@mininglamp-oss/cc-channel-octo 1.0.1-dev.0ac574a

package/dist/octo/socket.js

@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+// Forked from openclaw-channel-octo v1.0.13 (2026-06-04)
+// Source: https://github.com/Mininglamp-OSS/openclaw-channel-octo
+// Changes: Exported Encoder and Decoder classes for protocol testing.
+import { EventEmitter } from "events";
+import WebSocket from "ws";
+import { generateKeyPair, sharedKey } from "curve25519-js";
+import { Buffer } from "buffer";
+import CryptoJS from "crypto-js";
+import { Md5 } from "md5-typescript";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+const PROTO_VERSION = 4;
+/**
+ * Maximum bytes allowed in the WebSocket inbound assembly buffer.
+ * D1/S6 (齐 P0-1): a malicious server can send partial packets indefinitely
+ * (e.g. an unending variable-length encoding) and OOM the bot. 1 MiB is
+ * >> any legitimate single packet — if we cross it, close + reconnect.
+ */
+const MAX_TEMP_BUFFER_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024;
+/**
+ * Maximum bytes used to encode a single variable-length integer (MQTT spec).
+ * D1/S6: refuse > 4 continuation bytes — anything longer is malformed and
+ * keeps tempBuffer filling forever.
+ */
+const MAX_VARLEN_BYTES = 4;
+/**
+ * Per-message decrypt/parse failure cap. After this many failed attempts on the
+ * SAME messageID, ack-and-drop it so a single poison (corrupt / non-JSON)
+ * payload cannot wedge the stream via infinite server redelivery. A transient
+ * failure (< cap) is left un-acked so the server retries.
+ */
+const MAX_DECRYPT_RETRIES = 3;
+/** Cap on distinct messageIDs tracked for decrypt failures (memory bound). */
+const MAX_DECRYPT_FAIL_ENTRIES = 1000;
+// ─── Binary Encoder / Decoder ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+export class Encoder {
+    w = [];
+    writeByte(b) { this.w.push(b & 0xff); }
+    writeBytes(b) { for (let i = 0; i < b.length; i++)
+        this.w[this.w.length] = b[i]; }
+    writeInt16(b) { this.w.push((b >> 8) & 0xff, b & 0xff); }
+    writeInt32(b) { this.w.push((b >> 24) & 0xff, (b >> 16) & 0xff, (b >> 8) & 0xff, b & 0xff); }
+    writeInt64(n) {
+        const hi = Number(n >> 32n);
+        const lo = Number(n & 0xffffffffn);
+        this.writeInt32(hi);
+        this.writeInt32(lo);
+    }
+    writeString(s) {
+        if (s && s.length > 0) {
+            const arr = stringToUint(s);
+            this.writeInt16(arr.length);
+            for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++)
+                this.w[this.w.length] = arr[i];
+        }
+        else {
+            this.writeInt16(0);
+        }
+    }
+    toUint8Array() { return new Uint8Array(this.w); }
+}
+export class Decoder {
+    data;
+    offset = 0;
+    constructor(data) {
+        this.data = data;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Bounds guard: every reader calls this before touching the buffer so a
+     * truncated/malformed packet throws a typed error instead of silently reading
+     * `undefined` (which coerces to 0/NaN and produces corrupt parses — wrong
+     * messageID/seq → ack mismatch, message loss/dup). The packet-decode caller
+     * wraps decode in try/catch, so a throw cleanly rejects the bad packet.
+     */
+    require(n) {
+        if (this.offset + n > this.data.length) {
+            throw new RangeError(`WKDecoder: out-of-bounds read (need ${n} byte(s) at offset ${this.offset}, have ${this.data.length})`);
+        }
+    }
+    readByte() { this.require(1); return this.data[this.offset++]; }
+    readInt16() {
+        this.require(2);
+        const v = (this.data[this.offset] << 8) | this.data[this.offset + 1];
+        this.offset += 2;
+        return v;
+    }
+    readInt32() {
+        this.require(4);
+        const v = (this.data[this.offset] << 24) |
+            (this.data[this.offset + 1] << 16) |
+            (this.data[this.offset + 2] << 8) |
+            this.data[this.offset + 3];
+        this.offset += 4;
+        return v >>> 0; // unsigned
+    }
+    readInt64String() {
+        // Read 8 bytes as a big-endian unsigned integer string
+        this.require(8);
+        let n = BigInt(0);
+        for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+            n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(this.data[this.offset + i]);
+        }
+        this.offset += 8;
+        return n.toString();
+    }
+    readInt64BigInt() {
+        this.require(8);
+        let n = BigInt(0);
+        for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+            n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(this.data[this.offset + i]);
+        }
+        this.offset += 8;
+        return n;
+    }
+    readString() {
+        const len = this.readInt16();
+        if (len <= 0)
+            return "";
+        // Guard the declared length against the remaining buffer so an oversized
+        // length field can't over-read (slice() would silently short-return and
+        // leave the offset past the end, corrupting every subsequent field).
