) => sanitizeSensitiveData(output),
+      error: sanitizedToolError
+    }
+  };
+}
+function redactedToolInput(_payload) {
+  return { sql: "[REDACTED_SQL]" };
+}
+function sanitizedToolError() {
+  return { message: sanitizeDatabaseError(undefined) };
+}
 async function loadPrismaMcpToolsets(databaseUrl, clientFactory = createPrismaMcpClient) {
   let client = null;
   try {
@@ -285660,6 +286312,7 @@ async function generateSqlWithPrismaAgent(options2) {
     databaseUrl: options2.databaseUrl,
     schema: options2.schema,
     prismaSchemaPath: options2.prismaSchemaPath,
+    sensitiveTablePatterns: options2.config.sensitiveTablePatterns,
     instructions: [
       "Use qcp_read_prisma_context and qcp_validate_sql to improve SQL quality.",
       "Do not call qcp_execute_read_sql while generating SQL for qcp CLI output.",
@@ -285769,7 +286422,7 @@ function stringProcessEnv() {
   }
   return env4;
 }
-var safetyReportSchema, queryResultSchema, prismaContextSchema, PrismaAgent;
+var safetyReportSchema, tenantIsolationReportSchema, approvalReasonSchema, queryResultSchema, prismaContextSchema, PrismaAgent;
 var init_prisma_agent = __esm(() => {
   init_tools();
   init_dist32();
@@ -285789,6 +286442,18 @@ var init_prisma_agent = __esm(() => {
     processedSql: exports_external.string(),
     statementType: exports_external.string()
   });
+  tenantIsolationReportSchema = exports_external.object({
+    safe: exports_external.boolean(),
+    errors: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()),
+    warnings: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()),
+    processedSql: exports_external.string(),
+    injectedPredicates: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()),
+    scopedTables: exports_external.array(exports_external.string())
+  });
+  approvalReasonSchema = exports_external.object({
+    type: exports_external.enum(["sensitive_table", "large_scan", "no_limit", "high_cost"]),
+    detail: exports_external.string()
+  });
   queryResultSchema = exports_external.object({
     rows: exports_external.array(exports_external.record(exports_external.string(), exports_external.unknown())),
     rowCount: exports_external.number(),
@@ -285814,6 +286479,7 @@ var init_prisma_agent = __esm(() => {
             databaseUrl: config2.databaseUrl,
             schema: config2.schema,
             prismaSchemaPath: config2.prismaSchemaPath,
+            sensitiveTablePatterns: config2.sensitiveTablePatterns,
             queryExecutor: config2.queryExecutor,
             explainExecutor: config2.explainExecutor
           }) : {}
@@ -285875,8 +286541,12 @@ async function handlePrismaQuestion(input) {
   let estimatedRows;
   const safeMode = options2.safeMode ?? input.config.safeMode;
   if (safeMode || options2.debug) {
-    try {
-      const explain = await explainQuery(input.databaseUrl, safetyReport.processedSql);
+    const explain = await executeSecurePrismaExplainQuery({
+      databaseUrl: input.databaseUrl,
+      schema: input.schema,
+      sensitiveTablePatterns: input.config.sensitiveTablePatterns
+    }, safetyReport.processedSql);
+    if (explain.ok) {
       estimatedRows = explain.estimatedRows;
       if (options2.debug) {
         console.log(source_default.dim(`
@@ -285884,7 +286554,9 @@ async function handlePrismaQuestion(input) {
         console.log(source_default.dim(explain.plan.slice(0, 1200)));
         console.log();
       }
-    } catch {}
+    } else if (options2.debug) {
+      console.log(source_default.dim(`EXPLAIN unavailable: ${explain.error}`));
+    }
   }
   if (safeMode && !options2.noConfirm) {
     const approvalReasons = getApprovalReasons(safetyReport.processedSql, safetyReport, input.config.sensitiveTablePatterns, estimatedRows);
