@meteora-ag/cp-amm-sdk 1.0.2 → 1.0.4

package/node_modules/@noble/curves/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,998 @@
+# noble-curves
+
+Audited & minimal JS implementation of elliptic curve cryptography.
+
+- 🔒 [**Audited**](#security) by independent security firms
+- 🔻 Tree-shakeable: unused code is excluded from your builds
+- 🏎 Fast: hand-optimized for caveats of JS engines
+- 🔍 Reliable: cross-library / wycheproof tests and fuzzing ensure correctness
+- ➰ Short Weierstrass, Edwards, Montgomery curves
+- ✍️ ECDSA, EdDSA, Schnorr, BLS, ECDH, hashing to curves, Poseidon ZK-friendly hash
+- 🔖 SUF-CMA, SBS (non-repudiation), ZIP215 (consensus friendliness) features for ed25519 & ed448
+- 🪶 93KB (36KB gzipped) for everything with hashes, 26KB (11KB gzipped) for single-curve build
+
+Curves have 4KB sister projects
+[secp256k1](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1) & [ed25519](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ed25519).
+They have smaller attack surface, but less features.
+
+Take a glance at [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/discussions) for questions and support.
+
+### This library belongs to _noble_ cryptography
+
+> **noble cryptography** — high-security, easily auditable set of contained cryptographic libraries and tools.
+
+- Zero or minimal dependencies
+- Highly readable TypeScript / JS code
+- PGP-signed releases and transparent NPM builds
+- All libraries:
+  [ciphers](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ciphers),
+  [curves](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves),
+  [hashes](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-hashes),
+  [post-quantum](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-post-quantum),
+  4kb [secp256k1](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1) /
+  [ed25519](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ed25519)
+- [Check out homepage](https://paulmillr.com/noble/)
+  for reading resources, documentation and apps built with noble
+
+## Usage
+
+> `npm install @noble/curves`
+
+> `deno add jsr:@noble/curves`
+
+> `deno doc jsr:@noble/curves` # command-line documentation
+
+We support all major platforms and runtimes.
+For React Native, you may need a [polyfill for getRandomValues](https://github.com/LinusU/react-native-get-random-values).
+A standalone file [noble-curves.js](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/releases) is also available.
+
+```ts
+// import * from '@noble/curves'; // Error: use sub-imports, to ensure small app size
+import { secp256k1, schnorr } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { ed25519, ed25519ph, ed25519ctx, x25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { ed448, ed448ph, ed448ctx, x448 } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+import { p256, p384, p521 } from '@noble/curves/nist';
+import { bls12_381 } from '@noble/curves/bls12-381';
+import { bn254 } from '@noble/curves/bn254';
+import { jubjub, babyjubjub } from '@noble/curves/misc';
+import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes, concatBytes, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/curves/abstract/utils';
+```
+
+- [ECDSA signatures over secp256k1 and others](#ecdsa-signatures-over-secp256k1-and-others)
+- [Hedged ECDSA with noise](#hedged-ecdsa-with-noise)
+- [ECDH: Diffie-Hellman shared secrets](#ecdh-diffie-hellman-shared-secrets)
+- [secp256k1 Schnorr signatures from BIP340](#secp256k1-schnorr-signatures-from-bip340)
+- [ed25519](#ed25519) / [X25519](#x25519) / [ristretto255](#ristretto255)
+- [ed448](#ed448) / [X448](#x448) / [decaf448](#decaf448)
+- [bls12-381](#bls12-381)
+- [bn254 aka alt_bn128](#bn254-aka-alt_bn128)
+- [misc curves](#misc-curves)
+- [Low-level methods](#low-level-methods)
+- [Abstract API](#abstract-api)
+  - [weierstrass](#weierstrass-short-weierstrass-curve), [edwards](#edwards-twisted-edwards-curve), [montgomery](#montgomery-montgomery-curve), [bls](#bls-barreto-lynn-scott-curves)
+  - [hash-to-curve](#hash-to-curve-hashing-strings-to-curve-points), [poseidon](#poseidon-poseidon-hash)
+  - [modular](#modular-modular-arithmetics-utilities)
+  - [fft](#fft-fast-fourier-transform)
+  - [Creating private keys from hashes](#creating-private-keys-from-hashes)
+  - [utils](#utils-useful-utilities)
+- [Security](#security)
+- [Speed](#speed)
+- [Upgrading](#upgrading)
+- [Contributing & testing](#contributing--testing)
+- [License](#license)
+
+### Implementations
+
+#### ECDSA signatures over secp256k1 and others
+
+```ts
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+// import { p256 } from '@noble/curves/nist'; // or p384 / p521
+
+const priv = secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv);
+const msg = new Uint8Array(32).fill(1); // message hash (not message) in ecdsa
+const sig = secp256k1.sign(msg, priv); // `{prehash: true}` option is available
+const isValid = secp256k1.verify(sig, msg, pub) === true;
+
+// hex strings are also supported besides Uint8Array-s:
+const privHex = '46c930bc7bb4db7f55da20798697421b98c4175a52c630294d75a84b9c126236';
+const pub2 = secp256k1.getPublicKey(privHex);
+
+// public key recovery
+// let sig = secp256k1.Signature.fromCompact(sigHex); // or .fromDER(sigDERHex)
+// sig = sig.addRecoveryBit(bit); // bit is not serialized into compact / der format
+sig.recoverPublicKey(msg).toRawBytes(); // === pub; // public key recovery
+```
+
+The same code would work for NIST P256 (secp256r1), P384 (secp384r1) & P521 (secp521r1).
