@metamask-previews/kyc-controller 0.0.0-preview-4f4c98e → 0.0.0-preview-eb263b0ee

package/dist/ukyc/jwtChain.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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Returns the decoded, verified payload.\n *\n * @param keys - The JWKS keys published by the Fractal encryption service.\n * @param jwtChain - The compact-serialized EdDSA JWT from an encryption schema.\n * @returns The verified JWT payload.\n */\nexport function verifyJwtChain(keys: Jwk[], jwtChain: string): JwtChainPayload {\n  const [headerSegment, payloadSegment, signatureSegment] = jwtChain.split('.');\n  if (!headerSegment || !payloadSegment || !signatureSegment) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: jwtChain is not a well-formed JWT (expected 3 segments).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const header = decodeJsonSegment<JwtHeader>(headerSegment, 'header');\n  if (header.alg !== 'EdDSA') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UKYC: unsupported jwtChain alg \"${String(\n        header.alg,\n      )}\" (expected EdDSA).`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const jwk = keys.find((key) => key.kid === header.kid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UKYC: no JWKS key matches jwtChain kid \"${String(header.kid)}\".`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UKYC: JWKS key ${jwk.kid} is not an Ed25519 OKP key (kty=${jwk.kty}, crv=${jwk.crv}).`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const isValid = ed25519.verify(\n    base64UrlToBytes(signatureSegment),\n    new TextEncoder().encode(`${headerSegment}.${payloadSegment}`),\n    base64UrlToBytes(jwk.x),\n  );\n  if (!isValid) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: jwtChain signature verification failed against JWKS.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  return decodeJsonSegment<JwtChainPayload>(payloadSegment, 'payload');\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/localUserSecret.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/localUserSecret.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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It is generated once, on first enrollment, and persisted to\n * MetaMask Encrypted User Storage. It is never transmitted off the device, not\n * even to the idOS Relay. Every subsequent value (`storage_id`,\n * `data_encryption_key`, `signing_key`, `relay_tunnel_key`) is derived from it\n * via HKDF — see `deriveClientMaterial`.\n *\n * This module is platform-agnostic: the Encrypted User Storage backing is\n * injected as a {@link UkycLocalUserSecretStore} so the controller (which owns\n * the messenger) supplies the concrete `UserStorageController` calls.\n */\n\n/**\n * The Encrypted User Storage operations this module needs. On MetaMask clients\n * these are backed by `UserStorageController:performGetStorage` /\n * `performSetStorage`.\n */\nexport type UkycLocalUserSecretStore = {\n  /**\n   * Reads the base64 string stored at `path`, or `null` if none exists.\n   */\n  get: (path: string, entropySourceId?: string) => Promise<string | null>;\n  /**\n   * Writes the base64 string `value` at `path`.\n   */\n  set: (path: string, value: string, entropySourceId?: string) => Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * In-flight `getOrCreateLocalUserSecret` calls, keyed by entropy source.\n * Deduplicates concurrent enrollments in a single client session so we never\n * generate and persist two competing `local_user_secret`s for the same source.\n */\nconst inFlightCreations = new Map<string, Promise<Uint8Array>>();\n\n/**\n * Loads the persisted `local_user_secret` from Encrypted User Storage, if one\n * exists.\n *\n * @param store - The Encrypted User Storage adapter.\n * @param entropySourceId - Optional HD keyring entropy source id, used to scope\n * the secret to a specific SRP in multi-SRP wallets. Defaults to the primary SRP.\n * @returns The decoded `local_user_secret` bytes, or `null` if none has been\n * enrolled.\n */\nexport async function loadLocalUserSecret(\n  store: UkycLocalUserSecretStore,\n  entropySourceId?: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n  const stored = await store.get(UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_PATH, entropySourceId);\n\n  if (!stored) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const localUserSecret = base64ToBytes(stored);\n\n  if (localUserSecret.length !== UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UKYC: stored local_user_secret has unexpected length ${localUserSecret.length}, expected ${UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  return localUserSecret;\n}\n\n/**\n * Persists a freshly generated `local_user_secret` to Encrypted User Storage.\n *\n * @param store - The Encrypted User Storage adapter.\n * @param localUserSecret - The `local_user_secret` bytes to persist.\n * @param entropySourceId - Optional HD keyring entropy source id.\n */\nasync function persistLocalUserSecret(\n  store: UkycLocalUserSecretStore,\n  localUserSecret: Uint8Array,\n  entropySourceId?: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  await store.set(\n    UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_PATH,\n    bytesToBase64(localUserSecret),\n    entropySourceId,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates the UKYC `local_user_secret` if it does not already exist, otherwise\n * loads the existing one. This is the single entry point used on UKYC\n * enrollment.\n *\n * The operation is idempotent and safe against concurrent callers in the same\n * session: repeated or parallel calls resolve to the same `local_user_secret`\n * and never generate more than one secret for a given entropy source.\n *\n * @param store - The Encrypted User Storage adapter.\n * @param entropySourceId - Optional HD keyring entropy source id, used to scope\n * the secret to a specific SRP in multi-SRP wallets. Defaults to the primary SRP.\n * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes (existing or newly created).\n */\nexport async function getOrCreateLocalUserSecret(\n  store: UkycLocalUserSecretStore,\n  entropySourceId?: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cacheKey = entropySourceId ?? 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package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/storageAccessToken.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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See the\n * architecture doc, section \"Storage Authentication\".\n *\n * The token is Ed25519 over RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON of the payload. Only\n * the client holds the private `signing_key`, so only the client can mint a\n * token; a `read`/`write`-scoped token may then be handed to the Relay to\n * present, but `delete` is never delegated.\n */\n\n/**\n * Storage operations a `storage_access_token` can authorize.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageOperation = 'read' | 'write' | 'delete';\n\n/**\n * Who presents the token to UKYC storage. The Relay may only present\n * `read`/`write` tokens; `delete` is always client-presented.\n */\nexport type UkycTokenPresenter = 'client' | 'idos-relay';\n\n/**\n * The signed `storage_access_token` payload. Field names are snake_case because\n * they are canonicalized and hashed exactly as they appear on the wire.