@miraland-labs/conduit-bridge 0.16.181 → 0.16.184

package/dist/driver.js

@@ -2021,6 +2021,8 @@ export function untrustedCodeEnvironment(scratchHome) {
         GIT_SSH_COMMAND: "ssh -F /dev/null -o BatchMode=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o IdentityAgent=none -i /dev/null",
     };
 }
+/** Where a bwrap gate sees its TMPDIR; /tmp is a fresh tmpfs per spawn, so the name never collides. */
+export const SANDBOX_TEMP = "/tmp/gate";
 /** Pure spawn projection; parent mounts precede their writable children. */
 export function buildUntrustedCodeSpawn(input, host) {
     const direct = { command: input.command, argv: input.argv, cwd: input.cwd, env: input.env };
@@ -2034,6 +2036,9 @@ export function buildUntrustedCodeSpawn(input, host) {
         const argv = ["--die-with-parent", "--new-session", "--unshare-net", "--unshare-pid", "--unshare-ipc", "--unshare-uts",
             "--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--dev", "/dev", "--proc", "/proc",
             ...["/tmp", "/run", "/home", "/root"].flatMap((path) => ["--tmpfs", path]),
+            // Before every path bind: a nested sandbox's cwd and home live under /tmp/gate, and a later
+            // mount here would shadow them (CR17g, 2026-10-22: 8 of Conduit's own gate tests inside a gate).
+            ...(host.tempMount ? ["--bind", host.tempMount.source, host.tempMount.target] : []),
             ...(host.sourceRepository ? ["--ro-bind", host.sourceRepository, host.sourceRepository] : []),
             ...(host.toolchainRead ?? []).flatMap((path) => ["--ro-bind", path, path]),
             ...(rootWorkspace ? ["--bind", input.cwd, input.cwd] : []),
@@ -2202,8 +2207,12 @@ export async function untrustedCodeSpawn(input) {
     const home = await realpath(input.env.HOME);
     const temp = join(home, "tmp");
     await mkdir(temp, { recursive: true });
+    // CR17f (2026-10-22): under an attempt worktree this temp is ~150 bytes deep, past the 108-byte
+    // Unix socket limit, and a listen there fails or collides. bwrap shows it at a short path instead.
+    const tempMount = sandbox.os_sandbox === "bwrap" ? { source: temp, target: SANDBOX_TEMP } : undefined;
+    const visibleTemp = tempMount?.target ?? temp;
     const env = { ...input.env, PATH: (await sandboxPathDirectories(input.env)).join(delimiter), HOME: home, XDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(home, "config"),
-        XDG_CACHE_HOME: join(home, "cache"), XDG_DATA_HOME: join(home, "data"), TMPDIR: temp, TMP: temp, TEMP: temp };
+        XDG_CACHE_HOME: join(home, "cache"), XDG_DATA_HOME: join(home, "data"), TMPDIR: visibleTemp, TMP: visibleTemp, TEMP: visibleTemp };
     const writable = [cwd, home, temp];
     for (const key of ["CARGO_TARGET_DIR", "CARGO_HOME"]) {
         const path = input.env[key];
@@ -2218,7 +2227,7 @@ export async function untrustedCodeSpawn(input) {
         toolchainRead.push(await realpath(input.env.RUSTUP_HOME));
     const repository = await sandboxRepositoryPaths(cwd);
     return buildUntrustedCodeSpawn({ ...input, command, cwd, env, writable }, {
-        ...sandbox, home: await realpath(homedir()), toolchainRead, ...repository, ephemeral: await sandboxNodeScratch(cwd, repository.sourceRepository),
+        ...sandbox, home: await realpath(homedir()), toolchainRead, ...repository, ephemeral: await sandboxNodeScratch(cwd, repository.sourceRepository), tempMount,
     });
 }
 const sandboxExecFile = promisify(execFile);

package/dist/failure-signal.js

@@ -372,6 +372,20 @@ export const VERIFICATION_FAILS_ON_BASE = "verification fails on the base commit
  * red commit.
  */
 export const WORKSPACE_DEPENDENCIES_MISSING_PATTERN = /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:\/(?:usr\/)?bin\/)?(?:ba|z|da)?sh:\s*(?:(?:\d+:\s*)?[^:\n]{1,120}:\s*(?:command\s+)?not found|command not found:\s*[^\n]+)\s*(?=\n|$)|(?:^|\n)\s*'[^'\n]+' is not recognized as an internal or external command/im;
+/** A write the toolchain needs that the computer refused before any test ran: the sandbox or disk, not the base commit. */
+export const WORKSPACE_WRITE_REFUSED_PATTERN = /\b(?:EROFS|ENOSPC)\b|read-only file system|no space left on device/i;
+/** CR17e (2026-10-22): vitest could not write its config bundle under the sandboxed install; Bridge held the owner for its own mount. */
+export function workspaceWriteRefusedFailure(detail) {
+    return {
+        code: "workspace_write_refused",
+        class: "environment",
+        disposition: "hold",
+        responsible_party: "conduit",
+        message: "The gate could not start: this computer refused a write the project's toolchain needs.",
+        next_action: "Nothing to repair in the base commit — no test ran. Update Bridge on this computer (or free its disk), then press Try again.",
+        diagnostic_detail: detail,
+    };
+}
 /** The one envelope for a gate whose tool is absent from the checkout, wherever it was noticed. */
 export function workspaceDependenciesMissingFailure(detail) {
     return {
@@ -602,6 +616,9 @@ export function classifyFailureSignal(signal) {
         if (signal.exit_code === 127 || WORKSPACE_DEPENDENCIES_MISSING_PATTERN.test(output)) {
             return workspaceDependenciesMissingFailure([`$ ${command}`, `exit ${signal.exit_code ?? "unknown"}`, output].filter(Boolean).join("\n"));
         }
+        if (WORKSPACE_WRITE_REFUSED_PATTERN.test(output)) {
+            return workspaceWriteRefusedFailure([`$ ${command}`, `exit ${signal.exit_code ?? "unknown"}`, output].filter(Boolean).join("\n"));
+        }
         return {
             code: "verification_red_base",
             class: "contract",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@miraland-labs/conduit-bridge",
-  "version": "0.16.181",
+  "version": "0.16.184",
   "description": "Conduit Bridge CLI — join, connect, disconnect, multi-driver lanes, and run Claude Code / Codex / Cursor / OpenCode / Pi / Kiro / Antigravity / Grok Build agents for a Conduit organization",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {