@memberjunction/server 6.2.0-edge.5 → 6.2.0-edge.7

package/src/auth/localDevAuth.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Local Development Mock/Test JWT Authentication (`local`).
+ *
+ * Provides a zero-external-IdP local development login flow backed by MJ's
+ * in-memory RS256 `MagicLinkKeyManager` and JWKS endpoint.
+ *
+ * HARD SECURITY INVARIANTS:
+ * 1. Fail loud in production: If `MJ_DEV_AUTH_ENABLED` (or `configInfo.devAuth?.enabled`)
+ *    is enabled while `NODE_ENV === 'production'`, server startup throws a fatal error
+ *    and refuses to boot.
+ * 2. Strict localhost-only guard: Every request to `/auth/dev-login` and `/auth/dev-users`
+ *    verifies that:
+ *    - `NODE_ENV !== 'production'` and local dev auth is enabled.
+ *    - `X-Forwarded-For` (if present) contains only loopback addresses.
+ *    - `Host` header is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`.
+ *    - `Origin` / `Referer` headers (if present) resolve to `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`.
+ *    - Socket remote address is loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) or local
+ *      Docker bridge/host-gateway when no external `X-Forwarded-For` is present.
+ *    Any request failing these checks is denied with `403 Forbidden` and logged.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/auth/localDevAuth
+ */
+
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import { Router, json, type Request, type Response } from 'express';
+import { rateLimit } from 'express-rate-limit';
+import {
+  AuthProviderConfig,
+  DatabaseProviderBase,
+  IMetadataProvider,
+  LogError,
+  LogStatusEx,
+  Metadata,
+  UserInfo,
+} from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { UUIDsEqual } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import { AuthProviderFactory, LocalDevProvider } from '@memberjunction/auth-providers';
+import { UserCache } from '@memberjunction/generic-database-provider';
+import { configInfo } from '../config.js';
+import { ApiRoute } from '../apiRoot.js';
+import { MagicLinkKeyManager } from './magicLink/MagicLinkKeys.js';
+import { MAGIC_LINK_JWKS_PATH } from './magicLink/MagicLinkRouter.js';
+import { AssertLocalDevAuthAllowed, IsLocalDevAuthEnabled } from './initializeProviders.js';
+
+export { AssertLocalDevAuthAllowed, IsLocalDevAuthEnabled };
+
+/** Claims embedded in a local development JWT. */
+interface LocalDevJWTClaims extends Record<string, unknown> {
+  iss: string;
+  aud: string;
+  sub: string;
+  email: string;
+  given_name: string;
+  family_name: string;
+  name: string;
+  preferred_username: string;
+  iat: number;
+  exp: number;
+}
+
+/** Result of the localhost-only request guard. */
+export interface LocalhostGuardResult {
+  Allowed: boolean;
+  Reason?: string;
+}
+
+const LOCALHOST_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '[::1]']);
+
+function TrimTrailingSlashes(value: string): string {
+  let end = value.length;
+  while (end > 0 && value.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) {
+    end--;
+  }
+  return value.slice(0, end);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks whether an IP address is a loopback address, or (when `allowDockerBridge` is true)
+ * a local Docker bridge / Docker Desktop host-gateway address.
+ */
+export function IsLoopbackAddress(rawIp: string | undefined, allowDockerBridge: boolean): boolean {
+  if (!rawIp) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const normalized = rawIp.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+  if (normalized === '127.0.0.1' || normalized === '::1' || normalized === 'localhost') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (/^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(normalized)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (allowDockerBridge) {
+    // Docker Desktop macOS/Windows host-gateway IPs (192.168.65.0/24) and local
+    // Docker bridge gateway (.1) addresses when a host browser connects to a
+    // port-forwarded container bound to 127.0.0.1 on the host.
+    if (/^192\.168\.65\.\d{1,3}$/.test(normalized)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])\.\d{1,3}\.1$/.test(normalized)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (normalized === '10.0.2.2') {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function isRunningInsideContainer(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean {
+  if (env.MJ_DEV_AUTH_ALLOW_DOCKER_BRIDGE === 'true') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (env.MJ_DEV_AUTH_ALLOW_DOCKER_BRIDGE === 'false') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return fs.existsSync('/.dockerenv') || fs.existsSync('/run/.containerenv');
+}
+
+/** Extracts the hostname (without port) from a raw HTTP `Host` header value. */
+function extractHostnameFromHostHeader(hostHeader: string | undefined): string {
+  if (!hostHeader) {
+    return '';
+  }
+  const trimmed = hostHeader.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (trimmed.startsWith('[')) {
+    const closeIdx = trimmed.indexOf(']');
+    return closeIdx >= 0 ? trimmed.slice(1, closeIdx) : trimmed;
+  }
+  const colonIdx = trimmed.indexOf(':');
+  return colonIdx >= 0 ? trimmed.slice(0, colonIdx) : trimmed;
+}
+
+/** Extracts the hostname from an `Origin` or `Referer` URL header. */
+function extractHostnameFromUrlHeader(urlHeader: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(urlHeader);
+    return parsed.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies that an incoming HTTP request to a local-dev auth endpoint originated
+ * strictly from localhost (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`).
