@memberjunction/server 6.2.0-edge.3 → 6.2.0-edge.4

package/src/realtimeSessions/RealtimeVerifyRouter.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview The PUBLIC verify-link routes of mid-session identity verification.
+ *
+ * Mounted BEFORE the unified auth middleware (the person opening the emailed link — often on another
+ * device — holds no MJ token; the single-use token IS the capability).
+ *
+ * | Route | Effect |
+ * |---|---|
+ * | `GET  /realtime/verify/:token` | Renders a one-button confirmation page. **No side effects.** |
+ * | `POST /realtime/verify` (form field `token`) | Redeems the token; renders "You're verified" or the uniform failure page. |
+ *
+ * ## Why the redemption is a POST
+ *
+ * Mail scanners and link previewers GET every URL in a message. A GET that consumed the single-use token
+ * would let a scanner burn it before the human clicks. The magic-link redeem endpoint made the same
+ * choice. The human's click submits the form.
+ *
+ * ## What the responses reveal
+ *
+ * Nothing about any session. A malformed token, an unknown session, an expired link, a used link and a
+ * voided verification all render the SAME page with the SAME status; success is a bare "You're verified".
+ * Responses are `no-store`, never framed, sent with `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` (the token is in the
+ * URL of the GET), and carry a CSP that forbids everything but the page's own inline style.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import { Router, urlencoded, type Request, type Response } from 'express';
+import { rateLimit } from 'express-rate-limit';
+import { LogError } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { configInfo } from '../config.js';
+import { RealtimeSessionVerificationService } from './RealtimeSessionVerificationService.js';
+import { BuildVerifyConfirmHtml, BuildVerifyErrorHtml, BuildVerifyFailureHtml, BuildVerifySuccessHtml } from './verificationPages.js';
+
+/** Mount path of the public verify routes. Under `/realtime`, which is already reserved against server extensions. */
+export const REALTIME_VERIFY_MOUNT_PATH = '/realtime/verify';
+
+/** Headers every verify response carries. */
+function setSecurityHeaders(res: Response): void {
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+    res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
+    res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
+    res.setHeader(
+        'Content-Security-Policy',
+        "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
+    );
+}
+
+/** Sends an HTML page with the verify security headers. */
+function sendPage(res: Response, status: number, html: string): void {
+    setSecurityHeaders(res);
+    res.status(status).type('html').send(html);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds the public verify router. Mount at {@link REALTIME_VERIFY_MOUNT_PATH} BEFORE the auth
+ * middleware.
+ *
+ * @param service - the verification service (injectable for tests; defaults to the process singleton)
+ */
+export function CreateRealtimeVerifyRouter(
+    service: Pick<RealtimeSessionVerificationService, 'RedeemLink'> = RealtimeSessionVerificationService.Instance,
+): Router {
+    const limits = configInfo.realtime?.identityVerification?.rateLimits;
+    // The route is public and a redemption does a database read + write, so it is throttled per IP — the
+    // same posture as the magic-link redeem endpoint. The message is the failure page, not JSON: this
+    // route talks to a browser.
+    const limiter = rateLimit({
+        windowMs: limits?.redeemWindowMs ?? 60_000,
+        limit: limits?.redeemPerIp ?? 30,
+        standardHeaders: 'draft-7',
+        legacyHeaders: false,
+        handler: (_req: Request, res: Response) => sendPage(res, 429, BuildVerifyFailureHtml()),
+    });
+
+    const router = Router();
+
+    // SAFE: renders the confirmation button. Never consumes the token (see the module header).
+    router.get('/:token', limiter, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+        const token = typeof req.params.token === 'string' ? req.params.token : '';
+        sendPage(res, 200, BuildVerifyConfirmHtml(token, REALTIME_VERIFY_MOUNT_PATH));
+    });
+
+    // The side-effecting redemption, gated by a human gesture.
