@metamask-previews/kyc-controller 0.0.0-preview-e57e5c3dc → 0.0.0-preview-c449b8da8

package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.d.mts

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-import type { UkycClientMaterial } from "./deriveClientMaterial.mjs";
-/**
- * Mints `storage_access_token` capabilities — the client-signed, scoped,
- * session-bound proofs that authorize UKYC storage operations. See the
- * architecture doc, section "Storage Authentication".
- *
- * The token is Ed25519 over RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON of the payload. Only
- * the client holds the private `signing_key`, so only the client can mint a
- * token; a `read`/`write`-scoped token may then be handed to the Relay to
- * present, but `delete` is never delegated.
- */
-/**
- * Storage operations a `storage_access_token` can authorize.
- */
-export type UkycStorageOperation = 'read' | 'write' | 'delete';
-/**
- * Who presents the token to UKYC storage. The Relay may only present
- * `read`/`write` tokens; `delete` is always client-presented.
- */
-export type UkycTokenPresenter = 'client' | 'idos-relay';
-/**
- * The signed `storage_access_token` payload. Field names are snake_case because
- * they are canonicalized and hashed exactly as they appear on the wire.
- */
-export type UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload = {
-    version: number;
-    /** Every verifier that may accept the token, e.g. UKYC Storage and idOS Kwil. */
-    aud: string[];
-    storage_id: string;
-    signing_public_key: string;
-    operations: UkycStorageOperation[];
-    presenter: UkycTokenPresenter;
-    /** UKYC session id. Required (and only present) when presenter is `idos-relay`. */
-    session_id?: string;
-    issued_at: string;
-    expires_at: string;
-};
-/**
- * The on-the-wire envelope: the payload plus its detached Ed25519 signature
- * (base64url) over the JCS canonicalization of the payload.
- */
-export type UkycStorageAccessToken = {
-    payload: UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload;
-    signature: string;
-};
-/**
- * Inputs for minting a `storage_access_token`.
- */
-export type SignStorageAccessTokenParams = {
-    /** Client material derived from `local_user_secret`. */
-    material: UkycClientMaterial;
-    /** Operations the token authorizes. `delete` must be the sole operation. */
-    operations: UkycStorageOperation[];
-    /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */
-    presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;
-    /** UKYC session id. Required when presenter is `idos-relay`. */
-    sessionId?: string;
-    /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */
-    issuedAt?: Date;
-    /** Token expiry. Must be strictly after `issuedAt`. */
-    expiresAt: Date;
-};
-type JsonValue = null | boolean | number | string | JsonValue[] | {
-    [key: string]: JsonValue | undefined;
-};
-/**
- * Serializes a JSON value to RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form.
- *
- * Scope note: this implementation covers the JSON shapes used by UKYC storage
- * payloads — objects, arrays, strings, integers, booleans, and null. Object
- * members are sorted by their UTF-16 code units (matching JS default string
- * ordering, which is what JCS requires) and `undefined` members are dropped.
- * Non-finite and non-integer numbers are rejected, since the payloads never
- * contain them and correct JCS number formatting for the general case is
- * intentionally out of scope here.
- *
- * @param value - The value to canonicalize.
- * @returns The canonical JSON string.
- */
-export declare function canonicalizeJson(value: JsonValue): string;
-/**
- * Builds and signs a `storage_access_token`.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link SignStorageAccessTokenParams}.
- * @returns The signed token envelope.
- */
-export declare function signStorageAccessToken(params: SignStorageAccessTokenParams): UkycStorageAccessToken;
-/**
- * Serializes a signed token to a compact string suitable for header transport
- * (`Authorization: AccessToken <token>`, see `UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME`). The
- * complete envelope is base64url-encoded; the private `signing_key` is never
- * included.
- *
- * @param token - The signed token envelope.
- * @returns The base64url-encoded envelope string.
- */
-export declare function encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(token: UkycStorageAccessToken): string;
-export {};
-//# sourceMappingURL=storageAccessToken.d.mts.map