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload = {\n  version: number;\n  /** Every verifier that may accept the token, e.g. UKYC Storage and idOS Kwil. */\n  aud: string[];\n  // Wire-shape fields are snake_case; they are canonicalized and signed exactly\n  // as they appear on the wire.\n  /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/naming-convention */\n  storage_id: string;\n  signing_public_key: string;\n  operations: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  presenter: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required (and only present) when presenter is `idos-relay`. */\n  session_id?: string;\n  issued_at: string;\n  expires_at: string;\n  /* eslint-enable @typescript-eslint/naming-convention */\n};\n\n/**\n * The on-the-wire envelope: the payload plus its detached Ed25519 signature\n * (base64url) over the JCS canonicalization of the payload.\n */\nexport type UkycStorageAccessToken = {\n  payload: UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload;\n  signature: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Inputs for minting a `storage_access_token`.\n */\nexport type SignStorageAccessTokenParams = {\n  /** Client material derived from `local_user_secret`. */\n  material: UkycClientMaterial;\n  /** Operations the token authorizes. `delete` must be the sole operation. */\n  operations: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */\n  presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required when presenter is `idos-relay`. */\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */\n  issuedAt?: Date;\n  /** Token expiry. Must be strictly after `issuedAt`. */\n  expiresAt: Date;\n};\n\ntype JsonValue =\n  | null\n  | boolean\n  | number\n  | string\n  | JsonValue[]\n  | { [key: string]: JsonValue | undefined };\n\n/**\n * Serializes a JSON value to RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form.\n *\n * Scope note: this implementation covers the JSON shapes used by UKYC storage\n * payloads — objects, arrays, strings, integers, booleans, and null. Object\n * members are sorted by their UTF-16 code units (matching JS default string\n * ordering, which is what JCS requires) and `undefined` members are dropped.\n * Non-finite and non-integer numbers are rejected, since the payloads never\n * contain them and correct JCS number formatting for the general case is\n * intentionally out of scope here.\n *\n * @param value - The value to canonicalize.\n * @returns The canonical JSON string.\n */\nexport function canonicalizeJson(value: JsonValue): string {\n  if (value === null) {\n    return 'null';\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'boolean') {\n    return value ? 'true' : 'false';\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'number') {\n    if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'UKYC: cannot canonicalize a non-integer number for JCS.',\n      );\n    }\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return `[${value.map((item) => canonicalizeJson(item)).join(',')}]`;\n  }\n\n  const entries = Object.keys(value)\n    .sort()\n    .reduce<string[]>((acc, key) => {\n      const child = value[key];\n      if (child !== undefined) {\n        acc.push(`${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalizeJson(child)}`);\n      }\n      return acc;\n    }, []);\n\n  return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats a date as RFC 3339 UTC with whole-second precision (e.g.\n * `2026-07-07T00:00:00Z`). `Date.prototype.toISOString` always emits\n * milliseconds (`...:00.000Z`); the `storage_access_token` wire format omits\n * fractional seconds, so the sub-second component is truncated (not rounded).\n *\n * @param date - The date to format.\n * @returns The RFC 3339 timestamp without fractional seconds.\n */\nfunction toRfc3339Seconds(date: Date): string {\n  return `${date.toISOString().slice(0, 19)}Z`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds and signs a `storage_access_token`.\n *\n * @param params - See {@link SignStorageAccessTokenParams}.\n * @returns The signed token envelope.\n */\nexport function signStorageAccessToken(\n  params: SignStorageAccessTokenParams,\n): UkycStorageAccessToken {\n  const {\n    material,\n    operations,\n    presenter = 'client',\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt = new Date(),\n    expiresAt,\n  } = params;\n\n  assertValidOperations(operations);\n\n  if (expiresAt.getTime() <= issuedAt.getTime()) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: storage_access_token expires_at must be after issued_at.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const isDelete = operations.includes('delete');\n\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && isDelete) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token cannot be delegated to the Relay.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay' && !sessionId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a Relay-presented storage_access_token requires a session_id.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const payload: UkycStorageAccessTokenPayload = {\n    version: UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_VERSION,\n    aud: [...UKYC_STORAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCES],\n    storage_id: toBase64Url(material.storageId),\n    signing_public_key: toBase64Url(material.signingPublicKey),\n    operations,\n    presenter,\n    issued_at: toRfc3339Seconds(issuedAt),\n    expires_at: toRfc3339Seconds(expiresAt),\n  };\n\n  // Only bind session_id for Relay-presented tokens; omit the key entirely for\n  // client-presented tokens so it does not appear in the canonicalized payload.\n  if (presenter === 'idos-relay') {\n    payload.session_id = sessionId;\n  }\n\n  const message = stringToBytes(canonicalizeJson(payload));\n  const signature = ed25519.sign(message, material.signingKey);\n\n  return {\n    payload,\n    signature: toBase64Url(signature),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Serializes a signed token to a compact string suitable for header transport\n * (`Authorization: AccessToken <token>`, see `UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME`). The\n * complete envelope is base64url-encoded; the private `signing_key` is never\n * included.\n *\n * @param token - The signed token envelope.\n * @returns The base64url-encoded envelope string.\n */\nexport function encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(\n  token: UkycStorageAccessToken,\n): string {\n  return toBase64Url(stringToBytes(JSON.stringify(token)));\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates that an operations list is one storage understands: a non-empty set\n * of `read`/`write`, or exactly `['delete']`. `delete` is never combined with\n * other operations.\n *\n * @param operations - The requested operations.\n */\nfunction assertValidOperations(operations: UkycStorageOperation[]): void {\n  if (operations.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: storage_access_token requires at least one operation.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const unique = new Set(operations);\n\n  if (unique.size !== operations.length) {\n    throw new Error('UKYC: storage_access_token operations must be unique.');\n  }\n\n  if (unique.has('delete') && operations.length > 1) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'UKYC: a delete-scoped storage_access_token must contain only \"delete\".',\n    );\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/testToken.d.ts.map

