@metalabel/dfos-protocol 0.52.0 → 0.53.0

package/dist/chain/index.d.ts

@@ -86,6 +86,25 @@ declare const verifyIdentityChain: (input: {
      */
     asOf?: string;
 }) => Promise<VerifiedIdentity>;
+/**
+ * The trusted state cannot be extended incrementally: it does not carry the
+ * chain-wide id-to-material binding. The caller replays the log.
+ *
+ * THERE IS NO RECONSTRUCTION, and that is the whole point. `seenKeys` is a
+ * monotonic index that never forgets a key id once the chain declared it — even
+ * after the id is dropped from the declared arrays — and nothing else in the
+ * state remembers it: an id introduced without a proof and then removed is in
+ * neither `declared` (removed) nor `provedKeys` (never proved). Reading the
+ * binding off those two arrays therefore treats a re-declaration of that id,
+ * bound to DIFFERENT material, as a fresh introduction and accepts it — while a
+ * full replay of the same operations rejects it. A fast path that accepts what
+ * its own re-verification refuses is worse than one that says it cannot answer.
+ *
+ * The Go twin is `ErrIdentityStateNoSeenKeys`, with this exact message.
+ */
+declare class IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError extends Error {
+    constructor();
+}
 /**
  * Verify a single new operation against already-verified identity state
  *
@@ -100,7 +119,8 @@ declare const verifyIdentityChain: (input: {
  * is REJECTED on this path exactly as a replay of the same two operations would
  * reject it. Without that the fast path would accept a chain its own
  * re-verification refuses, and a relay's linear path is the path almost every
- * operation takes.
+ * operation takes. A state that does not carry `seenKeys` is therefore not
+ * extensible at all — see `IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError`.
  *
  * THE POSSESSION FOLD RUNS HERE TOO, and it needs both halves of the trusted
  * state: the EFFECTIVE arrays (to know what an introduction is a transition out
@@ -130,8 +150,16 @@ type AnchorKind = 'chain' | 'artifact' | 'invalid';
  * Enforce the services byte cap on the CBOR-encoded array — same encoding the
  * wire uses, so the bound is identical across implementations. Mirrors the
  * artifact payload size check.
+ *
+ * MEASURE THE RAW DECODED PAYLOAD'S ARRAY, never zod's output. The parameter is
+ * `unknown` to make that hard to get wrong: the schema is a validator, not a
+ * canonicalizer, and its output object is freshly built — a `__proto__` data
+ * member (constructible only by `JSON.parse`) does not survive the copy. Handing
+ * this the parsed `op.services` measured 19 bytes for a 33,032-byte signed
+ * array, which Go's `parseServices` — reading the wire map directly — rejects.
+ * Same rule as the operation CID, and for the same reason.
  */
-declare const assertServicesWithinCap: (services: ServiceEntry[]) => Promise<void>;
+declare const assertServicesWithinCap: (services: unknown) => Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Classify a ContentAnchor target by structural form. Resolvers dispatch on the
  * result: 'chain' → resolve a content chain by contentId; 'artifact' → fetch by
@@ -560,4 +588,4 @@ declare const assertCanonicalSignRequestPayload: (payloadTyp: string, payloadByt
     subject: string;
 }) => void;
 