+ */
+export function VerifyLocalhostRequest(
+  req: Request,
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env
+): LocalhostGuardResult {
+  if (env.NODE_ENV?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'production') {
+    return {
+      Allowed: false,
+      Reason: 'Local dev auth is strictly forbidden when NODE_ENV=production.',
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 1. Inspect X-Forwarded-For / Forwarded / X-Real-IP / CF-Connecting-IP if present — every hop must be pure loopback
+  const xffRaw = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
+  const xffValue = Array.isArray(xffRaw) ? xffRaw.join(',') : xffRaw;
+  if (xffValue && xffValue.trim().length > 0) {
+    const hops = xffValue.split(',').map((h) => h.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+    for (const hop of hops) {
+      if (!IsLoopbackAddress(hop, false)) {
+        return {
+          Allowed: false,
+          Reason: `Non-loopback X-Forwarded-For address '${hop}' rejected.`,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const proxyHeader of ['x-real-ip', 'cf-connecting-ip'] as const) {
+    const rawHeader = req.headers[proxyHeader];
+    const headerVal = Array.isArray(rawHeader) ? rawHeader[0] : rawHeader;
+    if (headerVal && headerVal.trim().length > 0 && !IsLoopbackAddress(headerVal, false)) {
+      return {
+        Allowed: false,
+        Reason: `Non-loopback ${proxyHeader} address '${headerVal}' rejected.`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  const forwardedHeader = req.headers['forwarded'];
+  const forwardedVal = Array.isArray(forwardedHeader) ? forwardedHeader.join(',') : forwardedHeader;
+  if (forwardedVal && forwardedVal.trim().length > 0) {
+    const forMatches = forwardedVal.matchAll(/for=\s*"?\[?([^;,"\]]+)\]?"?/gi);
+    for (const match of forMatches) {
+      const candidateIp = match[1]?.split(':')[0]?.trim();
+      if (candidateIp && !IsLoopbackAddress(candidateIp, false)) {
+        return {
+          Allowed: false,
+          Reason: `Non-loopback Forwarded address '${candidateIp}' rejected.`,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 1b. Reject browser cross-site requests via Sec-Fetch-Site
+  const secFetchSite = typeof req.headers['sec-fetch-site'] === 'string' ? req.headers['sec-fetch-site'].trim().toLowerCase() : undefined;
+  if (secFetchSite === 'cross-site') {
+    return {
+      Allowed: false,
+      Reason: `Cross-site request (Sec-Fetch-Site: ${secFetchSite}) rejected.`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 2. Inspect Host header — must be localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1
+  const hostHeader = typeof req.headers.host === 'string' ? req.headers.host : req.hostname;
+  const hostName = extractHostnameFromHostHeader(hostHeader);
+  if (!hostName || !LOCALHOST_HOSTNAMES.has(hostName)) {
+    return {
+      Allowed: false,
+      Reason: `Non-localhost Host header '${hostHeader ?? 'missing'}' rejected.`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // 3. Inspect Origin header if present
+  const originHeader = typeof req.headers.origin === 'string' ? req.headers.origin : undefined;
+  if (originHeader) {
+    const originHost = extractHostnameFromUrlHeader(originHeader);
+    if (!originHost || !LOCALHOST_HOSTNAMES.has(originHost)) {
+      return {
+        Allowed: false,
+        Reason: `Non-localhost Origin header '${originHeader}' rejected.`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 4. Inspect Referer header if present
+  const refererHeader = typeof req.headers.referer === 'string' ? req.headers.referer : undefined;
+  if (refererHeader) {
+    const refererHost = extractHostnameFromUrlHeader(refererHeader);
+    if (!refererHost || !LOCALHOST_HOSTNAMES.has(refererHost)) {
+      return {
+        Allowed: false,
+        Reason: `Non-localhost Referer header '${refererHeader}' rejected.`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 5. Inspect socket remote address (allow Docker local bridge ONLY when running in a container and no proxy header is present)
+  const hasProxyHeader = Boolean(
+    (xffValue && xffValue.trim().length > 0) ||
+    (forwardedVal && forwardedVal.trim().length > 0) ||
+    req.headers['x-real-ip'] ||
+    req.headers['cf-connecting-ip']
+  );
+  const allowDockerBridge = !hasProxyHeader && isRunningInsideContainer(env);
+  const remoteAddress = req.socket?.remoteAddress || req.ip;
+  if (!IsLoopbackAddress(remoteAddress, allowDockerBridge)) {
+    return {
+      Allowed: false,
+      Reason: `Non-loopback socket remote address '${remoteAddress ?? 'unknown'}' rejected.`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { Allowed: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Registers the `local` auth provider in `AuthProviderFactory` and `configInfo.authProviders`
+ * using the server's configured public URL and the shared `MagicLinkKeyManager` JWKS endpoint.