+
+#### Hedged ECDSA with noise
+
+```ts
+const noisySignature = secp256k1.sign(msg, priv, { extraEntropy: true });
+const ent = new Uint8Array(32).fill(3); // set custom entropy
+const noisySignature2 = secp256k1.sign(msg, priv, { extraEntropy: ent });
+```
+
+Hedged ECDSA is add-on, providing improved protection against fault attacks.
+It adds noise to signatures. The technique is used by default in BIP340; we also implement them
+optionally for ECDSA. Check out blog post
+[Deterministic signatures are not your friends](https://paulmillr.com/posts/deterministic-signatures/)
+and [spec draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise/).
+
+#### ECDH: Diffie-Hellman shared secrets
+
+```ts
+const someonesPub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey());
+const shared = secp256k1.getSharedSecret(priv, someonesPub);
+// NOTE:
+// - `shared` includes parity byte: strip it using shared.slice(1)
+// - `shared` is not hashed: more secure way is sha256(shared) or hkdf(shared)
+```
+
+#### secp256k1 Schnorr signatures from BIP340
+
+```ts
+import { schnorr } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+const priv = schnorr.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+const pub = schnorr.getPublicKey(priv);
+const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('hello');
+const sig = schnorr.sign(msg, priv);
+const isValid = schnorr.verify(sig, msg, pub);
+```
+
+#### ed25519
+
+```ts
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('hello');
+const sig = ed25519.sign(msg, priv);
+ed25519.verify(sig, msg, pub); // Default mode: follows ZIP215
+ed25519.verify(sig, msg, pub, { zip215: false }); // SBS / e-voting / RFC8032 / FIPS 186-5
+
+// Variants from RFC8032: with context, prehashed
+import { ed25519ctx, ed25519ph } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+```
+
+Default `verify` behavior follows ZIP215 and
+can be used in consensus-critical applications.
+If you need SBS (Strongly Binding Signatures) and FIPS 186-5 compliance,
+use `zip215: false`. Check out [Edwards Signatures section for more info](#edwards-twisted-edwards-curve).
+Both options have SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks).
+
+#### X25519
+
+```ts
+// X25519 aka ECDH on Curve25519 from [RFC7748](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748)
+import { x25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+const priv = 'a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4';
+const pub = 'e6db6867583030db3594c1a424b15f7c726624ec26b3353b10a903a6d0ab1c4c';
+x25519.getSharedSecret(priv, pub) === x25519.scalarMult(priv, pub); // aliases
+x25519.getPublicKey(priv) === x25519.scalarMultBase(priv);
+x25519.getPublicKey(x25519.utils.randomPrivateKey());
+
+// ed25519 => x25519 conversion
+import { edwardsToMontgomeryPub, edwardsToMontgomeryPriv } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+edwardsToMontgomeryPub(ed25519.getPublicKey(ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey()));
+edwardsToMontgomeryPriv(ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey());
+```
+
+#### ristretto255
+
+```ts
+// ristretto255 from [RFC9496](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9496)
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha512';
+import {
+  hashToCurve,
+  encodeToCurve,
+  RistrettoPoint,
+  hashToRistretto255,
+} from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+
+const msg = utf8ToBytes('Ristretto is traditionally a short shot of espresso coffee');
+hashToCurve(msg);
+
+const rp = RistrettoPoint.fromHex(
+  '6a493210f7499cd17fecb510ae0cea23a110e8d5b901f8acadd3095c73a3b919'
+);
+RistrettoPoint.BASE.multiply(2n).add(rp).subtract(RistrettoPoint.BASE).toRawBytes();
+RistrettoPoint.ZERO.equals(dp) === false;
+// pre-hashed hash-to-curve
+RistrettoPoint.hashToCurve(sha512(msg));
+// full hash-to-curve including domain separation tag
+hashToRistretto255(msg, { DST: 'ristretto255_XMD:SHA-512_R255MAP_RO_' });
+```
+
+#### ed448
+
+```ts
+import { ed448 } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+const priv = ed448.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+const pub = ed448.getPublicKey(priv);
+const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('whatsup');
+const sig = ed448.sign(msg, priv);
+ed448.verify(sig, msg, pub);
+
+// Variants from RFC8032: prehashed
+import { ed448ph } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+```
+
+#### X448
+
+```ts
+// X448 aka ECDH on Curve448 from [RFC7748](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748)
+import { x448 } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+x448.getSharedSecret(priv, pub) === x448.scalarMult(priv, pub); // aliases
+x448.getPublicKey(priv) === x448.scalarMultBase(priv);
+
+// ed448 => x448 conversion
+import { edwardsToMontgomeryPub } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+edwardsToMontgomeryPub(ed448.getPublicKey(ed448.utils.randomPrivateKey()));
+```
+
+#### decaf448
+
+```ts
+// decaf448 from [RFC9496](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9496)
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+import { shake256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha3';
+import { hashToCurve, encodeToCurve, DecafPoint, hashToDecaf448 } from '@noble/curves/ed448';
+
+const msg = utf8ToBytes('Ristretto is traditionally a short shot of espresso coffee');
+hashToCurve(msg);
+
+const dp = DecafPoint.fromHex(
+  'c898eb4f87f97c564c6fd61fc7e49689314a1f818ec85eeb3bd5514ac816d38778f69ef347a89fca817e66defdedce178c7cc709b2116e75'
