@metalabel/dfos-web-relay 0.4.0 → 0.5.0

package/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Portable HTTP relay for the [DFOS protocol](https://protocol.dfos.com). Receives, verifies, stores, and serves identity chains, content chains, beacons, countersignatures, and content blobs.
 
-See [RELAY.md](./RELAY.md) for the full protocol specification.
+See [RELAY.md](./RELAY.md) for the full relay specification.
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ npm install @metalabel/dfos-web-relay @metalabel/dfos-protocol
 
 ## Usage
 
+### Embedded (Hono app)
+
 ```typescript
 import { createRelay, MemoryRelayStore } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay';
 
@@ -24,6 +26,77 @@ const relay = createRelay({
 export default relay;
 ```
 
+### Standalone (Node.js)
+
+```typescript
+import { serve } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay/node';
+
+serve({ port: 4444 });
+```
+
+## Routes
+
+| Method | Path                                     | Description                                                      |
+| ------ | ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `GET`  | `/.well-known/dfos-relay`                | Relay metadata (DID, protocol version)                           |
+| `POST` | `/operations`                            | Submit signed operations (identity, content, beacon, countersig) |
+| `GET`  | `/identities/:did`                       | Get identity chain state and operation log                       |
+| `GET`  | `/content/:contentId`                    | Get content chain state and operation log                        |
+| `GET`  | `/operations/:cid`                       | Get a single operation by CID                                    |
+| `GET`  | `/beacons/:did`                          | Get beacon for an identity                                       |
+| `GET`  | `/countersignatures/:cid`                | Get countersignatures for an operation                           |
+| `GET`  | `/operations/:cid/countersignatures`     | Same as above (alias)                                            |
+| `PUT`  | `/content/:contentId/blob/:operationCID` | Upload blob (auth required)                                      |
+| `GET`  | `/content/:contentId/blob`               | Download blob at head (auth + credential)                        |
+| `GET`  | `/content/:contentId/blob/:ref`          | Download blob at specific operation ref                          |
+
+## Blob Authorization
+
+**Upload**: Auth token required. Caller must be the chain creator or the signer of the referenced operation (enables delegated upload).
+
+**Download**: Auth token required. Chain creator can download directly. Other identities must present a `DFOSContentRead` VC-JWT credential (issued by the creator) in the `X-Credential` header.
+
+## Conformance Test Suite
+
+The `conformance/` directory contains a Go integration test suite that exercises the full relay HTTP surface. It runs against any live relay via the `RELAY_URL` environment variable.
+
+```bash
+# Run against a local relay
+RELAY_URL=http://localhost:4444 go test -v -count=1 ./conformance/
+
+# Run against a remote relay
+RELAY_URL=https://registry.imajin.ai/relay go test -v -count=1 ./conformance/
+```
+
+71 tests covering:
+
+- Well-known discovery
+- Identity lifecycle (create, update, delete, batch, idempotency, controller key rotation)
+- Content lifecycle (create, update, delete, fork rejection, post-delete rejection, notes, long chains)
+- Content update after auth key rotation, multiple independent chains
+- Operations by CID
+- Beacons (create, replacement, not-found, unknown/deleted identity)
+- Countersignatures (dedup, empty result, multi-witness, self-countersign, non-existent operation)
+- Blob upload/download (CID verification, auth, credential-based access, multi-version, idempotent upload)
+- Delegated content operations (write credentials, delegated blob upload, delegated delete)
+- Credentials (expiry, scope mismatch, type enforcement, deleted issuer behavior)
+- Signature verification (tampered signature, wrong signing key)
+- Auth edge cases (wrong audience, expired token, rotated-out key)
+- Batch processing (3-step dependency sort, content-identity sort, large batch, dedup, mixed valid/invalid, multi-chain)
+- Input validation (malformed JSON, empty operations, invalid JWS)
+
+The conformance suite depends on [`dfos-protocol-go`](../dfos-protocol-go) for protocol operations.
+
+## Custom Store
+
+Implement the `RelayStore` interface to use any persistence backend:
+
+```typescript
+import type { RelayStore } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay';
+```
+
+`MemoryRelayStore` is provided as a reference implementation and for testing.
+
 ## License
 
 MIT

package/RELAY.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # DFOS Web Relay
 
-An HTTP relay for the DFOS protocol — receives, verifies, stores, and serves identity chains, content chains, beacons, countersignatures, and content blobs.
+An HTTP relay for the DFOS protocol — receives, verifies, stores, and serves identity chains, content chains, artifacts, beacons, countersignatures, and content blobs.
 
 This spec is under active review. Discuss it in the [clear.txt](https://clear.dfos.com) space on DFOS.
 
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The relay serves two distinct planes of data with different access models:
 
 ### Proof Plane (public)
 
-Signed chain operations, beacons, and countersignatures. These are cryptographic proofs — anyone can verify them with a public key. The proof plane gossips freely: relays push operations to peers, peers verify and store independently.
+Signed chain operations, artifacts, beacons, and countersignatures. These are cryptographic proofs — anyone can verify them with a public key. The proof plane gossips freely: relays push operations to peers, peers verify and store independently.
 
 All proof plane routes are unauthenticated. The operations themselves carry their own authentication (Ed25519 signatures).
 
@@ -39,34 +39,36 @@ Content plane access requires two credentials:
 
 The content creator (the DID that signed the genesis content operation) can always read their own blobs with just an auth token.
 
+Content plane support is optional per relay. When disabled (`content: false` in the well-known response), all content plane routes return **501 Not Implemented** — not 404 (resource doesn't exist), but 501 (capability not supported).
+
 ---
 
 ## Operation Ingestion
 
-All proof plane artifacts enter through a single endpoint: `POST /operations`. The request body is an array of JWS tokens — identity operations, content operations, beacons, and countersignatures can be mixed freely in the same batch.
+All proof plane operations enter through a single endpoint: `POST /operations`. The request body is an array of JWS tokens — identity operations, content operations, artifacts, beacons, and countersignatures can be mixed freely in the same batch.
 
 ### Classification
 
 Each token is classified by its JWS `typ` header:
 
-| `typ` header           | kid DID == payload DID? | Classification           |
-| ---------------------- | ----------------------- | ------------------------ |
-| `did:dfos:identity-op` | —                       | Identity chain operation |
-| `did:dfos:content-op`  | yes                     | Content chain operation  |
-| `did:dfos:content-op`  | no                      | Countersignature         |
-| `did:dfos:beacon`      | yes                     | Beacon announcement      |
-| `did:dfos:beacon`      | no                      | Beacon countersignature  |
+| `typ` header           | Classification           |
+| ---------------------- | ------------------------ |
+| `did:dfos:identity-op` | Identity chain operation |
+| `did:dfos:content-op`  | Content chain operation  |
+| `did:dfos:beacon`      | Beacon announcement      |
+| `did:dfos:artifact`    | Artifact                 |
+| `did:dfos:countersign` | Countersignature         |
 
-When the signing key's DID differs from the payload DID, the operation is classified as a countersignature (witness attestation) rather than a primary operation.
+Each operation type has its own `typ` header. Classification is unambiguous — no DID comparison needed.
 