+ */
+export function RegisterLocalDevAuthProvider(publicUrl?: string): void {
+  AssertLocalDevAuthAllowed();
+  MagicLinkKeyManager.Instance.Initialize(configInfo.magicLink?.rsaPrivateKey);
+
+  const base = publicUrl ? TrimTrailingSlashes(publicUrl) : undefined;
+  const issuer = base ? `${base}/local-dev` : ApiRoute('/local-dev', { absolute: true });
+  const jwksUri = base ? `${base}${MAGIC_LINK_JWKS_PATH}` : ApiRoute(MAGIC_LINK_JWKS_PATH, { absolute: true });
+  const providerConfig: AuthProviderConfig = {
+    name: 'local',
+    type: 'local',
+    issuer,
+    audience: LocalDevProvider.DEFAULT_AUDIENCE,
+    jwksUri,
+  };
+
+  try {
+    const factory = AuthProviderFactory.Instance;
+    const existingProvider = factory.getByName('local');
+    if (existingProvider && existingProvider.issuer === issuer && existingProvider.jwksUri === jwksUri) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    configInfo.authProviders = configInfo.authProviders ?? [];
+    const existingIdx = configInfo.authProviders.findIndex((p) => p.type === 'local' || p.name === 'local');
+    if (existingIdx >= 0) {
+      configInfo.authProviders[existingIdx] = providerConfig;
+    } else {
+      configInfo.authProviders.push(providerConfig);
+    }
+    factory.register(AuthProviderFactory.createProvider(providerConfig));
+    LogStatusEx({
+      message: `[LocalDevAuth] Registered local dev auth provider (issuer: ${providerConfig.issuer}, jwks: ${providerConfig.jwksUri})`,
+      verboseOnly: true,
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    LogError(`[LocalDevAuth] Failed to register local dev auth provider: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the active local MJ user to sign in as for local development.
+ */
+export async function ResolveLocalDevUser(
+  requestedEmail?: string,
+  provider?: IMetadataProvider
+): Promise<UserInfo | null> {
+  const effectiveProvider = provider ?? Metadata.Provider;
+  if ((!UserCache.Instance.Users || UserCache.Instance.Users.length === 0) && effectiveProvider) {
+    try {
+      await UserCache.Instance.Refresh(effectiveProvider as DatabaseProviderBase);
+    } catch (err) {
+      LogError(`[LocalDevAuth] Failed to refresh UserCache: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const allUsers = UserCache.Instance.Users ?? [];
+  const activeUsers = allUsers.filter(
+    (u) =>
+      u.IsActive &&
+      !UUIDsEqual(u.ID, UserCache.Instance.SYSTEM_USER_ID) &&
+      u.Name?.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'system'
+  );
+
+  const targetEmail =
+    requestedEmail?.trim() ||
+    process.env.MJ_DEV_AUTH_DEFAULT_EMAIL?.trim() ||
+    configInfo?.devAuth?.defaultEmail?.trim();
+  if (targetEmail) {
+    const matched = activeUsers.find((u) => u.Email?.trim().toLowerCase() === targetEmail.toLowerCase());
+    if (matched) {
+      return matched;
+    }
+    // If an explicit email was requested on the call and doesn't exist, return null
+    if (requestedEmail?.trim()) {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 1. Default MJ installer admin email
+  const defaultAdmin = activeUsers.find((u) => u.Email?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'admin@memberjunction.org');
+  if (defaultAdmin) {
+    return defaultAdmin;
+  }
+
+  // 2. First active user holding the Developer role
+  const developerUser = activeUsers.find(
+    (u) =>
+      u.Email?.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'not.set@nowhere.com' &&
+      u.UserRoles?.some((r) => r.Role?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'developer')
+  );
+  if (developerUser) {
+    return developerUser;
+  }
+
+  // 3. First active Owner user with a real email
+  const ownerUser = activeUsers.find(
+    (u) =>
+      u.Email?.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'not.set@nowhere.com' &&
+      u.Type?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'owner'
+  );
+  if (ownerUser) {
+    return ownerUser;
+  }
+
+  return activeUsers[0] ?? null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mints a signed RS256 local-dev JWT for the given `UserInfo`.