+);
+DecafPoint.BASE.multiply(2n).add(dp).subtract(DecafPoint.BASE).toRawBytes();
+DecafPoint.ZERO.equals(dp) === false;
+// pre-hashed hash-to-curve
+DecafPoint.hashToCurve(shake256(msg, { dkLen: 112 }));
+// full hash-to-curve including domain separation tag
+hashToDecaf448(msg, { DST: 'decaf448_XOF:SHAKE256_D448MAP_RO_' });
+```
+
+#### bls12-381
+
+```ts
+import { bls12_381 as bls } from '@noble/curves/bls12-381';
+
+// G1 keys, G2 signatures
+const privateKey = '67d53f170b908cabb9eb326c3c337762d59289a8fec79f7bc9254b584b73265c';
+const message = '64726e3da8';
+const publicKey = bls.getPublicKey(privateKey);
+const signature = bls.sign(message, privateKey);
+const isValid = bls.verify(signature, message, publicKey);
+console.log({ publicKey, signature, isValid });
+
+// G2 keys, G1 signatures
+// getPublicKeyForShortSignatures(privateKey)
+// signShortSignature(message, privateKey)
+// verifyShortSignature(signature, message, publicKey)
+// aggregateShortSignatures(signatures)
+
+// Custom DST
+const htfEthereum = { DST: 'BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_POP_' };
+const signatureEth = bls.sign(message, privateKey, htfEthereum);
+const isValidEth = bls.verify(signature, message, publicKey, htfEthereum);
+
+// Aggregation
+const aggregatedKey = bls.aggregatePublicKeys([
+  bls.utils.randomPrivateKey(),
+  bls.utils.randomPrivateKey(),
+]);
+// const aggregatedSig = bls.aggregateSignatures(sigs)
+
+// Pairings, with and without final exponentiation
+// bls.pairing(PointG1, PointG2);
+// bls.pairing(PointG1, PointG2, false);
+// bls.fields.Fp12.finalExponentiate(bls.fields.Fp12.mul(PointG1, PointG2));
+
+// Others
+// bls.G1.ProjectivePoint.BASE, bls.G2.ProjectivePoint.BASE;
+// bls.fields.Fp, bls.fields.Fp2, bls.fields.Fp12, bls.fields.Fr;
+```
+
+See [abstract/bls](#bls-barreto-lynn-scott-curves).
+For example usage, check out [the implementation of BLS EVM precompiles](https://github.com/ethereumjs/ethereumjs-monorepo/blob/361f4edbc239e795a411ac2da7e5567298b9e7e5/packages/evm/src/precompiles/bls12_381/noble.ts).
+
+#### bn254 aka alt_bn128
+
+```ts
+import { bn254 } from '@noble/curves/bn254';
+
+console.log(bn254.G1, bn254.G2, bn254.pairing);
+```
+
+The API mirrors [BLS](#bls12-381). The curve was previously called alt_bn128.
+The implementation is compatible with [EIP-196](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-196) and
+[EIP-197](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-197).
+
+We don't implement Point methods toHex / toRawBytes.
+To work around this limitation, has to initialize points on their own from BigInts.
+Reason it's not implemented is because [there is no standard](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/halo2curves/issues/109).
+Points of divergence:
+
+- Endianness: LE vs BE (byte-swapped)
+- Flags as first hex bits (similar to BLS) vs no-flags
+- Imaginary part last in G2 vs first (c0, c1 vs c1, c0)
+
+For example usage, check out [the implementation of bn254 EVM precompiles](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/blob/3ed792f8ad9932765b84d1064afea8663a255457/test/bn254.test.js#L697).
+
+#### misc curves
+
+```ts
+import { jubjub, babyjubjub } from '@noble/curves/misc';
+```
+
+Miscellaneous, rarely used curves are contained in the module.
+Jubjub curves have Fp over scalar fields of other curves. They are friendly to ZK proofs.
+jubjub Fp = bls n. babyjubjub Fp = bn254 n.
+
+#### Low-level methods
+
+```ts
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+
+// Curve's variables
+// Every curve has `CURVE` object that contains its parameters, field, and others
+console.log(secp256k1.CURVE.p); // field modulus
+console.log(secp256k1.CURVE.n); // curve order
+console.log(secp256k1.CURVE.a, secp256k1.CURVE.b); // equation params
+console.log(secp256k1.CURVE.Gx, secp256k1.CURVE.Gy); // base point coordinates
+
+// MSM
+const p = secp256k1.ProjectivePoint;
+const points = [p.BASE, p.BASE.multiply(2n), p.BASE.multiply(4n), p.BASE.multiply(8n)];
+p.msm(points, [3n, 5n, 7n, 11n]).equals(p.BASE.multiply(129n)); // 129*G
+```
+
+Multi-scalar-multiplication (MSM) is basically `(Pa + Qb + Rc + ...)`.
+It's 10-30x faster vs naive addition for large amount of points.
+Pippenger algorithm is used underneath.
+
+## Abstract API
+
+Implementations use [noble-hashes](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-hashes).
+If you want to use a different hashing library, abstract API doesn't depend on them.
+
+Abstract API allows to define custom curves. All arithmetics is done with JS
+bigints over finite fields, which is defined from `modular` sub-module. For
+scalar multiplication, we use
+[precomputed tables with w-ary non-adjacent form (wNAF)](https://paulmillr.com/posts/noble-secp256k1-fast-ecc/).
+Precomputes are enabled for weierstrass and edwards BASE points of a curve. You
+could precompute any other point (e.g. for ECDH) using `utils.precompute()`
+method: check out examples.
+
+### weierstrass: Short Weierstrass curve
+
+```ts
+import { weierstrass } from '@noble/curves/abstract/weierstrass';
+import { Field } from '@noble/curves/abstract/modular';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import { hmac } from '@noble/hashes/hmac';
+import { concatBytes, randomBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+
+const hmacSha256 = (key: Uint8Array, ...msgs: Uint8Array[]) =>
+  hmac(sha256, key, concatBytes(...msgs));
+
+// secQ (not secP) - secq256k1 is a cycle of secp256k1 with Fp/N flipped.