+    router.post('/', limiter, urlencoded({ extended: false, limit: '4kb' }), async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+        const body = (req.body ?? {}) as { token?: unknown };
+        const token = typeof body.token === 'string' ? body.token : '';
+        try {
+            const result = await service.RedeemLink(token, req.ip);
+            if (result.Success) {
+                sendPage(res, 200, BuildVerifySuccessHtml());
+            } else if (result.ErrorCode === 'persist_failed') {
+                // A server fault after a VALID token: the link is still redeemable, so say "try again".
+                sendPage(res, 500, BuildVerifyErrorHtml());
+            } else {
+                // 410 for every other refusal: the page and status are identical whether the token was unknown,
+                // malformed, expired or used, so the route cannot be used to probe sessions.
+                sendPage(res, 410, BuildVerifyFailureHtml());
+            }
+        } catch (error) {
+            LogError(`RealtimeVerifyRouter: redemption threw: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+            sendPage(res, 500, BuildVerifyErrorHtml());
+        }
+    });
+
+    return router;
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/SessionVerificationPortsBase.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview {@link SessionVerificationPortsBase} — the config-free half of the production
+ * {@link VerificationPorts}: reading and writing a session, publishing `identity.verified`, and the
+ * audit entry. Everything that depends on server configuration (the settings, the service principal,
+ * the mail provider) is left abstract.
+ *
+ * The split exists so the DB-facing behaviour can be exercised with real sessions by anything that
+ * cannot — or must not — load the server's configuration at import time (the integration-test bundle
+ * subclasses it with captured email and a fixed principal). `RuntimeVerificationPorts`, in
+ * `RealtimeSessionVerificationService.ts`, is the production subclass that supplies the configuration.
+ *
+ * ## Which identity performs the writes, and why
+ *
+ * Reads of the session for **authorization** run as the CALLER, so row-level security is the first gate
+ * (a widget guest cannot even load another guest's session). Every **write** of server-decided state
+ * runs as a service principal ({@link SessionVerificationPortsBase.ResolveServiceUser}), inside
+ * `RunWithTrustedSessionConfigWrites`. That is not a convenience: the session owner can already `Update`
+ * their own session row, which is exactly why `MJAIAgentSessionEntityServer` refuses owner writes to
+ * `identityVerification` and `maxSessionDeadlineIso`. Server-decided state must be written by the server,
+ * after the caller was authorized, in a scope no remote caller can enter. The verify link has no caller
+ * identity at all (the token is the capability), so it needs the service principal for its reads too.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import { LogError, Metadata, type IMetadataProvider, type UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { RunWithTrustedSessionConfigWrites } from '@memberjunction/core-entities-server';
+import type { MJAuditLogEntity } from '@memberjunction/core-entities';
+import type { IdentityVerifiedEventPayload } from '@memberjunction/ai-core-plus';
+import { LoadSessionForAccess, type LoadedSessionForAccess } from './sessionAccess.js';
+import { RealtimeSessionEventService } from './RealtimeSessionEventService.js';
+import {
+    type ConfigMutation,
+    type ConfigMutationResult,
+    type OutboundEmail,
+    type SessionSnapshot,
+    type VerificationAuditEntry,
+    type VerificationCaller,
+    type VerificationPorts,
+    type VerificationSettings,
+} from './verificationWorkflow.js';
+
+/** The seeded audit-log type (see `metadata/audit-log-types/.realtime-session-audit-types.json`). */
+export const REALTIME_IDENTITY_VERIFIED_AUDIT_TYPE = 'Realtime Identity Verified';
+
+const AUDIT_LOG_ENTITY = 'MJ: Audit Logs';
+const SESSION_ENTITY_NAME = 'MJ: AI Agent Sessions';
+
+
+/** Reduces a loaded session to the snapshot the workflow reasons about. */
+function toSnapshot(loaded: LoadedSessionForAccess): SessionSnapshot {
+    const { Session } = loaded;
+    return {
+        AgentSessionID: Session.ID,
+        OwnerUserID: Session.UserID,
+        ConversationExternalID: loaded.ConversationExternalID,
+        Status: Session.Status,
+        ConfigRaw: Session.Config_,
+        // `__mj_CreatedAt` is the row's creation instant — i.e. the session start. It is read-only and
+        // set by the database, so a client cannot move it.
