npm - @mochi.js/core - Versions diffs - 0.2.2 → 0.6.0 - Mend

@mochi.js/core 0.2.2 → 0.6.0

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Files changed (27) hide show

package/README.md +19 -10
package/package.json +4 -4
package/src/__tests__/cookies-jar.test.ts +361 -0
package/src/__tests__/default-profile.test.ts +181 -0
package/src/__tests__/dx-cluster.e2e.test.ts +245 -0
package/src/__tests__/geo-consistency.test.ts +277 -0
package/src/__tests__/geo-probe.test.ts +415 -0
package/src/__tests__/init-injector.e2e.test.ts +144 -0
package/src/__tests__/init-injector.test.ts +249 -0
package/src/__tests__/inject.test.ts +80 -162
package/src/__tests__/integration.e2e.test.ts +24 -0
package/src/__tests__/page-dx-cluster.test.ts +292 -0
package/src/__tests__/proc-linux-server.test.ts +243 -0
package/src/__tests__/proxy-auth.test.ts +22 -55
package/src/__tests__/screenshot.e2e.test.ts +126 -0
package/src/__tests__/screenshot.test.ts +363 -0
package/src/cdp/init-injector.ts +644 -0
package/src/default-profile.ts +112 -0
package/src/geo-consistency.ts +343 -0
package/src/geo-probe.ts +603 -0
package/src/index.ts +43 -1
package/src/launch.ts +277 -17
package/src/linux-server.ts +157 -0
package/src/page.ts +420 -9
package/src/proc.ts +48 -5
package/src/proxy-auth.ts +26 -107
package/src/session.ts +595 -78

package/src/cdp/init-injector.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+/**
+ * Init-script delivery via `Fetch.fulfillRequest` body injection + CSP rewriter.
+ *
+ * Architectural pivot — see PLAN.md §8.4. This REPLACES
+ * `Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument` as the inject delivery mechanism.
+ *
+ * Why
+ * ---
+ * Scripts installed via `Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument` carry a
+ * source-attribution leak: the "Vanilla CDP" detection probe inspects how
+ * the very first script entered the page and recognises the
+ * `addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument` channel. Patchright sidesteps the leak
+ * entirely (see `crNetworkManagerPatch.ts:166-453`,
+ * `RouteImpl._fixCSP`/`_injectIntoHead`/`fulfill`) by intercepting the
+ * document response itself, rewriting any restrictive CSP, splicing the
+ * payload as an inline `<script>` at end-of-`<head>` (before the first
+ * non-comment `<script>`), and emitting `Fetch.fulfillRequest` with the
+ * rewritten body.
+ *
+ * After this lands the inject is byte-indistinguishable from a same-origin
+ * developer's own `<script>` tag.
+ *
+ * Wire algorithm
+ * --------------
+ * `Fetch.enable` is sent once with patterns
+ *   `[{ urlPattern: "*", resourceType: "Document" }, { urlPattern: "*" }]`
+ * — the more-specific Document pattern matches first; the catch-all wildcard
+ * ensures every request also pauses (so we can answer `Fetch.authRequired`
+ * via the same domain when credentials are configured).
+ *
+ * On `Fetch.requestPaused`:
+ *   - resourceType === "Document":
+ *       - request stage (no `responseStatusCode`)  → `Fetch.continueRequest`
+ *           with `interceptResponse: true` so we get the response stage too.
+ *       - response stage (has `responseStatusCode`) → fetch body, rewrite
+ *           CSP, splice script, `Fetch.fulfillRequest`.
+ *   - other resourceType → `Fetch.continueRequest` immediately (zero-cost
+ *     pass-through; the request hangs if we don't reply).
+ *
+ * On `Fetch.authRequired` (only when `auth` is set): `Fetch.continueWithAuth`
+ * with `ProvideCredentials`.
+ *
+ * Self-removing payload
+ * ---------------------
+ * The injected `<script>` runs an IIFE whose first statement is
+ * `document.currentScript?.remove()`. A defensive post-`load` walk via
+ * `document.querySelectorAll(".${MOCHI_INIT_SCRIPT_CLASS}")` strips any leftover
+ * — added by the same IIFE so the DOM-walk happens once we know the document
+ * is loaded.
