@mmerterden/multi-agent-pipeline 20.2.1 → 20.3.0

package/pipeline/multi-agent-refs/features/unattended-security.md

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+# Feature: Unattended Security
+
+<!-- toc -->
+- [What turns it on](#what-turns-it-on)
+- [The guard](#the-guard)
+- [Phase 4: a PR request instead of a push](#phase-4-a-pr-request-instead-of-a-push)
+- [The runner's launch](#the-runners-launch)
+- [The publish step](#the-publish-step)
+- [Phase 5 and channels](#phase-5-and-channels)
+- [What leaves the machine is scanned](#what-leaves-the-machine-is-scanned)
+- [Text a run did not write is data](#text-a-run-did-not-write-is-data)
+- [The OS sandbox is the boundary](#the-os-sandbox-is-the-boundary)
+- [Machine setup (applied by the operator)](#machine-setup-applied-by-the-operator)
+- [Hook timeout and cost](#hook-timeout-and-cost)
+- [The phone routes](#the-phone-routes)
+- [Residual risk, accepted and stated](#residual-risk-accepted-and-stated)
+- [Reference](#reference)
+<!-- /toc -->
+
+**Pattern**: a run nobody watches is also a run nobody can stop in time. Its
+input is text other people wrote (a ticket, a page, a PR thread), so it has to be
+assumed that some of that text will ask for something the task never did. This
+feature keeps an unattended run's reach to its own worktree: it can build, test
+and commit, and everything that leaves the machine goes through the autopilot
+runner, after the runner checked it again outside the run. An attended run is unchanged.
+
+## What turns it on
+
+`MULTI_AGENT_UNATTENDED=1` in the hook's own environment, and nothing else. The
+autopilot runner sets it on the `claude` process it spawns, and hooks inherit
+it. It is never read from `agent-state.json` or any file the run writes: a rule
+the run can switch off is not a rule. `lib/unattended.sh` (`ma_unattended`) and
+`lib/unattended.mjs` (`isUnattended`) answer the question; `agent-guard.py` reads
+the variable the same way.
+
+With the variable unset every hook behaves as it did without this feature:
+`smoke-unattended-redteam.sh` runs the same inputs both ways, and
+`test/unattended-guard.test.mjs` holds the attended verdicts.
+
+## The guard
+
+`scripts/agent-guard.sh` is the PreToolUse hook on `Bash`, on
+`Edit|Write|NotebookEdit`, and on `WebFetch|mcp__multi-agent-toolkit__.*`
+(`install/claude.mjs` registers all three; a matcher is a regex over the tool
+name, so the last one covers `WebFetch` and every toolkit tool, including
+`agent_run_steps`, which dispatches the web tools, and the `ios_open_url` /
+`android_open_url` tools, which open a URL in the device browser). The
+"already present" check for the Bash guard requires the tool-name matcher
+`Bash`, a guard entry written under a `Bash(...)` command filter - which a
+hook never matches - is migrated to `Bash` in place, and the web-tools-only
+matcher `WebFetch|mcp__multi-agent-toolkit__web_.*` an older install wrote is
+migrated to the wider one. `install/templates/claude-hooks.json` carries the
+same three registrations. Its decision core is
+`agent-guard.py`; the unattended rules are `scripts/unattended_policy.py` and the
+lists they read are `schemas/unattended-policy.json`.
+
+In every mode it blocks AI attribution in commit messages and a force-push to
+main, master or develop, including `git push -f origin HEAD`, a remote with any
+name, `-o` / `--push-option` values, and a push that names another checkout
+with `git -C <dir>` or follows a `cd`. A push that removes a protected branch
+without a force flag is blocked the same way: `--delete` / `-d`, a refspec with
+an empty source (`git push origin :main`), `--mirror` (always), and `--prune`
+with a glob refspec or none. The rule reads through a subshell or group
+(`(git push -f origin main)`), a `sh -c` / `bash -c` / `zsh -lc` payload and an
+`eval`, and a `cd` it cannot read literally (`cd "$W"`) leaves the directory
+unknown for every relative `cd` after it, so a bare force-push there is
+blocked.
+
+### The model under the variable: refuse what it cannot parse
+
+A list of bad commands cannot be complete. Under the variable the guard
+inverts the default: a Bash command is judged only when it reduces to
+**simple commands joined by `;`, `&&`, `||` and plain pipes between
+non-interpreter commands**. Anything that hides a command from a line reader is
+refused outright, before any family check runs:
+
+- a subshell or group - `(`, `)`, `{`, `}` (outside quotes)
+- a backtick, `<(...)` or `>(...)` substitution, and `$((...))` arithmetic
+- a `$(...)` the guard cannot analyse: one nested inside another, an
+  unterminated one, or one in command position (`$(echo git) push`)
+- a heredoc with an unquoted delimiter (its body expands `$(...)`)
+- a `${...}` other than a plain `${NAME}`
+- a background job - a bare `&` (not `&&`, `&>`, `>&` or `2>&1`)
+- a shell keyword in command position - `if`, `then`, `for`, `while`, `case`,
+  `function`, `eval`, `exec`, `source`, `.`, `export`, `trap`, `set`, `unset`,
+  `alias`, and the rest
+- an interpreter reading its program from stdin - `echo ... | bash`,
+  `python3 -`, `bash <<< '...'` (a pipe into `node script.mjs` only passes
+  data and is judged like running the script), or `xargs` with a command
+- a `-c` cluster on a shell or Python - `bash -lc "..."`, `sh -c ...`,
+  `python3 -c ...`
+- an inline program on any other interpreter - `node -e/-p/--eval/--print`,
+  `perl -e/-E` (in a cluster too, `-lne`), `ruby -e`, `osascript -e`,
+  `php -r/-R/-B/-E`, `lua -e`, `Rscript -e`, `swift -e`, `bun -e/--eval/--print`,
+  `deno eval` / `deno repl`
+- a program file the run could have written. An interpreter's script
+  (`bash x.sh`, `python3 x.py`, `node x.mjs`, `osascript x.scpt`, `tclsh`,
+  `swift x.swift`, `bun`/`deno run <file>`), a module `python3 -m` finds in the
+  cwd, a command named by path (`./x.sh`, also behind `nohup`, `env`,
+  `timeout`), an `awk -f` / `sed -f` program file and the Makefile `make` reads
+  must be one of: under `~/.claude/scripts` or `~/.claude/lib` (the installed
+  pipeline, itself write-protected), a file the user cannot write, a binary in
+  `node_modules/.bin`, or a file tracked by git and unmodified against HEAD
+  (staged, unstaged and untracked changes all count as modified)
+- `make` with `--eval`, or with a `VAR=value` operand a recipe could expand
+- an awk program with `system(`, a pipe (`|`, not `||`), `getline`, a `print >`
+  redirect, `@load` or `@include`, and awk's `-i` / `-l` / `-E` loaders
+- a sed program with a `w` / `W` / `e` command or the `w` / `e` flag of `s///`
+- `script` and `watch`, which run the rest of the line in a way the guard does
+  not model, and `env -S` / `env -C`, which re-split the command or move it
+- a command name built at run time - a first token starting with `$`
+- `sudo`, `doas`, and `find -exec` / `-execdir` / `-ok`
+- more than 50 segments (refused unparsed, so a 300-`npm ci;` line ending in a
+  push is rejected in milliseconds, not after 300 git reads)
+
+**`$(...)` is analysed, not refused.** Each top-level substitution is
+extracted quote-aware and balanced, and its inner command goes through the same
+parser and every policy check as if it were typed directly, in the cwd its
+segment runs in; the outer command is then judged with the substitution replaced
+by a placeholder. `SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)` passes; a substitution whose inner
+command pushes, POSTs, reads a credential or writes a protected path is refused
+for what that inner command does. A substitution-built value can never name a
+command, a git or gh subcommand, a publisher verb or a write target. A heredoc
+behind a quoted delimiter (`<<'EOF'`) is stripped as literal data before
+parsing, so `git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF' ... EOF)"` works. Segments and
+redirections are split quote-aware, so a `|` or `;` inside a quoted sed, jq or
+awk program is text. Variables assigned earlier in the same command
+(`D=build; ... > "$D/x"`) and `$HOME` are expanded; a write target or `cd` whose
+variable cannot be resolved is refused, and so is a relative write after an
+unresolvable `cd`.
