@miphamai/cli 0.56.0 → 0.58.0

package/bin/mipham.ts

@@ -1057,6 +1057,36 @@ async function runTokenCLI(): Promise<boolean> {
   process.exit(1)
 }
 
+// ── mipham init [dir] — 生成规范项目文档 (CLAUDE.md/MIPHAM.md/README.md) ──
+async function runInitCLI(): Promise<boolean> {
+  const args = process.argv.slice(2)
+  if (args[0] !== 'init') return false
+
+  const { resolve } = await import('node:path')
+  const { homedir } = await import('node:os')
+  const { scaffoldProject } = await import('../src/core/project-scaffold')
+
+  const rawTarget = args.slice(1).find((a) => !a.startsWith('--'))
+  const targetDir = rawTarget ? resolve(rawTarget.replace(/^~/, homedir())) : process.cwd()
+
+  const gitInit = !args.includes('--no-git')
+  const result = scaffoldProject(targetDir, { gitInit })
+
+  const lines: string[] = ['', `✅ Mipham Code 项目已初始化：${targetDir}`, '']
+  if (result.created.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('已创建：')
+    for (const c of result.created) lines.push(`  ✅ ${c}`)
+  }
+  if (result.skipped.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('已存在（跳过）：')
+    for (const s of result.skipped) lines.push(`  ⏭  ${s}`)
+  }
+  if (result.gitInitialized) lines.push('  ✅ git init')
+  lines.push('', '下一步：', '  1. 填写各文档中的 [占位符]', '  2. 运行 mipham 开始协作')
+  console.log(lines.join('\n'))
+  process.exit(0)
+}
+
 async function main() {
   // ── Deleted-cwd guard ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
   // `process.cwd()` throws ENOENT when the directory the process was launched
@@ -1129,6 +1159,7 @@ async function main() {
 
 Usage:
   mipham                     Launch interactive CLI
+  mipham init [dir]          Scaffold a project (CLAUDE.md/MIPHAM.md/README.md)
   mipham update              Update to the latest version
   mipham upgrade             Same as 'mipham update'
   mipham daemon <cmd>        Daemon lifecycle (start, stop, status, restart)
@@ -1183,6 +1214,10 @@ npm:  https://www.npmjs.com/package/@miphamai/cli`)
   const handledUpdate = await runUpdate()
   if (handledUpdate) return
 
+  // ── Init command ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const handledInit = await runInitCLI()
+  if (handledInit) return
+
   // ── Daemon commands ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   const handledDaemon = await runDaemonCLI()
   if (handledDaemon) return

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@miphamai/cli",
-  "version": "0.56.0",
+  "version": "0.58.0",
   "description": "Mipham Code — Multi-model open-core intelligent coding terminal by MiphamAI",
   "keywords": [
     "ai",

package/skills/standard/mipham-code-setup.SKILL.md

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Project:       [✅/⬜] .mipham/  [✅/⬜] config.yml  [✅/⬜] MIPHAM.md
 User Config:   [✅/⬜] ~/.mipham/config.yml
 API Keys:      [N] set (list names or "none")
 Skills:        [N] installed
-Permissions:   [mode] (default/acceptEdits/plan/auto/dontAsk/bypass)
+Permissions:   [mode] (default/acceptEdits/plan/bypassPermissions)
 Trust:         [✅/⬜] workspace trusted
 ```
 
@@ -336,8 +336,6 @@ Or directly:
 | `default`           | Prompt for each tool            | Normal development (recommended)    |
 | `acceptEdits`       | Auto-allow edits, prompt others | Active coding sessions              |
 | `plan`              | Plan-only, no tool execution    | Design & architecture work          |
-| `auto`              | Auto-allow all                  | Trusted, frequent use               |
-| `dontAsk`           | Never auto-allow                | CI/CD safety                        |
 | `bypassPermissions` | Skip all checks                 | ⚠️ Only for fully trusted codebases |
 
 ### 6.2 — Configure
@@ -345,7 +343,7 @@ Or directly:
 In `.mipham/config.yml`:
 
 ```yaml
-permission: auto
+permission: default
 ```
 
 Or via slash command:
@@ -357,11 +355,9 @@ Or via slash command:
 
 ### 6.3 — CI/CD Safety
 
-For CI/CD environments, use `dontAsk` mode to prevent the AI from executing tools without explicit approval:
-
-```yaml
-permission: dontAsk
-```
+For CI/CD environments, use the `default` mode (the daemon default): headless
+sessions never prompt, so `ask`-level tools (Bash/Write/Edit) are blocked rather
+than auto-approved.