+// https://personaelabs.org/posts/spartan-ecdsa
+// https://zcash.github.io/halo2/background/curves.html#cycles-of-curves
+const secq256k1 = weierstrass({
+  a: 0n,
+  b: 7n,
+  Fp: Field(2n ** 256n - 432420386565659656852420866394968145599n),
+  n: 2n ** 256n - 2n ** 32n - 2n ** 9n - 2n ** 8n - 2n ** 7n - 2n ** 6n - 2n ** 4n - 1n,
+  Gx: 55066263022277343669578718895168534326250603453777594175500187360389116729240n,
+  Gy: 32670510020758816978083085130507043184471273380659243275938904335757337482424n,
+  hash: sha256,
+  hmac: hmacSha256,
+  randomBytes,
+});
+
+// NIST secp192r1 aka p192
+// https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf, https://neuromancer.sk/std/secg/secp192r1
+const secp192r1 = weierstrass({
+  a: 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffffffffffffcn,
+  b: 0x64210519e59c80e70fa7e9ab72243049feb8deecc146b9b1n,
+  Fp: Field(0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffffn),
+  n: 0xffffffffffffffffffffffff99def836146bc9b1b4d22831n,
+  Gx: 0x188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a18800f4ff0afd82ff1012n,
+  Gy: 0x07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd573f977a11e794811n,
+  hash: sha256,
+  hmac: hmacSha256,
+  randomBytes,
+});
+```
+
+Short Weierstrass curve's formula is `y² = x³ + ax + b`. `weierstrass`
+expects arguments `a`, `b`, field `Fp`, curve order `n`, cofactor `h`
+and coordinates `Gx`, `Gy` of generator point.
+`hmac` and `hash` must be specified for deterministic `k` generation.
+
+**Weierstrass points:**
+
+- Are exported as `ProjectivePoint`
+- Are represented in projective (homogeneous) coordinates: (x, y, z) ∋ (x=x/z, y=y/z)
+- Use complete exception-free formulas for addition and doubling
+- Can be decoded/encoded from/to Uint8Array / hex strings using
+  `ProjectivePoint.fromHex` and `ProjectivePoint#toRawBytes()`
+- Have `assertValidity()` which checks for being on-curve
+- Have `toAffine()` and `x` / `y` getters which convert to 2d xy affine coordinates
+
+**ECDSA signatures:**
+
+- Are represented by `Signature` instances with `r, s` and optional `recovery` properties
+- Have `recoverPublicKey()`, `toCompactRawBytes()` and `toDERRawBytes()` methods
+- Can be prehashed, or non-prehashed:
+  - `sign(msgHash, privKey)` (default, prehash: false) - you did hashing before
+  - `sign(msg, privKey, {prehash: true})` - curves will do hashing for you
+- Are generated deterministically, following [RFC6979](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979).
+  - Consider [hedged ECDSA with noise](#hedged-ecdsa-with-noise) for adding randomness into
+    for signatures, to get improved security against fault attacks.
+
+More examples:
+
+```typescript
+// All curves expose same generic interface.
+const priv = secq256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+secq256k1.getPublicKey(priv); // Convert private key to public.
+const sig = secq256k1.sign(msg, priv); // Sign msg with private key.
+const sig2 = secq256k1.sign(msg, priv, { prehash: true }); // hash(msg)
+secq256k1.verify(sig, msg, priv); // Verify if sig is correct.
+
+// Default behavior is "try DER, then try compact if fails". Can be explicit:
+secq256k1.verify(sig.toCompactHex(), msg, priv, { format: 'compact' });
+
+const Point = secq256k1.ProjectivePoint;
+const point = Point.BASE; // Elliptic curve Point class and BASE point static var.
+point.add(point).equals(point.double()); // add(), equals(), double() methods
+point.subtract(point).equals(Point.ZERO); // subtract() method, ZERO static var
+point.negate(); // Flips point over x/y coordinate.
+point.multiply(31415n); // Multiplication of Point by scalar.
+
+point.assertValidity(); // Checks for being on-curve
+point.toAffine(); // Converts to 2d affine xy coordinates
+
+secq256k1.CURVE.n;
+secq256k1.CURVE.p;
+secq256k1.CURVE.Fp.mod();
+secq256k1.CURVE.hash();
+
+// precomputes
+const fast = secq256k1.utils.precompute(8, Point.fromHex(someonesPubKey));
+fast.multiply(privKey); // much faster ECDH now
+```
+
+### edwards: Twisted Edwards curve
+
+```ts
+import { twistedEdwards } from '@noble/curves/abstract/edwards';
+import { Field } from '@noble/curves/abstract/modular';
+import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha512';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+
+const Fp = Field(2n ** 255n - 19n);
+const ed25519 = twistedEdwards({
+  a: Fp.create(-1n),
+  d: Fp.div(-121665n, 121666n), // -121665n/121666n mod p
+  Fp: Fp,
+  n: 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n,
+  h: 8n,
+  Gx: 15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202n,
+  Gy: 46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960n,
+  hash: sha512,
+  randomBytes,
+  adjustScalarBytes(bytes) {
+    // optional; but mandatory in ed25519
+    bytes[0] &= 248;
+    bytes[31] &= 127;
+    bytes[31] |= 64;
+    return bytes;
+  },
+} as const);
+```
+
+Twisted Edwards curve's formula is `ax² + y² = 1 + dx²y²`.
+You must specify `a`, `d`, field `Fp`, order `n`, cofactor `h`
+and coordinates `Gx`, `Gy` of generator point.
+For EdDSA signatures, `hash` param required.
+`adjustScalarBytes` which instructs how to change private scalars could be specified.
