@memberjunction/server 6.2.0-edge.3 → 6.2.0-edge.5

package/src/realtimeSessions/ownedRealtimeSession.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview The ownership gate for client-direct realtime session writes: the GraphQL mutations of
+ * `RealtimeClientSessionResolver` and the recording REST routes both load the session through
+ * {@link LoadOwnedRealtimeSession}, so "may this caller write to this session?" is decided in one place.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+import { IMetadataProvider, LogError, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { UUIDsEqual } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import type { MJAIAgentSessionEntity } from '@memberjunction/core-entities';
+
+const SESSION_ENTITY = 'MJ: AI Agent Sessions';
+
+/** The session does not exist, or the caller cannot read it. */
+export class RealtimeSessionNotFoundError extends Error {
+    constructor(public readonly AgentSessionID: string) {
+        super(`Realtime session ${AgentSessionID} not found`);
+        this.name = 'RealtimeSessionNotFoundError';
+    }
+}
+
+/** The session exists but belongs to another user. */
+export class RealtimeSessionOwnershipError extends Error {
+    constructor(public readonly AgentSessionID: string) {
+        super('Not authorized: you do not own this realtime session');
+        this.name = 'RealtimeSessionOwnershipError';
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Loads a session under the caller's identity and enforces ownership (`UserID === contextUser.ID`). It
+ * deliberately does NOT reject `Closed` sessions: the final channel-state flush and the recording terminal
+ * signal legitimately arrive after the session closed. A scoped-anonymous widget guest owns the session it
+ * minted, so the same check covers it; loading as the caller also applies the entity's row-level security.
+ *
+ * @throws RealtimeSessionNotFoundError when the row does not load
+ * @throws RealtimeSessionOwnershipError when the caller is not the owner (logged with both user ids)
+ */
+export async function LoadOwnedRealtimeSession(
+    agentSessionId: string,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<MJAIAgentSessionEntity> {
+    const session = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJAIAgentSessionEntity>(SESSION_ENTITY, contextUser);
+    if (!(await session.Load(agentSessionId))) {
+        throw new RealtimeSessionNotFoundError(agentSessionId);
+    }
+    if (!UUIDsEqual(session.UserID, contextUser.ID)) {
+        LogError(
+            `LoadOwnedRealtimeSession: ownership check failed — user ${contextUser.ID} attempted to operate on session ${agentSessionId} owned by ${session.UserID}`,
+        );
+        throw new RealtimeSessionOwnershipError(agentSessionId);
+    }
+    return session;
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/sessionAccess.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Who may see and act on ONE realtime session.
+ *
+ * One pure decision ({@link AuthorizeSessionAccess}) shared by everything that addresses a live
+ * session on behalf of a caller: the `RealtimeSessionEvents` subscription (at subscribe time AND for
+ * every delivered event), the verification mutations, and the status query. Keeping it in one place
+ * is what stops "who owns this session?" from being re-derived — slightly differently — in each.
+ *
+ * ## The two ownership rules
+ *
+ * 1. **Owner.** The session's `UserID` must be the caller's user.
+ * 2. **Scope.** A *named* user is fully identified by (1). An **anonymous widget guest** is not:
+ *    every guest authenticates as the one shared Anonymous user, so (1) alone would let any guest
+ *    address any other guest's session. What separates guests is the signed per-session scope in
+ *    their token (`MagicLinkScope.ResourceID`), which `SessionManager` stamps onto the session's
+ *    Conversation as `ExternalID`. So a principal that carries a scope must match it, and an
+ *    anonymous principal that carries NO scope is refused outright — it cannot be told apart from
+ *    every other anonymous principal.