+        this.require(len);
+        const slice = this.data.slice(this.offset, this.offset + len);
+        this.offset += len;
+        return uintToString(Array.from(slice));
+    }
+    readRemaining() {
+        const d = this.data.slice(this.offset);
+        this.offset = this.data.length;
+        return d;
+    }
+    readVariableLength() {
+        let multiplier = 0;
+        let rLength = 0;
+        while (multiplier < 27) {
+            const b = this.readByte();
+            rLength = rLength | ((b & 127) << multiplier);
+            if ((b & 128) === 0)
+                break;
+            multiplier += 7;
+        }
+        return rLength;
+    }
+}
+function stringToUint(str) {
+    return Array.from(new TextEncoder().encode(str));
+}
+function uintToString(array) {
+    return new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(array));
+}
+function encodeVariableLength(len) {
+    if (len === 0)
+        return [0];
+    const ret = [];
+    while (len > 0) {
+        let digit = len % 0x80;
+        len = Math.floor(len / 0x80);
+        if (len > 0)
+            digit |= 0x80;
+        ret.push(digit);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+// ─── AES-CBC Encryption Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+function aesDecrypt(data, aesKey, aesIV) {
+    const str = Buffer.from(data).toString("binary");
+    const ciphertext = CryptoJS.enc.Base64.parse(str);
+    const decrypted = CryptoJS.AES.decrypt(CryptoJS.enc.Base64.stringify(ciphertext), CryptoJS.enc.Utf8.parse(aesKey), {
+        keySize: 128 / 8,
+        iv: CryptoJS.enc.Utf8.parse(aesIV),
+        mode: CryptoJS.mode.CBC,
+        padding: CryptoJS.pad.Pkcs7,
+    });
+    return Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(decrypted.toString(CryptoJS.enc.Utf8)));
+}
+// ─── Packet Encoding / Decoding ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+function encodeConnectPacket(opts) {
+    const body = new Encoder();
+    body.writeByte(opts.version);
+    body.writeByte(opts.deviceFlag);
+    body.writeString(opts.deviceID);
+    body.writeString(opts.uid);
+    body.writeString(opts.token);
+    body.writeInt64(BigInt(opts.clientTimestamp));
+    body.writeString(opts.clientKey);
+    const bodyBytes = Array.from(body.toUint8Array());
+    const frame = new Encoder();
+    // header: packetType << 4 | flags
+    frame.writeByte((1 /* PacketType.CONNECT */ << 4) | 0);
+    frame.writeBytes(encodeVariableLength(bodyBytes.length));
+    frame.writeBytes(bodyBytes);
+    return frame.toUint8Array();
+}
+function encodePingPacket() {
+    return new Uint8Array([(7 /* PacketType.PING */ << 4) | 0]);
+}
+function encodeRecvackPacket(messageID, messageSeq) {
+    const body = new Encoder();
+    body.writeInt64(BigInt(messageID));
+    body.writeInt32(messageSeq);
+    const bodyBytes = Array.from(body.toUint8Array());
+    const frame = new Encoder();
+    frame.writeByte((6 /* PacketType.RECVACK */ << 4) | 0);
+    frame.writeBytes(encodeVariableLength(bodyBytes.length));
+    frame.writeBytes(bodyBytes);
+    return frame.toUint8Array();
+}
+function parseSettingByte(v) {
+    return {
+        receiptEnabled: ((v >> 7) & 0x01) > 0,
+        topic: ((v >> 3) & 0x01) > 0,
+        streamOn: ((v >> 1) & 0x01) > 0,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * WuKongIM WebSocket client for bot connections.
+ *
+ * Implements the WuKongIM binary protocol directly over WebSocket,
+ * with per-instance DH key exchange, AES encryption, heartbeat,
+ * reconnect, and RECVACK.