+        StartedAtMs: Session.__mj_CreatedAt instanceof Date ? Session.__mj_CreatedAt.getTime() : Date.now(),
+    };
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * The session-facing {@link VerificationPorts}, minus configuration. Subclasses supply the settings, the
+ * service principal and the mail delivery.
+ */
+export abstract class SessionVerificationPortsBase implements VerificationPorts {
+    /** The live settings. */
+    public abstract GetSettings(): VerificationSettings;
+
+    /** Delivers an email. Must not throw; reports failure in the result. */
+    public abstract SendEmail(email: OutboundEmail): Promise<{ Success: boolean; ErrorMessage?: string }>;
+
+    /** The principal state writes (and the link caller's reads) run as; null when none is available. */
+    protected abstract ResolveServiceUser(): UserInfo | null;
+
+    public Now(): number {
+        return Date.now();
+    }
+
+    public async LoadSession(agentSessionId: string, caller: VerificationCaller): Promise<SessionSnapshot | null> {
+        const reader = this.readerFor(caller);
+        if (!reader) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        const loaded = await LoadSessionForAccess(agentSessionId, reader.User, reader.Provider);
+        return loaded ? toSnapshot(loaded) : null;
+    }
+
+    public async MutateSessionConfig<T>(
+        agentSessionId: string,
+        caller: VerificationCaller,
+        mutate: ConfigMutation<T>,
+    ): Promise<ConfigMutationResult<T>> {
+        const writer = this.writerFor(caller);
+        if (!writer) {
+            return { Persisted: false, ErrorMessage: 'No service principal is available to record verification state.' };
+        }
+        try {
+            const loaded = await LoadSessionForAccess(agentSessionId, writer.User, writer.Provider);
+            if (!loaded) {
+                return { Persisted: false, ErrorMessage: `Session ${agentSessionId} could not be read.` };
+            }
+            const session = toSnapshot(loaded);
+            const { NextConfigRaw, Outcome } = mutate(session);
+            if (NextConfigRaw === null) {
+                return { Session: session, Outcome, Persisted: false };
+            }
+            loaded.Session.Config_ = NextConfigRaw;
+            const saved = await RunWithTrustedSessionConfigWrites(() => loaded.Session.Save());
+            if (!saved) {
+                const detail = loaded.Session.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error';
+                LogError(`RealtimeSessionVerification: saving session ${agentSessionId} failed: ${detail}`);
+                return { Session: session, Outcome, Persisted: false, ErrorMessage: detail };
+            }
+            return { Session: session, Outcome, Persisted: true };
+        } catch (error) {
+            const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+            LogError(`RealtimeSessionVerification: updating session ${agentSessionId} threw: ${message}`);
+            return { Persisted: false, ErrorMessage: message };
+        }
+    }
+
+    public PublishVerified(
+        routing: { AgentSessionID: string; OwnerUserID: string; ScopeKey: string | null },
+        payload: IdentityVerifiedEventPayload,
+    ): { Success: boolean; ErrorMessage?: string } {
+        return RealtimeSessionEventService.Instance.PublishRouted(routing, 'identity.verified', payload);
+    }
+
+    public async WriteAudit(entry: VerificationAuditEntry): Promise<void> {
+        const writer = this.ResolveServiceUser();
+        const provider = Metadata.Provider; // global-provider-ok: server-side audit write under the server's single default provider
+        const type = provider?.AuditLogTypes?.find((t) => t.Name?.trim().toLowerCase() === REALTIME_IDENTITY_VERIFIED_AUDIT_TYPE.toLowerCase());
+        const sessionEntityId = provider?.EntityByName(SESSION_ENTITY_NAME)?.ID;
+        if (!writer || !type) {
+            // The audit type ships as metadata (a release seed); without it, fall back to the server log so
+            // the verification is still recorded somewhere durable-ish rather than silently unaudited.
