@modelcontextprotocol/inspector 2.10.0 → 2.11.0

package/clients/mcpdo/build/{chunk-2E5EZYNU.js → chunk-O6RN6WMD.js}

@@ -2707,6 +2707,84 @@ function isJsonDocumentResponse(contentType) {
   const mediaType = contentType.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
   return mediaType === "application/json" || mediaType.endsWith("+json");
 }
+var SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER = "x-inspector-oauth-metadata-synthesized";
+var synthesizedResponses = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakSet();
+function isSynthesizedMetadataResponse(response) {
+  return synthesizedResponses.has(response);
+}
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
+function continuesDiscovery(status) {
+  return status < 500 || status === 502;
+}
+function authorizationServerForFinalCandidate(url) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(url);
+  } catch {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  const { pathname } = parsed;
+  if (pathname === OIDC_WELL_KNOWN) return parsed.origin;
+  if (!pathname.endsWith(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN)) return void 0;
+  if (pathname.startsWith(`${RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN}/`) || pathname.startsWith(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}/`)) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  return `${parsed.origin}${pathname.slice(0, -OIDC_WELL_KNOWN.length)}`;
+}
+function synthesizeAuthorizationServerMetadata(issuer, overrides) {
+  return {
+    issuer,
+    authorization_endpoint: overrides.authorizationUrl ?? new URL("/authorize", issuer).href,
+    token_endpoint: overrides.tokenUrl ?? new URL("/token", issuer).href,
+    registration_endpoint: new URL("/register", issuer).href,
+    response_types_supported: ["code"],
+    code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"]
+  };
+}
+function requestMethodOf(input, init) {
+  if (init?.method) return init.method.toUpperCase();
+  if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
+    return input.method.toUpperCase();
+  }
+  return "GET";
+}
+function acceptsJson(input, init) {
+  let accept = null;
+  if (init?.headers) {
+    accept = new Headers(init.headers).get("accept");
+  } else if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
+    accept = input.headers.get("accept");
+  }
+  if (!accept) return false;
+  const mediaTypes = accept.split(",").map((part) => part.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase());
+  return mediaTypes.includes("application/json") && !mediaTypes.includes("text/event-stream");
+}
+function synthesizedMetadataResponse(input, init, response, overrides) {
+  if (!continuesDiscovery(response.status)) return void 0;
+  if (requestMethodOf(input, init) !== "GET") return void 0;
+  if (!acceptsJson(input, init)) return void 0;
+  const issuer = authorizationServerForFinalCandidate(requestUrlOf(input));
+  if (!issuer) return void 0;
+  void response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {
+  });
+  console.warn(
+    `[oauth] ${issuer} publishes no authorization server metadata; using the configured endpoint override(s) in place of the SDK's /authorize and /token fallbacks.`
+  );
+  const synthesized = new Response(
+    JSON.stringify(synthesizeAuthorizationServerMetadata(issuer, overrides)),
+    {
+      status: 200,
+      statusText: "OK",
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        [SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER]: "endpoint-overrides"
+      }
+    }
+  );
+  synthesizedResponses.add(synthesized);
+  return synthesized;
+}
 function responseWithBody(response, body) {
   const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
   headers.delete("content-length");
@@ -2734,7 +2812,9 @@ function withOAuthEndpointOverrides(fetchFn, getOverrides) {
     const overrides = resolveOverrides();
     if (!overrides) return response;
     if (!isAuthorizationServerMetadataRequest(input)) return response;
-    if (!response.ok) return response;
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      return synthesizedMetadataResponse(input, init, response, overrides) ?? response;
+    }
     if (!isJsonDocumentResponse(response.headers.get("content-type")))
       return response;
     let parsed;
@@ -2910,8 +2990,8 @@ import {
   OAuthMetadataSchema,
   OpenIdProviderDiscoveryMetadataSchema
 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/core";
-var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
-var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server";
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
 var COMPAT_SOURCE_HEADER = "x-inspector-oauth-metadata-source";
 function oidcDiscoveryCandidates(rfc8414Url) {
   let url;
@@ -2920,16 +3000,16 @@ function oidcDiscoveryCandidates(rfc8414Url) {
   } catch {
     return [];
   }
-  if (!url.pathname.startsWith(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN)) return [];