package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.mjs

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-import { stringToBytes } from "@metamask/utils";
-import { ed25519 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
-import { UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCES, UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_VERSION } from "./constants.mjs";
-import { toBase64Url } from "../encoding.mjs";
-/**
- * Serializes a JSON value to RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form.
- *
- * Scope note: this implementation covers the JSON shapes used by UKYC storage
- * payloads — objects, arrays, strings, integers, booleans, and null. Object
- * members are sorted by their UTF-16 code units (matching JS default string
- * ordering, which is what JCS requires) and `undefined` members are dropped.
- * Non-finite and non-integer numbers are rejected, since the payloads never
- * contain them and correct JCS number formatting for the general case is
- * intentionally out of scope here.
- *
- * @param value - The value to canonicalize.
- * @returns The canonical JSON string.
- */
-export function canonicalizeJson(value) {
-    if (value === null) {
-        return 'null';
-    }
-    if (typeof value === 'boolean') {
-        return value ? 'true' : 'false';
-    }
-    if (typeof value === 'number') {
-        if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {
-            throw new Error('UKYC: cannot canonicalize a non-integer number for JCS.');
-        }
-        return JSON.stringify(value);
-    }
-    if (typeof value === 'string') {
-        return JSON.stringify(value);
-    }
-    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-        return `[${value.map((item) => canonicalizeJson(item)).join(',')}]`;
-    }
-    const entries = Object.keys(value)
-        .sort()
-        .reduce((acc, key) => {
-        const child = value[key];
-        if (child !== undefined) {
-            acc.push(`${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalizeJson(child)}`);
-        }
-        return acc;
-    }, []);
-    return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;
-}
-/**
- * Formats a date as RFC 3339 UTC with whole-second precision (e.g.
- * `2026-07-07T00:00:00Z`). `Date.prototype.toISOString` always emits
- * milliseconds (`...:00.000Z`); the `storage_access_token` wire format omits
- * fractional seconds, so the sub-second component is truncated (not rounded).
- *
- * @param date - The date to format.
- * @returns The RFC 3339 timestamp without fractional seconds.
- */
-function toRfc3339Seconds(date) {
-    return `${date.toISOString().slice(0, 19)}Z`;
-}
-/**
- * Builds and signs a `storage_access_token`.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link SignStorageAccessTokenParams}.
- * @returns The signed token envelope.
- */
-export function signStorageAccessToken(params) {
-    const { material, operations, presenter = 'client', sessionId, issuedAt = new Date(), expiresAt, } = params;
-    assertValidOperations(operations);
-    if (expiresAt.getTime() <= issuedAt.getTime()) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: storage_access_token expires_at must be after issued_at.');
-    }
-    const isDelete = operations.includes('delete');
-    if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && isDelete) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token cannot be delegated to the Relay.');
-    }
-    if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && !sessionId) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: a Relay-presented storage_access_token requires a session_id.');
-    }
-    const payload = {
-        version: UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_VERSION,
-        aud: [...UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCES],
-        storage_id: toBase64Url(material.storageId),
-        signing_public_key: toBase64Url(material.signingPublicKey),
-        operations,
-        presenter,
-        issued_at: toRfc3339Seconds(issuedAt),
-        expires_at: toRfc3339Seconds(expiresAt),
-    };
-    // Only bind session_id for Relay-presented tokens; omit the key entirely for
-    // client-presented tokens so it does not appear in the canonicalized payload.
-    if (presenter === 'idos-relay') {
-        payload.session_id = sessionId;
-    }
-    const message = stringToBytes(canonicalizeJson(payload));
-    const signature = ed25519.sign(message, material.signingKey);
-    return {
-        payload,
-        signature: toBase64Url(signature),
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Serializes a signed token to a compact string suitable for header transport
- * (`Authorization: AccessToken <token>`, see `UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME`). The
- * complete envelope is base64url-encoded; the private `signing_key` is never
- * included.
- *
- * @param token - The signed token envelope.
- * @returns The base64url-encoded envelope string.
- */
-export function encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(token) {
-    return toBase64Url(stringToBytes(JSON.stringify(token)));
-}
-/**
- * Validates that an operations list is one storage understands: a non-empty set
- * of `read`/`write`, or exactly `['delete']`. `delete` is never combined with
- * other operations.
- *
- * @param operations - The requested operations.
- */
-function assertValidOperations(operations) {
-    if (operations.length === 0) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: storage_access_token requires at least one operation.');
-    }
-    const unique = new Set(operations);
-    if (unique.size !== operations.length) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: storage_access_token operations must be unique.');
-    }
-    if (unique.has('delete') && operations.length > 1) {
-        throw new Error('UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token must contain only "delete".');
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=storageAccessToken.mjs.map