+
+**The documented steps are written to pass.** The guard judges each Bash call
+alone, so every command in the phase docs is one the guard accepts as written
+once its placeholders are filled.
+Shell control flow lives in installed scripts (`worktree-prepare.sh`,
+`build-lock.sh`, `probe-evidence-capability.sh --platform auto`,
+`triage-memory.mjs prior-art`, `memory-save.sh --from-json`, and the `--out`,
+`--json-out`, `--append`, `--stack-from` and `--analysis-from-state` options of
+the gates) and the doc calls each as one command. A write target is spelled
+`{worktreePath}/...`, the literal path, rather than `$WORKTREE/...`, because the
+guard checks only a target it can read from the command itself; LLM-written JSON
+(analysis, plan, reviewer and triage output) is written with the Write tool. The
+few steps a run does not take carry a `# unattended: skipped` comment on the
+line before them. `test/unattended-doc-lines.test.mjs` runs every command line
+of the bash blocks in `phases/*.md` and `features/unattended-gates.md` through
+the guard (a `NAME=value` line such as `S="$HOME/.claude/scripts"` sets NAME for
+the later lines of the same document), allows only the refusals recorded in
+`test/fixtures/unattended-doc-lines-refused.json`, and fails on any other.
+
+Wrappers are stripped WITH their option values before the command is read, so
+`env -u FOO`, `nice -n N`, `timeout -s SIG N`, `nohup`, `caffeinate`,
+`stdbuf`, `command`, `builtin`, `xcrun [--sdk X]`, `arch -arm64` and
+`sandbox-exec -p ...` do not smuggle the wrapped command past the check
+(`xcrun git push` is judged as `git push`; `xcrun --find` runs nothing).
+Assignments the wrapped command receives - leading ones, those after `env`, and
+`arch -e` values - are judged like any other. Command basenames are casefolded
+(`GIT push`), and an absolute path is reduced to its basename (`/usr/bin/git`)
+once the file itself passed the program-file check above.
+
+Configuration that makes a later program run code is refused wherever it is
+set. One key list (`GIT_EXEC_CONFIG`) covers `git -c`, `git --config-env`,
+`git clone -c` and `git config`: `alias.*`, `core.hooksPath`,
+`core.sshCommand`, `core.fsmonitor`, `core.editor`, `core.pager`,
+`core.askPass`, `core.gitProxy`, `sequence.editor`, `diff.external`,
+`diff.*.command` / `textconv`, `difftool.*`, `mergetool.*`, `merge.*.driver`,
+`filter.*`, `credential.*`, `gpg.*`, `url.*.insteadOf` / `pushInsteadOf`,
+`include*`, `http.*`, `remote.*`, `branch.*.remote` / `pushRemote`,
+`protocol.*`, `pager.*`, `hook.*`, `submodule.*`, `trailer.*` and the rest.
+`git config` writes to `--global` / `--system` and `git config --edit` are
+refused too. The environment: every `GIT_*` variable except the commit
+identity, date and prompt ones (so `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` / `KEY_n` / `VALUE_n`,
+`GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`, `GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF`, `GIT_SSH(_COMMAND)`, `GIT_ASKPASS`,
+`GIT_EXEC_PATH`, `GIT_DIR`), `EDITOR` / `VISUAL` / `PAGER` / `GIT_EDITOR` /
+`GIT_PAGER` other than a no-op (`cat`, `true`, `:`, `less`), `BASH_ENV`,
+`ENV`, `PROMPT_COMMAND`, `CDPATH`, `PATH`, `HOME`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`,
+`NODE_OPTIONS`, `PYTHONPATH`, `PERL5OPT`, `RUBYOPT`, `LD_*`, `DYLD_*`,
+`npm_config_*` and `MULTI_AGENT*`. Git subcommands that run a command line are
+refused: `rebase --exec` / `-x`, `bisect run`, `submodule foreach`,
+`difftool -x` / `--extcmd`, `filter-branch`, `grep -O`, `--upload-pack`,
+`--receive-pack`, `--exec`, `--template`, and any `ext::` or `fd::`
+transport.