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package/dist/ukyc/testToken.js.map

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No\n * server \"fills in\" the `signing_public_key`: it is derived from a\n * `local_user_secret` the caller controls and registered on first write, so\n * reusing the same secret yields a stable `storage_id` and controlling key.\n */\n\n/** Default token lifetime when `expiresAt` is not supplied (4 hours). */\nconst DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1000;\n\n/**\n * Inputs for {@link mintUkycTestToken}. All fields are optional; the only value\n * a caller usually pins is `localUserSecret`, so `storage_id` and the signing\n * key stay stable across runs.\n */\nexport type MintUkycTestTokenParams = {\n  /**\n   * The root `local_user_secret`, as raw 32 bytes or a hex string. When omitted\n   * a fresh random secret is generated (returned in the result so it can be\n   * reused).\n   */\n  localUserSecret?: Uint8Array | string;\n  /** Operations the token authorizes. Defaults to `['read']`. */\n  operations?: UkycStorageOperation[];\n  /** Who will present the token. Defaults to `client`. */\n  presenter?: UkycTokenPresenter;\n  /** UKYC session id. Required when `presenter` is `idos-relay`. */\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** Token issue time. Defaults to now. */\n  issuedAt?: Date;\n  /** Token expiry. Defaults to `issuedAt` + 4 hours. */\n  expiresAt?: Date;\n};\n\n/**\n * The minted token plus everything needed to exercise UKYC Storage with it.\n */\nexport type MintedUkycTestToken = {\n  /** The `local_user_secret` used, hex-encoded, so the caller can reuse it. */\n  localUserSecret: string;\n  /** base64url `storage_id` — use it as the `{storage_id}` path segment. */\n  storageId: string;\n  /** base64url `signing_public_key` registered on first write. */\n  signingPublicKey: string;\n  /** The signed token envelope (payload + signature). */\n  token: UkycStorageAccessToken;\n  /**\n   * The full `Authorization` header value, e.g.\n   * `AccessToken <base64url(envelope)>`, ready to send to UKYC Storage.\n   */\n  authorizationHeader: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolves the caller-supplied secret into raw bytes, generating a random one\n * when none is provided.\n *\n * @param secret - Raw 32 bytes, a hex string, or undefined for a random secret.\n * @returns The `local_user_secret` bytes.\n */\nfunction resolveLocalUserSecret(secret?: Uint8Array | string): Uint8Array {\n  if (secret === undefined) {\n    return randomBytes(UKYC_LOCAL_USER_SECRET_SIZE_BYTES);\n  }\n  return typeof secret === 'string' ? hexToBytes(secret) : secret;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mints a signed UKYC `storage_access_token` for testing.\n *\n * @param params - See {@link MintUkycTestTokenParams}.\n * @returns The token, its `Authorization` header, and the derived identifiers.\n */\nexport function mintUkycTestToken(\n  params: MintUkycTestTokenParams = {},\n): MintedUkycTestToken {\n  const {\n    operations = ['read'],\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt = new Date(),\n    expiresAt = new Date(issuedAt.getTime() + DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS),\n  } = params;\n\n  const localUserSecret = resolveLocalUserSecret(params.localUserSecret);\n  const material = deriveClientMaterial(localUserSecret);\n\n  const token = signStorageAccessToken({\n    material,\n    operations,\n    presenter,\n    sessionId,\n    issuedAt,\n    expiresAt,\n  });\n\n  const { storageId, signingPublicKey } = encodeClientMaterial(material);\n\n  return {\n    localUserSecret: bytesToHex(localUserSecret),\n    storageId,\n    signingPublicKey,\n    token,\n    authorizationHeader: `${UKYC_CAPABILITY_AUTH_SCHEME} ${encodeStorageAccessTokenForHeader(\n      token,\n    )}`,\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/ukyc/wrapEncryptionKey.js.map