+ *
+ * The injected `<script>` tag MUST NOT carry `defer`, `async`, or
+ * `type="module"` — those defer execution past first parse and re-introduce
+ * the same race window `runImmediately:true` originally closed.
+ *
+ * CSP rewriting
+ * -------------
+ * See {@link rewriteCsp}. We handle:
+ *   - `Content-Security-Policy:` and `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only:`
+ *     response headers.
+ *   - `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="…">` tags in the
+ *     HTML head.
+ *   - nonce reuse (`'nonce-abc123'` → tag carries `nonce="abc123"`).
+ *   - `'strict-dynamic'` (admits any script the original allowed dispatched —
+ *     reusing the existing nonce is sufficient).
+ *   - missing-nonce / `'self'`-only policies → add `'unsafe-inline'`.
+ *   - multiple CSPs (header + meta) → most-restrictive wins, so we rewrite
+ *     them ALL.
+ *
+ * §8.2 invariant
+ * --------------
+ * `Fetch.enable` is NOT on the forbidden list (only `Runtime.enable` and
+ * `Page.createIsolatedWorld`). Fetch operates at the network layer below
+ * page script and is invisible from JS — see PLAN.md §8.2.
+ *
+ * @see PLAN.md §8.2, §8.4
+ * @see docs/audits/patchright.md HIGH §"Init-script delivery via Fetch.fulfillRequest"
+ */
+import type { MessageRouter, Unsubscribe } from "./router";
+/**
+ * The class attribute applied to every injected `<script>` tag. Patchright
+ * uses a similar marker (`__playwright_init_script__`) — we publish ours so
+ * the post-`load` cleanup walk (and any future probe-friendly diagnostic)
+ * can find leftovers.
+ */
+export const MOCHI_INIT_SCRIPT_CLASS = "__mochi_init_script__";
+/**
+ * Public global the injected payload sets to `true` on first run. Used by the
+ * live conformance test to assert "our inject ran BEFORE the document's first
+ * `<script>`" — a property of execution order that distinguishes the
+ * fulfill-rewrite mechanism from a post-parse alternative.
+ */
+export const MOCHI_INIT_MARKER = "__mochi_inject_marker";
+/** What the `Fetch.requestPaused` event carries (subset we consume). */
+interface FetchRequestPausedEvent {
+  requestId: string;
+  request: { url: string; method?: string };
+  resourceType?: string;
+  responseStatusCode?: number;
+  responseHeaders?: { name: string; value: string }[];
+  /** Set by Chromium when the response intercept was opted in via continueRequest. */
+  responseErrorReason?: string;
+  frameId?: string;
+}
+/** Options for {@link installInitInjector}. */
+export interface InitInjectorOptions {
+  /** The compiled payload source code. May be empty when bypassInject is on. */
+  payloadCode: string | null;
+  /** Optional proxy credentials. When set, `Fetch.authRequired` is answered via `continueWithAuth`. */
+  auth?: { username: string; password: string };
+}
+/** Lifecycle handle. `dispose()` removes listeners and sends `Fetch.disable`. Idempotent. */
+export interface InitInjectorHandle {
+  dispose(): Promise<void>;
+}
+/**
+ * Wire the unified Fetch-domain handler. Sends `Fetch.enable` once with the
+ * Document-first patterns, subscribes to `Fetch.requestPaused` (and
+ * `Fetch.authRequired` when `auth` is set), and tears down on `dispose()`.
+ *
+ * No-op fallback: when `payloadCode` is `null` AND `auth` is undefined, the
+ * function returns a disposed handle without sending `Fetch.enable` — this
+ * is the bypassInject + no-proxy capture path that wants zero protocol
+ * surface.
+ */
+export async function installInitInjector(
+  router: MessageRouter,
+  opts: InitInjectorOptions,
+): Promise<InitInjectorHandle> {
+  const { payloadCode, auth } = opts;
+  // Capture flow with no proxy auth has nothing to do — return a disposed
+  // no-op handle so callers can construct uniformly.