-export { type AnchorKind, ArtifactPayload, ContentOperation, CountersignPayload, type CreditClaimFailureReason, CreditClaimVerifyError, type CreditEntry, type CreditEntryState, ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC, ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC, IdentityOperation, RECOGNIZED_SERVICE_TYPES, ServiceEntry, type SignRequestFailureReason, SignRequestVerifyError, Signer, type VerifiedArtifact, type VerifiedContentChain, type VerifiedCountersignature, type VerifiedCreditClaim, type VerifiedCreditEntry, VerifiedIdentity, type VerifiedRevocation, type VerifiedSignRequest, anchorsByLabel, assertCanonicalSignRequestPayload, assertServicesWithinCap, buildSignRequest, classifyAnchor, decodeEd25519PublicMultikey, decodeMultikey, deriveChainIdentifier, deriveContentId, encodeEd25519Multikey, isRecognizedServiceType, relayEndpoints, signArtifact, signContentOperation, signCountersignature, signCreditClaim, signIdentityOperation, signRevocation, verifyArtifact, verifyContentChain, verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyCountersignature, verifyCreditClaim, verifyCreditEntry, verifyIdentityChain, verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyRevocation, verifySignRequest };
+export { type AnchorKind, ArtifactPayload, ContentOperation, CountersignPayload, type CreditClaimFailureReason, CreditClaimVerifyError, type CreditEntry, type CreditEntryState, ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC, ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC, IdentityOperation, IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError, RECOGNIZED_SERVICE_TYPES, ServiceEntry, type SignRequestFailureReason, SignRequestVerifyError, Signer, type VerifiedArtifact, type VerifiedContentChain, type VerifiedCountersignature, type VerifiedCreditClaim, type VerifiedCreditEntry, VerifiedIdentity, type VerifiedRevocation, type VerifiedSignRequest, anchorsByLabel, assertCanonicalSignRequestPayload, assertServicesWithinCap, buildSignRequest, classifyAnchor, decodeEd25519PublicMultikey, decodeMultikey, deriveChainIdentifier, deriveContentId, encodeEd25519Multikey, isRecognizedServiceType, relayEndpoints, signArtifact, signContentOperation, signCountersignature, signCreditClaim, signIdentityOperation, signRevocation, verifyArtifact, verifyContentChain, verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyCountersignature, verifyCreditClaim, verifyCreditEntry, verifyIdentityChain, verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyRevocation, verifySignRequest };

package/dist/chain/index.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
   CreditClaimVerifyError,
   DeclaredKeyState,
   IdentityOperation,
+  IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError,
   Iso8601,
   MAX_ARTIFACT_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
   MAX_CREDIT_CLAIM_SIZE,
@@ -52,9 +53,9 @@ import {
   verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState,
   verifyRevocation,
   verifySignRequest
-} from "../chunk-OU2DPHCN.js";
-import "../chunk-IV3TIYKP.js";
-import "../chunk-QRCOMLAP.js";
+} from "../chunk-WBFWGQTS.js";
+import "../chunk-VEKRLXZ5.js";
+import "../chunk-ISHAX5WN.js";
 import {
   ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC,
   ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC,
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ import {
   decodeMultikey,
   encodeEd25519Multikey
 } from "../chunk-F7RHI2CK.js";
-import "../chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+import "../chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 export {
   ARTIFACT_CID_ANCHOR_RE,
   ArtifactPayload,
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ export {
   ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC,
   ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC,
   IdentityOperation,
+  IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError,
   Iso8601,
   MAX_ARTIFACT_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
   MAX_CREDIT_CLAIM_SIZE,

package/dist/{chunk-QRCOMLAP.js → chunk-ISHAX5WN.js}

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
   isValidEd25519Signature,
   sha256,
   signPayloadEd25519
-} from "./chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+} from "./chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 
 // src/key-proof/role-set.ts
 var KEY_ROLES = ["auth", "assert", "controller"];

package/dist/{chunk-QTJZGXMH.js → chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js}

@@ -161,10 +161,15 @@ var assertJwsProfile = (header, makeError) => {
 var decodeJwsSegment = (segmentB64) => {
   let text;
   try {
-    text = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(base64urlDecode(segmentB64));
+    text = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true }).decode(
+      base64urlDecode(segmentB64)
+    );
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
+  if (text.charCodeAt(0) === 65279) {
+    throw new Error("leading byte order mark is not canonicalizable");
+  }
   assertCanonicalJsonText(text);
   let value;
   try {
@@ -178,7 +183,7 @@ var decodeJwsSegment = (segmentB64) => {
 var asJwsHeader = (raw) => {
   if (typeof raw["alg"] !== "string") return null;
   if (typeof raw["typ"] !== "string") return null;
-  if (typeof raw["kid"] !== "string") return null;
+  if ("kid" in raw && typeof raw["kid"] !== "string") return null;
   if ("cid" in raw && typeof raw["cid"] !== "string") return null;
   return raw;
 };