+ *
+ * Each WKSocket instance maintains its own independent connection,
+ * enabling multiple bot accounts to run simultaneously.
+ */
+export class WKSocket extends EventEmitter {
+    opts;
+    ws = null;
+    connected = false;
+    needReconnect = true;
+    reconnectTimer = null;
+    heartTimer = null;
+    pingRetryCount = 0;
+    pingMaxRetry = 3;
+    reconnectAttempts = 0;
+    stableTimer = null;
+    lastConnectTime = 0;
+    rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+    // Per-instance crypto state (set after CONNACK)
+    aesKey = "";
+    aesIV = "";
+    dhPrivateKey = null;
+    serverVersion = 0;
+    // Buffer for handling packet fragmentation (sticky packets)
+    tempBuffer = [];
+    // Per-message decrypt-failure counts (by messageID). After
+    // MAX_DECRYPT_RETRIES, a poison message is ack'd-and-dropped so the server
+    // stops redelivering it forever (a single corrupt/non-JSON payload must not
+    // wedge the stream). Bounded to avoid unbounded growth from many distinct ids.
+    decryptFailCounts = new Map();
+    constructor(opts) {
+        super();
+        this.opts = opts;
+    }
+    /** Connect to WuKongIM WebSocket */
+    connect() {
+        this.needReconnect = true;
+        this.doConnect();
+    }
+    /** Gracefully disconnect */
+    disconnect() {
+        this.needReconnect = false;
+        this.connected = false;
+        this.lastConnectTime = 0;
+        this.rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+        this.stopHeart();
+        this.stopReconnectTimer();
+        this.clearStableTimer();
+        if (this.ws) {
+            try {
+                this.ws.removeAllListeners();
+                this.ws.close();
+            }
+            catch { /* ignore */ }
+            this.ws = null;
+        }
+    }
+    /** Disconnect and wait for the old WS to fully close before resolving. */
+    async disconnectAndWait(timeoutMs = 2000) {
+        this.needReconnect = false;
+        this.connected = false;
+        this.stopHeart();
+        this.stopReconnectTimer();
+        this.clearStableTimer();
+        const oldWs = this.ws;
+        this.ws = null;
+        this.lastConnectTime = 0;
+        this.rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+        if (!oldWs)
+            return;
+        return new Promise((resolve) => {
+            let resolved = false;
+            const done = () => {
+                if (resolved)
+                    return;
+                resolved = true;
+                oldWs.removeAllListeners();
+                resolve();
+            };
+            oldWs.on("close", done);
+            try {
+                oldWs.close();
+            }
+            catch { /* ignore */ }
+            setTimeout(() => {
+                if (!resolved) {
+                    try {
+                        oldWs.terminate?.();
+                    }
+                    catch { /* ignore */ }
+                    done();
+                }
+            }, timeoutMs);
+        });
+    }
+    // ─── Internal Connection Logic ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    doConnect() {
+        this.clearStableTimer();
+        if (this.ws) {
+            try {
+                this.ws.close();
+            }
+            catch { /* ignore */ }
+            this.ws = null;
+        }
+        this.tempBuffer = [];
+        const ws = new WebSocket(this.opts.wsUrl);
+        ws.binaryType = "arraybuffer";
+        this.ws = ws;
+        ws.on("open", () => {
+            if (this.ws !== ws)
+                return; // stale guard
+            this.tempBuffer = [];
+            // Generate DH key pair
+            const seed = randomBytes(32);
+            const keyPair = generateKeyPair(seed);
+            this.dhPrivateKey = keyPair.private;
+            const pubKey = Buffer.from(keyPair.public).toString("base64");
+            const deviceID = generateDeviceID() + "W";
+            const packet = encodeConnectPacket({
+                version: PROTO_VERSION,
+                deviceFlag: 0, // 0 = app/bot
+                deviceID,
+                uid: this.opts.uid,
+                token: this.opts.token,
+                clientTimestamp: Date.now(),
+                clientKey: pubKey,
+            });
+            ws.send(packet);
+        });
+        ws.on("message", (data) => {
+            if (this.ws !== ws)
+                return; // stale guard
+            // Buffer is already a Uint8Array view; use it directly to avoid the
+            // 3-arg vs 1-arg footgun. `new Uint8Array(buffer)` without byteOffset/
+            // byteLength reads the WHOLE underlying ArrayBuffer, which for a Buffer
+            // that is a view (e.g. from a buffer pool) leaks adjacent memory into
+            // the frame parser.