+  if (payloadCode === null && auth === undefined) {
+    return {
+      async dispose(): Promise<void> {
+        // no-op
+      },
+    };
+  }
+  const wrappedPayload = payloadCode === null ? null : wrapSelfRemovingPayload(payloadCode);
+  // Per-request id-set — `requestPaused` may fire twice for the same id
+  // (request stage + response stage when interceptResponse: true) and we
+  // want one fulfillment per request.
+  const fulfilled = new Set<string>();
+  // Subscribe BEFORE Fetch.enable so we never miss the first event.
+  const offAuth: Unsubscribe | null = auth
+    ? router.on("Fetch.authRequired", (params) => {
+        const requestId = (params as { requestId?: string } | null)?.requestId;
+        if (typeof requestId !== "string") return;
+        router
+          .send("Fetch.continueWithAuth", {
+            requestId,
+            authChallengeResponse: {
+              response: "ProvideCredentials",
+              username: auth.username,
+              password: auth.password,
+            },
+          })
+          .catch((err: unknown) => {
+            if (!isClosedError(err)) {
+              console.warn("[mochi] Fetch.continueWithAuth failed:", err);
+            }
+          });
+      })
+    : null;
+  const offPaused: Unsubscribe = router.on("Fetch.requestPaused", (params, sessionId) => {
+    const ev = params as FetchRequestPausedEvent | null;
+    if (ev === null || typeof ev.requestId !== "string") return;
+    void handlePaused(router, ev, sessionId, wrappedPayload, fulfilled).catch((err: unknown) => {
+      if (!isClosedError(err)) {
+        console.warn(
+          `[mochi] init-injector: failed handling ${ev.resourceType ?? "?"} ${ev.request?.url ?? "?"}:`,
+          err,
+        );
+      }
+      // Best-effort: continue the request so it doesn't hang. Errors here
+      // most commonly mean we can't get the body (already consumed) — we
+      // still want the page to load.
+      router
+        .send(
+          "Fetch.continueRequest",
+          { requestId: ev.requestId },
+          sessionId !== undefined ? { sessionId } : {},
+        )
+        .catch(() => {
+          /* ignore */
+        });
+    });
+  });
+  // Patterns: Document first (matches first per CDP semantics), wildcard
+  // catch-all second so every other request also pauses for proxy-auth
+  // forwarding. Both stages of a Document request reach us when we set
+  // `interceptResponse: true` on the request-stage continueRequest.
+  await router.send("Fetch.enable", {
+    handleAuthRequests: auth !== undefined,
+    patterns: [{ urlPattern: "*", resourceType: "Document" }, { urlPattern: "*" }],
+  });
+  let disposed = false;
+  return {
+    async dispose(): Promise<void> {
+      if (disposed) return;
+      disposed = true;
+      offAuth?.();
+      offPaused();
+      try {
+        await router.send("Fetch.disable");
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (!isClosedError(err)) {
+          console.warn("[mochi] Fetch.disable failed:", err);
+        }
+      }
+    },
+  };
+}
+/**
+ * Per-event dispatcher. Document responses get the body-splice path; every
+ * other resource is waved through with `continueRequest`.
+ */
+async function handlePaused(
+  router: MessageRouter,
+  ev: FetchRequestPausedEvent,
+  sessionId: string | undefined,
+  wrappedPayload: string | null,
+  fulfilled: Set<string>,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const sendOpts = sessionId !== undefined ? { sessionId } : {};
+  const isDocument = ev.resourceType === "Document";
+  const isResponseStage = typeof ev.responseStatusCode === "number";
+  // Non-Document or no-payload: forward immediately.
+  if (!isDocument || wrappedPayload === null) {
+    await router.send("Fetch.continueRequest", { requestId: ev.requestId }, sendOpts);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Document, request stage (no response yet): opt into the response
+  // intercept so we get a second `requestPaused` carrying the body.
+  if (!isResponseStage) {
+    await router.send(
+      "Fetch.continueRequest",
+      { requestId: ev.requestId, interceptResponse: true },
+      sendOpts,
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  // Document, response stage: fetch body, rewrite CSP, splice payload,
+  // fulfill. Guard against a duplicate fulfillment for the same id (shouldn't
+  // happen, but the set is cheap insurance).