-  const path7 = url.pathname.slice(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN.length);
+  if (!url.pathname.startsWith(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2)) return [];
+  const path7 = url.pathname.slice(RFC8414_WELL_KNOWN2.length);
   if (path7 !== "" && !path7.startsWith("/")) return [];
-  if (path7 === "") return [new URL(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN, url.origin).href];
+  if (path7 === "") return [new URL(OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2, url.origin).href];
   return [
-    new URL(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}${path7}`, url.origin).href,
-    new URL(`${path7}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN}`, url.origin).href
+    new URL(`${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}${path7}`, url.origin).href,
+    new URL(`${path7}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}`, url.origin).href
   ];
 }
-function continuesDiscovery(status) {
+function continuesDiscovery2(status) {
   return status >= 400 && status < 500 || status === 502;
 }
 async function releaseBody(response) {
@@ -2955,7 +3035,7 @@ function discoveryHeaders(input, init) {
   }
   return new Headers();
 }
-function requestMethodOf(input, init) {
+function requestMethodOf2(input, init) {
   if (init?.method) return init.method.toUpperCase();
   if (typeof input !== "string" && !(input instanceof URL)) {
     return input.method.toUpperCase();
@@ -2966,8 +3046,8 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
   return async (input, init) => {
     const response = await fetchFn(input, init);
     if (response.ok) return response;
-    if (!continuesDiscovery(response.status)) return response;
-    if (requestMethodOf(input, init) !== "GET") return response;
+    if (!continuesDiscovery2(response.status)) return response;
+    if (requestMethodOf2(input, init) !== "GET") return response;
     const candidates = oidcDiscoveryCandidates(requestUrlOf3(input));
     if (candidates.length === 0) return response;
     const headers = discoveryHeaders(input, init);
@@ -2997,7 +3077,7 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
           releaseBodyDetached(response);
           throw callerSignal.reason;
         }
-        if (continuesDiscovery(probe.status)) continue;
+        if (continuesDiscovery2(probe.status)) continue;
         return response;
       }
       let parsed;
@@ -3017,6 +3097,16 @@ function withRfc8414OidcCompat(fetchFn) {
       }
       const source = probe.url || candidate;
       releaseBodyDetached(response);
+      if (isSynthesizedMetadataResponse(probe)) {
+        return new Response(body, {
+          status: 200,
+          statusText: "OK",
+          headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            [SYNTHESIZED_METADATA_HEADER]: "endpoint-overrides"
+          }
+        });
+      }
       console.warn(
         `[oauth] ${source} returned RFC 8414 OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata, not an OpenID provider document. The MCP TypeScript SDK validates that path as OpenID Connect Discovery and would reject it (modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#2733), so the Inspector is handing it to discovery as the RFC 8414 document it is.`
       );
@@ -3497,7 +3587,10 @@ function parseAuthChallengeFromResponse(response, context) {
   if (status !== 401 && status !== 403) {
     return void 0;
   }
-  const wwwAuthenticate = response.headers.get("WWW-Authenticate") ?? void 0;
+  const wwwAuthenticate = response.headers.get("WWW-Authenticate") || void 0;
+  if (status === 403 && !wwwAuthenticate) {
+    return void 0;
+  }
   const bearer = wwwAuthenticate ? parseWwwAuthenticateBearer(wwwAuthenticate) : {};
   const requiredScopes = parseScopeString(bearer.scope);
   return {
@@ -4487,6 +4580,17 @@ async function recordNamespaceKeys(stateFilePath, secretStore, namespace, server
     warnLedgerFailure("update", error);
   }
 }
+async function recordedNamespaces(stateFilePath) {
+  try {
+    const ledger = parseLedger(
+      await readStoreFile(namespaceLedgerPath(stateFilePath))
+    );
+    return [...ledger.keys()].reverse();
+  } catch (error) {
+    warnLedgerFailure("read", error);
+    return [];
+  }
+}
 async function purgeSupersededNamespaces(stateFilePath, secretStore, current) {
   let ledger;
   let location;
@@ -4650,24 +4754,13 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
   if (raw !== null && snapshot === null) {
     throw new OAuthStateFileUnrecognizedError(filePath, "save");
   }
-  if (locked) {
-    await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, void 0);
-  }
   const namespace = newSecretsNamespace();
-  if (snapshot === null) return namespace;
-  const moves = [
-    ...Object.entries(snapshot.servers).map(([url, state]) => ({
-      legacyId: oauthSecretServerId(url),
-      scopedId: oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace),
-      fields: serverSecretFields(state)
-    })),