+            const bytes = data instanceof ArrayBuffer ? new Uint8Array(data) : data;
+            this.handleRawData(bytes);
+        });
+        ws.on("close", () => {
+            // Ignore close events from stale WebSocket instances.
+            // When onError triggers disconnect()+connect(), the old WS close event
+            // fires asynchronously and must not trigger a phantom reconnect.
+            if (this.ws !== ws)
+                return;
+            if (this.connected) {
+                this.connected = false;
+                this.opts.onDisconnected?.();
+            }
+            this.stopHeart();
+            this.clearStableTimer();
+            // Track rapid disconnects: if connection lasted <5s, it's unstable
+            if (this.lastConnectTime > 0) {
+                const duration = Date.now() - this.lastConnectTime;
+                if (duration < 5000) {
+                    this.rapidDisconnectCount++;
+                }
+                else {
+                    this.rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+                }
+                this.lastConnectTime = 0;
+            }
+            // If 3+ consecutive rapid disconnects, trigger onError for token refresh
+            if (this.rapidDisconnectCount >= 3) {
+                this.needReconnect = false;
+                this.rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+                this.opts.onError?.(new Error("Connect failed: rapid disconnect detected"));
+                return;
+            }
+            if (this.needReconnect) {
+                this.scheduleReconnect();
+            }
+        });
+        ws.on("error", (err) => {
+            if (this.ws !== ws)
+                return; // stale guard
+            console.debug("[WKSocket] ws error:", err.message);
+            // The 'close' event will follow, which handles reconnect
+        });
+    }
+    scheduleReconnect() {
+        this.stopReconnectTimer();
+        const baseDelay = 3000;
+        const maxDelay = 60000;
+        const exponentialDelay = Math.min(baseDelay * Math.pow(2, this.reconnectAttempts), maxDelay);
+        // Add ±25% random jitter to prevent thundering herd
+        const jitter = exponentialDelay * (0.75 + Math.random() * 0.5);
+        const delay = Math.floor(jitter);
+        this.reconnectAttempts++;
+        this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            if (this.needReconnect) {
+                this.doConnect();
+            }
+        }, delay);
+    }
+    stopReconnectTimer() {
+        if (this.reconnectTimer) {
+            clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer);
+            this.reconnectTimer = null;
+        }
+    }
+    startStableTimer() {
+        this.clearStableTimer();
+        this.stableTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            if (this.connected) {
+                this.reconnectAttempts = 0;
+                this.rapidDisconnectCount = 0;
+            }
+        }, 30_000);
+    }
+    clearStableTimer() {
+        if (this.stableTimer) {
+            clearTimeout(this.stableTimer);
+            this.stableTimer = null;
+        }
+    }
+    // ─── Heartbeat ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    restartHeart() {
+        this.stopHeart();
+        this.pingRetryCount = 0;
+        this.heartTimer = setInterval(() => {
+            this.pingRetryCount++;
+            if (this.pingRetryCount > this.pingMaxRetry) {
+                console.debug("[WKSocket] ping timeout, reconnecting...");
+                this.stopHeart();
+                this.clearStableTimer();
+                if (this.ws) {
+                    try {
+                        this.ws.close();
+                    }
+                    catch { /* ignore */ }
+                    this.ws = null;
+                }
+                if (this.connected) {
+                    this.connected = false;
+                    this.opts.onDisconnected?.();
+                }
+                if (this.needReconnect) {
+                    this.scheduleReconnect();
+                }
+                return;
+            }
+            this.sendRaw(encodePingPacket());
+        }, 60_000); // 60s heartbeat interval (matches SDK default)
+    }
+    stopHeart() {
+        if (this.heartTimer) {
+            clearInterval(this.heartTimer);
+            this.heartTimer = null;
+        }
+    }
+    // ─── Raw Data & Packet Framing ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    sendRaw(data) {
+        if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) {
+            this.ws.send(data);
+        }
+    }
+    handleRawData(data) {
+        for (let i = 0; i < data.length; i++)
+            this.tempBuffer.push(data[i]);
+        // D1/S6 (齐 P0-1): cap tempBuffer at MAX_TEMP_BUFFER_BYTES to prevent
+        // unbounded growth from a malicious/buggy server that sends partial
+        // packets indefinitely (e.g. an unending variable-length encoding).