+ *
+ * The decision is deliberately pure (no I/O) so it can be applied identically to a freshly loaded
+ * row at subscribe time and to the owner/scope snapshot carried inside each published event.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import { IMetadataProvider, LogError, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { IsValidUUID, UUIDsEqual } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import type { MJAIAgentSessionEntity, MJConversationEntity } from '@memberjunction/core-entities';
+
+/** Entity names, centralised so the `MJ: ` prefix convention lives in one place. */
+const SESSION_ENTITY = 'MJ: AI Agent Sessions';
+const CONVERSATION_ENTITY = 'MJ: Conversations';
+
+/** What the decision needs to know about the session. */
+export interface SessionAccessSubject {
+    /** `AIAgentSession.UserID`. */
+    SessionUserID: string;
+    /**
+     * `Conversation.ExternalID` of the session's conversation — the signed per-session scope id for an
+     * anonymous guest. `null`/`undefined` when the conversation has none (a named user's session) or
+     * could not be loaded.
+     */
+    ConversationExternalID: string | null | undefined;
+}
+
+/** What the decision needs to know about the caller (a subset of `UserInfo`). */
+export interface SessionAccessPrincipal {
+    /** The caller's user id. */
+    ID: string;
+    /** True for the shared-Anonymous-user principal of a public-widget guest. */
+    IsMagicLinkAnonymous?: boolean;
+    /** The signed per-session scope carried by the caller's token, when any. */
+    MagicLinkScope?: { ResourceID?: string } | undefined;
+}
+
+/** Why access was refused. Callers log the reason; clients get a uniform refusal. */
+export type SessionAccessRefusal = 'not_owner' | 'scope_missing' | 'scope_mismatch';
+
+/** Outcome of {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess}. */
+export type SessionAccessDecision = { Allowed: true } | { Allowed: false; Reason: SessionAccessRefusal };
+
+/**
+ * Decides whether `principal` may address the session described by `subject`.
+ *
+ * Fails closed: anything that cannot be positively matched is refused.
+ *
+ * @param subject - owner + scope of the session
+ * @param principal - the authenticated caller (from the server-built `UserInfo`, never from client args)
+ */
+export function AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+    subject: SessionAccessSubject,
+    principal: SessionAccessPrincipal | null | undefined,
+): SessionAccessDecision {
+    if (!principal?.ID || !subject.SessionUserID || !UUIDsEqual(subject.SessionUserID, principal.ID)) {
+        return { Allowed: false, Reason: 'not_owner' };
+    }
+    const scopeId = principal.MagicLinkScope?.ResourceID;
+    if (!scopeId) {
+        // An anonymous principal without a per-session scope is indistinguishable from every other
+        // anonymous principal: owning "the Anonymous user's" session proves nothing.
+        return principal.IsMagicLinkAnonymous ? { Allowed: false, Reason: 'scope_missing' } : { Allowed: true };
+    }
+    // Scope ids are opaque base64url strings (case-significant), so compare exactly — not UUIDsEqual.
+    return subject.ConversationExternalID === scopeId ? { Allowed: true } : { Allowed: false, Reason: 'scope_mismatch' };
+}
+
+/** A session row together with the one fact about its conversation the decision needs. */
+export interface LoadedSessionForAccess {
+    /** The session entity, loaded under the caller's own identity (so RLS applied to the read). */
+    Session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity;
+    /** The session's conversation `ExternalID` (anonymous scope id), or null. */
+    ConversationExternalID: string | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Loads a session (and its conversation's scope id) under `contextUser`'s identity.
+ *
+ * Loading as the caller — rather than as a privileged user — means the entity layer's row-level
+ * security (`Widget Guest: Own Agent Sessions`, `UI: Own Agent Sessions`) is the FIRST gate; the
+ * explicit {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} check that follows is defence in depth.
+ *
+ * @returns the loaded session, or `null` when the id is malformed, the row does not exist, or the
+ *   caller cannot read it. Failure to read the conversation yields `ConversationExternalID: null`,
+ *   which {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} then treats as "no scope to match" (refused for a scoped caller).