 
 ### ✅ Verification
 

package/src/agent/sub-agent.ts

@@ -210,9 +210,6 @@ export class SubAgent {
           ? agentDef.permissionMode
           : 'inherit'
       subPermission = this.permission.createSubAgentPermission(agentPermMode)
-      // P0-5: Enable sub-agent safety mode — auto mode returns 'ask' for
-      // Bash/Write/Edit so hooks remain the safety gate in background agents.
-      subPermission.setSubAgentMode(true)
     }
 
     // Resolve execution directory: worktree isolation or process cwd

package/src/agent/types.ts

@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ export interface AgentFrontmatter {
   tools?: string // comma-separated allowlist
   disallowedTools?: string
   model?: string // 'sonnet' | 'opus' | 'haiku' | 'inherit' | full model ID
-  permissionMode?:
-    'default' | 'acceptEdits' | 'auto' | 'bypass' | 'plan' | 'bypassPermissions' | 'dontAsk'
+  permissionMode?: 'default' | 'acceptEdits' | 'bypass' | 'plan' | 'bypassPermissions'
   maxTurns?: number
   skills?: string
   background?: boolean

package/src/commands/project.ts

@@ -111,21 +111,22 @@ const permissionsCmd: CommandHandler = (ctx) => {
   return {
     content: `─ Permission Settings ─
 
-Mode:       ${ctx.config.permission}
+Mode:       ${ctx.engine.getPermission().getMode()}
 Messages:   ${msgs.length} in context
 Tools:      ${ctx.engine.getTools().size} available
 
-Permission levels:
-  auto    — run tools automatically without asking
-  ask     — prompt before each tool execution (default)
-  bypass  — skip all permission checks (use with caution)
+Switch mode with Shift+Tab. Modes (least → most permissive):
+  default            — per-tool defaults (Bash/Write/Edit ask first)
+  acceptEdits        — reads + edits free; Bash auto-runs read/check commands
+  plan               — reads only (Read/Grep/Glob); nothing writes or runs
+  bypassPermissions  — skip ALL permission checks (⚠️ use with caution)
 
-Change with /config permission <level>.
+To let Bash run without asking: press Shift+Tab until the status line shows
+"acceptEdits", then send your message again.
 
 Current directory permissions:
   CWD:      ${process.cwd()}
 
-To add a directory: use /add-dir (coming soon).
 Tool execution is sandboxed to the project directory by default.`,
   }
 }

package/src/config/defaults.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export const DEFAULT_CONFIG: MiphamConfig = {
   version: PACKAGE_VERSION,
   defaultProvider: 'deepseek',
   defaultModel: 'deepseek-v4-pro',
-  permission: 'auto',
+  permission: 'default',
   // Org 级权限限制（可选）：forbiddenModes 禁指定模式 / maxAllowedMode 封顶层级；
   // 请求被禁模式时 fail-closed 降级（如 forbiddenModes:['bypassPermissions']）。
   // permissionRestrictions: { forbiddenModes: ['bypassPermissions'] },

package/src/core/crsi-producer.ts

@@ -80,6 +80,47 @@ export function buildLessonContent(signal: CrsiSignal, timestamp: string): strin
   return lines.join('\n')
 }
 
+/** 教训精华（标题 + 建议），用于运行时召回注入系统提示。 */
+export interface CrsiLessonSummary {
+  title: string
+  suggestion: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * 从 crsi-lessons.md 提取每条教训的「精华」（标题 + 建议），跳过证据段落。
+ * 这是「只写不读」缺口 → 「写后召回」的读取侧。
+ */
+export function extractCrsiLessonSummaries(content: string): CrsiLessonSummary[] {
+  const out: CrsiLessonSummary[] = []
+  let title = ''
+  for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
+    const h = line.match(/^##\s+(.+?)\s*$/)
+    if (h) {
+      title = h[1]!.trim()
+      continue
+    }
+    const s = line.match(/^-\s*建议[:：]\s*(.+)$/)
+    if (s && title) {
+      out.push({ title, suggestion: s[1]!.trim() })
+      title = ''
+    }
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
+/** 把教训精华渲染为系统提示召回块。无教训时返回空串。 */
+export function buildCrsiLessonsBlock(summaries: CrsiLessonSummary[]): string {
+  if (summaries.length === 0) return ''
+  const items = summaries.map((s, i) => `${i + 1}. **${s.title}**\n   ${s.suggestion}`).join('\n\n')
+  return `## CRSI Lessons (Self-Improvement Recall)
+
+These are hard-won lessons consolidated by the CRSI self-improvement
+loop from past sessions. Apply them proactively — do not repeat these
+mistakes:
+
+${items}`
+}
+
 /** 产出教训文件变更候选。无合格信号时返回 null。 */
 export function produceCrsiProposal(
   insights: CrsiInsight[],

package/src/core/engine.ts

@@ -764,10 +764,26 @@ export class QueryEngine {
   }
 
   private async *continueWithTools(signal?: AbortSignal): AsyncGenerator<StreamChunk> {
-    const MAX_TURNS = 20
+    // Tool-calling round cap. 20 was too low for real multi-step tasks — the model
+    // hit "max turns" and dropped pending tools mid-task. 100 stays bounded.