+        if (this.tempBuffer.length > MAX_TEMP_BUFFER_BYTES) {
+            console.error(`[WKSocket] tempBuffer exceeded ${MAX_TEMP_BUFFER_BYTES} bytes (got ${this.tempBuffer.length}) — dropping and reconnecting`);
+            this.tempBuffer = [];
+            if (this.ws) {
+                try {
+                    this.ws.close();
+                }
+                catch { /* ignore */ }
+            }
+            return;
+        }
+        try {
+            // Parse complete packets using a moving cursor instead of re-slicing the
+            // whole buffer per packet. The old `tempBuffer = tempBuffer.slice(total)`
+            // per iteration was O(n²): a peer dribbling many tiny frames near the 1 MiB
+            // cap forced ~n full-array copies of an ~n-element array, stalling the event
+            // loop (shared across bots) without exceeding the byte cap. Now we advance
+            // an offset and trim the consumed prefix exactly once at the end.
+            let consumed = 0;
+            for (;;) {
+                const used = this.unpackOne(this.tempBuffer, consumed);
+                if (used === 0)
+                    break; // incomplete packet — wait for more bytes
+                consumed += used;
+            }
+            if (consumed > 0) {
+                this.tempBuffer = this.tempBuffer.slice(consumed);
+            }
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            console.debug("[WKSocket] decode error:", err);
+            // Reset buffer and reconnect
+            this.tempBuffer = [];
+            if (this.ws) {
+                try {
+                    this.ws.close();
+                }
+                catch { /* ignore */ }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Parse ONE packet starting at `start` in `data`. Returns the number of bytes
+     * consumed, or 0 if the buffer does not yet hold a complete packet (caller
+     * should wait for more bytes). Reads via `start + offset` and slices only the
+     * single packet's bytes — never the whole buffer — so repeated calls over a
+     * large buffer stay O(n) total, not O(n²).
+     */
+    unpackOne(data, start) {
+        const available = data.length - start;
+        if (available <= 0)
+            return 0;
+        const header = data[start];
+        const packetType = header >> 4;
+        // PONG is a single byte
+        if (packetType === 8 /* PacketType.PONG */) {
+            this.onPong();
+            return 1;
+        }
+        // PING from server (shouldn't happen but handle gracefully)
+        if (packetType === 7 /* PacketType.PING */) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        const fixedHeaderLength = 1;
+        let pos = start + fixedHeaderLength;
+        let remLength = 0;
+        let multiplier = 1;
+        let hasMore = false;
+        let remLengthFull = true;
+        do {
+            if (pos > data.length - 1) {
+                remLengthFull = false;
+                break;
+            }
+            // D1/S6 (齐 P0-1): cap at MAX_VARLEN_BYTES per MQTT spec. Without
+            // this, a stream of 0x80 bytes would never terminate and would let
+            // tempBuffer grow until handleRawData kills the connection — raise
+            // earlier and more explicitly here.
+            if (pos - (start + fixedHeaderLength) >= MAX_VARLEN_BYTES) {
+                throw new Error(`[WKSocket] variable-length encoding exceeded ${MAX_VARLEN_BYTES} bytes — malformed packet`);
+            }
+            const digit = data[pos++];
+            remLength += (digit & 127) * multiplier;
+            multiplier *= 128;
+            hasMore = (digit & 0x80) !== 0;
+        } while (hasMore);
+        if (!remLengthFull)
+            return 0; // Incomplete frame — need more bytes
+        const remLengthLength = pos - (start + fixedHeaderLength);
+        const totalLength = fixedHeaderLength + remLengthLength + remLength;
+        if (totalLength > available)
+            return 0; // Incomplete packet — need more bytes
+        // Extract exactly this one packet's bytes and dispatch.