@@ -285908,13 +286580,13 @@ async function handlePrismaQuestion(input) {
   const queryResult = await executePrismaQuery(input, safetyReport.processedSql);
   if (!queryResult)
     return false;
-  printResults(queryResult);
-  const summaryResult = await summarizePrismaResults(input, sqlResult, queryResult);
+  printResults(queryResult.result);
+  const summaryResult = await summarizePrismaResults(input, sqlResult, queryResult.result, queryResult.isolation.processedSql);
   if (summaryResult)
     printSummary(summaryResult.summary);
   if (sqlResult.explanation)
     printExplanation(sqlResult.explanation);
-  const totalMs = sqlResult.latencyMs + queryResult.executionTimeMs + (summaryResult?.latencyMs ?? 0);
+  const totalMs = sqlResult.latencyMs + queryResult.result.executionTimeMs + (summaryResult?.latencyMs ?? 0);
   trackQuery({
     provider: input.config.provider,
     model: input.config.model,
@@ -285926,7 +286598,7 @@ async function handlePrismaQuestion(input) {
       tokensOut: (sqlResult.tokensOut ?? 0) + (summaryResult?.tokensOut ?? 0),
       totalLatencyMs: totalMs,
       sqlGenerationMs: sqlResult.latencyMs,
-      executionMs: queryResult.executionTimeMs,
+      executionMs: queryResult.result.executionTimeMs,
       summaryMs: summaryResult?.latencyMs ?? 0,
       provider: input.config.provider,
       model: input.config.model
@@ -285936,7 +286608,7 @@ async function handlePrismaQuestion(input) {
   log3("info", "Prisma query completed", {
     provider: input.config.provider,
     model: input.config.model,
-    rows: queryResult.rowCount,
+    rows: queryResult.result.rowCount,
     latencyMs: totalMs
   });
   return true;
@@ -285963,22 +286635,24 @@ async function generateSql(input) {
 }
 async function executePrismaQuery(input, sql) {
   const spinner = ora(input.commandName === "chat" ? "Executing..." : "Executing query...").start();
-  try {
-    const queryResult = await executeQuery(input.databaseUrl, sql);
-    spinner.succeed(input.commandName === "chat" ? `${queryResult.rowCount} row(s) · ${queryResult.executionTimeMs}ms` : `Query executed · ${queryResult.rowCount} row(s) · ${queryResult.executionTimeMs}ms`);
-    return queryResult;
-  } catch (err) {
+  const queryResult = await executeSecurePrismaReadQuery({
+    databaseUrl: input.databaseUrl,
+    schema: input.schema,
+    sensitiveTablePatterns: input.config.sensitiveTablePatterns
+  }, sql);
+  if (!queryResult.ok) {
     spinner.fail(input.commandName === "chat" ? "Execution failed" : "Query execution failed");
-    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-    printError(message);
+    printError(queryResult.error);
     trackError(input.commandName, "prisma_query_execution_failed");
     return;
   }
+  spinner.succeed(input.commandName === "chat" ? `${queryResult.result.rowCount} row(s) · ${queryResult.result.executionTimeMs}ms` : `Query executed · ${queryResult.result.rowCount} row(s) · ${queryResult.result.executionTimeMs}ms`);
+  return queryResult;
 }
-async function summarizePrismaResults(input, sqlResult, queryResult) {
+async function summarizePrismaResults(input, sqlResult, queryResult, executedSql) {
   const spinner = ora(input.commandName === "chat" ? "Summarizing..." : "Generating summary...").start();
   try {
-    const summaryResult = await input.provider.generateSummary(input.question, sqlResult.sql, queryResult, (chunk) => {
+    const summaryResult = await input.provider.generateSummary(input.question, executedSql, queryResult, (chunk) => {
       if (input.options?.debug)
         process.stderr.write(source_default.dim(chunk));
     });
@@ -285998,7 +286672,6 @@ var init_prisma_query = __esm(() => {
   init_dist18();
   init_ora();
   init_prisma_agent();
-  init_db();
   init_logger2();
   init_output();
   init_safety();