+
+Under the variable it also blocks:
+
+| Family | Blocked | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| Outward writes | `git push` in any form; `gh pr create/merge/ready/edit/comment/review/close`; `gh issue create/close/edit/comment/...`; `gh release`, `repo`, `workflow`, `secret`, `variable`, `label`, `alias`, `ssh-key`, `gpg-key`, `extension`, `codespace` writes; `gh api` with a mutating method, with `-f`/`-F` (attached forms too) / `--input` and no explicit GET, a GraphQL `mutation`, or a graphql `@file` field; `gh auth` (except `auth status`); `curl`/`wget` with a body or a non-GET method (`-x`, `--proxy`, `--connect-to`, `--resolve`, `-K`, `--unix-socket`, `--doh-url` are refused outright) | the runner is the only writer |
+| Publisher scripts | `jira-publish.sh`, `post-pr-review.sh`, `update-issue-progress.sh`, `analysis-jira-write.sh`, `jira-attach.sh`, `md2confluence-v3.py create/update`, `multi-repo-pipeline.sh push/pr`, `keychain-save.sh`, `credential-store.sh get/set/delete`, `keychain.py get/set/delete`, `gate-ledger.mjs append`, `phone-devices.mjs add/revoke/launch` | the same, a credential never lands in the transcript, gates record verdicts through their own in-process calls (`park` stays allowed: it only stops the run, so there is nothing to forge), and a run never enrols a device that could then command this machine |
+| Git redirection | `git remote add/set-url/rename/remove`; the configuration, environment and subcommands above | each changes what a later command runs or where the runner's push goes |
+| Keychain | `security find-*`, `dump-keychain`, `export`, `add-*password`, `delete-*password`, also behind leading flags (`security -q find-generic-password`) | a run needs no credential it did not get from a fetcher |
+| Network | `curl`/`wget`/`WebFetch`/the toolkit's `web_*` tools to a host outside the allowlist, or to a URL built at run time; `web_eval` outright; every step of `agent_run_steps` judged as if called directly (a nested `agent_*` step or an unreadable step list refused); `ios_open_url` / `android_open_url`, `xcrun simctl openurl` and `open` with a web URL outside the allowlist (an app's own deep-link scheme passes; `open` of anything but an allowed URL is refused); the `research_*` tools outright | an injected "fetch this script" is the first step of most attacks, and a browser opened on a crafted URL sends data out in the query |
+| Packages | `npm/pnpm/yarn/bun install|add <pkg>`, `npm install-test/it <pkg>`, `update`, global installs (`yarn global` too), `npx` / `npm exec` / `npm x` of a binary not already in `node_modules/.bin` (with no TTY npm installs it without asking), `npx --yes/--package/--call`, `pnpm dlx`, `pnpx`, `yarn dlx`, `bunx`, `bun x`, `uvx`, `uv tool run/install`, `pipx run/install`, `pip install <pkg>`, `uv/poetry add`, `gem install`, `bundle add`, `brew install`, `cargo add/install`, `go get`, `go install pkg@v`, `swift package add-dependency`, `pod update`; `npm ci`, `pod install` and `pip install -r` once the run changed the manifest they restore from | slopsquatting: a model asked to add a dependency can name one that does not exist yet, and someone can register it |
+| Host changes | `crontab` (except `-l`), `launchctl` (except the read verbs), `defaults` writes, `altool`, `notarytool` | a job or preference outlives the run and runs as the operator; an upload is outward |
+| Manifests | Edit, Write or a shell write to `Package.swift`, `Package.resolved`, `package.json`, lockfiles, `Podfile(.lock)`, `build.gradle(.kts)`, `settings.gradle(.kts)`, `libs.versions.toml`, `requirements*.txt`, `pyproject.toml`, `go.mod`/`go.sum`, `Cargo.toml`/`Cargo.lock`, `Gemfile(.lock)` | the same decision, made through the file instead of the command |
+| Protected paths | `.github/workflows/`, `CODEOWNERS`, any `.claude/` in a repo, `.mcp.json`, `.git/` (all casefolded), a directory that is an ancestor of one of these (`mv evil .github`), `~/.gitconfig`, `~/.config/git/`, `~/.config/gh/`, `~/.ssh/`, `~/.gnupg/`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, `~/.git-credentials`, the shell startup files (`~/.zshrc`, `~/.zshenv`, `~/.zprofile`, `~/.zlogin`, `~/.zlogout`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.bash_profile`, `~/.bash_login`, `~/.profile`), `~/Library/LaunchAgents/`, `~/.claude.json`, the whole host roots `~/.claude`, `~/.copilot` and `~/.codex` (every path under them, `config.toml` and all, not an enumerated list - an unattended run writes under `~/.multi-agent-unattended` instead), everything under the runner's root | each one changes what runs next, with more rights than the run has |
+
+Shell write targets are read from redirections (`>`, `>>`, `&>`), `tee`,
+`sed -i`, `perl -pi`, and the targets of `cp`/`mv`/`ln`/`install`/`rsync`/`ditto`
+(including `-t DIR`, `--target-directory=DIR`, `-tDIR`), `rm`, `touch`,
+`truncate`, `chmod`, `dd of=`, `sort -o`, `find -fprint/-fprint0/-fprintf/-fls`
+and the starting points of `find -delete`, `curl -o`/`--output`,
+`tar -C`/`--directory`, `unzip -d`, `patch`, `git checkout -- <file>`,
+`git restore <file>`, `git diff/log/show --output` and `git format-patch -o`,
+with `--opt=value` and attached short options (`-tDIR`, `-oFILE`) parsed. A
+write target with an unquoted glob character (`cp x .gi?/hooks/`) is refused:
+the shell expands it at run time to paths the guard cannot see. Paths are
+casefolded on darwin, resolved through `cd` / `pushd` state, and a directory
+that is a prefix of a protected path is protected too. A `cd` into a glob is
+refused, and with `CDPATH` in the environment a relative `cd` that does not
+start with `./` or `../` leaves the directory unresolved (a `CDPATH=`
+assignment is refused outright). Every Bash write target,
+and every Write, Edit or NotebookEdit `file_path`, goes through the same check.
+
+**Fail-closed.** An attended guard allows a call it cannot judge, so a guard bug
+cannot break legitimate work. Under the variable the same case is refused: an
+unparseable payload, a missing `agent-guard.py`, or no `python3`.
+
+**No package allowlist.** A restore from the committed lockfile is allowed
+(`npm ci`, `pod install`, `pip install -r` while the manifest is unchanged).
+Adding a package is refused without exception. An allowlist the run can reach
+would be edited by the same text that asks for the package, and one it cannot
+reach is a person's decision made in advance, which is what the refusal already
+asks for. A task that needs a new dependency ends with the need recorded in the
+PR body under follow-ups.