package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.mjs.map

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See the\n * architecture doc, section \"Storage Authentication\".\n *\n * The token is Ed25519 over RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON of the payload. Only\n * the client holds the private `signing_key`, so only the client can mint a\n * token; a `read`/`write`-scoped token may then be handed to the Relay to\n * present, but `delete` is never delegated.\n */\n\n/**\n * Storage operations a `storage_access_token` can authorize.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageOperation = 'read' | 'write' | 'delete';\n\n/**\n * Who presents the token to UKYC storage. The Relay may only present\n * `read`/`write` tokens; `delete` is always client-presented.\n */\nexport type UkycTokenPresenter = 'client' | 'idos-relay';\n\n/**\n * The signed `storage_access_token` payload. Field names are snake_case because\n * they are canonicalized and hashed exactly as they appear on the wire.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload = {\n  version: number;\n  /** Every verifier that may accept the token, e.g. UKYC Storage and idOS Kwil. */\n  aud: string[];\n  // Wire-shape fields are snake_case; they are canonicalized and signed exactly\n  // as they appear on the wire.\n  /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/naming-convention */\n  storage_id: string;\n  signing_public_key: string;\n  operations: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  presenter: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required (and only present) when presenter is `idos-relay`. */\n  session_id?: string;\n  issued_at: string;\n  expires_at: string;\n  /* eslint-enable @typescript-eslint/naming-convention */\n};\n\n/**\n * The on-the-wire envelope: the payload plus its detached Ed25519 signature\n * (base64url) over the JCS canonicalization of the payload.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageAccessToken = {\n  payload: UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload;\n  signature: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Inputs for minting a `storage_access_token`.\n */\nexport type SignStorageAccessTokenParams = {\n  /** Client material derived from `local_user_secret`. */\n  material: UkycClientMaterial;\n  /** Operations the token authorizes. `delete` must be the sole operation. */\n  operations: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */\n  presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required when presenter is `idos-relay`. */\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */\n  issuedAt?: Date;\n  /** Token expiry. Must be strictly after `issuedAt`. */\n  expiresAt: Date;\n};\n\ntype JsonValue =\n  | null\n  | boolean\n  | number\n  | string\n  | JsonValue[]\n  | { [key: string]: JsonValue | undefined };\n\n/**\n * Serializes a JSON value to RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form.\n *\n * Scope note: this implementation covers the JSON shapes used by UKYC storage\n * payloads — objects, arrays, strings, integers, booleans, and null. Object\n * members are sorted by their UTF-16 code units (matching JS default string\n * ordering, which is what JCS requires) and `undefined` members are dropped.\n * Non-finite and non-integer numbers are rejected, since the payloads never\n * contain them and correct JCS number formatting for the general case is\n * intentionally out of scope here.\n *\n * @param value - The value to canonicalize.\n * @returns The canonical JSON string.\n */\nexport function canonicalizeJson(value: JsonValue): string {\n  if (value === null) {\n    return 'null';\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'boolean') {\n    return value ? 'true' : 'false';\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'number') {\n    if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'UKYC: cannot canonicalize a non-integer number for JCS.',\n      );\n    }\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return `[${value.map((item) => canonicalizeJson(item)).join(',')}]`;\n  }\n\n  const entries = Object.keys(value)\n    .sort()\n    .reduce<string[]>((acc, key) => {\n      const child = value[key];\n      if (child !== undefined) {\n        acc.push(`${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalizeJson(child)}`);\n      }\n      return acc;\n    }, []);\n\n  return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats a date as RFC 3339 UTC with whole-second precision (e.g.\n * `2026-07-07T00:00:00Z`). `Date.prototype.toISOString` always emits\n * milliseconds (`...:00.000Z`); the `storage_access_token` wire format omits\n * fractional seconds, so the sub-second component is truncated (not rounded).\n *\n * @param date - The date to format.\n * @returns The RFC 3339 timestamp without fractional seconds.\n */\nfunction toRfc3339Seconds(date: Date): string {\n  return `${date.toISOString().slice(0, 19)}Z`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds and signs a `storage_access_token`.\n *\n * @param params - See {@link SignStorageAccessTokenParams}.\n * @returns The signed token envelope.\n */\nexport function signStorageAccessToken(\n  params: SignStorageAccessTokenParams,\n): UkycStorageAccessToken {\n  const {\n    material,\n    operations,\n    presenter = 'client',\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt = new Date(),\n    expiresAt,\n  } = params;\n\n  assertValidOperations(operations);\n\n  if (expiresAt.getTime() <= issuedAt.getTime()) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: storage_access_token expires_at must be after issued_at.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const isDelete = operations.includes('delete');\n\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && isDelete) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token cannot be delegated to the Relay.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && !sessionId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a Relay-presented storage_access_token requires a session_id.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const payload: UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload = {\n    version: UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_VERSION,\n    aud: [...UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCES],\n    storage_id: toBase64Url(material.storageId),\n    signing_public_key: toBase64Url(material.signingPublicKey),\n    operations,\n    presenter,\n    issued_at: toRfc3339Seconds(issuedAt),\n    expires_at: toRfc3339Seconds(expiresAt),\n  };\n\n  // Only bind session_id for Relay-presented tokens; omit the key entirely for\n  // client-presented tokens so it does not appear in the canonicalized payload.\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay') {\n    payload.session_id = sessionId;\n  }\n\n  const message = stringToBytes(canonicalizeJson(payload));\n  const signature = ed25519.sign(message, material.signingKey);\n\n  return {\n    payload,\n    signature: toBase64Url(signature),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Serializes a signed token to a compact string suitable for header transport\n * (`Authorization: AccessToken <token>`, see `UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME`). The\n * complete envelope is base64url-encoded; the private `signing_key` is never\n * included.\n *\n * @param token - The signed token envelope.\n * @returns The base64url-encoded envelope string.\n */\nexport function encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(\n  token: UkycStorageAccessToken,\n): string {\n  return toBase64Url(stringToBytes(JSON.stringify(token)));\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates that an operations list is one storage understands: a non-empty set\n * of `read`/`write`, or exactly `['delete']`. `delete` is never combined with\n * other operations.\n *\n * @param operations - The requested operations.\n */\nfunction assertValidOperations(operations: UkycStorageOperation[]): void {\n  if (operations.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: storage_access_token requires at least one operation.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const unique = new Set(operations);\n\n  if (unique.size !== operations.length) {\n    throw new Error('UKYC: storage_access_token operations must be unique.');\n  }\n\n  if (unique.has('delete') && operations.length > 1) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token must contain only \"delete\".',\n    );\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.cjs