 ### Dependency Sort
 
 Within a batch, operations are sorted by dependency priority before processing:
 
 1. **Identity operations** — must be processed first so their keys are available
-2. **Beacons** — reference identity keys
-3. **Content operations** — reference identity keys for signature verification
-4. **Countersignatures** — reference both identity keys and existing operations
+2. **Beacons and artifacts** — reference identity keys for signature verification
+3. **Content operations** — reference identity keys, may have chain dependencies
+4. **Countersignatures** — reference identity keys and existing operations (target must exist)
 
 Within each priority level, genesis operations (no `previousOperationCID`) are processed before extensions. This ensures that a single batch can bootstrap an entire identity-and-content lifecycle — including chained create + update operations — without multiple round trips.
 
@@ -74,19 +76,34 @@ Within each priority level, genesis operations (no `previousOperationCID`) are p
 
 Each operation is verified against the relay's stored state:
 
-- **Identity operations**: The full chain (stored log + new operation) is re-verified from genesis. The relay uses `verifyIdentityChain()` from the protocol library
-- **Content operations**: The full chain is re-verified with `enforceAuthorization: true`. Non-creator signers must include a `DFOSContentWrite` VC-JWT
+- **Identity operations**: Extension operations are verified against the relay's current trusted state using O(1) extension verification — the trusted head state plus the new operation is sufficient. Genesis operations verify the single-operation chain. The relay uses `verifyIdentityChain()` / `verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState()` from the protocol library
+- **Content operations**: Extension operations are verified against trusted state with `enforceAuthorization: true`. Non-creator signers must include a `DFOSContentWrite` VC-JWT. The relay uses `verifyContentChain()` / `verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState()` from the protocol library
+- **Artifacts**: Signature is verified against the signing DID's current identity state. CID integrity is checked. Payload must conform to the declared `$schema`. CBOR-encoded payload must not exceed 16384 bytes
 - **Beacons**: Signature, CID integrity, and clock skew are verified. Replace-on-newer: only the most recent beacon per DID is retained
-- **Countersignatures**: The referenced operation or beacon must already exist. Signature is verified against the witness DID's identity chain
-- **Beacon countersignatures**: The referenced beacon must exist and the countersignature CID must match the current beacon CID
+- **Countersignatures**: Two-phase verification. Protocol-level (stateless): signature, CID integrity, payload schema. Relay-level (stateful): target CID must exist in the relay, witness DID must differ from the target's author DID, one countersign per witness per target
 
 ### Fork Policy
 
 First-seen-wins. If a chain head has already advanced past the `previousOperationCID` referenced by an incoming operation, the new operation is rejected. The relay does not attempt to resolve forks — the first valid extension wins.
 
-Duplicate submissions (same operation CID) are silently accepted (idempotent).
+Duplicate submissions (same operation CID, same JWS token) are silently accepted (idempotent). Submissions with the same CID but a different JWS token are rejected — since Ed25519 is deterministic, a different token for the same payload means a different signing key, which is either a self-countersign attempt or an unauthorized re-sign.
+
+Duplicate countersignatures (same witness DID, same target CID) MUST be deduplicated — one countersign per witness per target. The relay MUST NOT store multiple attestations from the same witness for the same target. Resubmission SHOULD return `accepted` (idempotent).
+
+### Deletion Semantics
+
+Deletion means the identity stops being an active participant. Historical operations remain verifiable — keys persist in state for signature verification — but no new acts flow from a deleted identity.
+
+Specifically:
 
-Duplicate countersignatures (same witness DID, same target CID) MUST be deduplicated. The relay MUST NOT increase the countersignature count on resubmission. Resubmission SHOULD return `accepted` (idempotent).
+- **Identity operations after deletion**: Rejected. A deleted identity chain is sealed.
+- **Content operations after deletion**: Rejected. A deleted content chain is sealed.
+- **Beacons from deleted identities**: Rejected. A deleted identity MUST NOT publish new beacons.
+- **Artifacts from deleted identities**: Rejected. A deleted identity MUST NOT publish new artifacts.
+- **Credentials from deleted issuers**: Rejected. Identity deletion revokes all authority, including outstanding `DFOSContentRead` and `DFOSContentWrite` credentials issued by the deleted identity. Credentials that were valid at time of issuance cease to be honored once the issuer is deleted.
+- **Countersignatures from deleted witnesses**: Rejected. A deleted identity MUST NOT publish new countersignatures. Countersignatures on operations by deleted authors are still accepted — deletion of the target's author does not prevent other identities from attesting.
+
+Self-countersignatures — where the witness DID matches the target's author DID — are rejected at the relay level. A countersignature's semantic is "a distinct witness attests." The protocol-level verifier is stateless and does not enforce this; the relay resolves the target's author and rejects self-attestation.
 
 ### Result Ordering
 
@@ -94,14 +111,226 @@ Ingestion results are returned in the same order as the input `operations` array
 
 ---
 
+## Artifacts
+
+Artifacts are standalone signed inline documents — immutable, CID-addressable proof plane primitives. Unlike chain operations which extend a sequence, an artifact is a single signed statement with no predecessor or successor.
+
+### Payload
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "type": "artifact",
+  "did": "did:dfos:...",
+  "content": {
+    "$schema": "https://schemas.dfos.com/profile/v1",
+    "name": "My Relay",
+    "description": "A relay for the dark forest"
+  },
+  "createdAt": "2026-03-25T00:00:00.000Z"
+}
+```
+
+The `content` object MUST include a `$schema` string that identifies the artifact's schema. The schema acts as a discriminator — consumers use it to determine how to interpret the artifact's content. Schema names are free-form strings (no protocol-level registry). Communities may establish conventions for well-known schemas.
+
+### Constraints
+
+- **JWS `typ` header**: `did:dfos:artifact`
+- **Max payload size**: 16384 bytes CBOR-encoded. This is a protocol constant — not configurable per relay
+- **Immutability**: Once ingested, an artifact is never updated or replaced. To "update" an artifact's content, publish a new artifact
+- **CID-addressable**: Each artifact is addressed by the CID of its CBOR-encoded payload
+
+### Verification
+
+1. JWS signature verification against the signing DID's current key state
+2. CID integrity — the payload CID matches the computed CID from the raw payload bytes
+3. Payload schema validation — the payload conforms to the artifact structure (`version`, `type`, `did`, `content` with `$schema`, `createdAt`)
+4. Size limit — CBOR-encoded payload does not exceed 16384 bytes
+
+---
+
+## Countersignatures
+
+A countersignature is a standalone witness attestation — a signed statement that references a target operation by CID. Unlike the original operation primitives (which carry the data itself), a countersign is pure attestation: "I, witness W, attest to operation X."
+
+### Payload
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "type": "countersign",
+  "did": "did:dfos:witness...",
+  "targetCID": "bafy...",
+  "createdAt": "2026-03-25T00:00:00.000Z"
+}
+```
+
+### Properties
+
+- **JWS `typ` header**: `did:dfos:countersign`
+- **Own CID**: Each countersign has its own CID, distinct from the target. This avoids the ambiguity of multiple JWS tokens sharing the same CID
+- **Stateless verification**: Signature + CID integrity + payload schema. No relay state required to verify the cryptographic validity of a countersign
+- **Composable**: The `targetCID` can reference any CID-addressable operation — content ops, beacons, artifacts, identity ops, even other countersigns
+- **Immutable**: Once published, a countersign is permanent
+
+### Relay-Level Checks
+
+The relay enforces semantic rules beyond cryptographic validity:
+
+1. **Target exists**: The `targetCID` must reference an operation already stored in the relay
+2. **Witness ≠ author**: The countersign's `did` (witness) must differ from the target operation's author DID
+3. **Deduplication**: One countersign per witness per target. If the same witness submits a second countersign for the same target, the relay accepts idempotently
+4. **Deleted witness rejection**: Countersigns from deleted identities are rejected
+
+---
+
 ## Relay Identity
 