+  if (fulfilled.has(ev.requestId)) return;
+  fulfilled.add(ev.requestId);
+  const bodyResp = await router.send<{ body: string; base64Encoded: boolean }>(
+    "Fetch.getResponseBody",
+    { requestId: ev.requestId },
+    sendOpts,
+  );
+  const originalBody = bodyResp.base64Encoded ? base64Decode(bodyResp.body) : bodyResp.body;
+  // Existing response headers may carry CSP. We rewrite them and pass them
+  // through to fulfillRequest. fulfill defaults Content-Length to body
+  // length, but we still strip any explicit Content-Length to avoid mismatch
+  // and the CSP pair.
+  const originalHeaders = ev.responseHeaders ?? [];
+  const { headers: rewrittenHeaders, scriptNonce } = rewriteHeaders(originalHeaders);
+  // CSP-in-meta rewrite happens on the body string (HTML).
+  const { html: cspFixedBody } = rewriteMetaCsp(originalBody);
+  const splicedBody = injectIntoHead(cspFixedBody, wrappedPayload, scriptNonce);
+  await router.send(
+    "Fetch.fulfillRequest",
+    {
+      requestId: ev.requestId,
+      responseCode: ev.responseStatusCode ?? 200,
+      responseHeaders: rewrittenHeaders,
+      body: base64Encode(splicedBody),
+    },
+    sendOpts,
+  );
+}
+// ---- payload wrapper --------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Wrap the raw payload in a self-removing IIFE that:
+ *   1. Removes its own `<script>` node from the DOM as the very first action.
+ *   2. Sets `__mochi_inject_marker = true` for conformance tests.
+ *   3. Schedules a post-`load` DOM walk to strip any sibling marker tags
+ *      (defence in depth — the same payload may run in many frames during
+ *      a single page lifecycle).
+ *   4. Runs the original payload.
+ *
+ * The wrapper produces no detectable global; the marker is gone after the
+ * conformance test reads it (the test reads via `Runtime.callFunctionOn`
+ * synchronously after `goto`).
+ */
+export function wrapSelfRemovingPayload(payloadCode: string): string {
+  // Note: the inner IIFE wrapping is preserved AS-IS — buildPayload already
+  // emits `(()=>{ ... })()`. We just prepend the self-remove + marker block.
+  return [
+    "(function(){",
+    // Self-remove: keep the line short so a syntax error here is obvious.
+    "try{document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.remove&&document.currentScript.remove();}catch(_){}",
+    // Marker — set on every `globalThis` regardless of frame; the conformance
+    // test reads it on the top-level frame.
+    `try{Object.defineProperty(globalThis,${JSON.stringify(MOCHI_INIT_MARKER)},{value:true,writable:false,configurable:true});}catch(_){try{globalThis[${JSON.stringify(MOCHI_INIT_MARKER)}]=true;}catch(__){}}`,
+    // Belt: post-load DOM walk that strips any leftover marker tags.
+    `try{var __mochi_strip=function(){try{var ns=document.querySelectorAll(${JSON.stringify(`.${MOCHI_INIT_SCRIPT_CLASS}`)});for(var i=0;i<ns.length;i++){try{ns[i].parentNode&&ns[i].parentNode.removeChild(ns[i]);}catch(_){}}}catch(_){}}; if(document.readyState==='complete'){__mochi_strip();}else{addEventListener('load',__mochi_strip,{once:true});}}catch(_){}`,
+    // Original payload — already wrapped in its own IIFE by buildPayload, so
+    // we just splice it in. The trailing semicolon is defensive.
+    payloadCode,
+    ";})();",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+// ---- HTML splice ------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Splice an inline `<script>` carrying our payload into the document `<head>`
+ * AHEAD of any existing non-comment `<script>` tag. When no head exists,
+ * insert one at top of `<html>`. When that's also missing, prepend at the
+ * very top of the body.
+ *
+ * Critical: the tag MUST NOT carry `defer`, `async`, or `type="module"` —
+ * those defer execution past first parse and re-introduce the race window.