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.mintUkycTestToken = void 0;
-const utils_1 = require("@noble/hashes/utils");
-const constants_js_1 = require("./constants.cjs");
-const deriveClientMaterial_js_1 = require("./deriveClientMaterial.cjs");
-const storageAccessToken_js_1 = require("./storageAccessToken.cjs");
-/**
- * Mints ready-to-use UKYC `storage_access_token`s for testing UKYC Storage.
- *
- * This composes the same pure functions the MetaMask client uses in production
- * (`deriveClientMaterial` + `signStorageAccessToken`), so a third party such as
- * idOS can produce a valid, signed token without deriving one on-device. No
- * server "fills in" the `signing_public_key`: it is derived from a
- * `local_user_secret` the caller controls and registered on first write, so
- * reusing the same secret yields a stable `storage_id` and controlling key.
- */
-/** Default token lifetime when `expiresAt` is not supplied (4 hours). */
-const DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-/**
- * Resolves the caller-supplied secret into raw bytes, generating a random one
- * when none is provided.
- *
- * @param secret - Raw 32 bytes, a hex string, or undefined for a random secret.
- * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes.
- */
-function resolveLocalUserSecret(secret) {
-    if (secret === undefined) {
-        return (0, utils_1.randomBytes)(constants_js_1.UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES);
-    }
-    return typeof secret === 'string' ? (0, utils_1.hexToBytes)(secret) : secret;
-}
-/**
- * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.
- * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.
- */
-function mintUkycTestToken(params = {}) {
-    const { operations = ['read'], presenter, sessionId, issuedAt = new Date(), expiresAt = new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS), } = params;
-    const localUserSecret = resolveLocalUserSecret(params.localUserSecret);
-    const material = (0, deriveClientMaterial_js_1.deriveClientMaterial)(localUserSecret);
-    const token = (0, storageAccessToken_js_1.signStorageAccessToken)({
-        material,
-        operations,
-        presenter,
-        sessionId,
-        issuedAt,
-        expiresAt,
-    });
-    const { storageId, signingPublicKey } = (0, deriveClientMaterial_js_1.encodeClientMaterial)(material);
-    return {
-        localUserSecret: (0, utils_1.bytesToHex)(localUserSecret),
-        storageId,
-        signingPublicKey,
-        token,
-        authorizationHeader: `${constants_js_1.UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME} ${(0, storageAccessToken_js_1.encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader)(token)}`,
-    };
-}
-exports.mintUkycTestToken = mintUkycTestToken;
-//# sourceMappingURL=testToken.cjs.map