-Every relay has a DID, published at `GET /.well-known/dfos-relay`. The relay DID serves as:
+Every relay has a DID that resolves on its own proof plane. The relay DID serves as:
 
 - **Auth token audience**: Auth tokens are scoped to a specific relay via the JWT `aud` claim, preventing cross-relay token replay
 - **Peer identity**: When relays gossip proof plane data to each other, the relay DID identifies the peer
+- **Self-proof anchor**: The relay's identity chain lives in its own store, verifiable by anyone querying the relay
+
+### Relay Profile
+
+The relay MUST publish a profile artifact signed by its own DID using the HEAD key state. The profile artifact uses the `https://schemas.dfos.com/profile/v1` schema:
+
+```json
+{
+  "$schema": "https://schemas.dfos.com/profile/v1",
+  "name": "edge.relay.dfos.com",
+  "description": "Cloudflare edge relay for the DFOS network",
+  "image": { "id": "relay-avatar", "uri": "https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png" },
+  "operator": "Metalabel",
+  "motd": "Welcome to the dark forest"
+}
+```
 
-The relay does not currently sign operations or participate in the protocol as an identity. It's a passive verifier and store.
+All fields are optional except `name`, which SHOULD be present. The `image.uri` field is any valid URI (operator choice — CDN, content-plane reference, or any resolvable URL). The profile JWS token is inlined in the well-known response — self-proving, no extra fetch needed.
+
+### Well-Known Endpoint (`GET /.well-known/dfos-relay`)
+
+Returns relay metadata. All fields are required — `profile` is the relay's proof of DID controllership (an artifact JWS signed by the relay DID's controller key).
+
+```json
+{
+  "did": "did:dfos:edgerelay0000000000000",
+  "protocol": "dfos-web-relay",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "proof": true,
+  "content": false,
+  "profile": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIs..."
+}
+```
+
+| Field      | Type    | Description                                                                |
+| ---------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `did`      | string  | The relay's DID, resolvable on this relay's proof plane                    |
+| `protocol` | string  | Protocol identifier, always `"dfos-web-relay"`                             |
+| `version`  | string  | Relay protocol version (semver)                                            |
+| `proof`    | boolean | MUST be `true`. A relay without proof plane capability is not a relay      |
+| `content`  | boolean | Whether the relay supports content plane (blob upload/download)            |
+| `profile`  | string  | The relay's profile artifact as a compact JWS token — self-proving payload |
+
+`proof: false` is not a valid value. A compliant relay always serves the proof plane.
+
+---
+
+## Operation Log
+
+The relay maintains a global append-only operation log. Every successfully ingested operation (identity ops, content ops, artifacts, beacons, countersignatures) is appended to the log in ingestion order.
+
+### Global Log (`GET /log?after={cid}&limit=N`)
+
+Returns log entries starting after the given CID cursor.
+
+```json
+{
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "cid": "bafy...",
+      "jwsToken": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIs...",
+      "kind": "identity-op",
+      "chainId": "did:dfos:..."
+    },
+    {
+      "cid": "bafy...",
+      "jwsToken": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIs...",
+      "kind": "artifact",
+      "chainId": "did:dfos:..."
+    }
+  ],
+  "cursor": "bafy..."
+}
+```
+
+| Field                | Type         | Description                                                                      |
+| -------------------- | ------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `entries[].cid`      | string       | Operation CID                                                                    |
+| `entries[].jwsToken` | string       | The full compact JWS token — makes the log self-contained for sync               |
+| `entries[].kind`     | string       | Operation kind: `identity-op`, `content-op`, `beacon`, `artifact`, `countersign` |
+| `entries[].chainId`  | string       | DID (identity/beacon/artifact), contentId (content), or targetCID (countersign)  |
+| `cursor`             | string\|null | CID to pass as `after` for the next page. `null` means caught up                 |
+
+Parameters:
+
+- **`after`** (optional): CID cursor. Omit to start from the beginning of the log
+- **`limit`** (optional): Max entries to return. Default: 100. Max: 1000
+
+Pagination is forward-only. The log is ordered by ingestion time. JWS tokens are included in every entry because proof-plane JWS payloads are bounded (chain operations and artifacts have finite size), keeping the log self-contained — a syncing peer can replay the log without separate fetches.
+
+### Per-Chain Logs
+
+Identity and content chains expose their own log views with the same cursor-based pagination:
+
+- `GET /identities/:did/log?after={cid}&limit=N`
+- `GET /content/:contentId/log?after={cid}&limit=N`
+
+Same cursor-based pagination parameters as the global log. Per-chain log entries include `{ cid, jwsToken }` — the chain-specific subset of the global log entry shape. Returns operations belonging to that chain in chain order.
+
+---
+
+## Identity and Content State
+
+State endpoints return projected state — the computed result of replaying the chain — without embedding the full operation log.
+
+### Identity State (`GET /identities/:did`)
+
+```json
+{
+  "did": "did:dfos:abc123...",
+  "headCID": "bafy...",
+  "state": {
+    "did": "did:dfos:abc123...",
+    "isDeleted": false,
+    "authKeys": [...],
+    "assertKeys": [...],
+    "controllerKeys": [...]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Content State (`GET /content/:contentId`)
+
+```json
+{
+  "contentId": "abc123...",
+  "genesisCID": "bafy...",
+  "headCID": "bafy...",
+  "state": {
+    "contentId": "abc123...",
+    "genesisCID": "bafy...",
+    "headCID": "bafy...",
+    "isDeleted": false,
+    "currentDocumentCID": "bafy...",
+    "length": 1,
+    "creatorDID": "did:dfos:..."
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Chain history is available via the per-chain log routes described above.
 