+
+**Edwards points:**
+
+- Are exported as `ExtendedPoint`
+- Are represented in extended coordinates: (x, y, z, t) ∋ (x=x/z, y=y/z)
+- Use complete exception-free formulas for addition and doubling
+- Can be decoded/encoded from/to Uint8Array / hex strings using `ExtendedPoint.fromHex` and `ExtendedPoint#toRawBytes()`
+- Have `assertValidity()` which checks for being on-curve
+- Have `toAffine()` and `x` / `y` getters which convert to 2d xy affine coordinates
+- Have `isTorsionFree()`, `clearCofactor()` and `isSmallOrder()` utilities to handle torsions
+
+**EdDSA signatures:**
+
+- `zip215: true` is default behavior. It has slightly looser verification logic
+  to be [consensus-friendly](https://hdevalence.ca/blog/2020-10-04-its-25519am), following [ZIP215](https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215) rules
+- `zip215: false` switches verification criteria to strict
+  [RFC8032](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032) / [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/5/final)
+  and additionally provides [non-repudiation with SBS](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244),
+  which is useful for:
+  - Contract Signing: if A signed an agreement with B using key that allows repudiation, it can later claim that it signed a different contract
+  - E-voting: malicious voters may pick keys that allow repudiation in order to deny results
+  - Blockchains: transaction of amount X might also be valid for a different amount Y
+- Both modes have SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks).
+
+Check out [RFC9496](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9496) for description of
+ristretto and decaf groups which we implement.
+
+### montgomery: Montgomery curve
+
+The module contains methods for x-only ECDH on Curve25519 / Curve448 from RFC7748.
+Proper Elliptic Curve Points are not implemented yet.
+
+### bls: Barreto-Lynn-Scott curves
+
+The module abstracts BLS (Barreto-Lynn-Scott) pairing-friendly elliptic curve construction.
+They allow to construct [zk-SNARKs](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/) and
+use aggregated, batch-verifiable
+[threshold signatures](https://medium.com/snigirev.stepan/bls-signatures-better-than-schnorr-5a7fe30ea716),
+using Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme.
+
+The module doesn't expose `CURVE` property: use `G1.CURVE`, `G2.CURVE` instead.
+Only BLS12-381 is currently implemented.
+Defining BLS12-377 and BLS24 should be straightforward.
+
+The default BLS uses short public keys (with public keys in G1 and signatures in G2).
+Short signatures (public keys in G2 and signatures in G1) are also supported.
+
+### hash-to-curve: Hashing strings to curve points
+
+The module allows to hash arbitrary strings to elliptic curve points. Implements [RFC 9380](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9380).
+
+Every curve has exported `hashToCurve` and `encodeToCurve` methods. You should always prefer `hashToCurve` for security:
+
+```ts
+import { hashToCurve, encodeToCurve } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+hashToCurve('0102abcd');
+console.log(hashToCurve(randomBytes()));
+console.log(encodeToCurve(randomBytes()));
+
+import { bls12_381 } from '@noble/curves/bls12-381';
+bls12_381.G1.hashToCurve(randomBytes(), { DST: 'another' });
+bls12_381.G2.hashToCurve(randomBytes(), { DST: 'custom' });
+```
+
+Low-level methods from the spec:
+
+```ts
+// produces a uniformly random byte string using a cryptographic hash function H that outputs b bits.
+function expand_message_xmd(
+  msg: Uint8Array,
+  DST: Uint8Array,
+  lenInBytes: number,
+  H: CHash // For CHash see abstract/weierstrass docs section
+): Uint8Array;
+// produces a uniformly random byte string using an extendable-output function (XOF) H.
+function expand_message_xof(
+  msg: Uint8Array,
+  DST: Uint8Array,
+  lenInBytes: number,
+  k: number,
+  H: CHash
+): Uint8Array;
+// Hashes arbitrary-length byte strings to a list of one or more elements of a finite field F
+function hash_to_field(msg: Uint8Array, count: number, options: Opts): bigint[][];
+
+/**
+ * * `DST` is a domain separation tag, defined in section 2.2.5
+ * * `p` characteristic of F, where F is a finite field of characteristic p and order q = p^m
+ * * `m` is extension degree (1 for prime fields)
+ * * `k` is the target security target in bits (e.g. 128), from section 5.1
+ * * `expand` is `xmd` (SHA2, SHA3, BLAKE) or `xof` (SHAKE, BLAKE-XOF)
+ * * `hash` conforming to `utils.CHash` interface, with `outputLen` / `blockLen` props
+ */
+type UnicodeOrBytes = string | Uint8Array;
+type Opts = {
+  DST: UnicodeOrBytes;
+  p: bigint;
+  m: number;
+  k: number;
+  expand?: 'xmd' | 'xof';
+  hash: CHash;
+};
+```
+
+### poseidon: Poseidon hash
+
+Implements [Poseidon](https://www.poseidon-hash.info) ZK-friendly hash:
+permutation and sponge.
+
+There are many poseidon variants with different constants.
+We don't provide them: you should construct them manually.
+Check out [micro-starknet](https://github.com/paulmillr/micro-starknet) package for a proper example.