-    ...Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).map((issuer) => ({
-      legacyId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer),
-      scopedId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace),
-      fields: [IDP_SESSION_FIELD]
-    }))
-  ];
-  if (moves.length === 0) return namespace;
+  if (snapshot === null || Object.keys(snapshot.servers).length === 0 && Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).length === 0) {
+    if (locked) {
+      await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, void 0);
+    }
+    return namespace;
+  }
   if (!locked) {
     throw new SecretStoreUnavailableError(
       `Could not save OAuth state: ${filePath} predates per-state-file secret namespaces, and migrating its secret-store entries needs the file lock, which is unavailable here (see the lock warning above). Migrating without it could lose credentials if two processes migrate at once. Nothing was changed; make the lock directory writable and retry \u2014 or, if you cannot, clear this file's stored OAuth state and re-authorize (clearing does not migrate, and the fresh state file mints its namespace without the lock).`
@@ -4682,10 +4775,24 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
   );
   const touched = [];
   try {
-    for (const { legacyId, scopedId, fields } of moves) {
-      for (const field of fields) {
-        const value = await secretStoreGetStrict(secretStore, legacyId, field);
-        if (value === null) continue;
+    const values = await readEntrySecrets(
+      snapshot,
+      secretStore,
+      void 0,
+      await recordedNamespaces(filePath)
+    );
+    const copies = [
+      ...[...values.servers].map(([url, secrets]) => ({
+        scopedId: oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace),
+        secrets
+      })),
+      ...[...values.idpSessions].map(([issuer, secrets]) => ({
+        scopedId: oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace),
+        secrets
+      }))
+    ];
+    for (const { scopedId, secrets } of copies) {
+      for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) {
         touched.push({ serverId: scopedId, field, value: null });
         await secretStore.set(scopedId, field, value);
       }
@@ -4695,7 +4802,14 @@ async function adoptSecretsNamespace(filePath, secretStore, locked) {
     await restoreSecretFields(secretStore, touched, warnRestoreFailure);
     throw error;
   }
-  for (const { legacyId } of moves) {
+  await purgeSupersededNamespaces(filePath, secretStore, namespace);
+  const legacyIds = [
+    ...Object.keys(snapshot.servers).map((url) => oauthSecretServerId(url)),
+    ...Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions).map(
+      (issuer) => oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer)
+    )
+  ];
+  for (const legacyId of legacyIds) {
     try {
       await secretStore.deleteAllForServer(legacyId);
     } catch (error) {
@@ -4748,6 +4862,14 @@ function preserveNonDurableSecrets(diskSecrets, secrets) {
   return keep;
 }
 async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
+  await writeOAuthSectionsFrom(
+    filePath,
+    async () => snapshot,
+    sections,
+    secretStore
+  );
+}
+async function writeOAuthSectionsFrom(filePath, resolveSnapshot, sections, secretStore) {
   const policy = getPersistTokensPolicy();
   const durable = await secretStoreIsDurable(secretStore);
   await withOAuthStateLock(filePath, "save", async (locked) => {
@@ -4831,6 +4953,7 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           unconfirmed = null;
           namespace = diskNamespace;
         }
+        const snapshot = await resolveSnapshot(disk, namespace);
         const effective = sections ? {
           servers: sections.servers && [...new Set(sections.servers)],
           idpSessions: sections.idpSessions && [
@@ -4864,7 +4987,8 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           const candidates = [
             .../* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
               ...serverSecretFields(getOwnEntry(disk?.servers, url)),
-              ...serverSecretFields(next)
+              ...serverSecretFields(next),
+              ...[...restoreBaseline.values()].filter((prior) => prior.serverId === serverId).map(({ field }) => field)
             ])
           ];
           const entryPrior = await snapshotSecretFields(
@@ -4873,8 +4997,12 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
             candidates
           );
           priorSecrets.push(...entryPrior);
+          const entryPriorValue = new Map(
+            entryPrior.map(({ field, value }) => [field, value])
+          );
           if (next === void 0) {
             for (const field of candidates) {
+              if (entryPriorValue.get(field) === null) continue;
               ourWrites.set(priorKey({ serverId, field }), null);
             }
             await secretStore.deleteAllForServer(serverId);