 ---
 
@@ -167,10 +396,15 @@ interface RelayStore {
 
   getCountersignatures(operationCID: string): Promise<string[]>;
   addCountersignature(operationCID: string, jwsToken: string): Promise<void>;
+
+  appendToLog(entry: LogEntry): Promise<void>;
+  readLog(params: { after?: string; limit: number }): Promise<LogPage>;
 }
 ```
 
-The package includes `MemoryRelayStore` for development and testing. Production deployments would implement the interface over Postgres, SQLite, S3, or any durable store.
+The `appendToLog` / `readLog` pair supports both the global log and per-chain log queries. The store implementation determines how to scope queries (e.g., by filtering on `chainId`).
+
+The package includes `MemoryRelayStore` for development and testing. Production deployments would implement the interface over Postgres, SQLite, D1, or any durable store.
 
 ---
 
@@ -179,9 +413,15 @@ The package includes `MemoryRelayStore` for development and testing. Production
 ```typescript
 import { createRelay, MemoryRelayStore } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay';
 
-const relay = createRelay({
-  relayDID: 'did:dfos:myrelay00000000000000',
+// JIT mode — generates relay identity + profile artifact at startup
+const relay = await createRelay({
+  store: new MemoryRelayStore(),
+});
+
+// Or provide a pre-created identity (production)
+const relay = await createRelay({
   store: new MemoryRelayStore(),
+  identity: { did: 'did:dfos:myrelay...', profileArtifactJws: '...' },
 });
 
 // Mount on any Hono-compatible runtime
@@ -198,8 +438,11 @@ The returned Hono app exposes:
 | `GET`  | `/operations/:cid/countersignatures` | proof   | none                    |
 | `GET`  | `/countersignatures/:cid`            | proof   | none                    |
 | `GET`  | `/identities/:did`                   | proof   | none                    |
+| `GET`  | `/identities/:did/log`               | proof   | none                    |
 | `GET`  | `/content/:contentId`                | proof   | none                    |
+| `GET`  | `/content/:contentId/log`            | proof   | none                    |
 | `GET`  | `/beacons/:did`                      | proof   | none                    |
+| `GET`  | `/log`                               | proof   | none                    |
 | `PUT`  | `/content/:contentId/blob/:opCID`    | content | auth token              |
 | `GET`  | `/content/:contentId/blob[/:ref]`    | content | auth token + credential |
 
@@ -210,5 +453,5 @@ The returned Hono app exposes:
 - **Peer gossip**: Proactive push of proof plane operations to other relays
 - **Rate limiting / anti-spam**: Operational concern, not protocol concern
 - **Docker/CF reference deployments**: Focus on the core library first
-- **Pagination**: Chain logs are returned in full — fine for v1, needs pagination at scale
 - **Blob size limits**: No enforcement yet — production deployments should add limits at the middleware layer
+- **Artifact `$schema` registry**: Schema names are free-form strings for now — no formal registry or validation beyond structural checks

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,16 +1,28 @@
-import { Hono } from 'hono';
 import { VerifiedIdentity, VerifiedContentChain, VerifiedBeacon } from '@metalabel/dfos-protocol/chain';
+import { Hono } from 'hono';
 
+interface RelayIdentity {
+    /** The relay's DID */
+    did: string;
+    /** Profile artifact JWS token (signed by the relay DID) */
+    profileArtifactJws: string;
+}
 interface RelayOptions {
-    /** The relay's DID — used as auth token audience and published in well-known */
-    relayDID: string;
     /** Storage backend */
     store: RelayStore;
+    /** Pre-created relay identity — if omitted, a JIT identity and profile are generated */
+    identity?: RelayIdentity;
+    /** Whether content plane routes are enabled (default: true) */
+    content?: boolean;
 }
 interface StoredIdentityChain {
     did: string;
     /** Ordered JWS tokens from genesis to head */
     log: string[];
+    /** CID of the most recent operation */
+    headCID: string;
+    /** createdAt timestamp of the most recent operation */
+    lastCreatedAt: string;
     state: VerifiedIdentity;
 }
 interface StoredContentChain {
@@ -18,6 +30,8 @@ interface StoredContentChain {
     genesisCID: string;
     /** Ordered JWS tokens from genesis to head */
     log: string[];
+    /** createdAt timestamp of the most recent operation */
+    lastCreatedAt: string;
     state: VerifiedContentChain;
 }
 interface StoredBeacon {
@@ -30,8 +44,8 @@ interface StoredOperation {
     cid: string;
     jwsToken: string;
     /** Which chain type this operation belongs to */
-    chainType: 'identity' | 'content';
-    /** The chain identifier — DID for identity, contentId for content */
+    chainType: 'identity' | 'content' | 'artifact' | 'beacon' | 'countersign';
+    /** The chain identifier — DID for identity/beacon/artifact, contentId for content, targetCID for countersign */
     chainId: string;
 }
 /** Key for blob storage — deduplicates across chains sharing the same document */
@@ -39,6 +53,15 @@ interface BlobKey {
     creatorDID: string;
     documentCID: string;
 }
+/** A single entry in the global append-only operation log */
+interface LogEntry {
+    cid: string;
+    jwsToken: string;
+    kind: OperationKind;
+    chainId: string;
+}
+/** All operation kinds in the protocol */
+type OperationKind = 'identity-op' | 'content-op' | 'beacon' | 'artifact' | 'countersign';
 /**
  * Storage backend for a DFOS web relay
  *
@@ -63,24 +86,45 @@ interface RelayStore {
     putBlob(key: BlobKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
     getCountersignatures(operationCID: string): Promise<string[]>;
     addCountersignature(operationCID: string, jwsToken: string): Promise<void>;
+    appendToLog(entry: LogEntry): Promise<void>;
+    readLog(params: {
+        after?: string;
+        limit: number;
+    }): Promise<{
+        entries: LogEntry[];
+        cursor: string | null;
+    }>;
 }
 interface IngestionResult {
     cid: string;
     status: 'accepted' | 'rejected';
     error?: string;
     /** What was ingested */
-    kind?: 'identity-op' | 'content-op' | 'beacon' | 'countersig' | 'beacon-countersig';
+    kind?: OperationKind;
     /** Chain identifier if applicable */
     chainId?: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Generate a relay identity and profile artifact, ingest both into the store
+ *
+ * Creates an Ed25519 keypair, signs an identity genesis operation, derives
+ * the DID, then signs a profile artifact with the relay's name. Both the
+ * identity genesis and profile artifact are ingested into the store so
+ * they are available via the relay's proof plane routes.
+ */
+declare const bootstrapRelayIdentity: (store: RelayStore) => Promise<RelayIdentity>;
+
 /**
  * Create a DFOS web relay Hono application
  *
  * The returned app is portable — mount it on any Hono-compatible runtime
  * (Node.js, Cloudflare Workers, Deno, Bun, etc.).
+ *
+ * When `identity` is provided, the relay uses the given DID and profile. When
+ * omitted, a JIT identity and profile artifact are generated at startup.
  */
-declare const createRelay: (options: RelayOptions) => Hono;
+declare const createRelay: (options: RelayOptions) => Promise<Hono>;
 