package/dist/{chunk-IV3TIYKP.js → chunk-VEKRLXZ5.js}

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
   decodeJwsUnsafe,
   sha256,
   verifyJws
-} from "./chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+} from "./chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 
 // src/credentials/schemas.ts
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ var verifyDFOSCredential = async (jwsToken, options) => {
   }
   const payload = result.data;
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new CredentialVerificationError("credential kid must be present");
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
   if (hashIdx < 0) throw new CredentialVerificationError("credential kid must be a DID URL");
   const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ var matchesResource = async (att, resource, action) => {
 };
 var decodeDFOSCredentialUnsafe = (jwsToken) => {
   const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(jwsToken);
-  if (!decoded) return null;
+  if (!decoded || decoded.header.kid === void 0) return null;
   const result = DFOSCredentialPayload.safeParse(decoded.payload);
   if (!result.success) return null;
   return {

package/dist/{chunk-OU2DPHCN.js → chunk-WBFWGQTS.js}

@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ import {
   matchesResource,
   verifyDFOSCredential,
   verifyDelegationChain
-} from "./chunk-IV3TIYKP.js";
+} from "./chunk-VEKRLXZ5.js";
 import {
   KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP,
   KEY_ROLES,
   unsafeKeyProofSubject,
   verifyChainKeyProof
-} from "./chunk-QRCOMLAP.js";
+} from "./chunk-ISHAX5WN.js";
 import {
   decodeEd25519PublicMultikey
 } from "./chunk-F7RHI2CK.js";
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import {
   decodeJwsUnsafe,
   generateIdNoPrefix,
   verifyJws
-} from "./chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+} from "./chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 
 // src/chain/schemas.ts
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ var verifyIdentityChain = async (input) => {
       });
       if (op.services) {
         try {
-          await assertServicesWithinCap(op.services);
+          await assertServicesWithinCap(decoded.payload["services"]);
         } catch (e) {
           throw new Error(`log[${idx}]: ${e.message}`);
         }
@@ -560,6 +560,7 @@ var verifyIdentityChain = async (input) => {
       throw new Error(`log[${idx}]: cid mismatch in protected header`);
     }
     const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+    if (kid === void 0) throw new Error(`log[${idx}]: kid must be present`);
     let signingKeyId;
     if (kid.includes("#")) {
       const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
@@ -660,14 +661,19 @@ var verifyIdentityChain = async (input) => {
     seenKeys: [...state.seenKeys.values()]
   };
 };
+var IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError = class extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("identity state has no seenKeys; replay the chain");
+    this.name = "IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError";
+  }
+};
 var verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState = async (input) => {
   const { currentState, headCID, lastCreatedAt, newOp } = input;
   const priorEffective = keyStateOf(currentState);
   const priorDeclared = currentState.declared ?? priorEffective;
   const priorProved = currentState.provedKeys ?? priorEffective;
-  const seenKeys = keyMaterialIndex(
-    currentState.seenKeys ?? [...flatKeys(priorDeclared), ...flatKeys(priorProved)]
-  );
+  if (!currentState.seenKeys?.length) throw new IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError();
+  const seenKeys = keyMaterialIndex(currentState.seenKeys);
   const priorSeenKeys = [...seenKeys.values()];
   const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(newOp);
   if (!decoded) throw new Error("failed to decode JWS");
@@ -704,6 +710,7 @@ var verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState = async (input) => {
   if (!decoded.header.cid) throw new Error("missing cid in protected header");
   if (decoded.header.cid !== operationCID) throw new Error("cid mismatch in protected header");
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new Error("kid must be present");
   if (!kid.includes("#")) {
     throw new Error("non-genesis op kid must be DID URL, got bare key ID");
   }
@@ -731,7 +738,7 @@ var verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState = async (input) => {
         throw new Error("cannot repeat key ids in same usage");
       }
     });
-    if (op.services) await assertServicesWithinCap(op.services);
+    if (op.services) await assertServicesWithinCap(decoded.payload["services"]);
   }
   const newState = (() => {
     switch (op.type) {
@@ -892,6 +899,7 @@ var verifyContentChain = async (input) => {
       }
     }
     const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+    if (kid === void 0) throw new Error(`log[${idx}]: kid must be present`);
     const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
     if (hashIdx < 0) throw new Error(`log[${idx}]: kid must be a DID URL`);
     const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -1002,6 +1010,7 @@ var verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState = async (input) => {
     throw new Error("createdAt must be after last op");
   }
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new Error("kid must be present");
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
   if (hashIdx < 0) throw new Error("kid must be a DID URL");
   const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -1080,6 +1089,7 @@ var verifyCountersignature = async (input) => {
   }
   const payload = result.data;
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new Error("kid must be present");
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
   if (hashIdx < 0) throw new Error("countersignature kid must be a DID URL");
   const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -1133,6 +1143,7 @@ var verifyArtifact = async (input) => {
     throw new Error(`invalid artifact typ: ${decoded.header.typ}`);
   }
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new Error("kid must be present");
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
   if (hashIdx < 0) throw new Error("artifact kid must be a DID URL");
   const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -1190,6 +1201,7 @@ var verifyRevocation = async (input) => {
     throw new Error(`invalid revocation typ: ${decoded.header.typ}`);
   }
   const kid = decoded.header.kid;
+  if (kid === void 0) throw new Error("kid must be present");
   const hashIdx = kid.indexOf("#");
   if (hashIdx < 0) throw new Error("revocation kid must be a DID URL");
   const kidDid = kid.substring(0, hashIdx);
@@ -1295,8 +1307,7 @@ var verifyCreditClaim = async (jwsToken, options) => {
   }
   const decoded = decodeJwsUnsafe(jwsToken);
   if (!decoded) throw invalid("failed to decode credit claim JWS");
-  const rawHeader = decoded.header;
-  if (typeof rawHeader["typ"] !== "string" || typeof rawHeader["kid"] !== "string") {
+  if (typeof decoded.header.kid !== "string") {
     throw invalid("credit claim header must carry a string typ and kid");
   }
   if (decoded.header.typ !== "did:dfos:credit-claim") {
@@ -1522,7 +1533,7 @@ var verifySignRequest = async (jwsToken, options) => {
       throw invalid2("sign request protected header must be an object");
     }
     assertJwsProfile(rawHeader, invalid2);
-    if (typeof rawHeader["typ"] !== "string" || typeof rawHeader["kid"] !== "string") {
+    if (typeof rawHeader["typ"] !== "string" || typeof decoded.header.kid !== "string") {
       throw invalid2("sign request header must carry a string typ and kid");
     }
     if (decoded.header.typ !== "did:dfos:sign-request") {
@@ -1673,6 +1684,7 @@ export {
   anchorsByLabel,
   signIdentityOperation,
   verifyIdentityChain,
+  IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError,
   verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState,
   signContentOperation,
   verifyContentChain,