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.cjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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No\n * server \"fills in\" the `signing_public_key`: it is derived from a\n * `local_user_secret` the caller controls and registered on first write, so\n * reusing the same secret yields a stable `storage_id` and controlling key.\n */\n\n/** Default token lifetime when `expiresAt` is not supplied (4 hours). */\nconst DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1000;\n\n/**\n * Inputs for {@link mintUkycTestToken}. All fields are optional; the only value\n * a caller usually pins is `localUserSecret`, so `storage_id` and the signing\n * key stay stable across runs.\n */\nexport type MintUkycTestTokenParams = {\n  /**\n   * The root `local_user_secret`, as raw 32 bytes or a hex string. When omitted\n   * a fresh random secret is generated (returned in the result so it can be\n   * reused).\n   */\n  localUserSecret?: Uint8Array | string;\n  /** Operations the token authorizes. Defaults to `['read']`. */\n  operations?: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */\n  presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required when `presenter` is `idos-relay`. */\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */\n  issuedAt?: Date;\n  /** Token expiry. Defaults to `issuedAt` + 4 hours. */\n  expiresAt?: Date;\n};\n\n/**\n * The minted token plus everything needed to exercise UKYC Storage with it.\n */\nexport type MintedUkycTestToken = {\n  /** The `local_user_secret` used, hex-encoded, so the caller can reuse it. */\n  localUserSecret: string;\n  /** base64url `storage_id` — use it as the `{storage_id}` path segment. */\n  storageId: string;\n  /** base64url `signing_public_key` registered on first write. */\n  signingPublicKey: string;\n  /** The signed token envelope (payload + signature). */\n  token: UkycStorageAccessToken;\n  /**\n   * The full `Authorization` header value, e.g.\n   * `AccessToken <base64url(envelope)>`, ready to send to UKYC Storage.\n   */\n  authorizationHeader: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolves the caller-supplied secret into raw bytes, generating a random one\n * when none is provided.\n *\n * @param secret - Raw 32 bytes, a hex string, or undefined for a random secret.\n * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes.\n */\nfunction resolveLocalUserSecret(secret?: Uint8Array | string): Uint8Array {\n  if (secret === undefined) {\n    return randomBytes(UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES);\n  }\n  return typeof secret === 'string' ? hexToBytes(secret) : secret;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.\n *\n * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.\n * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.\n */\nexport function mintUkycTestToken(\n  params: MintUkycTestTokenParams = {},\n): MintedUkycTestToken {\n  const {\n    operations = ['read'],\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt = new Date(),\n    expiresAt = new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS),\n  } = params;\n\n  const localUserSecret = resolveLocalUserSecret(params.localUserSecret);\n  const material = deriveClientMaterial(localUserSecret);\n\n  const token = signStorageAccessToken({\n    material,\n    operations,\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  });\n\n  const { storageId, signingPublicKey } = encodeClientMaterial(material);\n\n  return {\n    localUserSecret: bytesToHex(localUserSecret),\n    storageId,\n    signingPublicKey,\n    token,\n    authorizationHeader: `${UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME} ${encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(\n      token,\n    )}`,\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.d.cts

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-import type { UkycStorageAccessToken, UkycStorageOperation, UkycTokenPresenter } from "./storageAccessToken.cjs";
-/**
- * Inputs for {@link mintUkycTestToken}. All fields are optional; the only value
- * a caller usually pins is `localUserSecret`, so `storage_id` and the signing
- * key stay stable across runs.
- */
-export type MintUkycTestTokenParams = {
-    /**
-     * The root `local_user_secret`, as raw 32 bytes or a hex string. When omitted
-     * a fresh random secret is generated (returned in the result so it can be
-     * reused).
-     */
-    localUserSecret?: Uint8Array | string;
-    /** Operations the token authorizes. Defaults to `['read']`. */
-    operations?: UkycStorageOperation[];
-    /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */
-    presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;
-    /** UKYC session id. Required when `presenter` is `idos-relay`. */
-    sessionId?: string;
-    /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */
-    issuedAt?: Date;
-    /** Token expiry. Defaults to `issuedAt` + 4 hours. */
-    expiresAt?: Date;
-};
-/**
- * The minted token plus everything needed to exercise UKYC Storage with it.
- */
-export type MintedUkycTestToken = {
-    /** The `local_user_secret` used, hex-encoded, so the caller can reuse it. */
-    localUserSecret: string;
-    /** base64url `storage_id` — use it as the `{storage_id}` path segment. */
-    storageId: string;
-    /** base64url `signing_public_key` registered on first write. */
-    signingPublicKey: string;
-    /** The signed token envelope (payload + signature). */
-    token: UkycStorageAccessToken;
-    /**
-     * The full `Authorization` header value, e.g.
-     * `AccessToken <base64url(envelope)>`, ready to send to UKYC Storage.
-     */
-    authorizationHeader: string;
-};
-/**
- * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.
- * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.
- */
-export declare function mintUkycTestToken(params?: MintUkycTestTokenParams): MintedUkycTestToken;
-//# sourceMappingURL=testToken.d.cts.map