 /**
  * In-memory relay store — all data lives in Maps, lost on restart
@@ -94,6 +138,7 @@ declare class MemoryRelayStore implements RelayStore {
     private beacons;
     private blobs;
     private countersignatures;
+    private operationLog;
     getOperation(cid: string): Promise<StoredOperation | undefined>;
     putOperation(op: StoredOperation): Promise<void>;
     getIdentityChain(did: string): Promise<StoredIdentityChain | undefined>;
@@ -106,6 +151,14 @@ declare class MemoryRelayStore implements RelayStore {
     putBlob(key: BlobKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
     getCountersignatures(operationCID: string): Promise<string[]>;
     addCountersignature(operationCID: string, jwsToken: string): Promise<void>;
+    appendToLog(entry: LogEntry): Promise<void>;
+    readLog(params: {
+        after?: string;
+        limit: number;
+    }): Promise<{
+        entries: LogEntry[];
+        cursor: string | null;
+    }>;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -140,4 +193,4 @@ declare const createCurrentKeyResolver: (store: RelayStore) => (kid: string) =>
  */
 declare const ingestOperations: (tokens: string[], store: RelayStore) => Promise<IngestionResult[]>;
 
-export { type BlobKey, type IngestionResult, MemoryRelayStore, type RelayOptions, type RelayStore, type StoredBeacon, type StoredContentChain, type StoredIdentityChain, type StoredOperation, createCurrentKeyResolver, createKeyResolver, createRelay, ingestOperations };
+export { type BlobKey, type IngestionResult, type LogEntry, MemoryRelayStore, type OperationKind, type RelayIdentity, type RelayOptions, type RelayStore, type StoredBeacon, type StoredContentChain, type StoredIdentityChain, type StoredOperation, bootstrapRelayIdentity, createCurrentKeyResolver, createKeyResolver, createRelay, ingestOperations };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
-// src/relay.ts
-import { VC_TYPE_CONTENT_READ, verifyCredential } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/credentials";
-import { dagCborCanonicalEncode as dagCborCanonicalEncode2, decodeJwsUnsafe as decodeJwsUnsafe3 } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
-import { Hono } from "hono";
-import { z } from "zod";
-
-// src/auth.ts
-import { verifyAuthToken } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/credentials";
-import { decodeJwsUnsafe as decodeJwsUnsafe2 } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
+// src/bootstrap.ts
+import {
+  encodeEd25519Multikey,
+  signArtifact,
+  signIdentityOperation
+} from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/chain";
+import {
+  createNewEd25519Keypair,
+  generateId,
+  signPayloadEd25519
+} from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
 