package/dist/credentials/index.js

@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ import {
   verifyDelegationChain,
   verifyIdentityProofEnvelope,
   verifyRequestProofEnvelope
-} from "../chunk-IV3TIYKP.js";
+} from "../chunk-VEKRLXZ5.js";
 import "../chunk-F7RHI2CK.js";
-import "../chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+import "../chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 export {
   ApiRequestVerifyError,
   Attenuation,

package/dist/crypto/index.d.ts

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ declare const normalizedId: <T extends string>(prefix: T, id: string) => `${T}_$
 interface JwsHeader {
     alg: 'EdDSA';
     typ: string;
-    kid: string;
+    kid?: string;
     /** CIDv1 of the operation payload (dag-cbor + SHA-256), signed in the protected header */
     cid?: string;
 }
@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ interface JwsHeader {
  * signature (64 bytes)
  */
 declare const createJws: (options: {
-    header: JwsHeader;
+    header: JwsHeader & {
+        kid: string;
+    };
     payload: Record<string, unknown>;
     sign: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array>;
 }) => Promise<string>;

package/dist/crypto/index.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import {
   signPayloadEd25519,
   verifyJws,
   verifyJwt
-} from "../chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+} from "../chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 export {
   JwsVerificationError,
   JwtVerificationError,