+ */
+export async function LoadSessionForAccess(
+    agentSessionId: string,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<LoadedSessionForAccess | null> {
+    if (!IsValidUUID(agentSessionId)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const session = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJAIAgentSessionEntity>(SESSION_ENTITY, contextUser);
+    if (!(await session.Load(agentSessionId))) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return { Session: session, ConversationExternalID: await LoadSessionConversationExternalID(session, contextUser, provider) };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads an already-loaded session's conversation `ExternalID` (the anonymous scope id) under `contextUser`;
+ * null when there is no conversation or it cannot be read (logged). For callers that loaded the session
+ * through another gate and only need the scope half of {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess}'s subject.
+ */
+export async function LoadSessionConversationExternalID(
+    session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<string | null> {
+    if (!session.ConversationID) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    try {
+        const conversation = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationEntity>(CONVERSATION_ENTITY, contextUser);
+        if (!(await conversation.Load(session.ConversationID))) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        return conversation.ExternalID ?? null;
+    } catch (error) {
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        LogError(`LoadSessionForAccess: could not read conversation ${session.ConversationID} of session ${session.ID}: ${message}`);
+        return null;
+    }
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/sessionConfigStamps.ts

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+/**
+ * @fileoverview What the session-start path stamps into a new realtime session's `Config` for identity
+ * verification: the policy snapshot, the unverified duration cap, and any verified identity carried
+ * forward from the session being resumed.
+ *
+ * Split in two so the decision is testable without a database:
+ *
+ * - {@link BuildMintConfigStamps} — **pure**. Given the resolved realtime config, the existing `Config`
+ *   and an optional inherited identity, returns the `Config` to write (or `null` when there is nothing
+ *   to stamp).
+ * - {@link LoadInheritedVerifiedIdentity} — the one read: the prior session's verified identity, only
+ *   when the new caller is authorized on that prior session.
+ *
+ * Everything stamped here lives under server-authoritative keys (`identityVerification`,
+ * `maxSessionDeadlineIso`); the caller writes it inside `RunWithTrustedSessionConfigWrites`.
+ *
+ * ## Resume after the cap
+ *
+ * If an unverified session hits its cap before the person verifies, the janitor closes it. A verify link
+ * redeemed afterwards still records the verification on that (closed) session, and a **new** session
+ * started with `lastSessionId` pointing at it inherits the verified identity (and, with it, the
+ * `verifiedMaxSeconds` cap instead of the unverified one). Inheritance requires the same ownership/scope
+ * authorization as any other access to the prior session, so a stranger cannot adopt someone else's
+ * verification by naming their session id.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import type { IMetadataProvider, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { AuthorizeSessionAccess, LoadSessionForAccess } from './sessionAccess.js';
+import {
+    ExtractIdentityVerificationPolicyFromRealtimeConfig,
+    ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer,
+    TightenSessionDeadline,
+} from './verificationPolicy.js';
+import {
+    ParseConfigObject,
+    ReadIdentityVerificationState,
+    WriteIdentityVerificationState,
+    type IdentityVerificationState,
+    type VerifiedIdentity,
+} from './verificationCore.js';
+
+/** The `Config` to persist at session start. */
+export interface MintConfigStampPlan {
+    NextConfigRaw: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decides what to stamp into a freshly created session's `Config`.
+ *
+ * - **Policy snapshot.** The cascade's verification layer (`channels.config.IdentityVerification` plus the
+ *   duration caps) is copied onto the session, so the rules a person is held to are fixed at mint,
+ *   server-side, and cannot be chosen by the caller later.
+ * - **Duration cap.** When the cascade configures `unverifiedMaxSeconds` (or, for a session that inherited
+ *   a verified identity, `verifiedMaxSeconds`), the session's absolute deadline is set to now + cap —
+ *   applied to ANY principal, not only widget guests — and never loosens a tighter deadline already
+ *   stamped (the widget voice cap).
+ * - **Inherited identity.** A verified identity carried forward from the resumed session.