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package/dist/ukyc/wrapUserKey.d.ts.map

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package/dist/ukyc/wrapUserKey.js.map

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hexToBytes(recipientPublicKey)\n    : base64ToBytes(\n        recipientPublicKey\n          .replace(/-/gu, '+')\n          .replace(/_/gu, '/')\n          .padEnd(\n            recipientPublicKey.length +\n              ((4 - (recipientPublicKey.length % 4)) % 4),\n            '=',\n          ),\n      );\n\n  if (bytes.length !== X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UKYC: wrappingPublicKey has unexpected length ${bytes.length}, expected ${X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES}.`,\n    );\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps `keyToWrap` for the holder of `recipientPublicKey` using an\n * ephemeral-static ECDH + AES-256-GCM sealed-box scheme:\n *\n *   ephemeral = fresh X25519 keypair (one per call)\n *   shared    = X25519(ephemeralPrivate, recipientPublic)\n *   aeadKey   = HKDF-SHA256(shared, 32 bytes)\n *   iv        = 12 random bytes\n *   ct        = AES-256-GCM(aeadKey, iv).encrypt(keyToWrap)   // ct includes tag\n *\n * The recipient reverses it with their private key:\n *\n *   shared  = X25519(recipientPrivate, ephemeralPublic)\n *   aeadKey = HKDF-SHA256(shared, 32 bytes)\n *   key     = AES-256-GCM(aeadKey, iv).decrypt(ct)\n *\n * This mirrors the X25519 + AES-256-GCM/HKDF decryption used for MoonPay\n * Check/Auth-frame credentials, so both directions share one primitive.\n *\n * @param recipientPublicKey - The recipient's X25519 public key (hex or base64).\n * @param keyToWrap - The raw symmetric key bytes to encrypt (e.g. the\n * `data_encryption_key`).\n * @returns Base64url of `ephemeralPublicKey(32) || iv(12) || ciphertext+tag`.\n */\nexport function wrapUserKey(\n  recipientPublicKey: string,\n  keyToWrap: Uint8Array,\n): string {\n  const recipient = decodePublicKey(recipientPublicKey);\n\n  const ephemeralPrivateKey = x25519.utils.randomSecretKey();\n  const ephemeralPublicKey = x25519.getPublicKey(ephemeralPrivateKey);\n\n  const shared = x25519.getSharedSecret(ephemeralPrivateKey, recipient);\n  const aeadKey = hkdf(sha256, shared, undefined, undefined, 32);\n\n  const iv = randomBytes(IV_SIZE_BYTES);\n  const ciphertext = gcm(aeadKey, iv).encrypt(keyToWrap);\n\n  const blob = new Uint8Array(\n    ephemeralPublicKey.length + iv.length + ciphertext.length,\n  );\n  blob.set(ephemeralPublicKey, 0);\n  blob.set(iv, ephemeralPublicKey.length);\n  blob.set(ciphertext, ephemeralPublicKey.length + iv.length);\n\n  return toBase64Url(blob);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ukyc/wrappedRelayPayload.d.ts.map

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package/dist/ukyc/wrappedRelayPayload.js.map

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