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 export { JwsHeader, JwsVerificationError, JwtClaims, JwtCreateOptions, JwtHeader, JwtVerificationError, JwtVerifyOptions, PrefixedID, assertCanonicalJsonText, assertJwsProfile, base64urlDecode, base64urlEncode, createJws, createJwt, createNewEd25519Keypair, dagCborCanonicalEncode, decodeJwsUnsafe, decodeJwtUnsafe, generateId, generateIdNoPrefix, importEd25519Keypair, isCanonicallyEqual, isValidEd25519Signature, isValidId, normalizedId, parseDagCborCID, sha256, signPayloadEd25519, verifyJws, verifyJwt } from './crypto/index.js';
 export { A as ARTIFACT_CID_ANCHOR_RE, a as ArtifactPayload, b as Attenuation, C as CONTENT_ID_ANCHOR_RE, c as ContentOperation, d as CountersignPayload, e as CredentialVerificationError, f as CreditClaimPayload, D as DFOSCredentialPayload, g as DeclaredKeyState, I as IdentityOperation, h as Iso8601, M as MAX_ARTIFACT_PAYLOAD_SIZE, i as MAX_CREDENTIAL_SIZE, j as MAX_CREDIT_CLAIM_SIZE, k as MAX_KEY_PROOFS, l as MAX_OPERATION_SIZE, m as MAX_SERVICES_ENTRIES, n as MAX_SERVICES_PAYLOAD_SIZE, o as MAX_SIGN_REQUEST_PAYLOAD_SIZE, p as MAX_SIGN_REQUEST_SIZE, q as MultikeyPublicKey, R as ResolvedIdentity, r as RevocationChecker, s as RevocationPayload, S as ServiceEntry, t as ServicesArray, u as SignRequestPayload, v as Signer, V as VerifiedDFOSCredential, w as VerifiedDelegationChain, x as VerifiedIdentity, y as VoidKeyMembership, z as createDFOSCredential, B as decodeDFOSCredentialUnsafe, E as isAttenuated, F as matchesResource, G as parseProtocolTimestampUnix, H as verifyDFOSCredential, J as verifyDelegationChain } from './dfos-credential-j-kHtFvG.js';
-export { AnchorKind, CreditClaimFailureReason, CreditClaimVerifyError, CreditEntry, CreditEntryState, ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC, ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC, RECOGNIZED_SERVICE_TYPES, SignRequestFailureReason, SignRequestVerifyError, VerifiedArtifact, VerifiedContentChain, VerifiedCountersignature, VerifiedCreditClaim, VerifiedCreditEntry, VerifiedRevocation, VerifiedSignRequest, anchorsByLabel, assertCanonicalSignRequestPayload, assertServicesWithinCap, buildSignRequest, classifyAnchor, decodeEd25519PublicMultikey, decodeMultikey, deriveChainIdentifier, deriveContentId, encodeEd25519Multikey, isRecognizedServiceType, relayEndpoints, signArtifact, signContentOperation, signCountersignature, signCreditClaim, signIdentityOperation, signRevocation, verifyArtifact, verifyContentChain, verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyCountersignature, verifyCreditClaim, verifyCreditEntry, verifyIdentityChain, verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyRevocation, verifySignRequest } from './chain/index.js';
+export { AnchorKind, CreditClaimFailureReason, CreditClaimVerifyError, CreditEntry, CreditEntryState, ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC, ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC, IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError, RECOGNIZED_SERVICE_TYPES, SignRequestFailureReason, SignRequestVerifyError, VerifiedArtifact, VerifiedContentChain, VerifiedCountersignature, VerifiedCreditClaim, VerifiedCreditEntry, VerifiedRevocation, VerifiedSignRequest, anchorsByLabel, assertCanonicalSignRequestPayload, assertServicesWithinCap, buildSignRequest, classifyAnchor, decodeEd25519PublicMultikey, decodeMultikey, deriveChainIdentifier, deriveContentId, encodeEd25519Multikey, isRecognizedServiceType, relayEndpoints, signArtifact, signContentOperation, signCountersignature, signCreditClaim, signIdentityOperation, signRevocation, verifyArtifact, verifyContentChain, verifyContentExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyCountersignature, verifyCreditClaim, verifyCreditEntry, verifyIdentityChain, verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState, verifyRevocation, verifySignRequest } from './chain/index.js';
 export { ApiRequestVerifyError, DEFAULT_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS, DEFAULT_PROOF_WINDOW_SECONDS, DFOS_AUTH_SCHEME, EMPTY_BODY_SHA256, IDENTITY_PROOF_JWS_TYP, IdentityProofPayload, MAX_BODY_BYTES, MAX_PROOF_FRESHNESS_SPAN_SECONDS, MAX_REQUEST_PROOF_SIZE, ParsedProofPayload, ProofEnvelopeInput, ProofExtraMembers, ProofPresenterState, REQUEST_PROOF_JWS_TYP, RequestProofFailurePhase, RequestProofFailureReason, RequestProofPayload, ResolveProofPresenter, SignApiIdentityRequestInput, SignApiRequestInput, VerifiedProofEnvelope, apiIdentitySigningInput, apiRequestSigningInput, assertProofVerifierConfig, buildApiAuthHeaders, buildApiIdentityHeaders, canonicalExtraMembers, invalidProof, misconfiguredProof, parseDfosAuthorization, sha256BodyHash, signApiIdentityRequest, signApiRequest, unverifiableProof, verifyIdentityProofEnvelope, verifyRequestProofEnvelope } from './credentials/index.js';
 export { DEFAULT_KEY_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS, KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP, KEY_ROLES, KeyProofFailureReason, KeyProofPayload, KeyProofVerifyError, KeyRole, MAX_KEY_PROOF_SIZE, SignKeyProofInput, VerifiedKeyProof, VerifyChainKeyProofOptions, VerifyKeyProofOptions, isCanonicalRoleSet, keyProofSigningInput, keyWordFingerprint, parseRoleSet, roleSetCovers, serializeRoleSet, signKeyProof, unsafeKeyProofSubject, verifyChainKeyProof, verifyKeyProof } from './key-proof/index.js';
 export { FoldOperation, INDEX_V1_SCHEMA, IndexDelta, IndexDocument, IndexEntry, LwwDelta, OrderKey, byteCompare, compareHeadPreference, compareLinear, foldIndexV1, foldLwwMap, linearize } from './fold/index.js';