+            LogError(
+                `RealtimeSessionVerification: audit entry not written for session ${entry.AgentSessionID} ` +
+                    `(${writer ? `audit log type '${REALTIME_IDENTITY_VERIFIED_AUDIT_TYPE}' is not seeded` : 'no service principal'}): ` +
+                    `${entry.Email} via ${entry.Method}.`,
+            );
+            return;
+        }
+        try {
+            const row = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJAuditLogEntity>(AUDIT_LOG_ENTITY, writer);
+            row.NewRecord();
+            row.UserID = entry.OwnerUserID;
+            row.AuditLogTypeID = type.ID;
+            row.Status = 'Success';
+            row.EntityID = sessionEntityId ?? null;
+            row.RecordID = entry.AgentSessionID;
+            row.Description = `Realtime session verified ${entry.Email} by ${entry.Method === 'link' ? 'emailed link' : 'typed code'}.`;
+            row.Details = JSON.stringify({
+                email: entry.Email,
+                method: entry.Method,
+                ipAddress: entry.ClientIp ?? null,
+                maxSessionDeadlineIso: entry.MaxSessionDeadlineIso ?? null,
+            });
+            if (!(await row.Save())) {
+                LogError(`RealtimeSessionVerification: audit row save failed for session ${entry.AgentSessionID}: ${row.LatestResult?.CompleteMessage ?? 'unknown error'}`);
+            }
+        } catch (error) {
+            LogError(`RealtimeSessionVerification: audit write threw for session ${entry.AgentSessionID}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** The identity + provider an authorization read runs under. */
+    private readerFor(caller: VerificationCaller): { User: UserInfo; Provider: IMetadataProvider } | null {
+        if (caller.Kind === 'principal') {
+            return { User: caller.ContextUser, Provider: caller.Provider };
+        }
+        const user = this.ResolveServiceUser();
+        return user ? { User: user, Provider: Metadata.Provider } : null; // global-provider-ok: public verify route has no request-scoped provider
+    }
+
+    /** The identity + provider a state write runs under: always the service principal. */
+    private writerFor(caller: VerificationCaller): { User: UserInfo; Provider: IMetadataProvider } | null {
+        const user = this.ResolveServiceUser();
+        if (!user) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        return { User: user, Provider: caller.Kind === 'principal' ? caller.Provider : Metadata.Provider }; // global-provider-ok: public verify route has no request-scoped provider
+    }
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/SlidingWindowRateLimiter.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview A small in-memory sliding-window rate limiter keyed by string, with an injectable
+ * clock so it is deterministic under test.
+ *
+ * Used for the limits that the HTTP-layer `express-rate-limit` cannot express because the request is a
+ * GraphQL mutation (per IP / per email domain / per recipient on verification sends, and per session on
+ * code attempts). The HTTP verify route uses `express-rate-limit` directly, the same way the widget
+ * and magic-link routers do.
+ *
+ * **Per-instance, best-effort.** State is in process memory, so with several server replicas each
+ * enforces its own budget. That is the same trade the widget mint limiter makes. The limits that must
+ * hold across replicas — sends per session and code attempts per verification — are NOT here: they are
+ * persisted on the session (`identityVerification`) and enforced from the database.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+/** Outcome of {@link SlidingWindowRateLimiter.TryConsume}. */
+export interface RateLimitDecision {
+    /** True when the event fits the budget (and was counted). */
+    Allowed: boolean;
+    /** When refused, ms until the oldest counted event leaves the window. 0 when allowed. */
+    RetryAfterMs: number;
+}
+
+/** Construction options. */
+export interface SlidingWindowRateLimiterOptions {
+    /** Events allowed per key per window. A limit of 0 or less disables the limiter (everything allowed). */
+    Limit: number;
+    /** Window length in ms. */
+    WindowMs: number;
+    /** Upper bound on distinct keys held in memory; the oldest-seen keys are evicted past it. Default 10 000. */
+    MaxKeys?: number;
+}
+
+/** Default bound on distinct keys held. */
+const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS = 10_000;
+
+/**
+ * Counts events per key over a sliding window.