+
+**The network allowlist is data.** `network.staticHosts` in
+`schemas/unattended-policy.json` (GitHub's hosts, localhost), plus the hosts
+named by `network.prefsHostKeys` in `prefs.global.hosts` (Jira, Confluence,
+Bitbucket, Fortify, Graylog, Jenkins), read at hook time. A subdomain of an
+allowed host is allowed; `corpDomain` is not used, because it is an email domain
+and would allow every host under it. The host is parsed with
+`urllib.parse.urlsplit`, so `http://evil.com#@github.com/` resolves to `evil.com`
+and is refused. The same allowlist governs `WebFetch`, the toolkit's
+`web_goto` / `web_crawl` (any URL argument), each step of `agent_run_steps`,
+and a web URL given to `ios_open_url` / `android_open_url`; `web_eval` is
+refused outright because inline JavaScript can reach any host. Reads only: a request body or
+upload - `-d`/`--data*`, `-F`/`--form`, `-T`/`--upload-file`, and their attached
+and clustered short forms (`-d@file`, `-sd`, `-Tfile`) - is **refused outright**,
+whatever the host, rather than allowed to an allowlisted one; a run has nothing
+to POST that is not the runner's to send.
+
+If the allowlist must be pinned at launch instead of re-read from prefs on every
+call, the runner may set `MA_UNATTENDED_HOSTS` (a comma-separated snapshot); when
+it is absent the guard reads `prefs.global.hosts` as before, and protecting
+`~/.claude/multi-agent-preferences.json` from the run is what keeps that read
+trustworthy.
+
+## Phase 4: a PR request instead of a push
+
+Under the variable Phase 4 commits as usual (the commit hook still needs a
+passing gate ledger) and then writes a request instead of pushing:
+
+```bash
+node "$HOME/.claude/scripts/pr-request.mjs" write \
+  --branch "$BRANCH" --base "$BASE_BRANCH" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" \
+  --title "$PR_TITLE" --body-file "$WORKTREE/.pipeline/pr-body.md"
+```
+
+The body is the one Step 3 builds for a PR (the `channels/pr.md` section set,
+humanizer pass, no auto-close keywords). The script writes
+`<run root>/pr-requests/<MULTI_AGENT_SESSION_ID>.json` (the run root is
+`~/.multi-agent-unattended`, the one place outside the worktree the sandbox lets
+the run write; `lib/pr-request-location.mjs`), mode 0600, validated against
+`schemas/pr-request.schema.json`: `{branch, base, title, body, draft: true, repo}`.
+It refuses a protected branch, a branch equal to its base and an auto-close
+keyword (exit 1), and a body or title carrying a token shape (exit 7, rule and
+line reported, never the value). Nothing is written on a refusal. The guard
+allows that one file and no other under the runner's root; the run never
+hand-writes it.
+
+Skipped under the variable, because each one writes outward: push (standard step
+7), the PR prompt and creation (step 8), the Step 2.9 evidence push (`host:
+none`, reason `unattended`), the issue body update (step 10), and the Jira
+comment. Worktree finalize exits 3 on the unpushed branch and keeps the
+worktree, which is what the runner needs to push from.
+
+The runner publishes it after the session ends ("The publish step" below).
+Attended runs never call `pr-request.mjs`.
+
+## The runner's launch
+
+Before every launch - the dev run, a research pass, a resume - the runner:
+
+- refuses to launch unless `agent-guard.sh` is registered as a PreToolUse hook
+  on `Bash`, `Edit|Write|NotebookEdit` and `WebFetch|mcp__multi-agent-toolkit__.*`
+  in the user settings (`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` or `~/.claude`) or macOS managed
+  settings, read the way `install/claude.mjs` writes it: a matcher is a regex
+  over the tool name (the legacy `Bash(git push:*)` covers nothing, and the web
+  entry has to cover `agent_run_steps` and both `open_url` tools), the hook
+  command is exactly the installer's `bash $HOME/.claude/scripts/agent-guard.sh`
+  (or the same path with `$HOME` expanded) and that script exists. The
+  checkout's `.claude/` settings never count toward the registration - the repo
+  under work is not where the guard may come from - but `disableAllHooks` in
+  any of these files, the checkout's included, turns every hook off. It also
+  refuses when `~/.claude/multi-agent-unattended.settings.json`, the permission
+  profile, is missing. A refused first launch is recorded as
+  `blocked-guard-missing` (nothing ran, no attempt counted) and the item stays
+  queued; a refused research or resume launch leaves the run parked.
+  `guardRegistration` in the runner.
+- launches the child with `--settings ~/.claude/multi-agent-unattended.settings.json`
+  (`launchArgv`, `researchArgv`, `resumeArgv`; `schemas/launch.json` carries it
+  as `{settingsFile}` for a client that launches itself).
+- creates `<autopilot root>/pr-requests/` at mode 0700 and removes any request,
+  verdict or summary left under the new session's id (`prepareLaunch`).
+- passes `MULTI_AGENT_UNATTENDED=1`, `MULTI_AGENT_SESSION_ID`,
+  `MCP_TOOLKIT_URL_POLICY=strict` (forced, never loosened by the runner's own
+  environment) and `MCP_TOOLKIT_INDEX_DENY` (the profile's list plus any entries
+  the runner's environment adds), values read from
+  `schemas/unattended-profile.json` (`launchEnv`).
+
+## The publish step
+
+`scripts/autopilot-publish.mjs`, called by the runner when a session ended
+(gone, finished, or idle waiting) with `currentPhase >= 4` and a request at
+`prRequestPath(sessionId)`; again from the next tick's recovery when supervision
+stopped before the session did, and when a parked session ends. Everything the
+run wrote is a claim to check:
+
+Files the run could have written are read only as bounded regular files
+(`lib/regular-file.mjs`): the path is resolved, opened non-blocking without
+following a final symlink, and the open descriptor must be a regular file under
+a size cap. A FIFO, a device or an oversized file is refused under its gate
+without being read, so nothing the run leaves behind can block the runner's
+thread. The runner reads run states and trackers the same way.