@@ -4889,10 +5017,9 @@ async function writeOAuthSections(filePath, snapshot, sections, secretStore = de
           }
           const { residue, secrets } = splitServerOAuthState(next, policy);
           for (const field of candidates) {
-            ourWrites.set(
-              priorKey({ serverId, field }),
-              secrets[field] ?? null
-            );
+            const value = secrets[field] ?? null;
+            if (value === entryPriorValue.get(field)) continue;
+            ourWrites.set(priorKey({ serverId, field }), value);
           }
           setOwnEntry(merged.servers, url, residue);
           if (!durable) {
@@ -5035,26 +5162,52 @@ function secretRequestsFor(snapshot, namespace) {
   }
   return requests;
 }
-async function joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace) {
-  const requests = secretRequestsFor(snapshot, namespace);
-  const values = requests.length > 0 ? await secretStoreGetManyStrict(secretStore, requests) : {};
+function fillMissingSecrets(target, source) {
+  for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(source ?? {})) {
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(target, field)) setOwnEntry(target, field, value);
+  }
+}
+async function readEntrySecrets(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks) {
+  const servers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  const idpSessions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const url of Object.keys(snapshot.servers)) servers.set(url, {});
+  for (const issuer of Object.keys(snapshot.idpSessions)) {
+    idpSessions.set(issuer, {});
+  }
+  for (const source of [namespace, ...fallbacks]) {
+    const requests = secretRequestsFor(snapshot, source);
+    if (requests.length === 0) break;
+    const values = await secretStoreGetManyStrict(secretStore, requests);
+    for (const [url, target] of servers) {
+      fillMissingSecrets(target, values[oauthSecretServerId(url, source)]);
+    }
+    for (const [issuer, target] of idpSessions) {
+      fillMissingSecrets(
+        target,
+        values[oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, source)]
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  return { servers, idpSessions };
+}
+async function joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks) {
+  const values = await readEntrySecrets(
+    snapshot,
+    secretStore,
+    namespace,
+    fallbacks
+  );
   return {
     servers: Object.fromEntries(
       Object.entries(snapshot.servers).map(([url, state]) => [
         url,
-        joinServerOAuthState(
-          state,
-          values[oauthSecretServerId(url, namespace)] ?? {}
-        )
+        joinServerOAuthState(state, values.servers.get(url) ?? {})
       ])
     ),
     idpSessions: Object.fromEntries(
       Object.entries(snapshot.idpSessions).map(([issuer, session]) => [
         issuer,
-        joinIdpSession(
-          session,
-          values[oauthIdpSecretServerId(issuer, namespace)] ?? {}
-        )
+        joinIdpSession(session, values.idpSessions.get(issuer) ?? {})
       ])
     )
   };
@@ -5121,7 +5274,9 @@ async function readOAuthStore(filePath, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
         warnMigrationFailure(error);
       }
     }
-    return joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, parseSecretsNamespace(raw));
+    const namespace = parseSecretsNamespace(raw);
+    const fallbacks = namespace === void 0 ? await recordedNamespaces(filePath) : [];
+    return joinSnapshot(snapshot, secretStore, namespace, fallbacks);
   });
 }
 async function removeOAuthStore(filePath, secretStore = defaultSecretStore()) {
@@ -5748,6 +5903,11 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   // rendered by the list panel instead of vanishing into an unhandled
   // rejection — which read as "this server has no tools" (#1953).
   error = null;
+  // Whether a fetch has committed a list this session. Until it has, the empty
+  // `items` mean "not loaded yet", not "the server has none" — a distinction a
+  // count of the list cannot make from `items` alone (#2607). Set and cleared
+  // just before the `*Change` dispatch, so a reader keyed on that event sees it.
+  loaded = false;
   config;
   // Debounce a burst of `list_changed` notifications into a single
   // refresh (or one indicator light) once it settles.
@@ -5783,6 +5943,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
           this.listChangedTimer = null;
         }
         this.items = [];
+        this.loaded = false;
         this.dispatchChange();
         this.setListChanged(false);
         this.setError(null);
@@ -5841,6 +6002,14 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   getItems() {
     return [...this.items];
   }
+  /**
+   * Whether a fetch has committed a list since the last connect. False while
+   * the connect-time load is in flight, when it was deferred (paginated mode),
+   * and after a disconnect. Changes only alongside the `*Change` event (#2607).