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/testToken.d.mts

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-import type { UkycStorageAccessToken, UkycStorageOperation, UkycTokenPresenter } from "./storageAccessToken.mjs";
-/**
- * Inputs for {@link mintUkycTestToken}. All fields are optional; the only value
- * a caller usually pins is `localUserSecret`, so `storage_id` and the signing
- * key stay stable across runs.
- */
-export type MintUkycTestTokenParams = {
-    /**
-     * The root `local_user_secret`, as raw 32 bytes or a hex string. When omitted
-     * a fresh random secret is generated (returned in the result so it can be
-     * reused).
-     */
-    localUserSecret?: Uint8Array | string;
-    /** Operations the token authorizes. Defaults to `['read']`. */
-    operations?: UkycStorageOperation[];
-    /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */
-    presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;
-    /** UKYC session id. Required when `presenter` is `idos-relay`. */
-    sessionId?: string;
-    /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */
-    issuedAt?: Date;
-    /** Token expiry. Defaults to `issuedAt` + 4 hours. */
-    expiresAt?: Date;
-};
-/**
- * The minted token plus everything needed to exercise UKYC Storage with it.
- */
-export type MintedUkycTestToken = {
-    /** The `local_user_secret` used, hex-encoded, so the caller can reuse it. */
-    localUserSecret: string;
-    /** base64url `storage_id` — use it as the `{storage_id}` path segment. */
-    storageId: string;
-    /** base64url `signing_public_key` registered on first write. */
-    signingPublicKey: string;
-    /** The signed token envelope (payload + signature). */
-    token: UkycStorageAccessToken;
-    /**
-     * The full `Authorization` header value, e.g.
-     * `AccessToken <base64url(envelope)>`, ready to send to UKYC Storage.
-     */
-    authorizationHeader: string;
-};
-/**
- * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.
- * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.
- */
-export declare function mintUkycTestToken(params?: MintUkycTestTokenParams): MintedUkycTestToken;
-//# sourceMappingURL=testToken.d.mts.map

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/testToken.mjs

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes, randomBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils";
-import { UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME, UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES } from "./constants.mjs";
-import { deriveClientMaterial, encodeClientMaterial } from "./deriveClientMaterial.mjs";
-import { encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader, signStorageAccessToken } from "./storageAccessToken.mjs";
-/**
- * Mints ready-to-use UKYC `storage_access_token`s for testing UKYC Storage.
- *
- * This composes the same pure functions the MetaMask client uses in production
- * (`deriveClientMaterial` + `signStorageAccessToken`), so a third party such as
- * idOS can produce a valid, signed token without deriving one on-device. No
- * server "fills in" the `signing_public_key`: it is derived from a
- * `local_user_secret` the caller controls and registered on first write, so
- * reusing the same secret yields a stable `storage_id` and controlling key.
- */
-/** Default token lifetime when `expiresAt` is not supplied (4 hours). */
-const DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-/**
- * Resolves the caller-supplied secret into raw bytes, generating a random one
- * when none is provided.
- *
- * @param secret - Raw 32 bytes, a hex string, or undefined for a random secret.
- * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes.
- */
-function resolveLocalUserSecret(secret) {
-    if (secret === undefined) {
-        return randomBytes(UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES);
-    }
-    return typeof secret === 'string' ? hexToBytes(secret) : secret;
-}
-/**
- * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.
- *
- * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.
- * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.
- */
-export function mintUkycTestToken(params = {}) {
-    const { operations = ['read'], presenter, sessionId, issuedAt = new Date(), expiresAt = new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS), } = params;
-    const localUserSecret = resolveLocalUserSecret(params.localUserSecret);
-    const material = deriveClientMaterial(localUserSecret);
-    const token = signStorageAccessToken({
-        material,
-        operations,
-        presenter,
-        sessionId,
-        issuedAt,
-        expiresAt,
-    });
-    const { storageId, signingPublicKey } = encodeClientMaterial(material);
-    return {
-        localUserSecret: bytesToHex(localUserSecret),
-        storageId,
-        signingPublicKey,
-        token,
-        authorizationHeader: `${UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME} ${encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(token)}`,
-    };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=testToken.mjs.map