+
+```ts
+import { poseidon, poseidonSponge } from '@noble/curves/abstract/poseidon';
+
+const rate = 2;
+const capacity = 1;
+const { mds, roundConstants } = poseidon.grainGenConstants({
+  Fp,
+  t: rate + capacity,
+  roundsFull: 8,
+  roundsPartial: 31,
+});
+const opts = {
+  Fp,
+  rate,
+  capacity,
+  sboxPower: 17,
+  mds,
+  roundConstants,
+  roundsFull: 8,
+  roundsPartial: 31,
+};
+const permutation = poseidon.poseidon(opts);
+const sponge = poseidon.poseidonSponge(opts); // use carefully, not specced
+```
+
+### modular: Modular arithmetics utilities
+
+```ts
+import * as mod from '@noble/curves/abstract/modular';
+
+// Finite Field utils
+const fp = mod.Field(2n ** 255n - 19n); // Finite field over 2^255-19
+fp.mul(591n, 932n); // multiplication
+fp.pow(481n, 11024858120n); // exponentiation
+fp.div(5n, 17n); // division: 5/17 mod 2^255-19 == 5 * invert(17)
+fp.inv(5n); // modular inverse
+fp.sqrt(21n); // square root
+
+// Non-Field generic utils are also available
+mod.mod(21n, 10n); // 21 mod 10 == 1n; fixed version of 21 % 10
+mod.invert(17n, 10n); // invert(17) mod 10; modular multiplicative inverse
+mod.invertBatch([1n, 2n, 4n], 21n); // => [1n, 11n, 16n] in one inversion
+```
+
+Field operations are not constant-time: they are using JS bigints, see [security](#security).
+The fact is mostly irrelevant, but the important method to keep in mind is `pow`,
+which may leak exponent bits, when used naïvely.
+
+`mod.Field` is always **field over prime number**. Non-prime fields aren't supported for now.
+We don't test for prime-ness for speed and because algorithms are probabilistic anyway.
+Initializing a non-prime field could make your app suspectible to
+DoS (infilite loop) on Tonelli-Shanks square root calculation.
+
+Unlike `mod.inv`, `mod.invertBatch` won't throw on `0`: make sure to throw an error yourself.
+
+### fft: Fast Fourier Transform
+
+Experimental implementation of NTT / FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) over finite fields.
+API may change at any time. The code has not been audited. Feature requests are welcome.
+
+```ts
+import * as fft from '@noble/curves/abstract/fft.js';
+```
+
+#### Creating private keys from hashes
+
+You can't simply make a 32-byte private key from a 32-byte hash.
+Doing so will make the key [biased](https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2020/07/28/the-definitive-guide-to-modulo-bias-and-how-to-avoid-it/).
+
+To make the bias negligible, we follow [FIPS 186-5 A.2](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/5/final)
+and [RFC 9380](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9380#section-5.2).
+This means, for 32-byte key, we would need 48-byte hash to get 2^-128 bias, which matches curve security level.
+
+`hashToPrivateScalar()` that hashes to **private key** was created for this purpose.
+Use [abstract/hash-to-curve](#hash-to-curve-hashing-strings-to-curve-points)
+if you need to hash to **public key**.
+
+```ts
+import { p256 } from '@noble/curves/nist';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import { hkdf } from '@noble/hashes/hkdf';
+import * as mod from '@noble/curves/abstract/modular';
+const someKey = new Uint8Array(32).fill(2); // Needs to actually be random, not .fill(2)
+const derived = hkdf(sha256, someKey, undefined, 'application', 48); // 48 bytes for 32-byte priv
+const validPrivateKey = mod.hashToPrivateScalar(derived, p256.CURVE.n);
+```
+
+### utils: Useful utilities
+
+```ts
+import * as utils from '@noble/curves/abstract/utils';
+
+utils.bytesToHex(Uint8Array.from([0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]));
+utils.hexToBytes('deadbeef');
+utils.numberToHexUnpadded(123n);
+utils.hexToNumber();
+
+utils.bytesToNumberBE(Uint8Array.from([0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]));
+utils.bytesToNumberLE(Uint8Array.from([0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]));
+utils.numberToBytesBE(123n, 32);
+utils.numberToBytesLE(123n, 64);
+
+utils.concatBytes(Uint8Array.from([0xde, 0xad]), Uint8Array.from([0xbe, 0xef]));
+utils.nLength(255n);
+utils.equalBytes(Uint8Array.from([0xde]), Uint8Array.from([0xde]));
+```
+
+## Security
+
+The library has been independently audited:
+
+- at version 1.6.0, in Sep 2024, by [Cure53](https://cure53.de)
+  - PDFs: [website](https://cure53.de/audit-report_noble-crypto-libs.pdf), [in-repo](./audit/2024-09-cure53-audit-nbl4.pdf)
+  - [Changes since audit](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/compare/1.6.0..main)
+  - Scope: ed25519, ed448, their add-ons, bls12-381, bn254,
+    hash-to-curve, low-level primitives bls, tower, edwards, montgomery.
+  - The audit has been funded by [OpenSats](https://opensats.org)
+- at version 1.2.0, in Sep 2023, by [Kudelski Security](https://kudelskisecurity.com)
+  - PDFs: [in-repo](./audit/2023-09-kudelski-audit-starknet.pdf)
+  - [Changes since audit](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/compare/1.2.0..main)
+  - Scope: [scure-starknet](https://github.com/paulmillr/scure-starknet) and its related
+    abstract modules of noble-curves: `curve`, `modular`, `poseidon`, `weierstrass`
+  - The audit has been funded by [Starkware](https://starkware.co)
+- at version 0.7.3, in Feb 2023, by [Trail of Bits](https://www.trailofbits.com)
+  - PDFs: [website](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2023-01-ryanshea-noblecurveslibrary-securityreview.pdf),
+    [in-repo](./audit/2023-01-trailofbits-audit-curves.pdf)
+  - [Changes since audit](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves/compare/0.7.3..main)
+  - Scope: abstract modules `curve`, `hash-to-curve`, `modular`, `poseidon`, `utils`, `weierstrass` and
+    top-level modules `_shortw_utils` and `secp256k1`
+  - The audit has been funded by [Ryan Shea](https://www.shea.io)
+
+It is tested against property-based, cross-library and Wycheproof vectors,
+and is being fuzzed in [the separate repo](https://github.com/paulmillr/fuzzing).