 // src/ingest.ts
 import {
   decodeMultikey,
+  verifyArtifact,
   verifyBeacon,
-  verifyBeaconCountersignature,
   verifyContentChain,
+  verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState,
   verifyCountersignature,
-  verifyIdentityChain
+  verifyIdentityChain,
+  verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState
 } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/chain";
 import { dagCborCanonicalEncode, decodeJwsUnsafe } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
 var classify = (jwsToken) => {
@@ -44,30 +48,10 @@ var classify = (jwsToken) => {
   }
   if (typ === "did:dfos:content-op") {
     const opDID = typeof payload["did"] === "string" ? payload["did"] : null;
-    if (opDID && kidDID && kidDID !== opDID) {
-      return {
-        ...base,
-        kind: "countersig",
-        referencedDID: opDID,
-        signerDID: kidDID,
-        priority: 3,
-        previousCID: null
-      };
-    }
     return { ...base, kind: "content-op", referencedDID: null, signerDID: opDID, priority: 2 };
   }
   if (typ === "did:dfos:beacon") {
     const beaconDID = typeof payload["did"] === "string" ? payload["did"] : null;
-    if (beaconDID && kidDID && kidDID !== beaconDID) {
-      return {
-        ...base,
-        kind: "beacon-countersig",
-        referencedDID: beaconDID,
-        signerDID: kidDID,
-        priority: 3,
-        previousCID: null
-      };
-    }
     return {
       ...base,
       kind: "beacon",
@@ -77,6 +61,30 @@ var classify = (jwsToken) => {
       previousCID: null
     };
   }
+  if (typ === "did:dfos:countersign") {
+    const witnessDID = typeof payload["did"] === "string" ? payload["did"] : null;
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      kind: "countersign",
+      referencedDID: witnessDID,
+      signerDID: null,
+      priority: 3,
+      // processed last — target must already be ingested
+      previousCID: null
+    };
+  }
+  if (typ === "did:dfos:artifact") {
+    const artifactDID = typeof payload["did"] === "string" ? payload["did"] : null;
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      kind: "artifact",
+      referencedDID: artifactDID,
+      signerDID: null,
+      priority: 1,
+      // same as beacons — needs identity keys resolved first
+      previousCID: null
+    };
+  }
   return unknown;
 };
 var createKeyResolver = (store) => async (kid) => {
@@ -135,15 +143,32 @@ var ingestIdentityOp = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const encoded = await dagCborCanonicalEncode(payload);
   const cid = encoded.cid.toString();
   const existing = await store.getOperation(cid);
-  if (existing) return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "identity-op", chainId: existing.chainId };
+  if (existing) {
+    if (existing.jwsToken !== jwsToken) {
+      return {
+        cid,
+        status: "rejected",
+        error: "operation already exists with a different signature"
+      };
+    }
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "identity-op", chainId: existing.chainId };
+  }
   const opType = payload["type"];
   const isGenesis = opType === "create";
   if (isGenesis) {
-    const identity2 = await verifyIdentityChain({ didPrefix: "did:dfos", log: [jwsToken] });
-    const chain2 = { did: identity2.did, log: [jwsToken], state: identity2 };
+    const identity = await verifyIdentityChain({ didPrefix: "did:dfos", log: [jwsToken] });
+    const createdAt = payload["createdAt"];
+    const chain2 = {
+      did: identity.did,
+      log: [jwsToken],
+      headCID: cid,
+      lastCreatedAt: createdAt,
+      state: identity
+    };
     await store.putIdentityChain(chain2);
-    await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "identity", chainId: identity2.did });
-    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "identity-op", chainId: identity2.did };
+    await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "identity", chainId: identity.did });
+    await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "identity-op", chainId: identity.did });
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "identity-op", chainId: identity.did };
   }
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
@@ -151,11 +176,22 @@ var ingestIdentityOp = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const did = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
   const chain = await store.getIdentityChain(did);
   if (!chain) return { cid, status: "rejected", error: `unknown identity: ${did}` };
-  const newLog = [...chain.log, jwsToken];
-  const identity = await verifyIdentityChain({ didPrefix: "did:dfos", log: newLog });
-  const updated = { did: identity.did, log: newLog, state: identity };
+  const extResult = await verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState({
+    currentState: chain.state,
+    headCID: chain.headCID,
+    lastCreatedAt: chain.lastCreatedAt,
+    newOp: jwsToken
+  });
+  const updated = {
+    did: chain.did,
+    log: [...chain.log, jwsToken],
+    headCID: extResult.operationCID,
+    lastCreatedAt: extResult.createdAt,
+    state: extResult.state
+  };
   await store.putIdentityChain(updated);
   await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "identity", chainId: did });
+  await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "identity-op", chainId: did });
   return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "identity-op", chainId: did };
 };
 var ingestContentOp = async (jwsToken, store) => {
@@ -165,25 +201,44 @@ var ingestContentOp = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const encoded = await dagCborCanonicalEncode(payload);
   const cid = encoded.cid.toString();
   const existing = await store.getOperation(cid);
-  if (existing) return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: existing.chainId };
+  if (existing) {
+    if (existing.jwsToken !== jwsToken) {
+      return {
+        cid,
+        status: "rejected",
+        error: "operation already exists with a different signature"
+      };
+    }
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: existing.chainId };
+  }
+  const signerDID = payload["did"];
+  if (typeof signerDID === "string") {
+    const signerIdentity = await store.getIdentityChain(signerDID);
+    if (signerIdentity?.state.isDeleted) {
+      return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "signer identity is deleted" };
+    }
+  }
   const resolveKey = createKeyResolver(store);
   const opType = payload["type"];
   const isGenesis = opType === "create";
   if (isGenesis) {
-    const content2 = await verifyContentChain({
+    const content = await verifyContentChain({
       log: [jwsToken],
       resolveKey,
       enforceAuthorization: true
     });
+    const createdAt = payload["createdAt"];
     const chain2 = {
-      contentId: content2.contentId,
-      genesisCID: content2.genesisCID,
+      contentId: content.contentId,
+      genesisCID: content.genesisCID,
       log: [jwsToken],
-      state: content2
+      lastCreatedAt: createdAt,
+      state: content
     };
     await store.putContentChain(chain2);
-    await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "content", chainId: content2.contentId });
-    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: content2.contentId };
+    await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "content", chainId: content.contentId });
+    await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "content-op", chainId: content.contentId });
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: content.contentId };
   }
   const previousCID = payload["previousOperationCID"];
   if (typeof previousCID !== "string") {
@@ -198,24 +253,31 @@ var ingestContentOp = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const chain = await store.getContentChain(prevOp.chainId);
   if (!chain)
     return { cid, status: "rejected", error: `content chain not found: ${prevOp.chainId}` };
+  const creatorIdentity = await store.getIdentityChain(chain.state.creatorDID);
+  if (creatorIdentity?.state.isDeleted) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "content creator identity is deleted" };
+  }
   if (chain.state.headCID !== previousCID) {
     return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "chain has diverged (first-seen-wins)" };
   }
-  const newLog = [...chain.log, jwsToken];
-  const content = await verifyContentChain({
-    log: newLog,
+  const extResult = await verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState({
+    currentState: chain.state,
+    lastCreatedAt: chain.lastCreatedAt,
+    newOp: jwsToken,
     resolveKey,
     enforceAuthorization: true
   });
   const updated = {
-    contentId: content.contentId,
-    genesisCID: content.genesisCID,
-    log: newLog,
-    state: content
+    contentId: chain.contentId,
+    genesisCID: chain.genesisCID,
+    log: [...chain.log, jwsToken],
+    lastCreatedAt: extResult.createdAt,
+    state: extResult.state
   };
   await store.putContentChain(updated);
-  await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "content", chainId: content.contentId });
-  return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: content.contentId };
+  await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "content", chainId: chain.contentId });
+  await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "content-op", chainId: chain.contentId });
+  return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "content-op", chainId: chain.contentId };
 };
 var ingestBeacon = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const resolveKey = createKeyResolver(store);
@@ -228,6 +290,10 @@ var ingestBeacon = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   }
   const did = verified.payload.did;
   const cid = verified.beaconCID;
+  const identity = await store.getIdentityChain(did);
+  if (identity?.state.isDeleted) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "identity is deleted" };
+  }
   const existing = await store.getBeacon(did);
   if (existing) {
     const existingTime = new Date(existing.state.payload.createdAt).getTime();
@@ -237,72 +303,96 @@ var ingestBeacon = async (jwsToken, store) => {
     }
   }
   await store.putBeacon({ did, jwsToken, beaconCID: cid, state: verified });
+  await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "beacon", chainId: did });
+  await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "beacon", chainId: did });
   return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "beacon", chainId: did };
 };
-var ingestCountersig = async (jwsToken, store) => {
-  const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(jwsToken);
-  if (!decoded) return { cid: "", status: "rejected", error: "failed to decode JWS" };
-  const payload = decoded.payload;
-  const encoded = await dagCborCanonicalEncode(payload);
-  const operationCID = encoded.cid.toString();
-  const existingOp = await store.getOperation(operationCID);
-  if (!existingOp) {
-    return { cid: operationCID, status: "rejected", error: `unknown operation: ${operationCID}` };
-  }
+var ingestCountersign = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const resolveKey = createKeyResolver(store);
+  let verified;
   try {
-    await verifyCountersignature({ jwsToken, expectedCID: operationCID, resolveKey });
+    verified = await verifyCountersignature({ jwsToken, resolveKey });
   } catch (err) {
     const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "verification failed";
-    return { cid: operationCID, status: "rejected", error: message };
-  }
-  await store.addCountersignature(operationCID, jwsToken);
-  return {
-    cid: operationCID,
-    status: "accepted",
-    kind: "countersig",
-    chainId: existingOp.chainId
-  };
-};
-var ingestBeaconCountersig = async (jwsToken, store) => {
-  const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(jwsToken);
-  if (!decoded) return { cid: "", status: "rejected", error: "failed to decode JWS" };
-  const payload = decoded.payload;
-  const encoded = await dagCborCanonicalEncode(payload);
-  const beaconCID = encoded.cid.toString();
-  const beaconDID = typeof payload["did"] === "string" ? payload["did"] : null;
-  if (!beaconDID) {
-    return { cid: beaconCID, status: "rejected", error: "missing beacon DID" };
+    return { cid: "", status: "rejected", error: message };
   }
-  const existingBeacon = await store.getBeacon(beaconDID);
-  if (!existingBeacon) {
-    return { cid: beaconCID, status: "rejected", error: `unknown beacon for DID: ${beaconDID}` };
+  const cid = verified.countersignCID;
+  const { witnessDID, targetCID } = verified;
+  const existing = await store.getOperation(cid);
+  if (existing) {
+    if (existing.jwsToken !== jwsToken) {
+      return {
+        cid,
+        status: "rejected",
+        error: "countersign already exists with a different signature"
+      };
+    }
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "countersign", chainId: targetCID };
   }
-  if (existingBeacon.beaconCID !== beaconCID) {
-    return {
-      cid: beaconCID,
-      status: "rejected",
-      error: "beacon countersignature CID does not match current beacon"
-    };
+  const targetOp = await store.getOperation(targetCID);
+  if (!targetOp) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: `unknown target operation: ${targetCID}` };
+  }
+  let targetAuthorDID = null;
+  if (targetOp.chainType === "identity") {
+    targetAuthorDID = targetOp.chainId;
+  } else {
+    const targetDecoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(targetOp.jwsToken);
+    if (targetDecoded) {
+      const targetPayload = targetDecoded.payload;
+      targetAuthorDID = typeof targetPayload["did"] === "string" ? targetPayload["did"] : null;
+    }
+  }
+  if (targetAuthorDID && witnessDID === targetAuthorDID) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "witness DID must differ from target author DID" };
+  }
+  const witnessIdentity = await store.getIdentityChain(witnessDID);
+  if (witnessIdentity?.state.isDeleted) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "witness identity is deleted" };
+  }
+  const existingCountersigns = await store.getCountersignatures(targetCID);
+  for (const csJws of existingCountersigns) {
+    const csDecoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(csJws);
+    if (!csDecoded) continue;
+    const csPayload = csDecoded.payload;
+    if (csPayload["did"] === witnessDID) {
+      return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "countersign", chainId: targetCID };
+    }
   }
+  await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "countersign", chainId: targetCID });
+  await store.addCountersignature(targetCID, jwsToken);
+  await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "countersign", chainId: targetCID });
+  return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "countersign", chainId: targetCID };
+};
+var ingestArtifact = async (jwsToken, store) => {
   const resolveKey = createKeyResolver(store);
+  let verified;
   try {
-    await verifyBeaconCountersignature({
-      jwsToken,
-      expectedCID: beaconCID,
-      resolveKey
-    });
+    verified = await verifyArtifact({ jwsToken, resolveKey });
   } catch (err) {
     const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "verification failed";
-    return { cid: beaconCID, status: "rejected", error: message };
-  }
-  await store.addCountersignature(beaconCID, jwsToken);
-  return {
-    cid: beaconCID,
-    status: "accepted",
-    kind: "beacon-countersig",
-    chainId: beaconDID
-  };
+    return { cid: "", status: "rejected", error: message };
+  }
+  const cid = verified.artifactCID;
+  const did = verified.payload.did;
+  const existing = await store.getOperation(cid);
+  if (existing) {
+    if (existing.jwsToken !== jwsToken) {
+      return {
+        cid,
+        status: "rejected",
+        error: "artifact already exists with a different signature"
+      };
+    }
+    return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "artifact", chainId: did };
+  }
+  const identity = await store.getIdentityChain(did);
+  if (identity?.state.isDeleted) {
+    return { cid, status: "rejected", error: "identity is deleted" };
+  }
+  await store.putOperation({ cid, jwsToken, chainType: "artifact", chainId: did });
+  await store.appendToLog({ cid, jwsToken, kind: "artifact", chainId: did });
+  return { cid, status: "accepted", kind: "artifact", chainId: did };
 };
 var dependencySort = (ops) => {
   const buckets = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -378,11 +468,11 @@ var ingestOperations = async (tokens, store) => {
         case "beacon":
           result = await ingestBeacon(op.jwsToken, store);
           break;
-        case "countersig":
-          result = await ingestCountersig(op.jwsToken, store);
+        case "countersign":
+          result = await ingestCountersign(op.jwsToken, store);
           break;
-        case "beacon-countersig":
-          result = await ingestBeaconCountersig(op.jwsToken, store);
+        case "artifact":
+          result = await ingestArtifact(op.jwsToken, store);
           break;
         default:
           result = { cid: "", status: "rejected", error: "unrecognized operation type" };
@@ -399,7 +489,65 @@ var ingestOperations = async (tokens, store) => {
   return indexedResults.sort((a, b) => a.index - b.index).map((r) => r.result);
 };
 