package/dist/index.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
   CreditClaimVerifyError,
   DeclaredKeyState,
   IdentityOperation,
+  IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError,
   Iso8601,
   MAX_ARTIFACT_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
   MAX_CREDIT_CLAIM_SIZE,
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ import {
   verifyIdentityExtensionFromTrustedState,
   verifyRevocation,
   verifySignRequest
-} from "./chunk-OU2DPHCN.js";
+} from "./chunk-WBFWGQTS.js";
 import {
   ApiRequestVerifyError,
   Attenuation,
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ import {
   verifyDelegationChain,
   verifyIdentityProofEnvelope,
   verifyRequestProofEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-IV3TIYKP.js";
+} from "./chunk-VEKRLXZ5.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_KEY_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS,
   KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP,
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ import {
   unsafeKeyProofSubject,
   verifyChainKeyProof,
   verifyKeyProof
-} from "./chunk-QRCOMLAP.js";
+} from "./chunk-ISHAX5WN.js";
 import {
   ED25519_PRIV_MULTICODEC,
   ED25519_PUB_MULTICODEC,
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ import {
   signPayloadEd25519,
   verifyJws,
   verifyJwt
-} from "./chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+} from "./chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 import {
   INDEX_V1_SCHEMA,
   byteCompare,
@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ export {
   IDENTITY_PROOF_JWS_TYP,
   INDEX_V1_SCHEMA,
   IdentityOperation,
+  IdentityStateNoSeenKeysError,
   Iso8601,
   JwsVerificationError,
   JwtVerificationError,

package/dist/key-proof/index.d.ts

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ interface SignKeyProofInput {
  * The protected header is EXACTLY `{"alg":"EdDSA","typ":"<purpose>"}` — two
  * members, no `kid` (the key is in no chain and rides in the payload) and no
  * `cid` (there is no operation to bind). It is assembled by hand rather than
- * through `createJws`, whose `JwsHeader` requires a `kid` this envelope must not
+ * through `createJws`, whose header input requires a `kid` this envelope must not
  * carry.
  *
  * HOLDER OBLIGATIONS THIS FUNCTION CANNOT DISCHARGE (INTEGRATIONS.md, Holder

package/dist/key-proof/index.js

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ import {
   unsafeKeyProofSubject,
   verifyChainKeyProof,
   verifyKeyProof
-} from "../chunk-QRCOMLAP.js";
+} from "../chunk-ISHAX5WN.js";
 import "../chunk-F7RHI2CK.js";
-import "../chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
+import "../chunk-NUIIVAZ3.js";
 export {
   DEFAULT_KEY_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS,
   KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@metalabel/dfos-protocol",
-  "version": "0.52.0",
+  "version": "0.53.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "DFOS Protocol — Ed25519 signed chain primitives, services, credentials, and verification",
   "license": "MIT",