+   */
+  isLoaded() {
+    return this.loaded;
+  }
   /** Whether a `list_changed` arrived since the last refresh (indicator on). */
   getListChanged() {
     return this.listChanged;
@@ -5934,6 +6103,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
   /** Commit a fetched list as the current one and notify subscribers. */
   applyItems(items) {
     this.items = items;
+    this.loaded = true;
     this.dispatchChange();
   }
   dispatchChange() {
@@ -5944,6 +6114,7 @@ var ManagedListState = class extends TypedEventTarget {
     this.unsubscribe?.();
     this.unsubscribe = null;
     this.items = [];
+    this.loaded = false;
   }
 };
 
@@ -7212,6 +7383,10 @@ function checkSkillNameCollisions(entries) {
 }
 
 // ../../core/mcp/skillsVerification.ts
+var DEFAULT_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with the server's skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes settings",
+  verifyOne: "by verifying this skill alone"
+};
 function reasonOf(err) {
   return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
 }
@@ -7273,7 +7448,7 @@ function responseBytes(result) {
   }
   return total;
 }
-async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata) {
+async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata, budgetHint = DEFAULT_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT) {
   const collisions = checkSkillNameCollisions(entries);
   const reports = [];
   const budget = resolveSkillCatalogBudget(client.getServerSettings?.());
@@ -7285,7 +7460,7 @@ async function verifySkills(client, entries, metadata) {
     const files = [];
     const declared = entry.resources === DYNAMIC_RESOURCES ? [] : entry.resources;
     const manifest = withinBudget ? boundedManifest(declared) : [];
-    let incomplete = !withinBudget ? `Not read: this run already reached its catalog budget of ${budget.maxSkills} skills / ${budget.maxBytes} bytes (raise it in the server's Skills settings). Nothing about this skill's files has been checked \u2014 verify it on its own with \`--method skills/get --uri <uri> --verify\`, where <uri> is this report's uri, to get a verdict.` : manifest.length < declared.length ? `Only ${manifest.length} of ${declared.length} manifest entries were read: the skill exceeds the ${SKILL_MAX_RESOURCE_ENTRIES}-entry / ${SKILL_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES}-byte interoperability limits, so the rest were not fetched and cannot be reported on.` : void 0;
+    let incomplete = !withinBudget ? `Not read: this run already reached its catalog budget of ${budget.maxSkills} skills / ${budget.maxBytes} bytes (raise it ${budgetHint.raise}). Nothing about this skill's files has been checked \u2014 verify it on its own ${budgetHint.verifyOne} to get a verdict.` : manifest.length < declared.length ? `Only ${manifest.length} of ${declared.length} manifest entries were read: the skill exceeds the ${SKILL_MAX_RESOURCE_ENTRIES}-entry / ${SKILL_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES}-byte interoperability limits, so the rest were not fetched and cannot be reported on.` : void 0;
     let receivedBytes = 0;
     const entryIdentity = skillUriIdentity(entry.uri);
     let selfAttempted = false;
@@ -7423,6 +7598,14 @@ function anySkillUnverifiable(reports) {
 }
 
 // ../../core/cli/handlers/skills-verify.ts
+var CLI_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with --skill-catalog-max-skills / --skill-catalog-max-bytes, or the server's skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes",
+  verifyOne: "with `--method skills/get --uri <uri> --verify`, where <uri> is this report's uri,"
+};
+var MCPDO_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT = {
+  raise: "with skillCatalogMaxSkills / skillCatalogMaxBytes in the connection's catalog entry",
+  verifyOne: "with `mcpdo @<conn> skills/get <uri> --verify`, where <uri> is this report's uri,"
+};
 function skillVerificationExitCode(reports, requireDigests) {
   if (allSkillsVerified(reports)) return void 0;
   if (anySkillFailed(reports)) return EXIT_CODES.SKILL_NONCONFORMANT;
@@ -7474,7 +7657,8 @@ function assertSkillsSupported(inspectorClient, method) {
   }
 }
 var resourceStreamRefs = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
-async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
+async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args, options = {}) {
+  const skillBudgetHint = options.skillBudgetHint ?? CLI_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT;
   let managedToolsState = null;
   let managedResourcesState = null;
   let managedResourceTemplatesState = null;
@@ -7539,7 +7723,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
       if (args.appInfo) {
         result = { ...appInfo };
       } else {
-        const invocation = args.task ? await inspectorClient.callToolStream(
+        const useTask = args.task === true || tool.execution?.taskSupport === "required";
+        const invocation = useTask ? await inspectorClient.callToolStream(
           tool,
           args.toolArg || {},
           args.metadata,
@@ -7770,7 +7955,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
         const reports = await verifySkills(
           inspectorClient,
           skills,
-          args.metadata