+
+| Step | Refused as (`verificationFailed.gate`) |
+|---|---|
+| the run's state is a regular JSON file (16 MB cap); a refused state cannot be parked, so only the verdict records it | `publish/state` |
+| the request is read once (1 MB cap) and `validatePrRequest` from `pr-request.mjs` runs in process on those bytes: schema, protected branch, auto-close keywords, and the outbound gate | `publish/pr-request` |
+| `repo` must equal the queue item's `nameWithOwner` from the runner's own config; the request never chooses the repository | `publish/repo` |
+| `host` from the config: `github` (default) or `bitbucket`; anything else | `publish/host` |
+| the request's base must be the configured `baseBranch`, else the remote's default branch (`ls-remote --symref <url> HEAD`), or a branch listed in `allowedBases`; a remote that names no default with no `baseBranch` set is refused | `publish/base` |
+| the worktree shares its git common dir with the configured `localPath`, and has no uncommitted change to a tracked file, so the tree verified below is the tree pushed | `publish/worktree` |
+| the branch is not main, master, develop, `release/*`, the configured base or an `allowedBases` entry; it equals the `branch` the run recorded in its state at Phase 0; it exists and is the worktree's HEAD | `publish/branch` |
+| the push URL is the config's `pushUrl`, else `gh repo view <repo> --json url`; never `.git/config`. A URL with credentials in it is refused | `publish/remote` |
+| the branch is fetched from the worktree into a fresh staging repository, and the base from the push URL; the branch must have commits not on the base | `publish/base`, `publish/branch` |
+| a branch already on the remote must have been pushed by this session (its earlier verdict says `pushed: true`) and its tip must be an ancestor of the run's HEAD | `publish/remote-branch` |
+| the gate ledger passes for every commit's parent in the range. The ledger is written by the run, so this is a consistency check, not evidence | `publish/gate-ledger` |
+| the ledger's latest `test-summary` entry names a test log (`detail.source`), a regular file of at most 64 MB inside the worktree or the run's directory; no log, or failed or zero executed, is a failure | `publish/test-log`, `publish/test-summary` |
+| `pre-commit-check.sh --scan-range <merge-base>..<head>`: the commit hook's detectors over every commit in the range on its own, read from the commit objects, so a secret added in one commit and removed in a later one is still found in the history that would be pushed | `publish/secret-scan` |
+| the outbound gate on the title and body | `publish/outbound-gate` |
+| independent verification, below | `publish/verify-stack`, `publish/verify-scripts`, `publish/verify-build`, `publish/verify-test`, `publish/verify-credentials` |
+
+### Independent verification
+
+The gate ledger is agent-writable: a run can append `not-applicable` for every
+mandatory gate and `gate-ledger.mjs check` passes. So the publish step does not
+take the run's word that it built and tested. It resolves the worktree's stack
+with `_stack-adapter.mjs` and renders the adapter's `build` and `test` commands
+from the **base commit's** manifests (`package.json`, the lock files and the
+adapter's `when` files, copied out of the merge-base into a private directory).
+The run does not choose how it is verified: a range that changes a command
+line, a `build`/`test` package script or its `pre`/`post` hook, the declared
+`packageManager`, or a repository executable a command starts with (`./gradlew`)
+is refused as `publish/verify-scripts`. The commands then run in the worktree:
+its own process group killed at `verify.timeoutSec` (default 1800) and again
+when the command exits, output to a private file. Every process started for the
+command carries a per-run marker variable, and any process still carrying it
+after the group is killed is killed too, which covers a child that left the
+group with `setsid` or a double fork (a process that also clears its
+environment is not reached). The environment is the runner's with `MULTI_AGENT_UNATTENDED`,
+`MULTI_AGENT_SESSION_ID`, `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`, the askpass helpers and every
+variable whose name ends in `_TOKEN`, `_KEY`, `_SECRET`, `_PASSWORD` or
+`_CREDENTIALS` removed (`verifyEnv`). A non-zero exit refuses; then
+`evidence-gate.mjs --claim <kind> --status passed --stack <id>` judges the
+fresh output, and for the test run `test-summary.mjs` counts it: a failure or
+zero tests executed refuses. A stack the adapters cannot build and test (the
+unknown adapter, a package with no `build` or `test` script) refuses as
+`publish/verify-stack`, unless the config sets `verify.allowUnverifiedStack:
+true`, which publishes with the ledger and the log check alone and records
+`verified: false` in the verdict.
+
+The operator's credential settings (`credentialConfig`) are read before the
+build and tests run, and the push uses that snapshot. Afterwards
+`~/.gitconfig`, `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config` (default `~/.config/git/config`)
+and any `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` file must hash to what they did before, and the
+credential settings read again must equal the snapshot; otherwise nothing is
+pushed (`publish/verify-credentials`).
+
+Running the run's tests executes code the agent wrote, as the runner's user,
+outside every hook. Scrubbing the environment keeps token-shaped variables out
+of that process; it does not keep credentials away from it. That code can do
+anything the runner's user can do without a prompt, including:
+
+- read login-Keychain items whose access list lets the user's own tools read
+  them silently, which includes items the pipeline's credential store wrote
+  with `security` and anything readable by `security find-generic-password`
+  under that user;
+- run `gh auth token` and get the `gh` login's token, whether `gh` keeps it in
+  the Keychain or in `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`;
+- read any file the user can read (SSH keys, `~/.git-credentials`, cloud CLI
+  profiles) and open a network connection.
+
+Nothing in the publish step can take those away from a process running as the
+same user. The recommended setup is the separate, non-admin macOS user below,
+whose Keychain and home hold only the narrow tokens the runner needs; without
+it this step is the widest opening in the design.
+
+### The push, from a staging repository
+
+Nothing that touches the network runs in the worktree. The worktree's git
+config is the run's to write, and a denylist of keys that could move or
+observe a push (`url.*.insteadOf`, `http.proxy`, `http.curloptResolve`,
+`http.sslVerify`, `http.extraHeader`, `credential.*`, `core.sshCommand`,
+`include*`, and the ones git adds next) is never complete. So the publish step
+makes a fresh bare repository in a private temp directory and runs every
+network operation there, with `GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1`, `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`
+pointing at a file it writes, `-c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` and
+`GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`. That file holds only the operator's `credential.*`
+settings, read from the system and global scopes outside any repository
+(`credentialConfig`), so the helper the operator already uses still answers and
+nothing else from any config reaches the push.
+
+The branch enters the staging repository by a fetch the staging repository
+runs, naming the worktree as a local path: its config, not the worktree's,
+decides where that fetch reads. The base fetch and the remote-branch check run
+from one staging repository, which is deleted before independent verification
+starts; the push (`push --no-verify --porcelain <url>
+refs/heads/<branch>:refs/heads/<branch>`, never forced, submodules not
+recursed) runs from a second one, holding the credential snapshot taken
+before verification, made after the run's build and tests have exited, once the worktree is confirmed to be still on the checked commit with
+no tracked file changed (`publish/verify-test` otherwise). Code the tests
+started could otherwise have written into the staging repository's own config
+while it waited. The worktree is
+still read locally - `rev-parse`, a status with `core.fsmonitor=false`, the
+secret scan's `diff --no-ext-diff --no-textconv` - with the scrubbed
+environment. On GitHub, `gh pr create --draft --repo <repo> --base <base>
+--head <branch> --title ... --body-file <tmp>` runs from a private temp
+directory, not the worktree; the URL goes into `state.pr` through the
+write-state lock and the attempt is `pr-opened`. A push or `gh` failure is
+`publish/push` or `publish/pr-create`.