+    const MAX_TURNS = 100
+    // Task-level stall guard: a turn that produces no text or tool result for
+    // this long is considered stalled and stopped (prevents ~40-min idle spins).
+    const TURN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000
+    let lastActivity = Date.now()
     const toolDefs = this.getToolDefinitions()
 
     for (let turn = 0; turn < MAX_TURNS; turn++) {
+      if (Date.now() - lastActivity > TURN_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+        yield {
+          type: 'warning',
+          content: t('errors.turn_timeout', {
+            minutes: String(Math.round(TURN_TIMEOUT_MS / 60000)),
+          }),
+        }
+        yield { type: 'stop' }
+        return
+      }
       const systemPrompt = this.context.getSystemPrompt()
       const messages = this.context.getMessages()
 
@@ -812,6 +828,7 @@ export class QueryEngine {
           if (chunk.type === 'text' && chunk.content) {
             assistantContent += chunk.content
             this.context.recordChunk(chunk.content)
+            lastActivity = Date.now()
           }
 
           if (chunk.reasoning_content) {
@@ -911,6 +928,7 @@ export class QueryEngine {
       // Execute tools and feed results back to the model for the next turn
       for (const toolUse of toolUses) {
         const result = await this.executeTool(toolUse.name, toolUse.input)
+        lastActivity = Date.now()
         yield {
           type: 'tool_result',
           tool_use_id: toolUse.id,

package/src/core/instructions.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
 import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'
 import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'
 import { parse as parseYaml } from 'yaml'
 import type { InstructionFile } from '../shared/index.ts'
 import { COAUTHOR_TRAILER } from '../shared/index.ts'
+import {
+  LESSONS_FILE,
+  extractCrsiLessonSummaries,
+  buildCrsiLessonsBlock,
+  type CrsiLessonSummary,
+} from './crsi-producer'
 
 interface FrontmatterResult {
   data: Record<string, unknown>
@@ -54,6 +61,7 @@ export function parsePromptExclude(value: unknown): string[] {
 
 export class InstructionsLoader {
   private instructions: InstructionFile[] = []
+  private crsiLessonSummaries: CrsiLessonSummary[] = []
 
   loadAll(cwd: string): void {
     this.instructions = []
@@ -74,6 +82,9 @@ export class InstructionsLoader {
     // Tier 3: User-level ~/.mipham/USER.md
     const home = process.env.HOME || '~'
     this.tryLoad(join(home, '.mipham', 'USER.md'), 'user')
+
+    // CRSI 教训召回：读 crsi-lessons.md 提取精华，注入系统提示（只写不读 → 写后召回）
+    this.crsiLessonSummaries = this.loadCrsiLessons(cwd)
   }
 
   buildSystemPrompt(permissionMode?: string): string {
@@ -206,6 +217,10 @@ its live CRSI / SIS / constitution state. Report the numbers you read
 from it as live counts; if it shows a subsystem as 未初始化 (uninitialized),
 say so explicitly instead of claiming it exists.`)
 
+    // CRSI 教训召回 — 把 crsi-lessons.md 的教训精华注入，让模型「写后召回」而非只写不读
+    const lessonsBlock = buildCrsiLessonsBlock(this.crsiLessonSummaries)
+    if (lessonsBlock) parts.push(lessonsBlock)
+
     // AI 署名披露：提交时附带 Co-Authored-By 署名（与 Undercover 式隐瞒相反）
     parts.push(`## Commit Attribution
 
@@ -219,6 +234,26 @@ Never omit it or present the work as purely human-authored.`)
     return parts.join('\n\n---\n\n')
   }
 
+  /** 读 crsi-lessons.md（按仓库根定位）提取教训精华。读不到则返回空。 */
+  private loadCrsiLessons(cwd: string): CrsiLessonSummary[] {
+    let root = cwd
+    try {
+      root = execSync('git rev-parse --show-toplevel', {
+        cwd,
+        timeout: 5000,
+        encoding: 'utf-8',
+      }).trim()
+    } catch {
+      // 非 git 目录 → 回退 cwd
+    }
+    try {
+      const content = readFileSync(join(root, LESSONS_FILE), 'utf-8')
+      return extractCrsiLessonSummaries(content)
+    } catch {
+      return []
+    }
+  }
+
   /**
    * P2-2: Build a permission-mode context block for the system prompt.