+ */
+export function MintLocalDevJwt(
+  user: UserInfo,
+  publicUrl?: string,
+  ttlSeconds = 8 * 3600
+): { token: string; expiresAt: string; claims: LocalDevJWTClaims } {
+  AssertLocalDevAuthAllowed();
+  MagicLinkKeyManager.Instance.Initialize(configInfo.magicLink?.rsaPrivateKey);
+
+  const base = publicUrl ? TrimTrailingSlashes(publicUrl) : undefined;
+  const issuer = base ? `${base}/local-dev` : ApiRoute('/local-dev', { absolute: true });
+  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const expSeconds = nowSeconds + ttlSeconds;
+  const firstName = user.FirstName?.trim() || 'Admin';
+  const lastName = user.LastName?.trim() || 'User';
+  const fullName =
+    [user.FirstName?.trim(), user.LastName?.trim()].filter(Boolean).join(' ') ||
+    user.Name?.trim() ||
+    user.Email;
+
+  const claims: LocalDevJWTClaims = {
+    iss: issuer,
+    aud: LocalDevProvider.DEFAULT_AUDIENCE,
+    sub: `local-dev|${user.ID}`,
+    email: user.Email,
+    given_name: firstName,
+    family_name: lastName,
+    name: fullName,
+    preferred_username: user.Email,
+    iat: nowSeconds,
+    exp: expSeconds,
+  };
+
+  const token = MagicLinkKeyManager.Instance.Sign(claims);
+  return {
+    token,
+    expiresAt: new Date(expSeconds * 1000).toISOString(),
+    claims,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Attaches `/dev-login` and `/dev-users` routes onto the `/auth` router.
+ *
+ * When local dev auth is disabled, these routes respond with `404`.
+ * When enabled, every request is gated by {@link VerifyLocalhostRequest}.
+ */
+export function AttachLocalDevAuthRoutes(router: Router): void {
+  const devAuthLimiter = rateLimit({
+    windowMs: 60_000,
+    limit: 60,
+    standardHeaders: 'draft-7',
+    legacyHeaders: false,
+  });
+
+  router.post('/dev-login', devAuthLimiter, json(), async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+    if (!IsLocalDevAuthEnabled()) {
+      res.status(404).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Local dev auth is not enabled. Set MJ_DEV_AUTH_ENABLED=true in local development.',
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const guard = VerifyLocalhostRequest(req);
+    if (!guard.Allowed) {
+      LogError(`[SECURITY] Blocked /auth/dev-login request: ${guard.Reason}`);
+      res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Forbidden: /auth/dev-login is restricted to localhost only.',
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+      RegisterLocalDevAuthProvider();
+
+      const body = (req.body ?? {}) as { email?: string };
+      const requestedEmail = typeof body.email === 'string' ? body.email.trim() : undefined;
+      const user = await ResolveLocalDevUser(requestedEmail);
+
+      if (!user) {
+        const availableEmails = (UserCache.Instance.Users ?? [])
+          .filter((u) => u.IsActive && !UUIDsEqual(u.ID, UserCache.Instance.SYSTEM_USER_ID))
+          .map((u) => u.Email);
+        res.status(404).json({
+          success: false,
+          error: requestedEmail
+            ? `No active MJ user found matching email '${requestedEmail}'.`
+            : 'No active non-System MJ user found in UserCache.',
+          availableUsers: availableEmails,
+        });
+        return;
+      }
+
+      const { token, expiresAt, claims } = MintLocalDevJwt(user);
+      res.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+      res.status(200).json({
+        success: true,
+        token,
+        expiresAt,
+        user: {
+          id: user.ID,
+          email: user.Email,
+          name: claims.name,
+          firstName: claims.given_name,
+          lastName: claims.family_name,
+          roles: (user.UserRoles ?? []).map((r) => r.Role),
+        },
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      LogError(`[LocalDevAuth] /auth/dev-login error: ${message}`);
+      res.status(500).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: message,
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
+  router.get('/dev-users', devAuthLimiter, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+    if (!IsLocalDevAuthEnabled()) {
+      res.status(404).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Local dev auth is not enabled.',
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const guard = VerifyLocalhostRequest(req);
+    if (!guard.Allowed) {
+      LogError(`[SECURITY] Blocked /auth/dev-users request: ${guard.Reason}`);
+      res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Forbidden: /auth/dev-users is restricted to localhost only.',
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const users = (UserCache.Instance.Users ?? [])
+      .filter((u) => u.IsActive && !UUIDsEqual(u.ID, UserCache.Instance.SYSTEM_USER_ID) && u.Name?.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'system')
+      .map((u) => ({
+        id: u.ID,
+        email: u.Email,
+        name: u.Name,
+        firstName: u.FirstName,
+        lastName: u.LastName,
+        type: u.Type,
+        roles: (u.UserRoles ?? []).map((r) => r.Role),
+      }));
+
+    res.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+    res.status(200).json({ success: true, users });
+  });
+}

package/src/auth/loginEmailResolution.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * Which email a verified login is matched to a User record by, and whether that differs from the
+ * identity the token carries.