+ *
+ * Memory is bounded two ways: a key's timestamps older than the window are dropped whenever the key is
+ * touched, and when the number of keys exceeds `MaxKeys` the least-recently-inserted keys are evicted
+ * (an evicted key simply starts a fresh window — the limiter fails open by forgetting, never closed).
+ */
+export class SlidingWindowRateLimiter {
+    private readonly events = new Map<string, number[]>();
+    private readonly maxKeys: number;
+
+    constructor(private readonly options: SlidingWindowRateLimiterOptions) {
+        this.maxKeys = options.MaxKeys ?? DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Counts one event for `key` if the budget allows.
+     *
+     * @param key - what is being limited (an IP, a domain, a session id…); callers normalise it
+     * @param nowMs - the current time, epoch ms
+     */
+    public TryConsume(key: string, nowMs: number): RateLimitDecision {
+        if (this.options.Limit <= 0) {
+            return { Allowed: true, RetryAfterMs: 0 };
+        }
+        const windowStart = nowMs - this.options.WindowMs;
+        const live = (this.events.get(key) ?? []).filter((t) => t > windowStart);
+        if (live.length >= this.options.Limit) {
+            this.store(key, live);
+            return { Allowed: false, RetryAfterMs: Math.max(0, live[0] + this.options.WindowMs - nowMs) };
+        }
+        live.push(nowMs);
+        this.store(key, live);
+        return { Allowed: true, RetryAfterMs: 0 };
+    }
+
+    /** Number of keys currently tracked (exposed for tests and diagnostics). */
+    public get TrackedKeyCount(): number {
+        return this.events.size;
+    }
+
+    /** Re-inserts `key` (moving it to the newest position) and evicts the oldest keys past the bound. */
+    private store(key: string, timestamps: number[]): void {
+        this.events.delete(key);
+        this.events.set(key, timestamps);
+        while (this.events.size > this.maxKeys) {
+            const oldest = this.events.keys().next();
+            if (oldest.done) {
+                break;
+            }
+            this.events.delete(oldest.value);
+        }
+    }
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Realtime session events + mid-session identity verification — module barrel.
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+export * from './sessionAccess.js';
+export * from './subscriptionAuthorization.js';
+export * from './RealtimeSessionEventService.js';
+export * from './verificationPolicy.js';
+export * from './verificationCore.js';
+export * from './SlidingWindowRateLimiter.js';
+export * from './verificationPages.js';
+export * from './verificationWorkflow.js';
+export * from './sessionConfigStamps.js';
+export * from './SessionVerificationPortsBase.js';
+export * from './RealtimeSessionVerificationService.js';
+export * from './RealtimeVerifyRouter.js';

package/src/realtimeSessions/sessionAccess.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Who may see and act on ONE realtime session.
+ *
+ * One pure decision ({@link AuthorizeSessionAccess}) shared by everything that addresses a live
+ * session on behalf of a caller: the `RealtimeSessionEvents` subscription (at subscribe time AND for
+ * every delivered event), the verification mutations, and the status query. Keeping it in one place
+ * is what stops "who owns this session?" from being re-derived — slightly differently — in each.
+ *
+ * ## The two ownership rules
+ *
+ * 1. **Owner.** The session's `UserID` must be the caller's user.