+
+Bitbucket has no draft pull request, and opening a ready one would ask for
+review of work nobody has looked at. The runner pushes the verified branch,
+writes `<session id>.summary.md` (0600) beside the request with the branch,
+base, title and body, records `state.publish`, and the attempt is
+`pushed-awaiting-pr`: terminal, because the work is delivered and a retry would
+push it again, and not parked, because the step left is a person's and needs
+neither the worktree nor the repo's queue slot.
+
+Every process the publish step starts runs with `MULTI_AGENT_UNATTENDED` and
+`MULTI_AGENT_SESSION_ID` removed and `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`. The runner is not
+the agent: these are spawns, not tool calls, so no hook sees them, and the
+variable would only make the scripts behave as if the agent had called them.
+The runner's own credentials (the `gh` login, the git credential helper) are
+used; none reaches argv or a log.
+
+The verdict is written to `<session id>.verdict.json` (0600): the outcome, the
+URL or the gate and reason, whether the branch was pushed, and what the
+independent verification found, never a matched value. A refusal parks the run
+through `gate-ledger.mjs park`; once the cause is fixed a person re-runs the one
+step with `autopilot-publish.mjs --session <id> --state <agent-state.json>
+--repo <owner/name>`.
+
+## Phase 5 and channels
+
+Under the variable Phase 5 skips external delivery (`deferred-to-runner`) and
+`channels` posts nothing. After the PR opened, and only then, the runner posts
+what `~/.claude/autopilot/config.json` opts into
+(`schemas/autopilot-config.schema.json`), once, through the existing scripts:
+
+| Key | What the runner posts |
+|---|---|
+| `reportChannels: true` with `channels.mode: configured` | `jira`: one comment on the linked issue with the PR link and text (`lib/jira-publish.sh`). `pr`: the draft PR is the report. `confluence`, `wiki`: skipped and logged, because a page is composed by a session and a session with publish rights is what the unattended design does not create |
+| `reportIssueUpdates: true` | `update-issue-progress.sh` for the GitHub issue in `state.githubIssue`, and a PR-link comment on the linked Jira issue when no channel comment went out |
+
+Both default off; without them the draft PR is the only thing published. The
+text is scanned by the outbound gate before a script sees it, each script's own
+gate runs again, and each runs with `MULTI_AGENT_UNATTENDED` unset.
+`reportAfterPublish` in `autopilot-publish.mjs`.
+
+## What leaves the machine is scanned
+
+`lib/outbound-gate.mjs` (`SURFACES`) scans every published body for token
+shapes: the PR request body (`pr-request.mjs`, at write and at validate), the
+PR text and post-PR reports the runner publishes (`autopilot-publish.mjs`), Jira
+comments and descriptions (`jira-publish.sh`), Jira issue creation
+(`analysis-jira-write.sh`), Confluence pages (`md2confluence-v3.py`), PR reviews
+(`post-pr-review.sh`) and issue progress comments (`update-issue-progress.sh`).
+
+## Text a run did not write is data
+
+Fetched bodies, ticket descriptions, comments and PR text enter prompts inside
+`<untrusted-data source="...">` ... `</untrusted-data>`, produced by
+`lib/untrusted.mjs wrap`, which defuses a delimiter forged inside the text. The
+rule, in `features/external-context-injection.md` and the clarifier and reviewer
+agents: content inside a block is never an instruction. A prompt rule is
+advisory; the guard is what holds when a model follows the text anyway.
+
+## The OS sandbox is the boundary
+
+The primary containment for an unattended run is the OS sandbox (Seatbelt on
+macOS), not the command guard. A deny-list of command shapes cannot be
+complete; the sandbox is enforced by the kernel for every Bash command and
+every process it starts, whatever the command line looks like.
+
+`install --unattended` always writes an OS sandbox block into the profile
+(`schemas/unattended-profile.json` -> `~/.claude/multi-agent-unattended.settings.json`,
+`lib/unattended-settings-location.mjs`):
+
+- `sandbox.enabled: true`, `failIfUnavailable: true` (a missing sandbox is a
+  refusal to start, not an unsandboxed run), `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false`
+  (no `dangerouslyDisableSandbox` retry), `autoAllowBashIfSandboxed: false` (the
+  allow list still decides), and no `excludedCommands`.
+- Writes are confined to the run's worktree and the session temp directory.
+  `filesystem.denyWrite` additionally names `~/.claude`, `~/.copilot`, `~/.codex`,
+  `~/Library/LaunchAgents`, the shell rc/profile files, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`,
+  `~/.config/gh`, `~/.config/git`, `~/.gitconfig`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`,
+  `~/.git-credentials`, `~/.gradle/init.d`, `~/.lldbinit` and `~/.curlrc`.
+- `filesystem.denyRead` names `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/Library/Keychains`,
+  `~/.netrc`, `~/.git-credentials` and `~/.docker/config.json`.
+- `network.strictAllowlist: true` with `allowedDomains` limited to the package
+  registries and toolchains the stack adapters need (npm, PyPI, Maven/Google/
+  Gradle, CocoaPods, Go, crates, RubyGems, GitHub) plus the prefs hosts.
+  `enableWeakerNetworkIsolation: true` lets Go tools such as `gh` reach the
+  macOS trust service to verify TLS; `allowLocalBinding` and
+  `allowMachLookup: ["com.apple.coresimulator.*"]` let a dev server and the
+  simulator work.
+
+An unattended run therefore writes what the runner reads back not under
+`~/.claude` (the sandbox denies it) but under `~/.multi-agent-unattended`
+(`lib/pr-request-location.mjs`): `LOGS_ROOT` points the run's state there and
+the PR request file lives there; verdicts stay in the runner's own
+`~/.claude/autopilot` directory, which the run cannot write.