+// src/bootstrap.ts
+var bootstrapRelayIdentity = async (store) => {
+  const keypair = createNewEd25519Keypair();
+  const keyId = generateId("key");
+  const multibase = encodeEd25519Multikey(keypair.publicKey);
+  const signer = async (msg) => signPayloadEd25519(msg, keypair.privateKey);
+  const key = { id: keyId, type: "Multikey", publicKeyMultibase: multibase };
+  const identityOp = {
+    version: 1,
+    type: "create",
+    authKeys: [key],
+    assertKeys: [key],
+    controllerKeys: [key],
+    createdAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
+  };
+  const { jwsToken: identityJws } = await signIdentityOperation({
+    operation: identityOp,
+    signer,
+    keyId
+  });
+  const [identityResult] = await ingestOperations([identityJws], store);
+  if (!identityResult || identityResult.status !== "accepted" || !identityResult.chainId) {
+    throw new Error(`failed to bootstrap relay identity: ${identityResult?.error ?? "unknown"}`);
+  }
+  const did = identityResult.chainId;
+  const profilePayload = {
+    version: 1,
+    type: "artifact",
+    did,
+    content: {
+      $schema: "https://schemas.dfos.com/profile/v1",
+      name: "DFOS Relay"
+    },
+    createdAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
+  };
+  const kid = `${did}#${keyId}`;
+  const { jwsToken: profileArtifactJws } = await signArtifact({
+    payload: profilePayload,
+    signer,
+    kid
+  });
+  const [artifactResult] = await ingestOperations([profileArtifactJws], store);
+  if (!artifactResult || artifactResult.status !== "accepted") {
+    throw new Error(
+      `failed to ingest relay profile artifact: ${artifactResult?.error ?? "unknown"}`
+    );
+  }
+  return { did, profileArtifactJws };
+};
+
+// src/relay.ts
+import { VC_TYPE_CONTENT_READ, verifyCredential } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/credentials";
+import { dagCborCanonicalEncode as dagCborCanonicalEncode2, decodeJwsUnsafe as decodeJwsUnsafe3 } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { z } from "zod";
+
 // src/auth.ts
+import { verifyAuthToken } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/credentials";
+import { decodeJwsUnsafe as decodeJwsUnsafe2 } from "@metalabel/dfos-protocol/crypto";
 var authenticateRequest = async (authHeader, relayDID, store) => {
   if (!authHeader) return null;
   if (!authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")) return null;
@@ -427,14 +575,21 @@ var authenticateRequest = async (authHeader, relayDID, store) => {
 var IngestBody = z.object({
   operations: z.array(z.string()).min(1).max(100)
 });
-var createRelay = (options) => {
-  const { relayDID, store } = options;
+var createRelay = async (options) => {
+  const { store } = options;
+  const contentEnabled = options.content !== false;
+  const identity = options.identity ?? await bootstrapRelayIdentity(store);
+  const relayDID = identity.did;
+  const profileArtifactJws = identity.profileArtifactJws;
   const app = new Hono();
   app.get("/.well-known/dfos-relay", (c) => {
     return c.json({
       did: relayDID,
       protocol: "dfos-web-relay",
-      version: "0.1.0"
+      version: "0.1.0",
+      proof: true,
+      content: contentEnabled,
+      profile: profileArtifactJws
     });
   });
   app.post("/operations", async (c) => {
@@ -462,16 +617,54 @@ var createRelay = (options) => {
       chainId: op.chainId
     });
   });
+  app.get("/identities/:did/log", async (c) => {
+    const did = c.req.param("did");
+    const chain = await store.getIdentityChain(did);
+    if (!chain) return c.json({ error: "not found" }, 404);
+    const after = c.req.query("after");
+    const limit = Math.min(Number(c.req.query("limit") || 100), 1e3);
+    const entries = chain.log.map((jws) => {
+      const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe3(jws);
+      return { cid: decoded?.header.cid || "", jwsToken: jws };
+    });
+    let startIdx = 0;
+    if (after) {
+      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.cid === after);
+      startIdx = idx >= 0 ? idx + 1 : entries.length;
+    }
+    const page = entries.slice(startIdx, startIdx + limit);
+    const cursor = page.length === limit ? page[page.length - 1].cid : null;
+    return c.json({ entries: page, cursor });
+  });
   app.get("/identities/:did{.+}", async (c) => {
     const did = c.req.param("did");
     const chain = await store.getIdentityChain(did);
     if (!chain) return c.json({ error: "not found" }, 404);
     return c.json({
       did: chain.did,
-      log: chain.log,
+      headCID: chain.headCID,
       state: chain.state
     });
   });
+  app.get("/content/:contentId/log", async (c) => {
+    const contentId = c.req.param("contentId");
+    const chain = await store.getContentChain(contentId);
+    if (!chain) return c.json({ error: "not found" }, 404);
+    const after = c.req.query("after");
+    const limit = Math.min(Number(c.req.query("limit") || 100), 1e3);
+    const entries = chain.log.map((jws) => {
+      const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe3(jws);
+      return { cid: decoded?.header.cid || "", jwsToken: jws };
+    });
+    let startIdx = 0;
+    if (after) {
+      const idx = entries.findIndex((e) => e.cid === after);
+      startIdx = idx >= 0 ? idx + 1 : entries.length;
+    }
+    const page = entries.slice(startIdx, startIdx + limit);
+    const cursor = page.length === limit ? page[page.length - 1].cid : null;
+    return c.json({ entries: page, cursor });
+  });
   app.get("/content/:contentId", async (c) => {
     const contentId = c.req.param("contentId");
     const chain = await store.getContentChain(contentId);
@@ -479,7 +672,7 @@ var createRelay = (options) => {
     return c.json({
       contentId: chain.contentId,
       genesisCID: chain.genesisCID,
-      log: chain.log,
+      headCID: chain.state.headCID,
       state: chain.state
     });
   });
@@ -512,7 +705,14 @@ var createRelay = (options) => {
       payload: beacon.state.payload
     });
   });
+  app.get("/log", async (c) => {
+    const afterParam = c.req.query("after");
+    const limit = Math.min(Number(c.req.query("limit") || 100), 1e3);
+    const result = await store.readLog(afterParam ? { after: afterParam, limit } : { limit });
+    return c.json(result);
+  });
   app.put("/content/:contentId/blob/:operationCID", async (c) => {
+    if (!contentEnabled) return c.json({ error: "content plane not available" }, 501);
     const contentId = c.req.param("contentId");
     const operationCID = c.req.param("operationCID");
     const auth = await authenticateRequest(c.req.header("authorization"), relayDID, store);
@@ -550,6 +750,7 @@ var createRelay = (options) => {
     return c.json({ status: "stored", contentId, documentCID, operationCID });
   });
   app.get("/content/:contentId/blob", async (c) => {
+    if (!contentEnabled) return c.json({ error: "content plane not available" }, 501);
     return await readBlob({
       contentId: c.req.param("contentId"),
       ref: "head",
@@ -560,6 +761,7 @@ var createRelay = (options) => {
     });
   });
   app.get("/content/:contentId/blob/:ref", async (c) => {
+    if (!contentEnabled) return c.json({ error: "content plane not available" }, 501);
     return await readBlob({
       contentId: c.req.param("contentId"),
       ref: c.req.param("ref"),
@@ -627,6 +829,10 @@ var verifyReadCredential = async (auth, chain, contentId, credHeader, store) =>
     if (vcIssuerDID !== chain.state.creatorDID) {
       throw new Error("credential must be issued by the chain creator");
     }
+    const issuerIdentity = await store.getIdentityChain(vcIssuerDID);
+    if (issuerIdentity?.state.isDeleted) {
+      throw new Error("credential issuer identity is deleted");
+    }
     const creatorKey = await resolveKey(vcHeader.kid);
     const credential = verifyCredential({
       token: credHeader,
@@ -657,6 +863,7 @@ var MemoryRelayStore = class {
   beacons = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   blobs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   countersignatures = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  operationLog = [];
   async getOperation(cid) {
     return this.operations.get(cid);
   }
@@ -707,9 +914,24 @@ var MemoryRelayStore = class {
     existing.push(jwsToken);
     this.countersignatures.set(operationCID, existing);
   }
+  async appendToLog(entry) {
+    this.operationLog.push(entry);
+  }
+  async readLog(params) {
+    let startIdx = 0;
+    if (params.after) {
+      const idx = this.operationLog.findIndex((e) => e.cid === params.after);
+      if (idx >= 0) startIdx = idx + 1;
+      else startIdx = this.operationLog.length;
+    }
+    const entries = this.operationLog.slice(startIdx, startIdx + params.limit);
+    const cursor = entries.length === params.limit ? entries[entries.length - 1].cid : null;
+    return { entries, cursor };
+  }
 };
 export {
   MemoryRelayStore,
+  bootstrapRelayIdentity,
   createCurrentKeyResolver,
   createKeyResolver,
   createRelay,