    * Tells the model its current permission level and what to expect.
@@ -230,9 +265,6 @@ Never omit it or present the work as purely human-authored.`)
       acceptEdits:
         'You are in **acceptEdits** mode. File reads and edits are allowed; Bash requires approval.',
       plan: 'You are in **plan** mode. Only Read/Grep/Glob are allowed — no file modifications or command execution.',
-      auto: 'You are in **auto** mode. Most tools run without approval. If a tool is blocked by security policy or hooks, try a different approach instead of retrying.',
-      dontAsk:
-        'You are in **dontAsk** mode. All tools blocked unless explicitly allowlisted. Check your allow rules before acting.',
       bypassPermissions:
         'You are in **bypassPermissions** mode. All tools are allowed. Use this power responsibly.',
     }

package/src/core/permission-config.ts

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ export const PERMISSION_MODE_HIERARCHY: PermissionMode[] = [
   'default',
   'acceptEdits',
   'plan',
-  'auto',
-  'dontAsk',
   'bypassPermissions',
 ]
 

package/src/core/permission.ts

@@ -9,20 +9,6 @@ import type { PermissionRuleEntry } from '../shared/index.ts'
 import { matchBashRule, compileRule } from './permission-rules'
 import { loadPermissionConfig, nextMode, clampMode, MODE_CYCLE } from './permission-config'
 
-/**
- * Check if a Bash command is a git/gh operation using a destructive flag
- * (--force, --amend, --no-verify, --hard) that must never be auto-approved.
- * v2.1.229 alignment: these rewrite history / force-push, so they fall back
- * to explicit user confirmation even in auto mode.
- */
-function hasDangerousGitFlags(input: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
-  const cmd = (input.command as string) || ''
-  // Detect a git/gh invocation anywhere in the command (not just `^git`), so
-  // `echo ok && git push --force` is still caught.
-  if (!/(?:^|[\s;&|])(?:sudo\s+)?(?:git|gh)\s+/.test(cmd)) return false
-  return /--force(?!-with-lease)\b|--amend\b|--no-verify\b|--hard\b/.test(cmd)
-}
-
 /**
  * Check if a Bash command is a "verification-only" command that should be
  * auto-approved in acceptEdits mode. These are non-destructive read/check
@@ -94,9 +80,6 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
   // ── Org-level restrictions (P0 security) ──
   private restrictions: PermissionRestrictions | undefined = undefined
 
-  // ── P0-5: Sub-agent mode (auto mode hardening for background tasks) ──
-  private isSubAgent = false
-
   // ── P1-4: Consecutive block counter (prevents infinite retry loops) ──
   private consecutiveBlockCount = 0
   private static readonly MAX_CONSECUTIVE_BLOCKS = 3
@@ -149,16 +132,6 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
     return this.restrictions
   }
 
-  /**
-   * P0-5 (v2.1.222 alignment): Enable sub-agent safety mode.
-   * When true, auto mode returns 'ask' for Bash/Write/Edit tools instead of
-   * 'bypass', ensuring PreToolUse hooks remain the safety gate in background agents.
-   */
-  setSubAgentMode(enabled: boolean): void {
-    this.isSubAgent = enabled
-    this.invalidateCache()
-  }
-
   /**
    * P1-4 (v2.1.225 alignment): Increment the consecutive block counter
    * when a tool is denied. Safety-filter refusals should NOT count.
@@ -216,8 +189,6 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
 
     const modeMap: Record<string, PermissionMode> = {
       bypassPermissions: 'bypassPermissions',
-      dontAsk: 'dontAsk',
-      auto: 'auto',
       plan: 'plan',
       acceptEdits: 'acceptEdits',
       default: 'default',
@@ -418,30 +389,6 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
           ? 'bypass'
           : 'ask'
 
-      case 'auto':
-        // Safety checks handled by hook layer (PreToolUse hooks).