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.mjs.map

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No\n * server \"fills in\" the `signing_public_key`: it is derived from a\n * `local_user_secret` the caller controls and registered on first write, so\n * reusing the same secret yields a stable `storage_id` and controlling key.\n */\n\n/** Default token lifetime when `expiresAt` is not supplied (4 hours). */\nconst DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1000;\n\n/**\n * Inputs for {@link mintUkycTestToken}. All fields are optional; the only value\n * a caller usually pins is `localUserSecret`, so `storage_id` and the signing\n * key stay stable across runs.\n */\nexport type MintUkycTestTokenParams = {\n  /**\n   * The root `local_user_secret`, as raw 32 bytes or a hex string. When omitted\n   * a fresh random secret is generated (returned in the result so it can be\n   * reused).\n   */\n  localUserSecret?: Uint8Array | string;\n  /** Operations the token authorizes. Defaults to `['read']`. */\n  operations?: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */\n  presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required when `presenter` is `idos-relay`. */\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */\n  issuedAt?: Date;\n  /** Token expiry. Defaults to `issuedAt` + 4 hours. */\n  expiresAt?: Date;\n};\n\n/**\n * The minted token plus everything needed to exercise UKYC Storage with it.\n */\nexport type MintedUkycTestToken = {\n  /** The `local_user_secret` used, hex-encoded, so the caller can reuse it. */\n  localUserSecret: string;\n  /** base64url `storage_id` — use it as the `{storage_id}` path segment. */\n  storageId: string;\n  /** base64url `signing_public_key` registered on first write. */\n  signingPublicKey: string;\n  /** The signed token envelope (payload + signature). */\n  token: UkycStorageAccessToken;\n  /**\n   * The full `Authorization` header value, e.g.\n   * `AccessToken <base64url(envelope)>`, ready to send to UKYC Storage.\n   */\n  authorizationHeader: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolves the caller-supplied secret into raw bytes, generating a random one\n * when none is provided.\n *\n * @param secret - Raw 32 bytes, a hex string, or undefined for a random secret.\n * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes.\n */\nfunction resolveLocalUserSecret(secret?: Uint8Array | string): Uint8Array {\n  if (secret === undefined) {\n    return randomBytes(UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES);\n  }\n  return typeof secret === 'string' ? hexToBytes(secret) : secret;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.\n *\n * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.\n * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.\n */\nexport function mintUkycTestToken(\n  params: MintUkycTestTokenParams = {},\n): MintedUkycTestToken {\n  const {\n    operations = ['read'],\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt = new Date(),\n    expiresAt = new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS),\n  } = params;\n\n  const localUserSecret = resolveLocalUserSecret(params.localUserSecret);\n  const material = deriveClientMaterial(localUserSecret);\n\n  const token = signStorageAccessToken({\n    material,\n    operations,\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  });\n\n  const { storageId, signingPublicKey } = encodeClientMaterial(material);\n\n  return {\n    localUserSecret: bytesToHex(localUserSecret),\n    storageId,\n    signingPublicKey,\n    token,\n    authorizationHeader: `${UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME} ${encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(\n      token,\n    )}`,\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.cjs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.wrapEncryptionKey = void 0;
-const tweetnacl_1 = require("tweetnacl");
-const encoding_js_1 = require("../encoding.cjs");
-/**
- * Wraps `keyToWrap` for the UKYC session server.
- *
- * The box is sealed with NaCl's `crypto_box`, keyed by the X25519 shared secret
- * between our session client private key and the session server public key
- * returned by `getWrappingKey`.
- *
- * @param sessionClientPrivateKey - Our session's X25519 private key.
- * @param sessionServerPublicKey - The server's X25519 public key (base64url).
- * @param keyToWrap - The raw symmetric key bytes to encrypt.
- * @returns The base64url `encryptedKey` (ciphertext + tag) and `nonce`.
- */
-function wrapEncryptionKey(sessionClientPrivateKey, sessionServerPublicKey, keyToWrap) {
-    const serverPublicKey = (0, encoding_js_1.base64UrlToBytes)(sessionServerPublicKey);
-    const nonce = (0, tweetnacl_1.randomBytes)(tweetnacl_1.box.nonceLength);
-    const encryptedKey = (0, tweetnacl_1.box)(keyToWrap, nonce, serverPublicKey, sessionClientPrivateKey);
-    return {
-        encryptedKey: (0, encoding_js_1.toBase64Url)(encryptedKey),
-        nonce: (0, encoding_js_1.toBase64Url)(nonce),
-    };
-}
-exports.wrapEncryptionKey = wrapEncryptionKey;
-//# sourceMappingURL=wrapEncryptionKey.cjs.map