+ *
+ * @param html        HTML source
+ * @param payloadCode JS source to inline (already self-removing-wrapped)
+ * @param nonce       optional nonce attribute (when CSP requires nonce reuse)
+ */
+export function injectIntoHead(
+  html: string,
+  payloadCode: string,
+  nonce: string | undefined,
+): string {
+  const idAttr = ` id="__mochi_init_${randomHex(16)}"`;
+  const classAttr = ` class="${MOCHI_INIT_SCRIPT_CLASS}"`;
+  const nonceAttr = nonce !== undefined && nonce.length > 0 ? ` nonce="${nonce}"` : "";
+  const tag = `<script${classAttr}${idAttr}${nonceAttr}>${payloadCode}</script>`;
+  // Find first `<script>` in the head, insert before it. We're not running
+  // an HTML parser; this is deliberately simple and matches every valid
+  // markup mochi tests against. patchright does the same.
+  const headOpen = findHeadOpen(html);
+  if (headOpen === null) {
+    // No <head>. Try <html> insert.
+    const htmlOpen = matchAfterTag(html, /<html[^>]*>/i);
+    if (htmlOpen !== null) {
+      return `${html.slice(0, htmlOpen)}<head>${tag}</head>${html.slice(htmlOpen)}`;
+    }
+    // No <html> either — prepend at top.
+    return tag + html;
+  }
+  // Search for the first `<script>` AFTER headOpen but inside <head>.
+  // Strip HTML comments before matching so we don't fall for
+  // `<!-- <script>... -->`.
+  const headEnd = findHeadClose(html, headOpen);
+  const headInner = headEnd === null ? html.slice(headOpen) : html.slice(headOpen, headEnd);
+  const stripped = stripHtmlComments(headInner);
+  // First `<script>` (with or without attributes) in the stripped slice.
+  const scriptMatch = /<script(\s|>)/i.exec(stripped);
+  if (scriptMatch !== null) {
+    // Translate the stripped-buffer offset back to the original buffer.
+    const orig = mapStrippedOffsetToOriginal(headInner, scriptMatch.index);
+    const insertAt = headOpen + orig;
+    return html.slice(0, insertAt) + tag + html.slice(insertAt);
+  }
+  // No existing <script> in head — splice just after `<head…>` so we still
+  // run before any inline script the body may carry.
+  return html.slice(0, headOpen) + tag + html.slice(headOpen);
+}
+/**
+ * Return the offset just after the opening `<head…>` tag, or null when
+ * there's no head.
+ */
+function findHeadOpen(html: string): number | null {
+  return matchAfterTag(html, /<head(\s[^>]*)?>/i);
+}
+function findHeadClose(html: string, from: number): number | null {
+  const re = /<\/head\s*>/i;
+  const slice = html.slice(from);
+  const m = re.exec(slice);
+  return m === null ? null : from + m.index;
+}
+function matchAfterTag(html: string, re: RegExp): number | null {
+  const m = re.exec(html);
+  if (m === null) return null;
+  return m.index + m[0].length;
+}
+/** Replace `<!-- ... -->` with whitespace of identical length so offsets line up. */
+function stripHtmlComments(s: string): string {
+  return s.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, (m) => " ".repeat(m.length));
+}
+/** Identity mapping — we used same-length whitespace replacement above. */
+function mapStrippedOffsetToOriginal(_original: string, strippedOffset: number): number {
+  return strippedOffset;
+}
+// ---- CSP rewrite — headers --------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Walk the response-header list, rewriting any `Content-Security-Policy[-
+ * Report-Only]` entries so an inline `<script>` we splice will be admitted.
+ *
+ * Returns the rewritten header list AND a nonce (extracted from the original
+ * `script-src 'nonce-…'` directive, when present) so we can attach it to the
+ * tag we splice. When multiple CSPs collide (rare — generally header + meta)
+ * we adopt the FIRST nonce we encounter; the rule "most-restrictive wins"
+ * means picking any one nonce always works because each policy is
+ * independently rewritten.
+ *
+ * Header names are case-insensitive on the wire; we preserve the original
+ * casing in the output to keep the response shape stable.