-        // Bypass the static permission system so hooks are the sole gate.
-        // Exception: SendMessage always goes through the permission classifier
-        // so deny/allow rules are honored for cross-session messages.
-        if (tool.name === 'SendMessage') {
-          return 'mode-baseline'
-        }
-        // P0-5: In sub-agent context, enforce 'ask' for destructive tools
-        // so hooks remain the sole safety gate. Without hooks, these tools
-        // would otherwise run completely un-gated in auto mode.
-        if (this.isSubAgent && ['Bash', 'Write', 'Edit'].includes(tool.name)) {
-          return 'ask'
-        }
-        // v2.1.229 alignment: destructive git/gh flags are never auto-approved.
-        if (tool.name === 'Bash' && input && hasDangerousGitFlags(input)) {
-          return 'ask'
-        }
-        return 'bypass'
-
-      case 'dontAsk':
-        // Only allowlisted tools free (already handled above); everything else requires approval
-        return 'ask'
-
       case 'bypassPermissions':
         return 'bypass'
 
@@ -453,11 +400,10 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
   // ── Legacy compatibility ──
 
   setDefaultLevel(level: PermissionLevel): void {
-    // Map legacy 3-level to new mode
-    let newMode: PermissionMode
-    if (level === 'auto') newMode = 'auto'
-    else if (level === 'bypass') newMode = 'bypassPermissions'
-    else newMode = 'default'
+    // Map legacy 3-level (auto/ask/bypass) to new 4-level mode.
+    // Legacy 'auto'/'ask' = "let each tool self-decide" → 'default'.
+    // Legacy 'bypass' → 'bypassPermissions'.
+    const newMode: PermissionMode = level === 'bypass' ? 'bypassPermissions' : 'default'
     this.mode = clampMode(newMode, this.restrictions)
     this.invalidateCache()
   }
@@ -465,8 +411,7 @@ export class PermissionSystem {
   getDefaultLevel(): PermissionLevel {
     // Legacy constructor fallback takes priority
     if (this.legacyDefaultFallback) return this.legacyDefaultFallback
-    if (this.mode === 'auto' || this.mode === 'bypassPermissions' || this.mode === 'dontAsk')
-      return 'bypass'
+    if (this.mode === 'bypassPermissions') return 'bypass'
     if (this.mode === 'plan') return 'ask'
     return 'auto'
   }

package/src/core/project-scaffold.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/**
+ * Mipham Code — Project Scaffold
+ *
+ * `mipham init` 生成规范的项目文档（CLAUDE.md + MIPHAM.md + README.md），
+ * 避免用户「冷建立文件」。模板遵循 One Mipham Corporation 规范。
+ */
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { join, basename } from 'node:path'
+import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'
+
+export interface ScaffoldResult {
+  created: string[]
+  skipped: string[]
+  gitInitialized: boolean
+}
+
+export function renderMiphamMd(projectName: string): string {
+  return `---
+model: mipham-code
+version: 1.0.0
+privacy: project
+language: zh-CN
+---
+
+# MIPHAM.md — ${projectName}
+
+> 本文件定义 ${projectName} 项目中 AI 助手的交互人格和项目规范。
+> 继承自 One Mipham Corporation 集团 MIPHAM.md。
+
+---
+
+## 项目概述
+
+[简要描述项目目的和定位]
+
+## 技术栈
+
+[列出主要技术栈]
+
+## 项目规范
+
+- [添加项目特有的编码规则]
+- [添加团队约定]
+
+## AI 交互偏好
+
+- 回复语言：[中文/英文]
+- 代码风格：[偏好]
+- 注释语言：[中文/英文]
+`
+}
+
+export function renderClaudeMd(projectName: string): string {
+  return `# CLAUDE.md
+
+> 项目：${projectName}
+> 版本：0.1.0
+> 初始化：\`mipham init\`
+
+## 项目概述
+
+[简要描述项目目的和定位]
+
+## 技术栈
+
+[列出主要技术栈]
+
+## 开发命令
+
+- 构建：[\`填入 build 命令\`]
+- 测试：[\`填入 test 命令\`]
+- Lint：[\`填入 lint 命令\`]
+
+## 项目规范
+
+- [添加项目特有的编码规则]
+- [添加团队约定]
+
+## 关键约束
+
+- 遵循上级 One Mipham Corporation CLAUDE.md 技术规范
+- 提交信息遵循 Conventional Commits
+- 禁止在代码、日志、配置或提交历史中硬编码凭据
+`
+}
+
+export function renderReadmeMd(projectName: string): string {
+  return `# ${projectName}
+
+[一句话描述项目]
+
+## 快速开始
+
+\`\`\`bash