+
+### Verified behaviour (Claude Code 2.1.282)
+
+Measured with a probe: `claude -p --model <a Haiku probe model> --settings
+<profile> --permission-mode dontAsk --allowedTools Bash` in a temp git repo,
+asked to run each command, against HOME-safe decoys (`$HOME/.ma-sandbox-decoy`
+in `denyWrite`, never the real `~/.claude`). Results:
+
+| Command | Result |
+|---|---|
+| `touch ~/.claude/sandbox-probe-x` | blocked (Operation not permitted) |
+| `touch ./ok` (in the worktree) | allowed |
+| `touch ~/.ma-sandbox-outside-file` (outside the worktree, not listed) | blocked |
+| `mv <denyWrite dir> /tmp`, `rm -rf <denyWrite dir>`, `cat <denyRead file>` | blocked |
+| `echo x > .git/hooks/pre-push`, `git config core.hooksPath /tmp` | blocked (protected path) |
+| `mkdir -p .github/workflows` with `denyWrite **/.github/workflows` | blocked |
+| Python/Node writing to a `denyWrite` path | blocked (EPERM) |
+| `curl https://example.com` (not allowlisted) | blocked (`network-outbound ... not on the allow list`) |
+| `curl https://registry.npmjs.org/` | allowed |
+| `gh api rate_limit`, `git ls-remote https://github.com/...` | allowed (with `enableWeakerNetworkIsolation`) |
+| `touch ~/... dangerouslyDisableSandbox:true` under `allowUnsandboxedCommands:false` | blocked (the escape hatch is ignored) |
+
+A relative `denyWrite`/`Edit(...)` entry in a `--settings` file does not resolve
+to the repository, so in-repo protection (`.git/hooks`, `.github/workflows`) is
+carried by `Edit(**/.github/workflows/**)` and `Edit(**/.git/hooks/**)` deny
+rules, which Claude Code adds to the sandbox `denyWrite` list, plus the sandbox's
+own built-in protected paths. `**/.github/workflows` as a bare `denyWrite`
+matched both the top-level and a nested `.github/workflows`; the `Edit(...)` deny
+form is used because it also covers the file tools.
+
+### The permission layer (second line, for the tools the sandbox does not cover)
+
+The same profile carries `permissions.defaultMode: "dontAsk"`, a narrow allow
+list (`xcrun` only as `simctl`, `xcresulttool`, `xctrace` and `--find`), deny
+rules for merge, push, and - since Edit/Write/NotebookEdit and MCP tools run
+outside the OS sandbox - `Edit(...)`/`Read(...)` deny rules on the same
+protected paths (`~/.claude/**`, `~/.copilot/**`, `~/.codex/**`,
+`~/Library/LaunchAgents/**`, the shell rc files, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`,
+`~/.config/gh`, `~/.config/git`, `~/.gitconfig`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`,
+`~/.git-credentials`, `.git/hooks/**`, `.git/config`, `**/.github/workflows/**`),
+and the toolkit env `MCP_TOOLKIT_URL_POLICY=strict` and
+`MCP_TOOLKIT_INDEX_DENY=~/.ssh,~/.aws,~/.gnupg,~/Library/Keychains`.
+
+The runner hands the file to each child with `claude --settings`, so only the
+unattended session loads it. `~/.claude/settings.json` is the attended posture
+and is not changed. Permission lists merge across settings files, so a
+whole-Bash allow (`Bash`, `Bash(*)`, `Bash(:*)`, `Bash(**)`) in `settings.json`
+still reaches the child: the installer reports it and doctor's
+`unattended-permissions` check warns, and neither removes it. `defaultMode` in
+the profile is forced to `dontAsk`; `bypassPermissions`, `acceptEdits` or any
+other value already there is replaced, never kept. When `settings.json` carries
+the v20.2.1 profile (that release wrote it there), the installer prints the move
+and removes exactly that release's entries (frozen in
+`install/unattended-profile-legacy.json`), including rules the current profile no
+longer has. `--unattended-sandbox` remains a synonym for `--unattended`; the
+sandbox is written either way. `lib/unattended-profile-check.mjs` is the one rule
+the installer, doctor and the runner's launch precondition apply.
+
+The runner refuses to launch (`blocked-sandbox-unavailable`) unless the profile
+file's content still holds the sandbox block, `dontAsk` and the deny rules, and
+the checkout's own `.claude/settings.json` adds no sandbox block, additional
+directory, path allow rule or WebFetch domain. It checks before every launch, so
+a run that rewrote the profile cannot widen the next one (R3 finding 14), and it
+hashes `~/.claude/{scripts,lib}`, the settings files, the profile and
+`~/Library/LaunchAgents` before and after publish verification (`hostFingerprint`
+in `autopilot-publish.mjs`) and refuses to push if any changed.
+
+The profile's `env` reaches the session and the commands it runs. The Claude
+Code docs pass environment to a stdio MCP server through the server entry, so
+pin the two toolkit variables there as well: `claude mcp add --env
+MCP_TOOLKIT_URL_POLICY=strict ...` when the server is registered.
+
+Details: `unattended-contract.md`, "The permission posture".
+
+## Machine setup (applied by the operator)
+
+These are outside the pipeline and nothing here applies them.
+
+1. **A separate, non-admin macOS user** for the runner, with its own login
+   Keychain holding only the tokens below. The run then cannot read the
+   operator's Keychain, SSH keys or browser profiles even through a path the
+   hook does not see, and cannot `sudo`. The LaunchAgent runs in that user's
+   session (`docs/server-readiness.md`).
+2. **GitHub credentials per repo**: a fine-grained PAT limited to the queued
+   repositories with `Contents: write` and `Pull requests: write` and nothing
+   else, or a GitHub App installed on those repositories with the same two
+   permissions. No `Administration`, no `Workflows`, no org scope.
+3. **Jira**: a token for an account that can read the queued projects and add
+   comments, and nothing more (no transition, no delete, no admin).
+4. **GitHub rulesets** on every default and release branch: no force-push, no
+   deletion, pull request required, code-owner review required, approval of the
+   most recent push required, required status checks, and the bot account or
+   App in no bypass list.
+5. **Optional: a Tart VM.** Running the runner's user inside a Tart macOS VM
+   separates the whole filesystem and network stack, and a snapshot makes each
+   run start clean. The steps above still apply inside the VM.