+ * 2. **Scope.** A *named* user is fully identified by (1). An **anonymous widget guest** is not:
+ *    every guest authenticates as the one shared Anonymous user, so (1) alone would let any guest
+ *    address any other guest's session. What separates guests is the signed per-session scope in
+ *    their token (`MagicLinkScope.ResourceID`), which `SessionManager` stamps onto the session's
+ *    Conversation as `ExternalID`. So a principal that carries a scope must match it, and an
+ *    anonymous principal that carries NO scope is refused outright — it cannot be told apart from
+ *    every other anonymous principal.
+ *
+ * The decision is deliberately pure (no I/O) so it can be applied identically to a freshly loaded
+ * row at subscribe time and to the owner/scope snapshot carried inside each published event.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import { IMetadataProvider, LogError, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { IsValidUUID, UUIDsEqual } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import type { MJAIAgentSessionEntity, MJConversationEntity } from '@memberjunction/core-entities';
+
+/** Entity names, centralised so the `MJ: ` prefix convention lives in one place. */
+const SESSION_ENTITY = 'MJ: AI Agent Sessions';
+const CONVERSATION_ENTITY = 'MJ: Conversations';
+
+/** What the decision needs to know about the session. */
+export interface SessionAccessSubject {
+    /** `AIAgentSession.UserID`. */
+    SessionUserID: string;
+    /**
+     * `Conversation.ExternalID` of the session's conversation — the signed per-session scope id for an
+     * anonymous guest. `null`/`undefined` when the conversation has none (a named user's session) or
+     * could not be loaded.
+     */
+    ConversationExternalID: string | null | undefined;
+}
+
+/** What the decision needs to know about the caller (a subset of `UserInfo`). */
+export interface SessionAccessPrincipal {
+    /** The caller's user id. */
+    ID: string;
+    /** True for the shared-Anonymous-user principal of a public-widget guest. */
+    IsMagicLinkAnonymous?: boolean;
+    /** The signed per-session scope carried by the caller's token, when any. */
+    MagicLinkScope?: { ResourceID?: string } | undefined;
+}
+
+/** Why access was refused. Callers log the reason; clients get a uniform refusal. */
+export type SessionAccessRefusal = 'not_owner' | 'scope_missing' | 'scope_mismatch';
+
+/** Outcome of {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess}. */
+export type SessionAccessDecision = { Allowed: true } | { Allowed: false; Reason: SessionAccessRefusal };
+
+/**
+ * Decides whether `principal` may address the session described by `subject`.
+ *
+ * Fails closed: anything that cannot be positively matched is refused.
+ *
+ * @param subject - owner + scope of the session
+ * @param principal - the authenticated caller (from the server-built `UserInfo`, never from client args)
+ */
+export function AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+    subject: SessionAccessSubject,
+    principal: SessionAccessPrincipal | null | undefined,
+): SessionAccessDecision {
+    if (!principal?.ID || !subject.SessionUserID || !UUIDsEqual(subject.SessionUserID, principal.ID)) {
+        return { Allowed: false, Reason: 'not_owner' };
+    }
+    const scopeId = principal.MagicLinkScope?.ResourceID;
+    if (!scopeId) {
+        // An anonymous principal without a per-session scope is indistinguishable from every other
+        // anonymous principal: owning "the Anonymous user's" session proves nothing.
+        return principal.IsMagicLinkAnonymous ? { Allowed: false, Reason: 'scope_missing' } : { Allowed: true };
+    }
+    // Scope ids are opaque base64url strings (case-significant), so compare exactly — not UUIDsEqual.
+    return subject.ConversationExternalID === scopeId ? { Allowed: true } : { Allowed: false, Reason: 'scope_mismatch' };
+}
+
+/** A session row together with the one fact about its conversation the decision needs. */
+export interface LoadedSessionForAccess {
+    /** The session entity, loaded under the caller's own identity (so RLS applied to the read). */
+    Session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity;
+    /** The session's conversation `ExternalID` (anonymous scope id), or null. */
+    ConversationExternalID: string | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Loads a session (and its conversation's scope id) under `contextUser`'s identity.