+ *
+ * @param args.EffectiveRealtime - `EffectiveConfig.realtime` of the resolved config (any shape; read defensively)
+ * @param args.ExistingConfigRaw - the session's current `Config`
+ * @param args.InheritedVerified - verified identity from the session being resumed, if any
+ * @param args.NowMs - the current time, epoch ms
+ * @returns the `Config` to write, or `null` when nothing needs stamping
+ */
+export function BuildMintConfigStamps(args: {
+    EffectiveRealtime: unknown;
+    ExistingConfigRaw: string | null;
+    InheritedVerified?: VerifiedIdentity;
+    NowMs: number;
+}): MintConfigStampPlan | null {
+    const layer = ExtractIdentityVerificationPolicyFromRealtimeConfig(args.EffectiveRealtime);
+    const hasPolicy = Object.keys(layer).length > 0;
+    if (!hasPolicy && !args.InheritedVerified) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const existingState = ReadIdentityVerificationState(args.ExistingConfigRaw, ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer);
+    const state: IdentityVerificationState = {
+        ...existingState,
+        ...(hasPolicy ? { Policy: layer } : {}),
+        ...(args.InheritedVerified ? { Verified: args.InheritedVerified } : {}),
+    };
+    const capSeconds = args.InheritedVerified ? (layer.verifiedMaxSeconds ?? layer.unverifiedMaxSeconds) : layer.unverifiedMaxSeconds;
+    const existingDeadline = ParseConfigObject(args.ExistingConfigRaw)['maxSessionDeadlineIso'];
+    const deadlineIso = capSeconds
+        ? TightenSessionDeadline(typeof existingDeadline === 'string' ? existingDeadline : undefined, args.NowMs + capSeconds * 1000)
+        : undefined;
+    return { NextConfigRaw: WriteIdentityVerificationState(args.ExistingConfigRaw, state, deadlineIso) };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The verified identity of the session being resumed, when the caller may inherit it.
+ *
+ * Reads the prior session as the caller and requires {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} to allow it; any
+ * failure (no such session, not the caller's, unreadable) yields `undefined` — inheritance is a
+ * convenience and must never block a session start.
+ *
+ * @param lastSessionId - the `lastSessionId` the client supplied at start
+ * @param contextUser - the starting caller
+ * @param provider - request-scoped provider
+ */
+export async function LoadInheritedVerifiedIdentity(
+    lastSessionId: string | undefined,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<VerifiedIdentity | undefined> {
+    if (!lastSessionId) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const prior = await LoadSessionForAccess(lastSessionId, contextUser, provider);
+    if (!prior) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const decision = AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+        { SessionUserID: prior.Session.UserID, ConversationExternalID: prior.ConversationExternalID },
+        contextUser,
+    );
+    if (decision.Allowed === false) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return ReadIdentityVerificationState(prior.Session.Config_, ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer).Verified;
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/subscriptionAuthorization.ts

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+/**
+ * @fileoverview The authorization of the `RealtimeSessionEvents` subscription, free of GraphQL schema
+ * decorators and server configuration so it can be exercised — and reused — without loading either.
+ *
+ * It is applied twice on purpose (see `RealtimeSessionEventsResolver`): once when the subscription is
+ * opened ({@link AuthorizeRealtimeSessionSubscription}) and once for every event
+ * ({@link RealtimeSessionEventsFilter}). In neither check does a client-supplied value decide who
+ * receives anything: `agentSessionId` only selects WHICH of the caller's own sessions to listen to; the
+ * identity it is checked against comes from the server-authenticated connection context.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import { IMetadataProvider, LogError, Metadata, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { IsValidUUID, UUIDsEqual } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import type { UserPayload } from '../types.js';
+import { AuthorizeSessionAccess, LoadSessionForAccess, type LoadedSessionForAccess } from './sessionAccess.js';
+import type { RealtimeSessionEventTopicPayload } from './RealtimeSessionEventService.js';
+
+/**
+ * Arguments of the subscription. `agentSessionId` is camelCase because it is the GraphQL argument name
+ * graphql-js hands to `subscribe` and to the filter — it is the wire contract, not an API of ours.
+ */
+export interface RealtimeSessionEventsArgs {
+    agentSessionId?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The slice of the WebSocket connection context the authorization reads. `userPayload` is camelCase to
+ * match `AppContext.userPayload`, the member graphql-ws populates and every resolver already destructures.