+
+If you see anything unusual: investigate and report.
+
+### Constant-timeness
+
+We're targetting algorithmic constant time. _JIT-compiler_ and _Garbage Collector_ make "constant time"
+extremely hard to achieve [timing attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack) resistance
+in a scripting language. Which means _any other JS library can't have
+constant-timeness_. Even statically typed Rust, a language without GC,
+[makes it harder to achieve constant-time](https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/open-source/rust-timing-shield/security)
+for some cases. If your goal is absolute security, don't use any JS lib — including bindings to native ones.
+Use low-level libraries & languages.
+
+### Supply chain security
+
+- **Commits** are signed with PGP keys, to prevent forgery. Make sure to verify commit signatures
+- **Releases** are transparent and built on GitHub CI. Make sure to verify [provenance](https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements) logs
+  - Use GitHub CLI to verify single-file builds:
+    `gh attestation verify --owner paulmillr noble-curves.js`
+- **Rare releasing** is followed to ensure less re-audit need for end-users
+- **Dependencies** are minimized and locked-down: any dependency could get hacked and users will be downloading malware with every install.
+  - We make sure to use as few dependencies as possible
+  - Automatic dep updates are prevented by locking-down version ranges; diffs are checked with `npm-diff`
+- **Dev Dependencies** are disabled for end-users; they are only used to develop / build the source code
+
+For this package, there is 1 dependency; and a few dev dependencies:
+
+- [noble-hashes](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-hashes) provides cryptographic hashing functionality
+- micro-bmark, micro-should and jsbt are used for benchmarking / testing / build tooling and developed by the same author
+- prettier, fast-check and typescript are used for code quality / test generation / ts compilation. It's hard to audit their source code thoroughly and fully because of their size
+
+### Randomness
+
+We're deferring to built-in
+[crypto.getRandomValues](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getRandomValues)
+which is considered cryptographically secure (CSPRNG).
+
+In the past, browsers had bugs that made it weak: it may happen again.
+Implementing a userspace CSPRNG to get resilient to the weakness
+is even worse: there is no reliable userspace source of quality entropy.
+
+### Quantum computers
+
+Cryptographically relevant quantum computer, if built, will allow to
+break elliptic curve cryptography (both ECDSA / EdDSA & ECDH) using Shor's algorithm.
+
+Consider switching to newer / hybrid algorithms, such as SPHINCS+. They are available in
+[noble-post-quantum](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-post-quantum).
+
+NIST prohibits classical cryptography (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ECDH) [after 2035](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf). Australian ASD prohibits it [after 2030](https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/ism/cyber-security-guidelines/guidelines-cryptography).
+
+## Speed
+
+```sh
+npm run bench:install && npm run bench
+```
+
+During first call of most methods, `init` is done, which calculates base point precomputes.
+The method consumes 20MB+ of memory and takes some time.
+You can adjust how many precomputes are generated,
+by using `_setWindowSize`. Check out the source code.
+
+Benchmark results on Apple M4:
+
+```
+# secp256k1
+init 10ms
+getPublicKey x 9,099 ops/sec @ 109μs/op
+sign x 7,182 ops/sec @ 139μs/op
+verify x 1,188 ops/sec @ 841μs/op
+getSharedSecret x 735 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+recoverPublicKey x 1,265 ops/sec @ 790μs/op
+schnorr.sign x 957 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+schnorr.verify x 1,210 ops/sec @ 825μs/op
+
+# ed25519
+init 14ms
+getPublicKey x 14,216 ops/sec @ 70μs/op
+sign x 6,849 ops/sec @ 145μs/op
+verify x 1,400 ops/sec @ 713μs/op
+
+# ed448
+init 37ms
+getPublicKey x 5,273 ops/sec @ 189μs/op
+sign x 2,494 ops/sec @ 400μs/op
+verify x 476 ops/sec @ 2ms/op
+
+# p256
+init 17ms
+getPublicKey x 8,977 ops/sec @ 111μs/op
+sign x 7,236 ops/sec @ 138μs/op
+verify x 877 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+
+# p384
+init 42ms
+getPublicKey x 4,084 ops/sec @ 244μs/op
+sign x 3,247 ops/sec @ 307μs/op
+verify x 331 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+
+# p521
+init 83ms
+getPublicKey x 2,049 ops/sec @ 487μs/op
+sign x 1,748 ops/sec @ 571μs/op
+verify x 170 ops/sec @ 5ms/op
+
+# ristretto255
+add x 931,966 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+multiply x 15,444 ops/sec @ 64μs/op
+encode x 21,367 ops/sec @ 46μs/op
+decode x 21,715 ops/sec @ 46μs/op
+
+# decaf448
+add x 478,011 ops/sec @ 2μs/op
+multiply x 416 ops/sec @ 2ms/op
+encode x 8,562 ops/sec @ 116μs/op
+decode x 8,636 ops/sec @ 115μs/op
+
+# ECDH
+x25519 x 1,981 ops/sec @ 504μs/op
+x448 x 743 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+secp256k1 x 728 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+p256 x 705 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+p384 x 268 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+p521 x 137 ops/sec @ 7ms/op
+