+          args.metadata,
+          skillBudgetHint
         );
         return {
           kind: "ndjson",
@@ -7799,7 +7985,8 @@ async function runMethod(inspectorClient, args) {
         const reports = await verifySkills(
           inspectorClient,
           [skill],
-          args.metadata
+          args.metadata,
+          skillBudgetHint
         );
         return {
           kind: "ndjson",
@@ -10881,10 +11068,10 @@ async function resolveIdpMetadata(issuer, storage, fetchFn) {
   }
   return discoverIdpMetadata(issuer, fetchFn);
 }
-var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
+var OIDC_WELL_KNOWN3 = "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
 async function fetchOpenIdConfiguration(issuer, issuerUrl, fetchFn) {
   const url = new URL(
-    `${issuerUrl.pathname.replace(/\/$/, "")}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN2}`,
+    `${issuerUrl.pathname.replace(/\/$/, "")}${OIDC_WELL_KNOWN3}`,
     issuerUrl.origin
   );
   try {
@@ -12171,7 +12358,11 @@ var OAuthManager = class {
 };
 
 // ../../core/mcp/remote/remoteClientTransport.ts
-import { SdkError as SdkError5, SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode5 } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
+import {
+  SdkError as SdkError5,
+  SdkErrorCode as SdkErrorCode5,
+  SdkHttpError
+} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
 
 // ../../core/mcp/remote/types.ts
 function oauthTokensToRemoteAuthState(tokens) {
@@ -12226,6 +12417,17 @@ function isConnectAuthChallenge(json) {
 function isConnectTransportError(json) {
   return typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "ok" in json && json.ok === false && "kind" in json && json.kind === "transport_error";
 }
+var SDK_ERROR_CODES = new Set(
+  Object.values(SdkErrorCode5)
+);
+function toSdkHttpError(message, http) {
+  const code = SDK_ERROR_CODES.has(http.code) ? http.code : SdkErrorCode5.ClientHttpNotImplemented;
+  return new SdkHttpError(code, message, {
+    status: http.status,
+    ...http.statusText !== void 0 && { statusText: http.statusText },
+    ...http.text !== void 0 && { text: http.text }
+  });
+}
 function legacySessionId(json) {
   if (typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "sessionId" in json && typeof json.sessionId === "string" && !("ok" in json)) {
     return json.sessionId;
@@ -12726,6 +12928,9 @@ var RemoteClientTransport = class {
       });
       return;
     }
+    if (json.http) {
+      throw toSdkHttpError(json.error, json.http);
+    }
     throw new Error(json.error);
   }
   async requestSend(message, options) {
@@ -12798,8 +13003,9 @@ var corePackageJson = {
   version: "0.0.0"
 };
 var MAX_URL_ELICITATION_RETRIES = 5;
-function connectionTimeoutMessage(timeoutMs) {
-  return `Connection timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms. To accommodate a slower server, you may increase the timeout value in Server Settings.`;
+var WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY = "To accommodate a slower server, you may increase the timeout value in Server Settings.";
+function connectionTimeoutMessage(timeoutMs, remedy = WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY) {
+  return `Connection timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms. ${remedy}`;
 }
 function createPendingAbortError() {
   return new Error("Pending request aborted");
@@ -12890,6 +13096,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
   /** Dedupes concurrent ambient auth challenges (reason + scopes). */
   ambientAuthChallengeInFlight = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   pipeStderr;
+  connectionTimeoutRemedy;
   initialLoggingLevel;
   // Modern-era per-request log level (#1629). On 2026-07-28 servers
   // `logging/setLevel` is gone; the client opts into logs per request via the
@@ -13127,6 +13334,7 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
     this.fetchFn = options.environment.fetch;
     this.logger = options.environment.logger ?? silentLogger;
     this.pipeStderr = options.pipeStderr ?? false;
+    this.connectionTimeoutRemedy = options.connectionTimeoutRemedy ?? WEB_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY;
     this.initialLoggingLevel = options.initialLoggingLevel;
     this.sample = options.sample ?? true;
     this.elicit = options.elicit ?? true;
@@ -13868,9 +14076,10 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
         // for that upstream gap and should be deleted with it.
         //
         // Known, accepted side effect of turning intercept on with no stored
-        // tokens: `parseAuthChallengeFromResponse` treats 403 as a challenge
-        // too, so a probe answered 403 for a *non-auth* reason (a gateway
-        // rejecting the unknown `server/discover` method, say) now starts OAuth
+        // tokens: `parseAuthChallengeFromResponse` treats a 403 carrying
+        // `WWW-Authenticate` as a challenge too, so a probe answered that way
+        // for a *non-auth* reason (a gateway rejecting the unknown
+        // `server/discover` method, say) now starts OAuth
         // discovery instead of letting "auto" fall back to the legacy
         // `initialize`. The outcome is a surfaced `oauthError`, not a hang, and
         // it goes away with this clause.