+ *
+ * The server links a login to a User row by email alone. `USER_EMAIL_MAP` can rewrite that email
+ * before the lookup, which makes a login run as a different person's record. That is a legitimate
+ * development aid, but it is silent, so a misconfigured map on a shared machine looks exactly like
+ * an authentication bug. These helpers keep the token's identity next to the one actually used, so
+ * the session audit and the server log can say when the two differ.
+ */
+
+/** The identity fields of a verified token that the lookup can use. */
+export interface LoginIdentityClaims {
+  email?: string; // case-violation-ok-legacy-back-compat: mirrors the provider's extracted user info shape
+  preferredUsername?: string; // case-violation-ok-legacy-back-compat: mirrors the provider's extracted user info shape
+}
+
+/** The email the token carries and the email the User lookup will use. */
+export interface LoginEmailResolution {
+  /** The identity from the verified token: its email claim, or its preferred username when it has none. */
+  TokenEmail: string | undefined;
+  /** The email the User record is looked up by, after any `USER_EMAIL_MAP` rewrite. */
+  LookupEmail: string | undefined;
+  /** True when `USER_EMAIL_MAP` replaced the token's email with a different one. */
+  Remapped: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the lookup email for a verified token. The map applies only to the email claim, with an
+ * exact (case-sensitive) key match, as it always has; a preferred username is never remapped.
+ *
+ * Named without "login"/"auth"/"verify": CodeQL treats calls with those words as authentication
+ * actions and reports the `if (!token)` guard above this call in GetUserPayload as a user-controlled
+ * bypass. This is a plain lookup, not an authentication step.
+ */
+export function ResolveUserLookupEmail(claims: LoginIdentityClaims, emailMap: Record<string, string> | undefined): LoginEmailResolution {
+  if (!claims.email) {
+    return { TokenEmail: claims.preferredUsername, LookupEmail: claims.preferredUsername, Remapped: false };
+  }
+  const mapped = emailMap?.[claims.email];
+  const lookupEmail = mapped ?? claims.email;
+  return { TokenEmail: claims.email, LookupEmail: lookupEmail, Remapped: mapped !== undefined && !EmailsMatch(mapped, claims.email) };
+}
+
+/** Case-insensitive, whitespace-trimmed comparison, matching how the User lookup compares emails. */
+export function EmailsMatch(a: string | undefined, b: string | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!a || !b) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return a.trim().toLowerCase() === b.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+/**
+ * The startup warning for a configured `USER_EMAIL_MAP`, or null when the map is absent or rewrites
+ * nothing. Lists every entry so whoever starts the server can see whose record each login will use.
+ */
+export function DescribeUserEmailMap(emailMap: Record<string, string> | undefined): string | null {
+  const entries = Object.entries(emailMap ?? {}).filter(([from, to]) => !EmailsMatch(from, to));
+  if (entries.length === 0) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const lines = entries.map(([from, to]) => `  ${from} -> ${to}`).join('\n');
+  return (
+    `[Auth] USER_EMAIL_MAP is set: ${entries.length} login email(s) will be matched to a different user's record. ` +
+    `A login with the first address runs as the user with the second. Remove the setting unless this is intended.\n${lines}`
+  );
+}