+# 安装依赖 / 运行项目
+\`\`\`
+
+## 技术栈
+
+[列出技术栈]
+
+## 文档
+
+- \`CLAUDE.md\` — AI 协作规范
+- \`MIPHAM.md\` — AI 交互人格
+- \`README.md\` — 项目说明（本文件）
+
+## 许可
+
+[填入许可证]
+`
+}
+
+/** 检测目录是否为「愣建文件夹」——无任何条目（忽略 .DS_Store）。目录不存在则视为非空。 */
+export function isEmptyProject(dir: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const entries = readdirSync(dir).filter((e) => e !== '.DS_Store')
+    return entries.length === 0
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+export function scaffoldProject(targetDir: string, opts?: { gitInit?: boolean }): ScaffoldResult {
+  mkdirSync(targetDir, { recursive: true })
+
+  const name = basename(targetDir) || 'my-project'
+  const files = [
+    { path: 'CLAUDE.md', content: renderClaudeMd(name) },
+    { path: 'MIPHAM.md', content: renderMiphamMd(name) },
+    { path: 'README.md', content: renderReadmeMd(name) },
+  ]
+
+  const created: string[] = []
+  const skipped: string[] = []
+
+  for (const f of files) {
+    const full = join(targetDir, f.path)
+    if (existsSync(full)) {
+      skipped.push(f.path)
+    } else {
+      writeFileSync(full, f.content, 'utf-8')
+      created.push(f.path)
+    }
+  }
+
+  let gitInitialized = false
+  if (opts?.gitInit && !existsSync(join(targetDir, '.git'))) {
+    try {
+      execSync('git init', { cwd: targetDir, stdio: 'ignore' })
+      gitInitialized = true
+    } catch {
+      // git 不可用或失败 — 不阻断脚手架
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { created, skipped, gitInitialized }
+}

package/src/daemon/server.ts

@@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ const DAEMON_PERMISSION_MODES: ReadonlySet<PermissionMode> = new Set<PermissionM
   'default',
   'acceptEdits',
   'plan',
-  'auto',
-  'dontAsk',
   'bypassPermissions',
 ])
 

package/src/i18n-core/locales/en-US.json

@@ -757,8 +757,6 @@
       "manual": "manual mode",
       "accept_edits": "accept edits on",
       "plan_mode": "plan mode / read-only",
-      "auto": "auto mode",
-      "dont_ask": "don't ask",
       "bypass": "bypass"
     },
     "loading": {
@@ -804,8 +802,7 @@
     "assistant": { "role_label": "Mipham Code" },
     "user": { "role_label": "User" },
     "input": {
-      "placeholder": "Type a message (Esc to cancel)...",
-      "vim_help": "[NORMAL] h/j/k/l w/b 0/$ dd yy p u / (Esc to insert)"
+      "placeholder": "Type a message (Esc to clear)..."
     },
     "slash_hints": {
       "label": "Commands:",
@@ -942,7 +939,7 @@
     "mcp": { "name": "MCP", "description": "Manage MCP server connections" }
   },
   "errors": {
-    "tool_not_allowed": "Tool \"{name}\" requires user approval (permission: ask). The tool was not executed.",
+    "tool_not_allowed": "Tool \"{name}\" requires user approval (permission: ask). The tool was not executed. Press Shift+Tab to switch permission mode, or run /permissions.",
     "tool_blocked": "Tool \"{name}\" blocked by hook",
     "user_input_blocked": "User input blocked by hook.",
     "dlp_blocked": "Request blocked by DLP policy.",
@@ -963,6 +960,7 @@
     "mcp_register_failed": "[mcp] Failed to register tool \"{tool}\" from server \"{server}\": {error}",
     "max_tool_turns": "Max tool-calling turns ({max}) reached. Some tool calls were not executed.",
     "max_tool_turns_warning": "You've reached the maximum of {max} tool-calling rounds. {pending} tool call(s) were not executed. Please summarize what you found so far and any next steps the user should take.",
+    "turn_timeout": "Task produced no substantial output for {minutes} minutes and was stopped. Break the task into smaller steps or clarify the next step, then retry.",
     "mcp_not_connected": "Error: MCP server \"{server}\" not connected",
     "mcp_tool_error": "MCP tool error: {error}",
     "mcp_no_connection": "No connection for \"{name}\""