+        const packetData = new Uint8Array(data.slice(start, start + totalLength));
+        this.onPacket(packetData);
+        return totalLength;
+    }
+    // ─── Packet Handling ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    onPong() {
+        this.pingRetryCount = 0;
+    }
+    onPacket(data) {
+        const firstByte = data[0];
+        const packetType = firstByte >> 4;
+        // Skip the header and variable-length bytes to get body
+        const dec = new Decoder(data);
+        dec.readByte(); // header byte
+        if (packetType !== 7 /* PacketType.PING */ && packetType !== 8 /* PacketType.PONG */) {
+            dec.readVariableLength(); // remaining length
+        }
+        // WuKongIM header byte layout: [packetType:4][flags:4]
+        // Bit 0 of flags has DIFFERENT semantics per packet type:
+        //   CONNACK: bit 0 = hasServerVersion (server includes version byte in body)
+        //   RECV:    bit 0 = noPersist (message should not be persisted)
+        // Bit 1 of flags:
+        //   RECV:    bit 1 = reddot (show unread badge)
+        switch (packetType) {
+            case 2 /* PacketType.CONNACK */: {
+                const hasServerVersion = (firstByte & 0x01) > 0;
+                this.onConnack(dec, hasServerVersion);
+                break;
+            }
+            case 5 /* PacketType.RECV */: {
+                const _noPersist = (firstByte & 0x01) > 0;
+                const _reddot = ((firstByte >> 1) & 0x01) > 0;
+                this.onRecv(dec, _noPersist, _reddot);
+                break;
+            }
+            case 9 /* PacketType.DISCONNECT */:
+                this.onDisconnect(dec);
+                break;
+            case 4 /* PacketType.SENDACK */:
+                // We don't send messages via WS, ignore
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    onConnack(dec, hasServerVersion) {
+        if (hasServerVersion) {
+            this.serverVersion = dec.readByte();
+        }
+        dec.readInt64BigInt(); // timeDiff (unused)
+        const reasonCode = dec.readByte();
+        const serverKey = dec.readString();
+        const salt = dec.readString();
+        if (this.serverVersion >= 4) {
+            dec.readInt64BigInt(); // nodeId (unused)
+        }
+        if (reasonCode === 1) {
+            // Success — derive AES key from DH shared secret.
+            // A malformed/short salt yields a wrong AES-CBC IV (CryptoJS zero-pads it),
+            // which makes EVERY subsequent payload decrypt fail — i.e. a bot that looks
+            // connected (heartbeat fine) but silently drops every message. Fail the
+            // handshake instead so we reconnect and re-derive, rather than entering
+            // that silent-drop state. (serverKey is validated the same way: a bad DH
+            // key throws in sharedKey(), caught by handleRawData's try/catch.)
+            // The IV needs 16 BYTES, so validate by byte length, not char length: a
+            // 16-char salt with multibyte UTF-8 chars is <16 OR >16 bytes and would
+            // yield a wrong IV (the same silent-decrypt-failure this guard prevents).
+            const saltByteLen = salt ? Buffer.byteLength(salt, "utf8") : 0;
+            if (saltByteLen < 16) {
+                this.connected = false;
+                console.error(`[WKSocket] CONNACK salt too short (got ${saltByteLen} bytes, need >=16) — ` +
+                    `AES IV would be invalid and every message would silently fail to decrypt. ` +
+                    `Failing the connection to force a fresh handshake.`);
+                if (this.ws) {
+                    try {
+                        this.ws.close();
+                    }
+                    catch { /* ignore */ }
+                }
+                // needReconnect stays true (default) so the close handler reconnects.
+                this.opts.onError?.(new Error("CONNACK salt too short"));
+                return;
+            }
+            const serverPubKey = Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(serverKey, "base64"));
+            const secret = sharedKey(this.dhPrivateKey, serverPubKey);
+            const secretBase64 = Buffer.from(secret).toString("base64");
+            const aesKeyFull = Md5.init(secretBase64);
+            this.aesKey = aesKeyFull.substring(0, 16);
+            // Take the first 16 BYTES of the salt as the IV (CryptoJS Utf8.parse(aesIV)
+            // re-encodes to bytes, so a 16-byte ASCII-equivalent slice is required).