+ */
+export function rewriteHeaders(headers: { name: string; value: string }[]): {
+  headers: { name: string; value: string }[];
+  scriptNonce: string | undefined;
+} {
+  let scriptNonce: string | undefined;
+  const out: { name: string; value: string }[] = [];
+  for (const h of headers) {
+    const lower = h.name.toLowerCase();
+    if (lower === "content-security-policy" || lower === "content-security-policy-report-only") {
+      const { value, nonce } = rewriteCsp(h.value);
+      if (scriptNonce === undefined && nonce !== undefined) scriptNonce = nonce;
+      out.push({ name: h.name, value });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (lower === "content-length") {
+      // Body changes shape; let Chromium recompute (omitting the header
+      // makes fulfillRequest set Content-Length itself).
+      continue;
+    }
+    out.push(h);
+  }
+  return { headers: out, scriptNonce };
+}
+// ---- CSP rewrite — meta tag in body -----------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Rewrite any `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="...">`
+ * tags in the HTML head. We do NOT remove the tag (callers may rely on its
+ * presence for non-script directives like `frame-ancestors`); we surgically
+ * relax the script-related directives in the `content` attribute instead.
+ */
+export function rewriteMetaCsp(html: string): { html: string; firstNonce: string | undefined } {
+  // case-insensitive `<meta ... http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" ... content="...">`
+  // Allow either order of attrs, single or double quotes.
+  const re =
+    /<meta\b[^>]*?http-equiv\s*=\s*("Content-Security-Policy"|'Content-Security-Policy')[^>]*>/gi;
+  let firstNonce: string | undefined;
+  const out = html.replace(re, (tag) => {
+    const contentRe = /content\s*=\s*("([^"]*)"|'([^']*)')/i;
+    const m = contentRe.exec(tag);
+    if (m === null) return tag;
+    const raw = (m[2] ?? m[3] ?? "") as string;
+    const decoded = htmlAttrDecode(raw);
+    const { value: rewritten, nonce } = rewriteCsp(decoded);
+    if (firstNonce === undefined && nonce !== undefined) firstNonce = nonce;
+    const encoded = htmlAttrEncode(rewritten);
+    const quoteChar = m[1]?.[0] ?? '"';
+    return tag.replace(contentRe, `content=${quoteChar}${encoded}${quoteChar}`);
+  });
+  return { html: out, firstNonce };
+}
+// ---- core CSP transformer ---------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Transform a single CSP string so an inline script we splice is admitted.
+ *
+ * Rules
+ * -----
+ *   - Walks every directive (`;`-separated). Only `script-src`,
+ *     `script-src-elem`, and `default-src` are mutated; others pass through.
+ *   - When the directive includes a nonce token (`'nonce-abc123'`), the
+ *     nonce is returned and the directive is left intact — reusing the
+ *     existing nonce on our `<script>` is sufficient.
+ *   - When the directive includes `'strict-dynamic'`, the directive is left
+ *     intact AND the nonce (if any) is extracted; strict-dynamic admits
+ *     anything an already-admitted script then loads, but our INITIAL inline
+ *     tag still needs a nonce. If no nonce exists alongside strict-dynamic
+ *     the directive is invalid and we fall through to the unsafe-inline path.
+ *   - Otherwise we ensure `'unsafe-inline'` is present.
+ *
+ * The function does not strip `'unsafe-eval'` or any unrelated directives.
+ */
+export function rewriteCsp(input: string): { value: string; nonce: string | undefined } {
+  const directives = input
+    .split(";")
+    .map((s) => s.trim())
+    .filter((s) => s.length > 0);
+  let extractedNonce: string | undefined;
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  // Track whether we've already mutated either of the script-relevant
+  // directives so we can fall back to default-src if neither is present.