+ *
+ * Loading as the caller — rather than as a privileged user — means the entity layer's row-level
+ * security (`Widget Guest: Own Agent Sessions`, `UI: Own Agent Sessions`) is the FIRST gate; the
+ * explicit {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} check that follows is defence in depth.
+ *
+ * @returns the loaded session, or `null` when the id is malformed, the row does not exist, or the
+ *   caller cannot read it. Failure to read the conversation yields `ConversationExternalID: null`,
+ *   which {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} then treats as "no scope to match" (refused for a scoped caller).
+ */
+export async function LoadSessionForAccess(
+    agentSessionId: string,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<LoadedSessionForAccess | null> {
+    if (!IsValidUUID(agentSessionId)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const session = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJAIAgentSessionEntity>(SESSION_ENTITY, contextUser);
+    if (!(await session.Load(agentSessionId))) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return { Session: session, ConversationExternalID: await loadConversationExternalID(session, contextUser, provider) };
+}
+
+/** Reads the session conversation's `ExternalID`; null when there is no conversation or it cannot be read. */
+async function loadConversationExternalID(
+    session: MJAIAgentSessionEntity,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<string | null> {
+    if (!session.ConversationID) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    try {
+        const conversation = await provider.GetEntityObject<MJConversationEntity>(CONVERSATION_ENTITY, contextUser);
+        if (!(await conversation.Load(session.ConversationID))) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        return conversation.ExternalID ?? null;
+    } catch (error) {
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        LogError(`LoadSessionForAccess: could not read conversation ${session.ConversationID} of session ${session.ID}: ${message}`);
+        return null;
+    }
+}

package/src/realtimeSessions/sessionConfigStamps.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview What the session-start path stamps into a new realtime session's `Config` for identity
+ * verification: the policy snapshot, the unverified duration cap, and any verified identity carried
+ * forward from the session being resumed.
+ *
+ * Split in two so the decision is testable without a database:
+ *
+ * - {@link BuildMintConfigStamps} — **pure**. Given the resolved realtime config, the existing `Config`
+ *   and an optional inherited identity, returns the `Config` to write (or `null` when there is nothing
+ *   to stamp).
+ * - {@link LoadInheritedVerifiedIdentity} — the one read: the prior session's verified identity, only
+ *   when the new caller is authorized on that prior session.
+ *
+ * Everything stamped here lives under server-authoritative keys (`identityVerification`,
+ * `maxSessionDeadlineIso`); the caller writes it inside `RunWithTrustedSessionConfigWrites`.
+ *
+ * ## Resume after the cap
+ *
+ * If an unverified session hits its cap before the person verifies, the janitor closes it. A verify link
+ * redeemed afterwards still records the verification on that (closed) session, and a **new** session
+ * started with `lastSessionId` pointing at it inherits the verified identity (and, with it, the
+ * `verifiedMaxSeconds` cap instead of the unverified one). Inheritance requires the same ownership/scope
+ * authorization as any other access to the prior session, so a stranger cannot adopt someone else's
+ * verification by naming their session id.
+ *
+ * @module @memberjunction/server/realtimeSessions
+ */
+
+import type { IMetadataProvider, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { AuthorizeSessionAccess, LoadSessionForAccess } from './sessionAccess.js';
+import {
+    ExtractIdentityVerificationPolicyFromRealtimeConfig,
+    ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer,
+    TightenSessionDeadline,
+} from './verificationPolicy.js';
+import {
+    ParseConfigObject,
+    ReadIdentityVerificationState,
+    WriteIdentityVerificationState,
+    type IdentityVerificationState,
+    type VerifiedIdentity,
+} from './verificationCore.js';
+
+/** The `Config` to persist at session start. */
+export interface MintConfigStampPlan {
+    NextConfigRaw: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decides what to stamp into a freshly created session's `Config`.