+
+## Hook timeout and cost
+
+A PreToolUse hook that times out does not block the tool call (Claude Code
+hooks reference), so a guard that ran out of time would fail open on the one
+path that must fail closed. `agent-guard.py` therefore arms its own `SIGALRM`
+deadline of 5 seconds: on expiry it prints and flushes the blocking verdict when
+unattended (and the allow verdict when attended, where a guard bug must not
+break legitimate work). `MA_GUARD_DEADLINE_SECONDS` may lower the deadline,
+never raise it; the tests use it with a slow `git` on `PATH`. The hook is registered with `timeout: 10`, above that deadline,
+so the guard's own verdict is what the harness sees. The work is bounded: no
+network, one prefs read, and read-only git calls memoized per invocation, each
+capped at 3 seconds; a command above 50 segments is refused unparsed rather than
+walked. Measured over a 40-command corpus the guard's median is about 0.13 s and
+its p99 about 0.17 s.
+
+## The phone routes
+
+`contract-server.mjs` serves a small signed subset to an enrolled phone
+(`features/phone-api.md`): read the redacted runs, answer a parked question
+with an offered option id, and queue a launch when the operator enabled it.
+Three things tie it to this page. The device registry and the phone audit log
+live under the autopilot root, which the guard forbids a run to write.
+`phone-devices.mjs add`, `revoke` and `launch` refuse under the variable and are
+blocked by name above. An answer from a phone goes through the same
+`answer-question.mjs` refusals as a desktop answer, and the step that asked
+re-runs its gate on resume, so a phone cannot answer past the maturity or
+open-questions check.
+
+## Residual risk, accepted and stated
+
+- **Bash runs code the hook cannot read, so it is refused, not inspected.** An
+  inline program (`python3 -c`, `node -e`, `perl -e`, `ruby -e`, `osascript -e`,
+  `php -r`, `deno eval`, `bash -c`), a nested or command-position substitution,
+  an unquoted heredoc, or a script, Makefile or awk/sed program file the run
+  wrote or modified hands the guard a program it cannot parse into simple
+  commands. Under the variable the guard refuses every one of those rather than
+  guessing; the cost is that a legitimate one-liner using those forms is
+  rejected and has to be written as separate simple commands or committed first.
+  What the guard cannot bound at all is a **committed, unmodified** script,
+  Makefile target, test runner or build plugin, and the code a test runner or
+  build loads from the worktree: `npm test`, `swift test`, `pytest` or a build
+  phase in the project file run code the run wrote, because running the run's
+  tests is the point. The separate macOS user bounds that, and the sandbox
+  narrows it further. A binary in `node_modules/.bin` is accepted the way `npx`
+  accepts it, and a run can write there.
+- **An archive's members are not read.** `tar -x` and `unzip` are judged by
+  their `-C` / `-d` target; a member path inside the archive
+  (`.git/hooks/pre-commit`) is not listed before extraction. `tar -P`, `patch`
+  and `git apply`/`am` are refused outright because their targets are not
+  enumerable. Extraction into the worktree with no `-C` is allowed, and the
+  sandbox confines the written paths to the worktree.
+- **Egress through an allowed host is not prevented.** A command that reads a
+  worktree file and sends it to an allowlisted host in a header or query
+  (`curl ... -H "X: $(cat .env)"` to `api.github.com`) passes both the guard
+  and the sandbox: the host is allowed and the file is the repo's own. The
+  network allowlist bounds *where* data can go, not *what*; the code-owner
+  review of the PR and the separate macOS user are the remaining checks.
+- **Build tools run code the run named.** `xcodebuild CC=./x.sh`,
+  `swift package plugin`, `swift run` and similar run a program the run could
+  run directly; the sandbox confines that program to the worktree and the
+  allowed network the same as any other command. `ssh`/`scp`/`nc`/`dig` and
+  rsync-to-remote are refused; other outbound tools are bounded by the network
+  allowlist.
+- **Shell control flow is refused, not parsed.** `if`/`for`/`while`/`case`,
+  functions, arrays, brace groups, backticks, process substitution, arithmetic
+  and non-trivial `${...}` are rejected under the variable even when harmless.
+  A documented step written that way has to become simple commands or a
+  checked-in script (`test/unattended-doc-lines.test.mjs` records every
+  phase-doc line in that state). Plain `$VAR`, `${NAME}` and analysable
+  `$(...)` are allowed.
+- **Permission rules match the command as written.** Claude Code's docs state a
+  Bash deny rule does not stop `sh -c` or an absolute path. The profile is a
+  second line for that reason.
+- **Reads are not blocked by the hook.** The deny rules and the sandbox cover the
+  credential directories; the rest of the user's files are readable, which is
+  why that user holds nothing else.
+- **The publish step runs the run's code.** Independent verification executes
+  the agent's build and tests as the runner's user, with token-shaped variables
+  removed from the environment but not from the disk or the Keychain: that code
+  can read Keychain items the user's own tools read without a prompt, run `gh
+  auth token`, and read the user's files. Its process group and every process
+  carrying the run's marker are killed when it exits; a process that moved into
+  a new session and cleared its environment outlives that. A changed user git
+  config refuses the push, but a credential helper program the user can write
+  is not checked. The separate macOS user is what bounds all of this.
+- **The PR body is reviewed text, not trusted text.** The outbound gate catches
+  token shapes, not every sensitive sentence; the draft PR and code-owner
+  review are where a person reads it.
+
+## Reference
+
+Scripts: `agent-guard.sh`, `agent-guard.py`, `unattended_policy.py`,
+`pr-request.mjs`, `autopilot-publish.mjs`, the continuous-mode runner
+(`guardRegistration`, `prepareLaunch`, `launchEnv`), `pre-commit-check.sh
+--scan-range`, `lib/pr-request-location.mjs`, `lib/untrusted.mjs`,
+`lib/outbound-gate.mjs`, `lib/unattended-settings-location.mjs`,
+`install/_unattended-profile.mjs`. Data:
+`schemas/unattended-policy.json`, `schemas/unattended-profile.json`,
+`schemas/pr-request.schema.json`. Tests: `test/unattended-guard.test.mjs`,
+`test/pr-request.test.mjs`, `test/autopilot-publish.test.mjs`,
+the runner's tests, `test/outbound-gate.test.mjs`,
+`test/unattended-profile.test.mjs`, `test/agent-guard.test.mjs`; smokes
+`smoke-agent-guard.sh`, `smoke-unattended-redteam.sh` (including a request that names another repo), `smoke-pre-commit.sh`,
+`smoke-untrusted-delimiters.sh`, `smoke-unattended-install-profile.sh`,
+`smoke-gates-interactive-noop.sh`. The phone routes: `features/phone-api.md`,
+`test/phone-api.test.mjs`.
+
+The runner's operations around a run - the sleep lock, the credential probe at
+arming, the parallel cap, the cleanup report and the daily digest - are in
+`features/autopilot-operations.md`.