@@ -13937,7 +14146,14 @@ var InspectorClient = class _InspectorClient extends InspectorClientEventTarget
           const timeoutPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => {
             timer = setTimeout(() => {
               connectTimedOut = true;
-              reject(new Error(connectionTimeoutMessage(connectTimeoutMs)));
+              reject(
+                new Error(
+                  connectionTimeoutMessage(
+                    connectTimeoutMs,
+                    this.connectionTimeoutRemedy
+                  )
+                )
+              );
             }, connectTimeoutMs);
           });
           try {
@@ -17287,16 +17503,30 @@ function buildConfigFromOptions(options) {
   const target = options.target ?? [];
   const first = target[0];
   const rest = target.slice(1);
+  if (first && options.serverUrl) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Cannot combine a positional target (${first}) with --server-url (${options.serverUrl}). Pass one or the other.`
+    );
+  }
   const urlFromTarget = first && (first.startsWith("http://") || first.startsWith("https://")) ? first : null;
   const url = urlFromTarget ?? options.serverUrl ?? null;
   if (url) {
-    if (rest.length > 0 && urlFromTarget) {
+    if (rest.length > 0) {
       throw new Error("Arguments cannot be passed to a URL-based MCP server.");
     }
+    if (options.transport === "stdio") {
+      throw new Error(
+        `stdio transport cannot be used with a URL (${url}). Use --transport http or --transport sse, or pass a local command instead.`
+      );
+    }
     let transportType;
     const t = options.transport === "http" ? "streamable-http" : options.transport;
     if (t === "sse" || t === "streamable-http") {
       transportType = t;
+    } else if (t) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Invalid transport type: ${t}. Valid types are: sse, http, stdio`
+      );
     } else {
       const u = new URL(url);
       if (u.pathname.endsWith("/mcp")) {
@@ -19078,6 +19308,26 @@ function readInspectorVersion(callerUrl) {
   );
 }
 
+// ../../core/cli/handlers/connect-timeout.ts
+var DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15e3;
+var CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY = "To accommodate a slower server, pass a larger --connect-timeout <ms>, or set connectionTimeout on the server's catalog or config entry.";
+function withConnectTimeout(settings, connectionTimeout) {
+  if (connectionTimeout === void 0) return settings;
+  if (settings) return { ...settings, connectionTimeout };
+  return {
+    headers: [],
+    metadata: {},
+    env: [],
+    connectionTimeout,
+    requestTimeout: 0,
+    taskTtl: DEFAULT_TASK_TTL_MS,
+    maxFetchRequests: DEFAULT_MAX_FETCH_REQUESTS,
+    autoRefreshOnListChanged: false,
+    paginatedLists: false,
+    roots: []
+  };
+}
+
 // src/connection/auth-helper.ts
 import { spawn } from "child_process";
 import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
@@ -19471,13 +19721,15 @@ async function runEmaIdpInteractiveFlow(active, storage, navigation) {
   );
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl = formatRunnerOAuthRedirectUrl(callbackUrlConfig);
+  const fetchFn = createProxyFetch();
   await runRunnerInteractiveOAuth({
     client: {
       authenticate: async () => {
         const { authorizationUrl } = await startIdpOidcAuthorization({
           idp: active,
           redirectUrl: redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl,
-          storage
+          storage,
+          fetchFn
         });
         navigation.navigateToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);
         return authorizationUrl;
@@ -19491,7 +19743,8 @@ async function runEmaIdpInteractiveFlow(active, storage, navigation) {
           authorizationCode,
           iss,
           redirectUrl: redirectUrlProvider.redirectUrl,
-          storage
+          storage,
+          fetchFn
         });
       },
       /* v8 ignore next 2 -- only reached when options.authChallenge is set, which this flow never does */
@@ -19511,7 +19764,13 @@ async function authorizeInFrontend(serverConfig, serverSettings, options) {
     return;
   }
   const environment = {
-    transport: createTransportNode
+    transport: createTransportNode,
+    // HTTPS_PROXY / HTTP_PROXY / NO_PROXY, as in the one-shot CLI (#2642):
+    // `InspectorClient` always hands the transport a defined fetch, so the
+    // transport's own proxy fallback never fires — the proxy has to sit here,
+    // at the bottom of the stack, for OAuth discovery and token requests to
+    // reach it. Undefined when no proxy variable is set.