package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.cjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.d.cts

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Wraps the `data_encryption_key` for the UKYC session server using NaCl's
- * `crypto_box` (X25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305) established with the server's
- * per-session wrapping key.
- *
- * Unlike {@link wrapUserKey} (which generates a fresh ephemeral keypair per
- * call), this uses the session client keypair whose public half was already
- * handed to the server via `POST /wrapping-key`. The server therefore already
- * knows our public key and can derive the same shared secret from its session
- * private key, so only `{ encryptedKey, nonce }` need be transmitted.
- */
-/**
- * The transmitted portion of a wrapped encryption key: the `crypto_box`
- * ciphertext (which includes the 16-byte Poly1305 auth tag) and the nonce,
- * both unpadded base64url-encoded.
- */
-export type WrappedEncryptionKeyParts = {
-    encryptedKey: string;
-    nonce: string;
-};
-/**
- * Wraps `keyToWrap` for the UKYC session server.
- *
- * The box is sealed with NaCl's `crypto_box`, keyed by the X25519 shared secret
- * between our session client private key and the session server public key
- * returned by `getWrappingKey`.
- *
- * @param sessionClientPrivateKey - Our session's X25519 private key.
- * @param sessionServerPublicKey - The server's X25519 public key (base64url).
- * @param keyToWrap - The raw symmetric key bytes to encrypt.
- * @returns The base64url `encryptedKey` (ciphertext + tag) and `nonce`.
- */
-export declare function wrapEncryptionKey(sessionClientPrivateKey: Uint8Array, sessionServerPublicKey: string, keyToWrap: Uint8Array): WrappedEncryptionKeyParts;
-//# sourceMappingURL=wrapEncryptionKey.d.cts.map

package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.d.mts

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Wraps the `data_encryption_key` for the UKYC session server using NaCl's
- * `crypto_box` (X25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305) established with the server's
- * per-session wrapping key.
- *
- * Unlike {@link wrapUserKey} (which generates a fresh ephemeral keypair per
- * call), this uses the session client keypair whose public half was already
- * handed to the server via `POST /wrapping-key`. The server therefore already
- * knows our public key and can derive the same shared secret from its session
- * private key, so only `{ encryptedKey, nonce }` need be transmitted.
- */
-/**
- * The transmitted portion of a wrapped encryption key: the `crypto_box`
- * ciphertext (which includes the 16-byte Poly1305 auth tag) and the nonce,
- * both unpadded base64url-encoded.
- */
-export type WrappedEncryptionKeyParts = {
-    encryptedKey: string;
-    nonce: string;
-};
-/**
- * Wraps `keyToWrap` for the UKYC session server.
- *
- * The box is sealed with NaCl's `crypto_box`, keyed by the X25519 shared secret
- * between our session client private key and the session server public key
- * returned by `getWrappingKey`.
- *
- * @param sessionClientPrivateKey - Our session's X25519 private key.
- * @param sessionServerPublicKey - The server's X25519 public key (base64url).
- * @param keyToWrap - The raw symmetric key bytes to encrypt.
- * @returns The base64url `encryptedKey` (ciphertext + tag) and `nonce`.
- */
-export declare function wrapEncryptionKey(sessionClientPrivateKey: Uint8Array, sessionServerPublicKey: string, keyToWrap: Uint8Array): WrappedEncryptionKeyParts;
-//# sourceMappingURL=wrapEncryptionKey.d.mts.map