+# hash-to-curve
+hashToPrivateScalar x 1,754,385 ops/sec @ 570ns/op
+hash_to_field x 135,703 ops/sec @ 7μs/op
+hashToCurve secp256k1 x 3,194 ops/sec @ 313μs/op
+hashToCurve p256 x 5,962 ops/sec @ 167μs/op
+hashToCurve p384 x 2,230 ops/sec @ 448μs/op
+hashToCurve p521 x 1,063 ops/sec @ 940μs/op
+hashToCurve ed25519 x 4,047 ops/sec @ 247μs/op
+hashToCurve ed448 x 1,691 ops/sec @ 591μs/op
+hash_to_ristretto255 x 8,733 ops/sec @ 114μs/op
+hash_to_decaf448 x 3,882 ops/sec @ 257μs/op
+
+# modular over secp256k1 P field
+invert a x 866,551 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+invert b x 693,962 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+sqrt p = 3 mod 4 x 25,738 ops/sec @ 38μs/op
+sqrt tonneli-shanks x 847 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+
+# bls12-381
+init 22ms
+getPublicKey x 1,325 ops/sec @ 754μs/op
+sign x 80 ops/sec @ 12ms/op
+verify x 62 ops/sec @ 15ms/op
+pairing x 166 ops/sec @ 6ms/op
+pairing10 x 54 ops/sec @ 18ms/op ± 23.48% (15ms..36ms)
+MSM 4096 scalars x points 3286ms
+aggregatePublicKeys/8 x 173 ops/sec @ 5ms/op
+aggregatePublicKeys/32 x 46 ops/sec @ 21ms/op
+aggregatePublicKeys/128 x 11 ops/sec @ 84ms/op
+aggregatePublicKeys/512 x 2 ops/sec @ 335ms/op
+aggregatePublicKeys/2048 x 0 ops/sec @ 1346ms/op
+aggregateSignatures/8 x 82 ops/sec @ 12ms/op
+aggregateSignatures/32 x 21 ops/sec @ 45ms/op
+aggregateSignatures/128 x 5 ops/sec @ 178ms/op
+aggregateSignatures/512 x 1 ops/sec @ 705ms/op
+aggregateSignatures/2048 x 0 ops/sec @ 2823ms/op
+```
+
+## Upgrading
+
+Previously, the library was split into single-feature packages
+[noble-secp256k1](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1),
+[noble-ed25519](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ed25519) and
+[noble-bls12-381](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-bls12-381).
+
+Curves continue their original work. The single-feature packages changed their
+direction towards providing minimal 4kb implementations of cryptography,
+which means they have less features.
+
+Upgrading from noble-secp256k1 2.0 or noble-ed25519 2.0: no changes, libraries are compatible.
+
+Upgrading from noble-secp256k1 1.7:
+
+- `getPublicKey`
+  - now produce 33-byte compressed signatures by default
+  - to use old behavior, which produced 65-byte uncompressed keys, set
+    argument `isCompressed` to `false`: `getPublicKey(priv, false)`
+- `sign`
+  - is now sync
+  - now returns `Signature` instance with `{ r, s, recovery }` properties
+  - `canonical` option was renamed to `lowS`
+  - `recovered` option has been removed because recovery bit is always returned now
+  - `der` option has been removed. There are 2 options:
+    1. Use compact encoding: `fromCompact`, `toCompactRawBytes`, `toCompactHex`.
+       Compact encoding is simply a concatenation of 32-byte r and 32-byte s.
+    2. If you must use DER encoding, switch to noble-curves (see above).
+- `verify`
+  - is now sync
+  - `strict` option was renamed to `lowS`
+- `getSharedSecret`
+  - now produce 33-byte compressed signatures by default
+  - to use old behavior, which produced 65-byte uncompressed keys, set
+    argument `isCompressed` to `false`: `getSharedSecret(a, b, false)`
+- `recoverPublicKey(msg, sig, rec)` was changed to `sig.recoverPublicKey(msg)`
+- `number` type for private keys have been removed: use `bigint` instead
+- `Point` (2d xy) has been changed to `ProjectivePoint` (3d xyz)
+- `utils` were split into `utils` (same api as in noble-curves) and
+  `etc` (`hmacSha256Sync` and others)
+
+Upgrading from [@noble/ed25519](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ed25519) 1.7:
+
+- Methods are now sync by default
+- `bigint` is no longer allowed in `getPublicKey`, `sign`, `verify`. Reason: ed25519 is LE, can lead to bugs
+- `Point` (2d xy) has been changed to `ExtendedPoint` (xyzt)
+- `Signature` was removed: just use raw bytes or hex now
+- `utils` were split into `utils` (same api as in noble-curves) and
+  `etc` (`sha512Sync` and others)
+- `getSharedSecret` was moved to `x25519` module
+- `toX25519` has been moved to `edwardsToMontgomeryPub` and `edwardsToMontgomeryPriv` methods
+
+Upgrading from [@noble/bls12-381](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-bls12-381):
+
+- Methods and classes were renamed:
+  - PointG1 -> G1.Point, PointG2 -> G2.Point
+  - PointG2.fromSignature -> Signature.decode, PointG2.toSignature -> Signature.encode
+- Fp2 ORDER was corrected
+
+## Contributing & testing
+
+- `npm install && npm run build && npm test` will build the code and run tests.
+- `npm run lint` / `npm run format` will run linter / fix linter issues.
+- `npm run bench` will run benchmarks, which may need their deps first (`npm run bench:install`)
+- `npm run build:release` will build single file
+
+Check out [github.com/paulmillr/guidelines](https://github.com/paulmillr/guidelines)
+for general coding practices and rules.
+
+See [paulmillr.com/noble](https://paulmillr.com/noble/)
+for useful resources, articles, documentation and demos
+related to the library.
+
+MuSig2 signature scheme and BIP324 ElligatorSwift mapping for secp256k1
+are available [in a separate package](https://github.com/paulmillr/scure-btc-signer).
+
+## License
+
+The MIT License (MIT)
+
+Copyright (c) 2022 Paul Miller [(https://paulmillr.com)](https://paulmillr.com)
+
+See LICENSE file.