+    fetch: createProxyFetch()
   };
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   const callbackUrlConfig = parseRunnerOAuthCallbackUrl(
@@ -19545,6 +19804,8 @@ async function authorizeInFrontend(serverConfig, serverSettings, options) {
       name: "inspector-cli",
       version: readInspectorVersion(import.meta.url)
     },
+    // Same knobs as the daemon's connect: --connect-timeout or mcp.json (#2615).
+    connectionTimeoutRemedy: CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY,
     initialLoggingLevel: "debug",
     progress: false,
     sample: false,
@@ -19754,9 +20015,15 @@ function tryReserveAuthFlow(lockPath) {
       if (!isStale(fs8.statSync(lockPath).mtimeMs)) return false;
       const claimPath = `${lockPath}.claim-${process.pid}`;
       fs8.renameSync(lockPath, claimPath);
-      const claimedFresh = !isStale(fs8.statSync(claimPath).mtimeMs);
+      if (!isStale(fs8.statSync(claimPath).mtimeMs)) {
+        try {
+          fs8.linkSync(claimPath, lockPath);
+        } finally {
+          fs8.rmSync(claimPath, { force: true });
+        }
+        return false;
+      }
       fs8.rmSync(claimPath, { force: true });
-      if (claimedFresh) return false;
       create();
       return true;
     } catch {
@@ -20411,7 +20678,13 @@ async function getLiveConnectionAuthInfo(connection) {
 }
 async function createConnectionClient(serverConfig, serverSettings) {
   const environment = {
-    transport: createTransportNode
+    transport: createTransportNode,
+    // HTTPS_PROXY / HTTP_PROXY / NO_PROXY, as in the one-shot CLI (#2642).
+    // `InspectorClient` builds its fetch chain on `environment.fetch ?? fetch`
+    // and always hands the transport the result, so the transport's own
+    // `createProxyFetch()` fallback is never reached — leave this out and the
+    // daemon connects direct. Undefined when no proxy variable is set.
+    fetch: createProxyFetch()
   };
   const redirectUrlProvider = new MutableRedirectUrlProvider();
   if (isOAuthCapableServerConfig(serverConfig)) {
@@ -20437,6 +20710,9 @@ async function createConnectionClient(serverConfig, serverSettings) {
       name: CONNECTION_CLIENT_NAME,
       version: readInspectorVersion(import.meta.url)
     },
+    // `mcpdo connect` takes the same --connect-timeout as the one-shot CLI, so
+    // a timeout names that rather than the web's Server Settings (#2615).
+    connectionTimeoutRemedy: CLI_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_REMEDY,
     initialLoggingLevel: "debug",
     progress: false,
     sample: false,
@@ -20493,6 +20769,9 @@ function connectCancelledError() {
 }
 
 // src/daemon/server.ts
+var MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS = {
+  skillBudgetHint: MCPDO_SKILL_BUDGET_HINT
+};
 var autoCancelElicitationChannel = {
   request(frame) {
     return Promise.resolve({
@@ -20924,7 +21203,7 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
     const clearAmbientSignal = client.setAmbientRequestSignal(signal);
     let outcome;
     try {
-      outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs);
+      outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS);
     } finally {
       clearAmbientSignal();
       signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
@@ -20968,7 +21247,10 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
     const unwire = wireElicitationBridge(client, channel, requestId);
     const outcome = (async () => {
       try {
-        return toRpcResult(await runMethod(client, methodArgs), params.method);
+        return toRpcResult(
+          await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS),
+          params.method
+        );
       } finally {
         unwire();
       }
@@ -21087,7 +21369,7 @@ var DaemonServer = class _DaemonServer {
       params.interactive
     );
     const methodArgs = stripConnectionFields(params);
-    const outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs);
+    const outcome = await runMethod(client, methodArgs, MCPDO_RUN_OPTIONS);
     if (outcome.kind !== "stream") {
       throw new CliExitCodeError(
         EXIT_CODES.USAGE,
@@ -21336,6 +21618,8 @@ export {
   resetNodeOAuthStorageCache,
   clearAllOAuthClientState,
   NodeOAuthStorage,
+  DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  withConnectTimeout,
   PLAIN,
   styleFromOpts,
   isCliAutoOpenForced,