+ *
+ * - **Policy snapshot.** The cascade's verification layer (`channels.config.IdentityVerification` plus the
+ *   duration caps) is copied onto the session, so the rules a person is held to are fixed at mint,
+ *   server-side, and cannot be chosen by the caller later.
+ * - **Duration cap.** When the cascade configures `unverifiedMaxSeconds` (or, for a session that inherited
+ *   a verified identity, `verifiedMaxSeconds`), the session's absolute deadline is set to now + cap —
+ *   applied to ANY principal, not only widget guests — and never loosens a tighter deadline already
+ *   stamped (the widget voice cap).
+ * - **Inherited identity.** A verified identity carried forward from the resumed session.
+ *
+ * @param args.EffectiveRealtime - `EffectiveConfig.realtime` of the resolved config (any shape; read defensively)
+ * @param args.ExistingConfigRaw - the session's current `Config`
+ * @param args.InheritedVerified - verified identity from the session being resumed, if any
+ * @param args.NowMs - the current time, epoch ms
+ * @returns the `Config` to write, or `null` when nothing needs stamping
+ */
+export function BuildMintConfigStamps(args: {
+    EffectiveRealtime: unknown;
+    ExistingConfigRaw: string | null;
+    InheritedVerified?: VerifiedIdentity;
+    NowMs: number;
+}): MintConfigStampPlan | null {
+    const layer = ExtractIdentityVerificationPolicyFromRealtimeConfig(args.EffectiveRealtime);
+    const hasPolicy = Object.keys(layer).length > 0;
+    if (!hasPolicy && !args.InheritedVerified) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const existingState = ReadIdentityVerificationState(args.ExistingConfigRaw, ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer);
+    const state: IdentityVerificationState = {
+        ...existingState,
+        ...(hasPolicy ? { Policy: layer } : {}),
+        ...(args.InheritedVerified ? { Verified: args.InheritedVerified } : {}),
+    };
+    const capSeconds = args.InheritedVerified ? (layer.verifiedMaxSeconds ?? layer.unverifiedMaxSeconds) : layer.unverifiedMaxSeconds;
+    const existingDeadline = ParseConfigObject(args.ExistingConfigRaw)['maxSessionDeadlineIso'];
+    const deadlineIso = capSeconds
+        ? TightenSessionDeadline(typeof existingDeadline === 'string' ? existingDeadline : undefined, args.NowMs + capSeconds * 1000)
+        : undefined;
+    return { NextConfigRaw: WriteIdentityVerificationState(args.ExistingConfigRaw, state, deadlineIso) };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The verified identity of the session being resumed, when the caller may inherit it.
+ *
+ * Reads the prior session as the caller and requires {@link AuthorizeSessionAccess} to allow it; any
+ * failure (no such session, not the caller's, unreadable) yields `undefined` — inheritance is a
+ * convenience and must never block a session start.
+ *
+ * @param lastSessionId - the `lastSessionId` the client supplied at start
+ * @param contextUser - the starting caller
+ * @param provider - request-scoped provider
+ */
+export async function LoadInheritedVerifiedIdentity(
+    lastSessionId: string | undefined,
+    contextUser: UserInfo,
+    provider: IMetadataProvider,
+): Promise<VerifiedIdentity | undefined> {
+    if (!lastSessionId) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const prior = await LoadSessionForAccess(lastSessionId, contextUser, provider);
+    if (!prior) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const decision = AuthorizeSessionAccess(
+        { SessionUserID: prior.Session.UserID, ConversationExternalID: prior.ConversationExternalID },
+        contextUser,
+    );
+    if (decision.Allowed === false) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return ReadIdentityVerificationState(prior.Session.Config_, ReadIdentityVerificationPolicyLayer).Verified;
+}