package/dist/serve.d.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ interface ServeOptions {
  * import { createRelay, MemoryRelayStore } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay';
  * import { serve } from '@metalabel/dfos-web-relay/node';
  *
- * const relay = createRelay({ relayDID: 'did:dfos:myrelay', store: new MemoryRelayStore() });
+ * const relay = await createRelay({ store: new MemoryRelayStore() });
  * serve(relay, { port: 4444 });
  * ```
  */

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@metalabel/dfos-web-relay",
-  "version": "0.4.0",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "DFOS Web Relay — verifying HTTP relay for identity chains, content chains, beacons, and content blobs",
   "license": "MIT",
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
     "README.md"
   ],
   "dependencies": {
-    "hono": "^4.12.5",
+    "hono": "^4.12.8",
     "zod": "^4.3.6"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
@@ -51,13 +51,15 @@
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^24.10.4",
     "tsup": "^8.5.1",
-    "vitest": "^4.0.18",
-    "@metalabel/dfos-protocol": "0.4.0"
+    "tsx": "^4.20.3",
+    "vitest": "^4.1.0",
+    "@metalabel/dfos-protocol": "0.5.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsup",
     "clean": "rm -rf dist",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "test": "vitest run"
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:conformance": "./tests/run-conformance.sh"
   }
 }