+ */
+export interface RealtimeSessionEventsContext {
+    userPayload?: UserPayload;
+}
+
+/** Why a subscription request was refused (logged; the client always gets the same message). */
+const REFUSAL_MESSAGE = 'Realtime session not found.';
+
+/** The principal the connection authenticated as, or undefined. */
+function connectionPrincipal(context: RealtimeSessionEventsContext | undefined): UserInfo | undefined {
+    return context?.userPayload?.userRecord as UserInfo | undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-event filter. Exported because it is the security-critical gate and must be testable in isolation.
+ *
+ * An event reaches a subscriber only when BOTH hold:
+ * 1. it is addressed to the session the subscriber asked for, and
+ * 2. the event's owner/scope snapshot passes {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} for the connection's
+ *    authenticated principal.
+ *
+ * Fails closed: a missing connection identity, a missing owner on the event, or a missing argument never matches.
+ */
+export function RealtimeSessionEventsFilter(data: {
+    payload: RealtimeSessionEventTopicPayload;
+    args: RealtimeSessionEventsArgs;
+    context: RealtimeSessionEventsContext | undefined;
+}): boolean {
+    const { payload, args, context } = data;
+    if (typeof args?.agentSessionId !== 'string' || !payload?.AgentSessionID || !UUIDsEqual(payload.AgentSessionID, args.agentSessionId)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    const decision = AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+        { SessionUserID: payload.OwnerUserID, ConversationExternalID: payload.ScopeKey },
+        connectionPrincipal(context),
+    );
+    return decision.Allowed;
+}
+
+/** Dependencies of {@link AuthorizeRealtimeSessionSubscription}, injectable for tests. */
+export interface SubscriptionAuthorizationDeps {
+    /** Loads a session under the caller's identity. */
+    LoadSession: (agentSessionId: string, user: UserInfo, provider: IMetadataProvider) => Promise<LoadedSessionForAccess | null>;
+    /** The provider to read with (a WebSocket context carries no request-scoped providers). */
+    GetProvider: () => IMetadataProvider;
+}
+
+/** Production dependencies. */
+export const DEFAULT_SUBSCRIPTION_AUTHORIZATION_DEPS: SubscriptionAuthorizationDeps = {
+    LoadSession: LoadSessionForAccess,
+    GetProvider: () => Metadata.Provider, // global-provider-ok: a WebSocket subscription context has no per-request providers
+};
+
+/**
+ * Subscribe-time authorization: loads the session as the connection's principal and requires
+ * {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} to allow it. Throws {@link REFUSAL_MESSAGE} (uniformly) otherwise.
+ *
+ * @param args - the subscription arguments
+ * @param context - the connection context (server-authenticated)
+ * @param deps - injectable dependencies (tests)
+ * @returns the validated session id
+ */
+export async function AuthorizeRealtimeSessionSubscription(
+    args: RealtimeSessionEventsArgs,
+    context: RealtimeSessionEventsContext | undefined,
+    deps: SubscriptionAuthorizationDeps = DEFAULT_SUBSCRIPTION_AUTHORIZATION_DEPS,
+): Promise<string> {
+    const principal = connectionPrincipal(context);
+    const agentSessionId = args?.agentSessionId;
+    if (!principal || typeof agentSessionId !== 'string' || !IsValidUUID(agentSessionId)) {
+        throw new Error(REFUSAL_MESSAGE);
+    }
+    const loaded = await deps.LoadSession(agentSessionId, principal, deps.GetProvider());
+    if (!loaded) {
+        throw new Error(REFUSAL_MESSAGE);
+    }
+    const decision = AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+        { SessionUserID: loaded.Session.UserID, ConversationExternalID: loaded.ConversationExternalID },
+        principal,
+    );
+    if (decision.Allowed === false) {
+        LogError(`RealtimeSessionEvents: refused subscription by user ${principal.ID} to session ${agentSessionId} (${decision.Reason}).`);
+        throw new Error(REFUSAL_MESSAGE);
+    }
+    return agentSessionId;
+}