+            this.aesIV = Buffer.from(salt, "utf8").subarray(0, 16).toString("latin1");
+            this.connected = true;
+            this.lastConnectTime = Date.now();
+            this.restartHeart();
+            this.startStableTimer();
+            this.opts.onConnected?.();
+        }
+        else if (reasonCode === 0) {
+            // Kicked
+            this.connected = false;
+            this.needReconnect = false;
+            if (this.ws) {
+                try {
+                    this.ws.close();
+                }
+                catch { }
+                this.ws = null;
+            }
+            this.opts.onError?.(new Error("Kicked by server"));
+            this.opts.onDisconnected?.();
+        }
+        else {
+            // Connect failed
+            this.connected = false;
+            this.needReconnect = false;
+            this.opts.onError?.(new Error(`Connect failed: reasonCode=${reasonCode}`));
+        }
+    }
+    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars
+    onRecv(dec, _noPersist, _reddot) {
+        const settingByte = dec.readByte();
+        const setting = parseSettingByte(settingByte);
+        dec.readString(); // msgKey (unused)
+        const fromUID = dec.readString();
+        const channelID = dec.readString();
+        const channelType = dec.readByte();
+        if (this.serverVersion >= 3) {
+            dec.readInt32(); // expire (unused)
+        }
+        dec.readString(); // clientMsgNo (unused)
+        const messageID = dec.readInt64String();
+        const messageSeq = dec.readInt32();
+        const timestamp = dec.readInt32();
+        if (setting.topic) {
+            dec.readString(); // topic (unused)
+        }
+        const encryptedPayload = dec.readRemaining();
+        // Decrypt + parse BEFORE acking. RECVACK tells the server "delivered, don't
+        // resend" — if we ack first and decrypt then fails (transient key/IV issue),
+        // the message is lost forever with only a debug log. By acking only after a
+        // successful parse, a transient failure leaves the message un-acked so the
+        // server redelivers it. (A *permanent* decrypt failure means the AES key/IV
+        // from CONNACK is wrong — onConnack now fails the connection in that case,
+        // forcing a fresh handshake rather than a silent-drop or redelivery loop.)
+        let payloadObj;
+        try {
+            const decryptedBytes = aesDecrypt(encryptedPayload, this.aesKey, this.aesIV);
+            const payloadStr = uintToString(Array.from(decryptedBytes));
+            payloadObj = JSON.parse(payloadStr);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // Count failures per messageID. Below the cap, leave it un-acked so the
+            // server redelivers (handles a transient hiccup). At the cap, ack-and-drop
+            // this one poison message so it can't wedge the stream forever.
+            const fails = (this.decryptFailCounts.get(messageID) ?? 0) + 1;
+            if (fails >= MAX_DECRYPT_RETRIES) {
+                console.error(`[WKSocket] payload decrypt/parse failed ${fails}x for message ${messageID} — ` +
+                    `ack-and-drop (poison message) so it stops redelivering:`, err);
+                this.decryptFailCounts.delete(messageID);
+                this.sendRaw(encodeRecvackPacket(messageID, messageSeq));
+                return;
+            }
+            // Bound the map so a flood of distinct failing ids can't grow it forever.
+            if (this.decryptFailCounts.size >= MAX_DECRYPT_FAIL_ENTRIES) {
+                this.decryptFailCounts.clear();
+            }
+            this.decryptFailCounts.set(messageID, fails);
+            console.error(`[WKSocket] payload decrypt/parse error (attempt ${fails}/${MAX_DECRYPT_RETRIES}) — ` +
+                `NOT acking so the server can redeliver:`, err);
+            return;
+        }
+        // Parse succeeded — clear any prior failure count and ack.
+        this.decryptFailCounts.delete(messageID);
+        this.sendRaw(encodeRecvackPacket(messageID, messageSeq));
+        // Build MessagePayload (same shape as SDK's contentObj-based output)
+        const payload = {
+            type: payloadObj?.type ?? 0,
+            content: payloadObj?.content,
+            ...payloadObj,
+        };
+        const msg = {
+            message_id: messageID,
+            message_seq: messageSeq,
+            from_uid: fromUID,
+            channel_id: channelID,
+            channel_type: channelType,
+            timestamp,
+            payload,
+            streamOn: setting.streamOn,
+        };
+        this.opts.onMessage(msg);
+    }
+    onDisconnect(dec) {
+        dec.readByte(); // reasonCode (unused)
+        dec.readString(); // reason (unused)
+        this.connected = false;
+        this.needReconnect = false;
+        this.stopHeart();
+        this.clearStableTimer();
+        if (this.ws) {
+            try {
+                this.ws.close();
+            }
+            catch { }
+            this.ws = null;
+        }
+        this.opts.onError?.(new Error("Kicked by server"));
+        this.opts.onDisconnected?.();
+    }
+}
+// ─── Utilities ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function generateDeviceID() {
+    return "xxxxxxxxxxxx4xxxyxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx".replace(/[xy]/g, (c) => {
+        const r = (Math.random() * 16) | 0;
+        const v = c === "x" ? r : (r & 0x3) | 0x8;
+        return v.toString(16);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=socket.js.map