+  let sawScriptSrc = false;
+  let sawScriptSrcElem = false;
+  for (const directive of directives) {
+    const parts = directive.split(/\s+/);
+    const name = (parts[0] ?? "").toLowerCase();
+    const tokens = parts.slice(1);
+    if (name === "script-src" || name === "script-src-elem" || name === "default-src") {
+      const { tokens: rewritten, nonce } = adjustScriptSrcTokens(tokens);
+      if (extractedNonce === undefined && nonce !== undefined) extractedNonce = nonce;
+      out.push([name, ...rewritten].join(" "));
+      if (name === "script-src") sawScriptSrc = true;
+      if (name === "script-src-elem") sawScriptSrcElem = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    out.push(directive);
+  }
+  // If a `default-src` was the only fallback for scripts and didn't admit
+  // inline, the rewrite already added `'unsafe-inline'` to default-src.
+  // Nothing more to do.
+  void sawScriptSrc;
+  void sawScriptSrcElem;
+  return { value: out.join("; "), nonce: extractedNonce };
+}
+/**
+ * Inspect `script-src`-style tokens. If a nonce is present, extract it and
+ * leave the tokens as-is. Otherwise add `'unsafe-inline'` (idempotent).
+ */
+function adjustScriptSrcTokens(tokens: string[]): { tokens: string[]; nonce: string | undefined } {
+  let nonce: string | undefined;
+  for (const t of tokens) {
+    const m = /^'nonce-([^']+)'$/i.exec(t);
+    if (m !== null) {
+      nonce = m[1];
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (nonce !== undefined) {
+    // Keep tokens intact — strict-dynamic et al stay live.
+    return { tokens, nonce };
+  }
+  // No nonce: ensure 'unsafe-inline' admits us. Idempotent.
+  if (!tokens.some((t) => t.toLowerCase() === "'unsafe-inline'")) {
+    return { tokens: [...tokens, "'unsafe-inline'"], nonce: undefined };
+  }
+  return { tokens, nonce: undefined };
+}
+// ---- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------
+/** Cryptographically-random hex string of `len` bytes. */
+function randomHex(len: number): string {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(len);
+  crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+  let out = "";
+  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0");
+  return out;
+}
+/**
+ * Decode HTML attribute entities we might encounter inside a meta-tag's
+ * `content="…"` attribute. Spec-rigorous decoding is out of scope; the
+ * common entities are enough for the policies real-world sites ship.
+ */
+function htmlAttrDecode(s: string): string {
+  return s
+    .replace(/&amp;/g, "&")
+    .replace(/&lt;/g, "<")
+    .replace(/&gt;/g, ">")
+    .replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
+    .replace(/&#39;/g, "'")
+    .replace(/&apos;/g, "'");
+}
+function htmlAttrEncode(s: string): string {
+  return s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/"/g, "&quot;").replace(/'/g, "&#39;");
+}
+/** Decode a Chromium `Fetch.getResponseBody` base64 string into UTF-8. */
+function base64Decode(s: string): string {
+  // Bun + browsers expose `atob`; fall back through Buffer for older runtimes.
+  if (typeof atob === "function") {
+    const bin = atob(s);
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
+    for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) bytes[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
+    return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: false }).decode(bytes);
+  }
+  // Buffer path — Bun has it globally.
+  const buf = (
+    globalThis as {
+      Buffer?: { from: (s: string, enc: string) => { toString(enc: string): string } };
+    }
+  ).Buffer;
+  if (buf !== undefined) return buf.from(s, "base64").toString("utf-8");
+  throw new Error("[mochi] no base64 decoder available");
+}
+/** Encode a UTF-8 string back into base64 for `Fetch.fulfillRequest`. */
+function base64Encode(s: string): string {
+  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(s);
+  if (typeof btoa === "function") {
+    let bin = "";
+    for (const b of bytes) bin += String.fromCharCode(b);
+    return btoa(bin);
+  }
+  const buf = (
+    globalThis as {
+      Buffer?: { from: (b: Uint8Array) => { toString(enc: string): string } };
+    }
+  ).Buffer;
+  if (buf !== undefined) return buf.from(bytes).toString("base64");
+  throw new Error("[mochi] no base64 encoder available");
+}
+/** Closed-pipe / browser-crashed errors are non-actionable during teardown. */
+function isClosedError(err: unknown): boolean {
+  if (err instanceof Error) {
+    return (
+      err.name === "BrowserCrashedError" ||
+      /transport already closed|pipe closed|browser process exited/i.test(err.message)
+    );
+  }
+  return false;
+}