@metalabel/dfos-protocol 0.50.0 → 0.52.0

package/dist/key-proof/index.d.ts

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ declare const isCanonicalRoleSet: (value: string) => boolean;
 declare const roleSetCovers: (value: string, role: KeyRole) => boolean;
 
 /**
- * The first registered purpose in KEY-PROOF.md's purpose registry: the candidate
+ * The registered key-proof purpose in PROTOCOL.md, The envelope: the candidate
  * key presents for addition to a ceremony-named identity's `authKeys`/
  * `assertKeys` sets.
  *
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ declare const KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP = "did:dfos:key-add";
 declare const MAX_KEY_PROOF_SIZE = 4096;
 /**
  * RECOMMENDED acceptance window, in seconds, EITHER SIDE of the verifier's clock
- * — matching a ceremony's own lifetime (KEY-PROOF.md, Verification step 5).
+ * — matching a ceremony's own lifetime (INTEGRATIONS.md, Presentation verification).
  */
 declare const DEFAULT_KEY_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
 /**
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ interface SignKeyProofInput {
  * through `createJws`, whose `JwsHeader` requires a `kid` this envelope must not
  * carry.
  *
- * HOLDER OBLIGATIONS THIS FUNCTION CANNOT DISCHARGE (KEY-PROOF.md, Holder
- * Obligations). A holder MUST show its human — before calling this — the
+ * HOLDER OBLIGATIONS THIS FUNCTION CANNOT DISCHARGE (INTEGRATIONS.md, Holder
+ * obligations). A holder MUST show its human — before calling this — the
  * audience, the purpose, the adopting identity, and the roles. A proof is
  * consent, and consent that was never displayed was never given.
  *
@@ -210,10 +210,10 @@ interface VerifyKeyProofOptions {
 /** What a verified key proof hands back. */
 interface VerifiedKeyProof {
     /**
-     * The validated payload. THE CALLER MUST NOW RUN STEP 6 against `payload.nonce`:
-     * check that it is a nonce this verifier minted, for this ceremony, not yet
-     * consumed, and consume it ATOMICALLY (check-and-delete) so two racing
-     * completions cannot both pass.
+     * The validated payload. THE CALLER MUST NOW RUN THE NONCE CHECK against
+     * `payload.nonce`: check that it is a nonce this verifier minted, for this
+     * ceremony, not yet consumed, and consume it ATOMICALLY (check-and-delete) so
+     * two racing completions cannot both pass.
      */
     payload: KeyProofPayload;
     /** The header `typ` — equal to `expectedTyp`, since anything else rejected. */
@@ -222,17 +222,18 @@ interface VerifiedKeyProof {
     now: number;
 }
 /**
- * Verify a key proof AT PRESENTATION TIME — KEY-PROOF.md's verification algorithm
- * steps 1–5 and 7: size cap, header gates, the closed payload schema over
- * CANONICAL bytes, the four expectation arms (audience, did, roleSet, prevCID),
- * freshness, and the signature against the payload's OWN `publicKeyMultibase`.
+ * Verify a key proof AT PRESENTATION TIME — INTEGRATIONS.md, Presentation
+ * verification except its nonce check: size cap, header gates, the closed
+ * payload schema over CANONICAL bytes, the four expectation arms (audience,
+ * did, roleSet, prevCID), freshness, and the signature against the payload's
+ * OWN `publicKeyMultibase`.
  *
  * EVERY EXPECTATION IS THE DEPLOYMENT'S OWN VALUE. There is no arm here that
  * compares the envelope to itself. `expectedDid`, `expectedRoleSet` and
  * `expectedPrevCID` are the position the completing authority is about to WRITE;
  * if the envelope names a different one, the holder consented to something else.
  *
- * STEP 6 (NONCE) IS THE CALLER'S, and this function cannot stand in for it. The
+ * THE NONCE CHECK IS THE CALLER'S, and this function cannot stand in for it. The
  * nonce MUST be one this verifier minted, for this ceremony, not yet consumed,
  * checked and consumed ATOMICALLY — a check-and-delete against the verifier's
  * own store, which is state this pure function does not hold. It is returned on

package/dist/key-proof/index.js

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ import {
   unsafeKeyProofSubject,
   verifyChainKeyProof,
   verifyKeyProof
-} from "../chunk-JVSC67DC.js";
-import "../chunk-IDVYITX7.js";
-import "../chunk-4LG2GEB2.js";
+} from "../chunk-QRCOMLAP.js";
+import "../chunk-F7RHI2CK.js";
+import "../chunk-QTJZGXMH.js";
 export {
   DEFAULT_KEY_PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS,
   KEY_ADD_JWS_TYP,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@metalabel/dfos-protocol",
-  "version": "0.50.0",
+  "version": "0.52.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "DFOS Protocol — Ed25519 signed chain primitives, services, credentials, and verification",
   "license": "MIT",

package/schemas/credit-claim.v1.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
   "$id": "https://schemas.dfos.com/credit-claim/v1",
   "title": "Credit Claim",
-  "description": "The payload of a did:dfos:credit-claim JWS — a claimant's own signed assertion that it holds a named role on a content chain. Unlike post/v1, profile/v1, and index/v1, this is NOT a document committed to a chain by CID: it is an envelope payload carried inside document bytes, in the claim field of a credits entry (see $defs/creditEntry). Attribution, not authorization — a credit claim grants nothing. Unknown top-level fields are deliberately NOT rejected here (no additionalProperties: false, unlike the document schemas): this is a wire payload under the protocol's MUST-ignore-unknown rule, and the CID commits to the exact bytes, so a verifier that stripped unknown keys would fail its own CID check. Full semantics, the two-way bind, and the four verification states: https://protocol.dfos.com/credits",
+  "description": "The payload of a did:dfos:credit-claim JWS — a claimant's own signed assertion that it holds a named role on a content chain. Unlike post/v1, profile/v1, and index/v1, this is NOT a document committed to a chain by CID: it is an envelope payload carried inside document bytes, in the claim field of a credits entry (see $defs/creditEntry). Attribution, not authorization — a credit claim grants nothing. Unknown top-level fields are deliberately NOT rejected here (no additionalProperties: false, unlike the document schemas): this is a wire payload under the protocol's MUST-ignore-unknown rule, and the CID commits to the exact bytes, so a verifier that stripped unknown keys would fail its own CID check. Full semantics, the two-way bind, and the four verification states: https://protocol.dfos.com/content-model#credits",
   "type": "object",
   "required": ["version", "type", "contentId", "did", "role", "createdAt"],
   "properties": {

package/schemas/post.v1.json

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
       "items": {
         "$ref": "#/$defs/credit"
       },
-      "description": "Ordered authorship credits. Array order is display order; the first entry is the primary author. Omit entirely for unattributed content. A bare entry is the assertion tier of the authorship lattice — the operation signer asserts it; a credited DID upgrades its credit to proof by adding a credit claim in the entry's claim field (see https://protocol.dfos.com/credits)."
+      "description": "Ordered authorship credits. Array order is display order; the first entry is the primary author. Omit entirely for unattributed content. A bare entry is the assertion tier of the authorship lattice — the operation signer asserts it; a credited DID upgrades its credit to proof by adding a credit claim in the entry's claim field (see https://protocol.dfos.com/content-model#credits)."
     }
   },
   "additionalProperties": false,